杰克·阿尔特曼谈产品市场契合度

你得对产品有个清晰的长远方向。

You've gotta have some North Star vision of your product.

盲目迎合每一个客户的需求显然是不对的。

It's obviously wrong to scramble to every single customer request.

完全无视客户反馈也不对。

It's also wrong to ignore it all.

其中一部分意见是好的。

Some of it's good.

另一部分则是不合适的。

Some of it's bad.

你急着找产品和市场的契合点，有人还在不断提要求，比如‘如果你能做这个，我就太喜欢了’。

You're both hungry to just, like, find product market fit, you have some people who are asking you still, oh, if you could do this, I'd really like that.

你得学会相信自己的判断，决定哪些地方要忽略。

And you kinda have to just, like, trust yourself to say, I'm gonna ignore that.

有时候，答案其实很明显。

Sometimes it's clear.

有时候你能分辨对错，但大多数时候，这些决定都很难做。

Sometimes you know it's right or wrong, but I think most of the time, those calls are hard.

初创公司最常见的建议之一就是倾听客户。

One of the most common pieces of start up advice is listen to your customers.

但如果客户提的需求是错的，该怎么办？

But what happens when customers ask for the wrong thing?

创始人总是在各种力量之间权衡取舍。

Founders are constantly balancing competitive forces.

坚定信念 versus 客户反馈，专注核心 versus 抓住机会，短期收入 versus 长期愿景。

Conviction versus feedback, focus versus opportunity, and short term revenue versus long term vision.

杰克·阿尔特曼花了多年时间应对这些权衡，先是作为Lattice的联合创始人兼CEO，现在则通过Alt Capital担任投资人。

Jack Altman has spent years navigating those trade offs, first as the cofounder and CEO of Lattice, and now as an investor through Alt Capital.

在这次快速对话中，杰克分享了关于产品市场契合、客户反馈、招聘、融资，以及哪些公司能真正启动、哪些会停滞不前的宝贵经验。

In this speedrun conversation, Jack shares lessons on product market fit, customer feedback, hiring, fundraising, and what separates companies that find momentum from those that stall.

我们来聊聊杰克·阿尔特曼。

Let's talk about Jack Altman.

一开始在投资银行工作。

Started off investment banking.

后来你成了Teespring的早期员工。

Then you were an early startup employee at Teespring.

接着你创办了Lattice，一家独角兽公司。

Then you built Lattice, unicorn company.

然后你成立了一只基金，首期规模2.75亿美元。

Then you started a fund, $275,000,000 first fund.

三个孩子，还有一档特别火的播客。

Three kids, a really popular podcast.

是的。

Yeah.

接下来有什么打算？

What's next?

是打算推出能量饮料，还是准备去练综合格斗？

Energy drink, or are you going to start training for MMA fighting?

我不确定。

I don't know.

我可能就一直做速通了。

I might just come do Speedrun all the time.

聊聊你现在生活的这部分吧。

Talk about this part of your life that you're in now.

是什么让你充满热情？

What's lighting you up?

是什么让你干劲十足？

What's firing you up?

只是咖啡因吗？

Is it just caffeine?

咖啡因喝得不少。

It's a lot of caffeine.

小孩子占去了每一分钟。

The little kids take every minute.

他们六个三岁一个，所以这占了很大一部分。

They're six three in one, so that's a lot of it.

我现在特别喜欢投资，以前在做Lattice的时候也碰过一点，但说实话，那时候我一心扑在创业上，对投资完全提不起兴趣。

But I'm loving investing right now, and I did some of it while I was running Lattice but the truth is when I was building a company investing was totally uninteresting to me.

我只想专心搞自己的公司，每次见到其他创始人，我都说‘恭喜你’，但真没法让自己兴奋起来。

I just wanted to work on my company and like going and meeting another founder I was like I'm happy for you but I just can't get myself excited.

那时候我完全被困在隧道里，现在终于能跳出那种视野狭窄的状态，感觉特别好。

Like I'm just too in the tunnel and now I'm enjoying being not in tunnel vision.

我觉得人生一直是由不同阶段组成的，我向来接受这些变化，最近这两年，我特别享受投资这件事，也一直在做这个。

And so for me I feel like life has always been chapters and I just embrace the changes but at the moment I'm loving investing and that's what I've been doing the last two years now.

说到你的经历，我第一次见你的时候，你还在Teespring，担任业务发展副总裁。

And then in terms of your journey, so when I met you, you were at Teespring, and you were the VP of business development.

那时候你之前当过任何副总裁吗？

Had you been a VP of anything at that point?

没有。

No.

我从来没管过任何人。

I had never managed anybody.

我刚加入Teespring的时候，公司才十来个人，两年后就涨到了三百人左右，你也看到了，这速度可能太快了。

When I joined Teespring, it was like ten ten people or 12 people, and over two years, it became like 300 people as you saw, and that was probably too fast.

这种事情真的很难做，你知道的。

You know, there's like you know, it's hard to do.

我们待会儿再细聊，但眼下我觉得， startups 正处在有史以来最注重增长的阶段，至少我是这么觉得的，这倒也不是坏事，我们当时确实赶上了这股势头。

Obviously, we'll talk about this, but right now we're probably in the most momentum centric moment of startup building, at least I've ever seen, which isn't a bad thing, but we definitely had that.

所以，管理方面的所有东西，我都是在那段时间里边学出来的。

So no, I've learned everything about management in that period of time, I guess.

有意思的是，我在想，那段经历到底是什么让你下定决心：下次我要当创始人，我要坐上那个最核心的位置？

What's interesting is, I'm wondering, what was it about that experience that made you say, You know what?

你从那段经历里有没有留下什么伤疤，或者非得去面对和解决的问题？

Next time I'm going to be the founder, I'm going to be the one in the hot seat, know, where there's scars or anything you need to work through from that experience.

某种程度上，我一直在想杰夫·贝佐斯说的那个‘最小化遗憾’的思路——我知道我喜欢科技，也喜欢创业，如果我不趁早自己搞一个公司，我总觉得，这会是我人生里最大的遗憾，毕竟在科技行业里，当创始人才是最顶配的体验。

I think on some level, I had the Jeff Bezos regret minimization thing, which is I was like, I know I love tech, I know I love startups, and if I don't try to build my own company at some point, I'm like, that is, seemed to me at least, like the pinnacle startup experience out of all of the different seats in tech.

我当时就是这么想的。

That was kind of how I felt about it.

所以我心想，要是不亲自试试创办一家公司，我肯定会后悔一辈子。

And so I just was like, if I don't try my hand at building a company, I'll kind of always regret it.

那时候我正好到了人生中适合做这件事的年纪。

And I was at an age, an appointment in my life where it made sense to do it.

不过说到这种精神的源头，你家里是不是有创业传统？

But then just in terms of like the origins of this spirit, right, there's entrepreneurship in your family, right?

这看起来像是你们家根深蒂固的价值观。

This seems to be it just seems to be kind of a core value.

你小时候有没有做过类似卖糖果的小生意？我是说，这种念头是从什么时候开始的？

Did you have some, you know, elementary school candy business like I did, or, you know, when when did it start?

完全没有。

Not at all.

我的意思是，我们小时候住在圣路易斯。

I mean, look, we grew up in St.

我们小时候在密苏里州的圣路易斯长大，那时候根本谈不上对科技或者未来职业发展的重视，至少在我记忆里是这样。

Louis, Missouri, and it was not like, there was no sort of focus on tech or even like professionalism in general like for the future I would say, you know, like embedded in our childhood.

不是说这有什么不好，相反，我觉得这挺好的。

Not in a negative way, think in like a positive way.

那时候就是一心一意当个孩子，这是我最真实的回忆。

Was just like focused on being a kid is really how I remember it.

直到我来到这里，后来在一家YC的公司工作，当你在一家小公司里，我相信在座的各位，你们的第十二个员工里，大概很多人都有朝一日想创业。

And it wasn't till coming out here, but I think once I worked at a YC company, and you're at a small company, I'm sure for all of you, hopefully most of your twelfth employees will want to start startups one day.

如果你的团队里有那种当过创始人、想当创始人、或者有潜力当创始人的员工，我觉得这特别棒。

I think that's a really good thing if you have the types of employees that have been founders or want to be founders or could be founders.

我觉得，一旦你在一个这样的公司待过，你就会想：我也试试看能不能做到。

So I think some of it too is once you work at a company that's like that, you're like, I want to see if I can do it.

你会觉得：这事儿我也能行。

You're like, I could do that.

也许吧。

Maybe.

也许我也可以做到。

Maybe I could do it.

关于Lattice的创意，你能说说你是怎么想到的吗？你们有多少人听说过Lattice？

And then in terms of the idea for Lattice, can you kind of talk about how you came how many of you have heard of Lattice?

不错啊。

That's pretty good.

Lattice真是个了不起的成功案例。

Lattice is a phenomenal success story.

你们是不是融了大约三亿美元？

I think you guys, what, raised around $300,000,000?

三千亿美元。

300,000,000,000.

是的。

Yeah.

不是。

No.

三十亿美元。

300,000,000.

不是。

No.

是三百亿美元。

It was 3,000,000,000.

但确实是三百亿美元。

But it was 3,000,000,000.

估值三百亿美元。

Billion dollar valuation.

对。

Yeah.

三百亿美元。

300,000,000,000.

就按这个说吧。

We'll go with that.

你知道吗，你五年内就做到了独角兽公司。

You know, you got to unicorn status in five years.

听起来好像特别简单。

It all sounds very easy.

你刚开始干这件事的时候，对这个想法到底有多大的把握？

You know, how sure were you about that idea when you set off on the adventure?

我知道确实存在一个问题，但没想到这其实是我们的第三次转型了。

I knew there was a problem, but I didn't know it was actually like our third pivot.

我们清楚问题所在——初创公司里人员管理是个大难题，员工之间的协作、反馈和薪酬这些模糊的人力资源问题层出不穷，但我们找的解决方案并不对。

So it was we had the problem right, which was that like people management was a problem at start ups and that there was coordination issue between employees and feedback and compensation, all these like murky HR people issues, but we didn't have the right solution.

我们看准了问题，只是解决方案错了。

So we knew the prob we got the problem right, we had the wrong solution.

你用什么标准来判断什么时候该转型？

What was sort of the rubric you used to say, okay, pivot time?

这不总是成立，但我后来逐渐明白，不管是初期找产品市场契合点，还是Lattice后来推出多个产品，都是如此。

This is not always true, but this was something I came to believe both with getting initial product market fit and then Lattice was also a company that launched many products.

这些年，我们有四条产品线都实现了可观的收入。

We had four product lines at substantial revenue over the years.

所以我逐渐意识到，大多数时候，只要东西能成，往往都是很快就能看到效果的，我现在还是这么认为。

So I came to the view that most of the time when stuff works it works fast and I still believe that.

现在我做投资，也基本还是坚持这个看法。

And now with my investing I still mostly think that.

这当然不是绝对的铁律，有些情况确实需要时间，比如产品还没完全契合市场，可能再加几个功能、打磨一下细节就能成。但总体来看，如果用户真想要你卖的东西，通常都会很快有反应——可我们那时候就是没这种势头。

And that's not like a hard and fast rule, there are things that take time, are situations where you don't quite have product market fit and it is actually right on the other side of like a few more features or a little bit more sanding of the edges but directionally speaking when people want what you're selling you know kind of quickly I think And we just weren't getting the pull.

总感觉再加一个功能就行，再加一个功能就行，可怎么就是差那么一口气。

And so it always seemed like one more feature, one more feature, and it was just never there.

第三次尝试的时候，其实一堆东西都乱七八糟的，但我们还是把产品推了出去。

And then on a third attempt, was like all this stuff was broken and we sold it anyway.

我记得一开始，你在销售上特别亲力亲为。

And at the beginning, you were really hands on in sales, as I remember.

公司发展到多大规模，你才慢慢开始放手不再亲自做销售？

How big how big did you did the company get before you started to kinda step away from that?

抽身？

Step away?

大概有一千万美元的年经常性收入吧。

Probably, like, 10,000,000 of ARR.

但我根本算不上顶尖销售，哪怕收入到两百万美元时也不是。

But I wasn't like, I was not the best sales rep even by like 2,000,000 of ARR.

我一开始做销售，只是为了看看能不能把生意做起来。

And I didn't do sales for the I mean, I did sales at first to see, you know, to try to have a business at all.

不过我觉得，哪怕公司已经有了能干的销售团队，创始人亲自参与销售依然很有价值，因为销售是最直接发现产品市场契合点的方式。

But then at some point, the reason I think it's good for founders to do sales, even when you have a sales team that can be productive, is I think sales is the best way to find product market fit.

即使在早期收入阶段，我也认为，亲自跟客户对话的人——不管是销售还是客户成功——往往能看得更清楚。

And even when you're in early revenue, I still think that the person who's doing the sales conversations or the customer success conversations just as good if not better.

只有亲身参与这些对话，才能真正明白哪些地方打动不了客户，哪些地方能让客户眼前一亮。

I think being in those rooms is like the best way still to know exactly what's not resonating, what lights customers up.

所以我一直不想脱离这个环节。

And so I just didn't wanna get away from that.

说实话，直到公司营收做到一亿，我还时不时亲自去谈客户，就是想看看哪些环节最让人头疼。

And the truth is, you know, till the end, at a 100,000,000 revenue, I was still selling customers periodically just because I was like, I just wanna see what feels hard.

那你得经常纠结吧？比如大客户非要某个功能，或者觉得他们急需某个我们目前还没做的东西，这就会把我们的精力从既定路线图上拽开。

And how often did you have to sort of wrestle with this potentially large customer wants this one thing or they think they need this one thing that we don't currently have and it kind of pull us away from our roadmap.

到底做不做？

Do we do it?

还是不做？

Do we not do it?

每天

Every

是的。

day.

就像，一直不停地做。

Like, constantly.

你是怎么应对的？

And how did you manage that?

有些是好的，有些是坏的。

Well, some of it's good, some of it's bad.

问题就在于，有些需求明显不该盲目跟进，每个客户提什么就做什么，这根本行不通。

And that's the issue with it is like some of it is like it is wrong to it's obviously like it's obviously wrong to scramble to every single customer request.

这明显行不通。

There's plainly that won't work.

但完全无视也不对，别自以为是地说：‘我知道得最清楚’。

It's also wrong to ignore it all and just be like, no I know best.

别跟客户说：‘我做的东西完美无缺，你的想法根本不对。’

Like let me tell you why the thing I'm building is perfect and why your idea is wrong.

所以这其实是个来回权衡的过程，得跟客户一起摸索——你得有个清晰的产品方向，但客户确实能帮你填补细节，告诉你在这个框架里，哪些地方该加点什么颜色。

And so some of it is like a judgment back and forth dance with customers to figure out you've gotta have some north star vision of your product but then I do think customers are good at helping fill in the gaps of like within this outline, like what's the color in the blanks.

所以我觉得，你真得认真听。

So I think you actually have to listen to it.

最难处理的情况之一，就是有个大客户跑来，说：‘你们要是做这个功能，我们每年给你们四十万美元’，而这个功能，其他客户压根没提过。

One of the trickiest things is when you get like a big customer, like some big enterprise comes along and they're like, hey, we'll give you $400,000 a year if you do this thing that zero other customers have asked you for.

你现在年经常性收入是二十二万美元。

And right now you're at 220,000 of ARR.

你心想，要是我花一个月时间改一改，收入是不是能翻三倍？

And you're like, oh, I could triple if I just derail myself for like a month?

这确实挺诱人的。

It's like kinda tempting.

通常来说，这种决定都很难做。

And usually, you know, usually that's a hard call.

有时候答案很明显，对错一目了然，但大多数时候，这种选择都特别纠结。

Sometimes it's clear, sometimes you know it's right or wrong, but I think most of the time those calls are hard.

但从来就不是只花一个月，也从来不是他们最后的要求。

But it's never a month and it's never their last ask.

是的。

Yeah.

你可能听过一些故事，比如Stripe早期有几家大客户，像Shopify和Lyft，他们推动产品朝着某些方向发展，结果反而帮了其他很多客户。

And you know, you'll hear stories about like at a company like Stripe for example, they had a couple early really big customers, I think like Shopify and Lyft, who pushed their product road map in directions that turned out to be really helpful for a lot of other customers.

所以这就是为什么这事没那么简单，我觉得没法简单地说哪个对、哪个错。

And so this is why it's not it's not straightforward and I don't think you can apply like a this is correct or this is incorrect thing to it.

你得认真想一想，比如听听Shopify的需求，我们从这些要求里能得到哪些其他客户还没提、但对很多大客户很有帮助的功能？

I think you really have to like think about it and see like if we listen to you know Shopify, are we gonna get a lot of features out of these requests that other people aren't currently asking for, but that will help a lot of other large customers or whatever else?

你们刚开始拓展销售团队的时候，是招了有经验的老销售，还是招了刚毕业、跟当年的你差不多的年轻人？

And then when you were first kind of ramping up in sales, did you hire seasoned sales folks, or did you hire kind of you but a couple years younger right out of school?

你们当时是怎么考虑的？

How did you think about it?

我们早期做得比较成功的是，找了那些很有创意、有创业精神的销售。

What we had good luck with early was we needed sales reps who were pretty creative and entrepreneurial.

我们试过几个来自大公司的销售，但效果并不好。

We tried a couple out of huge org sales reps and that just like worked less well for us.

他们总想要一套标准流程。

They like wanted a playbook.

他们想直接套用现成的方法，可那时候我们的产品还没成熟，他们得自己琢磨怎么创新、怎么建立流程。

They wanted to just like throughput this thing that like wasn't ready yet and they like had to figure out how to be creative and like figure out a process.

因为刚开始的时候，你既要摸索出一套销售流程，又要忙着把东西卖出去。

Because like the beginning you're trying to figure out a sales process as much as you're just trying to like sell stuff.

那你们当时的销售目标，比现有的能力超前了多少？

And and how far ahead of of your current capabilities were you selling?

你懂的。

You know?

作为CEO，你总是得稍微超前一点去推销愿景。

You're you're always sort of as this as the CEO, you're always selling a little bit ahead.

你们目前做到什么阶段了

How far

呀？

are you?

我那时候要提前六个月就开始做销售铺垫工作。

I was selling, like, six months ahead.

太厉害了。

Wow.

我的联合创始人经常会对我发火。

And my co founder would get really mad at me.

但后来他渐渐接受了，觉得这其实挺有帮助的。

But then at some point he was like kind of accepted that it was useful.

我会跟销售团队说，别提前承诺太多，可我自己却在这么做。

I would say the sales team was trying to, I was trying to tell them not to sell ahead even though I was doing it.

因为我觉得，对客户来说，如果卖的是你还没实现的东西，对品牌和信誉的伤害其实特别大。

Because like I actually think that like by and large with customers if you are selling things you don't have, I actually think that's really expensive to your brand and reputation.

所以我并不想普遍这么干。

So I didn't wanna do that like, broadly.

毕竟人与人之间会传话，最好的推荐都来自现有客户。

Like, people talk, the best referrals are ones from existing customers.

所以我觉得，客户得真喜欢你的产品，而且得到的确实跟他们预期的一样，这很重要。

And so, like, I actually think it's important that customers, like like your product and get what they thought they were getting and all of that.

但另一方面，我也发现，说一句‘我们正在考虑做这件事’，其实挺有用的。

But at the same time, speaking out the other side of their mouth, I did find it helpful to say, you know, we're thinking about doing this thing.

我们还没推出，但要是有了，你有兴趣吗？

We don't have it yet, but if we do, would you be interested?

作为创始人，你能感觉到，要是有了这个功能，我们的机会会不会扩大一点，甚至很大？

And that you can kind of feel as a founder, you know, will my aperture open a little bit or a lot if we had this thing?

这其实能帮你更好地规划产品路线。

And that can kind guide your product roadmap.

所以我觉得，一定程度上这样做确实很重要。

So I do think some amount of that's important.

当你开始扩张时，挑战就不只是销售了，还得让客户真正用起来。

And then as you as you start to scale, then it shifts from not just the challenge of selling, but actually getting folks implemented in live.

如果重来一次，你会怎么看待实施这一块？

Were there any kind of any if I could do it all over again, how would I think about implementation?

是的，没错。

Oh, yeah.

第一个产品没找到合适的市场定位，就是那个目标管理工具，OKR系统。

On the first product that didn't have good product market fit, which was this, like, goal management tool, OKR management.

你还记得这个吗？

You remember from this?

我记得。

I remember.

我们把这款产品做得特别复杂，功能多得离谱，结果大家根本没那么想要。

And it's like we built the shit out of this product, like way too many features, like and then people just like didn't want it that bad.

后来做绩效评估的时候，我们只做了部分功能，然后就跟客户说：这是未来的样子。

And then on performance reviews, we built like some of it, and then we were just like, here's designs of what it's going look like.

你得相信我们，我们肯定能把它做出来。

You should trust us that we're going be able to build it.

客户就说：太好了，我们愿意先付钱。

People were like, great, we'll pay you for it.

但我记得，我们第一批付费客户买绩效评估功能的时候，系统根本还没法完成评估闭环，也没法做后续跟进。

But I remember the very first annual paying customers we had for performance reviews launch performance reviews without there yet being a completed way to close the performance review and do the follow-up work.

所以当第一个绩效评估上线时，我联合创始人还在赶着写代码，实现结束周期和发送反馈的功能。

And so as the first performance review was going live, my co founder is like programming the ability to end the cycle and share feedback and stuff.

就像他们刚坐上过山车，但还没到终点。

Like they were like on the beginning of the roller coaster that didn't yet have the end.

我觉得这样挺好。

And so like and I'm like that's good.

结果还真行得通。

And it worked.

你知道的，他累坏了，但还是把事情办成了，也没问题。

And like you know, he was tired and he got it done and it's fine.

明白吗？

Know?

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

但我认为，比起非要等到一切都完美再开始，这种做法更适合初创公司早期的艰难阶段。

But I think that's a better way to approach the early crunchy days of a startup than, like, trying to make everything absolutely perfect.

其实就是，那种氛围通常不太对。

It's just, like, it's not the right energy usually.

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，很多时候你根本就是在做错的东西。

I mean, I think that's that often you just build the wrong thing.

对。

Yeah.

你确实得经历这么一遭。

You sort of have to Yeah.

没办法，只能走一遍。

Have to go through it.

就说打车这个事吧，我们可以聊聊哪些东西没变，哪些变了——我2015年起步，现在都2026年了，显然变化挺大的。

One cab I mean, we could talk about things that are, like, the same and different from, you know, I started a lesson in 2015, now it's 2026, like a lot has obviously changed.

我觉得有一件事确实变了，就是产品品质的标准整体提高了很多。

I do think one thing that has changed is the like standards of product quality have just gone up a lot.

我记得那时候在想，我们大概是在2016年底上线了绩效评估系统，但回想起2010年那些公司，他们的产品其实挺烂的，就一个云平台的垃圾玩意儿，结果居然火了。

And you know I remember thinking this and I guess we got the performance reviews things live like end of twenty sixteen but I remember talking about like oh man these companies from 2010 that just like got this like piece of junk live but it was cloud based and they just ripped.

他们运气也太好了吧？

Like how lucky were they?

那些产品差成那样，现在我们的产品得做到多好才行啊。

Because those products were awful and look how much better ours have to be.

现在我看一些A轮公司、年收入三百万的产品，简直惊了，比我们当年精致太多了。

Now I see like a product of a series A company with like 3,000,000 of ARR and I'm like woah that is a much more polished product than we had.

所以我觉得，这条建议可能得根据现在的情况调整一下，毕竟客户对产品品质的要求确实高了不少。

So I do think that like I don't know if this is a, I think this advice maybe should be a little bit adjusted for the time because I do think standards from customers are a little bit higher on what product quality should look like.

所以我对这一点没那么有把握了。

So I'm less confident on this.

你提到你的联合创始人，就是埃里克·科兹洛夫的搭档，人特别棒，你们俩的合伙关系也非常成功。

So you mentioned your cofounder, which Eric Kozlov's cofounder, really great human being, and you guys had a very successful cofounder relationship.

很多初创公司都卡在合伙关系这关上。

Lots of startups really struggle with that.

你有没有发现过哪些做法有效、哪些无效的规律？

Do you have any kind of pattern recognition on what works and what doesn't work?

这两方面都有一点运气成分。

There was some luck in both.

我们以前在Teespring就是朋友兼同事，彼此之间早就建立了很深的信任。

I mean, we were we were friends and colleagues from Teespring, and so there was, like, a lot of trust there.

但说实话，刚起步的时候，我们根本没想到会这么亲密。

But, like, I don't think we knew when we got started how close we would be.

所以这方面也确实有运气的成分。

So there was some luck involved there.

但要是换了另一个合伙人，我们俩可能早就在找到产品市场契合点之前就放弃了。

But to highlight what it I think with a different cofounder for both of us, would have quit before we had found product market fit.

那时候心里总想着，这是我特别在乎的人，他都愿意跟我一起拼，我怎么能轻易放弃呢？

And there was this sense of like, oh I asked this person I really care about to take to sleep and so we gotta keep pushing and not give up just yet.

所以这里面有太多关心和信任，我觉得正是这些帮我们熬过了最难的那段日子。

So there was a lot of care and trust in there which I think that just helps you get through tough times.

我觉得另一点特别有帮助的是，我们之间有很强的专业信任。

I think the other thing that was really useful was there was a high degree of, like, professional trust.

我觉得他在他擅长的领域确实很厉害。

Like, I thought he was good at what he was good at.

他也觉得我在我的专长上做得不错。

He thought I was good at what I was good at.

因此，我们在各自负责的领域都很清楚，很少互相猜疑。

And as a result, we, like, had clarity in, like, domains, and there wasn't a lot of second guessing each other.

我们也不会去干涉对方的工作。

There wasn't a lot of like getting in the way of each other's stuff.

很少出现两个人挤在一台电脑前，盯着同一个问题一起琢磨的情况。

There wasn't a lot of like both looking over the computer at the same issue trying to solve it together.

所以我们更多是分工合作，彼此信任对方的能力。

So there was like a high degree of divide and conquer and trust the other person.

这些都特别好。

So those were really good.

你们有没有一些固定的惯例，觉得对长期合作有帮助？

And did you guys have any sort of rituals that you think supported the partnership over time?

我们确实是朋友兼联合创始人。

We were definitely cofounders who were friends.

我们并不是单纯因为关系好才一起创业的。

It wasn't like we were just like best friends doing a company together.

我们的关系基础绝对是工作上的。

Like our relationship was rooted in work for sure.

但因为我们平时在外面也花很多时间待在一起，工作时自然就形成了很多默契。

But like the the fact that we spent so much time together outside of work too I think led to a lot of shorthand at work.

我觉得关键就是两人相处的时间实在太长了。

So I think it was just a large amount of time together.

在私人关系上，我们也都能放得开，小事不较真，从不人身攻击，彼此说话也从不藏着掖着。

I also think there was a degree in a personal relationship too of we both let little stuff go, stuff never got ad hominem, we didn't hold back from telling each other the truth.

我们会在所有人面前大声争吵，从不避讳，但争的永远是事情本身，从不针对对方个人。

We would get into loud arguments in front of everybody, not hiding anything, but it was always over, like, the ideas at hand, never, like, attacks at each other.

所以那是一种高度信任的关系，但也伴随着很多争论。

So it was, like, a high it was, like, a high trust relationship, but that included, like, a lot of arguing.

创造东西本来就不容易，摩擦是难免的。

Creating something is hard, and so there's gonna be friction.

听起来你们俩其实是默认了这一点。

And so I think it sounds like you guys kind of said, okay.

我们现在有分歧了。

We are having a disagreement right now.

对。

Yeah.

我们吵架就像兄弟姐妹之间那样，你知道的——你说了个想法，我觉得差了二十度，但要是关系没那么近，我才懒得跟你争。

And we would, like, kind of, like, bicker in, a sibling you know, it's like it wasn't like if you said x and I thought 20 degrees different from what you said, but I didn't have that close a relationship.

要是关系没那么近，我才不想跟你吵。

I didn't feel like fighting with you.

我就觉得，行吧。

I was just like, yeah.

当然。

Sure.

但情况不是那样的。

But it wasn't like that.

我当时就想，不行。

I was like, no.

其实我觉得有点不一样。

Actually, I think it's a little bit different.

你明白吗？

You know?

我觉得这一点真的很重要。

And I think I think that actually mattered.

回头看，YC项目里哪些关键点对你们帮助最大？

In hindsight, what were the sort of what were the big leverage points that you got out of the YC program?

我觉得有两点让我印象特别深。

I think there's like two things that stuck out to me.

一个是搞清楚了什么才是真正重要的事。

One was the clarity of what actually matters.

我觉得像Speedrun、YC这样的项目特别擅长帮人真正内化这些道理，因为光看博客和推特上那些内容是不够的，你得反复体会才能明白，真正关键的就两件事：找到产品市场契合点，组建一支优秀的团队。

Like, I do think programs like Speedrun, like YC are very good at helping people really just internal because it takes it takes some repetition to internalize these things that we've all seen in blog posts and we've all like seen on Twitter that like the only things that matter are like getting product market fit and building a great team.

而要实现产品市场契合，唯一的方法就是跟用户交流、不断打磨产品。

And only things that get product market fit are talking to users and building product.

但当你在运营一家初创公司初期的时候，总觉得有太多其他事情都好像很重要。

And like, it feels like there's so many other things that are important when you're running a very early stage startup.

这些事确实看起来重要，但其实都不关键，关键就是得反复提醒自己。

And they kind of are, but they basically aren't in just requires repetition.

所以我觉得，YC的一大作用就是早早地帮你确立了这种思维DNA：哪些事要紧，哪些事可以忽略。

And so I think that was one thing was like setting the DNA early of like the clarity of this matters, this doesn't matter.

那有没有哪些 advice 其实是干扰项？

And then was there anything that was just kind of noise?

在任何项目里，你都会听到各种建议，可能有例外，但一般来说，只要有人给你提建议，我就得说一句：我对自己说的这些话，其实也没百分百把握。

The advice that you're gonna get in any program, maybe this maybe there's an exception here, but generally speaking, any anytime anybody's trying to give advice this is why I'm, like, trying to say, like, nothing I'm saying I'm totally confident about.

但任何给一群公司提供的建议，都是尽量照顾到大多数情况。

But, like, any advice that you get that's given to a group of companies is doing its best to fit to the highest number possible.

但没有任何建议能适用于100%的公司。

But there's no advice that's right for 100% of companies.

所以你最终听到的，其实是一堆在80%情况下都有效的建议。

And so what you end up getting is a bunch of advice that probably is actually right 80% of the time.

但如果给了你十条建议， statistically 来说，总有两条可能根本不适合你。

But like if there's 10 pieces of advice given, two out of those 10 aren't gonna be right for you, just statistically or whatever.

所以我觉得，如果你把所有建议都当金科玉律，那肯定有一条会害了你。

So I do think that if you listen to it all as dogma, gonna something's gonna be wrong for sure.

回想一下你招前几个员工的时候，他们都是从哪儿来的？你是怎么说服他们加入的？

When you think back to hiring those first few employees, sort of, you know, where did they come from, and and how do you how did you sort of convince them to join?

有两点是确实成立的。

Two things are true.

第一，要想成为一家出色的公司，你的前十个员工里，必须有很高比例是真正优秀的人。

One is in order to be a great company, you need a high percentage of your first 10 employees to be, like, truly great.

几乎没有哪家伟大的公司是例外的。

There's almost no examples of great companies where that didn't happen.

所以这就是你现在要面对的任务。

And so that's the task at hand.

你还得现实一点，一个明显很优秀的人，不太可能当初创公司的第六个员工。

And you also have to sort of take the pragmatic view that an obviously great employee, it doesn't make that much sense for them to be the sixth employee at a start up.

原因很简单：如果他真的那么出色，他早去Frontier Lab、SpaceX这类地方拿上亿美金了，或者去一家热门的D轮公司当高管，又或者自己创业了。

The reason it doesn't make that much sense is if they are that obviously great, they're gonna go get 10 gazillion dollars from a Frontier Lab or SpaceX or whatever, or they're gonna get an exec job at some super hot series d company, or they're gonna be a founder.

所以你真正要找的是那些其实很优秀、但还没被大众认可的潜力股。

And so what you're really looking for is diamonds in the rough of people who are in fact great but are not legibly great to the entire world.

这是唯一的办法。

It's the only way.

这又是一条有八成把握的建议。

So this is like a piece, again this is 80% confidence advice.

还有很多其他的例子。

There are tons of other examples.

有很多情况是，有人坐在这儿说：‘我这已经是第三家公司了。’

There's a lot of situations where somebody will be sitting here and they're like, oh I built, this is my third company.

我前两家公司都是独角兽。

My last two were unicorns.

我有一群特别棒的人，愿意跟我走到天涯海角。

I have all these amazing people who would follow me to the ends of the earth.

但这事儿真不适合你。

Like, this isn't for you.

但总的来说，前十个员工的目标就是发掘那些还没被发现的潜力股，这一点必须牢记在心。

But generally speaking, the goal of the first 10 employees is diamonds in the rough, and that has to be the mindset.

那你在小团队里怎么做好新人融入呢？你是怎么给这前十个员工定调的？

And then when you think about onboarding on a small team, so how did you how did you sort of set the tone for that that first 10 people?

我们没搞什么正式的入职培训，因为十个人的时候，根本不需要花一两个小时专门培训，大家整天都在一个房间里。

We didn't do a heavy onboard because when you're 10 people, it's just like you could do the hour or two hours a day of onboarding, but you're just all together in a room all the time.

所以根本不用入职培训，一切都很自然，很快就能融入。

So it was like no onboarding needed because it's just so quick and so organic.

不过呢，我们确实做了很多有趣的事。

That said, we did like really fun stuff.

那时候我们才七个人，就一起去尼加拉瓜待了一周，住在一起，整天泡在Airbnb里，那段时间真的让团队特别有凝聚力。

Like when we were seven people, we went to Nicaragua for like a week and we just like hung out in an Airbnb altogether and that was like super gelling for the team.

我们还经常搞一些办公室外的稀奇古怪的活动。

We did like all sorts of like random stuff outside the office.

而且我们所有人整天都在一起，做同样的事，关心同一个问题。

We were also just all together all the time working on the same thing, caring about the same problem.

对一家SaaS公司来说，大家其实特别有使命感，都很在意我们做的事，我觉得这特别重要。

People actually like for a SaaS company like it was pretty mission oriented, so people cared about what we were doing, which I think is, like, really helpful.

说到找合适的投资人，你回想一下，整个过程中有哪些事让你印象特别深？

When you think about the the hunt for the right investor, you know, what what stands out in in your mind from your processes that you've gone through?

投资人能提供的帮助差别可大了，从完全帮不上忙到有点帮助，啥都有。

There are you'll get a range from how helpful investors are from founders to, like, from zero to medium.

有些人觉得根本无所谓，只要你能拿到最多的钱、最好的条款，还别想控制公司就行。

And some will say it just truly doesn't matter so all you want is like the most money at the best possible terms and the least control imaginable.

有些人会说，你其实是在找一个合伙人，所以得慢慢来，认真挑选。

There are some that'll tell you you're actually like hiring a partner basically and so you should take your time and do it.

这完全看个人偏好。

That's a personal taste thing.

我认识一些特别出色的创始人，他们对这两种方式都能说得通。

I know some like really great founders who would kind of describe it to you either way.

就我个人而言，我喜欢自己投资的伙伴，所以我希望建立一种关系。

Speaking personally, I liked liking my investors and so I wanted to have a relationship.

所以我花了不少时间去了解他们，背景调查特别重要，诸如此类的都挺关键。

So I did spend time like getting to them a little bit and references were super important and all of that.

不过我想分享几点关于融资的总体看法：你们现在可能正处在最理想的融资环境中。

But a few just like general thoughts on fundraising is you guys are probably in like the best fundraising market imaginable.

这真的是个特别好的时机，你们站在了有利的一边。

Like it's just like a very very good time so you're on like the right side of things.

我觉得现在整个市场特别依赖势头，我不是说这有什么不好，只是说我们都看得见，AI公司正以惊人的速度成长，整个市场已经全面转向这个方向了。

I think things are very momentum driven right now and again I don't mean that in a bad way, just mean that like you know we all see this that like AI companies are growing at these insane rates and so the whole market has really rotated in that direction.

所以当你介绍自己的公司时，很多投资人都特别关注：这个项目到底凭什么能起飞？你有没有清晰的后续规划，或者能拿得出手的数据支撑？

So as you think about talking about your companies, a lot of investors are very geared towards what's the story of how this is going to take off and whether you have a go forward rationale for that or some data you can point to.

在很多方面，确实都是由这个因素主导的。

I think it seems highly driven by that in a lot of ways.

我觉得像这样的加速器给你的融资建议，基本都特别靠谱。

I think the advice you get from accelerators like this about how to run a fundraiser are mostly extremely correct.

我建议你完全听他们的，就是说——

And I would basically just fully listen to them, which is like

不好意思，你能再说一遍吗？

I'm sorry, could you say that again?

如果非要说一条最重要的，那就是融资建议真的非常到位，我猜他们的建议大概是：广泛接触潜在投资人，压缩时间集中推进，反复练习你的陈述，及时跟进，全程保持简洁，这才是正确的融资方式。

If there's one thing, it is that the fundraising advice is very good, which I'm guessing that the fundraising advice is something along the lines of like talk to a wide funnel, do it all in a compressed timeline, practice what you're talking about, follow-up, keep the whole thing short, you know, that is the right way to raise the sea ground.

所以别去随便改动这套方法。

And so I wouldn't mess with the template on it.

我们还会补充一点：现阶段别急着融资，最好等我们再成熟一点。

We also would add, avoid raising, at this point, wait till we're Yeah.

摩根大通日之后。

Post MO day.

很多人会想让你早点融资，他们通常会说：我们对你做的事特别看好。

A lot of people will try to get you to, like, raise early, and the way they'll try to get you to raise is we're so excited about what you're doing.

来跟我们见个面吧。

Come meet us.

我们想多了解你。

We wanna get to know you.

我们希望你参与整个融资流程，推着你走一遍。

We wanna we want you to we're gonna make you run a process.

有人曾经跟我说过，我记得在Lattice的时候，他们打算投资另一个更有经验的创始人。

And, like, what you know, somebody gave me the you know, I was like, oh, I remember one time during Lattice, was like, oh, they're gonna invest in some, like, some other founder who's, like, more experienced.

我当时想，哦，不错。

Was like, oh, cool.

他们给你开了投资条款清单。

They gave you a term sheet.

我就说，不行。

I'm like, well, no.

但他们说，好吧。

But they like, okay.

如果你连条款书都没有，那他们根本没打算投，你就别再说这种话了。

Well, if you don't have a term sheet, they're they're not investing, so you should stop saying that.

优先认购权也是同样的道理——没有条款书，就谈不上什么优先认购。

And that's the same thing with, like, preemptions is, if you don't have a term sheet, you're not being preempted.

如果某个特别厉害的投资人来找你，说‘我愿意出X价格投Y’，你也很认可，那另当别论。

And so, like, if, you know, some if some amazing investor comes to you and says, I'll give you x at y, and you like that, that's one thing.

但如果有人想把你拖进一个流程，那我的标准是：团队告诉我流程正式启动了，才算数。

If someone's trying to drag you into a process, my process is in, you know, in the time that the team tells me it's in.

说到CEO这个角色，每个人的经历都不一样，我们常开玩笑说，第一要务是别把钱花光。

As you think about the role of CEO, and no two people experience it in exactly the same way, we we joke a lot, you know, job number one, don't run out of money.

那你平时是怎么给自己打分的？

But what was the sort of internal scorecard that you used on yourself?

你有没有类似杰克的那份评估表？

Like, did you have sort of Jack's report card?

你是怎么定期检视自己的表现的？

How did you how did you check-in with yourself?

总的来说，就是看公司是不是在正轨上。

Well, like, at a high level, it's just like, is the company going well?

不过在不同阶段，关注的重点也不一样。

And then, like, going into that at different times, it was different things.

一开始，最要紧的就是别把钱花光了。

Like, at first, it's don't run out of money is yeah.

我想这应该是梅索需求层次的最底层。

I guess that is the bottom of Meso's hierarchy.

梅索需求层次的下一步，是有没有产品市场契合度？

The next thing on Meso's hierarchy is do we have product market fit?

再下一步，是有没有一支出色的团队？

The next thing on Meso's hierarchy is do we have a great team?

你知道的。

You know?

然后你可以慢慢往上推，比如我们有没有足够的竞争优势？

And you can kind of work your way up through things of do we have good competitive differentiation?

我们有没有健全的流程之类的？

Do we have you know, good processes and all the rest of it?

但我觉得在早期阶段，除了别把钱花光之外，最重要的就是花时间搞清楚：我们到底有没有真正的产品市场契合度？

But I think at the earliest stages, aside from not running out of money, I just think the more time you are focused on do we have strong product market fit or do we not?

我们的产品是不是客户特别想要的？

Do we have a product that customers badly want?

他们用过之后，是不是还想继续用？

Once they get it, do they want to keep it?

他们愿不愿意从我们这儿再买更多？

Do they want to buy more of it from us?

我觉得在种子阶段，专注产品市场契合度才是核心中的核心。

I think like the purity of product market fit obsession at Seed is the whole thing.