AI原生CRM

但说实话，我们花了六个月时间，面对这样的客户，盯着他们看——

But it took us honestly six months of having customers like that, staring at them-

……才逐渐明白这一点。

... for that to emerge.

嗯，还有一点也会浮现出来，那就是如果你在打造一个更好的产品，并且有所有这些产品使用者，当然，但咱们先看看绿地市场和棕地市场的区别。

Well, one of the things that also emerges is if you're creating a better product and you have all of these people that are consumers of the product, of course, but let's just take the greenfield versus brownfield distinction.

你在绿地公司招聘的销售副总裁，已经习惯了并且接受过使用这个工具的培训。

The VP of sales that you hire at your greenfield company has been acclimated and trained to use this thing.

我记得我创办最早的一家公司时，非常坚决地不想每月付85美元给Salesforce，所以我用了这个叫SugarCRM的东西——

I actually remember when I started one of my first companies, I was so adamant about not paying $85 a month for Salesforce that I used this thing called SugarCRM-

……它是免费的。

... which was free.

最后，我放弃了。

And finally, I gave up.

我终于开始为Salesforce付费了。

I finally started paying for Salesforce.

为什么？

Why?

不是因为产品有什么缺陷或者别的，而是我雇了一个销售副总裁，他说：‘我才不用那个破玩意儿……’

Not because of product gaps or anything, but I hired this VP of sales, and he was like, "I'm not using that F-ing..."

我说：‘这个更简单，更好用。’

I was like, "It's easier, it's better."

但那也挺有挑战的。

But that was also challenging.

所以情况就是这样。

So it's also like this.

不是说新公司就一定要负责培训员工，但确实存在这个差距。

It's not like a new company needs to be in the business of training people per se, but there's also that gap.

关于绿地项目和棕地项目，有一点很少被人理解，那就是绿地项目的人会聘请棕地项目的副总裁，而这些副总裁实际上决定购买什么产品。

It's one of the things that is seldom understood about greenfield versus brownfield, is that the greenfield people hire brownfield VPs that actually make product... Or sorry, make purchasing decisions.

那你是怎么……

So how did you...

我坚信这绝对是个好得多的产品，但你怎么去克服那些人的反对意见呢？他们可能会说：“你知道吗？”

I feel adamantly this is a much, much, much better product, but how do you overcome some of the objections, if you will, from people who are like, "You know what?

“我就觉得用个不太好用的东西也挺好的。”

I'm just perfectly fine using something that doesn't work as well."

问得好。

It's a good question.

我们早期的设计原则之一就是，我们觉得自己很擅长说服创始人、工程负责人、产品负责人去用前沿技术来了解它的——

One of our design principles early on was that we figured we were going to be great at convincing the founder, the engineering leader, the product leader to use frontier tech to understand its-

……客户。

... customers.

但要说服那个新来的销售副总裁，可能得费不少劲——

But it was probably going to be a lot of work to convince that VP of sales that joins-

完全同意。

Totally

……这是正道。

... this is the way.

所以我们有个想法，对于所有销售主导的方案，我们就说：‘这个我们免费送给公司里的每个人。’

So we had this idea, for all of our sales-led plans, we're like, "We're going to give this thing away for free to anyone in the company."

第一，这能帮助Lightfield了解工程在做什么，客户支持在做什么，财务在做什么。

And one, it helps Lightfield to just understand what engineering's doing, what customer support's doing, what finance is doing.

另外，这能产生真正的公司网络效应，让替换我们变得更难。

The other thing is it'll create real company network effects that make it harder to rip and replace us.

所以我们在几家公司里看到，经验丰富的销售副总裁来了，他们说：‘这很酷，但我只会用——’

So we've been at a few companies now where the seasoned VP of sales comes in and they're like, "This is cool, but I only know how to use-

……Salesforce，因为我就是这么被培训的。’

... Salesforce because I've been trained that way."

而公司其他人会说：‘等等。’

And the rest of the company is like, "Well, hold on."

这就是工程师了解客户的方式。

This is how the engineers understand customers.

这就是财务做收入确认的方式。

This is how finance does revenue recognition.

这就是客户成功团队如何进行账户评分。

This is how customer success does account scoring.

你能再努力一点搞清楚这个吗？

Can you try harder to figure this out?

这样的话，我们就有了关系，我们介入，向他们展示我们将如何让他们的生活更轻松，这样我们就有机会了。

In which case, then we have the relationship, we jump in, we show them how we're going to make their lives easier, and we've got a fighting chance.

现在有很多不同的方式来完成那些过去只是表格的任务。

There's so many different ways to now do those tasks that were just a table in the past.

那么，你是想把那些表格交给人们，并试图让它非常拟物化，比如“这是你熟悉的CRM，而且它也是蓝色的”，等等等等？

And so do you want to try to give those tables to people and try to make it very skeuomorphic, like, "Here's the CRM that you're used to, and it's also blue," and blah, blah, blah?

还是说，“嘿，实际上，你现在可以用自然语言来做很多这样的事情。

Or is it, "Hey, actually, you can now use natural language to do a lot of this.

你其实不必看所有这些仪表盘。

You don't actually have to look at all these dashboards.

Lightfield会在事情发生时直接告诉你。”

Lightfield will just tell you when something happens."

你怎么看待这类产品上的取舍？

How do you think about those kind of product trade-offs?

我觉得很多系统记录类产品其实都在琢磨，怎么把人带到真正的未来，而这个未来现在已经来了。

Which I think a lot of systems of record are actually trying to figure out, how do we bring people to the real future, which is now here?

我觉得我们其实更偏向务实。

I think we've actually erred on the side of pragmatism here.

也就是说，现在我在公司里实际上就是销售经理。

Which is to say that right now, I'm the de facto sales manager at the company.

而且我现在开会还是用Lightfield的表格视图来管理所有会议。

And I still run all of our meetings from the spreadsheet view of Lightfield.

我觉得我们当时有个想法，如果我们真的想成为真正的企业级CRM，就不能太死板——

I think we had this view of if we really want to be a real enterprise CRM, we can't be religious-

……关于人们的工作方式。

... about the way people work.

所以我们在这方面下了功夫，我们有很棒的仪表盘，也有很棒的表格视图。

So we've leaned into, we have great dashboards, we have great table views.

如果你愿意的话，可以用那些功能。

You can use those things if you want.

然后如果你处于前沿，你可以做所有的事情。

And then if you're sort of at the frontier, you can do it all.

而且你想要命令行界面什么的。

And you want CLI or whatever.

对，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

你也可以那样做。

You could also do that.

完全同意。

Totally.

嗯，我发现……

Well, I find that...

有意思的是，我刚买了一辆新车。

So it's funny, I just bought a new car.

我之前开的是宝马，上面有九百万个按钮。

I came from a BMW, which had 9 million buttons.

你知道坐飞机的时候吧？

You know how if you go on an airplane, right?

就像你看驾驶舱，心想飞行员怎么知道——

It's like you look at the cockpit and it's like, how does the pilot know-

——那里有大概九千个开关。

... there were like 9,000 switches.

简直就是《阿波罗13号》里的场景。

It's straight out of "Apollo 13."

而且更酷的是，实际上更吓人。

And the really cool thing, it's actually even scarier.

不知道你知不知道这个。

I don't know if you know this.

最新的特斯拉，连换挡杆都没有了。

The newest Teslas, they don't even have a stalk to change gears.

一个都没有了。

There isn't one.

最实体的物理按钮完全消失了。

The most physical of physical buttons is just completely gone.

但实际上，它非常简单直观，五岁小孩都会用，希望五岁小孩——

But actually, it's so simple and so intuitive that a five-year-old can use it, and hopefully a five-year-old-

——不会开车。

... isn't driving a car.

但你明白我的意思。

But you get where I'm going.

这就像另一种思考有模式和无模式的方式，对吧？

It's like another way of thinking about schema versus schemaless, right?

就像如果你有所有这些旋钮和开关，那很好。

It's like if you have all these knobs and switches, it's great.

它非常先进。

It's so advanced.

副总裁——

The VP-

销售副总裁，或者说，如果你跟金融行业的人聊，他们对彭博终端上的所有按钮都了如指掌。

... of sales, part of... Or if you talk to finance people, they know all their buttons in Bloomberg.

但要想做出伟大的产品，一个关键方法就是让它直观到——

But one of the ways that you're able to build something great is just make it so intuitive-

连五岁小孩都会用。

... that even a five-year-old can do it.

Reddit 上有个专门的板块叫“Eli Five”，就是“解释得像五岁小孩也能懂”。

There's a whole category on Reddit called Eli Five, Explain Like I'm Five.

所以我觉得，这很酷，不过你是老板，你说了算，但感觉这就是你正在做的事，对吧？

So it feels like the cool thing, I don't know, you're the boss, not me, but it feels like that's what you have, right?

就像你经历了那个老时代，到处都是旋钮、开关和各种东西。

It's like you have this old era, which had lots of knobs and switches and everything else.

但话说回来，自然语言智能的好处之一就是你根本不需要那些东西。

But again, part of the benefit of plain language intelligence is that you don't need any of those things.

这几乎已经过时了。

It's almost rendered anachronistic.

确实如此。

This is true.

我觉得我们在不同方面都遇到了这个问题，对吧？

And I feel like we run into this in different ways, right?

也就是说，我们还没有赢得对抗传统仪表盘的战争。

Which is to say that we haven't won the war on deterministic dashboards.

我想每个人都希望早上喝咖啡时，

I think everyone wants to look-

看到同一个仪表盘。

... at the same dashboard every morning when they're drinking their coffee.

我也是。

Me too.

但它们都是——

But they're all-

希望是收入在涨。

Hopefully it's revenue going up.

它总是在涨。

It's always up.

但我觉得对于一些老的工作流程，我们已经彻底重新想象了它们。

But I think for some of these old workflows, we've completely reimagined them.

最经典的销售流程之一就是序列的概念，对吧？

One of the most classic sales workflows is the idea of a sequence, right?

就是你在不同的时间、不同的触发条件下，给可能对你的产品感兴趣的人发五封邮件。

Of you send out five emails at different times on different triggers to someone that might have expressed interest in your product.

以前你得用箭头来表达这些东西——

And you used to have to express these things with arrows-

还有条件和变量。

... and conditions and variables.

而在Lightfield里，我们会说：“不，你只需要和智能体聊天，智能体会为你写出一份方案。”

Whereas in Lightfield, we're like, "No, you just chat with the agent, and the agent writes out a recipe for you."

这个方案会考虑到你世界模型里的内容，然后自动执行下去。

The recipe takes into account what's in your world model, and it sort of runs with it.

一开始，有些销售主管会说：“我不信任这个东西。”

And at first, we had some sales leaders that were like, "I don't trust this thing."

“我需要我的旋钮。”

"I need my knobs.

“我需要我的开关。”

I need my switches."

但后来他们慢慢转变态度，觉得：“等等，这其实更高效，更好。”

But then they sort of come around to, "Wait a minute, this is actually efficient, better."

“而且我不用学那么多。”

"And I have to learn less."

我觉得我们在运营市场团队的各个方面都会遇到这种情况。

And I think we're running into this in every aspect of running a go-to market team.

现在当然有一股风潮，大家都觉得自己什么都能做，软件已死，什么事该自己做，什么事不该自己做？

There's, of course, this whole movement right now of everyone thinks they can build basically everything themselves, and software is dead, and what can I do myself versus not?

你怎么跟那些想自己搭建这些功能，或者正在尝试自己搭建这些功能的客户沟通？

How do you talk to customers that want to try to build elements of this, or are trying to build elements of this?

再多说说那个趋势，以及你们Lightfield是怎么应对的。

And just say a little bit more about that movement and how you're responding at Lightfield.

首先，我觉得作为记录系统，我们必须保持开放的心态。

First of all, I think just being a system of record, we have to be open-minded.

数据是你的，不是我们的。

It's your data, it's not ours.

我们告诉客户，我们为建模的准确性和对你们业务的精准理解感到非常自豪。

And we tell our customers that we take a lot of pride in the modeling and the accuracy of your business.

我们开发了自己的邮件同步功能。

We built our own email sync.

我们开发了自己的Slack同步功能。

We built our own Slack sync.

我们还开发了自己的——

We built our own-

……数据仓库同步。

... data warehouse sync.

而且我们为我们的数据库的高性能感到自豪。

And we are proud of how high performance our database is.

然后你可以把数据带到任何你想去的地方。

And then you can take that wherever you want.

所以我们确实有一些客户把Lightfield作为核心记录系统，然后他们试图在上面构建自己的工具。

So we've actually had a couple of customers that would use Lightfield as the core system of record, and then they'll try to build their own harness on top.

也许他们有自己的公司工具，对吧？

Maybe they've got a company harness, right?

我们对此表示支持。

And we're supportive of that.

你可以通过MCP或CLI把所有数据推送出去。

You can push it all through MCP or CLI.

但几周后，他们几乎总是会意识到，等等，你们的工具其实做了很多事情。

But after a few weeks, they almost always realize, wait a minute, your harness was actually doing quite a bit.

它的实体识别做得更好。

It had better entity recognition.

它的精确率和召回率也更高。

It had better precision and recall.

而且速度更快。

It was faster.

我们就说，'对，这就是我们的工作。'

And we're like, "Yeah, that's our job."

所以我觉得我们的态度是，数据是你的，你想怎么用就怎么用，我们会努力每天赢得你生产力的权利。

So I think our take is, it's your data, do what you want, and we're going to work hard to earn the right to your productivity every day.

你觉得，在这个话题上，定价现在是个很疯狂的问题，因为现在有按席位定价，但席位已经没有意义了。

Where do you think, on that topic, pricing is such a crazy question right now because there's seat-based pricing where the seats don't make sense anymore.

想象一下，幸好你用的是Lightfield而不是Zendesk，对吧？

Imagine running, thank God you run Lightfield and not Zendesk, right?

就像，他们是怎么样的，你需要多少个席位？

It's like, what are they like, how many seats do you need?

可能零个，对吧？

Maybe zero, right?

那挺吓人的。

That's pretty scary.

然后还有基于结果的定价，但结果是什么？

Then there's outcome-based pricing, but what is an outcome?

就像，我是在卖东西吗？

It's like, am I selling the thing?

如果我有一个永远满意的客户，我还在用CRM，所以结果有点难定义。

What if I just have a happy customer forever, I'm still using CRM for that, so outcomes are kind of tricky.

然后，与此相对，你有这种想法，我显然不同意，但人们说软件已死——

And then against all of that, you have this idea, which I don't agree with, obviously, but people like software is dead-

……整个SaaS末日论。

... the whole SaaSpocalypse.

你还会说，超市已死，你要自己种食物。

You're also going to, supermarkets are dead, you're going to grow your own food.

汽车制造商都完蛋了，你得自己焊接铝材了。

Car manufacturers are dead, you're going to weld your own aluminum.

你可以把这个想法推到极致，但我想，第一个问题是你怎么考虑定价的，或者你是怎么想出这个定价的？然后，在这个领域，你对基于结果的定价怎么看？

You could take this to the extreme, but I guess, where do you think about or how did you come up with pricing, maybe is question number one, and then what do you think about outcome-based pricing in this space?

因为不像支持服务那样，支持服务几乎说得通，就像它是一种成本，我能降低成本吗？

Because it's not as, like support almost makes sense where it's like it's a cost, can I bring down the cost?

当然，你可以用软件来回答问题。

And of course, you can have software answer questions.

它是一个知识库。

It's a knowledge base.

答案的数量是固定的。

There's a fixed number of answers.

我把答案和问题匹配起来，而感觉人类最后剩下的工作会是销售。

I match it up with the question, whereas it almost feels like the last job standing for humans will be sales.

但不管怎样，定价、结果、竞争。

But anyway, pricing, outcomes, competition.

我很好奇你是怎么考虑定价的，从负定价开始，你是怎么得出现在的价格的？

Just curious how you thought about how did you get to your pricing from negative pricing-

……虽然我不建议你一直保持负定价。

... which I would not recommend you keep in perpetuity.

但你是怎么得出这个定价的，又是怎么看待这个三角关系里发生的一切的？

But how did you get to pricing and how do you think about everything that's going on in that triangle?

这是个好问题。

It's a good question.

我们一开始就尝试了两个极端，我们认为这是找到最有效边界的最快路径。

We started with both extremes, and we figured that that is the fastest path to find the efficient frontier.

我们一开始用的是纯按席位定价，因为那正好符合Salesforce、HubSpot那套模式。

We started with pure seat pricing, because it just matched the sort of Salesforce, HubSpot world.

我觉得客户对它的接受度很高。

I think it was received really well by our customers.

但后来发现，头部用户的使用量比尾部用户高出10000倍。

But then the head was using 10,000X more than the tail.

然后我们意识到——

And we realized that-

从使用量来说。

Using in terms of consumption.

对，从使用量来说。

Yeah, in terms of consumption.

而且，按席位定价的话，我们撑不了多久。

And, we weren't going to be in business for a long time-

……按席位定价的话。

... with per-seat pricing.

所以后来我们试了纯使用量定价，在Lightfield里所有东西都算积分。

So then we tried purest consumption pricing, where everything is a credit in Lightfield.

结果我们发现没人用任何东西。

And then we found that nobody touched anything.

太贵了。

Too expensive.

是的。

Yes.

你可以想象得到。

As you can imagine.

那大概是公司最糟糕的三周，我们有这么多注册用户，但他们什么都不做。

It was about the worst three weeks of the company's life of we have all of these sign-ups, but they're not doing anything.

什么都不做。

Doing anything.

这可不好。

This is not good.

于是我们开始和客户交流。

So then we started talking to customers.

我们意识到，其实乔，我们把Lightfield做的工作分成了四类。

We realized there's sort of like, and Joe actually, we divided four buckets of work that Lightfield does-

而且我们能够区分它们。

... and we're able to distinguish between them.

第一类是日常的CRM工作，比如记录会议、填写档案和更新任务。

The first was your everyday CRM work of capture a meeting, fill out records, update tasks.

我觉得大多数客户都理所当然地认为这些功能应该包含在平台费里，或者按每个席位定价来覆盖。

I think most of our customers just expect that to be covered in a platform fee or expect that to be covered-

也就是按人头收费的模式。

... per seat pricing.

他们的想法是："我在看未来一年的预算时，可不想去操心核心CRM系统的计费细节。"

They're like, "I don't want to think about the error bounds of my core CRM when I look at my budget over the next year."

所以他们就说，把这个固定下来。

So they're like, "Make that fixed."

然后我们发现还有另外两个类别。

And then we found there were two other buckets.

一个是管道生成，也就是你愿意为管道生成支付消费价格。

One was pipeline generation, where you're pretty down to pay consumption price in a pipeline generation.

你意识到这里还有数据丰富化这一步。

You realize there's enrichment.

这里其实有你的机会。

There's actually alpha for you.

你会得到更多能转化为收入的会议。

You'll get more meetings that can convert to revenue.

然后还有另一类工作流自动化，我觉得大家普遍预期这些是要付费的。

And then there's this other bucket of workflow automations of where I think there's just an expectation that you pay for those.

顺便问一下，有什么好的例子吗？

What's a good example of that, by the way?

比如有人在我们网站上注册了演示，然后Lightfield做了一点研究，发现这个应该转给Henry——

It would be like someone signs up on our website for a demo, and then Lightfield does a little bit of research and realizes, oh, this should go to Henry-

因为那是一家深度科技公司，或者应该转给Matt，因为那是一家健康科技公司。

... because it's a deep tech company, or it should go to Matt because it's a health tech company.

我觉得这确实是在做实事，对吧？

And I think that's doing real work, right?

你可以想象那上面的投资回报率。

You can imagine the ROI on that.

所以你会为此付费。

So you'll pay for that.

然后最后一部分其实是情报和预测，这可能是Lightfield最未被发掘的部分，你有了这个公司的小水晶球或雪球，现在你要把前沿智能部署到上面，开始进行情景规划和预测接下来会发生什么。

And then the last piece is honestly intelligence and forecasting, which is maybe the most undiscovered part of Lightfield, of you've got this little crystal ball or snow globe of your company, and now you're going to deploy frontier intelligence to it and start scenario planning and figuring out what's next.

而且，我认为在那个世界里，你肯定会为那里的alpha付费。

And, I think in that world, you'll definitely pay for the alpha there.

我在周末让GPT-6在Lightfield上运行了几个小时后，改变了我的销售流程。

I changed my sales process after letting GPT-6 rip on Lightfield for a couple of hours on the weekend.

所以，总的来说，我们最终确定了核心CRM的平台费加座位费，其他一切按用量计费，效果还不错。

So, all of that is to say, we sort of landed in this platform fee plus seat for core CRM, and we do consumption for everything else, and it's landed pretty well.

关于你提到的结果问题，我认为作为一家销售公司，最难的事情是我们的结果在某种程度上取决于你产品市场契合度的强度。

To your other question about outcomes, I think the hardest thing about being a sales company is that our outcomes are sort of dependent on the strength of your product market fit.

当然。

Of course.

而且，如果我们为OpenAI做外呼勘探，那将会非常高效。

And it would be incredibly efficient for us to do outbound prospecting for OpenAI.

而且他们会取得惊人的成果，而且——

And they'd have incredible outcomes and-

他们确实感兴趣。

They are interested.

而且这会——

And it would be-

打电话过来吧。

Call here

……极其低效——

... incredibly inefficient-

……让我去为一个连网站都没有的初创公司做外呼开发客户。

... for me to do outbound prospecting for a seed stage startup with no website.

所以我觉得目前我们的定位是，我们必须按工作量收费。

So I think where we've landed at the moment is we have to charge for the work.

在这个领域，我们暂时还不能完全按成果收费。

We can't quite charge for the outcome in this space for now.

从你创办Tome到现在，实际的工作有什么变化？

Maybe from when you started Tome to today, how has the actual work changed?

一年多前我们第一次见面时，我就觉得这家公司特别厉害，特别吸引人，就是你们发布产品的速度太快了，感觉现在速度更是突飞猛进。

Something that I found amazing and just really fascinating about the company when we first met over a year ago was just how fast you guys were already shipping, and it feels like the velocity has just gone through the roof.

所以我很想知道，你们是怎么设计公司文化、工具和决策流程，来保持这种速度的，以及前后那种跳跃式的变化。

So I'd be curious how you've designed company culture and tooling and all the decision-making around basically velocity and just the step function change from before and after.

你聊聊这个吧。

Talk a little bit about that.

我觉得，关于Tome我有一件后悔的事，我们在Lightfield已经彻底解决了，就是我的联合创始人亨利经常说的。

So I think, one of the things I regret about Tome that we've definitely fixed with Lightfield is Henry, my co-founder, says this all the time.

就是有很多人像是在过家家。

It's like we had a lot of people playing house.

就是说，你有产品负责人、市场负责人、客户成功负责人，他们各有各的领域，如果有人对他们的领域提意见，他们就会很不高兴。

Just to say that you have the product leader and the marketing leader and the CS leader, and they all have their swim lanes, and they get really mad if someone gives them feedback about something in their swim lane.

我觉得正因为这样，我们的速度慢得像蜗牛一样，换个说法，就是根本没法转型。

And I think because of that, we were sort of slowed to a crawl and, maybe put another way, it was impossible to pivot.

因为你有所有这些——

Because you had all of these-

……互不沟通的附属部分，

... appendages that weren't talking to the

……和大脑脱节。

... the brains.

然后我们还试图过早地做长远规划，我觉得这在当今的公司建设时代

And then we also tried to plan too far in advance, which I think is sort of challenging-

……挺有挑战性的。

... in this era of company building.

所以我们完全不是那样。

So we're like none of that.

没有人有固定的职责范围。

No one has a swim lane.

你知道那句话吗，“人算不如天算”？

You know the expression, "Man plans and God laughs"?

现在是人计划，OpenAI发笑。

Now it's man plans and OpenAI laughs.

没错。

Exactly.

挺有意思的。

It's funny.

每个人都负责产品，每个人都负责客户成功，这是一种挺特别的安排——

Everyone owns product and everyone owns customer success, which is kind of an interesting setup of-

我们公司有40个人。

... we have 40 people at the company.

每天早上所有人都参加同一个站会。

Everyone shows up to the same standup every morning.

我们把最重要的问题排个优先级。

We stack rank the most important problems.

有些是交付问题，有些是工程问题，有些是客户成功问题。

Some of them are delivery, some of them are engineering, some of them are CS.

然后谁有空谁就接手。

And then whoever's free just takes them.

有意思。

Interesting.

我们做持续规划，所以每天列表都可能变。

And we do continuous planning, so every day the list can change.

每周我们重新评估一下列表。

Every week we reassess the list.

然后谁有空谁就接手这个问题。

And then whoever's free just picks up the problem.

抱歉，因为我们现在这个时代，任何人都能通过Lightfield快速上手一个客户。

Sorry, because of the age that we're in, anyone can ramp up on a customer through Lightfield.

对。

Yep.

任何人都能快速熟悉我们的设计系统库，因为大语言模型能操作Figma。

Anyone can ramp up on our design system library because the LLM can touch Figma.

而且因为Lightfield和Linear的连通性，任何人都能自动在Linear里创建任务。

And then anyone can auto-create tasks in Linear because of Lightfield's connectivity to Linear.

所以我们基本上营造了一个环境，每个人都是多面手。

So we sort of have this environment where basically everyone is a generalist.

工程师能带项目，设计师能带项目，客户成功经理也能带项目。

And engineers run projects, designers run projects, CSMs run projects.

如果你是专家，那你更多是在做类似的项目。

And then if you're a specialist, you sort of work on more of the similar projects than not.

你怎么确保每个人都是多面手，而且大家都能不断有新想法，同时专注于最重要的事情？

How do you keep that everyone's a generalist and everyone's constantly coming up with something and working on the most important thing?

你怎么让这一切和那个非常清晰的未来愿景保持一致？

How do you keep that aligned with this very coherent view of the future?

我就是不知道你是怎么管理这个过程的。

I just don't know how do you manage that process?

我觉得这总是一个拉锯的过程，每周我们都会开会讨论路线图和GTM——

I would say that it's always this push and pull of each week we meet about road mapping and GTM-

……然后我们就直接改它。

... and we just edit it.

然后我们会说：“对，有这个客户提了这个需求。

And we're like, "Yes, we have this customer that asked for this.

它怎么符合我们的使命呢？

How does it fit into the mission?

不符合。”

It doesn't."

所以我觉得就是这种不断的调整——

So I think it's just this constant editing-

……来确保公司产出的东西是一致的。

... to make sure that what's coming out of the company is coherent.

我觉得在Lightfield，启动一个项目的门槛很低，但发布一个项目的门槛相当高。

I would say that the bar to start a project is very low at Lightfield, but the bar to ship the project is pretty high.

所以我们还是会做全公司的bug大扫除。

So we still do company bug bashes.

这是我在Instagram时学到的东西。

It was something I learned at Instagram when I was there.

公司内部得先认可这个，才能给客户用。

The company needs to like this before it goes to customers.

我觉得这两点结合起来，能让我们保持比较快的速度。

And I feel like those things combined keep us moving pretty fast.

真棒。

So cool.

你最担心的是什么？

What's the thing that worries you the most?

我会说是速度。

I would say speed.

简单说，我们现在处在一个很有意思的环境里，也许我可以分享一些过去的事情。

Just to say, we're in this really interesting environment, and maybe I'll share something from the past.

在我们创办Lightfield之前，我读过所有那些Tegas报告，讲的是人们从一时流行的CRM转向Salesforce。

Before we started Lightfield, I read all of these Tegas reports about people moving off of flavor-of-the-month CRM to Salesforce.

我记得读过一篇关于你投资的一家公司，11 Labs，他们当时用的是那种初创公司的CRM。

And I remember reading this one about one of your portfolio companies, 11 Labs, where they were on one of these startup CRMs.

后来他们没法让那家公司快速建好仪表盘，结果等了四个月。

And then they couldn't get that company to build dashboards fast enough, and it was, like, four months.

哇。

Wow.

11 Labs的人厌倦了不断要求仪表盘，就转到了Salesforce。

And the folks at 11 Labs were tired of asking for dashboards and moved to Salesforce.

对。

Yep.

这其实是我最担心的事，我觉得我们有一个很棒的切入点——

And that's actually the thing that makes me the most paranoid, of I think we've got this incredible wedge-

就是成为新公司最好的CRM，我们得把一切都做好，让他们永远不会想转到旧世界去。

... of being just, like, the best CRM for new companies, and we just have to build everything so that those folks never feel the desire to go to the old world.

那你实际上是怎么做优先级排序的？

How do you actually, on that, how do you prioritize?

这就是新世界的疯狂之处，而且这又回到了你说的每个人都是通才的观点。以前，你可能会有个十人的产品设计和工程小组，或者随便你选个数字，但不会是100人，也不会是2人。

This is the craziness about the new world, and it actually goes back to your point on everybody being a generalist, is that once upon a time, you would have, like, a 10-person product design and engineering pod, or pick your number, but not 100, not two.

会有产品经理、设计师，然后大概九个工程师。

You'd have the product manager, you'd have the designer, and then you'd have, like, nine engineers.

而且有些工作会排到2028年。

And you would have things that would be booked out until, like, 2028.

现在任何人都能直接通过提示词做出产品，对吧？

And now anybody can just prompt their way into a product, right?

所以如果每个人都真正理解我们需要做什么，那么一方面，你可以更快地构建一切。

So if everybody actually is understanding what we need to do, but so on the one hand, it's like you could build everything much more quickly.

但你仍然需要做出权衡，比如，我是不是优先考虑这个我认识的客户？

But you still have to make trade-offs of, like, am I prioritizing this customer that I know?

天哪，我有这家很棒的公司。

Like, shoot, I have this amazing company.

如果我不做这个，他们就要流失了。

They're gonna churn unless I build this.

这确实是个很好的理由去做那件事。

That's a really good reason to build that thing.

但实际上，这可能不是好事，因为你还有另外15个客户，如果你不做另一件事，他们就不会签约。

But actually, that might not be a good thing because you have, like, 15 other customers that you're not gonna sign up unless you build the other thing.

而且这个问题从很久以前就存在了，可以说是老问题了。

And this is a time, this has been a problem since, like BC era.

但我想问，在这个AI时代，既然任何人都能构建任何东西，理论上你的公司可以拥有无限的产品经理和工程师，你有没有学到什么，或者有什么不同的做法？

But I guess, is there anything that you've learned and done differently in this kind of AI era around anybody can build anything and therefore you could theoretically have unlimited product managers and engineers in your company?

说来有趣。

It's funny.

在Lightfield，我们培养了一种技能，就是看一个客户的扩展潜力。

In Lightfield, we sort of built this skill where we look at the expansion potential of an account.

我觉得作为一家在红海领域的CRM公司，我们必须成为一家以扩展为导向的公司。

And I think as a CRM company in a red ocean space, we have to be an expansion company.

我认为在竞争激烈的领域，你往往得不到你预期的最初客户，因为赢得每个客户都很重要。

I think in a competitive space, you often don't get the initial land that you would've expected because it's just important to win every company.

但你想，到了第三年、第五年，这就不重要了。

But you're like, by year three, by year five, this is not-

因为你会成为一家大公司，我们会成为你重要的合作伙伴。

... gonna matter because you'll be a huge company, we'll be an important part of you.

对。

Yep.

所以我们看的是，这个客户在三年内能带来多大的扩展价值。

So I think we take this perspective of, like, what's sort of the expansion value of this account over a three-year time horizon?

我们怎么排优先级？

And how do we prioritize?

正因为如此，我们更倾向于为增长最快的客户开发产品，而不是为普通客户。

I think because of that, we've leaned more towards building for our fastest-growing customers than- ... our average customer.

但我也要说，我们什么都得做，这有点像，

But I would say at the same time, we have to build everything and it's sort of a time of being-

比平时更追求全面覆盖的时候。

... a little more maximalist than usual.

还有一件有意思的事是，我的观察是，我喜欢开玩笑说AI在硅谷几乎被过度炒作。

The other thing that's interesting is that my observation is, I like to joke that AI is almost over-hyped in Silicon Valley.

我不觉得它被过度炒作，但在世界这个小区域之外，它被严重低估了。

I don't think it is, but it's massively under-hyped outside of this little region of the world.

部分原因是人们多年没有尝试过新东西。

And part of it is people haven't tried things in years.

他们会说，‘哦，我在2022年11月试过ChatGPT，它产生了幻觉。’

They like, "Oh, I tried ChatGPT in November of 2022, and it hallucinated something.

‘哦，那不行。’

Oh, that doesn't work."

然后他们就不再用了。

And then they just put it to bed.

现在他们觉得它会以某种方式害死他们。

Now they think it's going to kill them somehow.

但你怎么看待长期……

But how do you think about long...

这跟绿地项目和棕地项目有关，但你可以进入硅谷，但要跨越鸿沟进入美国其他地区和世界其他地方，那是一个非常非常……

It's related to greenfield versus brownfield, but you can get Silicon Valley, but it's crossing the chasm into the rest of the country, the rest of the world, where that's a very, very...

他们是同一类客户。

It's the same type of customers.

他们有产品。

They have products.

他们有员工。

They have employees.

他们有销售人员。

They have salespeople.

他们卖东西。

They sell things.

他们想要报告，但他们没有那么融入，你不能只在101公路上打广告就能触达他们。

They want reports, but they're not as plugged in to like, you can't just advertise on 101 and reach them.

你怎么看待硅谷的过度炒作和世界其他地方的炒作不足？

How do you think about Silicon Valley overhype versus rest of world underhype?

我觉得对于大多数这些系统记录公司来说，你最终的大部分收入规模其实来自这里往外50英里甚至更远的地方。

I think for most of these system of record companies, you end up getting most of your revenue scale from actually the 50 miles out of here and more.

我一直把公司建设中的这个时刻看作是一个获取参考客户标志的诀窍，也就是说，我们有客户已经融资了2亿美元，却只有三个市场推广人员。

I've always thought about this moment in company building as a trick to get reference logos, which is that we have customers that have raised $200 million that have three go-to-market people.

他们总有一天会变得非常庞大。

And they're going to be huge one day.

所以我们只需要为他们提供出色的服务，这样当我们去……

So we just need to do amazing work for them so we can take their logos when we go to the-

……世界其他地方的时候，就可以拿着他们的标志说：“好的。

... rest of the world and be like, "All right.

我们有医疗行业的客户。”

We've got healthcare."

或者，“我们有金融科技行业的客户，”或者其他什么的。

Or, "We've got fintech," or whatever it is.

所以我认为，把焦点放在硅谷并不是为了高效地获取收入，而实际上只是为了高效地获取营销效果——

So I just see the focus on Silicon Valley not as efficient revenue capture, but actually just efficient marketing capture-

出去跟别人说，'好吧。

... to go out there and be like, "All right.

我们很期待进入制造业，而且我们实际上正在跟这里很多优秀的制造公司合作。'

We're excited to get into manufacturing, and we're actually working with a bunch of great manufacturing companies here."

'现在我们可以为你做到这些。'

"And now we can do that for you."

客户的想法是不是很有趣，对吧？

What is funny how customers think, right?

就像，好吧，你用的是完全相同的软件，但如果乔跟我不是同一个行业，而且他是个非常满意的客户，而我也想要完全一样的……

It's like, all right, you're using the exact same software, but somehow, if Joe is in a different industry than me, and he's a super happy customer, and I want the exact same...

我会用Fields的例子来说明，所以请耐心听我说。

I'm going to use the Fields example, so just bear with me.

但就像……

But like-

……

...

我在用完全相同的东西，但我不确定能不能信任你——

I'm destroying the exact same stuff, but I don't know if I can trust you-

……因为他卖牙刷，而我卖可口可乐。

... because he sells toothbrushes, and I sell Coca-Cola.

但就像，如果他卖牙刷，哦，那我必须要有那个其他卖牙刷的……

But it's like, if he sells toothbrushes, oh, I must have the thing that the other toothbrush-

……卖家卖的东西。

... seller sells.

这真的很奇怪。

It's really peculiar.

我一直觉得，这某种程度上又回到了参考能力的问题。

I always found that where it's like somehow that goes back to reference ability.

就像客户，他们只是想知道。

It's like customers, they just want to know.

就像那句老话，没人会因为买IBM而被解雇。

It's like the old nobody gets fired for buying IBM.

就是说，我想知道这东西确实管用，尤其是对于那种记录系统的核心数据。

It's like, I want to know that this works, especially for something that is a system of record.

而且我想知道，我的竞争对手、朋友，或者同行业的人，都在用这个产品，我才愿意去尝试。

And I want to know that somebody that is a competitor to me or a friend of mine or somebody in the same vertical is using the product before I'm willing to make the jump.

那你觉得是不是这样，就像你提到的制造业和别的行业，说到底，客户就是客户。

So do you find that that's true almost because it's like you mentioned manufacturing versus X, it's like at the end of the day, a customer is a customer.

联系人、联系信息这些，其实都差不多。

Like the contacts and the contact information, all that stuff is the same.

但为什么你会……

But why do you...

是不是因为他们太看重信任了，所以才这么在意？

Is it just like they care because there's just so much trust associated with the product?

我觉得是的。

I think so.

我觉得在很多方面，换掉你的CRM可能比换银行还难。

I think in many ways, your CRM is maybe harder to move off of than your bank.

而且我——

And I-

直到Lightfield出现。

Until Lightfield.

对。

Exactly.

然后我们——

And then we-

我们让它变得简单。

We make it easy.

我们已经让它变得容易多了。

We've made it a lot easier.

但我觉得从心理负担的角度来看——

But I think in terms of the mental overhead-

……你就是不想选错。

... you just do not want to choose the wrong one.

对。

Yes.

正因为如此，我觉得参考能力帮了大忙。

And because of that, I think that the reference ability goes a long way.

来的路上我跟乔说，我们在医疗和健康科技领域做得特别好。

On the way in, I was telling Joe that we do great with healthcare and health tech.

我觉得部分原因是我们很擅长处理那些有50个不同利益相关方的复杂交易。

I think part of it is that we do really well in these complex deals where there are 50 different stakeholders.

我们的上下文工程——

Our context engineering-

……做得非常好。

... did really well.

而且，我们一开始在安全方面就非常严格。

And also, we were hardcore about security at the start.

所以我们签了业务合作协议——

So we signed BAAs-

……

...

而且我们做了好几年的渗透测试。

and we did penetration testing for years.

现在拿下健康科技的单子对我们来说太轻松了。

And now it's so easy for us to win a health tech deal.

我觉得这是因为我们有这个关系网——

And I think it's because we have this network-

可以随时引用，然后继续推进。

... that we can reference and move on.

我觉得这就是游戏的一部分。

I think that's just part of the game.

就算是我自己，我也不想选错ERP系统。

If I imagine even myself, I don't want to choose the wrong ERP.

所以我可能会选那些和我情况类似的公司选过的ERP——

So I probably want to choose the ERP that companies who look like me chose-

...

...

这样我买了之后就不用再操心了。

so that I never have to think about this after I buy it.

回到之前的问题，在这个疯狂的时代，你有没有遇到那种说“不，我什么都不用”的人？

Do you run into, kind of going back to an earlier question, do you run into people in this crazy era of saying, "No, I'm not going to use anything.

“我就要自己造一个。”

I'm just going to build it myself."

那才是最疯狂的，对吧？

Because that's the craziest, right?

就像，我还能不能混下去？

It's like, am I going to be around?

比如我公司里那个决定用AI随便写个CRM的家伙，它是免费的，对吧？

Is the guy that is working at my company who's decided to vibe code a CRM, it's free, right?

但支持不免费，我付给他的工资也不免费。

But the support isn't free, the salary that I'm paying him or her isn't free.

但你有没有遇到那些想自己动手做的人，还是说这个说法被过度讨论了？

But do you run into people that are trying to DIY, or is that over-talked about?

我觉得有点被过度讨论了。

I think it's a little over-talked about.

当我们的目标客户是种子期创始人时，我们经常听到这种说法。

We heard it a lot when our ICP was the seed stage founder.

我们经常听到他们说：'你看，我们可以付你X钱，或者我们可以花四个周末自己做。'

And we would often hear, "Look, we can either pay you X, or we can do this over four weekends."

我们就会说：'太好了。'

And we were like, "Great."

祝你好运。

Good luck.

祝你好运。

Good luck.

是的。

Yes.

你可以试试看。

You should try it out.

五个周末后再给我们打电话。

Call us in five weekends.

对，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

然后他们就会说：“哎呀，这玩意儿根本不好使。

And then they're like, "Ah, none of this works right.

它老是在胡说八道。”

It's hallucinating."

“它还在乱发邮件。”

"It's sending out bad emails."

我觉得在大型公司那边，我们没听过“我要自己建一套系统”这种话。

I think on the larger company side, we don't hear, "I'm going to build my own system of record."

我们听到的是：“我要自己建一个公司大脑。”

We hear, "I'm going to build my own company brain."

很多。

A lot.

然后我们有很多这样的人回来说，其实构建一个公司大脑或者业务世界模型真的很难。

And then we've had so many of these folks come back and be like, "Actually, building a company brain or building a business world model is really hard."

也许最难的部分是对客户进行建模。

And maybe the hardest part of it is modeling the customers.

所以我们试过了，但不喜欢结果，所以现在来找你们了。

So we tried, and we don't like our results, so we'll come to you now.

你对未来最期待的是什么？

What are you most excited about for the future?

我觉得我最期待的事情，说起来挺有意思的。

I think the thing I'm most excited about, it's funny.

我很兴奋Lightfield能成为你做情景规划的水晶球。

I'm stoked about Lightfield becoming your crystal ball for scenario planning.

而让我每天早上起床的动力，就是看到人们用Lightfield来思考，我应该招多少销售代表。

And the thing that gets me up in the morning is actually having folks use Lightfield to think about, how many reps should I hire?

我接下来应该做什么产品？

What product should I build next?

我该往哪个方向走？

Where do I go?

我们有个做企业级销售的客户，通过 Lightfield 发现他需要做一个面向中型市场的产品。

And one of our customers who sells to enterprise discovered through Lightfield he needs to build a mid-market product.

然后他就因为这个发现，开发了一整条新产品线。

And built this whole new product line because of this thing he found.

我特别兴奋的是，我们能成为那面镜子——

And I'm just excited about us being that mirror-

对

Yes

——帮助企业做出最艰难、最重大的决策。

... for a company to make their hardest, most consequential decision.

我觉得这又回到了 Alex 之前说的那个点，就是说，在这个追求极致、什么都能做的世界里，你可以为任何人做产品。

I think this goes back to the point Alex was making on like, okay, in this world of maximalist, and you can build for anyone.

其实，答案就是拥有像Lightfield这样的工具。

Actually, the answer is having a tool like Lightfield.

如果你拥有所有这些数据和背景信息，你就能真正以数据为导向，而这正是将前沿智能应用于复杂决策的绝佳机会，对吧？

If you just have all of this data and all of this context, you can actually be data-driven, and this is the exact opportunity to throw frontier intelligence at a really complicated decision, right?

这在过去需要非常聪明的人、大量的运营人员、SQL以及其他一堆东西。

And it's something that historically would've required really smart people, and a lot of ops folks, and SQL, and a bunch of other stuff.

而现在，你只需花一个下午或一个周末与Lightfield交流，就能制定出一个非常明智的前进计划。

And instead, now you can just talk to Lightfield for an afternoon or a weekend and come up with a really intelligent plan to move forward.

我认为这就是你能够以这种方式运营公司的原因之一，这真的非常酷。

And I think that's one of the reasons that you can run your company the way you run it, which is really, really cool.

也许我最后一个问题是，有很多人可能...

Maybe my last question for you is, there's a lot of people that may...

我想至少会有一些人正处于转型的关键时刻，他们正在观看这个节目，思考未来，就像Keith一样，谈论他们新的了不起的公司。

I think there at least there'll be a handful of people that are going through some pivot moment that are watching this and thinking about the future, where they're Keith and they're talking about their new amazing company.

如果你能带着后见之明重新开始转型之旅，你会给自己的一条建议是什么？

What would be the one piece of advice that you'd go back and give yourself if you were just starting the pivot journey again with the benefit of hindsight?

我觉得最重要的是要记住，在转型的时候，周围几乎所有的噪音都不重要。

I think the most important thing to remember is that almost none of the noise around you matters when you're in a pivot.

你只需要找到痛点。

You just need to find pain.

你需要有灵感去打造一个产品或服务来解决那个痛点，并且要极度专注于你的客户。

You need to be inspired to build a product or service that solves that pain, and you need to be maniacally focused on your customers.

然后其他的一切都是噪音。

And then the rest is total noise.

我记得我们经历这个阶段的时候，人们在谈论他们的办公室让他们想起过去的美好时光。

I remember when we were going through this, people were talking about how their office reminded them of the good old days.

他们在谈论食物不够有创意。

They were talking about how the food wasn't inspiring.

他们在谈论“我的期权会怎么重新定价？”

They were talking about, "Well, how are my options going to get repriced?"

说实话，那些都不重要。

And, honestly, none of that matters.

我觉得你只需要戴上眼罩，专注于核心。

I think you can just put the blinders on and focus on the core.

我们对你的成就和你建立的业务感到非常钦佩。

Well, we could not be more impressed with what you've done, the business you've built.

这个产品简直太棒了。

The product is absolutely incredible.

如果你还没试过，一定要试试。

If you haven't tried it, you need to try it.

太不可思议了。

It's incredible.

去 lightfield.app 看看吧。

Go check it out at lightfield.app.

Keith，和你合作非常愉快，我们对未来充满期待。

Keith, it's an absolute pleasure to work with you, and we're so excited for the future.

谢谢你的认可。

Thanks for the honor.

谢谢邀请我。

Thanks for having me.

谢谢，Keith。

Thanks, Keith.

感谢收听本期a16z播客。

Thanks for listening to this episode of the a16z Podcast.

如果你喜欢这期节目，记得点赞、评论、订阅，给我们评分或留言，并分享给你的朋友和家人。

If you like this episode, be sure to like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or review, and share it with your friends and family.

更多节目，请前往YouTube、Apple Podcasts和Spotify。

For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify.

在X上关注我们@a16z，并订阅我们的Substack：a16z.substack.com。

Follow us on X, @a16z, and subscribe to our Substack at a16z.substack.com.

再次感谢收听，我们下期见。

Thanks again for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode.

提醒一下，这里的内容仅供参考。

As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only.

这些内容不应被视为法律、商业、税务或投资建议，也不应用于评估任何投资或证券，并且不针对任何a16z基金的投资者或潜在投资者。

It should not be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund.

请注意，a16z及其关联公司可能也持有本播客中讨论的公司的投资。

Please note that a16z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the companies discussed in this podcast.

欲了解更多详情，包括我们投资的链接，请访问a16z.com/disclosures。

For more details, including a link to our investments, please see a16z.com/disclosures.