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别让你的抱负被商业智慧给吞噬了。
Don't let your ambition fall prey of commercial wisdom.
如果你只是跟着大众走，根本别想跑赢市场。
If you're a consensus play, there's just no alpha.
我们服务超过三百万人，合作商户超过五万家。
We serve over 3,000,000 consumers, over 50,000 merchant partners.
我们的运营成本极低，生产线上有两百多名员工。
We have incredible cost to serve economics, over 200 agents in production.
我们公司从一开始就用单体仓库，而不是微服务架构。
We built a company on a monorepo as opposed to microservices.
现在单体仓库可火了。
Monorepos today are all the rage.
Anthropics 就是用单体仓库起步的。
Anthropics built on a monorepo.
谷歌就更不用说了，人家可是单体仓库的典型代表。
Google, obviously, famously is a monorepo company.
但我们刚创业的时候，微服务才是主流。
But when we started the company, microservices was where it was at.
那你们当时为什么做这个决定？
So why did you make that decision?
是什么让你有远见做出这样的选择？
Or what gave you the forethought to make it?
我请来了业内最顶尖的首席技术官。
I hired the best CTO in the business.
你们是怎么让整个团队文化快速运转起来的？
How did you get your organization culturally moving as quickly as you have?
这其实主要是两个原因。
It's basically a combination of two things.
我们对自己现在在哪、想去哪儿，有非常清晰的认识。
We have a very clear view of where we are and where we wanna be.
我们对大家的标准和期望一直讲得非常明白。
We have been extremely explicit with folks about standards and expectations.
这不会容易。
It's not going to be easy.
一直以来都不容易。
It hasn't been easy.
在拉丁美洲创办一家科技公司，往往意味着要解决其他地方根本不存在的问题。
Building a technology company in Latin America often means solving problems that don't exist elsewhere.
分散的金融基础设施、信贷获取困难以及落后的软件系统带来了挑战，但也提供了重新思考商业和金融服务运作方式的机会。
Fragmented financial infrastructure, limited access to credit, and underdeveloped software systems create challenges, but also opportunities to rethink how commerce and financial services work.
过去几年里，Addi 从一个‘先买后付’的产品，发展成了涵盖支付、商业、物流和银行业务的综合性平台。
Over the last several years, Addi has grown from a buy now, pay later product into a broader platform spanning payments, commerce, logistics, and banking.
安吉拉·斯特兰奇和加布里埃尔·瓦斯奎兹对话 Addi 的创始人兼首席执行官圣地亚哥·苏亚雷斯，探讨金融包容性、技术基础设施、人工智能，以及打造拉丁美洲最具雄心的金融科技公司之一。
Angela Strange and Gabriel Vazquez speak with Addi founder and CEO Santiago Suarez about financial inclusion, technology infrastructure, AI, and building one of Latin America's most ambitious fintech companies.
今天我们请到了 Addi 的创始人兼首席执行官圣地亚哥·苏亚雷斯。
We're here today with Santiago Suarez, the founder and CEO of Addi.
Addi 是一家总部位于哥伦比亚的‘先买后付’交易平台和支付平台，最近刚升级成了银行。
Addi is a buy now, pay later marketplace and payments platform in Colombia, and now just recently a bank.
Addi 已经服务了超过四分之一的人口。
And Addi has served over 25% of the population.
欢迎来到节目。
Welcome to the show.
非常高兴能来。
Thrilled to be here.
谢谢。
Thank you.
对于不太了解 Addi 的听众，你能简单说说公司现在做什么，规模有多大吗？
So for those in our audience who may be less familiar with Addi, can you give us a sense of what does the company do now and what scale are you at?
当然可以。
Absolutely.
我们为消费者和商家提供多种金融服务，比如销售时信贷、即时支付，还有物流支持。
So we provide consumers and merchants with financial solutions such as credit at the point of sale, instantaneous payments, logistics.
我们刚刚拿到了银行牌照。
We just got our banking license.
你可以把它看作是拉美增长最快经济体中，商业与金融服务的基础支柱。
So you should think of it as the kind of elemental fabric of commerce and financial services in one of the fastest growing Latin American economies.
从规模上看，我们服务了超过三百万人和五万家商户合作伙伴。
Size wise, we serve over 3,000,000 consumers or 50,000 merchant partners.
这就是Addi目前的规模和业务概览。
That's a little bit about the scale of Addi and what we do today.
明白了。
Okay.
接下来我们会重点聊聊Addi。
So we're gonna talk a lot about Addi.
我觉得谈谈你加入Addi之前的职业经历挺有意思的。
I think it's interesting to talk about your career pre Addi.
你来自哥伦比亚。
So you're from Colombia.
你来美国上大学。
You came to The US to go to college.
你作为第一位员工加入这家初创公司，后来还公开谈论过自己被解雇的事。
You'd joined the startup as a first employee, and you're pretty public about being fired from said startup.
然后你冷静地列出了心目中十大最优秀的运营人才，打算去其中一家工作。
And then left very surgically created a list of the 10 best operators in your mind, and you wanted to go work for one of those.
是的。
Yep.
你最终选择了杰米·戴蒙。
And you chose Jamie Dimon.
能不能跟我们聊聊，这些经历中有哪些经验对你现在做的事有帮助？
So maybe walk us through the lessons from those experiences that relate to what you're doing now.
对。
Yeah.
其实这一切都始于我来美国上大学的时候。
So it really starts with coming here for college.
最近几年我越来越愿意谈这件事了，但以前我一直觉得，没必要让别人知道。
I think I've been increasingly open about this most recent years, but for a while, I was like, no one needs to know this.
但我第一次离开哥伦比亚，就是为了来上大学。
But first time I ever left Colombia was to come to college.
我靠着全额奖学金来美国读书，因为父母根本负担不起美国的学费，连哥伦比亚大部分地方的学费都付不起。
And I came to The US for college on a full ride because my parents couldn't afford college in The US certainly and most places in Colombia.
对我来说，这大概是我第一次真正看到自己做到了别人觉得不可能的事。
So that to me was probably the first time that I could really see doing something that no one thought was possible.
那时候我们连台电脑都没有，我写大学申请文书只能借别人的电脑，那几年日子确实挺难的。
I mean, to the degree that I wrote my college essays on a borrowed computer because we didn't have a computer because in that particular case, those years were pretty tough.
我们真的没有电脑。
We didn't have one.
从借电脑写申请文书，到最终拿到奖学金来到这么棒的学校，这种转变太不可思议了。
So I had to borrow someone's computer to write the college essays and being able to go from doing that to just getting a scholarship to this incredible place.
那时候耶鲁给我的本科教育，简直不可思议，现在回想起来依然如此。
And it remains incredible, more so at the time, Yale for an undergraduate education.
它彻底改变了我对‘可能’这件事的理解。
It just really changes your definition of what's possible.
我觉得这也让我加入了第一家创业公司Navia。
I think that also led me to work at Navia, the first startup.
Navia在2010年就在做概率计算。
Navia was doing probabilistic computing back in 2010.
那时候我们常说，十六年前啊，我们总说自己的程序特别，因为每次运行结果都不一样。
And we used to say, this is, by the way, sixteen years ago, We used to say our programs are so special because every time you run them, you get a different output.
那是2010年的事了。
This is back in 2010.
那时候还没出现Transformer，还没ImageNet，什么都没有，我们跑去跟投资人说：我们的程序每次运行给出的答案都不一样，因为是概率性的。
And we were pre transformers, pre ImageNet, pre all these things, and we're out there talking to investors being like, oh, our programs run and give you a different answer every time because they're probabilistic.
这就是人工智能未来的样子。
This is how AI is gonna happen.
那会儿我们能拿得出手的，就这一条了。
That was about the one thing we had going for ourselves there.
但我对它的潜力充满热情
But I was so excited about the potential of
只是太早了。
It just just early.
对。
Yeah.
我们整整早了十几年。
We were just a couple decades early.
说到这点，我们当时有四个联合创始人。
And then to your point, we had four co founders.
我在那里的十二个月里，换了四五位CEO。
And in the twelve months I was there, we had four or five CEOs.
最后那段时间，我当了35天的CEO，然后我觉得我们需要开掉一个联合创始人，毕竟那时我才23岁，觉得他干得不够好。
And I was the CEO for thirty five days at the end of that And then I decided that what we needed was to fire a co founder because he wasn't doing a good job in my 23 year old head.
于是我找了该找的人，争取了支持，然后把他给辞了。
So I talked to the right people supposedly to gather support, and then I fired him.
结果不到24小时，那四个联合创始人就说：挺有意思，但你现在得走了。
And within twenty four hours, the four co founders were like, yeah, that's cute, but you're out of here.
我觉得这里面的教训之一，有个不太明显但其实很明显的点，就是人工智能的力量。
And I think the lessons there, one was, I mean, there's a non obvious one, which is obvious, which is, well, the power of AI.
第二个教训是，内部要有效组织起来，才能实现目标。
The second was the power of getting organized internally to pursue a goal.
尽管这些年来我们遇到了一些挑战，但Addi在自我组织方面一直做得很好。
And I think one of the things that we've been able to do at Addi well in spite of some challenges through the years is being very good at organizing ourselves.
对。
Mhmm.
我刚和一位董事会成员一起吃早餐，当时我们把新来的CFO也带上了。
I was just having breakfast with one of our board members, and we brought our new CFO.
这位新CFO在MercadoLibre有十一年的工作经历，这位董事会成员就问他：嘿，
And the new CFO has an eleven year career at MELI, and this board member asked him, hey.
让你最惊讶的是什么？
What is the thing that surprised you the most?
他回答说：公司居然这么有条理。
And he's like, how well organized the company is?
所以我觉得，这其中一个核心领悟就是：肯定有更聪明的办法。
So I think that was one of the core insights was like, there's gotta be a better way.
这让他们开始思考：我到底想怎么干这件事？
And that speaks to them, okay, how do I wanna do this?
关于创业，我早就想清楚了两件事。
And there were two things I knew about starting a company.
第一，我真的很想做这件事。
One, I wanted to do it.
第二，我绝不想靠签证来干。
Two, I never wanted to do on a visa.
因为以前在纳维亚的时候，政府一度拒了我的H-1B签证，我不得不重新申请。
Because one of the challenges in Navia was like, for a while, the government denied my H-1B, then I had to re get it.
所以我下定决心：如果真要在美國做这件事，我必须拿到绿卡。
So I was like, I need a green card if I'm ever gonna do that in The US.
这意味着公司规模会更大，个人回报可能低一些，但风险也小，能稳稳待下去。
That automatically means bigger company, lower upside, but lower downside, you can stay there.
至于第三点，你说得对，我是想亲眼看看那些顶尖首席执行官是怎么做事的。
And then the third thing to your point, was like, well, I wanna go see how great CEOs operate.
毕竟，我当那家五人公司CEO的三十五天里，根本不知道自己在干嘛，但别人不一样。
Because clearly, I have no idea what I was doing in my thirty five days as a CEO of a five person company, but at someone new someone else than that.
所以我列了个名单，里面包括了好市多，还有亚马逊。
So I wrote a list and we had Costco in it, had Amazon in it.
我还把温尼赌场加了进去。
I had Wynn Casinos in it.
其实根本不是金融服务业的事。
It wasn't even financial services, really.
我只是想知道，这些了不起的人到底怎么运作的？
It was just who are these incredible people, and how do they operate?
于是我动用了麦肯锡、耶鲁，还有我认识的所有人，就想办法靠近这些人，争取进到他们公司里。
And I basically leveraging McKinsey, Yale, everyone I knew, I just try to get in a position to get a job somewhere close to these people.
第一个机会是摩根大通的一个传奇性战略小组，当时只有十个人，因为杰米讨厌顾问。
And the first one that came up with this kind of legendary strategy group back at the time, which was 10 people at JP Morgan because Jamie hated consultants.
是的
Yeah.
所以他禁止了所有顾问，却保留了一个十人的战略小组。
So he had banned all consultants, but he had a strategy group of 10 people.
好吧，我明白了。
And I was like, okay.
那这个地方倒是很适合去学习。
Well, then that that feels like a good place to go learn.
我在那儿待了六年，收获特别大。
And I was there for six years, and it was incredible.
那里简直像一所大学，教你怎么经营公司、怎么思考金融服务。
It was like a whole university in how to run companies and how to think about financial services.
太棒了。
Amazing.
好的。
Alright.
那我们快进到创办Addi的时候吧。
So I wanna fast forward to starting Addi.
我发现你做了一些不太寻常的事。大多数创始人，或者投资者，一想到拉美市场，第一反应都是从巴西开始，因为那是最大的市场，然后才是墨西哥。
And I think you've done a few things that are usual, but most founders, when they look at Latin America or most investors, they look at Latin America, they expect founders to start in Brazil, which is the largest market, then Mexico.
你虽然是哥伦比亚人，但偏偏选择从哥伦比亚起步。
Obviously, you're from Colombia but decided you were going to do Colombia.
那时候大家普遍觉得，哥伦比亚太难搞了。
And I think the view at the time was Colombia is just too hard.
因为那里支付方式基本都是现金，占比高达65%到70%。
Like, payments are mostly cash, 65, 70%.
连信用卡都不到20%的人有。
Less than 20% of people even have a credit card.
而且少数几家银行几乎垄断了整个金融体系。
And then a small number of banks own everything.
那你当时看到了什么，才让你有底气进入这个市场？你觉得外界对这里最大的误解是什么？
And so what did you see that gave you the confidence to enter this market, and what do you think the outside observers get wrong?
所以，为什么选择哥伦比亚？
So the answer is on why Colombia?
回头看，原因有很多，但其中一部分是因为我当时就在哥伦比亚。
Hindsight is wonderful, there's so many reasons, but part of it was I was in Colombia.
我来哥伦比亚是因为追着女朋友——后来成了我妻子——来的，但我坚决不打算在哥伦比亚找工作。
And I had landed in Colombia because I had followed my girlfriend and my wife, and I refused to be employed in Colombia.
我觉得待在哥伦比亚反而对我当创业者帮助很大，因为我对美国的金融服务太了解了。
And I actually think being in Colombia was instrumental for being an entrepreneur because I knew too much about US financial services.
每次有人在美国给我提个点子，我都会想：1960年的《银行控股公司法》根本让这事儿行不通。
And every time someone would give me an idea in The US, I'd be like, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1960 actually makes this unworkable.
或者，杜宾法案一出，这项目就黄了。
Or, you know, Durbin will make sure this doesn't work.
或者，你根本不懂SWIFT系统是怎么运作的。
Or here's how you don't understand SWIFT.
我之前陷在美国金融体系太深了，脑子里全是创业会失败的十种方式。
And I had just been so into the matrix here that all I could see was the 10 ways in which your startup is gonna fail.
如果我当时在哥伦比亚也这么被这些条条框框困住，我肯定会说，你这公司根本没戏。
Had I been that into the matrix in Colombia, I would have been like, yeah, your company is never gonna work out.
现在回头看，我懂的多了，但那时候我真不懂。
Knowing what I know now, but I didn't.
所以我觉得，有时候无知反而是一种福气，再加上运气好、时机对，又不肯去给人打工。
So I think a little bit of ignorance is always bliss, a little bit of being the right place, right time, and refusing to be an employee.
不过，当时我注意到两件特别重要的事。
But there were two things that I saw that were very, very important.
第一点，是技术普及的速度快得惊人。
The first one is extreme amount of technological adoption.
你也在我们的董事会里，应该也看过这些数据，我们说哥伦比亚人均智能手机数量比巴西和墨西哥还高，这力量太强了，75%的哥伦比亚人都有智能手机。
And you're on our board, you now see we have these metrics and we say, hey, there's more smartphone per capita than Brazil and Mexico, which is incredibly powerful, 75% of Colombians have a smartphone.
但更让我惊讶的是，从2014年到2016年这三年间，智能手机从只有我那些银行朋友才用、还比美国落后三年的玩意儿，变成了人人都在用的东西。
But more than that, I remember in a three year period from 2014 to 2016, smartphones went from being the thing that my banking friends had locally, and always three years behind the models we had in The US, to being something everyone had.
我当时就明白了。
I was like, okay.
尤其是银行业，一直以来最大的问题就是渠道。
And when you think about banking in particular, right, distribution has always been the issue with banking.
所以银行网点才这么值钱。
That's why branch networks are so valuable.
这也解释了为什么美国的新兴银行在面向消费者时，很难建立起真正深入的渠道网络。
And that's why neo banking in The US has been so challenged to have these very embedded distribution networks, particularly in in consumer, I should say.
我当时就想，哇。
But I was like, wow.
现在每个人手里都有一台设备，而且分发成本几乎是零。
We now have a distribution device in everyone's hands at zero marginal cost of distribution.
于是我意识到第一点。
So I was like, insight one.
这太了不起了。
I was like, this is incredible.
而第二点，正如你所说，这个国家一直有分期付款的传统，但却没有真正有效的解决方案。
And then the second thing, to your point, was this is a country that has this very strong pay over time tradition, but no real work around it.
唯一的问题是，维萨和万事达已经调整了他们的支付系统，支持分期付款，主要在几个国家，比如巴西、韩国、土耳其和美国，那里分期付款已经是默认选项。
The only thing was Visa and Mastercard had actually changed their switches and rails to enable installments, a handful of countries, right, Brazil, Korea, Turkey, Us, where that is the default.
所以，这两点加在一起。
So it was like those two things.
我当时就想，你知道吗？
Was just like, you know what?
这里头有个绝佳的机会。
There is a great opportunity here.
最后而且最重要的一点，是用户体验。
And the last and most important one, the UX.
归根结底，用户体验真的特别关键。
At the end day, UX really matters.
我说的用户体验，不是那种穿黑高领毛衣、设计得特别漂亮的表面功夫，而是真正解决用户痛点的体验。
And when I say UX, I mean UX not in the black turtleneck, beautifully designed thing, but UX in customer pain.
我经常举两个例子。
And I always give two examples.
我有一次想分期买件T恤，结果花了二十二分钟，因为他们要给我做指纹识别。
One is I went to buy a t shirt on installments, and it took me twenty two minutes because they had to fingerprint me.
还得给我拍两张照片。
They had to take two photos of me.
还要打电话给我的两个朋友，而且这事只能在工作时间办。
They had to call two of my friends, and then they would only do this during working hours.
等等，先停一下，这做法真的太反直觉了。
Sundays Pause on that for a second because that's I think it's very unintuitive.
他们干嘛要打电话给你的朋友？
Like, why are they calling your friends?
这其实就是为了确认你的个人关系背景。
That's basically the way of, like, what's your personal reference.
对吧？
Right?
银行的人其实就是想确认你这个人是不是真实存在的。
So the bankers literally just making sure they exist.
你只是想买一件普通的商品。
You're trying to buy a retail purchase.
才十块钱。
A $10.
可验证身份的过程居然是打电话找朋友。
And the KYC is literally phone a friend.
要找两个朋友。
Two friends.
是的。
Yeah.
不是找一个，是两个。
Not one, two.
对。
Mhmm.
还要指纹识别、拍照片，搞一大堆麻烦事。
And then fingerprinting you and taking photos of you and all these things.
你就坐在那儿想，总得有个正经银行吧。
And you're just sitting there like, there's gotta be a as far as Gotta be real bank.
低得离谱。
Low.
我还觉得特别荒唐的是，银行居然收你用网上银行的费，却不收你通过线下渠道操作的费用。
And the other thing that I found asinine was that banks would charge you to use their online banking and not to use them to, like, Wireline, to access it.
我当初在哥伦比亚的银行账户，一个月只能登录两次网上银行。
So my original bank account in Colombia, I was able to enter my online bank portal twice in a month.
第三次登录就开始收费，每次两毛钱。
But after the third time, they would charge me, like, 20¢.
我当时就想，这到底为啥啊？
And I was like, this makes, first of all, why?
其次，这等于逼我去网点，结果银行服务我的成本反而比我自己在线操作或打电话还高。
Secondly, now it means I have to go to the branch where I am more expensive to serve than if I'm self serving myself or call you.
任何其他服务渠道的成本都比线上高。
Like, any other channel of service is more expensive.
你为什么要为这个本就昂贵的服务渠道收费？
Why are you charging me to use the channel that for use is expensive?
但这恰恰反映了市场的运作方式。
But that just gives you a little bit of that dynamics of the market.
现在回想起来，我当时就觉得，这真是个不错的投资机会。
Now I think that's what we saw originally, and I thought, wow, this is a great test bet.
我得承认，我当初没意识到这个机会有多大。
I will confess what I didn't see was how big the opportunity was.
就连现在，我都觉得这规模太惊人了。
Like, even like, nowadays, I'm like, it's huge.
但就算当时，我也只是觉得，嗯，能打下个基础也不错。
But even at the time, I was like, okay.
我们至少能先建立起一个不错的用户群，之后再拓展到国外——后来我们也确实这么做了。
We'll be able to build a good base, but then we gotta go abroad, which we did eventually.
对。
Mhmm.
但现在我觉得，不对。
But nowadays, I'm like, no.
这是一个巨大的市场。
This is this is a massive market.
是的。
Yeah.
Santi，你知道吗，有一家全球公司，它成功的关键就是只专注在一个国家的一家公司，那就是CASB。
And, Santi, you know, there's there's an example of a global company that reached success by just focusing on one company in one country, that that's CASB.
据说，你曾在LinkedIn上给那位首席执行官发了四条消息，他才回复，然后你飞去哈萨克斯坦，专门去见他、陪他一段时间。
And, you know, the story goes that you messaged the CEO four times on LinkedIn before he replied, and then you flew to Kazakhstan to meet him, to spend time with him.
我们很想知道，你能不能再多分享一点，你是怎么和他沟通的，又是怎么找到那些只专注在一个国家就取得成功的人的。
We'll be curious to if you can share a little bit more of those lessons on having spoke to him and find somebody that found success only focusing in one country.
对。
Yeah.
我要特别感谢一位投资者，他很早就把我介绍给了CASB。
So I give a lot of credit to one of our investors who introduced me to CASB well before.
现在他们在金融科技圈里有了一点名气。
They are now a little bit known in fintech circles.
但那时候，他们还没人知道。
At the time, they were not.
对。
Yep.
当我们退出巴西市场时，虽然大家都很支持，但就连那些支持的人也担心，不知道接下来会怎样。
And when we exited Brazil, I think everyone was very supportive, but I think even those folks who were supportive were worried, like, you know, how what what's gonna happen?
这些人却特别兴奋。
These guys were so excited.
他们说，这太棒了。
They were like, this is great.
我们真的非常激动。
We're very excited.
顺便说一句，我们早就跟你说过该这么做。
By the way, we've been telling you to do this.
正确的对标公司是这家在哈萨克斯坦的企业。
The the right comp is this country company in Kazakhstan.
我当时就想，好吧。
I'm like, okay.
不错。
Great.
不过他们在伦敦上市了，所以我们能拿到很多资料。
But they were public in London, so we had a lot of info.
于是我们就开始研究他们。
So we started reading about them.
每年我和我的联合创始人丹尼尔都会安排一次出行，实地看看情况。
And then what Daniel, my cofounder, and I try to do every year is we try to take a trip to see things.
我们去过一次中东。
So we've done one to The Middle East.
当然，我们第一次去的是巴西。
We obviously, the first one we did was to Brazil.
这次我们就决定，去中亚看看。
And this time around, we said, well, let's go to Central Asia.
我们去了中亚，大家都知道哈萨克斯坦，但乌兹别克斯坦其实更惊人。
We go to Central Asia, but everyone knows about Kazakhstan, but also Uzbekistan is incredible.
在乌兹别克斯坦，有三家金融科技独角兽，奥利弗·休斯——以前是Thinkof的长期CEO——现在管着一家叫TBC的公司。
In the Uzbekistan, there were like three fintech unicorns, Oliver Hughes, who was the long term Thinkof CEO, now runs, what's the name, TBC Uzbekistan.
所以我们决定，走，去一趟。
So we're like, let's go.
但显而易见，最大的目标是CASB。
But obviously, you know, the big price is CASB.
我就开始想尽办法，想约见这位先生。
So I started like trying to get in front of this guy in many ways.
我联系了他们的一位投资人。
I pinged one of their investors.
结果被转到了他们的投资者关系团队。
I got sent to their IR team.
但结果是，发了三四封冷邮件之后，他终于说：行吧，见一面。
But the way it worked was after like three or four cold LinkedIn emails, he was like, okay, fine.
我就说：太好了，来吧。
I'm like, come.
我们去见他，结果他特别慷慨。
Then we go meet him, and he was so generous.
他坐在那儿，问我们：你们有什么问题？
But he she sat there, he's like, what questions do you have?
我就说：好。
I was like, okay.
太棒了。
Great.
那我来问你几个问题。
Well, I shall ask you some questions.
然后我和丹尼就跟他聊了好久，他精力特别旺盛。
And then Danny and I just spent nightmares with him, he was extremely energetic.
他就是那种，你知道的，上市公司CEO，但他的思维方式真的很特别。
He just, you know, obviously, public company CEO, but it's just like just the way he thinks.
我们从他身上学到了两个很重要的教训。
And the there were two two important lessons for us.
第一，NPS。
Number one, NPS.
不过我说的NPS，其实不是那个意思。
And then when I say NPS, I I don't mean it.
他公开说过，对于员工不到一千人的公司，NPS是个很差的指标。
He he he's actually been public about this where he's like, I think NPS for a company with less than a thousand employees is a terrible metric.
你还不如直接去听客户客服的通话记录。
You should just listen to customer service calls.
所以每周的业务复盘，我们第一件事就是看上周客户发生了什么。
So, you know, weekly business reviews, we always start with what happened to the customer last week.
除了各种客户体验的KPI，我们还会随机抽两段客服通话记录来分析。
And we have two transcripts pulled at random in addition to a number of a battery of KPIs just on customer experience.
他说，你首先得考虑NPS。
And he was like, the first thing you need to think about is NPS.
事实上，他们现在完全用NPS来考核所有产品经理。
And in fact, they measure all their product managers on NPS alone these days.
他们根本没有利润表。
They don't have a P and L.
他还提到第二点，这对我们规划自己的产品路线图特别有帮助。他说，大家都觉得得同时做所有事。
And then the second thing that he he said, and it was very useful, particularly as we think about our own product road map, he was like, everyone thinks you gotta do everything at once.
但他一上任就明确说，事情不是这么做的。
But he literally got on board, and he's like, that's not quite the way it works.
他是这么想的，我们是怎么规划路线图的，你们也可以参考一下。
Here's how you here's how we thought about structuring our road map, potentially think about it.
这对我们做产品决策影响很大，因为我们的做法恰恰跟直觉相反。
And that informs a lot of our proper road map decision because it's very counterintuitive, the work we do.
上周我们办了个活动，同一场活动中，我们发布了银行账户服务、次日物流、次日送达，还有接入了全国三分之一POS设备的集成。
You know, we had an event last week, and we announced in the same event a bank account, next day logistics, next day shipping, and an integration with a third of the country's entire POS device fleet.
就在同一个活动上，面对同样的听众。
I was like, in the same event, to the same audience.
这真的不太容易让人理解。
That's just not very intuitive.
接着，他给了我们第三点建议，我们一直都很重视，他说：你看。
And then the third piece which he gave us, which, you know, we we always take to heart, he was like, look.
这是一个非常特别的打法。
This is a very unusual play.
投资人根本不会懂这个。
Equity investors will not understand this.
别管他们，五年到十年都别理。
Just ignore them for five years to ten years.
等到有一天，你突然出现，他们就会问：你怎么不早点找我？
And then one day, you'll come out and they'll be like, why didn't you call me?
那时候你就说：我试过好多次了。
And you'll say, I tried many times.
那就是一种明确的目标感和专注力，带着坚定的信念，以一种不同的方式服务市场。
And and it was just this clarity of purpose, clarity of focus, high conviction serving a market in a different way.
特别是在交易平台方面，Kaspi 在不依赖物流的情况下，把电商业务做得非常出色。
And then on on the marketplace in particular, Kaspi has done an incredible job at owning e commerce without logistics.
这并不是因为我们只是过客。
And it's not because we're tourists.
而是因为，今天你不会像2004年做Facebook那样去搭建一个社交网络。
It's because you wouldn't build a social network today like you built Facebook in 2004.
你也不会像当年那样去搭建一个交易平台。
You wouldn't build a marketplace like you built.
很多地方我们也都亲身体会到了，那时候我们还是个很小的公司，比如我们最初做Addi的时候，所有身份验证都得自己一手操办。
So a lot and and we even saw it, and we were a tiny company and smaller, but, like, you know, when we built the the Addi in the first iteration, we had to do all of our ID checks in house.
你还记得吗？
You remember this?
对。
Yep.
现在我们会把其中一部分模块化。
Nowadays, we modularize some of it.
我们保留核心部分，比如算法和软件。
We keep, like, the real valuable part, the algorithms, the software.
但像这种普通的生物识别验证，有很多专业的服务商可以做。
But, for a commodity, run of the mill biometric check, there's great providers that that'll do it.
在那里根本创造不了任何股权价值。
And zero equity value generated there.
那纯粹就是一项基础服务。
That's just a commodity.
所以用模块化的思维去思考非常重要，这也是我们学到的另一课。
So thinking modularly is very important, and that was another lesson there.
这次出行非常有收获。
Very productive trip.
确实如此。
Yeah.
非常有收获。
Very productive.
这也为你接下来的行程铺平了道路。
And that leads you to the next trip.
你现在在纽约。
You're here in New York.
你刚刚获得了《快公司》颁发的奖项，被评为全球最具创新力的金融科技公司之一。
You're receiving an award from the fast company, most innovative fintech companies in the world.
你们是怎么从哥伦比亚做到这一点的？
How do you achieve that from Colombia?
确实如此。
Yeah.
这可是件大事。
This was this is this is a big deal.
我们之前聊过，现在平时很少出差，但这次真的值得破例。
And we were talking before the podcast that we travel very rarely these days, but this was this was worth the the exception.
所以，是的，我们一直
So, yeah, we've been
全球的投资人终于在过去的五年里，注意到了你之前提到的这一点。
named Investors in the world finally woke up past five years to your earlier point.
没错。
Yes.
就是这样。
Exactly.
我们被《快公司》评为全球金融科技领域第三最具创新力的公司。
So we've been named the third most innovative company in fintech by Fast Company globally.
我觉得，我们确实更用心地讲好了自己的故事，但真正的原因是，在过去两年里，我们长期投入的项目终于开花结果，让我们推出了非常令人兴奋的产品。
Look, I think there's obviously a little bit of our being a little more disciplined in telling our story, but the real story is in the last twenty four months, a lot of our long term investments have really paid off and have allowed us to ship extremely exciting product.
对吧？
Right?
我们打造了一个基于单体仓库的统一数据架构，当大语言模型真正可用之后，这让我们虽然不能说轻而易举，但至少能够规模化地推动它们落地。
You know, we built a monorepo based unified data architecture company that once LLMs became workable, made it, I'm not gonna say very easy, but made it feasible to like drive them at scale.
所以现在，我们公司拥有全国增长最快的市场平台，还建成了国内最成熟、规模最大的闭环支付网络之一。
So, you know, today, have a company that has a major, has the fastest growing marketplace, has one of the most viable and at scale closed loop payment networks in the country.
我们在全国1100座城市中的1000多座都部署了自己的支付系统。
We are in over a thousand cities, in a country with 1,100 cities with our own payment rails.
所有的清算和结算都由我们自主研发的技术完成。
We do our own clearing, our own settlement, all in our own tech.
当然，既然现在是2026年，我们在人工智能方面也做了很多非常出色、有影响力的工作。
And then I think, obviously, because we live in the year 2026, we've done extremely attractive and powerful things on AI.
我们自主研发了智能客服代理，目前完全承担了所有客户服务请求。
So we built our own in house agents that currently handle a 100% of all customer service scores.
这些代理处理了全部请求，其中近八成的问题都能直接解决。
They handle a 100%, and they resolve close to 80%.
全程无需人工介入，问题一次性彻底解决。
So full resolution, no human in the loop.
所以根本不需要再转接或分派任务。
So there's not a lot of dispatching.
完全由人工处理的完整解决方案。
Oh, the human full resolution.
商户入驻也是同样的情况。
The same thing on a merchant onboarding.
我们有个商户入驻代理，每个月能处理两三千家商户的入驻。
We have a merchant onboarding agent that allows us to board over two to 3,000 merchants a month.
同样是这套系统。
Same stuff.
处理率达百分之百，转化率提升了超过百分之二十。
A 100% handle rate, over 20% improvement in conversion.
今年晚些时候，我们将推出自己的Transformer模型。
We're launching our own transformer later this year.
很多这些做法，当你亲眼看到的时候，我们一直以顶尖水平为标杆，现在有几项成果已经让我们真正接近那个层次了。
So a number of these things that I think when you when you see it, we've always, you know, we've always benchmarked ourselves against the best, and there are a number of things we've done that I think are now putting us in that direction.
我们公司用英语运营是有原因的——无论现在我们在哥伦比亚，始终希望吸引全球顶尖人才。
I mean, there's a reason we run the company in English, which is we always want as talent even though we're now in Colombia.
用哥伦比亚式的英语经营公司，听起来很反直觉，但你一想明白就懂了。
It's very counterintuitive that you run a company in Colombian English, but it is not once you think about Yeah.
因为世界级的市场在那里。
Where the world class market is.
我们非常感恩，能和这样的团队并肩确实让人谦卑，这同时也是对我们过去四五年巨大投入的回报。
So I think we're very grateful, and and and it's pretty humbling to be in in in such company, but it's also just, I think, the recognition of four, five years of incredible investments panning up.
说到AI，我刚和你们一起工作时就发现，和美国不一样，在美国你可以搭建金融业务，每一层都有别的公司提供现成的服务。
Maybe just to to stick on AI, I think one of the one of the things I learned when we first started working together is unlike in The US where you can build financial services and then every piece of the stack, there's some other company doing it as a service.
但在哥伦比亚，这些服务根本不存在。
Like, none of that existed in Colombia.
对吧？
Right?
就像你说的，KYC流程可能没什么壁垒，但当时根本找不到现成的第三方服务可以直接接入。
To your point, like, KYC might be undefensible, but it's not like there was another service that you could just bolt in there.
所以Addi确实走了一条独特的路。
And so I think Addi has got a real history.
你们得自己搭建整个贷款管理系统，每一层都得从零做起。
You had to build your own loan management system of just having to build every layer of that stack.
所以能不能聊聊，你们是怎么想到要让Addi全面转向AI的？当时是怎么决定从哪里开始的？
And so maybe talk about how did you approach like, think you were very fast on we need to rethink, Addi, to be very AI forward.
你们是怎么决定先从哪里入手的？
How did you how did you decide where to start?
我觉得我们其实七年前就做了两个关键决定，直到今天还在帮我们。
So I would say we actually started seven years ago when we made two foundational decisions that to this day help us.
第一个决定是，我们选择用单一代码库来构建公司，而不是微服务架构。
The first one was we built a company on a mono repo as opposed to microservices.
现在单一代码库特别流行。
Mono repos today are all the rage.
Anthropic就是用单一代码库搭建的。
Anthropics built on a mono repo.
谷歌就更不用说了，众所周知，他们就是一家用单一代码库的公司。
Google, obviously, famously is a mono repo company.
但我们刚创业的时候，微服务才是主流。
But when we started the company, microservices was where it was at.
那你们当时为什么做这个决定？
So why did you make the decision?
是什么让你有远见做出这样的选择？
Or what gave you the forethought to make it?
我请来了业内最顶尖的CTO。
I hired the best CTO in the business.
我现在能说清楚原因，但当时他直接说：你们都傻。
I'd be like, you know, now I can tell you exactly why, but he was like, you're all idiots.
我们就建单体仓库。
We're gonna build a monorepo.
单体仓库的好处，对不了解的人来说，就是所有代码都放在一个仓库里。
And the monorepo gives you, obviously, you know, for folks who don't know what the monorepo is is basically all your code is in a single repository.
这样AI代理读取起来要简单得多，总比分散在公司各个角落的多个代码库强。
So for agents to read it, it's a lot easier than if you have multiple code bases in many parts of the org.
而且它们在经济上也有很大优势，因为重复代码极少。
They also have some extreme economic advantages because there's very little duplication.
组件几乎可以自动复用。
You reuse components almost automatically.
我们有六十位产品工程师在支持一个极其庞大的产品体系。
You know, we have 60 product engineers supporting a gigantic product surface.
所以，采用单体仓库这个决定，让我们能够顺利推进人工智能项目。
So MonoRepo was kind of canonical decision one that allowed us to drive AI.
第二个原因是，我们公司是基于事件溯源架构搭建的，也就是说，公司里发生的每一个事件都会被记录下来——比如我们给你发了条消息，你往购物车里加了东西，你的信用评分，或者你的财务数据，全都算在内。
And the second one is, you know, we built a company using an event sourcing architecture, which means that every single event that happens at this company gets logged, and events are anything from we texted you to you add something to our shopping cart, to your bureau score, to your financial everything.
你知道我们每天能生成多少事件吗？
You know, we generate over 10 what is it?
每天超过一千万个事件。
Over 10,000,000 events per day.
这两点一直是我们坚持的基础。
So those two things were there.
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关键是，这些基于事件的架构，我们用Kafka跑了这么久，查询起来特别吃力。
Critically, these event architectures, we used Kafka for hours, are brutal to query.
对。
Mhmm.
所以大多数人最后都选择放弃这种做法。
So that's why most people end up moving away from this.
四年前，根本不可能。
And, again, four years ago no.
五年前，我们开始和Databricks合作。
Five years ago now, we partnered with Databricks.
对。
Mhmm.
这意味着你可以实时摄入这些事件数据，把它们转换成向量格式供大语言模型使用，转成SQL格式给传统机器学习模型，当然也保留表格形式——毕竟我们还是有人类员工的。
So what that means is you, in real time, are able to ingest these events and showcase them in vector form for LMs, SQL form for classical machine learning models, obviously, tabular forms for still the humans we've got because we do have some humans.
所以整个系统的核心和基础都已经搭好了。
So the whole the whole engine and foundation was there.
你可以在一个非常稳固的基础上继续发展。
And you're able to build on a very solid foundation.
后来我们介入了，我很幸运能和一支非常务实的团队一起工作，当时的问题是：我们该从哪儿开始？
And then, of course, once we we went in, and I'm lucky enough to work with a great team that is very anti hype, the question was, okay, where do we start?
然后我们反其道而行之，决定先从法务部门入手。
And then we decided to start counterintuitively with legal.
法务部门有两个原因。
And legal has two reasons.
第一，现在有个很棒的巴西公司已经搞明白了——在这些国家，你随时可能被起诉，对吧？
One, and now there's a wonderful Brazilian company that has figured this out, which is you get sued for everything in these countries, right?
比如在哥伦比亚，有一种紧急宪法诉讼，你只有48小时的时间来回应。
So there are these things called in Colombia to tell us, which are emergency constitutional actions, and you get forty eight hours to respond.
如果你没及时回应，公司的法律代表——通常是CEO——就会被关进监狱。
And if you don't respond, the legal representative of the company, usually the CEO, goes to jail.
真的有可能坐牢。
Like, it is liable to go to jail.
这真的事关重大。
Like, it is that high stakes.
还有各种消费者权益方面的索赔，一大堆问题。
And then like that, you have all these consumer protection losses, all these things.
而且回复时间要求极其紧迫。
So with insane response times.
但我们主动选择从不和解，因为那样会开坏先例。
And by by choice, we never settle them because that's the precedent.
在哥伦比亚，有一群人专门靠起诉银行来逼他们删除你的信用记录。
So, you know, and there's a cottage industry in Colombia of people who will be like, oh, we'll sue the bank to get them to remove your credit report.
对，就是这样。
Yep.
银行删掉一条信用记录只花两美分，但你要打这场官司，可能得花几千甚至上万美元。我们有几起案子一路打到了最高法院下面一级，就因为我们坚决不和解。
And it takes the bank cost the bank 2¢ to remove the credit report, and it may cost you a few thousand dollars to fight the lawsuit, maybe $10,000 We've taken a couple all the way up to, like, the little below the Supreme Court because we will just not settle.
因为只有这样，别人才会明白我们的态度。
Because then then people know.
对。
Yep.
这是原则问题。
Matter of principle.
所以我们一开始是从法律层面入手的。
So we started with legal.
因为做法律相关的工作，你得真正用上我之前说的那些坚实基础，但同时还得确保你的大模型表现得极其出色。
Because with legal, you actually need to take this incredible foundation that I was talking about, but you now need to make sure your LLMs work extremely well.
所以你得搭建正确的数据处理流程。
So you need to build the right rack pipelines.
你得设计好反馈机制，还要在内部建立强化学习和人类反馈的闭环，因为48小时倒计时已经开始了。
You need to build the right kind of feedbacks and effectively RL, IHF in house loops because forty eight hour clock starts.
你需要整合每一位客户的所有客服互动记录、核心财务数据、交易历史日志等等。
You need all the data from every customer service interaction this customer had, all the data from your financial core, all the data from the transaction history log.
然后把这些信息整理成合理、合法、符合法律规范的格式，准备好让一位资历较浅的律师一看就能说：‘这份材料看起来没问题。’
They need to package this in a way that's sensible, legally allowed with the right presidents, and they need to get it ready for a lawyer, fairly junior lawyer to say, this looks good on print.
我记得当时我们在讨论这个的时候，我说：‘咱们不如像别人一样，先从客服做起吧。’
So and I I remember when we were discussing this, I was like, but let's start with customer service like everyone else.
但我CTO卡洛斯和马uro都直接说：不行。
And Carlos, my CTO, and then Mauro, they were like, no.
这个问题才更难解决。
This is the harder problem
对。
Mhmm.
但这个问题才是能真正规模化的关键。
But this is the one that scales.
首先，我们通过这套系统节省了不少律师，甚至可能更多，因为效率提升得太明显了。
Because all the pipelines we need to build for the a, by the way, we are saving a few lawyers, if not more on this because we're able to get incredible efficiencies.
其次，你想一下，要在48小时内搞定一场可能让CEO坐牢的诉讼，得把所有相关数据、信息、价格全都精准调出来，这有多难。
But b, think about what it think about what it takes to resolve a lawsuit in forty eight hours that otherwise the CEO is liable to go to jail, where you have to pull all the right data, you have to pull all the right information, all the right pricing with great accuracy.
所以我们花了六个月时间来搭建这些系统。
So it was a six month investment to build these pipelines.
我们搭建了这些流程。
We built these pipelines.
然后，不到九十天，我们就推出了客户服务中心的第一个版本，就像我之前说的，一开始就能做到100%的处理率，不是解决率，是处理率。
And then, you know, within ninety days, we had V one of our customer service agent, which, as I mentioned, you know, off the gate, there was crazy off the gate, a 100% resolution, a 100%, not resolution, a 100% handling.
一开始的解决率就达到了60%。
And off the gate, it was 60% resolution.
真厉害。
Wow.
因为如果你能解决一场诉讼，那大多数客户问题都能处理了。
Because if you could resolve a lawsuit, you could resolve most customer service interactions.
圣地亚哥，我。
Santiago, I
我想稍微聊聊你提到的关于人才和打造优秀公司这一点，因为我们投资过几家拉美公司，发现一个明显的区别：那些能吸引全球人才的公司，往往更容易成功。
wanted to touch a little bit on a point that you mentioned about talent and building a great company because, you know, we we invested in a couple of companies in Latin America, and one differentiation that we've seen is people that attract global talent tend to have a larger success case.
我很好奇，以你在美国工作、同时在拉美创业的经历来看，你是怎么看待吸引顶尖人才的？又是怎么打造一个能在这个时代吸引这类人才的团队的？
And I wanted, you know, from your experience having worked in The US and also building in Latin America, you know, curious how you think about attracting the best talent and how you build an organization that can attract this talent from this era.
是的
Mhmm.
对
Yeah.
这其实是我个人特别在意的事，因为我之前在一些公司待不长，就是因为觉得同事水平不够。
It's so it's been a so I think I would say it's been a selfish focus of mine because I think one of the reasons I didn't last as long as I did in some of my jobs is I just thought my teammates were not great.
所以当我决定自己创业的时候，我就想
So I think when I when I decided to start my own company, I was like
我可以自己选团队。
I have control of picking my teammates.
我只能做到
I can only point
我就是，嗯，没错。
I just I yeah.
没错。
Exactly.
我能自己选一起工作的人。
I get to choose who I work with.
你知道的，我们上周刚招待了他们。
And as I you know, we hosted them last week.
我们每年面对面聚会六次。
We meet, like, six times a year in person.
我说了，兄弟们，和你们一起工作真的特别开心——这可是真心话。
In And real time, I said I said, guys, I just have a great time working with all of you, which is true.
但我花了不少时间才走到这一步。
I don't I it took me a while to get to to get to that place.
我们对人才的考量有好几个角度。
But how we thought about talent was multiple ways.
我之前提过，我们公司用英语运营。
One, I think I mentioned earlier, we run the company in English.
我们公司用英语运营。
And we run the company in English.
显而易见的好处是，这让我们能吸引非西语人才。
The obvious reason is it allows us to attract non Spanish speaking talent.
不太明显但后来我们发现的是，会说西语的人才也想加入优秀公司。
The non obvious reason, which we figured out later, was Spanish speaking talent wants to work for great companies.
而用英语运营，实际上提升了整个标准。
And being in English actually there is a certain raising of the bar.
一种溢价。
A premium.
这就是一种溢价。
It's a premium.
没错。
Yeah.
确实有这种吸引力，大家都想要这种环境。
There is a certain and people want that.
我记得我们回哥伦比亚的时候，我和联合创始人聊过这件事。
And I remember when we went back to Colombia, my cofounder and I were discussing.
他问，我们是不是该转用西班牙语了？
He's like, oh, should we now migrate to Spanish?
因为用英语运营公司其实有个很大的成本，很简单的一个问题。
Because there's a huge tax about running the company in English, an easy one.
我们所有文案都是英文的，但客户想看西班牙语版本，就得再翻译一遍。
All our copies in English, and then it needs to get translated because our customers wanna see it in Spanish.
我们聊到这儿，我就说：不用。
And we were discussing this, and then I was like, no.
我们没搞过正式的高管外出会议，但每年会办一次类似的管理层活动。
We we we had we had not quite an exec off-site, but more like a manager.
每年一次，我们会把整整两百人都召集起来。
Once a year, we do this thing, and we brought the full 200 of them.
他们大多数都是本地员工。
And most of them are local.
但关键是，只要让他们亲身经历一下，想法就会改变。
But the fact that they get to like, it changes their mind.
我们在这儿是为了认真做事，因为我们用的是英语。
It's like, we are here to do serious work because we're we're in English.
你懂我的意思吧？
You know what I mean?
所以我就说，那确实是个关键点。
So I was like, there's that was a piece.
我们公司用英语运营，这反而吸引了本地人才。
The so we run the company in English, which actually counterintuitively attracts local talent.
我们还设定了很高的标准，而且不断把标准拉得更高。
The other thing we've done is we have a very high bar, and we push the bar very high.
我们对工作内容要求非常严格。
And we're very editorial.
我们对同事和团队成员交付的东西，要求特别细致。
And we're very editorial on what we wanna see from our colleagues and teammates.
我的想法一直很明确：不一定非得要很多人达到这个水平，但只要有一两百人能做到就够了。
And my view has always been there may not that me that many of them, but we only need, you know, a few 100 of that.
在三十亿到四十亿的人才池里，我们完全有能力找到这样的人。
And in whatever 300, 400,000,000 pool of people, we should be able to get this.
这还涉及到另一点，就是我们区域性招聘。
And that speaks to the other one, which is we hire regionally.
我还要说，我们是一家远程优先的公司。
I would also say we're also a remote first company.
在考虑AI应用时，我们认为远程办公其实是个巨大的优势，因为它确保所有信息都是明确的，也让AI代理能有效利用这些信息。
As we think about our AI adoption, we actually think being a remote company is a huge competitive advantage because it ensures all the context is explicit, and it allows agents to work on that context.
举个极端的例子，如果我们三个人现在正在创业，根本不会互相发备忘录。
Like, if if you want to take an extreme example, the three of us were building a company right now, we wouldn't be sending memos to each other.
我们更可能直接在白板上讨论，然后让AI代理来跟进——但AI很难掌握这种非正式的上下文。
We'd probably just be hashing things out on a board, and then we want an agent to prop on like, it's just hard for the agent to have context.
我们公司有很多正式的API接口。
We have a lot of, like, formal APIs at the company Yeah.
这些接口让AI代理可以轻松调用并自主运行。
That allow agents to grab them and run with them.
另一点是我们为员工提供绝佳的发展机会。
And then the other piece is we give people great development opportunities.
我们有一个模式，就是引进世界级的领导者，虽然每次招聘都要花上九个月，但我们在这方面越来越擅长。
So we we have a model where we bring world class leaders, and we become very good at hiring them even though each search takes, like, nine months.
真的不是吹的。
True story.
然后我们培养年轻有为的人才。
And then we train young up and coming talent.
这种组合的力量非常强大。
And that combo is extremely powerful.
说到这个，我们之前在录播客前也聊过，在硅谷，你根本不可能不被AI裹挟。
And then related to that, and we were talking about this before the podcast, it is impossible not to be AI pilled if you're in the valley.
你就站在咖啡馆里看看。
Like, just stand in a coffee shop.
你听到的全是关于AI的讨论。
It's the only conversations you're gonna hear.
你走在街上，
You walk down the street.
能撞上五个来自实验室的人，
You bump into five people from labs.
但在波哥大可没这种氛围。
That is not the environment in Bogota.
确实没有。
No.
你显然有个大力推动AI的CTO，
How so you obviously had a CTO that was leaning into it.
你自己也在积极跟进，
You were leaning into it.
但你们是怎么让整个团队文化这么快就转变的？
But how did you get your organization culturally moving as quickly as you have?
我觉得，跟我们之前做过的几次转型是一样的方式。
I think the same way we've done a few of these transformations.
对吧？
Right?
四年前，我们就下定决心了，不管多难，一定要赚钱，尤其是2022年夏天。
Like, four years ago, we're like, we're gonna make money come hell or high water, summer of twenty twenty two.
我记得有一天，就是那样。
I was just like, one day, I remember.
我记得当时为什么这么想。
And I remember why.
那时候我才意识到，这个世界真的变了。
And it's like, I was like, wow, this world has changed.
我觉得可能也是类似的情况。
And I think it was it's it's probably the similar thing.
它就成了公司最优先的事情。
It just becomes the top priority for the company.
当然，像我们这么大的公司、这么广的产品线，我的团队经常提醒我，要处理的优先事项太多了。
Obviously, for a company of our scale and our product surface, as I am reminded often by my team, there are many priorities.
我觉得这话说得在理。
I was like, that's fair.
但这次不一样，这才是关键。
But this is this is the one.
我觉得这其实是由两方面组成的。
I think it it's basically a combination of two things.
一方面，给你提供工具；另一方面，这事儿没得商量。
One, giving you the tools, and then two, it is not optional.
我们对自己现在的位置和想要达到的目标非常清楚。
And we have a very clear view of where we are and where we wanna be.
我们对大家明确说明了标准和期望。
We have been extremely explicit with folks about standards and expectations.
这不会容易。
It's not gonna be easy.
一直以来都不容易。
It hasn't been easy.
比我想的要顺利一些，但我们让员工做的事，跟其他公司一样，都是要求他们在几个月内连续完成三项高难度任务。
It has been easier than I thought, but we're asking our workforce the same way everyone is asking their workforce to undertake, like, three high jumps in sequence in a span of months.
不过你知道吗，像现在大多数人一样，我每周一都会给公司发一封邮件，后来突然就变成了每月一个主题。
But, you know, I I I send I send like, most people do these days, I send a note to the company every Monday, and it suddenly it became month thematic.
我当时就想，我做的另一件事是，对。
And I was like and the other thing I did was Mhmm.
在我真正下定决心推动这件事之前，我先自己搭了一套系统。
Before I got conviction to push this, I built my own stack.
所以我自己申请了云服务资源。
So I got I got my own cloud provisioned.
我开始动手尝试，一路做到了底。
I started playing with and and I went the whole way.
那时候我完全是自己在做DevOps。
So I was doing my own DevOps.
我亲自部署和配置服务器实例。
I was provisioning my instances.
我还在申请自己的API密钥。
I was getting my own API keys.
我能真正地深入折腾那些核心工具。
I can just really playing with the core tooling.
那特别有意思，因为我和CTO晚上十点还在发消息。
It was so fun because, like, my I I my CTO and I would text at 10PM.
我就跟他说：嘿。
I was like, hey.
亚马逊上这个东西出问题了。
This thing on Amazon is breaking.
他回我：你这是在搞什么？
He's like, what are you doing with this?
我当时只是在要一些跟AI本身完全无关的运维支持，但我就是想把整个端到端的系统都搭起来。
Like, I was just literally asking for DevOps style support that had nothing to do with the actual AI, but I was like, I wanna build the whole end to end stack.
我不想只是凑热闹，现在到处都是搞智能代理的跟风者。
I don't wanna just play because there's a lot of now agent rappers.
对吧？
Right?
所以他们会说，把所有这些MCB都连上，然后就能飞起来了。
So they'll be like, hook all these MCBs, and you're off the races.
我说，不行。
I was like, no.
我想自己搞一个。
I wanna build my own.
于是我从一个空的EC2实例开始。
So I I started from a empty EC two instance.
从那以后，我们一步步把所有东西都搭建起来了。
And from there, we built everything.
当我意识到，如果我在这种规模下都能用，而且在会议间隙也能轻松操作，那整个公司都应该能用。
And once I figured out, okay, if this is helpful for me at this scale, and if I'm able to do this kind of in between meetings, basically, then the entire company should be able to do this.
然后和合作伙伴一起讨论，天啊，我们现在有了四个非常强大的支柱，对吧？
And then working with the partners, saying, God, now we've got a very powerful kind of four pillars, right?
我们来聊聊客户支持团队Addi，我们管他们叫客服代理，之前也提过他们。
So we talk about, A, our customer service, Addi, we call our agents, and we've talked about them.
我们在大力投入Transformer技术，自己用GPU训练属于我们的GPT类模型。
You know, we're investing in transformers, So we're building our own transformers using own GPUs to train our own kinda like GPT of sorts.
我们把它叫做Addi DNA，早期效果非常惊人。
We call it Addi DNA with incredible early results.
当然，我们也在全面重构整个工程代码库。
Obviously, we've got kinda like our whole refactoring of the engineering code base.
我们正逐步从反应式Java转向更声明式的编程方式，让代码本身更像硬逻辑。
So we we're moving away mostly from reactive Java to more declarative language, so kinda code as hardness.
早期成果已经非常显著。
And we've seen extremely powerful early results.
我们刚上线了新版的网页商城。
We just shipped a version of our web marketplace.
我们的商城集成在App里，因为我们主打的是App优先的策略。
So, you know, our marketplace is in our app because we're very app centric.
是的
Mhmm.
但把平台放到网页上，是个很棒的获客方式。
But having it on web, great customer acquisition tool.
这样TikTok和谷歌都能抓取到你的内容。
It also allows TikTok to index you, Google to index.
好处太多了。
It's just a lot of benefits.
但我们以前总是觉得，得花六到九个月，五个工程师，六十个产品工程师。
But we would always be like, man, it takes six to nine months, five engineers, 60 product engineers.
真不一定能达到预期标准。
Not quite sure it hits the bar.
三个工程师就能一次搞定。
Three engineers to once.
对
Mhmm.
太棒了。
Awesome.
那这就是关键部分。
Then that that's the piece.
最后一块是我在花最多时间做的，虽然短期内经济影响最小，就是把公司运营模式改成以代理和AI为先。
And then the last piece, is the one that I'm spending most of the time, even though it has the least economic impact in the short term, is changing the operating model of the company to be kind of agent and AI first.
在这方面，我们已经取得了不错的进展，
And that's where we are making great inroads,
但和其他方面比起来，我们还是落后不少。
but we're we're further behind against the other ones.
Addi有意思的地方在于，它是在AI出现之前就创立的，而你们刚才提到的是在拉美金融领域的机遇。
One thing that's very interesting about Addi is that, you know, it started pre AI, and we're obviously using you you described opportunity in financial services in in Latin America.
想听听你的看法，如果能回到当年和Santi一起创业的时候，你会给那些听播客、正在创业的人，尤其是拉美和全球的创业者，哪些建议？要特别注意些什么？
Curious if you could share some thoughts, if if you were to go back to Santi when you were starting the company back then, what would be some of those lessons that things to watch out, especially for entrepreneurs that listen to the podcast and starting companies, not only in Latin America but globally?
不过，真的很想听听你的分享。
But, yeah, it would be great to hear from you.
首先，你要记住，你是一家科技公司。
The first one is remember you're a technology company.
我们做得最出色的一件事，只是五年后才变得明显，那就是我们在技术上的投入。
If there's one thing we did extremely well, but only became obvious five years down the line was our investments in technology.
就像我们现在聊的，我们已经有两百多个智能代理在实际运行了。
Like, this stuff that we're talking about about having we have over 200 agents in production.
我们的服务成本控制得非常出色。
We have incredible cost to serve economics.
所有这些优势，都源于我们是一家科技公司。
All these things are only possible because we're a technology company.
真的如此。
Truly.
几年前，公司管理层里有些人每周都会讨论，工程师把代码推到生产环境后，编译要花多长时间。
And, you know, we we would have some people on the management team because for about a year or three years ago, we would spend every week talking about how long it would take to compile when an engineer pushed the code into production.
那时候编译时间从不到十分钟，拖长到了三十三分钟。
And it would it it had gone from sub ten minutes to thirty three minutes.
我们把这当成一个严重的问题来对待。
And we treated this as like as a major problem.
对。
Mhmm.
所以我们就在想，为什么我们要浪费时间在这上面？
And so we were like, why do why are we even wasting time on this?
但你猜怎么着？
But it's like, guess what?
一百个工程师，每人每天两次，每次二十分钟，加起来就是海量的时间。
Like, you know, a 100 engineers times twenty minutes twice a day, that's a lot of minutes.
这让你明白，你不可能某天突然说一句‘我是科技公司’就完事了。
But it just gives you a sense that you cannot just one day show up and be like, oh, I'm a technology company.
我觉得我们在这方面做得特别好，一部分是因为早期做了几个正确的基础决策，另一部分是因为我们真的清楚这一点。
So I think it's something we did extremely well in part because we made some early good founding decisions, but in part because we actually knew that.
尤其是在拉丁美洲，人们很容易忘记这一点。
And I think particularly in Latin America, it is very easy to forget that.
人们总是把技术当成事后想法，或者只是个辅助工具。
And people treat technology kind of as an afterthought or as an enabler.
但我们觉得，不，这是一家真正的科技公司。
We're like, no, no, this is a real technology company.
而你的大部分股权价值，其实正是在这里慢慢积累起来的。
And and that's actually where a lot of your equity value eventually compounds.
我想说的第二个经验是，刚开始的时候要慢一点。
The second lesson I would say is go a bit slower at the beginning.
那会很好。
That'd be great.
回想我们早期那些差点倒闭的经历，其实只要放慢一点节奏，全都可以避免。
If I think about some of our early near death experiences, they could have all been avoided by going a little bit slower.
一开始我们遇到过几起严重的欺诈事件，就是因为跑得太快了。
We had some awful fraud experiences at the beginning, and it was because we were just going too fast.
但别忘了，那时候正是拼命赶工的年代。
But again, remember, right, this was the go go years.
所以在那个快速扩张的年代，你必须跑得特别快。
So in the go go years, you have to go very fast.
最后一点是，野心要大，但实现的方式一定要反其道而行之。
And then the last piece is be very big in your ambition, but be very contrarian in how you get there.
就在今天早上，我参加了一个会议，心里直嘀咕：天哪。
Even this morning, was on a in a meeting, and I was like, oh my god.
这条路看起来太普通了，根本不是你想去的地方该走的路。
This just feels very conventionally a con conventional path to get into where you wanna get.
这听起来挺 obvious，但在拉美，大家普遍觉得该去巴西、墨西哥，或者在多个市场浅浅地铺一层。
So it it sounds obvious, but particularly in LatAm, the conventional wisdom in that case was go to Brazil, Mexico or thin layer across many markets.
我不是说我们的做法适合所有人。
And I'm not saying our playbook is the right one for everyone.
当然，有些情况确实适合在多个市场做浅层覆盖。
You know, there might be cases where you should go thin layer many markets.
但别让野心被商业常识拖垮了，否则就一点突破都没了。
But don't let your ambition fall prey of commercial wisdom because then there's no there's no alpha.
对吧？
Right?
如果你只是跟着大流走，根本拿不到超额回报。
If if you're a consensus play, there's just no alpha.
这三点是核心，再加一个加分项：找个出色的联合创始人。
Those would be the three the three and then maybe bonus, have a great cofounder.
我觉得我们可以再多聊聊你现在的公司管理方式。
I think it'd be interesting to talk a little bit more about how you're running the company now.
你确实有些独特的做法，最近你转向了用北极星指标替代一大串季度OKR。
And you do you do a few unique things, but one of the ones that you've moved to recently is North Star metric versus long list of quarterly OKRs.
没错。
Right.
北极星指标长期以来一直是公司运作的核心原则。
So the North Star metric was the foundational organizing principle of the company for a very long time.
它现在依然是，不过我们也在不断调整它。
It it remains so, but we're we're playing with it.
但当初我们特别讨厌OKR，我觉得它们太繁琐了。
But it it started when we always hated OKRs because I found OKRs to be very heavy.
真的，太沉重了。
Like, just so heavy.
就觉得，行吧。
Was like, okay.
五条OKR，每条下面还要再分五条。
Five OKRs, five OKRs per OKRs.
这么一来，公司层面就有二十五项了。
So now we're 25 things.
我光是看公司这一层就已经够呛了。
I'm gonna look at just for the company.
如果你还讲究纯正的层级 cascading，那就更麻烦了。
And then if you're being purist, then you cascade them.
一下子就得应付一百五十项任务。
So suddenly, you have, like, a 150 things.
我最近在推特上看到一篇特别棒的文章，是红杉的投资人肖恩·马圭尔写的，讲的是X公司到底会不会成功。
And I recently read this incredible post on Twitter by by this this Sequoia investor, Sean Maguire, about why X was gonna win or not.
我不打算具体聊这个，但那篇文章对马斯克如何管理公司分析得特别透彻。
And, you know, I don't wanna talk about that in particular, but it was an incredible treatise on how Elon Musk runs his companies.
我们最后意识到，他把所有时间都花在了最重要的事情上。
And what we end up realizing is he spends all his time on the most important thing.
对。
Mhmm.
其他所有事，他几乎不花时间。
And very little time on everything else.
所以我觉得，我们后来把这当成了核心方向，因为到了2022年夏天，我们终于明白，股权融资市场暂时是走不通了。
So I think the north star became that because we ended up realizing, again, summer of twenty twenty two, equity capital markets are done, at least for a while.
我们得自己赚钱。
We need to make money.
这其实是一个非常实用的行动准则。
And it should be considered it's a very useful organizing principle.
我们现在赚了这么多钱。
We're making this this amount of dollars.
但亏得更多。
We're losing a lot more.
我们第一步该调整什么，才能不亏钱？
What is the first thing we can move to not lose money?
我们一开始从风险调整后的利润率入手。
As we started with risk adjusted margin.
然后转到毛利润率。
Then we went to gross margin.
接着是毛利润减去销售和市场费用，最后干脆直接看EBITDA。
Then we went to gross margin minus sales and marketing, and finally we're like, okay, EBITDA.
现在我们甚至开始优化税务，因为想把收入最大化。
And now these days we even optimize our taxes because we're trying to optimize that income.
这样一来，讨论就聚焦多了。
So it just focuses the discussion.
顺便说一下，这个方法效果很好，但现在你有了三个差异很大的业务线，我们开始更细致地调整，琢磨到底该定哪些核心指标，我们管它们叫L1指标。
By the way, it worked really well, but now that you have three very different business lines, we're starting to play with it a little bit more and saying, what are the but so we call them the l one metrics.
就是一两个，最多三个我们想追踪的关键指标。
One or two, maybe three KPIs that we wanna track.
但就算这样，也只定三个，不是五个、七个。
But it's it but even then, it's three, not five, seven.
因为一旦超过五个、七个，没人能记得住。
Because once you get to five and seven, no one no one knows him.
那样就太难操作了。
So that becomes hard.
对。
Yeah.
如果公司里每个人都说不出这些指标，那说明你定得太多了。
If everybody at the company can't name them, then you've got too many.
这一点在关注盈利能力时特别明显。
Which was a great thing about profitability.
没错。
Yep.
顺便说一句，说实话，我们实现盈利后遇到的最大挑战之一，就像狗追上了公交车——追上了，然后呢？
And by the way, for what it's worth, I actually think one of the biggest challenges we had after we hit profitability is kinda like the dog that catch the bus.
他们说：‘我们盈利了。’
And they were like, profitable.
接下来怎么办？
Now what?
但其实我们早就知道这一点，只是它在过去三年里，一直是每周业务复盘的核心议题。
But but now it turns out we we knew we knew it, but but it, like, it was such a core thing of every weekly business review for for for three years.
可真到了这一天，我们反而得花大量时间向全公司做普及，因为我们不再每周提它了。
Then once we actually got there, we even had to do a lot of, like, company education because we start we stopped talking about it on a weekly basis.
就像没人会说‘你上班得穿得得体’一样——这本来就是理所当然的。
But we said the same way that no one says you should show up to work wearing appropriate clothing.
盈利，就是这么一回事。
That's like that is profitability.
这只是一个基本期望。
It's just, an expectation.
因为大家会想，如果我们不提这件事，是不是又会回到不盈利的状态？
Like, we've gotten because people are like, well, if we don't talk about it, can we be unprofitable again?
我们的回答是：不可能。
And we're like, no.
你不可能再回到那种状态。
You cannot be.
这已经成了我们日常工作中理所当然的一部分。
It's just just unnecessary part of what we do.
对。
Yeah.
我觉得你很早就确立了另一个原则，而且一直系统性地坚持执行，那就是所有事情都要写下来。
And I think the other the other principle that you instituted very early on and have been very systematic about enforcing it is that everything is written down.
就连那些显而易见、觉得没必要记录的事，你也确保它们都被写了下来。
Like, even obvious shit that feels like maybe it shouldn't be written down, you managed to get written down.
所以，这一点在智能代理的世界里，后来证明特别有远见。
And so let me talk through like, that turns out to be very prescient in the world of agents.
你们所有的标准操作流程本质上都是写下来的，但当初在还没有这种必要性的时候，是什么促使你们这么做的呢？
All of your SOPs are by definition written down, but what drove that before there was that kind of necessity?
最初的洞察其实并不是因为智能代理要来了。
So the original insight was certainly not agents are coming.
我最初的启发是，我读过不少关于早期亚马逊文化的资料，特别是他们用备忘录的方式。
The original insight was a, I had read enough about the early Amazon culture with the memos.
对。
Mhmm.
另外，我当过顾问，也去过不少地方，看到很多人用PPT来假装在思考。
But, b, I had been a consultant and I had been in enough places where PowerPoint was used to just model thinking.
那时候我就想，好吧。
Then I was like, okay.
我们可不想这样。
We don't wanna do that.
还有第三点，我觉得你可能也见过，就是当你在打造一家公司的时候，总会列出一些宣称的价值观，但你心里其实想：算了吧。
And then c, which is I think where what you probably have seen is as we build a company you know, as you build a company, you have some stated values that you're like, nah.
我们实际上并不认同那些所谓的价值观。
We're actually not that's actually not a value.
我们根本不在乎这些东西。
Like, we don't value that.
但有些原本没说出来的价值观，反而变得特别重要。
But there are some even originally unstated values that become extremely powerful.
其中一个就是：你能说清楚为什么吗？
And one of them was, can you articulate the why?
即使那个理由看起来再明显，你也能说得清楚吗？
And can you articulate the why even if it's the most obvious why.
从那时起，对我们来说，让每个人都把想法写下来变得至关重要。
And that's when, for us, it became extremely important for everyone to write things down.
而且我们从很早以前，甚至在疫情之前，就一直是远程优先的模式，尤其是在工程和产品团队。
And even you know, we we were always remote first for engineering and product, even pre COVID.
疫情之后，大家都走了，事情反而变得简单了。
And post COVID, everyone left, then it became very easy.
但即使我们还在办公室的时候，也会打印备忘录，让大家读一读、批注一下，然后提问题。
But even when we were in in person, we would just print memos and just have people read the thing and mark it up and ask questions.
因为我觉得每家公司都特别独特，而我本人也特别固执。
Because it I I I think it's just all these companies are very idiosyncratic, and I'm very idiosyncratic.
最让我受不了的就是，别人根本说不清自己为什么要做这些事。
And one of things that drives me nuts is when people don't know why they're doing things.
所以我们干脆定下规矩：你必须能说清楚自己为什么这么做。
So then we we basically said, well, you always gotta be able to say why you're doing things.
顺便说一句，我也包括在内。
By the way, myself included.
对吧？
Right?
每周我都会遇到管理团队里的人问我：你能不能说清楚，为什么这个想法是好的？
Like, I will tell you once a week, someone on the management team will be like, well, can you just articulate why this is a good idea?
即使我们成了银行，有些管理层的人还是说，我知道你觉得这是个好主意。
And even when we became a bank, some of the folks on management were like, I understand you think it's a great idea.
但我真不明白。
I don't understand it.
你能写个备忘录，解释一下为什么你觉得当银行是个好主意吗？
So would you mind just writing a note explaining why you think becoming a bank is a good idea?
就是为了确保这事儿能顺利推进。
So it just so it it works.
顺便说，在这个过程中，我们不仅承诺要成为银行，还发现了一些原本可能忽略的问题。
And by the way, in that process, we a, we committed to becoming a bank, but b, found a few things that we otherwise would not have found out.
所以，Santi，我们来看看未来。
So Santi, let's look ahead.
如果一切按现在的趋势顺利发展的话。
Everything goes well the way that it's going.
五年后，Addi会是什么样子？
Five years from now, where is Addi?
那伟大的愿景是什么？
What's the great vision?
我们一直
We've been
这么做已经七年半了。
doing this now for seven and a half years.
如果当初我预测到七年半后的今天我们会走到这一步，我恐怕大多数判断都会错，但有几件事我大概能猜对，那些核心的东西应该不会变。
So had I predicted we would be here in seven and a half years, I don't think I would have gotten most things I would have gotten most things wrong, but I think I would have gotten a few things right, which I think will remain the same.
首先，我们致力于推动金融包容和经济发展，不仅在哥伦比亚，也在许多其他国家。
So the first one is we are a force for financial inclusion and economic development, not only in Colombia, but in many countries.
我们找到了一种方法，把零售和商业技术同金融服务结合起来，从而带动经济活动。
Like, we figured out a way of packaging kind of retail and commerce technology with financial services to just drive economic activity.
这种做法带来的影响是巨大的。
And that you see that that has massive impact.
我们见过太多这样的例子，人们因此有能力送孩子上学了。
Like, we we have cases upon cases of people who are able to send their kids to school.
两周前，我们在商户活动上介绍过一位80岁的老人，他当时每月卖1000美元的Briati产品，现在月销售额已经涨到3万美元，而我们占了其中75%。
You know, we just featured featured this eighty year old man two weeks ago in our merchant event who was selling a thousand bucks a month of Briati, and now they sell $30,000 a month, and we're 75% of those sales.
这简直不可思议。
And it's insane.
一年收入超过30万美元啊，而且还是在亚马逊地区，就在亚马逊雨林深处。
It's like, you know, 300 k plus a year, like this in in the Amazon, by the way, down in the Amazon Forest.
就在亚马逊雨林里，就这么干起来了。
Like, this is just, like, out in the Amazon.
所以五年内，我们必须能把这种模式放大到更高的规模，提升两到三个数量级，还要扩展到更多国家。
So in five years' time, we need to be able to do that at even higher scale, two, three orders from magnitude more and in more countries.
这是第一点，而且这种组合非常独特。
That's the first thing that that and it's a very unique combination.
我们不只是金融科技公司，也不只是零售电商平台。
We're not just a fintech or a retail commerce.
就是这两者的结合。
It's just that combo.
另一点是，我们不只是以AI为先，更像是完全由AI驱动的原生平台。
The other piece is we're not only AI first, we're probably mostly AI, AI native.
我跟人力资源负责人聊过，说不如把你头衔改成‘人类与智能体资源负责人’。
You know, I was talking to my head of human resource, I said, we should think about calling you the head of human and agentic resources.
现在你的职责不仅是管人，还要管那些既有人类也有智能体的生产团队，这难道不是一种全新的模式吗？
Like like, is there a different way where you're now in charge of the productivity of the people who produce, and the people who produce are people and agents.
最让我兴奋的是，哪怕是在这个小小的哥伦比亚公司里，我们也能亲身参与这些前沿探索。
So one of the things that I get most excited about is I get to play at even with Addi in this tiny Colombian company, we get to play on the forefront of some of these things.
五年后，我们希望到处都是智能体在运作——这是第二点；第三点是，我们还要成为让人感到快乐、能发挥人生最大潜能的地方，因为他们在推动经济赋权、包容与增长。
And can we so in five years' time, we should have agents running all around the place, and that'd be that'd be and then the third piece is have in five years' time, we need we also need to be the place where people have a great time and do the best work of their lives because they're driving economic empowerment, inclusion, growth.
他们用着顶尖的技术，而技术又反过来支持他们，让他们不断前进。
They're playing with great technology and great technology enabling them, and they keep going.
对吧？
Right?
之前聊 podcast 的时候我说过，我是个很少出差的人。
You know, I'm a we were talking before the podcast that I'm a rare traveler.
咱们就组个小家庭吧。
Let's just have a young family.
这些工作和公司要求太高了，你得确保自己做的是对的事，但同时也要享受其中。
And these jobs and these companies are so demanding that you just need to make sure you're doing them for the right reason, but you're having fun.
所以五年后，我每天去上班的时候，会不会就是那种感觉？
So in five years' time, like, are we like, I go to work.
我简直兴奋得不得了。
I'm I'm so giddy.
每一天，就像安吉拉知道的，总会有新事情发生，但我就是特别兴奋。
And every day there's, as Angela knows, like, there's always something, but I am so giddy.
所以五年后，我们得保持这种兴奋劲儿。
So in five years' time, we need to be giddy.
那时候大概就几百号人吧，顺便说一句，不会更多了。
Like, there are a few 100 people, because it'll be a few 100 people, by the way.
我看不出怎么可能会有一千人。
I I don't see how it'll be a thousand people.
你知道吗，Angela还不知道这事，因为我们还没开夏季董事会，但我们现在比预算少了150个人，业绩却还超了。
You know, Angela doesn't know this because we we haven't yet had our summer board meeting, but, we're running a 150 heads below our budget while exceeding the growth.
整整150人。
Like 150 heads.
天啊。
Wow.
而且你们的服务成本已经——
And your cost to serve is already
我们的服务成本高得离谱。
Our cost to serve is nuts.
我们这么做，并不是要裁员。
And we're running this because we're seeing and it doesn't mean, by the way, that we are cutting heads.
只是说，以我们今年的增长速度来看，本来应该要多招不少人。
It just means that for the growth rate we had, right, we were growing this year again at that rate.
就算有了AI，我们还是得时不时补几个岗位，好支撑业务。
We even with AI, we're like, oh, we gotta make a few hires here or there to support the thing.
而且我们现在进度落后了。
And we're running behind.
所以我们砍掉了这个，以后还会继续砍。
So we cut that thing, and we're gonna keep cutting it again.
我们目前看到的速度和效率都是实实在在的，五年后，想想我们能做成什么样。
So the velocity and efficiencies we're seeing are real, five years down the line, like imagine what we can do.
到那时候，我们可能真要讨论把这事做到星际级别了。
And you know at that point we may be talking about you know taking this interplanterly.
对吧？
Right?
我老问这个问题，我也跟丹尼尔说，你创办这家公司的部分原因，就是想一直往前冲，突破边界。
Like, like, I always ask, and this is something I tell Daniel, I'm like, you part of the reason you build this company is because you always wanna be pushing the envelope a little bit.
我觉得，如果哪天我再也无法突破边界了，那可能就是我该考虑换份工作的时候了——但顺便说一句，突破边界不一定非得在旧金山。
I think the day I can't push the envelope may be the day that I'm like, I may look for a different job, but you get to put and by the way, don't have to be in San Francisco to push the envelope.
我们在波哥大，一样在以独特的方式突破边界。
Like, we're in Bogota and we're pushing the envelope in interesting ways.
当然，方式跟基金会实验室不一样。
Different ways, obviously, than the foundation labs.
但五年后，我们还是得继续突破边界。
But, yeah, in five years, we should still be pushing the envelope.
如果过去五年的情况能说明什么，那五年后我们肯定在搞些疯狂的事，比如喷气背包之类的。
And in five if if the last five years are an indication, I mean, we'll be, you know, we'll be doing crazy stuff with jetpacks or whatever it is that will be there.
但保持这份乐趣和惊奇感，我觉得特别重要，真希望五年后还能看到这一点。
But but maintaining that sense of joy and wonder, I think, is gonna be critical, and I'd love to see that again in five years.
太棒了。
Awesome.
桑蒂，非常感谢你参与我们的对话。
Santi, thank you so much for joining us.
谢谢大家。
Thank you, guys.
很高兴能来。
Was pleasure.
桑蒂。
Santi.
感谢您收听本集的a16z播客。
Thanks for listening to this episode of the a 16 z podcast.
如果您喜欢这集节目，请点赞、评论、订阅，给我们打分或写评价，并分享给您的朋友和家人。
If you like this episode, be sure to like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or a review, and share it with your friends and family.
想收听更多节目，请前往YouTube、Apple Podcast和Spotify。
For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcast, and Spotify.
关注我们在X平台上的账号@a16z，并在Substack订阅我们的频道：a16z.substack.com。
Follow us on x at a sixteen z, and subscribe to our Substack at a sixteen z dot Substack dot com.
再次感谢您的收听，我们下集再见。
Thanks again for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode.
提醒您，本节目内容仅作信息参考，不构成法律、商业、税务或投资建议，也不应用于评估任何投资或证券，且不针对任何a16z基金的投资者或潜在投资者。
As a reminder, the content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business, tax, or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security, and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a sixteen z fund.
请注意，a16z及其关联方可能仍持有本节目所讨论公司的投资。
Please note that a sixteen z and its affiliates may also maintain investments in the companies discussed in this podcast.
如需更多详情，包括我们的投资链接，请访问 a16z.com/discoveries。
For more details, including a link to our investments, please see a 16z.com forward slash disclosures.
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