创始人如何取胜 | 本·霍洛维茨

如果你不觉得自己除了创办公司别无选择，那你还算不上一个伟大的创业者。

You're not a great entrepreneur unless you feel like you don't have a choice but to build the company.

如果你不能用同样优秀的产品击败竞争对手，那你就需要拿出一个明显更好的东西。

If you don't take out a competitor with an equally good product, you need something dramatically better.

我们上市时，过去十二个月的收入只有两百万美元，从两百万一路做到七十五亿。

We went public on $2 million in trailing revenue, two million going to 75.

那是当时的预测。

That was the forecast.

这显然是个糟糕的主意。

That's clearly a bad idea.

疑虑总是会有的。

The doubts are going to be there.

别去理会那些疑虑。

Ignore the doubts.

最糟糕的疑虑不是别人强加给你的，而是你自己给自己设下的。

The worst doubts aren't the ones people put on you, it's the ones that you put on yourself.

如果你的直觉没有沸腾，那你根本就没在努力。

If your guts aren't boiling, you're not even trying.

AI 可能让创业变得容易得多，但成为创始人并不会因此变得轻松。

AI may make it dramatically easier to build a company, but it doesn't make being a founder any easier.

在本期节目中，Andrew Chen 与 a16z 联合创始人 Ben Horowitz 坐下来，探讨 AI 改变了什么，又没改变什么关于创业这件事。

In this episode, Andrew Chen sits down with a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz to talk about what AI changes and what it doesn't about entrepreneurship.

他们讨论了为什么 AI 公司能比以往的技术浪潮更快地触达庞大受众，是否能用小团队打造出十亿美元级别的企业，以及当所有人都能使用类似模型时，什么才能真正构成护城河。

They discuss why AI companies can reach massive audiences faster than previous technology waves, whether billion-dollar businesses can be built with tiny teams, and what actually creates defensibility when everyone has access to similar models.

但他们也深入探讨了技术无法自动化的创业部分：在不确定自己是否正确时做出艰难决定，在不确定性中保持信心，以及当怀疑不可避免地出现时，继续相信自己。

But they also get into the part of company building that technology can't automate: making hard decisions when you don't know if you're right, maintaining confidence through uncertainty, and continuing to bet on yourself when the doubts inevitably show up.

我不知道你还记不记得，很多年前我第一次见到你的时候，我去过 Ben 在 Loudcloud 后来变成 Opsware 的办公室。

I don't know if you remember this, but many years ago when I first met you, so I visited Ben at the Loudcloud turned then Opsware offices.

每个会议室都以一位嘻哈艺术家的名字命名。

Every conference room was named after a hip-hop artist.

我记得那件事。

I remember that.

没错。

That's right.

我当时就想，"好吧，这会是个很特别的人，很特别的文化。"

And I was like, "All right, this is going to be a unique guy, unique culture."

我记得当时问过你，因为你马上就要把公司卖给惠普了，你接下来打算做什么。

And I remember asking you, since you were about to sell the company to HP, what you were going to do next after.

我记得你跟我说你接下来要退休。

And I remember you told me that you were going to retire next.

你就是这么说的。

That's what you said.

我当时太累了。

I was tired.

所以有意思的是，当然，Ben 做的恰恰相反。

And so the funny thing is, of course, Ben has done exactly the opposite of that.

完全是反着来的。

Literally the opposite of that.

所以我的第一个问题是，发生了什么？

So my first question is, what happened?

你决定不退休了，反而做了相反的事。

You decided not to retire, you decided to do the opposite.

这是怎么发生的？

How did that come about?

我有了另一个想法。

I had another idea.

生活很大一部分在于把你的想法付诸实践。

A lot of what life is about is getting your ideas out.

所以，我有了一个想法。

So, I had an idea.

我觉得这就是创业者的特质，对吧？

And I think that's what makes an entrepreneur, right?

你有一个想法，你相信它，你想把它实现。

You have an idea, and you believe in your idea, and you want to get it out.

作为创业者，这就是我的本色。

As an entrepreneur, that's who I am.

这就是我必须做的事。

That's what I got to do.

到那时，我别无选择。

I don't have a choice at that point.

所以，除非你觉得自己除了创办公司别无选择，否则你算不上伟大的创业者，因为不然你迟早会放弃。

So you're not a great entrepreneur unless you feel like you don't have a choice but to build the company, because otherwise you're going to quit anyway.

所以，就别想了。

So forget about it.

你见证了互联网的各个阶段。

You've seen so many stages of the internet.

我们经历了桌面软件，然后是网页，接着是移动和云计算，现在又是这个人工智能。

We've had desktop software, then the web, and then mobile and cloud, and then now this AI thing.

人工智能有什么独特和特别之处，让它可能与其他事物相似，或者又有所不同？

What is unique and special about AI that makes it maybe similar or also just different to some of the other stuff?

所以，最让人想起互联网早期的一点是，互联网刚出现的时候，每天你上网都能看到一些非常新奇、很棒的东西。

So the thing that's very reminiscent of the early days of the internet is when the internet first happened, every day you would look out on the internet, and there would be some very new, awesome thing that was going on.

现在AI的情况也绝对是这样。

And that's definitely the case with AI.

所以，我觉得这就是最相似的地方。

So that's what's really similar, I think.

不过其他方面就不太一样了，因为AI是……

Everything else is kind of different, though, in that AI is...

如果你回顾一下计算的历史，也就是这个行业的历史，它一直都是关于网络和计算机的。

So if you think about the history of computing, the history of the industry, it's always been networks and computers.

所以我们有过微波、集成电路、大型机、SNA、个人电脑、局域网、智能手机和互联网。

And so we had microwaves and integrated circuits and mainframes and SNA and PCs and LANs and smartphones and the internet.

这些在技术上非常不同，而且它们的普及曲线也大相径庭。

And they're very different technologically and have very different adoption curves.

但它们之间其实是相互促进的。

But then they really enhance each other.

而且我觉得在这个时代，AI显然就是新的计算机。

And I think in this era, AI is the new computer, very clearly.

它是一台概率计算机，而我们之前用的是确定性计算机。

It's a probabilistic computer where we previously had deterministic computers.

所以从这个角度看，它和互联网很不一样，互联网绝对是一个网络。

And so in that way, it's very different than the internet, which was definitely a network.

而网络有这种采用曲线，可能会因为网络上的人还不够多，而过早地在炒作周期里达到很高的位置。

And networks have these adoption curves that can get very high in the hype cycle too early because there's not enough people on the network.

你能看到它未来的走向，但在它真正达到之前，它还没达到。

You can see where it's going, but until it gets there, it's not there.

所以特别是互联网，如果你回顾一下导致电信大崩溃的互联网泡沫破裂，当时的情况是每个投资者都说：“哦，这是有史以来最伟大的东西。

And so particularly with the internet, if you go back to the great dot-com crash that led to the great telecom crash, what happened was every investor was like, "Oh, this is the biggest thing ever.

我要把所有钱都投入进去。”

I'm going to put all my money into it."

但事实是，在1996年，Netscape只有90%的浏览器市场份额，我们只有5500万用户。

But the truth was there was only, at Netscape in 1996, we had 90% browser share, and we had 55 million users.

所以整个互联网其实没那么大。

And so the whole internet wasn't that big.

而且那时候一半人还在用拨号上网。

And then half of those people were on dial-up.

所以你要是想开发一个互联网应用，得花不少钱，因为得用Sun Microsystems的服务器、EMC的存储设备等等这些。

So you could go build an internet app, and it would cost you a lot of money because you had to use Sun Microsystems servers and EMC storage and all this.

但顶多也就覆盖个三千万人左右，那你就自求多福吧。

But you could get to 30 million people or something, so good luck with that.

那根本算不上什么生意。

That's not really a business.

所以整个行业先崩了，然后才重建起来。

And so the whole thing kind of collapsed before it rebuilt.

但最终它还是会发展起来的。

But eventually, it was going to get there.

而AI就不一样，一旦它管用，几乎立刻就能吸引海量用户。

Whereas with AI, when it works, almost instantly, you can get to a giant number of users.

我们看到的公司增长速度比以往任何公司都快，因为你不需要更多的人加入网络。

We've seen companies grow faster than any companies we've ever seen because you don't need more people on the network.

这已经不是问题了。

That's not a thing.

互联网已经普及了。

The internet's already here.

每个人都在上面，你只需要把你的东西放上去，他们就能访问。

Everybody's on it, and all you have to do is put your thing up, and they can get to it.

所以在这方面非常不同。

So it's very different in that way.

让整个行业震惊的一件事是，LLM在编写代码方面表现得如此出色。

One of the amazing things that I think everyone in the industry is so shocked by is how good LLMs are at writing code.

谁会想到呢？

And who would've thought?

所以有一种想法是，也许构建软件、编写软件会变得像在互联网上创建内容一样容易。

And so there's this idea that maybe building software, writing software, becomes as easy as creating content on the internet.

有一种想法是，也许最终会出现很多由小得多的团队打造的十亿美元公司。

There's the idea that maybe you end up with a bunch of billion-dollar companies being built with much smaller teams.

也许它会进一步实现地理上的民主化，或者也许会出现单人创业者打造出十亿美元……

Maybe it becomes even further geographically democratized, or maybe there's going to be solopreneurs with billion-dollar...

所有这些不同的情况。

All those variations.

你同意这种看法吗？

Do you agree with that?

你认为这会带来哪些风险？

What risks do you think come with that?

你认为这是一个持久的趋势，还是最终仍然需要扩大企业规模？

Do you think that's a lasting trend, or do you think you need to still scale businesses, ultimately?

嗯，我想我们拭目以待。

Well, I think we're going to see.

有趣的是，我记得雷·库兹韦尔曾预测每个人都会成为独立创业者。

It's funny because I think Ray Kurzweil predicted everybody was going to be a solo entrepreneur.

有可能达到那种程度——我是说，Instagram 只有13个人，却卖了一百亿美元。

It could get to there- I would say, Instagram was 13 people and sold for a billion dollars.

但 Meta 的员工数量多得离谱。

But Meta's got a ridiculous number of employees.

如果 Instagram 没被 Meta 收购，它会不会也只有那么多人？

Would Instagram have just been that many employees if they hadn't got bought by Meta?

很可能。

Probably.

所以我认为，用很少的人就能获得庞大的受众和大量的金钱。

And so I think you can get to a giant audience and a ton of money with a very few number of people.

我觉得这绝对是事实。

I think that's for sure true.

然后问题在于，你能不能维持下去，或者会不会被那些做得更多的人淘汰掉。

And then the question is, can you sustain it or will you get taken out by somebody who's kind of doing more things?

从历史上看，我倾向于认为，人们总是想要更多。

I would tend to think, just historically, that people always want more.

人们对标准的要求只会越来越高。

The standard just goes up in terms of what people want.

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯有一篇非常著名的论文，或者说这是他最糟糕的一篇论文，他写这篇论文的时间大概是在1934年到1935年，基本上就是说，一旦人们的基本需求得到满足，也就是有了住所、食物和衣服之后，人们每周可能只需要工作不超过15个小时。

John Maynard Keynes had this very famous, or it was his worst paper, but he had this paper that he wrote in, I think it was 1934 to '35, which basically said, as soon as people's needs are met, so once they had shelter, food, and clothes, people would start to work maybe no more than 15 hours a week.

结果这个预测大错特错，因为后来突然之间，每个人都需要一辆汽车，然后每个家庭成员都需要一辆汽车，每个人都需要一台电视，然后家里每个房间都需要一台电视，现在每个人都需要智能手机，每个人都需要空调。

And that turned out to be spectacularly wrong because, of course, then all of a sudden, everybody needed a car, and then everybody needed a car for everybody in the family, and everybody needed a television, and then everybody needed a television in every room in the house, and now everybody needs a smartphone, and everybody needs air conditioning.

而他写那篇文章的时候，这些东西根本都还不存在。

And none of that stuff even existed when he wrote that.

所以现在人们的工作时间，我敢肯定在座没有谁是每周只工作15个小时的。

And so now people are working, I'm sure nobody here is working 15 hours a week.

我觉得人们的需求确实几乎是无限膨胀的。

I think what people need does tend to expand almost infinitely.

所以为了满足这些需求，有时候你不得不把公司做大，但走着瞧吧。

So to fulfill that need, sometimes you have to build a bigger company, but we'll see.

软件变得太容易开发了，以至于出现了那种快时尚式的软件即服务。

Software gets so easy to build that you kind of have fast fashion SaaS.

你总是会遇到一些抄袭者，他们基本上就是被克隆出来的。

You kind of get copycats all the time that kind of get cloned.

另一个被预测的版本是定制软件。

The other version that has been predicted is bespoke software.

也许每个人使用的软件版本都略有不同，这些软件是在运行时生成的，并且是针对你个人定制的。

Maybe everybody uses a slightly different version of software that gets generated, that's instantiated basically at runtime, that's personalized to you.

这一切听起来都很科幻，但也许我们真的会实现。

This is all very sci-fi, but maybe we'll get there.

不过，人类就是这样有趣，即使在时尚界，我们也有快速时尚。

It's funny how humans are, though, because even in fashion, we do have fast fashion.

我看了一下，很多人穿着类似的东西。

I'm looking, and a lot of people are wearing kind of similar stuff.

所以，我并不是说那会完全消失……

And so, I'm not saying that'll totally go...

关于软件的另一个问题是，有多少会是我们今天所认为的软件，而有多少会只是像‘好吧，我们就换个方式使用AI’，甚至都不会是一个应用程序。

The other question on software is, how much will be what we consider software today and how much will just be like, "Okay, we'll just use the AI differently," and it won't even be an application.

你直接让AI去做就行了。

You just ask the AI to do it.

所以我觉得这个还不太确定，但我觉得应用程序这种模式可能是最容易被淘汰的。

And so I think that's a little bit TBD, but I think the paradigm of an application may be the thing that fades the most.

你把数据整理好，然后有智能体，你让它们去处理数据。

You organize your data, and then you have agents that you ask to do stuff against the data.

这就是商业应用和个人应用的工作方式。

And that's how business applications work, and personal applications work too.

你怎么看待防御性，尤其是对于AI应用，有一种说法是，现在很多产品其实没什么网络效应。

How do you think about defensibility in, especially for AI apps, there's sort of an argument that, hey, a lot of the products right now, they don't really have very much in the way of network effects.

也许它们只是GPT的包装。

Maybe they're GPT wrappers.

有各种这样的批评。

There's all these kind of critiques.

那你认为创始人应该具备哪些持久的优势？

And so what do you think of as the durable advantages that founders should be-

说GPT包装器这个说法，其实一直有点蠢，不是说不要做这种东西，而是说用这个词来形容它不太合适。

GPT wrapper thing was always a bit of a dumb idea in terms of, not to build one, but to call it that.

我的意思是，如果你像我一样老，你会记得关系数据库刚出来那会儿。

And what I mean, so if you go back, if you're as old as me, you remember when relational databases came out.

关系数据库，对吧？

And relational databases, right?

哦，你有一种声明式语言，然后你只要告诉数据库你要什么，它就会去做。

Oh, you've got this declarative language, and then you just tell the database what to do, and then it does it.

那为什么还需要SAP呢？他们还会说Siebel或者Salesforce什么的。

And so why the heck would you need SAP or, and they'll say Siebel or Salesforce or whatever.

那太荒谬了。

That's ridiculous.

那里面什么也没有。

There's nothing there.

它就是个关系数据库的包装器。

It's just a RDBMS wrapper.

但事实证明，这种想法是错的。

But of course, that turned out to be wrong.

而且，当我看看今天基于LLM构建的应用时，它们本身就有很多模型。

And when I look at the applications that are built on LLMs today, they themselves have many models.

我觉得Cursor现在有14个模型，在基础模型之上还有相当复杂的模型。

I think Cursor is at 14 models now, fairly sophisticated models on top of the kind of foundation model.

所以我不认为他们是错的。

And so I don't think they're wrong.

我认为他们是相当复杂的模型和应用之类的。

I think they're pretty sophisticated kind of models and applications and so forth.

而且这些模型有大量数据，并且理解——如果你整天和顶级程序员讨论如何设计他们的程序，那你的系统和模型里就会有很多别人没有的信息。

And those models have a lot of data and understand, if you're talking to super high-end programmers all day about how to design their program, that's a lot of information into your system and into your model that nobody else has.

所以，我认为这成为了差异化的一部分。

And so that becomes, I think, part of the differentiation.

而在软件竞争中，占有就是一切。

And then possession is nine-tenths of the law in competing on software.

所以如果你已经拿到了客户，那现在ChatGPT比Grok好多少呢？如果从零开始的话。

So if you get the customer, how much better is ChatGPT than Grok right now, if you were starting from scratch?

其实差别不大。

It's kind of marginal.

这算不上什么巨大的优势，也还没有形成网络效应。

It's not a massive differentiator, and it's not a network effect yet.

只是因为你一直在用那个，我已经习惯了。

Just the fact that you're using that one, I'm used to it.

界面也不复杂。

It's not even a complicated interface.

你就是在跟它对话。

You're just talking to it.

要换的话也容易。

To switch it.

但如果你已经在用某个，那很可能你就会继续用下去。

But it doesn't matter if that's what you're using, that's very likely what you're going to continue to use.

要让你离开那个，你需要一个明显更好的东西。

And to get you off that, you need something dramatically better.

所以你不能用一个同样好或者稍微好一点的产品来击败竞争对手。

So you don't take out a competitor with an equally good product or a slightly better.

需要的是十倍好的产品。

It's like a 10 times better product.

如果你拿下市场，我认为那可能是最明显、最重要的事情。

If you take the market, I think that's probably the most obvious, most significant thing.

而且，当然，在人工智能方面，如果你拿下市场，你确实会获得更多关于你特定类型用户的数据。

And then, of course, with AI, if you take the market, you do get more data about your particular kind of user.

看起来市场可能只是自然地分阶段发展，我们现在处于这种抢占阶段，最重要的功能就是“能用”这个功能。

It seems like maybe the market's just going to naturally evolve in phases, and we're kind of in this land grab phase where just the most important feature is the it works feature.

然后我们会逐渐实现独特的用户体验创新以及所有的协作网络效应功能。

And then we'll get to the unique UX innovations and to all the collaboration network effects features over time.

当你有一台新电脑，能解决以前没人能解决的问题时，那确实很有趣，不管有没有网络效应。

When you have a new computer, and you can solve problems that nobody could solve before, then that's pretty interesting, regardless if there's a network effect.

我觉得在网络时代，也就是互联网时代，网络效应对很多事情来说变得超级强大，而且可能还会再次如此。

I think in the network era, which is the internet era The network effect thing became super powerful for a lot of things, and it probably will again.

不过，是的，我认为就目前而言，而且随着加密货币的兴起，看看它是否会成为AI的金钱网络，这会很有趣。

But yeah, I think for right now, and it'll be interesting to see with the rise of crypto is probably a money network for AI.

那么，一个智能体如何支付另一个智能体，或者如何获取金钱呢？

So how does an agent pay another agent or get money?

因为事实证明，AI是不允许申请信用卡的。

And because it turns out AIs aren't allowed to apply for credit cards.

那么这怎么运作呢？

So how does that work?

那么，这是否会成为一个加密货币网络，然后你是否会从价值交换中获得网络效应？

And so, does that become a crypto network, and then do you have network effects from value exchange?

诸如此类的事情。

And that kind of thing.

我认为这将会开始出现，还有其他类似的想法。

I think that'll start to emerge and other ideas like that.

对，我觉得从阶段上看，创始人的背景变化也很有意思。因为对于当时在场的人来说，当互联网刚出现时，你确实需要斯坦福的博士来建立像雅虎这样的目录链接，对吧？

Yeah, I think on the phases, too, it's so interesting to see how the backgrounds of founders changes so much because, for all the folks that were around then, it was like, when the web first came out, you literally had Stanford PhDs building Yahoo, like a directory of links, right?

因为你必须自己编写网络服务器，自己搭建基础设施，整个流程都得自己来。

Because you had to write your own web server, you had to write your own infrastructure, the whole thing.

然后过了很多年——

And then many years-

那时候还没有所谓的……对。

There was no such thing as... Yeah.

在那个年代，还没有应用服务器——

In those days, there was no application servers-

是的

Yes

……没有负载均衡器，没有……

... no load balancers, no...

那时候扩展软件非常困难——

It was very hard to scale software-

没错。

That's right

……达到那个规模。

... to that size.

而且从来没有人构建过这么大规模的软件，以前的用户量顶多就是IBM那几千个员工。

And nobody ever had built the biggest piece of software, like the audience was however many employees they had at IBM.

所以没人想过：“我得做一个五亿人都会用的东西。”

And so nobody thought about, "Okay, I've got to build something that 500 million people are going to use."

没错。

That's right.

那时候根本没这回事。

That wasn't a thing.

对。

That's right.

然后花了十年才发展到LAMP技术栈，而且——

And then it took 10 years to get to the LAMP stack and-

差不多就是非计算机专业的人，只是会写代码，然后最终像Airbnb那样，以设计为主、用户体验为主的人，构建了最有趣的应用程序。

... kind of non-CS major, just coders, and then eventually, like Airbnb and the kind of design-dominant, UX-dominant people sort of building the most interesting applications.

所以你可以说，所有这些AI应用可能会遵循类似的轨迹，现在有大量的博士和计算机科学人才，但可能还要过几年。

So you could maybe make the argument that all these AI apps will follow some kind of a similar trajectory, where you have tons of PhD, CS talent right now, and then, it may be years before.

这非常有趣，显然现在主流开发者已经能够以五年前不可能的方式构建AI应用了。

It's very interesting, obviously, these days, I think the mainstream developer is actually able to build AI apps in a way that was not true five years ago.

什么时候会达到平台期是个大问题。

And when do things plateau is a big question.

所以现在，语言模型在纯LLM方面已经相当停滞了。

So right now, the language models are plateaued quite a bit in terms of just the pure LLM.

然后强化学习方面正在扩展。

And then the reinforcement learning side is scaling.

所以代码质量在变得更好，但普通的聊天机器人并没有太大不同。

So, code is getting way better, but the regular kind of chatbot is not that different.

我们还能获得多少AI突破？

How many more AI breakthroughs will we get?

而且每次有突破，那都是架构上的变化，会改变整个应用层和整个基础设施层。

And every time there's a breakthrough, that's an architectural change, it'll change the entire application layer, the whole infrastructure layer.

这些平台期什么时候会出现？

When will those plateaus happen?

这些突破什么时候会发生？

When will those breakthroughs occur?

而机会就是这样排列的。

And that's kind of how the opportunities line up.

你可以说，随着科技格局的变化，有了社交媒体，有了——

You could kind of make the argument that as the tech landscape has changed, having social media, having-

播客等等这些东西，确实改变了风投行业。

... podcasts and the whole thing, that's really changed the VC industry.

而且也许——

And maybe-

……

...

整个格局以及你接触创始人的方式，其实都是紧密相连的。

the landscape and the way that you reach founders is kind of very intertwined.

所以在接下来这个阶段，随着AI的发展，也许人们能用小团队打造大公司，你觉得这会如何影响风险投资这个资产类别，或者整个VC行业呢？

And so in this next phase of everything that'll happen with AI and maybe people being able to build big companies with small teams and that kind of thing, how do you think this might affect venture as an asset class or as just the VC industry as a whole?

有意思的是，VC行业从1970年到2008、2009年基本没什么变化。

So it's funny because the VC industry kind of was the same from 1970 to 2008, 2009.

我们是2009年开始的。

We started in 2009.

VC的运作方式，从某种程度上说，天生就是为了不变而设计的。

Kind of a little bit the way VCs were set up, they were kind of built not to change.

事情就是这样发展的。

And that's just kind of how it rolled.

互联网让创业变得更容易了。

And so companies got easier to build with the internet.

第一个大变化就是，以前你要建Sun Microsystems或Tandem Computers这样的公司，在卖出第一个产品之前，你得先建好制造部门、专业服务团队，还得有直销队伍等等。

That was the first big change, was that if you're talking about building Sun Microsystems or Tandem Computers and so forth, before you even sold product one, you needed to build manufacturing, you needed to build professional services, you needed a kind of direct sales force, and so forth.

那是一个相当复杂的公司要建立。

That was a pretty complicated corporation to build.

然后快进到Twitter，五个人带着笔记本电脑和AWS，情况就大不相同了。

And then if you fast-forward to Twitter, five people with laptops and AWS and very different.

然后，随着AI的出现，这又是下一步。

And then, okay, with AI, there's kind of the next step of that.

所以我认为这几乎肯定会再次改变风险投资的格局。

So I think that it's almost certainly going to change the VC landscape again.

在过去，你只能做那么多。

In the old days, you could only do so many.

每一笔投资都非常昂贵。

Every bet was very expensive.

很难做。

It was hard to do.

它们很可能会失败，等等。

They were very likely to fail and so forth.

然后，至少对有潜力的公司来说，成功率提高了，这是一个很大的变化。

And then kind of the hit rate, at least for the promising companies, went up, so that's a big change.

另外，VC的一个重要价值在于，比如你有公司A和公司B，它们有完全相同的想法，而且团队都很优秀。

And then a big value in a VC is, okay, you have company A and company B, and they have both the exact same idea and both really good teams.

哪个会胜出？

Which one wins?

事实证明，作为创业者，你就像在穿越一个复杂的自适应系统，一个路径依赖的系统。

It turns out that you're kind of traveling as an entrepreneur through this complex adaptive system, path-dependent system.

所以，谁获得了更多的势头，谁就会胜出。

And so whoever gets more momentum ends up winning.

因此，VC的一个重要作用就是帮你获得这种势头。

And so a big role of a VC is to kind of help you get that momentum.

所以，'哦，我从最好的VC那里筹集到了资金。

So, "Oh, I raised money from the best VC.

因此，聪明的工程师会加入我的公司，而不是他们的公司，这样我就有更好的工程师，也有更好的产品。

Therefore, smart engineers will join my company and not their company, so then I have better engineers, and I have a better product.

然后我就吸引更多客户，赚更多钱，下一轮融资也更快，就这样一路走下去。

Then I pick up more customers, and then I have more money, and I get raised the next round faster, and away I go."

这就是你获胜的方式。

And that's how you win.

如果公司数量大幅增加，或者它们不再需要那么多资金，或者类似的情况，那将会是一个有趣的变化。

If there are just dramatically more companies, or they don't need as much money or that kind of thing, then that'll be an interesting change.

但我认为风险投资的一大功能将是如何赋予公司动力。

But I think a lot of the function of VC is going to be how do you give momentum?

这就像是一种动力，如何帮助他们打造更高质量的公司。

And that's like momentum in how do you help them build a higher-quality company?

如何让公司对客户、员工以及后续投资者更具吸引力，等等。

How do you make that company more attractive to customers and employees, and follow-on investors, and so forth?

这部分会保持不变，但我认为底层的一切，功能特性将会有所不同。

And that part will be the same, but I think that everything underneath, the feature set is going to be different.

嗯，我们经常遇到一些利润极高或表现非常好的公司——

Well, and we often encounter companies that are wildly profitable or doing very well-

……但他们还是想和风险投资合作，是的，就是为了你提到的那些原因——

... but they still want to work with VCs for, yeah, for all the reasons that you're-

对，因为你必须赢。

Yeah, because you have to win.

最棒的事情就是有一个好主意，让世界变得更好，做一些比自己更宏大的事，组建团队，建立公司。

The greatest thing is having a great idea that makes the world a better place, and doing something larger than yourself, and building a team, building a company.

如果这能成功，那就没有比这更好的了。

If that works, there's nothing better than that.

太棒了。

It's so awesome.

但如果失败了，那痛苦的程度会非常高。

But if it doesn't work, that's very high degree of misery.

就是很难。

It's just tough.

你雇佣了所有你认识的最聪明的人。

You hired all the smartest people you know.

你出去筹集了资金。

You went out and raised money.

你妈妈投资了这家公司。

Your mom invested in the company.

她很不高兴。

She's pissed.

这很糟糕。

It sucks.

确实如此。

It really does.

所以，任何能帮助你成功的事情，我认为总是有吸引力的。

So anything to help you succeed at that, I think, is always going to be attractive.

所以，十月份这里的Speedrun公司，他们将在旧金山面对一千名投资者进行演示日，并且他们会与大量天使投资人和种子基金进行快速交流。

So most of the Speedrun companies here in October, they're going to be doing their demo day in front of a thousand investors in San Francisco, and they're going to be speed dating a ton of angel investors and seed funds and all of that.

关于如何评估在种子阶段谁可能是最佳合作伙伴，你有什么建议或想法吗？

Do you have any tips and thoughts on how to evaluate who the best partner might be at that seed stage?

你总是缺少的，就是不知道怎么做好CEO这份工作。

The thing that you always don't have is you don't know how to do that CEO job.

跟我们合作过的创始人，如果不是大型公司的CEO，都不知道该怎么做。

No founders we work with who haven't been CEOs of giant companies know how to do that.

结果这其实是个非常复杂的技能组合，因为你要选对人才。

And it turns out to be a really complicated skill set because you have to select the right talent.

有时候你是在为某些职位挑选人才。

Sometimes you're selecting talent for jobs.

我从来没做过CFO。

I had never been a CFO.

我根本不知道那是什么玩意儿。

I didn't know what the hell that was.

什么是控制结构？

What's a control structure?

怎么跟华尔街打交道？

How do you talk to Wall Street?

我怎么会知道那些？

How would I know any of that?

但你仍然得雇那个人，这就像你不懂日语却要雇一个日语翻译。

But you still have to hire that person, which always into it's like hiring a Japanese interpreter if you don't know Japanese.

就像，他们听起来都不错。

It's like, they all sound good.

所以你有那个问题，而且每个人都有各自的职业抱负，然后马克·扎克伯格给你的员工提供一亿美元。

And so you have that problem, and everybody's got their own career ambitions, and then Mark Zuckerberg's offering your people a billion dollars.

所以这真的是一个很难的工作，而且你不知道该怎么做。

So it's a really hard job, and you don't know how to do it.

很多时候，当我看到创始人做不好这个工作时，总是归结为信心危机。

A lot of the times when I watch founders who fail at doing that job, it always comes down to a crisis in confidence.

所以你知道自己不知道自己在做什么。

So you know you don't know what you're doing.

你知道这对公司有害。

You know it's hurting the company.

但你仍然必须做出决定。

But yet you still have to make decisions.

要有信心做出那个决定，即使你不知道自己在做什么，也不知道那个决定是否正确，但不能犹豫。

Having the confidence to make that decision when you don't know what you're doing, and you don't know if that decision is right, but not hesitating.

而当你犹豫时，会让公司感到紧张。

And then, when you hesitate, it makes the company nervous.

这会拖慢一切。

It slows everything down.

这会产生政治斗争，因为人们会试图填补那个空白。

It creates politics because people try and fill that void.

那么你是怎么做到的呢？

So how do you do that?

你如何达到正确的信心水平，以便能够及时做出高质量的决定？

How do you get to the right confidence level where you can make high-quality decisions on time?

如果有投资者能帮你做到这一点，那真是无价之宝。

If there's an investor that can help you do that, that's invaluable.

所以，我大概会看重这两点：一是能真正帮你在招聘和进入下一轮融资等方面带来动力的投资人，二是你能与之合作、让你觉得‘哇，这个人不仅懂行，而且真的能帮上忙’的人。

So those are probably the two things I'd look for, is somebody who can really give you momentum in hiring and getting to the next round and all that, and then somebody who you can work with who goes, wow, this person not only knows what they're doing, but is helpful.

因为顺便说一句，每个天使投资人、每个风险投资人都会给你建议，即使他们……那些从来没当过CEO的家伙……

Because by the way, every angel investor, every VC will give you advice, even if they... Motherfuckers who have never been CEO- ...

我看到有人教别人怎么做CEO，还给他们出一些疯狂的主意。

I see telling people how to be CEO, and they give them these crazy ideas.

比如‘你现在就得组建一整套高管团队’。

You have to build a whole executive team right now.

我就想，你在说什么呢？

And it's like, what are you talking about?

那样会把公司搞垮的。

That's going to wreck the company.

但他们对自己的建议倒是信心十足。

But they have great confidence with their advice.

我收到过一条最喜欢的建议，而且我大概收到了27次，他们总是说：‘听着，关键是这样的。’

One of my favorite pieces of advice I got is, and I got it like 27 times, they're like, "Look, here's the key.

“招A级人才。”

Hire A players."

我当时就想，“好吧。”

And I was like, "Okay."

就好像，我原本的计划是招一堆蠢货。

It's like, my plan was to hire a bunch of fucking morons.

但现在我要招A级人才了。

But now I'm going to hire A players.

所以，外面那些没什么见地的建议，真的挺多的。

So it's just like the level of not good insight that's out there is high.

嗯，我确实觉得，这是湾区科技生态系统的一个优势。过去20年里，很多风险投资家，尤其是在欧洲和其他地方，往往以前是搞金融的。

Well, and I really think it's part of a strength of the Bay Area tech ecosystem that over the last 20 years, it kind of went from a lot of VCs, especially out in Europe and other places, are often really former finance folks.

那才是他们的背景。

And that's really their background.

他们通常可能来自私募股权，然后他们就想，哦，我也要——

And they're often coming in from maybe private equity, and so then they decide, oh, I'm going to also-

……也做点风险投资。

... also do some VC.

我觉得湾区的一大优势是，你最终会跟很多前经营者合作，整个行业也趋向于主要找那些有实际经验的投资人。

And one of the big strengths, I think, of the Bay Area is that you end up working with a lot of former operators, and the whole industry's moved towards that model of trying to mostly get investors that have done something.

大部分时候。

Mostly.

大部分时候。

Mostly.

不是特别多。

Not massive.

也许不是。

Maybe not.

这并不普遍。

It's not that universal.

也许吧，对，没错。

Maybe, yes, that's right.

而且还有不同的层次。

And different levels.

这游戏是有层次的。

There are levels to the game.

对你来说，a16z 是如何变化和演进的，最大的演变节点是什么，未来十年你在这个公司最想建设什么？

For you, how has a16z changed and evolved, the biggest beats of evolution, and what are you most excited to build at the firm over the next decade?

我知道这时间有点长，但是……

I know that's a long time, but...

对，我们刚开始的时候，想法很简单，就是我们认为风险投资的产品对投资者来说很好，但对创业者来说不够好，因为那种模式就是，你得到一个非常聪明的人加入你的董事会，但也就仅此而已。

Yeah, so when we started, the idea was very simple, which was the VC product we thought was very good for investors, but not nearly as good for entrepreneurs in that the kind of model was, okay, you get a very smart person on your board, not much more than that.

他们有一个网络，但那是那个人自己的网络。

They had a network, but it was that person's network.

他们中的很多人对产品非常在行，但产品建议在最初的三个月里就用完了，因为当你还在做最初的产品时。

A lot of them were very smart at product, but product advice runs out really in the first three months because when you're doing the initial kind of product.

而一旦你过了那个阶段，你和那个人之间的知识差距就太大了，你每天都在做这件事，而那个人一个月或一个季度才来开一次董事会，不管怎样，这种差距太大了，很难通过这种方式得到好的建议。

And then once you get past that, the knowledge gap between you, who's been working on it all day, every day, and a person showing up at a board meeting, be it once a month or once a quarter, whatever, is just so vast that it's hard to get good advice in that way.

我当时想的是，作为一个曾经尝试过创业、建立公司的人，我真正需要的是什么？

I had thought of it as like, okay, as a founder who had tried to build a company and build a company, what did I actually need?

然后我就想，我需要的远不止这些。

And I was like, well, I could use a whole lot more than that.

而最重要的一点，我反复强调的，就是信心。

And the biggest thing, and I go back to it, is just confidence.

所以，就像……

And so like- ...

什么会让你觉得自己像个CEO？

what would make you feel like a CEO?

所以我们做了很多事情。

And so we did a lot of things.

那么，怎么让人感觉像呢？嗯，如果你能打电话给任何可能购买你产品的高管，比如联邦快递或花旗银行之类的。

So, how do you make somebody feel like it's, well, what if you could call any senior executive who might buy your product, like a FedEx or Citibank or wherever.

你能做到吗？

Could you do that?

所以我们组建了一个团队，让这件事变得容易。

So we built a whole team to make it easy to do that.

然后，你怎么知道如何招聘高管，以及招聘的流程是什么？

And then, how could you know how to hire an executive, and what was the process for doing that?

所以我们组建了一个团队来帮忙处理这件事。

And so we built a team to help with that.

我们怎么介绍你认识五位优秀的CFO，你可以直接和他们坐下来聊聊，说：“嘿，这个职位你会招聘什么样的人，为什么这么做？”

How do we introduce you to five great CFOs, and you can just sit down with them and say, "Hey, what would you hire in this position, and why would you do that?

“面试时你会怎么测试他们？”

And how would you test for it in an interview?"

诸如此类的事情，让你提升技能，知道如何胜任这份工作。

and that kind of thing, and skill you up so you knew how to do the job.

所以这是第一个想法。

So that was the first idea.

然后，当我们深入进去的时候，有一件事，马克在2011年，我记得，写了关于这件事的文章。

And then, as we got into it, one of the things, and Mark wrote about it in, I think, 2011.

他说，"软件将吞噬整个世界。"

He said, "Software is going to eat the world."

我们从中得到的启示是，如果这真的会发生，那么风险投资在那之前的概念是，每年只有15家公司能达到一亿美元的收入，而整个公司的理念就是尽可能多地投资到那15家公司中。

Our takeaway from that was, okay, if that's going to happen, then VC, up until that point, was this idea that there were 15 companies in a given year that would ever get to 100 million in revenue, and the whole idea of the firm would be to get into as many of those 15 as you could.

但我们想，如果软件要吞噬整个世界，那就不只是15家，而是150家。

But we're like, well, if software is going to eat the world, that's not going to be 15, that's going to be 150.

那么，如何在不失去风险投资公司特质的情况下，扩大规模，保持个人化，同时又能扩展呢？

And so how do you actually scale a VC firm without losing all the things that make it a VC firm, very personal, but can scale up.

这就是垂直化的想法。

And so that was the verticalization idea.

所以我们想，我们能否建立一个比安德森·霍洛维茨最初在基础设施、应用、加密货币、生物、游戏、国防和公共安全等领域更优秀的公司。

So we're like, well, can we build a firm that's better than Andreessen Horowitz original in infra, in apps, in crypto, in bio, and in games, and defense and public safety and that kind of thing.

我认为，这是公司的一个重大转变。

That was, I would say, quite the major change in the firm.

而现在我们遇到的情况是，私营公司变得非常大，它们需要掌握另一套技能。

And then, the kind of thing that we've run into now is companies are getting very big as private companies, and there's a whole another layer of stuff that they need how to do.

怎么高效地走向国际？

How do you go international efficiently?

我们能帮你进入日本市场，帮你搞定头三笔交易吗？

Can we walk you into Japan and get you your first three deals?

你借我们的品牌，我们帮你借力，让你能赢。

You use our brand, and we'll enable you to lever off that so that you can win.

怎么增加渠道？

How do you add channels?

因为你要多国、多渠道、多产品地发展。

Because you have to be multi-country, multi-channel, multi-product as you go.

这些你怎么做到？

How do you do all that?

作为公司，我们能做些什么来支持这些？

And what can we as a firm do to enable that kind of thing?

所以我们正在尝试很多这样的想法，还有其他一些东西，希望能让我们变得更好。

So we're playing with a lot of those ideas and other things that'll hopefully make us better.