反人工智能运动的兴起

今天在AI每日简报中，我们将讨论反AI运动的兴起。

Today on the AI Daily Brief, we are talking about the rise of the anti AI movement.

AI每日简报是一档每日播客和视频节目，聚焦AI领域最重要新闻与讨论。

The AI Daily Brief is a daily podcast and video about the most important news and discussions in AI.

好了，朋友们。

All right, friends.

在开始之前，先快速说几点。

Quick notes before we dive in.

首先，感谢今天的赞助商：Robots and Pencils、Scrunch、AIUC和Blitzy。

First of all, thank you to today's sponsors, Robots and Pencils, Scrunch, AIUC, and Blitzy.

要获取无广告版本的节目，请访问patreon.com/aideallybrief，或在Apple播客上订阅。

To get an ad free version of the show, go to patreon.com/aideallybrief or you can subscribe on Apple Podcasts.

如果你想了解更多信息，关于如何赞助本节目，请发送邮件至sponsorsaidailybrief.dot.ai。

If you want to learn more about sponsoring the show, send us a note at sponsorsaidailybrief dot ai.

你也可以访问aideallybrief.ai，了解与AI每日简报相关的整个生态系统项目。

You can also head to aideallybrief.ai to find out all about the ecosystem of projects surround the AI Daily Brief.

我们有一个Claw Camp，有4000人正在学习如何使用OpenClaw并构建智能体和智能体团队。

We've got our Claw Camp where 4,000 people are learning how to use OpenClaw and build agents, and build agent teams.

我们的AI操作员社区，人们每天都在分享他们对AI的想法，等等。

Our AI Operators Community where people are sharing their ideas about AI every day, and so on and so forth.

在深入之前，最后提一下这期节目：如果你现在住在纽约附近，你应该知道我们刚刚经历了一场预计是过去五年来最大的暴风雪。

Now, a last note about this episode before we dive in: If you live anywhere near New York right now, you know we are just coming off of getting truly walloped by what is predicted to be one of the biggest blizzards in the last five years.

不幸的是，对我来说，这场暴风雪的路径和时间几乎与我们全家从南美返程的航班完全重合，这意味着航班被推迟了，我不得不提前录制这期节目。

Unfortunately for me, it turns out that the blizzard's path and timing was nearly identical to our family's flight back from South America, meaning of course that it got pushed, and I am having to record this show in advance.

不过这倒也凑巧，因为这个话题我早就想做了，原本计划这周就录。

Now this kind of works out because this is a topic I've wanted to do for a little while now, and was planning to do sometime this week.

但这是提前录制的，我实际上是在2月22日星期天录制的。

But this is a pre record, I'm actually recording this on Sunday, February 22.

除非发生什么重大变故，我明天应该就能回归正常的节目形式了。

Unless something dramatic happens, I should be back tomorrow with our normal format.

所以今天我们讨论的主题是反人工智能运动。

So what we are talking about today is the anti AI movement.

说实话，目前称其为一种运动可能有点言过其实了。

And to be honest, calling it a movement might be a little overstated at the moment.

它绝对不是一个庞大而有组织的整体。

It is certainly not one big organized thing.

其背后的原因并不单一。

The reasons for it are not monolithic.

人们有理由问：这种现象在多大程度上只是由媒体叙事驱动的？

And it would be reasonable for one to ask: To what extent this is just driven by media narrative?

当然，自ChatGPT推出以来的这几年里，我们一直经历着一种永无止境的循环：先是AI炒作和热情成为主流媒体故事，然后当这种兴奋感不再令人激动时，便转为某种怀疑性的叙事。

It is certainly the case that for the last few years, since the launch of ChatGPT, we've had a pretty never ending cycle of AI hype and enthusiasm as the main media story around followed by some type of skeptical narrative, when that excited narrative fails to be exciting anymore.

而媒体现在正全力关注这一话题。

And the media is all over this one right now.

就在这个周末，《纽约时报》刊登了一篇题为《人们曾热爱.com，AI热潮却没那么热》的文章。

Just this weekend from The New York Times, we got a piece called peoplelovethe.com boom, the AI boom, not so much.

文中作者大卫·斯特里菲尔德问道：科技领袖们开始担忧公众对他们用人工智能重塑世界的计划反应冷淡。

In it, author David Stratfield asks: Tech leaders are beginning to worry about the public's underwhelming enthusiasm for their plans to remake the world with artificial intelligence.

这会戳破泡沫吗？

Will that burst the bubble?

当然，上周《时代》杂志的封面更是引发了更多讨论，标题是《人民对抗人工智能》。

And then of course, even more commented on the Time Magazine cover from last week called The People versus AI.

封面展示了九张人物头像，他们因各种原因对当前形态的人工智能持反对态度，这构成了对这一新兴政治与社会力量的深度报道。

The cover features nine headshots of people who, for various reasons, find themselves opposed to AI at least as it's currently constituted, forming the basis for a large cover story about this emergent political and societal force.

对一些人来说，他们认为这一切确实值得鄙视。

For some, they believe that this is all somewhat deserving of scorn.

X平台上有人分享了《时代》杂志封面的改编版，九张头像换成了九个穴居人，标题改为《人民对抗车轮》。

Lumps on X shared a remixed version of the Time Magazine cover, this one featuring nine cave people, with the headline being The People versus the Wheel.

沉默的大多数发出咕噜声，拖着石头，滚动着前进。

Grunts from the silent majority dragging rocks and rolling as a drag.

我也见过很多类似的版本，比如《人民对抗互联网》或《人民对抗任何其他技术》。

I've also seen plenty of versions of this with the people versus the internet or the people versus any other technology.

当然，这里暗示的是：每一种新技术出现时，总会有一些抵制，而这些抵制在事后看来往往显得愚蠢和短视。

Now, of course, what's being implied here is that with any new technology there is always some amount of resistance that eventually looks silly and short sighted in retrospect.

对于那些最深入参与这项技术的人，我理解那种被抨击的挫败感——你明明认为自己正在创造一件非常积极的事情，却感觉有这么多人因为你所做的事情而真正对你感到愤怒。

And for those who are most involved in this technology, I do understand the frustration of feeling assailed for building or working on a thing that you think is going to be really positive, but where it feels like so many people are genuinely mad at you just for doing what you're doing.

然而，我认为将反人工智能情绪的兴起简单地视为一种媒体叙事是一种错误。

And yet, I think it would be a mistake to view the rise of anti AI sentiment as simply a media narrative.

已有大量且不断增长的研究表明，尤其是美国人对人工智能抱有极大的怀疑态度。

There is a huge and growing canon of studies that show particularly Americans have extreme skepticism around AI.

最近的一项YouGov研究发现，58%的美国人表示他们不信任人工智能，而只有35%的人表示信任。

A recent YouGov study found that 58% of Americans said that they don't have trust in AI versus 35% who do.

45%的美国人认为人工智能对经济的影响总体上是负面的，而仅有16%的人认为它会更积极而非消极。

45% of Americans said that they think that AI's effect on the economy will be mostly negative, versus just 16% who think that it will be more positive than negative.

在YouGov的这项调查中，近三分之二的美国人（63%）认为人工智能将导致美国就业岗位减少，而仅有7%的人认为它会增加就业岗位。

And nearly two thirds of Americans in that YouGov poll, 63%, think AI will lead to a decrease in the number of jobs available in The US, versus just 7% who think that it will increase the number of jobs.

在皮尤研究中心去年的一项调查中，美国在公民对人工智能更担忧而非更兴奋的比例上排名垫底。

In a Pew Research poll from last year, The US ranked dead last in terms of the ratio of citizens who were more concerned versus more excited about AI.

只有10%的受访者表示他们对人工智能更兴奋而非担忧，而50%的人表示他们更担忧而非兴奋。

Only 10% of those polled said that they were more excited than concerned, versus 50% who said they were more concerned than excited.

所以这里的关键是，无论你如何解释这种现象，即使你觉得媒体叙事被夸大了，美国人对人工智能确实普遍存在一种基本的怀疑和担忧。

So the point here is that whatever reasons you want to ascribe to it, and even if you think that it is overblown in the media narrative, there is definitely a base level of skepticism and concern among Americans when it comes to artificial intelligence.

而且，这种情绪似乎还在加剧。

And what's more, it seems to be growing.

新泽西州新布朗斯维克市的一些视频在X平台上走红，起因是数百名市民出席了一次关于数据中心的规划会议，并成功让该项目被取消。

A number of videos out of New Brunswick, New Jersey went viral on X after hundreds of citizens showed up to a planning meeting about a data center and got the project canceled.

几天前分享的这段视频获得了五百万人次的观看。

That video shared just a couple of days ago got 5,000,000 views.

发布这段视频的组织者本·佐比克写道：今晚，由于数百名居民到场，新布朗斯维克的数据中心项目被取消了。

Organizer Ben Zobiak, who posted the video, wrote: A data center in New Brunswick was canceled tonight when hundreds of residents showed up.

当我们对抗科技巨头和私募股权时，我们就能获胜。

When we fight big tech and private equity, we win.

人工智能观察员安德鲁·柯兰写道：三年过去了，在我看来，西方社会对人工智能的负面情绪现在达到了最高点。

AI curator Andrew Curran writes: After three years, it seems to me that public anti AI sentiment in the West is now at its highest point.

政治评论员兼统计学家内特·西尔弗最近一直在频繁谈论这个问题。

Political commentator and statistician Nate Silver has been talking about this a lot.

他最近在推特上写道：如果人工智能以比人类历史上任何事物快一到两个数量级的速度产生前所未有的技术颠覆，那么这将是一场前所未有的政治斗争。

He recently tweeted: If AI produces unprecedented levels of technological disruption on timescales that are an order of magnitude or two faster than anything in human history, it's going to be an unprecedented political fight.

顺便说一下，这些时间线可能与2028年美国大选相吻合。

And for what it's worth, the timelines potentially line up with the twenty twenty eight US election.

他还谈到，这种首先影响白领的颠覆在政治上并无先例。

He also talked about how this white collar first disruption doesn't have political precedent.

他写道：通常这些转型需要数十年时间，而且不会首先影响白领，因为他们拥有更多的政治影响力。

He writes, Usually these transitions would take decades and not affect white collar workers first, to have more political power.

狭窄类别的蓝领工人被取代，例如。

Displacement of narrow classes of blue collar workers, e.

比如。

G.

煤矿工人，即使大多数社会群体从中受益，通常也会引发巨大的政治博弈。

Coal miners, even if most of society would benefit, usually causes huge political battles.

而在这里，被取代的群体范围更广，带来的好处不明确，且被取代的人群更具影响力。

Here, the displacement would be much broader, the benefits are less clear, and the people displaced are more influential.

在另一条更具体关注数据中心问题的推文中，内特写道：从微观层面看，反对建设数据中心可能是不理性的，因为它们终究会在其他地方建成；但从中观层面看，人们对人工智能是否能广泛造福社会深表怀疑，这种怀疑其实完全合理。

In another tweet more specifically focused on the data center concern, Nate writes: Opposition to building data centers might be irrational at the microscale they're just gonna be built somewhere else but at the mesoscale, people are profoundly doubtful about whether AI will broadly benefit society, and that's not so irrational at all.

人们不喜欢被迫陷入他们未曾要求过的囚徒困境，从宏观层面来看，他们对这种局面感到抗拒甚至愤恨，这是合乎理性的。

People don't like being forced into prisoners' dilemmas they didn't ask for, and it is macro level rational for them to feel resistance and indeed resentment towards that.

来自彭博社《Odd Lots》的乔·魏斯坦塞尔，以他一贯在推特上颇具争议的风格写道：这是一个很好的观点。

Joe Weisenthal from Bloomberg's Odd Lots, perhaps somewhat provocatively as is his style on Twitter, writes: This is a good take.

我还没听过AI界有人能合理地解释，为什么普通人应该相信AI会让他们的生活变得更好。

I haven't heard anyone in the AI world credibly articulate why the average person should assume it will make their life better.

通常，他们说的恰恰相反。

Typically, they say the opposite.

伊桑·莫洛赫写道：我想补充的是，当人们想象反噬时，往往会想到《沙丘》中的巴特勒安圣战或卢德分子。

Ethan Moloch writes: I would add that when imagining backlash, people think of Dune's Butlerian Jihad or Luddites.

但这些斗争在之前的工业革命中实际表现为对监管、再分配、国有化、工会和安全网的诉求。

But what those fights actually looked like during the previous industrial revolutions were about regulation, redistribution, nationalization, unions, and safety nets.

可以预期类似的情况会发生。

Could expect similar.

现在，毫不意外的是，我在这些议题的核心内容上，与大多数反AI人士的感受截然不同。

Now it will come as no surprise that I have very different feelings than most of the anti AI folks when it comes to the substance of the issues.

但我并不认为这些担忧是不合理的，也不认为AI行业应该忽视这些声音和关切。

But I do not believe that the concerns are not legitimate, nor do I think it behooves the AI industry to ignore these voices and these concerns.

事实上，我认为AI行业的领导者在承认和应对人们真实关切方面，表现得极其糟糕。

In fact, I think the leaders of the AI industry have done a spectacularly bad job of both acknowledging and addressing real concerns that people have.

我们可能希望那些让我们兴奋的东西，也能让别人感到兴奋。

We may want things that are exciting to us to be exciting to others.

希望那些对我们来说不言而喻或显而易见的事情，对别人来说也同样不言而喻或显而易见。

To have things that are self evident or obvious to us, be self evident and obvious to others.

但世界并不是这样运转的。

But that's not how the world works.

如果我们承认并相信这项技术的影响范围将波及几乎所有人，我们就必须愿意与几乎所有人进行对话。

And if we acknowledge and believe that the impact scale of this technology is going to be circa everyone, we have to be willing to engage with circa everyone.

当我看到《时代》杂志的封面时，内心简直感到不适。

When I saw the Time cover, I absolutely cringed inside.

并不是因为我拒绝或对AI的批评不感兴趣，而是因为媒体通常呈现在我们面前的内容相当糟糕。

Not because I'm unwilling or even disinterested in AI critique, but because usually what the media puts in front of us is quite bad.

然而，看完这篇文章后，我竟然感到相当乐观，你可能难以置信。

I actually came away from the piece, however, feeling, believe it or not, pretty optimistic.

并非完全如此，但总体而言。

Not exclusively, but by and large.

他们为封面故事选择的参考对象并不是意识形态者或职业化的怀疑者，而是一些人，他们甚至不一定天生反对AI，但对这项技术的某些具体影响感到担忧，并倡导围绕它进行某些具体的政策改变。

The people they had focused on as their reference points for the cover story were not ideologues or careerist skeptics they were people who in many cases aren't even necessarily anti AI by disposition, but who find themselves concerned with some specific impact of the technology, and advocating for some specific change in policy around it.

在大多数情况下，我发现这些担忧是真诚提出的，而且实际上是可解决的。

In most of these cases, I found the concerns leveled in good faith in ways that were actually solvable.

因此，我认为更有用的做法是，将反AI运动拆解成不同的类别，这样我们就不会用笼统的术语来谈论它。

And so what I thought would be useful is to actually try to break apart the anti AI movement into constituent categories, so we're not talking about this thing in monolithic terms.

正如我在开头所说，我认为这更像是一场非组织化的运动，而目前更多是分散的担忧和抵制，这些力量未来可能轻易地凝聚成一股更大的政治力量。

Like I said at the beginning, I think this is much less an organized movement, and much more, right now, pockets of concerns and resistance that could at some point easily coalesce into a larger political force.

所以，让我们快速浏览几个不同的类别，看看它们的主要担忧是什么。

So let's quickly go through a handful of different categories, and try to understand what their big concerns are.

我们先从AI安全人士开始：他们担心AI带来的极端风险或存在性风险，彼此讨论他们所认为的‘毁灭概率’。

We'll start first with the AI safety folks: the people who are concerned about x risk or existential risk, who talk to each other about what their p doom is.

‘毁灭概率’就是指AI导致人类灭绝的可能性。

P doom being probability of doom, that AI ends us all.

你有时会发现，AI领域的人会批评这些人活在科幻小说的世界里。

These are the voices that you will sometimes find AI folks critiquing as living in the realm of the sci fi.

他们是‘回形针最大化主义者’，认为超级智能AI很可能会终结人类，甚至不一定出于恶意，而仅仅是因为人类挡住了它们实现某个目标的道路。

It's the paperclip maximalists who argue for why super intelligent AI would be likely to end humanity, not even necessarily out of malice, but because we stood in the way of accomplishing some goal that they were trying to achieve.

在ChatGPT发布后不久，这一群体的声音变得非常响亮。

The voice of this group was much louder right after ChatGPT was launched.

可能是因为那时会出现一些耸人听闻的标题，比如‘机器人将毁灭我们所有人’，像埃利泽·尤德科夫斯基这样的人还会在杂志上发表文章阐述这种观点。

Probably for the reason that you could get crazy headlines about how the robots were going to kill us all, and folks like Eliezer Yudkowsky to come in your magazine and write an essay to that effect.

就像在整个反AI运动中一样，事实上在AI乐观派阵营中，即使在这一类担忧者内部，也存在着巨大的观点差异。

Now just like within the anti AI movement overall, and frankly on the opposite side of the AI booster train, there is a massive spectrum of folks even just within this concern range.

其中许多人是出于真诚的善意行事，这使得即使你从根本上不同意他们的所有观点，依然有更多对话的空间。

Many of them operate from a place of genuinely good faith, which creates much more room for discussion even if you fundamentally disagree with everything that they think.

你可以去看看 Twitter 上的 AI 安全表情包账号作为例子，或者看看劳伦特·沙皮罗的《末日辩论》播客。

You can go check out the AI Safety Memes account on Twitter as an example, or even check out Laurent Shapiro's Doom Debates podcast.

我认为，即使你从根本上不同意这些人的担忧，考虑到我们谁都不知道真正的未来，对此保持一定的认知谦逊也是值得的。

I think even if one fundamentally disagrees with the concerns animating these folks, it's worth having a bit of epistemic humility about all of this, given that none of us know the actual future.

有趣的是，与反 AI 领域的其他人不同，他们实际上非常认同加速主义者对 AI 强大能力的看法。

Now, an interesting note about these folks is that unlike some of the others in the anti AI space, they actually quite agree with the Accelerationists on how powerful AI is.

只是他们非常担心这种能力会带来什么后果。

It's just they're very concerned about what the implications of that are.

有趣的是，我认为这些人并没有像 ChatGPT 发布后头六个月里看起来的那样，成为推动对话的主要力量。

Interestingly, I don't really think that these folks have been as much of a driver of the conversation as it might have seemed if you looked just in the first six months after ChatGPT was launched.

回到安德鲁·库兰那条关于公众反 AI 情绪现在达到最高点的推文，他继续说道：最主要的驱动因素远非存在性风险，而是对就业和艺术影响的担忧。

Going back to that tweet by Andrew Curran about how public anti AI sentiment is now at its highest point, he continued: The primary driver by far is not ex risk but concerns about employment and the impact on art.

如果过去几年里，安全倡导者更多地强调社会和经济影响，而非存在性风险，他们可能已经更有效，现在也可能处于更强有力的位置。

Safety advocacy might have been more effective, and might now be in a much stronger position, if they had emphasized societal and economic impacts more than x risk over the last few years.

接下来，我们来看反 AI 群体中的下一个类别，我们可以称之为能力怀疑论者。

Moving on to the next category of the anti AI folks are what we might call the capability skeptics.

这些人活跃在社交媒体上，声称人工智能不过是高级的自动补全工具。

These are the folks you see running around on social networks, claiming things like AI is just fancy autocomplete.

这充分说明反人工智能阵营并非铁板一块，这些人之所以反对安全派，是因为如果AI只是高级的自动补全工具，那它显然不可能接管世界并把我们都变成纸夹。

Demonstrating just how much the anti AI space is not one thing, these folks disagree with the safetyists because if AI is just fancy autocomplete, it's obviously not going to take over the world and turn us all into paperclips.

如果你想找个例子，最著名的代表之一就是加里·马库斯。

If you're looking for an example of this, one of the most prominent examples is Gary Marcus.

老实说，你可能想不到，我对这一群体的挫败感反而最深。

And honestly, believe it or not, this is the group that I kinda have the most frustration with.

那些一直在鼓吹这些观点的人，每次媒体对AI的舆论转向负面时，就会更新他们之前那篇关于AI已经停滞的文章，尽管事实上，AI现在的水平早已远超他们上次说同样话时的阶段。

The people who've been lobbying these arguments take advantage of every time the media narrative shifts against AI to update their previous essay about why AI has plateaued, despite the fact that it's plateaued at a point significantly more advanced than the last time they said the same thing.

总体而言，能力怀疑论者往往过于吹毛求疵、思维僵化、无法根据新证据调整观点，最终几乎完全不值得理会。

I think in general, the capability skeptics are pedantic, pretty viciously intellectually rigid and unable to change their perception based on new evidence, and ultimately almost entirely ignorable.

我不认为我们该把少数人靠在辩论面板上扮演‘官方怀疑者’来谋生，误认为他们的观点真的有实际价值。

I don't think we should mistake the fact that a few people can make careers by being the token skeptics on the panel, with their perspective actually being useful.

我之所以对这个群体最为不满和反感，是因为普通人最希望他们是对的。

And the reason that I have the most frustration and animosity towards this group is that these are the ones who so many normal folks want to be right.

他们希望这些人是对的，这样他们就可以安心地忽视这个他们并不喜欢的东西，直到它像NFT一样逐渐消退。

They want them to be right so they can safely ignore this thing that they don't particularly like until it fades like NFTs.

我真心认为，许多人之所以不会真正参与人工智能，正是因为能力怀疑论者助长了他们天生的抗拒心理。

I genuinely believe that many people will not engage meaningfully with AI because the capability skeptics aid and abet their natural disinclination to do so.

正因为如此，当涉及到人工智能的使用时，这些人会远远落后。

And because of that, those people will be extremely far behind when it comes to AI usage.

他们将是适应人工智能冲击最差的人，也最不可能从人工智能创造的新机遇中获益。

They will be the least adaptable to AI disruption, the least likely to benefit from new opportunities that AI creates.

因此，我真心认为，在对个人造成的经济伤害方面，能力怀疑论者比那些为推销产品而夸大其词的AI炒作派造成的危害更大。

And because of that, I genuinely believe that the capability skeptics will cause more economic harm when it comes to individual people than the AI hypsters who overstate things in order to sell their products.

现在，这个群体中有一小部分人至少提出了一个合理的观点：他们并不是每隔五分钟就宣称AI进入了新 plateau，而是提醒我们应当把所有声音的音量稍微调低一点，因为AI真正渗透到工作场所和社会中的扩散模式，必然会比我们想象的漫长得多。

Now to the extent that there's one subset of this group that have at least a reasonable point is the group that isn't trying to say every five minutes that AI is on some new plateau, but who do caution that we should turn the volume down on everything just a few notches, because the actual diffusion pattern by which it makes it into the workplace and into society is inevitably going to be much longer than we think.

我甚至不确定是否应该把他们归入能力怀疑论者一类。

I don't even know if you can really count them alongside the capability skeptics.

也许更好的说法是‘时间线怀疑论者’，但我认为他们的观点要合理得多。

Maybe a better framing would be the timeline skeptics, but they I think have a much more reasonable point.

今天的节目由Robots and Pencils赞助，这是一家快速增长的公司。

Today's episode is brought to you by Robots and Pencils, a company that is growing fast.

作为一家高速发展的AWS和Databricks合作伙伴，他们正在寻找能够真正产生影响的顶尖人才。

Their work as a high growth AWS and Databricks partner means that they're looking for elite talent ready to create real impact at Velocity.

他们的团队由天生适应AI的工程师、战略家和设计师组成，他们热衷于解决复杂问题，并推动AI在真实产品中的应用。

Their teams are made up of AI native engineers, strategists, and designers who love solving hard problems and pushing how AI shows up in real products.

他们通过自己的智能代理加速平台Roboworks快速推进，使团队能够在数周内而非数月内交付切实成果。

They move quickly using Roboworks, their agentic acceleration platform, so teams can deliver meaningful outcomes in weeks, not months.

他们不组建庞大的团队。

They don't build big teams.

他们打造的是高效、灵活的团队。

They build high impact, nimble ones.

那里的员工极其聪明，拥有专利、发表的研究成果，并参与过塑造整个行业类别的工作。

The people there are wicked smart with patents, published research, and work that's helped shape entire categories.

他们以速度小组和工作室的形式工作，始终保持专注并有目的地推进。

They work in velocity pods and studios that stay focused and move with intent.

如果你准备好从事能定义职业生涯的工作，与那些既挑战你又支持你的同伴共事，那么Robots and Pencils就是你的不二之选。

If you're ready for career defining work with peers who challenge you and have your back, Robots and Pencils is the place.

请前往robotsandpencils.com/careers查看开放职位。

Explore open roles at robotsandpencils.com/careers.

网址是robotsandpencils.com/careers。

That's robotsandpencils.com/careers.

有个小问题：你上一次亲自访问网站做研究是什么时候？

Quick question: When was the last time you actually visited a website to research something?

如果你和我一样，现在AI已经基本替你完成这些工作了。

If you're like me, AI pretty much does that work for you now.

这自然引发了一个新的问题：对品牌而言。

That of course raises a new question for brands.

如果AI负责发现、研究和决策，那么你的网站到底为谁而存在？

If AI is doing the discovering, researching, and deciding, who or what is your website really for?

这种用户行为的转变——AI机器人成为你最重要的新访客——正是我的赞助商Scrunch正在积极应对的挑战。

That shift in user behavior, the rise of AI bots becoming your most important new visitors, is what my sponsor, Scrunch, is taking head on.

Scrunch 是一个 AI 客户体验平台，帮助营销团队了解 AI 代理如何体验他们的网站，AI 代理在 AI 回答中出现在哪里、未出现在哪里，以及是什么阻碍了它们被检索、被信任或被推荐。

Scrunch is the AI customer experience platform that helps marketing teams understand how AI agents experience their site, where they show up in AI Answers, where they don't, and what's preventing them from being retrieved, trusted, or recommended.

这不仅仅是可见性问题。

And it's not just visibility.

Scrunch 会向你展示影响重大的内容缺口、引用缺口和技术障碍，并帮助你修复这些问题，让你的品牌在 AI 回答中被找到并被选择。

Scrunch shows you the content gaps, citation gaps, and technical blockers that matter, and helps you fix them so your brand is found and chosen in AI Answers.

对于我们的听众，Scrunch 提供免费的网站审计服务，揭示 AI 如何看待你的网站，存在哪些缺口，以及你在 AI 回答中与竞争对手相比的表现如何。

Now for our listeners, Scrunch is providing a free website audit that uncovers how AI sees your site, where there's gaps, and how you're showing up in AI versus the competition.

请访问 scrunch.com/aidaily 运行你的网站审计。

Run your site through it at scrunch.com/aidaily.

我认为，对于企业级 AI 代理领域，一个新的标准将变得非常重要。

There's a new standard that I think is going to matter a lot for the enterprise AI agent space.

它被称为 AIUC 1，旨在成为全球首个 AI 代理标准。

It's called AIUC one, and it builds itself as the world's first AI agent standard.

它旨在涵盖所有核心的企业风险，例如数据与隐私、安全、可靠性、问责制以及社会影响，并由可信的第三方进行验证。

It's designed to cover all the core enterprise risks, things like data and privacy, security, safety, reliability, accountability, and societal impact, all verified by a trusted third party.

它引起我注意的原因之一是，Eleven Labs——我之前多次提到过这家公司，目前正是一个绝对的行业巨头——刚刚成为首个通过AI UC一标准认证的语音代理，并推出了全球首个可投保的AI代理。

One of the reasons it's on my radar is that Eleven Labs who you've heard me talk about before and is just an absolute juggernaut right now just became the first voice agent to be certified against AI UC one, and is launching a first of its kind insurable AI agent.

这意味着在实践中，它具备实时防护机制，能够阻止不安全的回复并防范操纵行为，同时还配备完整的安全体系。

What that means in practice is real time guardrails that block unsafe responses and protect against manipulation, plus a full safety stack.

这种特性正是推动企业采用的关键所在。

This is the kind of thing that unlocks enterprise adoption.

当一家基于Eleven Labs构建的公司能够出示第三方认证，并宣称其代理是安全、可靠且经过验证的，这将彻底改变对话的格局。

When a company building on Eleven Labs can point to a third party certification and say our agents are secure, safe, and verified, that changes the conversation.

前往aiuc.com，了解全球首个AI代理标准。

Go to aiuc.com to learn about the world's first standard for AI agents.

网址是aiuc.com。

That's aiuc.com.

你已经试过IDE中的Copilot了。

You've tried In IDE Copilots.

它们速度很快，但只能看到你代码中的局部孤岛。

They're fast, but they only see local silos of your code.

在大型企业代码库中使用这些工具，它们的效果会迅速下降。

Leverage these tools across a large enterprise codebase and they quickly become less effective.

根本的限制：上下文。

The fundamental constraint: Context.

Blitzy 通过无限的代码上下文解决这个问题：能够理解数百万行代码中每一行的依赖关系。

Blitzy solves this with infinite code context: understanding your codebase down to the line level dependency across millions of lines of code.

虽然 Copilot 帮助开发者更快地编写代码，但 Blitzy 却能协调数千个代理，对整个代码库进行推理。

While Copilots help developers write code faster, Blitzy orchestrates thousands of agents that reason across your full codebase.

让 Blitzy 承担繁重工作，自主交付每个冲刺任务中超过 80% 的、经过严格验证的代码。

Allow Blitzy to do the heavy lifting, delivering over 80% of every sprint autonomously with rigorously validated code.

Blitzy 会提供一份详尽的清单，列出需要人类与 Copilot 协作完成的剩余任务。

Blitzy provides a granular list of the remaining work for humans to complete with their Copilots.

以五倍的速度处理功能新增、大规模重构、遗留系统现代化和全新项目。

Tackle feature additions, large scale refactors, legacy modernization, greenfield initiatives, all 5x faster.

前往 blitzy.com 了解 Blitzy 的独特之处。

See the Blitzy difference at blitzy.com.

这就是 blitzy.com。

That's blitzy.com.

接下来是一群与怀疑者有些重叠但本质上不同的群体。

Next up, a group that has some overlap with the skeptics but are ultimately a different thing.

我们称他们为‘AI 泡沫者’。

These we'll call the AI Bubblers.

他们并不一定，或者说最初并不怀疑人工智能的能力。

They're not necessarily or at least a priori skeptical of the capabilities of AI.

事实上，许多人相信人工智能在长期中的强大影响力和颠覆潜力。

In fact, many of them are convinced in the long term power and disruption potential of AI.

他们对商业层面持怀疑态度。

They're skeptical of the business side of things.

他们怀疑价值将在哪里实现。

They're skeptical of where value is going to get realized.

他们质疑当今的商业模式是否能支撑起为该行业融资所需的交易和债务结构。

They're skeptical of whether today's business models can support the deal and debt structures that financing the industry.

他们对这些公司的市场估值持怀疑态度。

They're skeptical of the market's valuations of these companies.

也许目前在媒体曝光度上最突出的代表是《大空头》的主角迈克尔·伯里。

Maybe the most prominent of these, at least right now when it comes to a media profile, is Michael Burry of Big Short fame.

我在这档节目中一直强调，必须把对技术本身的怀疑与对市场如何与技术互动的怀疑区分开来。

One of the things that I've always said on this show is that it's extremely important to break apart skepticism of the technology itself from skepticism of the market's interaction with the technology.

换句话说，一个人完全可以既认为人工智能将彻底改变世界，又认为市场没有正确评估背后公司的价值。

It would be a completely coherent intellectual position, in other words, for someone to think that AI is going to radically changing things, and still not think the market is pricing the companies behind it correctly.

下一类我们称之为艺术家倡导者。

The next category we'll call the artist advocates.

在某些情况下，这些人是艺术或娱乐领域的从业者，他们对人工智能正在取代他们和同行的工作感到沮丧。

Now, in some cases, these are folks in the artistic or entertainment fields, who are frustrated that AI is doing the things that they and their peers used to do.

另一些人则更关注版权和知识产权问题。

Others are concerned about copyright and IP more generally.

当然，还有一大群人并非艺术家，但他们对事情的公平性普遍存在不安，而这种不安并非像最高法院关于版权和人工智能的判决所能解决的。

And then, of course, a big group of these folks are kind of just normal folks who aren't necessarily artists themselves, who just have a general uneasiness of the fairness of things, which is not something that, for example, Supreme Court decisions about copyright and AI are going to solve.

下一个群体并不直接描述对AI的反感动机，而是一种贯穿许多不喜欢AI人群的共同组织原则，即对AI的输出产生本能的厌恶。

The next grouping doesn't exactly describe a motivation for disliking AI, but a shared organizing principle that cuts across many people who don't like AI, which is to viscerally dislike the outputs of AI.

我们将这些人称为‘垃圾退出者’。

We'll call these the slop secessionists.

就像《时代》杂志由达伦·阿罗诺夫斯基发起的1776项目那样，数以百万计的评论者用AI制作关于美国关键历史年份的微型纪录片，而YouTube上的评论者几乎全都猛烈抨击这些内容，认为它们看起来完全是AI垃圾。

And it's the people like the millions of commentators on Time Magazine's 1776 project by Darren Aronofsky, where they're using AI to go create mini documentaries about that pivotal year in American history, with all of the YouTube commenters basically just absolutely railing on it for looking like, in their estimation, AI slop.

正如我所说，我认为人们并不是因为讨厌‘垃圾’才反对AI。

Like I said, I don't think that people are anti AI because they dislike slop.

我认为他们之所以觉得AI的输出是垃圾，是因为他们本来就反对AI。

I think they dislike and consider the output of AI slop because they're already anti AI.

但这种情绪已经形成足够强大的文化力量，值得单独加以识别。

But it's enough of a cultural force that it is worth identifying on its own terms.

另一群人尤其在宗教和保守派圈子中受到广泛关注，他们非常担忧AI对儿童和青少年的影响。

Another group, which has a significant amount of attention particularly in religious and conservative circles, are the folks who are really concerned about the impact of AI on children and teens.

他们担心的是人际关系结构的变化。

They're concerned about human relationship structures.

他们担心人工智能对儿童发展的影响。

They're concerned about the impact of AI on child development.

他们担心当人们更愿意与AI女友或男友交谈，而不是与现实中的伴侣交流时会发生什么。

They're concerned about what happens when people want to talk to AI girlfriends and boyfriends more than real life girlfriends and boyfriends.

我发现，这种担忧对许多不身处相关圈子的人来说是看不见的，但在某些群体和社区中却极其重要，甚至可能是首要关切。

I found that this category of concern is invisible to many who aren't around the circles where it's important, but incredibly pertinent in fact, maybe the very top of the list in certain groups and communities.

我们在节目开头提到的数据中心否认者，是一股日益壮大的政治力量，他们坚决反对数据中心进入他们的社区。

The data center deniers we touched on at the beginning of the show, and are a growing political force of people who are specifically pushing back on data centers showing up in their community.

当然，这一群体与环保活动人士有重叠，他们担心人工智能通过数据中心耗水以及整个行业的电力消耗对环境造成的影响。

This group, of course, overlaps with the environmental activists, who are concerned about AI's impact on the environment through things like the consumption of water for data centers, as well as just the general electricity profile of the industry.

但这两者略有不同。

But these two are slightly different.

环保人士关注的是宏观层面的问题，而许多参加数据中心抗议的人则只关心与自身密切相关的议题，比如电费的实际或潜在上涨。

Whereas the environmentally concerned folks are thinking on macro scale, many of the people that are showing up at data center protests are just focused on very close to home issues like the actual or potential rise of their electricity bills.

我认为，迄今为止规模最大、覆盖面最广、政治影响力可能最强的群体，是那些担忧人工智能可能导致失业的人。

Now I think the category that is by far the biggest, most broad based, and has potentially the biggest political footprint is those who are concerned about the job displacement potential of AI.

任何听过这个节目的人都会经常听到我谈到这一点，所以我认为我们不需要深入探讨。

Anyone who listens to this show will have heard me talk about this quite a bit, so I don't think we need to get too deep into this.

简单来说，这里的担忧是，如果人工智能在所有方面都比我们做得更好，那人们还剩下什么工作？

Simply put, the concern here is that if AI does everything better than us, what jobs are there left for people?

实际上，我对这个问题有很多答案，但今天这期节目的目的并不是要回应这些不同群体的所有担忧。

Now I actually have lots of answers to that, but the point of today's episode is not to answer the concerns of all these different categories.

而只是承认它们确实存在，在许多情况下还在增长，并且是真实人们所持有的真实立场，而不仅仅是网络辩论中的次要顾虑。

It's just to acknowledge that they exist, that they are in many cases growing, and that they're real positions that real people have, not just some sidelong concerns for internet debates.

现在，在担心就业替代的人群中，有一个有趣的子群体，我们在《时代》杂志的文章中看到了，他们不仅一般性地担忧白领工作的冲击，还对人工智能在特定工作场所的实施方式有具体的疑问和批评。

Now one interesting subcategory of the folks concerned about job displacement, which we see in the Time piece, are the folks who aren't just generally concerned about things like white collar job disruption, but have specific issues and criticisms with the way that AI is being implemented in particular workplaces.

《时代》杂志文章中提到的一个例子是护士汉娜·德鲁蒙德。

An example of this from the TIME piece is nurse Hannah Drummond.

根据《时代》杂志的报道——当然，这是我了解汉娜的全部信息——在我看来，她似乎并不是那种从根本上排斥人工智能的意识形态人士。

Now based on TIME's profile, which is of course all I know about Hannah, it doesn't seem to me like she's some ideologue who rejects AI on principle.

她真正关心的是人工智能在她所在领域中的使用方式，而她对自己在一线的实际经验有合理的信心。

It's that she has specific concerns with how it's used in her field, which she understandably feels like she has some ground level lived experience insight into.

《时代》杂志写道：德鲁蒙德帮助HCA医疗系统内包括她自己所在医院在内的17家机构的护士，在最近的合同中争取到了人工智能保护条款，其中包括一项规定：医院在实施与患者护理相关的新技术时，必须征询注册护士的意见。

Time writes: Drummond helped nurses at 17 facilities in the HCA hospital system, including her own, win AI protections in their most recent contract, including a provision requiring hospitals to give registered nurses a say in how new technologies related to patient care are implemented.

德鲁蒙德指出，护士们担心的是，人工智能的不当使用不仅没有帮助，反而造成了实际伤害。

Drummond points to concerns that nurses have had where the improper use of AI has not only been not helpful but actively harmful.

她举了一个例子：一款旨在自动化交接班的人工智能工具，曾将一名新冠患者与一名免疫功能低下者安排在一起，这显然对免疫功能低下的患者构成了巨大风险。

One example she gave was of an AI tool that was designed to automate shift handoffs that had assigned a patient with COVID alongside another who was immunocompromised, which created obviously big risks for the immunocompromised patient.

《时代》杂志写道，德鲁蒙德并不希望将人工智能完全禁止在医院之外，但她认为必须对其使用实施严格管控。

Drummond time writes doesn't want to ban AI from hospitals but says there need to be strict controls around its use.

她说：所有进入医疗领域、接触患者的物品，都经过了严格的测试，被证明是安全、有效且不会对我们造成伤害的。

She says: Everything that reaches patients in healthcare has gone through rigorous testing and has proven to be safe, effective, and free from harming us.

那我们为什么要在人工智能这里跳过这些同样的测试环节呢？

Why would we cut out those same test points for this?

现在，我想讨论的最后一种反人工智能群体，同样是一个宽泛的类别，我们可以称之为‘科技巨头反对者’。

Now the last category of the anti AI folks that I wanted to discuss is once again kind of a catch all, and we'll call the big tech haters.

这一群体内部有多种不同的类型。

There are a bunch of flavors of this.

一种在政治言论中越来越流行的观点是，将科技亿万富翁视为党派反派。

One flavor that's increasingly popular in political rhetoric is the tech billionaires as partisan villains.

这在左翼中尤为突出，并得到了科技界在最近选举周期中明显转向支持特朗普的推动，以及彼得·蒂尔和埃隆·马斯克等人在国家政治舞台上的高调参与的助长。

This is of course more prominent on the left, and was aided and abetted by Tech's loud shift towards Trump in the most recent election cycle, as well as the very visible involvement of people like Peter Thiel and Elon Musk on a national political stage.

有些人并不把马克·安德森当作超级反派，但他们普遍担忧大型科技公司积累了过多的权力。

There are folks for whom hold aside any idea of Marc Andreessen as a supervillain, just have concerns in general about how much power the big tech companies have accrued.

同样，回到本集的核心理念——即使对那些自己不认同的观点也要保持谦逊——确实，直到上一代人之前，我们从未有过任何公司能像大型科技公司这样触及数十亿人。

And again, going back to the core idea at the heart of this episode, of having humility even around positions that one doesn't hold, it is absolutely the case that up until the last generation, we had never had companies that touched billions of people in the way that big tech companies do.

监管大型科技公司如此困难的部分原因在于，网络和网络效应的运作方式与以往的公司截然不同。

Part of the reason that it's so hard to regulate big tech is that networks and network effects don't operate in the same way that previous types of companies did.

无论人们如何解决这些问题，关于公民社会、政府与企业之间权力平衡的问题都大量存在，而大型科技公司正是这一问题的典型代表。

And however one wants to resolve them, there are lots of legitimate questions around the balance of powers between civil society, governments, and companies, with big tech being a quintessential example.

现在，有一群人——我认为他们解释了人工智能敌意的很大一部分原因——他们回顾过去，从社交媒体问世二十年后的视角来看，认为社交媒体不仅没有特别帮助我们，反而让世界因为它的存在而变得更糟。

Now one group, which I actually think explains an extraordinary amount of AI animosity, is the folks who look back now, twenty years on from the advent of social media, who believe that not only has social media not particularly helped us, but in fact that the world is actively worse for it existing.

马修·伊格莱西亚斯最近就此撰文指出：所有关于人工智能的讨论，都笼罩在十五至二十五年前人们对社交媒体文化影响所抱有的巨大而真诚的乐观情绪的阴影之下。

Matthew Iglesias wrote about this recently, saying, All discussions about AI happen in the shadow of the tremendous and very sincere optimism about the cultural impact of social media that existed fifteen to twenty five years ago.

我认为，即使是那些非常前沿且进步的技术支持者，也对上一代技术和社交媒体抱有极大的担忧，这一点从千禧一代父母如何对待孩子的社交媒体使用上就能看出来。

I think that even people who are very technology forward and progressive have massive concerns about the last generation of technology and social media, which you can see in the way that millennial parents are handling social media for their kids.

我有一个四岁、快五岁的孩子，还有一个七岁的孩子，我们社区里没有一位家长会考虑让年幼的孩子使用智能手机。

I have a four, almost five year old, and a seven year old, and none of the parents in and around our community are even considering giving their kids smartphones when they're young.

我们会看看实际情况如何变化，但目前我认识的几乎所有家长——我要明确一点，他们并不是反技术的卢德分子，其中许多人本身就在科技行业工作——

We'll see how this changes in practice, but right now, pretty much all the parents I know who are not, I will be clear, Luddite anti technology folks many of them work in the technology field.

但他们没有一个愿意让自己的十二三岁孩子接触Instagram。

But not a one of them wants their 12 or 13 year old interacting with Instagram.

事实上，当你放大视角来看，我认为目前在美国，有几个因素正在为人工智能营造出一种特别恶劣的环境。

Indeed, when you zoom out, I think that there are a few ingredients that are creating a particularly caustic environment for AI right now in America.

第一，就像我刚才提到的，许多人并不认为互联网让我们的生活变得更好，因此很难接受所有技术都必然代表进步的观点。

One, like I just mentioned, is that many are not convinced that we're better off because of the Internet, and so have a hard time accepting that all technology is inherently progress.

与这一点密切相关的是我刚才讨论的内容，即人们对大型科技公司塑造我们生活的巨大权力所持有的合理担忧。

Related very closely to that is what I was just discussing, which is the legitimate concerns of people around the incredible power of the big technology companies to shape our lives.

当这些公司的主要产出并非我们认为能普遍改善生活的事物，而是那些常常让我们感觉更糟的社交媒体平台时，这也会影响人们对新一代技术前景的看法。

When the big output of those companies are not things that we perceive as generally having made our lives better, but social media platforms that so often make us feel worse, that colors how people look at the promise of a new generation of technology as well.

但我认为另一个重要的部分是，一切在某种程度上都是经济的衍生结果。

But I think that the other important part is that everything, to some extent, is downstream of economics.

而对大多数人来说，现在的经济状况实际上或至少被感知为非常艰难。

And economics for most people right now is actually or at least perceived to be very hard.

现在有很多探讨，为什么尽管整体宏观统计数据有所改善，人们对自己个人经济状况的感知却变得糟糕得多。

Now there is a ton of exploration around why people's perception of their own individual economic situation has gotten so much worse, even as general macro statistics have gotten better.

许多人对这种所谓的‘情绪氛围’问题都有自己的答案。

Many people have answers to this question about the so called vibe session.

其中一部分与我们刚刚谈到的社交媒体有关。

Some of it is related to the social media that we just talked about.

人们现在不断看到别人过着他们向往却负担不起的生活的画面。

The idea that people are now constantly confronted with images of people leading the lives that they'd like to, that they can't afford.

这改变了人们对自身经济状况的感知，即使在实际层面，情况并没有变得更糟，甚至可能有所改善。

That changes people's perception of their own economic situation, even if in real terms, things haven't gotten worse or have even gotten better.

还有一些更具体、实际的经济因素，与单纯的感知无关。

There are also more discrete, actual economic things that don't have to do with just perception.

当食品、交通、医疗和住房等必需品的价格上涨速度超过整体通胀时，即使平板电视等先进技术变得更便宜了，也无关紧要。

When the price of essentials like groceries, transportation, healthcare, and housing rise faster than overall inflation, it doesn't really matter if advanced technology like flat screen TVs have gotten cheaper.

当你每周去超市购物时，你会切实感受到压力。

You're feeling the pinch in a week to week way when you go to the grocery store.

当然，在这一切之上，我们正处在一个极度政治分裂的时刻，这使得问题更容易被政治化。

And then, of course, on top of all of this, we are in just an extremely politically divided moment, which makes this easier to make this partisan.

因此，所有这些因素共同营造了公众对人工智能的不利认知环境。

So you have all of these reasons that set up a rough environment for AI in terms of public perception.

然后，你再看看这个行业的所谓领袖们。

And then you have the so called leaders of this industry.

萨姆·阿尔特曼最近在一次公开讨论中说：人们总在谈论训练人工智能模型消耗多少能源，但训练一个人类也需要大量能量。

Sam Altman recently said in a public discussion: People talk about how much energy it takes to train an AI model, but it also takes a lot of energy to train a human.

你需要耗费二十年的生命，以及这期间吃下的所有食物，才能变得聪明。

It takes like twenty years of life and all the food you eat during that time before you get smart.

上下文工程师马拉岑·科兰回应道：我靠构建人工智能为生。

Context engineer Maratzen Koylan responded to this: I build AI for a living.

我相信我们正在打造的东西。

I believe in what we're building.

但这种言论让我的工作变得更加困难和危险。

But this kind of rhetoric makes my work harder and more dangerous.

将人类发展与模型训练相比较，是完全失察且策略上极其鲁莽的。

Comparing human development to model training is tone deaf and strategically reckless.

人们正在失去工作。

People are losing jobs.

他们感到愤怒。

They're getting angry.

他们把人工智能视为敌人，而不是解决方案。

They're seeing AI as an enemy instead of a solution.

有些人正计划摧毁数据中心以及建造这些技术的人。

Some are planning to destroy data centers and the people who build this stuff.

这种愤怒和反弹可能还没波及到你的楼层，但它已经影响到真正从事这项工作的工程师和建设者。

That anger and backlash might not be reaching your floor, but it reaches the engineers and builders doing the actual work.

最知名的AI公司的CEO不应将人类描述为低效的计算单元。

The CEO of the most visible AI company should not frame humans as inefficient compute units.

作为领导者，你的职责是展示AI如何解决人类面临的实际问题，而不是在舒适的位置上将人类生活简化为一个能源核算问题。

Your role as a leader is to show how AI solves real problems for humanity, not to reduce human life to an energy accounting problem from a comfortable position.

我是一个技术乐观主义者。

I'm a techno optimist.

我相信AI能够增强人类的能力。

I believe AI enhances human capability.

我每天都在与这种新型智能共事。

I work with this new form of intelligence every day.

我真心尊重它是什么。

I genuinely respect what it is.

它是真实存在的，意义重大，且前所未有。

It is real, significant, and unlike anything that has existed before.

但我同样相信人类的卓越。

But I also believe in human excellence.

我们必须接受，这是两种根本不同的智能形式在协同工作。

We have to accept that it's two fundamentally different forms of intelligence working together.

在我看来，真正的技术乐观主义立场并不是AI比人类更便宜。

In my humble opinion, the real techno optimist position isn't AI is cheaper than humans.

而是我们这个星球上现在有了两种智能形式，它们的结合比单独任何一种都更强大。

It's we now have two forms of intelligence on this planet, and the combination is more powerful than either alone.

直接对萨姆说，他得出结论：你是OpenAI的领导者，无论你是否主动选择，你都代表着如今所有在开发AI的人。

Speaking to Sam directly, he concludes: You're the leader of open AI, and whether you chose it or not, you represent everyone building an AI right now.

你所说的每一句话，都在塑造世界如何看待这项技术以及背后的人。

Every word you say shapes how the world sees this technology and the people behind it.

请以这种方式行事。

Please act like it.

现在，我制作这一集的目的是拆解当前反AI情绪的各个要素。

Now, I wanted to do this episode to break apart the different elements of anti AI sentiment right now.

因为我认为，当我们更精确地了解人们的担忧时，就能更好地应对它们。

Because I think that as we get more precise about what people's concerns are, we can do more to address them.

就像我在开头提到的，你可以说我天真，但我认为，相比人们所想的，乐观的空间其实更大。

And like I indicated at the beginning, call me naive, but I think that there's more room for optimism than people might think.

即使在批评声中也是如此。

Even in the critique.

回到《时代》杂志这篇报道中提到的那九个人：你没有看到任何人声称机器人军队会因为某种未知的原因起来杀死我们所有人。

Coming back to the nine folks profiled in this Time magazine piece: What you don't have in there is anyone claiming that an army of robots is going to rise up and kill us all for some unknown reason.

你也没有看到任何人谈论AI泡沫、市场定价的担忧，或者有人声称AI其实并没有那么好。

You don't have anyone talking about AI bubbles and concerns about market pricing, or people giving the line that, well, actually AI isn't all that good.

相反，你看到的是像我们刚刚介绍过的帕纳德鲁蒙这样的人，他们并不排斥在自己的领域使用AI，只是希望确保AI真正有用。

Instead, you have folks like Panadrummon that we just profiled, who aren't unwilling to engage with AI in their field they just want to ensure that it's actually helpful.

来自奥斯汀的牧师迈克尔·格雷森明确反对使用AI，但他担心青少年对聊天机器人的依赖以及孤独症的蔓延。

Austin based pastor Michael Grayson is very demonstratively not AI on principle, but worried about teen chatbot dependency and the loneliness epidemic.

穆斯科吉族活动家乔丹·哈蒙德和麦肯齐·罗伯茨关注的是数据中心，但并不是因为数据中心本身是坏的，而是因为在他们所工作的特定地区，数据中心正与原住民土地主权问题纠缠在一起。

Muskogee Nation activists Jordan Harmon and Mackenzie Roberts are concerned with data centers, but not because data centers are a priori bad, because in the specific area that they work, they're getting tangled up with sovereign and native land rights.

佐治亚州公共服务委员会成员艾莉西亚·约翰逊，同样，并不是真正反对AI。

Georgia Public Service Commission member Alicia Johnson, again, is not actually against AI.

她希望数据中心的建设方式在经济上是公平的。

She wants the way that data centers get built to be economically fair.

过去新增发电能力并网的方式是将新建发电设施的成本转嫁给本地消费者，但当这些消费者并非受益者，而所有新增电力都流向数据中心时，这种方式显然行不通。

The way that increased energy generation capacity used to be brought online, where the cost of setting up new generation was passed on to local consumers, very obviously doesn't work when those consumers aren't the beneficiary, but all that new power goes to a data center.

但这其实是一个完全可以解决的问题。

But that is an unbelievably solvable issue.

坦率地说，这个问题至今未被解决，我认为是建设数据中心的人在政策和想象力上的巨大失败。

And frankly, the fact that it hasn't been solved yet is, I think, a massive failure of both policy and imagination from the people who are building the data centers.

在当前的经济结构下，数据中心完全有可能成为它们运营所在社区中最有利于社区、最积极参与的商业类型，没有任何理由做不到。

There is absolutely no reason, with the economic structures being what they are, that data centers couldn't be some of the most pro community, positively engaged types of businesses wherever they operate.

顺便说一句，就连唐纳德·特朗普也越来越推动人工智能企业做出承诺，确保它们成为数据中心所在社区更好的守护者。

By the way, even Donald Trump is on this train, increasingly pushing the AI operators to make commitments to ensure that they are better stewards for the communities that their data centers operate within.

最后一点乐观之处是，目前关于人工智能的政治讨论尚未固化。

A last point of optimism, as we conclude, is that right now, the political discourse around AI has not hardened.

它尚未从党派立场上固化，甚至人们希望解决这些问题的政策仍在形成之中。

It hasn't hardened from a partisan perspective, and even the policies that people want to address all these issues are still forming.

政界人士目前正在探索为人工智能时代制定新政策的多种提案，目前仍有大量空间来塑造人们对该做什么的看法。

Politicians are currently exploring new types of proposals for new policies for the AI age, and there's still a ton of room to shape perception of what should be done.

我确信，随着2026年政治竞选占据更多公众注意力，我们会更多地讨论这些提案的具体内容。

I'm sure that as political campaigns take on a bigger portion of mindshare in 2026, we'll be talking more about what some of those proposals look like.

但关键是，如今的世界并没有像X平台可能让你以为的那样，分裂为超人类加速主义者与新卢德主义者两极。

But the point is that right now, the world has not, despite what X might make you think, hardened into the transhumanist accelerationists on the one hand, and the neo Luddites on the other.

绝大多数人仍处于中间地带，努力理解人工智能将如何影响他们自己、他们的家庭以及他们的社区。

The vast, vast majority of people sit in the middle, trying to make sense of what this is all going to mean for them, their families, and their communities.

他们不会盲目接受人工智能必然带来好处的说法，但大多数人也不会 outright 拒绝它可能带来积极影响的可能性。

They are not going to accept blindly that somehow this is just going to be a good thing, But most of them are also not going to reject out of hand the possibility that it could be.

我们越是努力解决实际问题，哪怕是一点一点地逐步推进，就越有可能将正在兴起的反人工智能运动转变为一个谨慎乐观的联盟，真正对未来抱有期待。

The more we do to address real issues, even if it's incrementally and one by one, the more that we might be able to shift the emerging anti AI movement into a cautiously optimistic coalition that actually can look forward to the future.

最终，这个节目不会变成一档政治节目，也不会主要聚焦于人工智能的社会影响，尽管这始终是其中的一部分。

Ultimately, this show is not going to turn into a political show, and it is not going to primarily focus on the societal impacts of AI, although that will always be a part.

我在这所有事情中的使命，是为那些已经认定人工智能将成为他们未来生活中极其重要力量的人们，尽我所能提供一切工具，使这一变革对他们及其家庭尽可能积极正面。

My mission in all of this is to give the people who have decided that AI is going to be an incredibly important force in their lives going forward all the tools I possibly can to make that as positive for them and their families as can be.

但当我看到这篇《时代》杂志的文章时，我看到的不是一群反对者。

But when I see this Time Magazine piece, I do not see a bunch of opponents.

我看到的只是机遇。

I just see opportunity.

祝我回家一路顺利。

Wish me luck getting home.

希望明天我能以正常形式从哈德逊河谷与你们见面。

Hopefully, will be with you in normal form from the Hudson Valley tomorrow.

目前，今天的AI每日简报就到这里。

For now, that is gonna do it for today's AI Daily Brief.

一如既往，感谢您的收听或观看，下次再见，平安。

Appreciate you listening or watching as always, and until next time, peace.