Aircraft Leasing Lift-Off

大家好，我是爱德华·钱塞勒，欢迎收听又一期《资本周期》播客。

Hello, this is Edward Chancellor with another episode of Capital Cycle podcast.

今天我又请来了汤姆·沃勒姆，他是北美投资组合的分析师。

I've got with me again, Tom Wharram, who's an analyst on the North American portfolios.

欢迎。

Welcome.

你好。

Hello.

很高兴再次见到你。

Good to see you again.

汤姆，我们这次要做一件以前在《资本周期》播客上从未做过的事，那就是回顾你写的一篇文章，实际上是2024年12月写的，当时我很喜欢，但出于某种原因，没能在播客中安排上。

Tom, we're going to do something we've never done before on one of these Capital Cycle podcasts, which is to go back to a piece that you wrote actually in December 2024, which I liked at the time, but for some reason didn't really have space to include it in the podcast.

另外，这个月我还会和你的同事本·斯林斯比聊聊，他写了一篇关于欧洲飞机发动机制造商的文章。

Now, I'm also speaking this month to your colleague, Ben Slingsby, who has written about the European aircraft engine manufacturers.

我想谈谈你之前那篇关于飞机租赁和飞机租赁资本周期的文章，这样我们可以从另一个资本周期的角度来审视飞机和航空业。

And I wanted to talk about your old piece on aircraft leasing and the capital cycle in aircraft leasing to give us a sort of take on the aircraft and airline industry from a slightly different capital cycle perspective.

那我们能不能先回顾一下你的文章，然后再讨论之后发生的事情？

So can we recap your piece and then later go in and and discuss what has happened since then?

商用航空生产的峰值是在2018年，当时波音和空客向客户交付了大约1600架飞机。

So the the peak of commercial aviation production was in 2018 when Boeing and Airbus delivered around 1,600 aircraft to customers.

不出所料，我们都知道，低谷出现在2020年，由于疫情，他们生产的飞机不到那个数字的一半。

Unsurprisingly, as we all know, the trough in that came in 2020 when they produced fewer than half of that, thanks to the pandemic.

当我在2024年底写这篇文章时，我说产量仍比峰值低30%。

And when I wrote the piece at the end of twenty twenty four, I said that production remained 30% below that peak.

然后更新到今天，2025年，产量大约比2018年的峰值低15%。

And then just updating that for today, in 2025, production was about 15% below the 2018 peak.

而且预计未来两年内还不会超过那个峰值。

And we're still not expected to surpass that for another two years.

所以在典型的资本周期中，像这样大幅削减产量通常是因为飞机过剩。

So in a classic capital cycle, dramatic production cuts such as these would normally be the result of an excess of aircraft.

是的，那通常是我们看到的情况。

Yes, that's what we'd normally see.

这种减产，你可能会以为是因为飞机太多了，但这里的情况并不是这样。

Those kind of production cuts, you'd expect it to be because there were too many aircraft, but that's not the case here.

过去几年，飞机制造商面临的困境很多，但和供需平衡完全无关。

The woes that have faced the aircraft OEMs over the past few years are extensive, but completely unrelated to the balance of supply and demand.

这些问题大家都非常清楚。

The issues are very well known.

我猜，报纸上到处都是这些新闻。

They've been all over the papers, I suspect.

2019年，波音737 MAX停飞。

In 2019, you had the July MAX grounding.

然后显然还有疫情以及所有相关的供应链中断。

Then obviously you had the pandemic and all the associated supply chain disruptions.

之后还有大量的发动机问题。

And then there'd been extensive engine troubles.

还有熟练工人短缺、工人罢工，以及737 MAX 9的门塞问题和其他的质量控制问题。

You had skilled labor shortages, you had labor strikes, and then the seven thirty seven MAX nine door plug issues that they had and other quality control items.

所以所有这些因素构成了一张相互关联的挑战网络，使得扩大生产规模难以轻易实现。

So all of these things form a sort of connected web of challenges to scaling up production that can't be easily overcome.

正如我所说，预计到2027年我们才能超过2018年的产量。

As I've said, the expectations are that we won't exceed that 2018 production number until 2027.

而且这些预测甚至可能过于乐观。

And even these forecasts might turn out to be optimistic.

AirCap的首席执行官在最近的电话会议上指出，飞机生产方面从来不会有意外惊喜。

The CEO of AirCap made the point on their recent call that you just don't get surprises to the upside on aircraft production.

而在等式的另一边，需求持续强劲增长。

And on the other side of the equation, demand continues to grow robustly.

是的。

Yes.

人们使用的指标是收入客公里。

The metric people use is revenue passenger kilometres.

也就是付费乘客旅行的总公里数。

So that's total kilometres travelled by paying customers.

自1980年以来，这一数字平均每年增长5%。

And that's grown at an average rate of 5% since 1980.

而2024年，它超过了疫情前的峰值。

And 2024 was the year that it exceeded the pre pandemic high.

预计到2030年，全球中产阶级将占总人口的57%，而2021年这一比例为47%。

The middle class globally is expected to get to 57% of the population in 2030, and that compares to 47% in 2021.

所以这是一个很大的增长，而且他们会想要坐飞机。

So that's a big increase, and and they will want to fly.

另一个需求点是，新技术的飞机比上一代每座燃油效率提高约20%到25%，即燃油消耗更低。

The other demand point to raise is that the new technology aircraft are about 20 or 25% more efficient or less fuel burn per seat than the previous generation.

因此，这意味着飞机短缺，尤其是那些更高效的新技术飞机。

And so what this means is you have an aircraft shortage, particularly for those more efficient new technology aircraft.

而扩大生产的挑战意味着，至少在2030年之前，这种短缺很难得到解决。

And the challenges to scaling up production means there's little chance of that shortage being remedied before at least 2030.

你认为，如果你拥有飞机和交付时段，这是个好消息。

And you believe this is great news if, for instance, you own aircraft and delivery slots.

换句话说，你是一家飞机租赁公司。

In other words, you're an aircraft leasing company.

是的，完全正确。

Yes, absolutely.

稍微岔开一下话题，说说飞机租赁的历史。这个行业始于20世纪70年代，当时新兴的小型航空公司纷纷出现，它们希望以轻资产的方式扩张。

And to take a little bit of a digression and a bit of history on aircraft leasing, the industry came about in the 1970s as new, small airlines sprung up, and they wanted a capital light way to expand.

从那时起，租赁的渗透率一直在稳步上升。

And since then, the penetration of leasing has increased steadily.

现在大约占全球机队的一半。

It's now about 50% of the global fleet.

所以，虽然这些租赁公司不为大众所知，看起来可能有点神秘，但它们为大约一半的商业航空业提供融资。

So while these leasing companies are not well known to people and they may seem pretty esoteric, they finance about half of the commercial airline industry.

而且这个比例预计还会继续上升。

And that's expected to continue to rise.

你特别写到了飞机租赁行业的先驱之一。

And you write particularly about one of the aircraft leasing industries, Pioneers.

马拉松的控股公司之一是Air Lease，这家公司是由史蒂芬·乌德瓦-哈兹创立的。

One of Marathon's holdings is a company called Air Lease, and that company was founded by Stephen Udvar Hazy.

他共同创立了最早的一家飞机租赁公司，叫做国际租赁金融公司，简称ILFC。

He co founded one of the first aircraft leasing companies called International Lease Finance Corporation or ILFC.

那是在1970年代。

That was in the 1970s.

他在1990年把它卖给了AIG。

And he sold it to AIG in 1990.

然后他作为AIG的一部分经营这家公司，直到大约2010年，他离开那里创立了Air Lease。

And then he ran that as part of AIG until about 2010 when he left there to found Air Lease.

这是另一家，或者至少曾经是另一家马拉松的控股公司。

Which is another, or at least has been another, Marathon Holding.

是的，没错。

Yes, exactly.

你说，先生……

And you say that Mr.

乌德瓦尔·哈齐在业内有着长期的成功记录。

Udvar Hazy has a long track record of success in the industry.

确实如此。

He does.

我对这个行业的了解，或者说我对这段历史的部分了解，来自一本叫《紧急迫降》的书，作者是爱尔兰租赁公司GPA的一位高管，这家公司曾面临破产，后来被拯救了。

And my knowledge of the industry, or not all my knowledge, but some of my knowledge of the sort of history here, comes from a book called Crash Landing, which was written by an executive of the Irish leasing company, GPA, which had to be rescued from bankruptcy

我记得GPA的失败或濒临失败。

I in remember the the GPA failure or near failure.

你还记得GPA到底是因为什么倒下的吗？

Do you remember what actually caused GPA to go down?

他们有两个问题。

They had two issues.

一个是在繁荣时期订购了太多飞机。

One was that they had ordered far too many planes during the boom times.

其次，他们有过多的老旧飞机。

And then second of all, they had too many old planes.

所以他们当时接收了所有这些新飞机，其中有些型号并不适合当时的市场。

And so they were getting all of these new planes being delivered, some of which were not the right models for the market at the time as well.

结果所有这些新飞机正好赶上了90年代初的经济衰退。

So getting all of these new planes being delivered exactly into the downturn of the early 90s.

而且他们还有很多老飞机，全都停在地面上。

And then they had a lot of older aircraft, all of which were on the ground.

总之，ILFC被拿来和GPA的情况做对比，说明他们做得有多好。

Anyway, ILFC are mentioned as a contrast to what was going on at GPA, and how much better they had done.

他们在繁荣时期没有订购新飞机，所以更好地应对了那次衰退。

And they'd held back from ordering new aircraft in the boom times, and they'd navigated that downturn much better.

你说的是，

And you say that Mr.

奥德·法哈齐在21世纪初又做得不错了。

Odd Fahazy was doing well again in the early 20s.

是的。

Yes.

我刚才讲的那段历史，显然是很久以前的事了。

So that history I've just given you is obviously a long time ago.

但在疫情期间，我们又看到了同样的逆周期思维，当时Air Lease在旅行需求前景不明朗的时候，大量订购新飞机。

But we saw that same countercyclical mindset on display during the pandemic when Air Lease placed large orders of new aircraft at exactly the moment where future travel demand was uncertain.

现在很难想象，当时人们都在说旅行会减少，尤其是商务旅行，但后来并没有发生。

It's easy to forget now that people were talking about much less travel, especially business travel, which hasn't come to pass.

而且波音和空客在价格上灵活了很多。

And Boeing and Airbus were much more flexible on price.

既然市场已经复苏，飞机价格上涨，他们就没有再下大单。

Since the market has recovered and aircraft prices have risen, they're not placing significant orders.

他们只是在等待那些以更优惠价格购买的飞机交付。

They're simply waiting for the delivery of those aircraft that were bought at much more attractive prices.

传统观点认为，你不应该投资航空公司。

Conventional wisdom holds that you don't invest in airlines.

人们可能会认为，分散的飞机租赁行业会有糟糕的资本周期，甚至更糟，因此投资者明智的做法是远离。

One might expect that a fragmented aircraft leasing industry would have a bad, if not worse, capital cycle, and therefore investors would be wise to stay away.

那确实是我最初接触这个行业时的预期。

That was certainly what I expected when I first came across the industry.

但举个例子，2020年可以说是航空史上最糟糕的一年，而Air Lease的收入只下降了0.1%，税前利润只下降了12%。

But maybe by way of example, so 2020, arguably the worst year in aviation history, and Air Lease's revenues fell just 0.1%, and profit before tax fell just 12.

所以这个商业模式比它们所服务的航空公司要稳定得多。

So the business model is much more stable than the airlines they supply.

这有几个方面。

And there are a few aspects of this.

首先，他们专注于拥有年轻的飞机，并在其经济寿命的三分之一时出售。

Firstly, they focus on owning young aircraft, and they sell them a third of the way through their economic life.

你会发现，在经济低迷时期，对年轻飞机的需求依然存在，因为它们更省油。

And what you find is when there's a downturn, the demand for younger aircraft remains as they're more fuel efficient.

所以你的年轻飞机继续飞行，而较旧的飞机则停在地面上。

So you keep your young aircraft flying, and the older ones are on the ground.

即使客户破产，较新的飞机也可以重新推销给新客户。

And even where a customer goes bankrupt, the younger planes can then be remarketed to new customers.

乌德瓦尔·哈齐先生有50年的记录，总是能在客户破产时重新推销飞机。

Mr Udvar Hazy has a 50 track record of always being able to remarket aircraft when a customer goes bankrupt.

公司是否因为成为租赁业务的主导者而受益？

And the company benefited from being a dominant player in the leasing business?

这对商业模式也至关重要。

This is also critical to the business model.

他们是少数几家规模足够大、能直接与制造商（波音和空客）打交道的飞机租赁公司之一，并且能利用自己的规模优势。

They are one of only a handful of aircraft lessors large enough to go directly to the manufacturers, to Boeing and Airbus, and they can leverage their scale.

正如我们之前谈到的，他们可以把握购买飞机的时机，以获得比小型租赁公司或小型航空公司更优惠的条件。

And as we've talked about, they can time their purchases of aircraft to get better terms than you would get if you were a small lessor or if you were a small airline.

大约有200家飞机租赁公司，所以乍一看这个行业似乎相当分散，但绝大多数公司缺乏与波音或空客直接交易的规模，大多数飞机租赁公司实际上是在一个竞争更激烈的售后回租市场竞争，这主要是提供最低的融资成本。

There are about 200 aircraft lessors, so at first you think this looks like quite a fragmented industry, but the vast majority lack the scale to go to Boeing or Airbus, And what most of the aircraft lessors do is they compete in a much more competitive sale and leaseback market, which is really about providing the lowest financing cost.

Air Lease拥有的另一个规模优势，也是那些少数大型租赁公司共有的，就是它们拥有投资级信用评级，因此能以比众多小型租赁公司低得多的成本融资。

The other scale advantage that air lease have, and again, those sort of handful of large lessors, is that they have investment grade credit ratings, so they can fund themselves at a much lower cost than the long tail of small lessors.

汤姆，你的文章让我感兴趣的是，它展示了在全球金融危机之后，利率如何鼓励了飞机租赁行业的收益追求，并吸引了新的进入者。

So what interested me, Tom, about your piece was how it showed that in the aftermath of global financial crisis, interest rates encouraged yield seeking in the aircraft leasing industry and attracted new entrants into the business.

完全正确。

That's exactly right.

2010年的时候，80%的租赁机队掌握在21家租赁公司手里。

So in 2010, 80% of the leased fleet was held by 21 lessors.

而到疫情前夕，这个数字几乎翻了一番，达到了38家。

And by the eve of the pandemic, this had nearly doubled to 38.

现在利率上升了，我们看到这种趋势开始逆转。

So with interest rates having risen, we're now seeing this pattern start to reverse.

那疫情期间，Air Lease的盈利能力怎么样？

And during the pandemic, what happened to Air Lease's profitability?

疫情期间，租赁公司对交付的飞机收取较低的租金，同时也与陷入困境的客户重组了租赁协议。

So during the pandemic, one of the things that happened is lessors agreed low leasing rates on the aircraft being delivered, and they also restructured leases with their customers who were struggling.

这些交易拖累了Air Lease的收入。

And so these deals acted as a drag on Air Lease's revenue.

自那以后，利率明显上升，更高的利息成本推高了Air Lease的融资成本，给净利润带来了压力。

Since then, obviously interest rates have come up, and higher interest costs have pushed Air Lease's funding costs up, pressuring net income.

所以我们这里讨论的相关指标是净租赁率。

So the relevant metric here we talk about is a net lease rate.

这实际上就是租赁率和他们的融资成本之间的差额。

So this is effectively the spread between the leasing rate and then their funding cost.

疫情之后出现的情况是，租赁率被锁定在较低水平，而融资成本却在上升，导致利润空间被压缩。

What you had in the aftermath of the pandemic was a squeeze where leasing rates were locked in at lower rates and funding costs were rising.

这意味着股本回报率降到了大约7%，而疫情前的平均水平大约是13%。

And this meant that return on equity came down to about 7% compared to the pre pandemic average of about 13%.

毫不意外，股本回报率的下降意味着，在我写这篇文章的时候，Air Lease的股价相对于账面价值只有0.8倍，而疫情前的正常水平是1.2倍。

Unsurprisingly, this decline in return on equity meant Air Lease was at the time, when I wrote the piece, trading at a price to book for about 0.8 times compared to the pre pandemic norm about 1.2 times.

你当时觉得这种被低估的估值是过度的吗？

You felt at the time that that depressed valuation was overdone?

是的。

Yes.

所以如果你想想飞机短缺的问题，我们在2014年就已经能看到这将开始推高租赁率。

So if you think about the aircraft shortage, we could already see in 2014 that that was going to start pushing lease rates up.

比如，2023年签的A321neo租赁合同，租金已经比2019年签的高出大约20%。

So for example, an A321neo lease signed in 2023 was already around 20% higher than those signed in 2019.

但是资产组合的调整速度很慢。

But the portfolio is very slow moving.

从和航空公司谈妥租赁条款到飞机真正交付，中间有两年的滞后期。

So there's a two year lag between agreeing the lease terms with the airline and that aircraft actually being delivered.

所以，更高的租金收益还没反映到Air Lease的收入里，但这种情况预计会在2025年底或2025年期间开始改变，并且会持续好几年。

So the benefit of higher lease rates had yet to feed into Air Lease's revenues, but this was set to start happening sort of end of twenty twenty five or during 2025 and continue for several years after that.

你不认为飞机租赁业务因为利率上升而受到了结构性损害吗？

You didn't believe that the aircraft leasing business had been structurally damaged by higher rates?

不认为。

No.

长期来看，更高的利率会通过更高的租金转嫁给客户。

In the long run, higher interest rates are passed through to the customer as higher lease rates.

但是，这里存在一个期限错配的问题。

But but there is a duration mismatch.

所以随着利率上升，你会看到Air Lease的债务成本挤压了净租赁收益率，而那些更高的租赁费率还没反映到收入上。

So as interest rates rose, you see Air Lease's cost of debt squeezing the net lease rates before those higher leasing rates come through on the top line.

我们最初看这个的时候，很难说这两个因素的平衡何时会开始推动股本回报率上升。

When we originally looked at this, it was hard to say when the balance of those two factors would start to drive return on equity up.

但我们预计股本回报率会在三到五年的时间内恢复到历史水平。

But we expected return on equity to return to historic levels on something like a three to five year time horizon.

我们认为ROE的改善会支撑至少与历史水平一致的市净率。

And we thought the improvement in ROE would justify a price to book multiple at least in line with history.

与此同时，你以很低的市盈率买入，而这些收益都保留在账面价值中，用于资助新飞机的交付，所以你的每股账面价值也在持续增长。

And in the meantime, you were buying at a very low price to earnings multiple, and those earnings are all being retained in the book value to fund new aircraft deliveries, so you're getting continued book value per share growth as well.

这个投资逻辑的另一个方面是，Air Lease通常在飞机使用寿命的三分之一时出售飞机，而飞机的短缺显然推高了飞机价值，这意味着他们出售这些飞机时可以获得可观的销售收益。

The other aspect of this thesis is that air lease normally sell aircraft around a third of the way through their useful life, and the shortage of aircraft has obviously pushed aircraft values up, and that means they can make healthy gains on sale when they sell those aircraft.

所以他们出售时的收益率大约在15%左右。

So they've been selling at around a gain on sale of around 15%.

现在很难判断他们拥有的整个飞机组合的价值，因为这些飞机附带租赁合同，从外部很难判断这如何影响价值。

Now it's quite hard to judge what the value of the total portfolio of aircraft they own is, because they have these attached leases, and from the outside it's quite difficult to judge how that impacts the value.

但我们认为，销售利润的改善以及飞机供应的紧张局面表明，账面价值很可能严重低估了飞机的实际价值。

But we felt that the improving gains on sales and the tightness in the supply of aircraft meant that it seemed likely that the book value was significantly underestimating the value of the aircraft.

你还觉得订单簿是另一个价值来源。

And you also thought that the order book was another source of value.

对，我们刚才谈的是账面价值，也就是他们目前拥有的那些实体资产。

Yeah, so what we've just talked about is the book value, I.

即他们当前持有的实物资产。

E, the physical assets that they currently own.

不过在我写这篇文章的时候，他们还有112架飞机没有安排订单。

But at the time that I wrote this piece, they had 112 unplaced orders.

这些订单预计会在2025年到2030年之间交付。

That is orders that were going to be delivered from sort of 2025 to 2030.

它们的平均成本估计是6300万美元。考虑到交付机位紧张，而且很多飞机是在疫情期间低价订的，这个价格肯定低于市场价值。

They have an estimated average cost of $63,000,000 And this was almost certainly below the market value of those aircraft, given the shortage of delivery slots, and the fact that so many of those aircraft were ordered during the low prices during the pandemic.

现在，Air Lease打算通过把飞机租给航空公司来变现这些交付量，而不是出售交付机位。

Now the way Air Lease are going to monetise those deliveries is by placing the aircraft with airlines, not by selling the delivery slots.

不过，我觉得还有这块表外价值，就是如果他们卖掉交付时段的话，我觉得可以合理假设一下。

However, I think there is this off balance sheet value, which is if they had sold the delivery slots, I think you could reasonably assume.

我的意思是，我保守估计，至少比他们买入价高出10%，可能还会更多。

I mean, I thought very conservatively a 10% premium to the price that they were going to buy them for, potentially more.

这样又能给账面价值增加10%到20%。

And that again adds 10% to 20% to the book value.

所以汤姆，当你在去年12月写那篇文章的时候，你说Air Lease盈利能力改善的确切时间还不确定，而Marathon凭借其耐心，能够从看似有利的资本周期动态中获益，但Marathon投资理念的一个关键方面是考察经营者的资本配置能力。

So Tom, when you wrote that, this piece back in December 24, you were saying that the exact timing of the improvement in Air Lease's profitability was uncertain, that Marathon was well placed with its patience to benefit from what looked like favorable capital cycle dynamics, but also a sort of key aspect of Marathon's investment philosophy is looking at the capital allocation skills of the person running the business.

自从你写了那篇文章以来，投资逻辑确实如预期那样实现了。

Now since you wrote that piece, the investment case has actually played out as expected.

是的。

Yes.

所以看最近一个季度的业绩，净租赁收益率扩大了，这已经是连续第四个季度扩大了。

So looking at the most recent quarterly results, net lease yields expanded, and that was the fourth quarter in a row of that expansion.

股本回报率也在上升。

Return on equity is going up.

这其实是由我们之前讨论过的那些因素推动的。

And that's really being driven by the things we've already talked about.

就是那些低收益的租约到期后以更高的利率续签，疫情期间的租约到期，新飞机以更高的租金出租。

So the lower yielding leases being extended at higher rates, the COVID era leases rolling off and new aircraft coming on at higher lease rates.

这些积极因素足以抵消融资成本的上升。

And those positives are more than offsetting the higher financing cost.

你知道，我之前说过，他们最近一个季度出售的飞机实现了15%的销售收益。

You know, as I've already said, they reported a 15% gain on sale on the aircraft they sold in the most recent quarter.

而且由于飞机生产依然紧张，这种情况短期内不会改变。

And with aircraft production remaining tight, that's not expected to change anytime soon.

那坏消息呢？

Now for the bad news?

对。

Yes.

我不确定是否一定要把它说成是坏消息，但大型租赁公司之间的整合仍在继续。

I I don't know whether we necessarily want to frame it as bad news, but consolidation is continuing among the large lessors.

而且我记得在最初的文章里提到过，AerCap收购了GECAS，SMBC收购了Goshorc。

And I think in the original piece, I mentioned that AerCap acquired GECAS and SMBC had acquired Goshorc.

现在SMBC正在收购Air Lease。

Now SMBC are acquiring Air Lease.

所以实际上它是由Apollo和Brookfield支持的财团收购的。

So it's actually being bought by a consortium backed by Apollo and Brookfield.

所以在此期间你在股票上赚了不少钱，但对收购价格不太满意？

So you've made a decent amount of money on the stock in the interim, but you're not quite happy with the take out price?

是的，没错。

Yes, that's right.

我们非常尊重Brookfield作为投资者。

We have a huge amount of respect for Brookfield as investors.

我们实际上也是Brookfield的股东。

We're actually shareholders of Brookfield.

我想我们基本上同意他们的结论，即每股65美元，略低于账面价值，仍然是一个有吸引力的价格。

I suppose we would essentially agree with their conclusion that $65 per share, just below the book value, is still an attractive price

对Air Lease来说。

for Air Lease.

所以你觉得价格应该更高？

So you thought it might have been more?

2025年，公司实现了大约10%的调整后股本回报率。

In 2025, the company achieved an adjusted return on equity of around 10%.

这仍然低于净租赁利差正常化后可以达到的十几倍的水平。

That is still below the low teen level they can get to with a normalization of net lease spreads.

在那些更高的水平上，溢价于账面价值是合理的。

And at those higher levels, a premium to book would be justified.

看看他们的竞争对手AerCap，现在交易价格大约是账面价值的1.3倍。

And if you look at their competitor, AerCap, that's now trading at around 1.3 times book.

而且别忘了，买家是以大约10倍市盈率买入这只股票的，所以即使在今天低迷的股本回报率下，你也能获得不错的盈利收益率，因此我认为溢价于账面价值是合理的。

And if you bear in mind, the buyers are buying the stock for about 10 times earnings, so you're getting a decent earnings yield today, at today's depressed ROE, hence my view that a premium to book would be justified.

另外，正如我们提到的，仅仅看账面价值并没有考虑到未来五年交付的飞机订单簿的价值，其中许多飞机是以疫情期间的价格购买的，远低于当前市场价值。

The other thing is, as we've mentioned, that just looking at the book value gives no value to the order book of aircraft being delivered in the next five years, many of which were purchased at COVID era prices, which are much lower than the current market value of the aircraft.

好的，谢谢你，汤姆。

So thanks, Tom.

我觉得这次对话很有意思，从两个角度来看。

And I think this conversation interesting for two perspective.

一是对飞机制造和融资行业的资本周期提出了一个不同的看法，二是更广泛地说明了利率周期如何影响资本周期。

One, just the another orthogonal take on the capital cycle in the aircraft manufacturing business and financing, but also more generally how interest rate cycle affects capital cycle.

因为你描述的情况是，在利率较低的时候，飞机租赁行业竞争加剧，而现在利率上升，行业正在整合，变成了我们所说的良性资本周期。

Because what you described is a period in which when the interest rates were low, the aircraft leasing industry had an expansion of competition, and now interest rates have risen, the industry is consolidating and turning into what we might call a benign capital cycle.

马拉松还有飞机租赁业务的风险敞口吗？

And Marathon still retains some exposure to the aircraft leasing business?

是的。

Yes.

没错。

That's right.

我们通过在中东和非洲投资组合中持有的中银航空租赁公司，仍然有这方面的风险敞口。

We have exposure through our ownership of BOC Aviation in our EM portfolios.

这其实是一个非常相似的投资逻辑。

It's really a very similar thesis.

这只股票表现一直不错，很大程度上是因为我们刚才讨论的那些原因。

The stock has been doing well, and and much for the reasons we've discussed.

非常好，汤姆。

Very good, Tom.

谢谢

Thank

你。

you.

太好了。

Great.

非常感谢你。

Thank you very much.

感谢你今天抽出时间。

Thank you for your time today.

希望您能收听下一期的《资本周期》。

I hope you will listen to the next edition of the Capital Cycle.

本通讯仅供参考。

This communication is provided for information purposes only.

更多信息（包括重要披露）请参阅马拉松网站及《全球投资评论》。

Please refer to Marathon's website and the Global Investment Reviews for further information, including important disclosures.