Barbarous Relics

大家好，我是爱德华·钱塞勒，欢迎收听又一期《资本周期》播客。

Hello, this is Edward Chancellor with another episode of the Capital Cycle podcast.

今天和我一起的是劳拉·法伊夫，她是新兴市场团队的分析师。

And I've got with me Laura Fyfe, who's an analyst on the Emerging Markets team.

欢迎你，劳拉。

Welcome, Laura.

谢谢你，爱德华。

Thank you, Edward.

我以前和你以及你的老板亚历克斯·达菲聊过新兴市场的资本周期。

I've talked with you and I've talked with your boss, Alex Duffy, about emerging market capital cycles in the past.

我们知道，新兴市场特别容易出现破坏性的资本周期。

And what we know is that emerging markets are particularly prone to damaging capital cycles.

我从这篇文章里看到，你读过Sparkline Capital的一些研究，指出在新兴市场，高资本开支的公司每年比低资本开支的公司表现差5%。

And I can see from this piece that you've read some research from Sparkline Capital that points out that high CapEx firms have underperformed low CapEx firms in emerging markets by five percent a year.

你可能不知道的是，这项研究是由我在GMO的前分析师凯·吴做的，我曾经教过他资本周期理论。

What you might not know is that that research was done by my former analyst at GMO called Kai Wu, who I taught the Capital Cycle to.

总之，我想我们之前可能讨论过，2010年之后十年新兴市场的回报令人失望，这在很大程度上可以归因于对大宗商品的过度投资，这些大宗商品在新兴市场中权重相对较高，而它们又在很大程度上是由中国相当惊人的房地产投资热潮所引发的。

Anyhow, I think again, we probably have discussed in the past how the disappointing returns from emerging in the decade after 2010 can largely be ascribed to excessive investment in commodities that have a relatively high weighting in Emerging that were in turn induced in large part by China's really quite extraordinary real estate investment boom.

我们之前也在播客中讨论过，中国长期的投资支出正在被削减。

We also discussed in earlier podcasts how China's chronic investment spending is in the process of being curtailed.

在本期播客中，我们将讨论马拉松新兴市场投资组合的一些最新增持，以及从资本周期的角度来看，它们相对于主导美国股市的大型科技巨头为何具有吸引力。

In this podcast, we're going to discuss some recent addition to Marathon's emerging portfolios and how they appear attractive from a capital cycle perspective relative to the big tech hyperscalers that dominate The US stock market.

所以首先，你在文章开头提到，投资者不应该追求“跟上琼斯家”。

So first, as you're sort of throat clearing in your piece, you talk about why investors shouldn't aim to keep up with the Joneses.

你这是什么意思？

What do you mean by that?

很多听众可能都知道“跟上琼斯家”这个说法，它实际上是一种衡量成功的方式，不是看绝对的生活水平，而是看相对于其他人、相对于周围人的水平。

Many listeners probably know the phrase keeping up with the Joneses, which is sort of an exercise in measuring success, in terms of absolute well-being, but relative to other people and relative to those they see around them.

所以人们可能会为了地位或者避免感觉自己落后而花钱，甚至超支。

So people might end up spending money or even overreaching to spend money for the sake of status or to avoid feeling left behind.

但作为资本周期投资者，我们实际上试图反其道而行之，寻找那些在资本密集度和竞争强度都在下降的行业中运营的公司。

But as capital cycle investors, we actually try to do the opposite of that and identify companies which operate in industries with decreasing capital intensity and decreasing competitive intensity.

所以，支出不足或投资不足实际上可以为我们创造机会。

So, underspending or underinvestment can actually create opportunity for us.

你举了一个投资者对投资前景过度兴奋的例子。

And you cite a case of investors getting overexcited about investment prospects.

你提到了2020年的中国互联网巨头。

You cite the Chinese internet giants back in 2020.

我想，类似的情况是，公司可能会因为支出而受到市场的“奖励”。

So the parallel, I suppose, is that companies can be quote unquote rewarded by the market for their spending.

所以，这里的地位就是指股价上涨，这最终可能导致泡沫。

So status in this sense would be share price appreciation, which can ultimately lead to bubbles.

我想你指的是我文章里提到的2020年，当时中国互联网巨头腾讯、阿里巴巴和美团每投入1元资本开支，就获得了86元的市值增长。

The one I think you're alluding to that's in my piece is in 2020 when the Chinese internet giants Tencent, Alibaba, and Meituan were rewarded with 86 yuan of incremental market capitalization for every yuan they spent on Capex.

可以说，他们通过支出来获得地位。

So they got status in return for spending, so to speak.

市场还在他们高峰期时，每产生1元销售额就给予6元的市值，这暗示着增量增长将复制或超过他们历史的高回报，因此做出了一些相当高的...

And the market also priced in 6 yuan of market value for every yuan of sales they generated at their peak, which implied incremental growth that would replicate or exceed their historically quite high returns, So making some quite high

结果并不顺利？

things didn't turn out well?

不，不顺利。

No, no, they didn't.

实际上，市场对那种支出的奖励反而吸引了更多的支出和竞争，最终压低了回报，而且在负的增量自由现金流利润率下，越来越多的增长，或者说市场所关注的销售持续增长，加剧了感知价值和实际价值之间的差距。

Actually, the market's rewarding of that spending actually attracted more spending and more competition and ultimately bid down returns and at negative incremental free cash flow margins, more and more of that growth or continued growth in what the market was focusing on, which was sales, fed the gap sort of between perceived and realized value.

所以关键的是，到2023年，他们的市值相比2020年的峰值已经蒸发了60%。

So the kicker is that 60% of their market value had vanished by 2023 versus the 2020 peak.

你认为大型科技巨头现在也在玩同样的攀比游戏，而市场目前正在为他们的资本支出公告买单，或者至少直到几周前还是这样。

And you think the big tech hyperscalers are now playing the same game of keeping up with the Joneses and the market is currently rewarding them for their CapEx announcements, or at least it has until a couple of weeks ago.

也许吧，是的。

Perhaps, yes.

我们对超大规模企业的一些支出承诺感到担忧。

We are weary of some of the spending commitments we've seen from the hyperscalers.

在我的文章中，我把阿里巴巴、Alphabet、亚马逊、IBM、Meta、微软、甲骨文和腾讯归为一组，类比开头段落中的那些“邻居”。

And in my article, I included Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, IBM, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle, and Tencent sort of as a group to be analogous to the Joneses in that opening paragraph.

所以，如果说琼斯家是在盖豪宅的话，那这些超大规模企业就是在AI资本支出上创纪录地花钱，甚至有些钱还花到了太空上。

So whereas the Joneses might build mansions, so to speak, the parallel is that these hyperscalers are spending records amount on AI CapEx and in fact, even spending some of it in space apparently.

是的，就是最近宣布的太空数据中心。

Yeah, that's latest announcement of data centers in space.

对。

Yes.

你觉得，抛开美国数据中心的这场军备竞赛，有一批新兴公司更有吸引力。

You think that away from this arms race in US data centers, that there's quite a cohort of emerging companies to more attractive.

是的，这些公司实际上享受着更低或递减的边际资本和竞争强度。

Yes, and these ones actually enjoy lower or decreasing marginal capital and competitive intensity.

所以，在我的文章里，我把我们全球新兴市场投资组合最近新增的三家公司放在一起，作为琼斯家族原型的对照。

So in my essay, I've compared the three most recent additions to our Global Emerging Markets portfolio as a group to sort of counter the Jones' archetype.

它们是中国资源置地，上次你和Kai聊过的那家，还有Millicom International和Intel Chile。

Those are China Resources Land, which you spoke to Kai about last time, Millicom International, and Intel Chile.

尽管这三家公司横跨两个行业、多个国家，但它们的共同点是，在整合目前不受青睐且资产密集的行业时，它们的资本需求都在放缓。

Despite these three companies spanning two industries and several countries, What they have in common is that they all enjoy moderating capital requirements as they consolidate what are currently out of favor and asset heavy industries.

所以我们知道华润置地是做什么的。

So we know what China Resources land does.

Millicom International和Intel，就简单介绍一下。

Millicom International and Intel, just very brief descriptions.

另外两家，Millicom和Intel，它们是规模相对较小的电信公司，在拉丁美洲多个市场占据领先地位。

So the other two, Millicom and Intel, they're relatively small telecommunications companies which operate leading market positions in several markets across Latin America.

它们的共同点是，都受益于一个主要参与者——西班牙电信公司Telefonica——从各自的市场中撤退。

What they have in common is that they're both actually benefiting from the retrenchment of a key player, which is Spain's Telefonica, from their respective mix of markets.

所以供应端在收缩，这常常引起我们在Marathon的兴趣。

So the supply side is shrinking, which is something that often piques our interest at Marathon.

过去几个月我们一直在研究这方面的具体情况。

So we've been researching the specifics of this over the past several months.

你说供应端在收缩，这些公司的资本周期进入了相对良性的阶段。

And as the supply side shrinking, you say that the capital cycle for these companies has entered a relatively benign phase.

没错。

Exactly.

所以他们的支出，也就是平均资本密集度或资本支出相对于销售额的比例，历来相当高。

So their spending, which is to say their average capital intensity or capital expenditure relative to sales, has historically been quite high.

我想大多数人都会把高支出和电信商业模式联系起来。

I think most people would associate high spending with telecom business models.

对于这三家公司来说，在截至2023年的三年里，这个比例平均约为20%，是超大规模企业琼斯平均水平（约10%）的两倍。

And for those three companies, it's averaged about 20% over the three years ended 2023, which is twice the hyperscaler Jones's average, which was about 10%.

现在这种情况正在逆转。

And now this is turning round.

是的，这其实是我写这篇文章的灵感来源。

Yes, and that was actually my inspiration for the essay.

我觉得这挺有意思的。

I think it's quite interesting.

我们现在看到，随着超大规模企业的支出增加，这种情况几乎发生了反转。

We're now seeing this more or less invert with the spending that the hyperscalers are putting out.

超大规模企业的资本密集度实际上将在几个月内突破20%的上限，因为他们继续这种追求地位的行为。

The hyperscalers' capital intensity is actually set to clear the 20% ceiling within a few months as they continue this sort of status seeking exercise.

他们的支出实际上将达到一个水平，远超.com时代的巨头们，当时的大手笔支出者最多也只达到了百分之十几的水平。

Their spending is actually set to get to levels that will tower over the .com era Joneses with the big spenders then having only reached sort of high teens levels.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，我的意思是，在你的脚注中，你提到北电的资本支出占销售额的比例，如果有人还记得的话，那是加拿大最大的电信公司，愿它安息，朗讯和北电的资本支出占销售额的比例达到了19%，朗讯达到了17%。

And so, I mean, in your footnote, you put that the capital spending sales at Nortel, if anyone ever remembers that, but the largest Canadian telecoms company, rest in peace, Lucent, Nortel got to 19% of CapEx sales, Lucent got 17%.

思科，曾经短暂成为市值最大的公司，达到了17%。

Cisco, largest stock briefly, got 17%.

英特尔达到了15%的资本支出占销售额比例，IBM达到了16%。

Intel to 15% CapEx sales and IBM to 16%.

现在人们正在将人工智能领域发生的事情与互联网泡沫时期进行大量比较。

And people are now making lots of comparisons between what's going on in artificial intelligence and what went on back in the dot com boom.

在某些方面，显然大型科技公司比2000年的许多互联网公司要扎实得多，但我们的重点是资本周期，显然资本周期的动态现在可能比2000年时更为负面。

And in some ways, obviously the big tech companies are much more grounded than a lot of the dot coms back in 2000, but our focus is on the capital cycle, and that clearly the capital cycle dynamics are probably more negative now than they were in 2000.

对于超大规模云服务商来说，预计2026年和2027年的资本强度将超过24%。

For the hyperscalers, they're actually projected to clear 24% capital intensity for 2026 and 2027.

相比之下，新兴市场的企业则理性地将支出控制在较低的两位数水平。

And the emerging market additions, by contrast, have rationalized their spending to the low double digits.

是的，是的。

Yes, yes.

因此，未来三年他们的资本支出与销售额之比平均约为12%。

So their CapEx to sales ratio is set to average about 12% over the next three years.

相比我们刚才提到的20%的平均水平，这是一个显著的改善。

So a material improvement from the 20% average we

刚才提到的。

just spoke about.

实际上，劳拉，我认为你选的三只股票是个例子，但这也反映了新兴市场的一个普遍现象，

And actually, Laura, I think this is a case, you've selected three stocks, but this is a general point that one makes about emerging markets now,

那就是

is that

它们已经进入了资本周期的良性阶段，而且一旦进入这个阶段，通常会持续很多年。

they have entered into a benign phase of the capital cycle, and that actually tends to last for many years when you enter into that phase.

现在回到你选的股票。

Now go back to your stock picks.

你说它们正在产生现金流。

You say they're throwing off cash.

是的。

Yes.

所以，正是这种较低的资本密集度，帮助推动了我们新兴市场投资组合中的新增标的，其自由现金流利润率和收益率在最近一个财年（即2024年）平均达到了两位数水平，这是一个巨大的改善，就像我们说的，相比之前几年的个位数甚至负值水平。

So it's actually this lower capital intensity which helped drive the new additions to our emerging markets portfolios, free cash flow margins, and yields to double digit levels on average in the most recent fiscal year, so 2024, which is a huge improvement, like we said, from single digit or even negative levels in prior years.

所以这表明我们开始看到行业修复的一些初步迹象。

So this would indicate we're starting to see some of the green shoots of industry repair.

你还指出，这些企业的增量投入资本回报率在上升。

And you also point out that these businesses have rising returns on incremental invested capital.

是的，增量投入资本回报率可以说为近期扩张支出的效率提供了一个脉搏检查。

Yes, so return on incremental invested capital provides sort of a pulse check, if you will, on the efficiency of recent expansionary spending.

但我在文章中关注的是现金增量投入资本回报率。

But something I've looked at in the article is cash return on incremental invested capital.

这名字有点拗口。

Bit of a mouthful of that.

但这个指标更进一步，用自由现金流作为分子。

But that takes the idea a bit further by using free cash flow in the numerator.

我看这个指标的想法是，随着超大规模企业和新兴市场企业的资本密集度分别上升和下降，现金回报率可能会趋于稳定并改善。

And my idea in looking at that is that cash return on incremental invested capital might actually moderate and improve as capital intensity ramps and eases for the group of hyperscalers and the group of new Global Emerging Markets holdings, respectively.

劳拉，在你的文章里，你展示了一个表格，比较了你新兴市场精选股和超大规模企业的预测投资资本回报率。

And Laura, in your piece, you show a table that compares the forecast returns on invested capital for your emerging PIKs compared to the hyperscalers.

你能给我们讲讲吗？

Can you talk us through that?

当然。

Sure.

所以我从四个主要指标比较了这两组：预估的增量投资资本现金回报率、预估的资本成本、当前自由现金流收益率，以及永续增长率。

So I've compared the two groups across four main metrics: estimated cash return on incremental invested capital, estimated cost of capital, current free cash flow yields, and implied growth rate into perpetuity.

未来三年，全球新兴市场（简称GEM）公司的平均预估增量投资资本现金回报率是13%，而超大规模企业只有1%。

So the average estimated cash return on incremental invested capital over the next three years is 13% for the Global Emerging Markets, abbreviated GEM, companies versus just 1% for the hyperscalers.

所以这正好验证了我刚才回答你上一个问题时提到的那个假设。

So sort of validating that hypothesis I just mentioned in response to your last question.

这两个组的这个数值都等于或低于我粗略估算的13%的资本成本。

Those are at and below my rough estimated cost of capital of 138% for the two groups.

我们来谈谈这个，因为有趣的是，高资本成本实际上会阻止公司乱花钱。

And let's talk about that, because actually what's interesting is that having a high cost of capital is actually what discourages firms from throwing the capital away.

当你

When you

指出超大规模云服务商和大型科技公司，因为它们的股价目前很高，它们的资本成本要低得多，而且它们的投资评级也高。

point out that hyperscalers, big techs, because their stock prices are so high at the moment, they have a much lower and also their investment grade.

所以它们估算的资本成本要低得多。

So they have a much lower estimated cost of capital.

说到你提到的资本成本，如果我们把当前的自由现金流收益率从两组平均估算的资本成本中减去，就能算出两组的永续增长率，从而比较一下市场预期。

Speaking to your point of cost of capital, if we subtract actually the current free cash flow yield from the average estimated cost of capital for the two groups, we can work out an implied growth rate into perpetuity for the two groups and sort of compare expectations, so to speak.

对于新兴市场公司来说，资本成本是13%，而它们的自由现金流收益率也是13%，这意味着它们不会增长。

For the gem companies, with a 13% cost of capital, their 13% free cash flow yield suggests they won't grow.

那加起来就是零。

That's a sum of zero.

而超大规模企业，以8%的资本成本减去2%的自由现金流收益率，意味着它们能持续保持高个位数的增长率，同样也是无限期的。

And the hyperscalers, with an 8% cost of capital less their 2% free cash flow yield, suggests they sustain a high single digit growth rate again indefinitely.

所以这对这两类公司来说都是一个巨大的变化。

So that's a profound change for both these groups.

是的，这将是一个重大的变化，尤其是因为历史上我们的新增投资并没有赚回它们的资本成本。

Yeah, this would be a material change, especially because historically our new additions haven't earned their cost of capital.

过去五年，它们的平均投入资本回报率只有4%，这与超大规模企业近20%的全球领先回报率相比，显得相形见绌。

Their average return on invested capital over the past five years has been only 4%, which doesn't compare very favorably to the hyperscalers' world leading returns averaging almost 20%.

所以一方面，超大规模企业资金雄厚，而新成立的公司则更多是在摸索阶段。

So on one hand, the hyperscalers have deep pockets, while the recently initiated companies are more so finding their feet.

但我觉得另一个有趣的点是，这两类公司的资产负债表也在边际改善，但强度在减弱。

But I think another interesting point is also that the balance sheets are marginally improving and reducing in strength for the two groups as well.

因为如果你的资本支出开始超过自由现金流生成，那么你就得发行债务或更多股票。

Because if your CapEx starts exceeding your free cash flow generation, then you either have to issue debt or more equities.

而且一些大型科技公司，比如甲骨文和Meta，最近都在发行债券。

And some of these big tech companies have been, Oracle and Meta recently, been issuing debt.

所以你是说，如果超大规模企业想获得可观的回报，就必须大幅增加收入。

So you say that hyperscalers will have to ramp up revenues if they're going to earn an acceptable return.

所以目前市场是在奖励那些宣布资本支出的超大规模企业吗？

So the market currently is rewarding the hyperscalers for announcing their capital spending?

对。

Yep.

现在超大规模企业的股价每增加1美元销售额，就能带来大约7美元的股价增长。

So today hyperscalers see about $7 of share price growth for every one of sales.

这很有意思，因为自2022年以来，它们实际上是以负的平均现金回报率对增量投资资本进行再投资。

And this is interesting because they've actually reinvested at a negative average cash return on incremental invested capital since 2022.

还记得我们对话开始时提到的中国公司吗？它们的股价每增加1美元销售额，只带来6元的股价增长，回报要低得多。

Recall we were talking at the start of our conversation about the Chinese companies, and they were actually less well rewarded with only 6 won of share price for every one of sales.

超大规模企业如果想获得可观的回报，就必须迅速增加收入。

The hyperscalers are going to have to ramp up revenues very quickly if they're going to earn an acceptable return.

是的，他们很可能能够达到这些高期望。

Yes, and they might well meet these high expectations.

但看起来市场已经定价了某种确定性，而我目前并不具备这种确定性。

But it appears that the market's pricing in a degree of certainty that I don't have at the moment.

例如，Sparkline 也持怀疑态度，正如我们读到的。

Sparkline, for example, is also sceptical, as we've read.

他们估计，人工智能收入需要在不到五年内增长约100倍，才能证明正在进行的数据中心建设是合理的。

They estimate that AI revenues need to grow about 100 fold in less than five years to justify the data centre buildout, which is ongoing.

这一点尤其有趣，因为人工智能资本支出已经超过了电信光纤资本支出在2000年互联网繁荣时期对GDP的贡献。

This is especially interesting in the context of AI CapEx having now surpassed the contribution telecom fiber optic CapEx had to GDP and the internet boom of 2000.

所以从投资角度来看，有时候期望低甚至没有期望反而有帮助。

So from an investment perspective, sometimes it helps to have low or even no expectations.

完全正确。

Exactly.

从投资角度和一般情况来看都是如此。

Investment perspective and in general.

这观点挺有道理的。

That's a stoical point.

是的，是的。

Yes, yes.

我觉得，隐含增长率越低，从数学上讲，就越容易带来惊喜。

I would say that lower implied growth rates almost mathematically leave more room to be positively surprised.

实际上，GEM组合新增的资产，每产生1美元的销售额，对应的市场价值还不到2美元。

The GEM portfolio additions actually attracted less than $2 of market value for every dollar of sales they generated.

所以，即使在没有改善的情况下，客户也能获得相当可观的、低两位数的现金收益率。

So in a no improvement scenario, clients would receive even then quite attractive low teens cash yields.

增长，我认为从低基数开始可能更容易实现，而且随着供应收缩，正如我们一直提到的，这基本上就是一个免费的期权。

Growth, which I would say is probably easier to achieve from low levels and as supply shrinks, as we've been alluding to, would be essentially a free option.

那我们聊聊Antel吧。

So let's discuss Antel.

好的，Antel就是一家体现这种低预期和低支出理念的公司。

Yes, a company that exemplifies these sort of low expectations and low spending ideas is Antel.

它是智利电信市场的领导者，也是JEM投资组合的最新成员。

It's Chile's telecommunications market leader and the newest addition to the JEM portfolio.

因此，由于在困境中的行业结构中运营，它似乎永远只能赚取低于其资本成本的回报。

So, a consequence of operating in a struggling industry structure, it appears price to earn only its sub cost of capital returns forever.

而Marathon对行业修复潜力的评估表明，这种情况不太可能发生。

And Marathon's appraisal of the potential for industry repair suggests this is unlikely.

对。

Correct.

我们认为当前行业的回报率低得不可持续，因此应该会有所改善。

We believe current industry returns are unsustainably low and, as a function of that, should improve.

智利实际上是世界上碎片化最严重、利润最低的移动市场之一。

Chile is actually one of the world's most fragmented and least profitable mobile markets.

有趣的是，自互联网繁荣以来已经过去了四分之一个世纪，电信行业的资本和竞争强度似乎正在减弱。

It's kind of interesting, a quarter century since the internet boom, capital and competitive intensity appears to be abating across telecoms.

所以，这是另一个相当有趣的逆转。

So another quite interesting inversion.

但在智利，行业排名第二、市场份额超过25%的西班牙电信（Telefonica）正在亏损，并加速退出，这一计划最初于2019年宣布。

But what's happening in Chile is that Telefonica, which is industry number two after Intel and which has more than a 25% market share, is loss making and accelerating its exit, which was first announced in 2019.

但他们在今年早些时候上任的新CEO的推动下，重新有了动力。

But they sort of have a renewed impetus under a new CEO who joined earlier this year.

此外，行业排名第三的WOM也在亏损，其背后有私募股权所有者。

And then on top of that, industry number three, called WOM, is also loss making and it has private equity owners.

所以它可能不会长期留在市场上。

So it might not be a permanent participant in the market.

相比之下，我们持有的Intel由三个家族企业集团所有，因此应该能够长期维持其地位。

By contrast, we have Intel, which is owned by three family business groups, so it should be able to sustain its position for the long term.

总的来说，市场整合到更紧凑的三家甚至两家公司似乎是合理的。

Broadly, consolidation to a tighter three if not two player market seems plausible.

在整合潜力之外，十五年的实际价格下降已经大幅侵蚀了行业收入，以至于收入需要增长四倍才能恢复到最初水平，这比超大规模企业所需的一百倍要少得多，但可能更容易实现。

And then on top of this consolidation potential, fifteen years of real pricing declines have eroded industry revenues quite substantially, so to the point that they could grow fourfold just to recover their initial levels, which is a lot less than the one hundredfold the hyperscalers need, but might be more easily achieved.

因此，总体而言，我们估计资本强度可能从最近的18%降至15%左右，并成为Intel自由现金流利润率从低个位数提升到两位数的关键驱动因素，同时巴西和危地马拉最近的电信行业修复也提供了先例。

So on balance, we estimate the capital intensity could moderate from a recent 18% to 15% or so and be a key driver of free cash flow margin improvement from low single digit double digit levels for Intel, having the benefit as well of recent telecom industry repair in Brazil and Guatemala providing precedent.

最后，总结一下这些股票的吸引力。

And in conclusion, summarize the attractiveness of these stocks.

所以，以平均13%的当前自由现金流收益率来看，我们新持有的股票定价是预期它们会永远萎缩，但它们可能不会。

So at an average 13% current free cash flow yield, our new holdings are priced to shrink into perpetuity, and they might not.

相比之下，超大规模企业以2%的自由现金流收益率定价，预期它们会以高个位数的速度增长，尽管面临日益激烈的竞争，而且增量投资资本的预期现金回报率较低。

By contrast, the hyperscalers at 2% free cash flow yield are priced to grow at high single digit rates against the tides of rising competition and with lower projected cash return on incremental invested capital.

同样，也是无限期的。

Again, indefinitely.

可以说，有些树可能不会长到天那么高。

There are trees which might not grow to the sky, so to speak.

所以我们专注于尽最大努力为客户创造长期超额回报，就是通过不断深入理解被低估的资本周期，追求适度但具有吸引力的绝对预期回报，而不去管别人怎么做。

So we're staying focused on doing the best we can to generate long term outperformance for clients just by chipping away at understanding underappreciated capital cycles with moderate, though attractive absolute expected returns, irrespective of the Joneses.

谢谢你，劳拉。

Thanks, Laura.

谢谢。

Thank you.

感谢你今天抽出时间。

Thank you for your time today.

希望你会收听下一期的《资本周期》。

I hope you will listen to the next edition of the Capital Cycle.

本通讯仅供参考。

This communication is provided for information purposes only.

请访问马拉松的网站和《全球投资评论》以获取更多信息，包括重要披露。

Please refer to Marathon's website and the Global Investment Reviews for further information, including important disclosures.