The Tyranny of the Index

大家好，欢迎收听本期《资本周期》播客。

Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Cap Cycle podcast.

我是爱德华·钱塞勒。

This is Edward Chancellor.

今天请到的是亚历克斯·达菲，他是马拉松资产管理公司的新兴市场投资组合经理。

And I have with me Alex Duffy, who's an Emerging Markets Portfolio Manager at Marathon Asset Management.

嗨，爱德华。

Hi, Edward.

非常感谢你再次邀请我。

Thanks very much for having me along again.

亚历克斯，我们要聊聊你写的一篇文章，叫《历史的教训与指数的暴政》。

So Alex, we're going to talk about a piece you've written called The Lessons from History and the Tyranny of the Index.

你一直在读一本我很喜欢的刊物，叫《全球投资回报年鉴》，这本年鉴将近300页，每年由伦敦商学院的几位经济学家迪姆森、马什和斯汤顿编写，以前由瑞信出版，现在由瑞银出版。

You've been reading a publication that I'm very keen on called The Global Investment Returns Yearbook, which is nearly a 300 page volume put out each year by the economists at London Business School, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, used to go out with Credit Suisse and is now published by UBS.

我觉得这本年鉴真的是对关注宏观投资的人来说最重要的出版物或参考资料之一，因为它提供了过去126年，也就是从1900年至今，涵盖20到30个不同市场的股票、债券和货币的回报率，还有通胀的详细数据。

And this yearbook, I think, is really one of the most important publications or source materials for people who are interested in big picture investment, because it gives the returns on equities, bonds, and currencies with inflation detail over the last one hundred and twenty six years, going back to 1900, covering 20 or 30 different markets.

所以你可以看到南非自1900年代以来的回报，实际上相当不错。

So you can see what the returns of South Africa have been since 1900s, which is actually pretty good.

而且据我所记得，瑞典在那段时期是表现最好的。

And as far as I remember, I think Sweden is the top performer over that period.

总之，我们说的不是最新版，因为最新版还没出来，但去年的《全球投资回报年鉴》给了你一些关于如何投资新兴市场的想法。

Anyhow, last year's, we're not talking actually about the new one, because the new one hasn't come out yet, but last year's Global Investment Returns Yearbook has given you some ideas about how you invest in emerging markets.

是的，我认为主动型经理人，尤其是股票经理人，经常面临的一个巨大挑战是，你总是被海量信息淹没，新闻不断，而且你时刻紧盯着市场动态。

Yeah, so I think one of the great challenges that active managers often face, equity managers face, is that you're presented with constant information overload, there's lots of news, and you're very close to what's going on in markets at all times.

实际上，像《全球投资回报年鉴》这样的资料能让你退一步，从更宏观的角度看问题，然后把当前的投资环境放到历史背景中去理解。

Actually pieces such as the Global Investment Returns Yearbook enable you to take a step back, look at the bigger picture and actually then contextualise the current environment that you're investing within versus history.

我觉得投资中一直让我感兴趣的一点是，真正的长期回报到底是什么？

I think one of the parts that always interests me about investing is what truly are long term returns?

我们应该如何看待实际的最低预期回报率和股票的实际回报预期？

How should one think about real hurdle rates and real return expectations from equities?

然后把这些发现应用到具体的公司、市场和投资组合中，努力构建一个既能绝对意义上超越长期回报门槛，又能长期提供比指数更差异化、更优回报的投资组合。

And then to take those findings into individual companies, markets and the portfolio, and put together and seek to build a portfolio that can drive in both an absolute sense towards beating the long term return thresholds, that we also think can deliver returns that are differentiated and better than the index over the long run.

我在文章中真正想说的是，市场有时会带来异常高的回报，短期内很难跟上。

My point really in the article was that there are periods in time when markets deliver exceptional returns, which are very difficult to keep pace with in the short term.

但从长远来看，长期回报率、股息复利的重要性，以及公司实际产生的实际绝对回报，才是决定投资组合结果的关键。

But over the long run, it's that long run hurdle rate, the importance of the compounding of dividends, and actually the absolute real returns that companies generate, which will determine the outcome for the portfolio.

在思考如何应对这个问题时，保持一些视角往往很有帮助。

Having some perspective is often quite helpful in thinking about how you approach that problem.

是的，我的意思是，我从年鉴中得出的一个结论是，首先，这些不同市场的回报率会围绕一个常态趋同，对吧？

Yes, I mean, so one of the things I take away from the yearbook on looking at it is first, the convergence of returns from these miscellaneous markets around a norm, right?

实际回报率在6%到8%之间。

6% to 8% real returns.

所以，我之前提到过瑞典和南非。

So, I mentioned earlier Sweden and South Africa.

南非，我们称之为新兴市场，从历史上看，实际上提供了非常高的可观回报。

South Africa, what we call an emerging market actually has put in historically a very high decent return.

即使在新兴市场领域，如果你看那本年鉴，它在世纪上半叶表现不佳，当时俄罗斯和中国市场消失了。

And even though emerging your area, if you look at that yearbook, it had a bad first half of the century when Russia and Chinese markets disappeared.

但随着时间的推移，即使是新兴市场也会回归到那个恒定的预期回报。

But over time, even emerging pulls back towards the constant expected return.

现在你在这篇文章中指出，我们来谈谈，你对美国股市的实际回报率做了一些评论，然后最近的表现是如何与历史水平背离的。

Now you point out in this piece, let's talk a bit, you make some comment on what the real return on US equities equities have been, and then how recent performance has diverged from the historic terms.

是的，我认为这是关键部分，长期回报就是那样，它们是在很长的时间段内累积起来的。

Yeah, I think that's the critical part, is that long term returns are just that, they are accrued over very long time periods.

数据显示，从1900年到2024年底，美国股市的实际年回报率大约是8.5%。

And so the data shows that from 1900 to the end of twenty twenty four, the real return on US equities has been about 8.5% per annum.

所以，在这么长的时间里，股票持有者因为承担股票风险而获得了丰厚的回报。

So equity owners have been handsomely rewarded for taking equity risk over that very long time term period.

但你说这是通过高度的周期性实现的。

But you say that that's been achieved with a high degree of cyclicality.

确实如此。

Absolutely that.

如果你站在1999年底，投资者会说，过去的二十年已经是很长的时间了。

If you stood at the end of nineteen ninety nine, an investor would say, well, the last twenty years is quite a long time period.

那二十年我们实现了10%的回报率。

We've generated 10% returns over those two decades.

这为接下来十年应该期待什么埋下了伏笔，而实际上，接下来的十年实际回报是负的。

That sows the seeds for what we should expect for the next decade, when in fact, the ten years that followed delivered negative real returns.

我可以告诉你，在书里，就是那本杰里米·格兰瑟姆回忆录《一个永久看空者的形成》里。

And I can tell you, so in the book, just gave you the Jeremy Grantham memoir, The Making of a Permabear.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆谈到了他和另一位杰里米——沃顿商学院的杰里米·西格尔——之间的辩论，西格尔写了一本书，我记得叫《股市长线法宝》，在90年代末是畅销书。

Jeremy Grantham talks about the debates he was having with another Jeremy, Jeremy Siegel of the Wharton Business School, author of a book called, I think it's Stocks for the Long Run, which was the bestseller in the late 1990s.

格兰瑟姆说，是的，美国股市的历史回报率是6%到7%，这也是西格尔的观点，但估值很重要。

And Grantham was saying, yes, we have a historic six to 7% return from US equities, which is what Siegel was doing, but the valuation is important.

到90年代末，我们进入了一个美国股市回报率持平的十年期，同时新兴市场回报率非常好。

By the late 1990s, we were going into this period, a ten year period of flat US equity returns, very good emerging returns at the same time.

但像杰里米·西格尔这样的人认为，无论价格如何，美国股市6%到7%的回报率会持续下去。

But it was Jeremy Siegels of this world thought that six or 7% return was going to continue from US equities, regardless of price.

我认为这又是一个关键点。

And I think that, again, is a critical point.

而且这实际上是马拉松资本周期投资理念的关键部分。

And it's actually a critical part for Marathon's investment philosophy of capital cycle investing.

股市是一个贴现机制，对吧？

It's that equity markets are discounting mechanisms, okay?

它们将未来利润水平和增长率的预期资本化，然后折现到今天的现值。

So they capitalise expectations of future levels of profit, of future growth rates, and they discount that back to a present value today.

所以在1999年底，你已经经历了二十年非常可观的回报，这导致估值倍数扩张。

And so at the end of nineteen ninety nine, you'd had twenty years of very attractive returns, and it led to valuation multiples to expand.

这样一来，由于未来盈利能力被资本化到更高的起始估值倍数，预期未来回报必然降低。

And in so doing, expected future returns have to be lower as a consequence of that capitalisation of future profitability into a higher starting valuation multiple.

对，除非你生活在一个新时代，未来的利润增长远高于历史水平。

Yeah, unless you're living in a new era with much higher than historic profits growth going forward.

反对这一点的主要论据是，过去每次他们宣称新时代到来，最终都证明是海市蜃楼。

And the main argument against that is that every time they've called a new era in the past, it turned out to be a mirage.

亚历克斯，让我们回到你写的内容。

Alex, let's get back to what you wrote.

你之前提到，美国股市近期的回报异常出色。

And you were talking about how The US returns in recent past have been exceptionally good.

事实上，好到把整个美国股市的历史回报都拉高了。

In fact, so good that they pushed up the historic returns of The US equity market as a whole.

这又回到了股市周期性的问题。

It comes back to this point around the cyclicality of equity markets.

过去十到十五年，美国股市的表现确实非常突出，我觉得甚至可以说是反常的。

So the last ten to fifteen years have been exceptional, I would argue anomalous for US equity markets.

我认为在过去十年里，美国股市的年化回报率达到了15%。

I think over the last decade, US equity markets have delivered 15% on an annualised basis.

这是长期回报门槛的两倍。

So double the long term return threshold.

过去十五年中有十一年都远高于长期平均水平。

And so 11 of the last fifteen years have been well above long term averages.

我们认为，如果从更高的估值起点出发，再加上美国许多行业正在进行或开始加速的资本投资，尤其是科技行业——我相信我们接下来会谈到这个——这实际上会导致资本周期的恶化，未来回报可能会令人失望，这与估值所暗示的完全相反。

And we would argue that when you take that higher valuation starting point with the levels of capital investment that is ongoing or started to ramp up in many industries in The US, not least the technology sector, which I'm sure we're going to come on to, it actually creates a deterioration in the capital cycle, which will potentially lead to disappointing returns in the future, in a complete contrast to what's implied in the valuations.

对。

Right.

我最近在播客里和你的同事，我的朋友查尔斯·卡特聊过。

And I was talking to your colleague, my friend, Charles Carter, in a recent podcast.

我们回顾了90年代末的市场。

We were going over the market of the late 1990s.

显然，90年代末美国出现了创纪录的高估值和激增的资本支出。

And clearly, you saw in the late 1990s was record high valuation and searching CapEx in The US.

而今天，我们也看到了极高的估值，具体取决于你用的指标。

And today, we also see extremely high valuation, depending on what measure you use.

要么接近2000年的水平，要么略低，但这是历史上第二贵的市场，而且美国的资本支出看起来比2000年还要高。

It's either around where we got to in 2000 or just below, but this is the second most expensive market in history, with CapEx in The US that looks to be even greater than in 2,000.

而且我们还看到了行业集中度，你说这现在比历史上要高得多。

And we've also got sectoral concentration here, which you say is now much higher than historically.

以前也更高过。

It's been higher previously.

我觉得更让人担心的是，股票回报越来越集中在少数几只股票上。

I think of more concern is the concentration of equity returns into fewer stocks.

如果你观察美国股市的行为特征，就会发现回报的拥挤和集中，以及散户资金的参与，自2020年以来，10只股票贡献了标普500指数超过一半的回报。

If you were to look at the sort of behavioural traits of US equity markets, it's that crowding and concentration of returns and the participation of retail money, where since 2020, 10 stocks have accounted for well over half of S and P 500 returns.

所以科技股的集中度相对于历史水平来说偏高。

And so concentration of technology is elevated versus history.

目前处于92年来的高位，但股票回报的集中度甚至比历史上任何时候都要高。

It's at a ninety two year high, but concentration of equity returns is even higher than it would have been historically.

这绝对是我们认为值得担忧的一个原因。

And that is definitely a cause of concern, we would feel.

当市场集中在少数几只股票上，并且这些股票表现优异的时候，往往也伴随着价值策略的表现不佳，我顺便提一下。

Periods when the market becomes concentrated in a handful of stocks by that handful of stocks outperforming also tend to coincide, I say parenthetically, with the underperformance of value strategies.

但让我们继续，你在这里提出的一个观点是，投资者倾向于将当前状况外推到未来，而历史表明，许多公司的寿命其实相当短暂。

But let's go on and one of the points you make here is that investors tend to extrapolate current conditions into the future, whereas history shows that many companies have in fact pretty brief lives.

我们研究了各种不同的指标，包括历史估值水平、隐含增长率、未来盈利水平与当前盈利水平的对比。

We looked at lots of different metrics around historic valuation levels, implied growth rates, future levels of profitability versus current levels of profitability.

我们的数据表明，股市越来越无视利润率均值回归的可能性，也无视增长率放缓的可能性，尤其是在某些行业的资本投资方面。

And what our data suggests is that equity markets are increasingly oblivious to the potential for mean reversion of either profit margins or indeed any slowdown in growth rates, particularly capital investment in certain sectors.

我认为最直观的体现就是美国盈利收益率的压缩。

And I think the best way in which you can see this most vividly is through the compression of US earnings yields.

过去十五年左右，美国的盈利收益率从大约7%的水平下降到了现在的不到5%。

So earnings yields in The US have declined over the last fifteen years or so from kind of a 7% range to under 5% currently.

要证明这种估值水平合理，你必须真正相信未来的增长率和未来的盈利能力，即投入资本回报率，会在更长时间内保持结构性高位。

And in order to justify that level of valuation, you need to truly believe that future growth rates and future levels of profitability, return on invested capital remain structurally higher for longer.

而正是这种预期被外推到了市场行为中。

And it's really that which has been extrapolated into market behavior.

这其实是近因偏差的结果，就像巴甫洛夫的狗一样，当你习惯了每年15%的回报，而且持续了十年，那么你的预期就是明年很可能也是15%。

It's really a consequence of the recency bias, like the sort of Pavlovian dog, when you get used to every year a 15% return and that goes on for a decade, well, your expectation is the next year is likely to be 15% as well.

但不幸的是，市场已经对此进行了贴现，价格已经反映了这一点。

But unfortunately, markets discount that and it's in the price.

然而，在其他领域，比如全球新兴市场以及美国以外的股票机会，我们Marathon对此相当看好，我们看到这些市场相对于美国股市在过去十到十五年间出现了大幅的估值下调，下调幅度大约在40%到45%左右。

Whereas there are other parts, and this is sort of bring it more to global emerging markets and the opportunity for ex US equities, which we at Marathon are quite enthused about in terms of the opportunity set, we've seen a material relative de rating versus US equities over the last ten to fifteen years, de rating of the order of 40 to 45% or so.

与此同时，这些市场里有很多个股机会，而且绝对估值非常有吸引力。

And at the same time, lots of stock opportunities, single stock opportunities in those markets at very attractive absolute valuations.

所以美国以外的地方既有绝对价值，同时也存在相对价值。

So absolute value is on offer outside of The US, and relative value is also on offer at the same time.

我觉得这一点很重要，毕竟我们在考虑如何构建全天候的多元化投资组合时，得想想该用哪些工具。

And I think that's quite important when one thinks about how to build diversified all weather portfolios and the tools that we should employ in so doing?

再说一次，今天的情况跟2000年其实没太大区别。当时美股的估值处于历史高位，而且是在盈利水平也很高的基础上达到的高估值。

Again, the situation today is not massively different from how it was in 2000, with The US market at that time on, as we've said, record valuations, but also record valuations on high reported profitability.

结果发现，美国

As it turns out, The U.

的

S.

公司都在虚报利润。

Companies were lying about their profitability.

但当时投资者却给这些 inflated 的利润支付了极高的估值倍数，也就是杰里米·格兰瑟姆所说的‘野蛮的双重计算’；而新兴市场则处于大幅折价交易的状态。正因如此，任何理性的投资者在2000年都知道，明智的做法是把资金撤出美国。

But at the time, the investors were putting high multiples on inflated profits, what Jeremy Grantham calls barbaric double counting, whereas emerging was trading at a massive discount, which is why any prudent investor in 2000 knew that the good call was to take your money out of The U.

美国。

S.

然后把钱投到新兴市场。

And put it into merging.

现在，你在文章中提出了一个有趣的观点。

Now, you raise an interesting point in this piece.

正如我之前所说，你的文章标题是《指数的暴政》，你在思考一种不同的方式来捕捉回报。

As I said earlier, you've entitled your piece The Tyranny of the Index, And you are looking at a different way of thinking about how to capture returns.

你还引用了查理·芒格使用的一个心理技巧，那就是在预期回报和表现上采用逆向思维。

And even cite a mental ploy used by Charlie Munger, which is to invert in your approach to expected returns and performance.

跟我们讲讲这个吧。

So tell us a bit about that.

这确实回到了关于长期回报的这一点。

That really comes back to this point around long term returns.

所以，如果我们认为长期来看，股票能带来8%的实际回报，也许某些市场因为估值较高而略低，其他市场因为估值较低而略高，但长期全球股市不会偏离历史表现。

So if we think that over the long run, 8% is the real returns that equities can deliver, maybe it's a little bit lower in some markets going forward because valuations are higher, maybe it's higher in other markets because valuations are lower, but long term global equity markets don't deviate from what they've delivered historically.

所以，为了实现客户要求的目标，也就是跑赢指数回报，实际上你真正需要做到的是跑赢6%到8%的回报率，还要加上各种费用。

So in seeking to achieve the client's required outcome, which is to beat the index return, actually what you're really being asked to achieve is to beat the six to 8% plus any fees.

因此，我们马拉松新兴市场团队把这称为“9%问题”或“9%难题”。

And so, we at Marathon in the Emerging Markets team call that the 9% question or the 9% problem.

所以，把挑战反过来，把问题反过来想，与其试图跑赢指数——指数会上下波动，会有重新估值和估值下调，还容易受到狂热和恐慌的影响——我们不如思考如何实现9%左右的回报率。

So invert the challenge, invert the problem and say, well, rather than trying to beat the index, which goes up and down and rerates and derates and is prone to manias and hysterias, how can we drive towards a 9% type return profile?

实现这个目标需要哪些组成部分？

What are the components that go into achieving that?

然后，与其担心和纠结于股市的短期波动，不如专注于追求那个绝对回报的门槛。

And then rather than worrying and fixating on the short term durations of equity markets, you think about driving towards that absolute return threshold.

现在，我想聊聊你提到的新兴市场投资组合中的一些主题。

Now, want to talk a bit, you mentioned some of your themes in your emerging portfolios.

如果美国目前科技股比重很大，而你更倾向于新兴市场中那些资产密集型的机会。

If The US is very tech heavy at the moment, you're attracted to more asset heavy plays in emerging markets.

从地域角度来看，你也更看好拉丁美洲。

And from a sort of geographic basis, you're also attracted more to Latin America.

这又回到了那个问题：我们如何解决客户要求的9%或中高个位数回报的问题。

This again comes back to that point around how do we answer the client's 9% problem or mid high single digit problem in terms of the outcome.

我们发现，由于过去五到十年拉丁美洲投资不足，以及新兴欧洲、中东、非洲部分地区，甚至东南亚边缘地带的投资不足，资产价格被压得很低。

What we have found is because of underinvestment or due to the underinvestment that we've seen in Latin America over the last five to ten years, that we've seen in parts of Emerging Europe, Middle East, Africa, and at the margin Southeast Asia, we would argue as well, you just have very depressed asset prices.

所以，起始股息率很高，而且这些公司也意识到，它们无法以高于股价所隐含的回报率来再投资现金流。

So high starting dividend yields, companies which have recognised that they're less able to reinvest cash flows at rates of return above that which are implied in their share prices.

因此，它们不再进行资本再投资，而是收紧了资本纪律。

And so they're not reinvesting the capital, they've tightened capital discipline.

这导致从水泥厂到电信股，再到矿业公司，整个行业的供应都在收紧。

It's leading to supply tightening in a whole range of industries from cement plants to telecommunication stocks, to mining companies.

实际上，我们看到了很多机会，企业的资产以低于重置价值的价格交易，因此，为了鼓励再投资并破坏供应面，盈利能力需要大幅提升。

And actually, we're being presented with a multitude of opportunities where businesses' assets trade at discounts to replacement value, and therefore profitability needs to increase significantly in order to encourage reinvestment and therefore damage the supply side.

在等待这种改善发生的同时，我们还能获得高股息收益率。

And we're also receiving high dividend yields whilst we wait for that improvement to occur.

从我们的角度来看，这是一个相当有吸引力的布局。

And that's quite an attractive setup from our perspective.

简单说一下，我们在之前的播客里聊过矿业，也聊过南方铜业，自从你提到它之后，它的表现非常好。

So briefly, from an exam we've talked actually in earlier podcasts about mining, we talked about Southern Copper, which since you spoke about it, has done very well.

你的同事劳拉·法伊夫在最近的播客里也谈到了拉美电信。

Your colleague, Laura Fife, talked about Latin American telecoms in recent podcasts.

你这里提到了水泥，提到了西麦斯。

You mentioned here on cement, you mentioned CEMEX.

简单说两句这个。

Just a brief word on that.

对。

Yeah.

西麦斯就是那种很有意思的公司。

So CEMEX is one of those interesting companies.

我们关注它很长时间了。

We followed it for a very long time.

过去十年，它经历了一段非常痛苦的资产负债表修复期。

It's been through a deeply painful period of balance sheet repair over the last decade.

管理层有变动，特别是他们对价值创造的想法有了转变。

There's been management change and particularly a change of emphasis around how they think about value creation.

而且在他们周围，整个行业投资严重不足。

And then around them, the industry has been deeply under invested.

所以建一个水泥厂的替代成本比市场上这些资产的交易价格高出40%到50%。

So the replacement cost of a cement plant would be 40 to 50% above where the assets are trading at in the marketplace.

因此，公司都停止投资了。

And so companies have stopped investing.

然后还有ESG周期，这意味着如果有人真的想在美国建新水泥厂，实际上是不被允许的。

And then you've had the ESG cycle, which has actually meant that if anyone were mad enough to try and build a new cement plant inside The US, they're actually not allowed to.

而CEMEX在拉丁美洲有业务，同时在美国也有工厂。

And CEMEX has got a balance of operations across Latin America, but also plants inside The US.

所以供应端非常受限，行业从产能过剩变成了产能不足。

And so you have a very constrained supply side with an industry which has gone from excess capacity or surplus capacity to a deficit of capacity.

那么，亚历克斯，最后一点是，那些没有进入你投资组合的企业，本身并不是差企业。

So, Alex, finally, point is that the businesses which haven't made it into your portfolio are not inherently bad businesses.

对。

Yeah.

我们的观点是，我们的新兴市场投资组合与指数看起来非常不同。

Our point here is that our emerging market portfolio looks very different to the index.

所以我们经常被问到，为什么我们不持有某些大型公司，这些公司吸引了很多媒体关注，投资也能带来收益。

So we often get asked, why do we not own such and such large company, which attracts a lot of media attention and investing Can give

举个例子，杰丝？

example, Jess?

比如阿里巴巴，中国的互联网公司就是一个例子，还有亚洲的一些大型科技公司。

So Alibaba, Chinese Internet companies is a case in point, some of the big technology companies in Asia.

你知道，我们投资组合的60%投资于重资产行业，如金融、材料、工业等。

You know, 60% of our portfolio is invested in asset heavy industries, financials, materials, industrials, and so on.

我们过去常

What we used to

称之为旧经济的行业，在

call old economy in the

烟囱工业。

smoky Smokestack.

就是那些烟囱工业。

The smokestack industries.

我们三分之一的投资组合投在了拉美股市。

A third of our portfolio is invested in Latin American equities.

这其实是因为我们是从绝对收益的角度来看待这个问题的。

And it's really because we've approached this problem from an absolute mindset.

并不是说我们不持有的那些公司本质上有什么问题，或者是不好的企业。

It's not that we think the businesses we don't own are fundamentally flawed, bad businesses.

很多情况下，它们其实是不错的企业。

In many cases, they're not, they're good businesses.

只是它们的价格已经反映了这些优点，甚至可能已经反映了未来更好的表现。

It's just that they're priced at levels that already reflect that, if not something even better in the future.

而我们持有的股票，我们认为在股息回报和相对于内在价值的折价之间提供了更好的平衡，特别是那些重资产行业，折价于重置成本，而且它们所在的行业结构供给更受限，整合度更高。

Whereas the stocks that we own offer, we feel, a much better balance between returns that come through dividends, plus a discount to intrinsic value, particularly if the asset heavy, it's discount replacement cost, And they're also operating in industry structures, which are far more supply constrained and consolidated.

所以我们觉得，我们公司的股权风险溢价要比那些我们没有投资的公司有利得多。

And so the equity risk premia for our companies is much more favourable, we feel, than the equity risk premium for the companies that we do not own.

这是一个绝对的结果，我们认为可以实现积极的相对结果，但我们是从绝对的角度来处理这个问题的。

And that is an absolute outcome that we think can achieve a positive relative outcome, but we've approached it from the absolute perspective.

好的。

Okay.

我想我们就到这里吧，亚历克斯，很高兴和你交谈，我们很快再聊。

I think we'll wrap it up at that point, Alex, and very nice speaking to you, and speak to you again soon.

谢谢，爱德华。

Thanks, Edward.

谢谢。

Thank you.

感谢你今天抽出时间。

Thank you for your time today.

希望你能收听下一期的《资本周期》。

I hope you will listen to the next edition of the Capital Cycle.

本通讯仅供参考。

This communication is provided for information purposes only.

请访问Marathon网站及《全球投资评论》以获取更多信息，包括重要披露。

Please refer to Marathon's website and the Global Investment Reviews for further information, including important disclosures.