US Small Caps: One Size Fits All

你好。

Hello.

我是爱德华·钱塞勒，这里是资本周期播客。

This is Edward Chancellor here with the Capital Cycle podcast.

和我一起的是罗伯特·安斯蒂，马拉松资产管理公司的美国投资组合经理。

And with me is Robert Anstey, US Portfolio Manager at Marathon Asset Management.

我们要讨论小盘股，但不会用人们通常看待小盘股作为投资类别的传统方式来讨论。

And we're going to talk about small caps, but we're not going to talk about it in the conventional way that people think about small cap as an investment category.

罗伯特为最新的《全球投资评论》写了一篇关于小盘股的文章，涉及前景以及他自己投资组合中的一些小盘股。

Robert's written a piece for the latest Global Investment Review on small cap, the prospects, some of the small caps in his own portfolio.

但我想我们应该先看大局，再深入细节，那就是如今市场高度集中于大盘股。

But I I think we should give the big picture first before we dive into the details, which is that the markets today are highly concentrated in large cap stocks.

内德·戴维斯研究公司提供市场集中度的数据，我几个月前看的时候，美国前十大股票占总市值的比例超过30%。

Ned Davis Research produces data on market concentration, which when I last looked at a few months ago, I think the top 10 US stocks had a share of total market capitalization of north of 30%.

前五十大股票占总市值的比例接近60%。

The top 50 stocks had a a share of total market capitalization of closer to 60% of the market.

我们过去也经历过几次这样的集中期，比如1972、1973年著名的“漂亮五十”热潮，当时小盘股和价值股被压得很惨。

And we've been through this these periods of concentration several times in the past during the famous nifty fifty boom of nineteen seventy two, seventy three, when small cap stocks and value stocks were beaten down.

在马拉松资产管理公司内部人士的记忆中，我们在上世纪90年代末也见过类似情况，当时大盘科技股、媒体和电信股越来越集中，而价值股非常便宜。

And within the living institutional memory of Marathon, we saw something similar in the late nineteen nineties with growing concentration in mega cap tech stocks and media and telecoms and value very cheap.

现在我们又回到了类似的情况，这提供了一些投资机会。

And now we're sort of back in the same situation today, which offers some investment opportunities.

不过，首先你在文章开头谈到了人类喜欢把事物分类的倾向，以及这如何影响你自己的分析方法。

But first of you open your piece talking about humans' propensity to categorize things and how this informs your own analytical approach.

我觉得这是人类一直以来的行为。

I think it's something which is, you know, humans have always done.

我们试图理解这个复杂的世界，而使用的基本心理过程就是分类。

We try to make sense of this complex world that we're in, and basic psychological process that we use is categorization.

我们把东西归在一起。

We group things together.

这样能节省精力，提高认知效率。

This enables us to conserve energy, to be cognitively efficient.

你知道，你可以把分类想象成一个金字塔结构。

You know, you think about categorization in a sort of pyramid structure.

所以，如果金字塔顶端是一个小群体，底部是一个非常宽泛的群体或类别，基本上，类别越宽泛，分析就越简单。

So if you had a small group at the top of the pyramid and then a very wide group or category at the bottom of the period, basically, you know, the broader the category, the more simplistic the analysis.

而在这个仍然复杂的世界里。

And in a world which still remains complex.

想想金融市场，我们周围到处都是分类，从金砖国家、MAG7、主题投资，你知道，还有电气化。

You think about financial markets, there's categorization all around us, from the BRICS, the MAG seven, thematic investing, you know, electrification.

当然，最宽泛的类别之一就是这些资产类别。

And, of course, one of the broadest categories of all is, you know, these asset classes.

我们谈论小盘股对大盘股或中盘股。

We talk about small cap versus large cap or mid cap.

但实际上，现实是，小盘股到底是什么意思？

And actually, the reality is that what does small cap mean?

嗯，这取决于你在世界的哪个地方。

Well, it depends where you are in the world.

对吧？

Right?

如果你在美国算小盘股，那相对世界其他地区的公司来说，你可能已经算很大的了。

If you're small in The US, you're probably quite large relative to companies elsewhere in the world.

所以我们试图简化一个复杂的世界。

So we try and simplify a complex world.

而我认为，作为一个逆向投资者，挑战这种简化很重要，因为实际上投资是复杂的，企业也是复杂的。

And I think as a contrarian investor, I think it's important to kick against that because actually investing is complex and businesses are complex.

你的观点是，不应该从市值角度来考虑投资机会，而是寻找另一种方式来分类有吸引力的投资。

And your argument is that one shouldn't approach investment opportunities from the perspective of their market capitalization, that you are looking for a different way of categorizing an attractive investment.

没错。

Correct.

是的。

Yeah.

我们遵循资本周期。

We're following the capital cycle.

所以我们关注的是资本在行业、国家、地区之间的流动，以及管理层的资本配置能力。

So we're following the flows of capital in and out of industries, countries, regions, and management's capital allocation ability.

你可能会说，我们有时把这看作是一种横向的视角，而不是纵向的视角。

Now you might say we sometimes refer to this as more of a horizontal view of the world as opposed to a vertical view.

纵向视角是指有行业专家深入研究细节，制作详细的Excel表格，从内部视角构建投资案例。

A vertical view would be you have sector specialists who dive into the minutiae and create their Excel spreadsheets in great detail, and they build that case for investment for an inside out view.

而横向视角则是我们跨行业观察。

Whereas a horizontal approach to the world, we're looking across industries.

某个行业的估值很高，吸引了资本流入。

What's happening with valuations in one industry very high, and that's attracting capital.

而在另一个行业，可能估值较低，资本正在退出。

And in another sector, maybe valuations alone, capital is exiting.

资本周期教会我们用更横向的视角看待新事物，也就是一种外部视角，如果你愿意的话，丹尼尔·卡尼曼可能会这么说。

And so the capital cycle teaches us to sort of look at new things in a sort of more horizontal view, really, of the world, a sort of outside view, if you like, if, you know, Daniel Kahneman would put it that way, I think.

虽然我们 supposedly 是在避开某些类别，但不可否认，美国大盘股在过去大约十五年里表现惊人，尤其是最近八年左右。

And although we supposedly are shooing categories, we can't deny large cap US stocks have done staggeringly well over the last, what, fifteen years or so, but in particular, over the last eight years or so.

而小盘价值股则令人失望。

And small cap value have disappointed.

然后你有一组很好的数据，我之前不知道，就是比较标普大盘指数和相对较小的标普600小盘指数的相对表现和估值，对吧？

And then you've got this very nice data, which I wasn't aware of, where you're comparing relative performance and valuations of the large cap S and P index against the relatively smaller cap S and P small cap S and P 600?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，首先要说的是，我们经历了一个大盘股跑赢的周期。

I mean, you know, so the first thing to say is that we've had this large cap outperformance cycle.

这个周期已经持续了13年。

It's been 13.

如果把它放在历史背景中看，自1927年以来，法玛和弗伦奇做了一项研究，显示小盘股平均每年跑赢大盘股285个基点。

If you put that in historical context, since 1927, Farmer and French did a study that showed that small caps on average have outperformed large caps by two eighty five basis points per annum.

所以这是百年的历史。

So that's a hundred year history.

但你会发现，在这段历史中，它经历了很长的周期，小盘股跑赢，然后大盘股跑赢，然后来回交替。

But what you find within that history is that it goes to these very long cycles where small caps outperform, then large caps outperform, then it goes backwards and forwards.

有意思的是，你一开始提到的那些时期，比如漂亮五十和互联网泡沫。

And it's interesting you reference those periods right at the start of this, you know, the nifty fifty and then the not.com boom.

因为实际上，1974年漂亮五十之后，小盘股经历了长达九年的 outperformance 时期。

Because, actually, in 1974, after the nifty 50, small caps went on a a nine year stretch of outperformance.

互联网泡沫破裂后，又经历了十二年的 outperformance 时期。

And after the .com bubble burst, it was a twelve year period of outperformance.

而且我认为小盘价值股跑赢了广泛指数。

And I think small cap value outperformed the broad index.

我记得大约是每年九个点，持续了八年左右，直到大约八二年。

I'm saying something like nine points a year for eight years or so up until about 'eighty two.

而超大盘股表现令人失望。

And the mega caps disappointed.

漂亮五十在那段时间下跌了50%，并且在接下来的至少十年里都表现不佳。

The nifty 50 went down 50% during that period, and disappointed at least for the next ten years or so.

所以我觉得很多听众可能不知道你展示的这些数据。

So I think many of the listeners won't be aware of of the data that you're showing here.

对。

Yeah.

所以我特意选了标普600，而不是罗素2000。

So I chose the S and P 600 deliberately rather than the Russell 2,000.

这是因为标普600只包含盈利的公司，而罗素2000，也就是美国更常用的小盘股基准，大约有40%的公司是不盈利的。

And that's because the S and P 600 only includes profitable companies, whereas the Russell 2,000, which is the more commonly used small cap benchmark in The US, contains approximately 40% unprofitable companies.

所以如果我们只看盈利的小盘股，而且这个数据，顺便说一句，是在最近特朗普行情之前的数据，我们会发现标普小盘600的市销率大约是一倍，而大盘基准是销售额的三倍。

So if we just look at the profitable small caps, and this data, by the way, is pre the recent Trump bump, but we find that S and P Small Cap 600 is on a price to sales ratio of about one, whereas the large cap benchmarks, three times sales.

从市现率来看，小盘股是现金流的10倍。

You find on a price to cash flow basis, small caps are on 10 times cash flow.

大盘股是19倍。

The large caps are on 19.

这些差异非常明显。

These are quite stark in the differences.

实际上，小盘股基准的相对市销率处于20多年来的最低点。

In fact, that relative price to sales ratio for the small cap benchmark is at a greater than twenty year low.

大盘股周期已经持续了十三年，而小盘股的市销率估值相对于大盘股处于二十多年来的低点。

We're thirteen years into a large cap cycle, and you've got small cap valuations on price of sales at a greater than twenty year low relative to large caps.

这个差距相当大。

That's quite a big difference.

对，大多数人会想，那是因为大盘股的预期每股收益增长要强得多，但你说并非如此。

Yeah, and most people would be thinking, well, that's because large cap has much stronger expected earnings per share growth, but you're saying that ain't so.

嗯，市场共识——如果你能相信的话，说实话，我真的不信这些数字——但共识认为明年小盘股的盈利增长会高于大盘股。

Well, the consensus, if you can believe it, and to be honest, I really don't believe these numbers, but the consensus has higher earnings growth for small caps than large caps next year.

但我觉得市场已经反映了这一点，而且我不相信。

But I think the market discounts it, and I don't believe it.

我认为小盘股折价交易有很多充分的理由，而我不是在主张投资者就一窝蜂地涌入小盘股。

I think there are lots of good reasons why small caps trade at a discount, and what I'm not arguing is that investors just pile into small caps.

正如我所说，如果你涌入罗素2000，你就是在涌入40%的不盈利公司，但这份数据表明，在市值谱系的下端，被低估的公司比顶端要多得多。

As I said, if you pile into the Russell 2,000, you're piling into 40% unprofitable companies, But what this data shows is that there are a lot more undervalued companies further down the market cap spectrum than at the top of the market cap

详细谈谈你讨论过的投资组合中的一只股票，你为什么认为我们正处于小盘股相对估值的低谷附近？

get into detail on one of your stock portfolio holdings that you discussed, why do you think it is that we're in this near trough devaluation of small cap relative

相对于大盘股？

to large?

原因有好几个。

Several reasons, really.

我觉得小盘股对经济更敏感。

I think small caps are more economically sensitive.

确实是这样。

You know, that's true.

而且我认为市场一直表现得像处于周期后期，担心增长，所以更偏好大盘股的安全性。

And I think the markets have been acting in a sort of late cycle type manner where they're worried about growth, so they prefer to the safety of large caps.

顺便说一句，1973年或1974年就是这样。

And that was by the way, that was what happened in 1973 or '4.

如果你还记得，1970年美国曾有过一次经济衰退。

If you remember, there was a sort of US downturn in 1970.

对。

Yeah.

当时那些超级投机股，也就是那个年代的网红股，全都崩了。

All the super spec, the sort of meme stocks of that day crashed.

对。

Yeah.

然后投资者就去寻求大盘股的庇护，也就是在那时候他们……

And the investors sought comfort in the mega caps, and and that that's when they

开始反弹了。

marked back.

有道理。

Makes sense.

然后，你知道，另一个原因是小盘股平均比大盘股背负更多的杠杆。

And then, you know, another reason is that small caps on average carry more leverage than large caps.

确实如此。

You know, that's true.

人们提到的另一个原因是私募市场的兴起。

The other reason that people have talked about is the rise of private markets.

现在有超过1200家独角兽公司，这些独角兽公司的市值都在十亿美元以上，而且都还在私人手里。

So there are over 1,200 unicorns, a unicorn having a market cap of a billion dollars plus that are in private hands.

所以有人就说，好公司留在私人市场的时间更长了，不会那么快进入公开市场。

And so the argument is that good companies are staying private for longer and not emerging into the public markets.

而在公开市场，我们这二十年来一直看到股票数量在减少。

Whereas in public markets, we've had this sort of equity shrinkage now for twenty years.

我觉得这些说法都有道理。

And I think those are all valid.

但如果我要持相反观点的话，我觉得作为公开市场的投资者，当那些独角兽最终上市的时候，那会是买方市场，它们迟早要上市的。

But if I took a a sort of contrary position to that, I think as a public market investor, it'll be a buyer's market when those unicorns eventually come to market, which they'll have to.

私募股权基金不可能一直互相转手，没完没了。

Private equity funds can't keep swapping between each other indefinitely.

它们迟早得有个退出策略，到时候就是买方市场了。

They're gonna have to have an exit strategy at some point, and it'll be a buyer's market.

对吧？

Right?

而且风险投资今年从机构计划中大量撤资，却没有真正把多少资金投回市场。

And venture capital is making heavy drawdowns on on their institutional plans, large sever this year, without actually putting much back on the market.

对。

Yeah.

不过，你并不是在主张应该大量投资小盘股，就小盘股这个类别而言。

Anyhow, you're not arguing you should load up on small cap per se on the category small cap.

没错。

Correct.

这正是分类的关键所在。

And that's the whole point about the categorization.

这不是说，咱们就都涌向这个资产类别，因为有很多小盘股价格很高。

This is not an argument, you know, just let's go pile up on this asset class, because there are plenty of expensive small caps.

有很多小盘股不盈利，也有很多小盘股负债累累。

There are plenty of small caps that are unprofitable, plenty of small caps with indebted balance sheets.

我想说的是，大盘股的高估值往往意味着长期回报较低。

I think the point I'd make is that high valuations in large caps will tend to mean lower long term returns.

这也意味着，从资本周期的角度看，高估值会吸引更多资本。

It also means that high valuations those high valuations from a capital cycle view will attract more capital.

就像我们刚才谈到的，大型科技和人工智能领域正在发生这种情况。

Which they're doing in the field of big tech AI as we talked about.

反之亦然。

And the converse is true.

所以，你在一些小型股中看到的低估值，意味着人们根本无视它们。

So the low valuations that you can find in some of these small caps means that people are just ignoring them.

资本不在那里。

That's not where the capital is.

华尔街一如既往地追逐资金。

Wall Street has followed the money as it always does.

但我发现，现在我的持股中有三分之一只有不到五个分析师在跟踪。

And but I'm finding that, you know, I have now a third of my holdings have fewer than five analysts covering them.

这太令人惊讶了。

It's astonishing.

对。

Yeah.

所以它们是被忽视的股票。

So they're neglected stocks.

被忽视。

Neglected.

那你跟我说说，你在很多不同领域都有一些细分市场的投资。

And tell me and so you you list your niche exposures in across a number of different areas.

你知道，这不太容易归类。

You know, it's something which does not lend itself well to easy categorization.

我第一次描述我的30只股票组合时，涉及的行业包括合规软件、二手车批发平台、陶瓷材料、农村宽带、牙科制造和滑雪场。

When I first described my portfolio of 30 holdings, there are industries ranging from regulatory compliance software, used automobile wholesale platforms, ceramic materials, rural broadband, dental manufacturing, and ski resorts.

恐怕很难把这些打包成一个ETF。

It's not easy to package those up into an ETF, I'm afraid.

但它们符合马拉松资本周期的理念，因为细分市场，几乎从定义上讲，就像沃伦·巴菲特的护城河一样，不会吸引大量新资本。

But they conform to the Marathon Capital Cycle philosophy because a niche, almost by definition, is a business like war like Warren Buffett's moats that doesn't attract huge amount of new capital.

这些领域里的每一家公司都有独特的供给侧故事，而这正是我们最终寻找的。

Each one of the companies held in those areas has a unique supply side story, and that's what we're looking for ultimately.

那我们就深入聊聊你在报告里重点提到的那家公司——Bio Rad实验室。

So let's do a deep dive on the company that you chose to highlight in your note, which is Bio Rad Laboratories.

说实话，Bio Rad其实不算小。

Bio Rad's not actually that small, if I'm honest.

它的企业价值大约有90亿美元。

It's about $9,000,000,000 enterprise value in terms of the world.

实际上是一家相当规模的公司。

It's actually quite a sizable company.

但它是在生命科学行业里运营的。

But it operates in the life science industry.

业务大概一半是生命科学，一半是诊断。

About half the business is life sciences and half is diagnostics.

这个行业的资本周期论点在于，这是一个多年来不断整合的行业。

The capital cycle thesis in this industry is this is an industry that has consolidated over many years.

我以前也持有过类似的公司，比如贝克曼库尔特、密理博，现在它们都被收购了。

I've owned companies in the past, Bettman Coulter, Millipore, they've all gone.

现在有丹纳赫和赛默飞世尔这两家巨头，一直在整合这个行业。

You have these two very large companies, Danaher and Thermo Fisher, that have been consolidating the industry.

但伯乐公司却一直保持独立，我觉得这很有意思。

Yet Bio Rad is a company that has remained steadfastly single, which I find interesting.

这是一家家族企业。

It's a family owned business.

它由施瓦茨家族创立，现任CEO诺曼·施瓦茨是创始人的儿子，他担任CEO大概有二十年了吧。

The Schwartz family founded it, and the current CEO, Norman Schwartz, is the son of the founders, and he's been the CEO for twenty years or so, I think.

尽管行业在整合，它依然保持独立，但它在约80%的业务领域里仍然处于领先地位。

But this company, although the industry's consolidated around it and it's remained single, it still has leading positions in about 80% of its business lines.

它的经常性收入占比大约70%，所以它有一些非常有吸引力的业务。

It's got recurring revenues of about 70%, So it's got some very attractive businesses.

所以即使在面对更大的竞争对手时，它也能设法进行创新。

So it's managed to sort of innovate even in the face of much larger competition.

我觉得生命科学或生命科学仪器的一个特点是，如果科学家发表了关于某个科学过程的研究论文，他们通常会引用他们在测试中使用的仪器和检测方法。

And I think one of the characteristics of life sciences or life science instruments is that if a scientist publishes a research paper about some scientific process, they will often cite the instruments and the assays that they've used in that test.

然后你会发现，其他学者或药物开发者想要复制这些结果。

Then what you find is that other academics or other drug developers, they want to replicate those results.

他们会使用相同的仪器。

They will use the same instrument.

这样就能在细分领域占据非常强的地位。

Can have these actually quite strong positions in niche areas.

目前他们领先的一个领域是前沿技术，叫做微滴数字聚合酶链反应仪器。

One of the areas that they have a leading position at the moment is a very cutting edge technology, which is called droplet digital polymerase chain reaction instruments.

我们简称为DD PCR。

We'll abbreviate that to DD PCR.

这些仪器能够以非常高的特异性扩增DNA和RNA。

But what those do is they enable the amplification of DNA and RNA with very high specificity.

他们是这个领域的领导者，市场份额一直在增长，这些仪器被用于液体活检、生物制药生产、病原体监测等各种领域。

They're a leader in that, they've been gaining share, and these instruments they're being used for liquid biopsy, biopharmaceutical production, pathogen surveillance, all kinds of things.

所以Bio-Rad一直能保持领先地位。

So BI RUD has been able to maintain leading positions.

但并不是所有业务线都表现良好。

It's not good in all its business lines.

事情从来不是非黑即白的。

It's never black and white like that.

也有灰色地带。

There are gray areas as well.

但你指出，与竞争对手或像赛默飞世尔这样的大公司相比，它最近的盈利能力相对令人失望。

But you point out that its profitability has recently been relatively disappointing compared to competitors, or the big names like Thermo Fisher.

对。

Yeah.

所以我觉得有趣的是，这家公司的营业利润率比同行低大约1000个基点。

So I think the interesting thing about this is that the company's operating margins are about a thousand basis points lower than peers.

你会想，这是为什么呢？

And you think, why is that?

而且，如果你回顾历史，我觉得有好几年它经营得不太好。

And actually, if you delve back into history, I think it wasn't particularly well run for a number of years.

但在疫情之前，Bio Rad 实际上增长速度超过同行，而且增量利润率更高。

But then prior to the pandemic, Bio Rad was actually outgrowing peers with higher incremental margins.

所以这个业务本身没有什么结构性问题，意味着它的利润率可以和同行差不多。

So there's nothing structural about the business, which means its margins can't be similar to peers.

事实上，它的毛利率和同行是同一水平。

In fact, its gross margins, the same level as peers.

而且他们所有的新产品毛利率都更高。

And all their newer products are at higher gross margins.

所以我觉得随着这些新产品增长并超过市场，利润率应该会提高。

So I think as these newer products grow and outpace the market, the margin should improve.

你是说那些低运营利润率与疫情期间的问题有关？

And you're saying that those low operating margins are to do with problems related to the pandemic period?

嗯，其实有不同的事情在发生。

Well, there's different things going on.

整个行业现在其实都在走下坡路，这也是我觉得它吸引人的原因。

The whole industry actually is in a downturn at the moment, and this is why I think it's attractive.

因为在疫情期间，制药公司和各国都大量采购了仪器设备。

Because In the pandemic, what happened was pharmaceutical companies, countries just loaded up on instruments and equipment.

我们基本上已经进入衰退两年了，他们在2020年和2021年买了那些仪器，但还没真正用起来。

We're basically two years into a downturn where they bought all those instruments in 2020, 2021, but they're not really chewing through them yet.

我们已经衰退两年了，这拖累了整个行业。

We're two years into a downturn, and that has depressed the whole sector.

我觉得现在是投资的好时机，因为你基本上是在这个行业里以有吸引力的价格买入。

I find this a very interesting time to invest now, because you're basically paying attractive prices within this industry.

特别是Bio Rad，它的价格被大幅低估了。

In particular, with Bio Rad, it's hugely discounted.

那么这只股票有一个隐藏的亮点，可能没有被

Then this stock has a jewel in the crown that perhaps is not being

充分认识到。如果你只看表面数据，你会觉得，哦，它看起来不太划算。

properly This is one where if you just look at the data on the surface, you think, oh, it doesn't look very good value.

但是你在彭博或者别的系统上看到的数据，并没有告诉你这家公司拥有欧洲公司赛多利斯超过三分之一的股份。

But what the data on on Bloomberg or whatever system you're using doesn't tell you is that this company owns more than a third of Sartorius, the European company.

很多人认为赛多利斯是欧洲生物制药加工领域的一颗明珠。

Sartorius is considered by many to be a sort of jewel in the crown within European biopharma processing.

它是市场领导者。

It's a market leader.

而且施瓦茨家族在二十多年前就认识了赛多利斯家族，他们投入了一亿美元入股赛多利斯，因为赛多利斯在机械分离技术方面非常擅长，我想是过滤技术，而伯乐擅长化学分离。

And the Schwartz family knew the Sartorius family twenty odd years ago, and they took a $100,000,000 stake in Sartorius because Sartorius was very good at mechanical separation technologies, I think filtration, whereas Bio Rad was good at chemical separation.

所以他们觉得这两家公司会很契合。

So they thought the two companies would fit well together.

总之，长话短说，那一亿美元的投资现在价值五十亿美元，相当于伯乐自身企业价值的一半。

Anyway, to cut a long story short, that $100,000,000 investment is now worth $5,000,000,000 which is half the enterprise value of Bio Rad itself.

如果你把这项投资和递延税减掉，伯乐的核心业务交易价格只是EBITDA的个位数倍数，而丹纳赫和赛默飞世尔是EBITDA的二十多倍。

And if you subtract that and deferred taxes, Bio Rad's core business is trading on a single digit multiple of EBITDA, whereas Danaher and Thermo Fisher are in mid twenties multiple of EBITDA.

这简直太惊人了。

It's absolutely astonishing.

为什么华尔街不喜欢这家公司？

Why does Wall Street not like this?

这家公司并没有被广泛关注。

It's not a very widely followed company.

大型投行不关注它，可能是因为没有交易可做。

The bulge bracket firms don't follow it, probably because there's no deals.

但负面因素是家族控制。

But the negatives are the family controls.

华尔街不喜欢这一点。

Wall Street doesn't like that.

他们希望家族变现这项资产，并进行一些金融工程操作。

They want them to monetize this asset and engage in some financial engineering.

但我认为，CEO——我见过他——他对这项业务非常热情，感觉肩负着历史的重任，他想创造长期价值。

But I think the CEO, having met with him, I think he is very passionate about this business and feels a sort of weight of history on his shoulders, and he wants to create long term value.

我们很高兴能与他并肩同行。

And we're happy to be alongside him in that.

非常好。

Very good.

好的，我希望你在美国小盘股领域能找到更多这样的特例。

Well, I hope you find more outliers in The US small cap era.

谢谢你，罗伯特，希望很快能再见到你。

Thank you, Robert, and hope to see you again soon.

一如既往地愉快。

Pleasure as always.

谢谢，爱德华。

Thanks, Edward.

感谢你今天抽出时间。

Thank you for your time today.

希望你能收听下一期的《资本周期》。

I hope you will listen to the next edition of the Capital Cycle.

本通讯仅供参考。

This communication is provided for information purposes only.

请访问马拉松的网站和《全球投资评论》以获取更多信息，包括重要的披露内容。

Please refer to Marathon's website and the Global Investment Reviews for further information, including important disclosures.