以色列是否迫使特朗普发动战争？

《纽约时报》观点频道的《观点》播客，为您带来一系列对话与新思想，汇集我们作家和专栏作家的声音。

The Opinions Podcast from New York Times Opinion, bringing you a mix of conversations and new ideas, featuring the voices of our writers and columnists.

在我看来，国际关系中最被低估的力量其实是愚蠢。

To me, the single most underestimated force in international relations is actually stupidity.

包括贾米尔·布伊。

Including Jamil Bouie.

信托人麦克米伦·科托姆。

Trustee McMillan Cottom.

米歇尔·戈德堡。

Michelle Gouldberg.

托马斯·弗里德曼。

Thomas Friedman.

还有更多。

And many more.

在您收听播客的任何平台都能找到这些观点内容。

Find the opinions wherever you get your podcasts.

播客。

Podcasts.

来自《纽约时报》，我是娜塔莉·基切罗夫。

From The New York Times, I'm Natalie Kitcheroff.

这是《每日新闻》。

This is The Daily.

总统先生，以色列是否迫使您对伊朗发动这些袭击？

Mister president, did Israel force your hand to launch these strikes against Iran?

内塔尼亚胡是否把美国拖入了这场战争？

Did Netanyahu pull The United States into this war?

没有。

No.

可能是我逼迫了他们的行动。

I might have forced their hands.

战争进入第六天，以色列在推动特朗普总统攻击伊朗方面所扮演的角色，已成为一个重大的政治争议点。

Six days into the war, the role that Israel has played in driving President Trump to attack Iran has become a major point of political tension.

根据谈判的进展，我认为他们可能会先发动攻击，而我不希望这种情况发生。

Based on the way the negotiation was going, I think they were gonna attack first, and I didn't want that to happen.

所以，如果非要说的话，可能是我逼迫了以色列。

So if anything, I might have forced Israel's hand.

关键问题在于，外国政府在多大程度上影响了美国三军统帅的行动。

The key questions have been, to what extent is a foreign country shaping the actions of The US commander in chief.

我们知道以色列将采取行动。

We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action.

我们知道这将引发对美国部队的袭击。

We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces.

我们知道，如果我们不先发制人地打击他们，等他们发动袭击后，我们将承受更大的伤亡。

And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties.

特朗普是如何同意这一项任何一位美国总统都从未同意过的行动的？

And how did Trump get on board with something no American president had ever agreed to?

与以色列联手对伊朗发动战争。

Waging a joint war with Israel against Iran.

我们是否已经将社会中最庄严的决定——开战的决定——交给了另一个国家？

Have we now delegated the most solemn decision that can be made in our society, the decision to go to war to another country?

今天，我的同事马克·马泽蒂和罗南·伯格曼将为我们讲述我们所了解的美国与以色列之间极其紧密的合作，以及这种伙伴关系如何影响伊朗局势的最终结局。

Today, my colleagues Mark Mazzetti and Ronen Bergman on what we know about the extraordinarily close cooperation between The US and Israel and how that partnership affects the endgame in Iran.

今天是3月5日，星期四。

It's Thursday, March 5.

马克、罗南，我们邀请你们两位上节目，是因为你们都一直在报道伊朗的这场冲突。

Mark, Ronen, we wanted to bring you both onto the show because you've both been covering this conflict in Iran.

罗南，你来自以色列；而你，马克，来自D。

Ronen, you from Israel, and you, Mark, the D.

C。

C.

Side。

Side.

你们正在合写一本书。

You are writing a book together.

你们经常是报道搭档，今天能有你们两位在这里，真是太好了。

You are often reporting partners, and it is so wonderful to have you both here today.

谢谢你们邀请我们。

Thanks for having us.

谢谢，娜塔莉。

Thanks, Natalie.

很高兴能来。

Pleasure.

所以，马克，你前几天做客节目时告诉我们，伊朗战争爆发前，以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡曾大力游说特朗普总统支持这场战争。

So, Mark, you told us when you were on the show a few days ago that part of the lead up to the war in Iran involved Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu lobbying hard for it with president Trump.

而在过去几天里，内塔尼亚胡是否可能是这场冲突背后的主要推手，这个问题在这里变得越来越关键。

And over the last few days, the extent to which Netanyahu may have been a driving force behind this conflict has become a much more central question here.

今天我们想深入探讨这一点，试图回答那些尚未解答的问题：以色列究竟在多大程度上决定了这些袭击的形态——这些袭击如今已持续到第五天，以及这场战争究竟在多大程度上反映的是美国的意愿，而非以色列的意愿。

And we wanna go deep on that today to try to answer the unanswered questions about how much Israel is actually determining the shape of these attacks, which have now continued into a fifth day, and the degree to which this war is about what The US wants versus what Israel wants.

我们该如何理解这一点？

How should we think about that?

所以公开来看，过去几个月里，我们看到特朗普总统走了一条迂回曲折的通往战争的道路。

So publicly, over the last few months, we've seen president Trump take this sort of circuitous path to war.

他真的想要发动打击吗？

Does he really want a strike?

他想要达成协议吗？

Does he want a deal?

他想要和平吗？

Does he want peace?

谁知道呢？

Who knows?

因此，这一局势究竟会走向何方一直非常不明朗。

So it's been very unclear which direction this was going.

但我认为真正的故事是，在幕后，局势每天都更接近战争。

But I think the real story is that behind the scenes, this was every day pushing closer to war.

同时，在幕后，始终不变的是以色列总理内塔尼亚胡施加的压力，推动特朗普走向战争。

And also behind the scenes, the constant was the pressure of prime minister Netanyahu to get Trump there.

这一问题在本周爆发，当时国务卿马可·卢比奥告诉记者，本质上，这场战争之所以爆发，是因为以色列即将发动，而美国需要保护自己免受伊朗可能的攻击。

And that issue blew up this week after secretary of state Marco Rubio told reporters that, in essence, the war began because Israel was going to begin it and that The United States needed to protect itself from possible Iranian attack.

换句话说，是以色列在推动此事，而美国则回应得仿佛别无选择，只能加入以色列发动的战争。

So in other words, Israel was driving this, and The US was responding as if there was no choice but to join the war that Israel started.

对。

Right.

卢比奥的这些言论被迅速抓住不放。

These comments by Rubio were seized upon.

它们立即引发了争议。

They were immediately controversial.

对。

Right.

因为这触及了一个许多人都曾批评的点，尤其是特朗普总统阵营中的人，他们批评以色列和内塔尼亚胡正在将美国拖入中东的战争，最终主导了美国的外交政策。

Because it already touches a point that many, particularly in president Trump's party, have criticized this idea that Israel and Netanyahu are getting The United States into wars in The Middle East, ultimately driving American foreign policy.

所以，罗南和我长期以来一直在报道这个问题。

So Ronen and I have been covering this issue for a long time.

是的

Right.

多年来，我们一直撰文指出内塔尼亚胡如何推动美国历任总统走向与伊朗的战争。

And we've written over the years about how Netanyahu has been pushing American presidents towards war with Iran for many years.

我们说的是乔治·W。

We're talking about George W.

布什。

Bush.

我们说的是奥巴马。

We're talking about Obama.

我们说的是乔·拜登。

We're talking about Joe Biden.

我们说的是唐纳德·特朗普。

We're talking about Donald Trump.

对。

Yep.

在过去一年半里，局势发生了变化，我们现在面临美国在伊朗的两场战争，因为内塔尼亚胡开始认为与伊朗开战的成本更低，这有助于推动美国介入。

The dynamic has changed in the last year and a half where we now have two American wars in Iran because Netanyahu began to see the costs of going to war with Iran as lower, and therefore, that helps sell The United States getting involved.

明白了。

Got it.

为了理解你所描述的这种新动态，我们应该从哪里开始？

And to understand that new dynamic as you've described it, where should we start?

这个故事从哪里开始？

Where does that story begin?

我认为你可以从特朗普政府的初期说起。

Well, I think you could begin at the beginning of the Trump administration.

所以2025年1月，特朗普上台后，内塔尼亚胡再次发起了关于对伊朗开战的压力运动。

So in January 2025, Trump comes in, and Netanyahu once again begins this pressure campaign about a war in Iran.

请记住，这两个人之间有着长期的不信任历史。

And remember, these two men have a history of mistrust.

记得2020年，内塔尼亚胡曾祝贺乔·拜登赢得选举，而唐纳德·特朗普却认为那场选举被窃取了。

Remember, BB in 2020 congratulated Joe Biden on winning the election that Donald Trump thought was stolen.

是的

Yep.

所以特朗普对此很生气。

So Trump was angry about that.

所以这里存在一段不信任的历史。

So there is a history of mistrust here.

因此，当特朗普在2025年1月上台时，他某种程度上继承了内塔尼亚胡早已开始的关于对伊朗开战的计划。

So when Trump comes in in January 2025, he sort of inherits planning that Netanyahu was already doing about an war with Iran.

好的。

Okay.

跟我说说当时已经展开的计划吧，罗南。

And tell me about that planning that was already underway, Ronen.

我们对它了解多少？

What do we know about it?

这是一项持续推进的攻击计划，首次要求美以两国联合对伊朗发动打击，结合以色列的情报力量与美国的绝对军事实力——这一直是内塔尼亚胡始终如一的梦想。

So this was a rolling plan towards an attack that called for in the first time in history, a joint US Israeli strike on Iran that would involve the Israeli intelligence and the almighty power of America together, something that Netanyahu always, always this was his his dream.

他热切期待着这一目标，所有人都告诉他这永远不会发生。

He he thrived for that, and everybody told him this will never happen.

然后有人在2025年4月对特朗普总统说：听好了。

And then someone said to president Trump, this is April 2025, listen.

我们正被拖入一场我们并不想要的战争，我们希望达成协议。

We are being dragged into war that we don't want, and we want an agreement.

你的意思是，当特朗普上台时，已经存在这些涉及美以联合攻击的计划，而他不得不面对这些计划。

You're saying that when Trump came to office, there were already these plans afoot that involved a joint US Israel attack that Trump then has to contend with.

到了四月，他说了不。

And in April, he said no.

是的。

Yes.

起初，他并不希望这样。

At the beginning, he doesn't want that.

他对内塔尼亚胡说：停下。

And he says to Netanyahu, stop.

别。

Don't.

现在，特朗普像本世纪每一位美国总统那样，对内塔尼亚胡说不。

Now Trump said no just like every other American president this century had said no to Netanyahu.

对。

Right.

正如罗南所说，四月份，他试图阻止此事。

And as Ronen says, in April, he tries to put a stop to it.

但显然，几个月后，我们确实看到了对伊朗核设施的打击。

But obviously then, a few months later, we do see these strikes on Iran's nuclear sites.

所以，特朗普在某个时候改变了主意。

So Trump, at some point, changed his mind.

发生了什么？

What happened?

内塔尼亚胡是如何成功做到他以前对其他美国总统都未能做到的事？

How did BB succeed where he'd failed with previous presidents?

因此，在特朗普四月表示反对后，以色列继续规划对伊朗发动袭击，美国不参与，或仅扮演防御性角色。

So after Trump says no in April, the planning continues in Israel to do strikes in Iran without The United States joining in or maybe just in a defensive role.

这一计划一直推进到六月，内塔尼亚胡发动了战争。

And this proceeds all the way to June when Netanyahu launches the war.

战争爆发后的第二天，特朗普正在观察事态发展。

And a day after the conflict begins, Trump is watching how it's playing.

他正在观看福克斯新闻。

He's watching Fox News.

他关注的是：这次行动是否成功？

He's watching the sense of, is this successful?

意思是，外界反应是否良好？

Meaning, is it being received well?

外界反应是否良好？

Is it being received well?

看起来进展顺利吗？

Does it seem to be going well?

正如我们去年报道的那样，美国决定加入。

And as we reported last year, decides The United States is gonna join.

内塔尼亚胡启动了某项行动，而他自己也表示，只有美国才能完成，因为美国拥有军事能力，特别是那种能够打击深层地下目标的钻地炸弹。

That Netanyahu had begun something that Netanyahu himself said only The United States can finish because The United States has military capabilities, specifically these bunker buster bombs that can hit deeply buried sites.

因此，如果要真正终结这场行动，美国就必须介入。

And so if this thing is gonna actually be brought to its conclusion, The United States has to get involved.

这最终说服了特朗普在去年六月加入空袭，打击了三处核设施，并以特朗普的话说，将它们‘彻底完全摧毁’。

And that's ultimately what convinces Trump to join the strikes last June, hit the three nuclear facilities, and then declare them, in Trump's words, completely and totally obliterated.

对。

Right.

他和比布都出来表示，这些设施已被成功摧毁，并使伊朗的核计划倒退了一代人的时间。

And both he and Beebe come out and say successfully dismantled the sites, and they have set Iran's nuclear program back a generation.

那么，我们是如何从特朗普批准这种被宣布极为成功的有限打击，演变为如今这场旨在推翻整个政权的更极端行动的呢？

So how did we then get from Trump okaying that kind of limited strike that was declared so successful to now this much more extreme campaign that is aimed at dismantling an entire regime.

甚至在飞机和轰炸机尚未返美之前，他就已经收到了战损评估报告。

Even before the planes, the bombers turned back to The US, and he already has the the BDA, the the battle damage assessment.

内塔尼亚胡说我们已经消除了核计划和导弹计划的威胁，持续数代，但他并没有做到，这也不真实。

And Bibi saying we've removed the threat from the nuclear project and the missile project for generations, but he didn't have that, and it was not true.

高级军事官员当时告诉我们，两国军队的战术成果符合预期，但没人料到这场有限的行动会消除威胁。

High ranking military officials told us in real time, the tactical achievements of both militaries were as expected, but nobody expected that this limited campaign would remove the threat.

因为如果它真的消除了威胁，那我们现在在做什么？

Because if it removed the threat, what are we doing now?

你消除了一个威胁，结果八个月后它又回来了？

Like, you remove a threat, and then it comes back after eight months?

但为了明确一下，你的意思是他们实际上并没有将伊朗的核计划推迟一代人，威胁依然存在，而且所有人都知道这一点。

But just to be clear, what you're saying is they did not actually set Iran's nuclear program back a generation, and that the threat was very much still present, and everyone knew that.

是的。

Yeah.

以色列的战损评估称，在情况良好的日子里，他们可能在一年内撤回了核计划的部分内容，其他部分则可能在数月内完成。

And the Israeli BDA said that in a good day, maybe they withdrew parts of the nuclear plan in maybe up to a year, maybe in some other parts in months.

所以问题不在于成果与目标之间的差距，而在于领导人声称目标已被彻底摧毁，而事实并非如此。

So the problem was not the achievements versus the targets, but the statements from the leaders who said it's it's obliterated, and it was not.

但无论如何，在特朗普看来，这个问题基本上已经解决了。

But, nevertheless, in Trump's mind, this issue is largely settled.

他发动了空袭。

He does the strikes.

他宣布这些设施已被摧毁，然后就转向其他事情。

He declares the sites obliterated, moves on.

但内塔尼亚胡没有就此罢休，因为罗南说，在以色列，有一种观点认为至少还需要再来一轮。

But Netanyahu doesn't move on because as Ronen says, in Israel, there's a view that there needs to be at least another round.

这些设施并没有被摧毁。

The sites aren't obliterated.

伊朗导弹的问题依然存在。

There's still the issue of Iranian missiles.

因此，这个问题对以色列人来说并未消失。

So this doesn't go away for the Israelis.

在六月空袭后的几个月里，你看到压力行动仍在低水平持续，以色列官员与美国军方及其他方面讨论在伊朗再次爆发冲突的必要性。

And in the months after the June strike, you see the pressure campaign continue at a low level where Israeli officials are discussing with the mill US military and others about the need for another conflict in Iran.

到了十二月下旬，这个问题最终回到了特朗普身上，当时内塔尼亚胡前往海湖庄园，极力主张发动另一场战争。

And this ultimately gets really to Trump in late December when Netanyahu comes to Mar A Lago and basically makes the case for another war.

那么，内塔尼亚胡当时提出了什么样的论点？

And what is the case that Netanyahu makes at that point?

他向总统提出的论点是一方面，但让我们先谈谈他向以色列军方所传达的论点，以及可能隐藏在乌瓦齐兹背后的其他动机。

So the case that he's making to the president is one, but let's first talk about the case that he's making to the Israeli military and maybe the possible additional motives behind Uvatizi.

好的。

Sure.

他命令以色列军方做好准备，在2026年4月至6月间对伊朗发动另一次大规模打击，无论美国是否参与。

He is giving the Israeli military an order to get ready to another massive strike in Iran, with The US or without The US, somewhere between April to June 2026.

那是去年十月、十一月的事。

That's back in November, October, November.

而且，我相信他也看到了2026年的时间表。

And also, he saw I am sure he saw the the timeline of 2026.

选举即将来临。

Elections are coming.

内塔尼亚胡在所有民调中都远远落后。

Netanyahu is lagging much behind in all the polls.

六月对伊朗的袭击并未在民调中带来预期的选票。

The attack on Iran in June did not bring the expected votes in the polls.

所有这些因素加在一起，他正在让军队做好攻击准备。

All of that together, he is getting the military ready to attack.

在做好这些准备后，他前往马拉阿戈。

And with that preparation, he comes to Malaga.

你的意思是，他在前往会见特朗普之前，正在说服以色列军方，制定推进这一计划的方案。

And what you're saying is that he is convincing the Israeli military, building a plan to go forward with this as he goes to meet with Trump.

那么，考虑到这一切，当比比抵达马拉阿戈时会发生什么？

So with all that in mind, what happens when Bibi gets to Mar A Lago?

他对特朗普说了什么？

What does he say to Trump?

他说：我们还有工作要做。

He says we have work to do.

中国正在向伊朗提供生产弹道导弹所需的零部件。

China is resupplying Iran with the necessary component for the production of ballistic missiles.

俄罗斯正在帮助他们。

Russia is helping them.

他们正在重新武装。

They are rearming.

他们正在重组。

They are regrouping.

我们需要再次攻击他们。

We need to attack them again.

如果是由美以联合发动的打击，我们当然非常乐意，但即使只是以色列单独行动也可以。

We would be more than happy if it's a joint US Israeli strike, but even just an Israeli strike.

我请求总统批准至少进行一次以色列的打击，并在2026年4月之前协助以色列防御弹道导弹。

I am asking the president Blessing to strike at least an Israeli strike and a and a help in the defense of Israel from ballistic missiles between April 2026.

因此，内塔尼亚胡表示，伊朗对以色列构成了迫在眉睫的威胁。

So Netanyahu is saying there is an imminent threat to Israel posed by Iran.

首先，马克，这是真的吗？

First of all, is that true, Mark?

其次，他目前并没有提到伊朗对美国构成任何直接威胁。

And second of all, he's not at this point talking about any direct threat that Iran is posing to The US at this time.

对吧？

Right?

这并不是论点的一部分。

That's not part of the case.

没错。

That's correct.

伊朗没有能够打击美国的导弹。

Iran does not have any missiles capable of hitting The United States.

内塔尼亚胡认为，自六月战争以来，导弹生产一直在加速，并对以色列构成直接威胁。

And Netanyahu is making the case that, the missile production has continued apace since the June war, and it poses a direct threat to Israel.

我认为，'迫在眉睫'这个问题总是需要稍微拆解一下。

Now I think the question of imminent is always one that needs to be sort of unpacked a little bit.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，以色列六月开战后，伊朗向以色列发射了导弹。

I mean, Iran launched missiles at Israel after Israel began the war in June.

对吧？

Right?

所以问题在于，这是否迫在眉睫，因为伊朗即将发动另一场战争？

So the question is, is it imminent because Iran is about to launch another war?

我认为BB根本没在说这一点，但毫无疑问，伊朗的能力对以色列构成了直接威胁。

I don't think BB was making that case at all, but there's no question that the capabilities of Iran pose a direct threat to Israel.

我只想补充一点，我认为伊朗并未对美国构成威胁，但BB不断提醒特朗普，伊朗确实对他个人构成了威胁——以色列情报部门发现了一项由最高领袖亲自下令的刺杀特朗普的阴谋。

May I just add here that I think that Iran didn't pose a threat to The US, but BB keeps reminding Trump that it did pose a very personal threat to Trump, that Israeli intelligence was able to identify a conspiracy to kill Trump ordered personally by the supreme leader.

对。

Right.

当然，这一阴谋被以色列情报部门挫败了，他们将此事告知了FBI和美国官员，但这给总统留下了一个非常个人化的感受。

This was, of course, disrupted by Israeli intelligence who told the FBI and American officials about that, but that left a very personal point from the point of view of the president.

对。

Right.

听好了。

Look.

这人想杀我。

This guy tried to kill me.

你说的是，内塔尼亚胡在提醒特朗普这一点。

And you're saying Bibi is reminding Trump of that.

这些人想杀你。

These guys tried to kill you.

记得吗？

Remember?

是的。

Yeah.

他们确实这么做了。

They did.

这是真实的，特朗普记得。

It was real, and Trump remembers.

内塔尼亚胡向特朗普提出的另一个论点是，伊朗现在很虚弱，现在是出击的时机。

And another case that Netanyahu is making to Trump is that Iran is weak right now, and the time is to strike.

他基本上在说，伊朗的代理势力，特别是真主党，已经被很大程度上摧毁了。

He's basically arguing that Iran's proxy forces, like specifically Hezbollah, has been largely destroyed.

他们的导弹发射器和导弹阵地在六月遭受了重创。

Their missile launchers and their missile sites were hit hard in June.

还要记住，这是德黑兰街头大规模抗议活动开始的时候，政府不得不镇压这些抗议。

And remember also, this is the beginning of mass protests happening on the streets of Tehran that the government has to put down.

所以，这正是内塔尼亚胡当时试图抓住的伊朗的虚弱时刻。

So this is a moment of weakness for Iran that it looks like Netanyahu at that time is just trying to seize.

这里有一个有趣的矛盾。

There's an interesting contradiction here.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，比比提出的第一个论点是伊朗构成迫在眉睫的威胁，也就是说伊朗很强。

I mean, the first argument Bibi's making is Iran poses an imminent threat, aka Iran is strong.

第二个论点是伊朗很弱，所以我们应该趁它虚弱时打击它。

The second argument is Iran is weak, so we should strike them while they're down.

我的意思是，这两个理由最终都得出同一个结论：我们应该打击伊朗。

I mean, both of those reasons end in we should strike Iran.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得这么说很公允。

I think that's fair to say.

我的意思是，内塔尼亚胡再次主张，主要是因为伊朗正在研制并正在建造这些导弹，如果我们再等三四个月，打击起来会更加危险。

I mean, Netanyahu is arguing that, again, primarily because of these missiles that Iran is trying to build and is building, that if we wait three, four months, it'll be even more dangerous to strike.

所以现在就是行动的时机，而伊朗政权本身也因过去一年半的事件而分心且削弱了。

So this is the moment to do it, and the regime itself is distracted and weakened by the events of the last year and a half.

明白了。

Got it.

那么特朗普如何回应这个论点？

And how does Trump respond to this argument?

所以他并没有关闭2026年可能发动袭击的可能性。

So he doesn't close the door on a possible strike in 2026.

因此，内塔尼亚胡离开佛罗里达时，认为未来某个时候采取行动至少是被考虑在内的。

And so Netanyahu leaves Florida thinking that it's at least on the table for some time in the future.

就在那几天后，特朗普授权了在委内瑞拉的军事行动，逮捕了尼古拉斯·马杜罗及其妻子，并将他们带到美国。

And then just a few days after that, Trump authorizes the military operation in Venezuela to capture Nicolas Maduro and his wife in Caracas and take them to The United States.

这一行动的意义在于，特朗普认为那些能快速、干净、风险相对较低的军事行动是可行的，而委内瑞拉行动让他更加大胆。

And the significance of this is that Trump sees military operations that can be done quickly, cleanly, with relatively little risk, and he is emboldened by the Venezuela operation.

这在一定程度上影响了他对全球其他地区使用武力的看法，包括伊朗。

And it sort of colors his view of where military force can be used elsewhere around the world, including Iran.

我想知道，罗南，内塔尼亚胡是否也将马杜罗被押解的这一刻，视为特朗普如今在全球舞台上愿意采取极端和强硬行动的信号？

I wonder, Ronen, if Netanyahu is also looking at this moment, at the extraction of Maduro as a sign that Trump is willing to go very far and be very aggressive now on the global stage?

我想知道他是否将此视为一个机会。

I wonder if he sees it as an opportunity.

我相信，这只是一个判断：如果内塔尼亚胡总理从这一事件中得出任何结论，那就是他觉得特朗普总统正处于一种无所不能的状态。

I believe that and this is just an assessment that if prime minister Netanyahu concludes anything from this event is that he would be finding president Trump in a mood that he's omnipotent.

只要轻轻一挥手，他就能下令进行改变历史的行动。

And just with the flipping of his fingers, he can order a history changing maneuvers.

没错。

Right.

因此，他会更加在意任何人的意见。

So he will be more sensitive to anyone.

我不只是说内塔尼亚胡，我也在谈美国政界人士，他们说：听好了，当所有前任美国总统都失败时，尤其是奥巴马，你却能成功，你做得到。

And I'm not sure just Netanyahu, I'm talking about American politicians as well who say, listen, you can succeed when all the previous American president fail, especially Obama, and you can do it.

你有胆量。

You have the guts.

内塔尼亚胡认为自己是那个能对总统耳语的人：你可以做所有前任美国总统都做不到的事。

And Netanyahu sees himself as the person who can whisper to the president here, you can do something that all the previous presidents of The United States failed.

你就是那个人。

You are the man.

你会有胆量。

You will have the guts.

你会有魄力去发动这一记重击，一次大规模的攻击，彻底推翻这个邪恶政权，做他们该做却不敢做的事。

You will have the kahunas to go for this one strike, one big attack that would take down this horrible regime once and for all and do what they needed to do, and they were afraid.

但你，总统先生，你不会。

But you you, mister president, you will not.

你并不害怕。

You are not afraid.

就在马杜罗被俘后不久，伊朗爆发了一月抗议活动，特朗普对此回应，承诺将通过可能的美国军事打击支持抗议者。

And then soon after the Maduro capture, we get the January protests in Iran, which Trump reacts to by promising to help the protesters with possible American strikes.

我们都听到了。

We all heard that.

那么，这如何融入这个故事中，马克？

So how does that fit into this story, Mark?

现在又出现了一个全新的因素，那就是这些抗议活动表明伊朗政权正在衰弱。

Well, now there's a whole another factor, which is that these protests suggest that the Iran regime is weak.

我认为在特朗普的脑海中，这是一种想法：美国可以介入，推翻或至少削弱伊朗政府，以支持抗议者。

And I think in Trump's mind, it's this idea of The United States can intervene to bring down or at least weaken the Iranian government to help the protesters.

因此，正当理由的焦点突然转向了支持抗议者。

So all of a sudden, the pivot for justification goes to helping protesters.

特朗普公开表示，正如你所说，美国可能会动用军事力量为抗议者提供支持。

And Trump says publicly, as you said, that, you know, The United States might use its military to intervene on the behalf of the protesters.

对。

Right.

但随后发生了一件非常有趣的事情。

But then something very interesting happens.

1月14日，内塔尼亚胡打电话给特朗普，基本上说：别在伊朗采取任何行动，因为我们还没准备好。

On January 14, Netanyahu calls Trump and basically says, don't do anything yet in Iran because we're not ready.

我们以色列人还没准备好发动打击。

We, the Israelis, are not ready for a strike.

正如罗南早些时候所说，原计划是2026年4月至6月。

There's, as Ronen said earlier, the original plan was April to June 2026.

对吧？

Right?

我们现在是1月初。

We're now early January.

当时正在进行的任何准备都还不成熟。

And any preparations that were being made were not mature.

所以论点是你得等一等。

And so the argument is you've gotta wait.

特朗普在一月份没有发动袭击。

Trump doesn't strike in January.

对吧？

Right?

我们知道他们一直等到二月才行动，这表明他确实听从了内塔尼亚胡的警告。

We know that they wait until February to do that, which suggests that he did heed Netanyahu's warning.

你所描述的这一切，都充分表明以色列和美国在这些行动上有着明确的协调。

And all of this, what you've described, really suggests that Israel and The US are very clearly coordinating on all of this.

这不仅仅是特朗普告诉内塔尼亚胡同意或不同意、给予批准或不给予批准。

It's not just Trump telling Netanyahu yes or no, giving his blessing or not.

在这种情况下，内塔尼亚胡对双方将采取的路径有着相当大的影响力。

In this case, Netanyahu has quite a bit of influence on what kind of path both sides are gonna take here.

是的。

Yes.

从一月中旬开始，你开始看到更低层级的规划在进行，军方正朝着以色列和美国联合行动、联合打击的方向推进。

And from, you know, this period in mid January, you start seeing planning happening at a lower level with the militaries moving towards what would be a joint operation, a joint strike between Israel and The United States.

因此，抗议者在特朗普心中为美国军事行动打开了大门。

So the protesters opened the door here in Trump's mind for US military action.

但很快之后，一个针对整个政权的更大规模美以联合行动的种子已经播下。

But pretty soon afterwards, the seed has been planted for a larger US Israeli operation to go after the entire regime.

因此，展望今天，我们看到内塔尼亚胡最终获得的远超他在十二月时所期望的。

And so looking forward to today, we see that Netanyahu ended up getting far more than he ever wanted back in December.

他得到了一场由美国主导的对伊朗的战争。

He got a US led war in Iran.

好的。

Okay.

到这个时候，我明白了为什么内塔尼亚胡想要这样，以及他是如何向特朗普游说的，他甚至可能比自己预期的还要成功。

So by this point, I now understand why Netanyahu wanted this and how he made his case to Trump, how he was perhaps more successful than he even bargained for.

对我来说不太清楚的是，为什么特朗普这次会同意，他为什么会走这么远，他计算过这对美国有什么好处。

What's less clear to me is why exactly Trump got on board this time around, why he went this far, what he calculated was in it for The US.

过去一周，我们花了大量时间试图回答这些问题，弄清楚是什么促使特朗普走向战争。

We've spent a lot of time over the last week trying to answer those questions and to sort of get to the matter of what led Trump to war.

答案是，背后有许多因素促使他做出这一决定，而讨论的核心最终集中在：这对美国有什么好处？

And the answer is that there were a lot of factors behind the scenes that led him to his decision and the deliberations that ultimately centered around the question, what's in this for The United States?

我们马上回来。

We'll be right back.

我是乔纳森·斯旺。

I'm Jonathan Swan.

我是《纽约时报》的白宫记者。

I'm a White House reporter for The New York Times.

我对我们的工作持一种相当务实的看法。

I have a pretty unsentimental view of what we do.

我们记者的职责是挖掘那些有权势的人不希望公开的信息，带你们进入你们本无法进入的场所，了解塑造我们国家的一些重大决策是如何制定的，然后 painstakingly 地回访消息源、核对公开文件，确保信息准确无误。

Our job as reporters is to dig out information that powerful people don't want published, to take you into rooms that you would not otherwise have access to, to understand how some of the big decisions shaping our country are being made, and then painstakingly to go back and check with sources, check with public documents, make sure the information is correct.

这件事你无法外包给人工智能。

This is not something you can outsource to AI.

没有任何机器人能走进局势室，去了解那里真正说了什么。

There's no robot that can go and talk to someone who was in the situation room and find out what was really said.

为了获取那些非公开的、真正原创的信息，我们需要依赖人类消息源，而这必须由记者亲自完成。

In order to get actually original information that's not public that requires human sources, we actually need journalists to do that.

所以，正如你从这番长篇大论中可能已经意识到的，我恳请你考虑订阅《纽约时报》。

So as you may have gathered from this long riff, I'm asking you to consider subscribing to The New York Times.

独立新闻至关重要，没有你的支持，我们根本无法继续运作。

Independent journalism is important, and without you, we simply can't do it.

所以，马克·罗伦，我猜当特朗普在考虑对伊朗发动潜在攻击时，他听到了来自顾问和全球盟友的意见，他们都指出这有多么危险。

So, Mark Ronen, I assume that as Trump was considering a potential attack on Iran, he was hearing from advisers, from allies around the world about just how risky that would be.

你说这些是复杂的审议过程。

You said these were complicated deliberations.

我们对这些审议了解多少？它们又预示着事态将如何发展？

What do we know about them, and what do they tell us about where all this is headed?

我们确实知道，总统特朗普从他的军事顾问那里，特别是参谋长联席会议主席丹·凯恩那里，收到了一系列关于对伊朗采取行动的选项，以及可能产生的后果。

We certainly know that president Trump was presented by his military advisers, namely chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Dan Kane, a set of not only options for what he could do in terms of striking Iran, but also what the potential repercussions are.

据我们了解，凯恩将军对大规模袭击可能带来的影响和后果给出了非常冷静的评估。

And from our understanding, General Kane gives a quite sober assessment of, especially if there is a large scale attack, what the implications, repercussions might be.

美国军人伤亡、经济动荡、整个中东地区可能陷入不稳定。

American service members killed, economic disruptions, potential destabilization of the entire Middle East.

当然，如果你要推翻伊朗政权，以色列显然会遭受大规模伤亡。

Of course, if you were to overthrow the regime in Iran, obviously, large scale casualties in Israel.

这些情况在特朗普做决定时都被呈报给了他。

So these are things that were presented to president Trump as he was making his decision.

你们是说，他们进行了这些战争推演？

They run those war games, you're saying?

他们进行战争推演。

They run the war games.

另一方面，尽管存在这些潜在的负面后果，但他的核心顾问中似乎没有人告诉他这是个糟糕的主意。

On the other side, even though there are these potentially negative consequences, no one among his close advisers seem to be telling him this is a bad idea.

他从顾问那里得到的主要是支持。

He's getting mostly support from his advisers.

我们报道说，副总统JD万斯——一向对美国军事干预持怀疑态度——对总统说：我不知道这是否是个好主意，但如果我们决定行动，就要大干一场。

We report that JD Vance, the vice president, who has been skeptical of American military interventions, tells the president, listen, I don't know if this is a good idea, but if we're gonna do it, go big.

对吧？

Right?

因此，总统的脑海中不断强化了必须采取军事行动的想法。

So you have this idea being reinforced in the president's mind that military action should take place.

请记住，还有一条并行的线索：贾里德·库什纳和史蒂夫·维特科夫正在就伊朗核计划的未来进行谈判，他们反馈说，我们认为这里没有达成协议的空间，因为以色列、美国和伊朗三方之间无法达成让所有人都满意的协议。

Remember, there's another track going on where Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff are negotiating over the future of Iran's nuclear program, and they're basically reporting back saying, you know, we don't think there's a deal here because there's no space for a deal between Israel, The United States, Iran that's going to satisfy everybody.

我们报道说，少数认为这是个糟糕主意的人之一是塔克·卡尔森，他至少三次会见总统，并力陈这将是一个巨大的错误。

We report that one of the few people who suggests that this is a bad idea is Tucker Carlson, who meets with the president at least three times, and he is making the case that this is an enormous mistake.

当然，他长期以来一直批评以色列在美国外交政策中所扮演的角色。

And, of course, he's got a long history of criticizing the role that Israel plays in American foreign policy.

对。

Right.

同时，听起来特朗普并不担心他的支持者群体对另一场海外战争可能产生的反应。

And at the same time, it sounds like Trump is not concerned with the potential reaction within his own base to another foreign war.

我认为，特朗普在公开评论中曾表示，简而言之，MAGA运动就是我。

I think that, you know, Trump has said in his public comments, boiling it down, you know, the MAGA movement is me.

我说什么、做什么，这个运动的追随者都会支持。

And what I say and do, the people of this movement will support.

因此，关于他党内MAGA派系反对这一行动的说法，在这场冲突爆发前似乎并未在特朗普的决策中占据重要地位。

So this idea that the MAGA wing of his party is against it, it seemed to not factor significantly in Trump's thinking in the lead up to this conflict.

有可能，对吧？他不仅不担心潜在的政治代价，反而认为这里存在政治收益。

It is possible, right, that he's not just not worried about potential political downsides, but that he sees political upsides here.

我的意思是，如果你看看可能的最佳结果——我知道我们离那还很远，但为了理解我们当前所见行为的最理想理由，设想一个伊朗攻击邻国和镇压本国人民的能力被严重削弱的世界，一个伊朗对美国的敌意降低、在中东不再那么制造混乱的世界，这可能会是一个改变世界的发展。

I mean, if you look at the possible best case outcome here, and I know we are far off from that, but just as a way of understanding the best version of a rationale for what we're seeing, a world in which Iran's ability to attack its neighbors and repress its people is significantly degraded, a world in which Iran becomes potentially less openly hostile to The US, less of a chaos agent in The Middle East, that could be a world changing development.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yes.

在伊朗问题上，特朗普将自己与前任总统进行比较。

And on the issue of Iran, Trump compares himself to his predecessors.

对吧？

Right?

在我之前的所有总统都让这个政权延续了下来。

All these presidents before me left this regime in place.

没错。

Yep.

在过去的几周里，我们逐渐听到了政府和特朗普本人尝试提出各种说法，以解释这场战争的真实原因。

And in the last couple weeks, we've sort of heard the administration and Trump himself kind of road test different ideas for what is the real reason for this war.

我们听到了伊朗弹道导弹对美国构成迫在眉睫的威胁这一说法，他在国情咨文中提到了这一点。

And we heard an imminent threat from Iran's ballistic missiles that could hit The United States that he sent in the State of the Union.

这不对。

That's not true.

明白吗？

Okay?

至少他们短期内做不到。

At least they can't do it anytime soon.

对吧？

Right?

嗯哼。

Mhmm.

史蒂夫·惠特科夫说伊朗一周内就能造出原子弹。

Steve Whitkoff said Iran can have a bomb in a week.

这不对。

That's not true.

对吧？

Right?

然后，最终在空袭开始后，特朗普在周六早上发布了录音讲话，他基本上提出了这样一个论点：听好了。

And then finally, after the strikes began and Trump made his recorded message on Saturday morning, he basically made this case of, listen.

这是一个已经实施恐怖主义长达四十七年、一直被放任至今的政权，其历史可追溯到1979年占领美国驻伊朗大使馆，以及1983年在贝鲁特杀害数百名海军陆战队员，现在是时候有人来处理它了。

This is a regime that's been carrying out terror for forty seven years that has been left in place that has a history going back to the takeover of the American embassy in 1979, the killing of hundreds of marines in 1983 in Beirut, and it's time someone dealt with it.

而他最后的立场就是，这个政权是个坏角色，必须被铲除。

And that's sort of where he landed at the end here, which was that this regime is a bad actor, and it needed to go.

好的。

Okay.

我想问一下。

I wanna ask.

显然，虽然促成特朗普决定开战的因素有很多，但内塔尼亚胡一直是主要推动力。

We've obviously seen that while there have been many factors that brought Trump to this decision of going to war, Netanyahu has been a driving force.

他一直不断在特朗普耳边施压，推动这一行动，并且兑现了自己作为完全合作伙伴的承诺。

He has constantly been in Trump's ear pushing for this, and he has followed through on his promise to be a full partner in it.

过去几天我们已经看到了这一点。

And we've seen that over the last several days.

现在战争已经持续了五天，我们对内塔尼亚胡和特朗普目前的默契程度了解多少？

Now that we are five days into this war, what do we know about how aligned Netanyahu and Trump are right now?

在操作层面、执行层面，每天都有数十架美国加油机从本-古里安机场起飞，协助以色列空军开展作战行动。

So on the operational level, on the working level, we have dozens of American fueling tankers taking off from Ben Gurion Airport every minute to help the Israeli Air Force in its war effort.

所以在执行层面，两国的合作可谓无比紧密和深入。

So on the working level, it couldn't be more close and more extensive.

但我认为，尽管他们目前保持一致并密切协调，但正是在这个节点上，他们的路径、目标、意图和利益可能会出现分歧，因为特朗普希望战争尽快结束，而以色列方面则表示他们还需要两周时间。

But I think that while they are aligned and closely synchronizing, this is the point where their path and goals and targets and interests might diverge because Trump is looking for a very short war and Israel, they say that they need two more weeks.

那么，这场战争该如何收场呢？

And also, how do you end it?

你意思是说，美国和以色列双方在战争持续时间上可能会出现分歧，特朗普可能希望尽早退出，而以色列则倾向于更长时间的军事介入。

What you're saying is that the two sides, US and Israel, they may begin to diverge in terms of how long each side wants to stay in this conflict, with potentially Trump favoring getting out of it early and Israel pushing for a longer engagement.

我觉得，对以色列而言，对我们其他人而言，问题在于特朗普并没有清晰地阐述这场冲突的最终解决方案。

And I feel as though part of the issue for Israel, but also for the rest of us, is that Trump hasn't really laid out a coherent vision for how this ends.

他最近就这个问题多次联系并接受了多家媒体的采访，包括我们《纽约时报》的同事佐兰·卡诺·杨，但他对这场冲突的最佳解决方式以及如何实现这一目标始终语焉不详。

He has called and talked to several different reporters, media outlets on this question recently, including our Times colleague, Zolan Kano Young's, and he's been unclear about what he sees as the best resolution for this conflict and how to get there.

他说他希望伊朗人民起义并接管政府，但他也表示愿意与伊朗政权残余势力进行谈判。

He has said he wants the Iranians to rise up and take over their government, but he's also suggested that he's open to negotiating with whatever's left of the Iranian regime.

这些关于美国真实意图的信息相互矛盾且令人困惑。

Those are conflicting and confusing messages about what The US actually wants here.

以色列方面也传递出矛盾且混乱的信息，因为以色列也声称，他们这样做是为了为伊朗人民重返街头抗议和示威创造条件。

And also the conflicting and confusing messages from Israel because Israel is also saying we are doing this in order to prepare the ground for the Iranian people to go back to the streets and revolt and demonstrate.

但这意味着什么？

But what does that mean?

比如，如果他们真的上街了，以色列会不会派攻击直升机到每条街道，对抗即将对他们大开杀戒的巴斯基民兵？还是美国会怎么做？这到底意味着什么？

Like, if they go, then Israel will send an attacking chopper to each street to fight against the Basiji who are going to butcher them, or The US What would do does it mean?

而且以色列正在打击导弹项目和核项目，但这些行动与支持抗议者之间有什么关联？

And also Israel is fighting the missile project and the nuclear project, but how is this connected to support of the protesters?

是的。

Right.

我真的不明白特朗普总统的意图是什么，也不太清楚以色列的目标，除了对政权的军事力量造成尽可能大的破坏之外。

I really don't understand where president Trump is going, and I don't really understand what's the goals from Israel except for inflicting as much damage to the military sides of the regime.