伊朗石油危机可能有多严重？

好的。

Okay.

对不起。

I'm sorry.

但这太疯狂了。

But that's insane.

从宏观角度看，我们正在把一个国家炸成废墟，此刻还威胁要摧毁他们的发电厂，同时解除对他们的石油制裁。

Just as a, like, a 30,000 foot that we are bombing the country into rubble that, as we speak right now, threatening to destroy their power plants and desanctioning their oil.

这真的表明，这里要么是毫无计划，要么就是出了问题。

Like, it it it really shows something here was unplanned for or or is off.

而且，如果我们现在的情况是，为了让他们能尽快将石油投入市场，我们暂时解除对伊朗石油的制裁长达三十天，那么这些石油最终很可能 anyway 也会被卖出去，只是我们让它更快一些。

And also that if we're at a place now where we are waiving sanctions on Iranian oil for thirty days so that they can put that oil in the market as fast as possible, it probably would have been sold eventually anyway, but let's do it faster.

而且，他们还能以更好的价格出售这些石油。

And again, they're gonna get a better price for it.

我们可能已经没有太多好选项了。

We may be running out of good options.

我们也可以谈谈其他一些降低油价的选项。

And we could talk about what some of the other options are to bring oil prices down.

我只是再次认为，这正是为什么石油一直以来都是一种关键的地缘政治武器，也是一种关键的地缘政治弱点。

And I just think again, this is why oil has always been such a key geopolitical weapon and such a key geopolitical vulnerability.

让我们暂时谈谈能源作为一种武器。

Let's talk about energy as a weapon for a moment.

你和梅根·L.

You and Meghan L.

奥沙利文去年年底在《外交事务》上发表了一篇题为《能源武器的回归》的长文。

O'Sullivan published late last year in foreign affairs a big piece called the return of the energy weapon.

什么是能源武器？

What's the energy weapon?

事实上，利用能源作为武器并不是什么新鲜事。

Well, and there's nothing new about energy being used as a weapon.

第一次世界大战期间，寇松勋爵曾著名地指出，盟军是靠石油的浪潮赢得胜利的，而在一战和二战期间，切断敌方的石油供应能力至关重要。

Lord Curzon in World War one famously said the allies floated to victory upon a wave of oil and the ability to cut off the supply of oil for the military in World War one, World War two.

这些是关键的能源来源。

These were key sources.

我的意思是，日本袭击珍珠港的原因之一就是在此之前失去了石油供应。

I mean, one of the reasons Japan attacked Pearl Harbor was it had lost access to oil supply before that.

斯大林没有把二战的胜利归因于切断了希特勒对某些油田的访问吗？

Didn't Stalin attribute the victory in World War two to cutting off Hitler's access to certain oil fields?

是的。

Yeah.

因此，针对能源供应的行动一直至关重要。

So trying to go after energy supply has always been central to that.

这正是温斯顿·丘吉尔 famously 将英国海军从煤炭转向石油的原因，因为石油是一种效率高得多的燃料。

It was why Winston Churchill famously moved the British Navy from coal to oil, which was a much more efficient fuel.

海军可以更快，但也因此暴露于新的脆弱性，因为英国本土靠近纽卡斯尔有大量煤炭，但现在却需要依赖波斯等地的石油。

The Navy could be faster and but it also exposed it to a new vulnerability because you had a lot of coal in The UK up near Newcastle, but now you needed to depend on places like Persia for your oil.

因此，能源的地缘政治问题以一种前所未有的方式成为了关键议题。

So geopolitics of energy became an issue that in a way it hadn't been before.

我们撰写这篇文章，是因为我认为将能源武器化的理念——这在上世纪七十年代，尤其是阿拉伯石油禁运、加油站排长队之后，给美国带来了巨大的国家创伤——对美国的能源政策产生了深远影响。

We wrote that piece because I think that the idea of energy being weaponized, which of course was a national trauma in the nineteen seventies, particularly after the Arab oil embargo, lines at the gas station, really it did have a long lasting effect on energy policy in The United States.

而我们对能源的认知，一直被这种创伤所塑造：即中东的能源可能被用作武器。

And the way we think about energy has been framed by that trauma that energy in particularly in The Middle East could be weaponized.

但自那以来的半个世纪里，世界已经发生了巨大变化。

But the world has changed a lot in the half century since then.

如今，美国已成为全球远超其他任何国家的最大石油生产国。

The United States is now the largest producer of oil in the world by far.

而且，在过去几十年里，我们总体上经历了一个相对合作、和谐的地缘政治与经济合作时期，全球化将其他国家纳入世贸组织等体系之中。

And generally, we've had this multi decade period of relatively cooperative and copacetic geopolitics, economic cooperation, globalization, bringing other countries into the fold through the World Trade Organization and in other ways.

因此，我们普遍对能源安全的风险变得有些自满，认为它们大多是过去的事情了。

And so I think we generally became a bit complacent with risks to energy security, viewed them as largely a thing of the past.

美国能源供应的空前增长在一定程度上安抚了市场，提供了充足的供应，使价格保持在低位。

We had this unprecedented increase in US supply that comforted markets a little bit and provided ample supply, kept prices low.

在过去二十年里，美国和欧洲的电力需求一直保持平稳。

Power demand was flat in The United States and Europe for the last twenty years.

当然，现在由于数据中心和其他因素，需求又迅速上升了。

Of course, now it's surging again with data centers and other things.

但最重大的变化是我们所熟知的全球秩序。

But the most significant shift is the global order we knew.

它似乎正在我们脚下崩塌，我们正进入一个充满冲突、竞争和大国对抗的新世界。

It seems to be collapsing beneath our feet, and we're in a new world of conflict and competition and rivalry between great powers.

在一个如此混乱的世界里，在冲突和竞争风险加剧的情况下，能源没有理由不成为关键武器和主要脆弱来源。

And in a world that is in disorder like that, a world where there is increased risk of conflict and competition, there's no reason energy would not be a key weapon and a key source of vulnerability.

我们已经开始看到这种情况上演。

And we're starting to see that play out.

显然，俄罗斯在入侵乌克兰后切断了对欧洲的天然气供应，甚至中国去年限制了稀土出口，这些举动都极大地震撼了外交政策界，引发了强烈震动。

Obviously, what Russia did to cut off the gas supply to Europe after it invaded Ukraine or even China last year restricted rare earth exports, and that really shook up the foreign policy community in ways that sent shock waves through it.

而且这些做法让我们迅速退让。

And in ways that made us back down quite quickly from

没错。

Exactly.

我们看到了如何

We saw how

唐纳德·特朗普与中国打交道的时间有多长。

long that Donald Trump had begun with China.

你刚才的回答用了太多被动语态。

You you you used a lot of passive voice in that answer.

你谈到了能源安全的风险，全球范围内的能源安全风险。

You talked about risks to energy security, global risks to energy security.

你谈到了全球和国际秩序的崩溃。

You talked about the collapsing of the global and international order.

但这是我们自己选择的。

But we chose this.

对吧？

Right?

这并不是无缘无故发生在我们身上的。

This didn't happen to us out of nowhere.

全球秩序并不是无缘无故崩溃的。

The global order isn't collapsing out of nowhere.

我的意思是，我们并不是唯一的。

I mean, we're not the only ones.

俄罗斯当然也负有其相应的责任。

Russia certainly bears its share of responsibility.

中国也存在过一些违规行为。

China has had its violations.

但唐纳德·特朗普一直在点燃全球秩序，推翻并俘虏其他国家的总统，未经任何人的实质协商就对伊朗发动战争，也许除了以色列之外。

But Donald Trump has been lighting the global international order on fire, deposing and capturing presidents of other countries, launched a war with Iran with no consultation functionally of anyone, except maybe Israel.

而这里的能源安全风险，其实是我们自己。

And the risk to energy security here again was us.

我们选择让能源安全面临风险。

We chose to put energy security at risk.

我们似乎在没有真正规划这会带来什么后果的情况下就这么做了，但这反映了一种我认为相当奇怪的现象：当你回想起2000年代主导这一话题的讨论时，我们当时需要实现美国的能源安全，让我们不再被欧佩克牵制。

We seem to have done so without any real planning for what it would mean, but it reflects something I think which is sort of odd, which is when you think about the conversation that dominated this in the two thousands, we needed to get to a point where America had energy security, where we couldn't be squeezed by OPEC.

我们实际上在这一方向上做了大量工作，成为净能源出口国，并经历了令人惊叹的页岩气革命，同时开始推动脱碳进程。

And we actually did quite a lot in that direction and became a net energy exporter and and had this amazing shale gas revolution and began to work on decarbonization.

但在过去的几年里，特朗普摧毁了太阳能和风能补贴，似乎尽其所能地阻碍我们在脱碳和电气化方面的进展，与此同时，他还采取了一系列外交政策行动，加剧了全球政治经济秩序的不稳定性。

And then in just of the past couple of years, I mean, Trump has destroyed the solar and wind subsidies, is trying as best he can, it seems to me, to set back our work on decarbonization and electrification, and at the same time, has executed a series of moves in foreign policy that have created a lot more instability in the global economic and political order.

我们选择了自己并未真正规划过的动荡，这种方式非常奇怪。

It has been we have chosen volatility that we have not planned for in a way that is very strange.

是的。

Yeah.

你刚才说的很难让人不同意。

It's hard to disagree with what you just said.

但正如你所说，这种趋势其实早已显现，而且涉及多个行为体。

But as you said, it's been, like, coming for some time, and there's a number of actors.

你的部分听众或许还记得，前国家安全顾问杰克·苏利文在布鲁金斯学会发表的一次演讲，他试图解释为何这一秩序正在发生变化，其中一部分原因在于，中国并未遵守许多人几十年前预期的规则。

You know, some of your listeners will recall this speech former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan gave at Brookings where he tried to explain why this order was changing, and part of it was China wasn't playing by the rules that a lot of people thought they might two or three decades ago.

但显然，当你对盟友发动贸易战，威胁以武力夺取其他领土（比如格陵兰），这同样让欧洲人深感震惊，并引发了他们对依赖美国的深切忧虑。

But clearly, when you threaten trade wars against your allies, threaten to take other pieces of territory by force like Greenland, That really did traumatize Europeans also and lead to a level of concern about dependence on The United States.

在一些大型国际会议之后，比如慕尼黑安全会议或达沃斯，我收到最多的问题是：作为欧洲人，我们把对俄罗斯能源的依赖转为对美国能源的依赖，是不是一个错误？

I wrote after some of these big international meetings like the Munich Security Conference or Davos, one of the questions I was getting the most was, are we misguided being Europeans to swap dependence on Russian energy for American energy?

你们是可靠的供应商吗？还是说这种依赖会被用作胁迫工具，以换取其他方面的让步？

Are you a reliable supplier or is that gonna be weaponized against us in a coercive ways as leverage to get a concession for something else?

你当时是怎么回答他们的？

What did you tell them?

我认为可能并非如此，但我能理解他们为什么会有这样的担忧。

I think it's probably not the case, but I understand why they might be concerned about it.

我的意思是，美国的能源出口可能相当可靠，但我们正目睹一个政府不断寻找杠杆，寻找各种方式，有时甚至使用胁迫手段来获取他国的让步。

I mean, I think US energy exports are probably pretty reliable, but we are seeing an administration that is looking for looking for leverage, looking for ways that it can sometimes use coercive tools to extract concessions from others.

这似乎正是所谓‘解放日关税’策略的一部分。

And it seems like that's part of what the strategy with the liberation date tariffs was.

但我认为，这告诉我们现在到处都存在能源风险。

But I think what that tells us now is there's energy risk all around.

对吧？

Right?

如果你回溯五年前，跟人们谈论能源转型的必要性，他们会说，好的。

If you go back five years ago and talk to people about the need to have an energy transition, they would have said, okay.

这很好，但我们不希望依赖中国。

That's that's good, but we don't wanna be dependent on China.

如果你需要太阳能电池板、电池、关键矿物和电动汽车，现在我们所有的供应链都依赖中国。

If you want solar panels and batteries and critical minerals and electric vehicles, now we're dependent on China for all of our supply chains.

我认为，这场冲突以及此前发生的一切——能源武器化——不仅仅是制裁，还包括物理性的军事封锁，比如我们为推翻马杜罗而阻止委内瑞拉出售石油，还有俄罗斯切断供应。

And I think one consequence of this conflict and everything that came before it, the weaponization of energy, I mean, literally not just sanctions, but a physical military blockade to prevent Venezuela from selling its oil as part of what we did to oust Maduro, Russia cutting off supply.

显然，如果你在欧洲，你不会再像以前那样把俄罗斯视为可靠的供应商。

People obviously, if you're in Europe, you're not looking at Russia the same way again as a reliable supplier.

现在你可能也不会再像以前那样看待海湾国家，或许你对美国能源政策反复无常的稳定性也心存疑虑。

Now you might not be looking at The Gulf the same way, and maybe you have your concerns about the predictability of US energy policy with policy swings back and forth.

顺便说一句，是拜登政府限制了天然气出口的新许可。

By the way, was, you know, the Biden administration that put restriction on new permits for export of natural gas.

因此，已经出现了许多可能让人感到担忧的信号。

So there's been lots of signals that might make people a little bit concerned.

所以现在你放眼全球，会发现周围处处都有能源风险。

So now you're looking at the whole world and you're saying there's energy risk all around.

那我该怎么做？

What do I want to do?

我想保护自己。

I want to insulate myself.

对吧？

Right?

上世纪七十年代之后，我们为提升能源安全所做的一件主要事情，其实是加强合作与互联互通。

After the nineteen seventies, one of the main things we did to increase energy security was actually more cooperation and more interconnectedness.

我们成立了国际能源署以促进外交协调。

We created the International Energy Agency for Diplomacy.

有大约三十个国家同意共同持有战略储备，以便在紧急情况下协同释放。

We had 30 or so countries that agreed to hold strategic stocks together in case there was an emergency and released them together.

我们还建立了之前提到的这个运转良好的市场。

And we created this well functioning market we talked about before.

所以我们当时都是相互关联的。

So we were all interconnected.

如果世界另一端出现供应冲击，市场力量可以重新分配供应。

If there's a supply shock halfway around the world, market forces can reallocate supply.

我认为，在这个地缘政治秩序崩塌、竞争加剧和风险上升的世界里，各国会越来越认为必须自力更生。

I think in this world of collapsing geopolitical order and and competition and risk, countries will increasingly say, need to take care of ourselves.

我们需要更多地以自给自足的思路思考，更加注重国内能源生产，减少进口，并降低与世界其他地区的互联程度。

We need to think a little more in an autarkic sense, focus much more on the domestic production of energy, reduce imports, and reduce interconnection to other parts of the world.

我认为这在地缘政治和能源价格方面都会产生重大影响。

And I think that has significant implications geopolitically and for energy prices.

如果你想在本国境内生产所有太阳能电池板，或进行所有关键矿物的开采、提炼和加工，成本会非常高。

It is very expensive if you wanna make all your solar panels or do all your mining and refining and processing of critical minerals within your own country.

告诉我中国在这个时刻的角色和定位。

Tell me about the role and positioning of China in this moment.

我认为在当下，中国支付更高的能源价格显然很痛苦。

I think in the immediate moment, obviously, it's painful for China to pay much higher energy prices.

中国大约一半的石油通过霍尔木兹海峡运输，约三分之一的液化天然气也依赖此通道，而且和全世界一样，他们现在为此支付了更高的价格。

China gets about half of its oil through the Strait Of Hormuz, about a third of its liquefied natural gas, and they're paying more for it just like everyone else.

我认为中国在应对这一情况时，准备得至少不比其他国家差，甚至更好。

I do think they're as well or better prepared than many to deal with that.

中国已经建立了约15亿桶的庞大石油战略储备，而美国却因为两党都误以为页岩革命能让我们完全免受这些影响，一直在出售我们的储备。

They've built up a huge strategic reserve of oil of about a billion and a half barrels while The United States has been selling ours off because of a misperception on both sides of the aisle that the shale revolution makes us insulated from all of this stuff.

几十年来，中国一直在推行一项将经济更多电气化的战略。

And China for decades has been pursuing a strategy to electrify more of its economy.

因此，中国销售的汽车中有一半是电动汽车。

That's why half the car sold in China are electric.

中国整体经济中电气化的比例远高于世界其他大多数地区。

A much higher share of their overall economy is electrified than in most of the rest of the world.

这更多是出于能源安全的考虑，而非单纯的清洁能源转型或气候变化问题。

That's more about energy security than it is a clean energy transition or climate change.

然后，他们希望用国内的能源来生产这些电力。

And then they wanna produce that electricity from domestic sources.

对他们来说，主要是煤炭和可再生能源，还有一些核能。

For them, that's coal and renewables mostly, some nuclear.

所以我认为，从长远来看，问题是其他国家，比如在欧洲依赖进口的国家，会不会说：我们不能再经历一次这样的事了。

So I think in the long run, the question is whether other countries, say if you're import dependent in Europe, and you say, look, we can't go through this again.

我们在2022年已经经历过一次俄罗斯的能源危机。

We went through it in 2022 with Russia.

现在我们又面临一次能源冲击。

Now we're facing an energy shock again.

我们真的需要在国内生产能源，并且需要进一步电气化。

We really need to produce our energy at home, and we need to electrify more.

这意味着什么？

What does that mean?

这意味着你得从中国购买大量东西。

It means you gotta buy a lot of stuff from China.

所有的电池、电动汽车、那些关键矿物和太阳能电池板。

All of the batteries and electric vehicles and all of those critical minerals and solar panels.

我认为从长远来看，中国可能会成为这场博弈中的一点赢家，因为他们正是这些产品的供应方。

And I think that China in the long run could end up a bit of a winner here in the sense that they're the ones supplying all of that.

长期以来，他们一直试图将自己定位为一个可靠的商业伙伴，而美国则是地缘政治不稳定之源。

And they have long been trying to position themselves as a reliable commercial partner while The United States is the source of geopolitical instability.

这场冲突并没有让他们的论点变得更难成立。

And this conflict doesn't make it harder for them to make their case.

我想暂时谈谈这两个国家在此事上的策略。

I wanna talk about the two countries' strategies here for a moment.

如果你过去几年一直关注中国和美国，尤其是特朗普第二任期上台以来，你会发现美国似乎在押注于成为介于石油国家和石油帝国之间的角色。

If you had just been watching China and The US for the past couple of years, particularly since Trump came back in for a second term, I think what you'd see is The US seems to be making a bet on being something in between a petrostate and a petro empire.

作为石油国家，特朗普一直在削减风能和太阳能补贴，使审批流程更加困难，并尽其所能延缓清洁能源转型，同时全力推动化石燃料的发展。

A petrostate in that Trump has been gutting the wind and solar subsidies and making permitting harder and as best I can, trying to retard the clean energy transition, but going all out on fossil fuels.

但除此之外，他还在试图扩大美国对其他国家化石燃料储备的影响力，甚至在一定程度上加以控制。

But in addition to that, he has been trying to expand US influence and to some degree control over the fossil fuel reserves of of other places.

委内瑞拉是最明显的例子，我们实际上接管了那个国家及其政府，并明确表示我们要掌控他们的石油。

So Venezuela is the most obvious example here where we functionally took over that country and government and said completely explicitly that we are taking over their oil.

我认为，特朗普对伊朗前景的设想是，要么他能与伊朗政权中某个较低层级的官员达成协议，让对方对美国更友好，以免伊朗成为下一个被砍头的国家，或成为下一个被导弹击中的目标。

And I think Trump's view of how Iran was gonna go was that either he was gonna cut a deal with some deputy level in the regime that would be friendlier to The US in order to not have their head be the next one on a pike or not have their home be the next one hit by a missile.

要么就会爆发一场自下而上的伊朗革命，伊朗人民会因此对他心存感激，新政权会更倾向于美国利益，并以更好的条件与我们打交道。

Or there's gonna be a bottom up Iranian revolution, and they'd be so grateful to him that the resulting regime would be friendlier to US interests and would sort of deal with us on on better terms.

无论哪种情况，美国都将凭借其巨大的能源出口潜力，加上特朗普与沙特阿拉伯等海湾国家极为紧密的关系，再叠加委内瑞拉和伊朗的石油、天然气等资源，从而获得巨大的影响力。

In in either case, you would now have America with its tremendous energy exporting potential, Trump's incredibly close relationships with different Gulf state countries like Saudi Arabia, and then you'd add in Venezuela and Iranian oil, gas, etcetera, and that would give us a lot of power.

正如你所说，中国一直在以惊人的速度推进电气化，并在清洁能源供应链上建立起实质性的主导地位。

And China has been, as you say, electrifying at a a really torrid pace, but developing functionally dominance over the clean energy supply chain.

在成本方面，他们能做到的水平非常、非常难以超越。

It is very, very hard to beat what they can do on cost.

拜登政府对中国电动汽车和太阳能组件等产品征收了高额关税。

The Biden administration put huge tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and Chinese solar power components and so on.

但随着美国对许多希望实现清洁能源转型的国家而言，逐渐成为一个不太可靠的合作伙伴，我认为这些国家正在重新评估，有些甚至已经改变了策略。

But practically as America becomes a a less viable partner for many countries that want to have a clean energy transition, I think they are rethinking and in some cases have actually changed course.

因此，中国似乎正大力押注，成为全球‘电气化国家’的供应商。

And so China seems to be betting a lot on becoming the supplier of the global electrostate.

首先，我想看看你在对这两种主要能源战略的描述中，有多少地方不同意。

So first, I wanna see how much in the in that rendering of the two major energy strategies you disagree with.

其次，作为一名能源专家，你认为世界未来的发展方向是什么？你会如何看待这两种战略？

And then second, given, you know, where, as an energy expert, the world looks to be going to you, how you would think about those two strategies.

我觉得完全正确。

I think it's exactly right.

正如我所说，这场冲突可能会给中国带来助力，因为此前，对于那些考虑加速向电气化经济和清洁能源转型的国家来说，这一直是个重大顾虑。

And as I said, this conflict might give a boost to China in the sense that it was a big concern before for countries that were thinking about moving much faster toward electrified economy, toward clean energy.

当时的制约因素是：我是否愿意严重依赖中国？

The constraint was, do do I wanna be heavily dependent on China?

在过去几年里，我一直认为，尽管撤销《通胀削减法案》的许多重要内容是个问题，但对更快实现清洁能源转型的最大风险，是美国和欧洲的政策制定者如何看待对中国的供应链依赖风险。

I mean, I've been thinking for the last couple of years, as problematic as I think it was to roll back significant parts of the inflation reduction act, the biggest risk to a faster clean energy transition was how policymakers, particularly in The US and Europe, come to perceive the risk supply chain risk of dependence on China.

因为购买太阳能板和购买电力是不同的。

Because it's different to buy a solar panel.

我们并不是从中国购买电力。

We're not buying electricity from China.

我们购买的是实现这一目标所必需的产品和技术，比如电池或太阳能板。

We're buying products and technologies that are necessary to do that, like a battery or a solar panel.

如果这被视为不可接受的风险，那就会在清洁能源转型的齿轮中投入大量沙子，而不是少量沙子，因为 elsewhere 建立这些供应链需要很长时间和大量资金。

If it is perceived as an unacceptable risk, that's a lot of a large amount of sand, not a small amount of sand in the gears of the clean energy transition because it takes a really long time and a lot of money to build those supply chains elsewhere.

我认为，当人们现在环顾世界时，可能会以不同的视角看待相对风险，比如担心中国在某些清洁能源供应链中占据主导地位。

I think people are gonna look potentially a bit differently at relative risk when you look around the world right now and you say, well, there's a concern about dependence on China's dominant position in some of these clean energy supply chains.

但风险无处不在。

But there is risk all around.

我认为，美国——至少是特朗普政府——的看法是进一步强化对石油国家的依赖。

And the view of The United States, certainly, well, at least the Trump administration, as you said, has been to double down on petrostate dominance.

如果你是全球最大的石油和天然气生产国，为什么还要从中国购买这么多廉价的清洁能源？

If you're the largest oil and gas producer in the world, why are we buying all this cheap clean energy from China?

能源安全来自于自给自足，生产比我们所需更多的石油和天然气。

Energy security comes from being self sufficient, producing more oil and gas than we need.

我认为，当前的冲突提醒我们，在相互关联的全球市场中，这种自给自足是有极限的。

And I think today's conflict is a reminder that in an interconnected global market, there's a limit to that.

那么，你现在想成为谁呢？

So like, who would you wanna be right now?

我认为，作为中国电动汽车制造商比亚迪在巴西的经销商，现在是个不错的位置，因为人们会对未来可能发生的事感到担忧，并以前所未有的方式看待石油安全。

I think being a BYD dealer, the Chinese EV maker in Brazil is like a pretty good place to be because people are gonna be a bit concerned about what might come and view oil security in a way we haven't seen before.

事实上，正如我之前所说，这类似于上世纪七十年代的国家创伤，当时我们把增加国内产量和寻找石油替代品、减少石油使用作为政策重点。

That is in fact, as I said before, the national trauma of the nineteen seventies where we'd really moved as a policy issue to increase domestic production, but also find alternatives to oil and use less of it.

在上世纪七十年代，我们20%的电力来自石油。

We were getting 20% of our electricity from oil in the nineteen seventies.

在短短几年内，我们就把这一比例降到了接近零。

And within a small number of years, you know, we brought that close to zero.

因此，我们积极寻找减少使用石油的机会。

So we looked for really opportunities to use less of that.

我认为，取决于这场危机持续多久以及经济冲击有多大，正如我们之前讨论的，它有可能产生类似长期影响。

And I think depending on how long this goes on and how large the economic shock is, as we talked about earlier, it has the potential to be something that causes that sort of long lasting effect.

我对您认为这可能对长期意味着什么很感兴趣。

I'm interested in what you think that could mean for the long term.

所以你回到上世纪七十年代的石油危机，那时人们大力寻求节能，因为当时还没有直接可行的替代能源来支撑全球经济的运转。

So you go back to the oil shock of the nineteen seventies, and you have a major effort to find efficiency because there's not a straightforward and viable alternative for what energy you would use to run the global economy.

于是，吉米·卡特告诉全国民众调低恒温器，穿上毛衣。

And so you have, you know, Jimmy Carter telling the country to turn down the thermostat and and put on a sweater.

而如今，我们已经经历了一个巨大的转型期，转向了太阳能、风能、地热能、电池以及其他多种能源形式。

Right now, you you have been in this period where we've seen a tremendous transition to solar, to wind, to geothermal, to to batteries, to other kinds of things.

现在是2026年了。

And, you know, it's 2026.

在过去五年里，你见证了两次重大的全球能源流动地缘政治冲击。

In the last five years, you've seen two tremendous geopolitical shocks to global energy flows.

作为一位研究清洁能源转型的人，我们之前主要从气候变化的角度讨论这个问题，你认为从长远来看，这是否会加速全球清洁能源转型？因为这减少了对某些传统能源供应方的依赖，还是说它只是创造了新的依赖，比如依赖中国，或依赖从你那里输入电力的其他任何国家，从而无法真正解决问题？

So as somebody who studies clean energy transition, which mostly we've talked about in terms of climate change, do you think this is in the long run an accelerant of global clean energy transition simply because it creates less dependencies on some of these traditional players, or does it just create new dependencies like on China or on whomever you get your electricity piped in from such that that does not offer itself as an answer?

我认为，再次强调，我们还不知道这场冲突会持续多久、严重到什么程度，但正如我们之前讨论的，石油价格可能尚未触及峰值。

I think, again, and we don't know yet how long this conflict's gonna go on, how severe it will be, but as we were talking about earlier, the potential that we haven't seen anything yet with oil prices.

如果这场冲突再持续几周，或者造成严重破坏，导致该地区基础设施需要数年才能修复，那么这种冲击的规模可能会类似于上世纪七十年代的危机，远超我过去二十五年从事能源政策、地缘政治和国家安全领域所见过的任何情况。

And if this goes on for weeks longer or if there's real damage that causes the infrastructure in the region to take years to repair, this has the potential to be a kind of shock more like we saw in the nineteen seventies than anything I've seen in the twenty five or so years that I've been working in energy policy, geopolitics, national security issues.

我认为这将是一个重要的加速因素，而且坦白说，是一个更强大的推动力。

And I think that would be a significant accelerant, and frankly, a more powerful one.

我的意思是，尽管我希望气候变化能成为政策制定者比现在更重视的问题，但如果某件事关乎国家安全，并且成为情况室的首要议题，它将比当前气候变化的紧迫性更能推动政策制定者采取行动。

I mean, although I would like climate change to be even a stronger concern for policymakers than it is, if something is a national security issue and it's top of the agenda in the situation room, it's gonna move policymakers in a way that the urgency of climate just doesn't today.

因此，现在我们有可能出现一个更强大的动力，推动向电气化经济转型，而欧洲等地的大部分电力将来自国内资源。

So you have the potential now for an even more powerful motivator to move toward electrified economy, and you get a lot of that electricity from domestic sources for places like Europe.

这尤其会涉及可再生能源和核能，它们能帮助我们走向低碳方向。

That'll be renewables and nuclear in particular, which can move you in a lower carbon direction.

实际情况比这更复杂，我想提一下煤炭。

It is more complicated than that, and I wanna say coal.

对世界许多地区而言，如果要减少对进口的依赖，一种国内的、价格低廉且可靠的能源来源也可能是煤炭。

For a lot of the world, a domestic source of pretty cheap reliable energy, if you're gonna try to say we want to be less dependent on imports, can also be coal.

如果你在印度尼西亚或东南亚其他地区，就会看到大量这种情况。

And if you're in Indonesia or parts of Southeast Asia or other places, you know, you're seeing a lot of that.

因此，它并不总是朝着单一方向发展。

So it doesn't always cut, you know, necessarily in one direction.

这里的影响力不仅仅是我们希望减少化石燃料，因此提到了煤炭。

And the the impact here is not just we want less fossil fuels, hence the comment about coal.

我们希望减少相互关联性。

It's we want less interconnectedness.

我们不想因这些受地缘政治风险影响的波动性全球市场而变得脆弱，并希望减少进口。

We don't want to be volatile exposed to these volatile global markets that are exposed to geopolitical risk, and we want to reduce imports.

我认为，这正是全球大部分地区能源安全对话将由此衍生出的内容。

That I think is what the energy security conversation in much of the world will be coming out of this.

不同地区对此的应对方式会有所不同。

And the way you respond to that is gonna look different in different places.

像欧洲这样的国家，我认为这将加速向清洁能源和电气化经济的转型。

A country like Europe, I do think it accelerates a move toward a clean energy and electrified economy.

在其他地方，情况可能会有所不同。

It might look different in other places.

那伊朗本身呢？

And how about Iran itself?

就目前而言，当我们交谈时，我认为特朗普和内塔尼亚胡不太可能实现他们最初推翻政权的目标。

Right now, as we're speaking, it does not look likely to me that Trump and Netanyahu are going to succeed in their initial goal of regime change.

如果你是幸存下来的伊朗政权，无论以何种条件存活，它都不会是一个解除武装的政权。

And if you are the Iranian regime that survives this under whatever conditions that might be true, it's not gonna be a disarmed regime.

我们不可能部署地面部队来实现这一目标。

We're not gonna have the boots on the ground that would be necessary to make that possible.

你想一想哈马斯是如何在被以色列包围的情况下将武器走私进加沙的，而对伊朗的任何控制都不可能达到那种程度。

You you think about the weaponry that Hamas was able to smuggle into Gaza when it was encircled by Israel, and there's gonna be no level of control over Iran that is anything like that.

如果你是那个伊朗政权，我认为你学到的是，除了最终获得核武器之外，你最好的防御手段是关闭霍尔木兹海峡。

If you're that Iranian regime, it seems to me what you have learned is that your best defense aside from eventually getting a nuclear weapon is your ability to close down the Strait Of Hormuz.

你需要投入大量精力和国家防御战略，去研究如何通过攻击其他海湾国家的能源系统以及关闭海峡来威胁区域能源供应。

That you want to be putting a huge amount of your effort and national defense strategy in figuring out how to threaten the regional energy supply through, you know, attacking the energy systems of of other Gulf states and through closing down the the strait.

因此，将伊朗逼入这种境地，可能会迫使它找到更有效地运用能源武器的方法，从而在未来对敌人形成更强的威慑。

And so in sort of forcing Iran into this position, you might have really forced it into a position where it is going to figure out how to make sure they can wield the energy weapon even more effectively in the future, thus creating better deterrence against its enemies.

我想知道，从能源武器的角度来看，你是如何看待这一点的。

I'm curious how you think about that from an energy weapon perspective.

我觉得这是对的。

I think that's right.

我认为这对伊朗来说是成立的。

I think it's true for Iran.

对其他国家也是如此。

True for others as well.

伊朗通过打压全球石油市场，在短短三十天内获得的美国制裁缓解，超过了它多年来就如何调整其核计划立场所谈判取得的成果。

Iran has, at least for a thirty day period, it's temporary, secured greater sanctions relief from The United States by cratering the global oil market than it did through years of negotiation about how it might adjust its posture toward its nuclear program.

我们已经认识到这种武器的不对称性有多强。

And we've learned how asymmetric that weapon can be.

甚至不需要真正物理性地关闭海峡，只需制造出你有能力关闭霍尔木兹海峡的风险感知即可。

It just doesn't take a lot to not even physically close it, but create the risk perception that you could close the Strait Of Hormuz.

因此，能源武器的特点就在于它的高度不对称性。

And so the thing about the energy weapon is it is quite asymmetric.

你不需要庞大的军队或战舰来运用它。

You don't need a massive military and battleships to wield it.

你可以以一种更有针对性、成本更低的方式做到这一点。

You can do it in a much more targeted lower cost way.

我认为伊朗正在从中学到教训，我担心其他国家也可能学到这一点。

And I think that is a lesson that Iran is learning from this, and I I fear other countries might learn as well.

美国是否应该或正在从中学到什么教训？

Are there lessons United States should be or is learning from this?

我认为我们应当吸取一些教训，首先是关于能源独立的迷思。

I think there are lessons we should be learning, and the first is kind of the myth of of energy independence.

毫无疑问，从二十年前进口60%的石油，转变为全球最大的石油生产国和主要净出口国，带来了经济和地缘政治上的好处。

There are no doubt economic and geopolitical benefits that have come from moving from importing 60% of our oil two decades ago to being the largest producer of oil in the world and a huge net exporter.

但这并不意味着我们实现了独立。

But that doesn't mean we are independent.

这并不意味着我们能够与世界其他地方发生的事情隔绝开来。

It doesn't mean we are isolated and insulated from what happens halfway around the world.

保护自己的最好方式，首先是减少石油的使用。

And the best way to protect ourselves would be to use less oil in the first place.

所以我们减少对这些地缘政治冲击的暴露，不仅仅是通过增加产量。

So we were less exposed to these geopolitical shocks, not just to produce more of it.

我应该指出，天然气的情况不同。

I should note it is different for natural gas.

我的意思是，欧洲和亚洲的天然气价格已经飙升至每百万BTU15到20美元。

I mean, the price of natural gas in Europe and in Asia has soared to 15 or $20 per million BTU.

在美国，它只有3美元。

In The US, it's 3.

所以完全脱钩了。

And so disconnected.

我们现在并没有像2022年亚洲和欧洲那样面临天然气危机。

We do not have a natural gas crisis right now in the same way that Asia and Europe do or did in 2022.

是的。

Yeah.

这会让我们的盟友对我们非常满意。

It's gonna make our allies quite thrilled with us.

他们正在转向我们寻求能源。

Well, they're turning to us for our energy.

我的意思是，欧洲在2022年之后就是这样做的。

I mean, that's what Europe did after 2022.

他们发展了更多的可再生能源。

They did more renewables.

他们提高了能效，但尽管存在你曾无比 eloquently 撰文讨论过的能源基础设施建设困难和许可改革争议，德国仍能在数月内迅速建成四个进口终端，以从美国获取更多天然气。

They did more efficiency, but they moved incredibly quickly for all the difficulty building energy infrastructure and discussion of permitting reform that you've written about as eloquently as anyone, somehow Germany was able in months to build four import terminals to get more natural gas from The United States.

因为当你真正面临能源安全危机时，政策制定者会不遗余力地寻找解决方案。

Because when you really have an energy security crisis, policymakers jump through hoops to figure out how to do something about it.

建设是一种政策选择。

Building is a policy choice.

所以在我看来，唐纳德·特朗普在这场战争中现在有两条路径。

So it seems to me that there are now two pathways for Donald Trump in this war.

一条是在非常近的未来，未来几天、一周或两周内，直接表示目标是将该政权的大部分进攻能力化为废墟，摧毁其海军。

One is in the quite near term, in the next days or week or two, to simply say, goal here was to reduce much of the regime's offensive capability to rubble, to destroy their navy.

我们已经做到了。

We've done it.

我们完成了。

We're done.

但这将使伊朗政权得以保留。

But that will leave in place the Iranian regime.

他们也会宣称自己取得了胜利。

They will declare victory as well.

他们会重建自己的军事力量和能力，而现在他们已经清楚地了解了美国及其盟友的真正弱点。

They will build back up their military, their capabilities now having done so with the knowledge of what the vulnerabilities of America and its allies actually are.

因此，这将是一种胜利的宣告，我认为市场会非常高兴，美国民众也会感到宽慰，但同时也被视为一种失败。

And so it would be a a sort of declaration of victory that I think markets would be very happy with and actually the American people would be relieved by, but also be seen as a kind of failure.

请记住，我们不久前才对他们发动过轰炸行动，声称他们的核能力已被彻底摧毁，但一年后又发起了这场行动，因为我们现在说他们距离拥有核武器仅剩几周或几天的时间。

And remember, we had a bombing campaign against them not that long ago, said their nuclear capabilities were obliterated, and then a year later started this campaign because now we say they were only, you know, weeks or days away from a nuclear weapon.

所以，显然，我们通过轰炸使其长期无力的能力，并不像人们所期望的那样有效。

So, apparently, our ability to bomb them into sustained powerlessness is not what one might have hoped.

另一个前进的路径是，这场战争会持续更长时间，甚至可能出动地面部队占领霍尔木兹海峡，以实现对该海峡的实际作战控制，并加强对伊朗境内局势的掌控。

The other pathway forward is this war goes on for quite a bit longer and possibly including ground troops to take the Strait to have actual operational control of the strait and more control over what happens in in Iran.

如果这种情况发生，我们将面临能源供应的长期危机。

And if that happens, then we're gonna have an extended crisis in energy supplies.

如果我们陷入这样的世界，特朗普有哪些选择来维持美国能源价格的某种稳定，以避免他在中期选举中遭到毁灭性打击？

If we end up in that world, what are Trump's options for trying to maintain some semblance of stability in American energy prices such that he and his party don't get annihilated in the midterms?

如果这场战争还持续一个月、两个月、三个月，甚至更久，他可能会尝试什么措施？

What what might he try in a world where this war has a month, two months, three months, maybe even more than that left in it?

没有任何政策工具足以应对全球石油供应每天减少一千万至一千五百万桶的损失。

There is not a policy tool in the policy toolkit large enough to deal with the loss of something like 10 to 15,000,000 barrels a day of global oil supply.

因此，如果霍尔木兹海峡持续关闭，油价飙升是无法避免的。

So there is no way to prevent oil prices from going through the roof if the Strait Of Hormuz remains closed.

我们已经看到政策制定者动用了他们手中最强有力的手段。

We've already seen policymakers pull some of the strongest levers they have.

国际能源署释放了有史以来最大规模的战略储备，共计四亿桶。

The largest ever release of strategic stockpiles through the International Energy Agency, 400,000,000 barrels.

在宣布那天，油价上涨了，而不是下跌。

And the day that was announced, oil prices went up, not down.

因为外界认为这一举措缺乏详细内容，但根本不足以解决问题。

Because it was perceived as there wasn't a lot of detail around it, but it's just not enough.

真正重要的是总数。

And what matters is not the total number.

真正重要的是每天1000万到1500万桶的供应中断，每天能有多少进入市场，而这个数字可能只有两三百万桶。

What matters is a 10 to 15,000,000 barrel a day per day disruption, how much you can get into the market every day, and that's maybe two or three.

然后你还会看到一些其他建议被提出来，比如豁免限制在美国两个港口之间运输燃料的法律，放宽一些环保标准。

And then you're gonna see some other ideas thrown around like waiving the this law that makes it hard to move fuel between two US ports, waiving some environmental standards.

所有这些措施最多只能让油价每加仑下降几美分。

All of these are a few cents at the pump at most.

实际上能做的非常有限。

There is really not much that can be done.

所以我认为你将面临一场真正的能源危机，我认为这将成为政府的重大制约因素，可能迫使人们不得不更快地退让。

So I think you're gonna have a real energy crisis and we're gonna have to I think that's gonna be a major constraint on the administration that might cause people to need to pull back much more quickly.

这就是市场所押注的。

That's what the market's betting on.

我们最初就是从这里开始的，这也是为什么油价没有比今天高多少。

That's where we started in the beginning and why oil prices are not much higher than they are today.

我们应该记住，该地区大部分能源基础设施尚未遭到破坏。

And we should remember that most of the energy infrastructure in the region has not yet been damaged.

因此，它能够相对较快地恢复运行。

So it can start operating again relatively soon.

如果你真的看到针锋相对的升级，比如你攻击伊朗，而他们已表明可以立即反击我们和其他海湾国家，那么恢复常态可能需要数月甚至数年，而不是几周到几个月。

If you really start to see tit for tat escalation where you go after Iran and they've signaled they can come right back at us and other Gulf states, then you're talking about months or years, not weeks to months to try to get things back to normal.

请帮我梳理一下，我不知道是否该称之为最糟糕的情景，但这是其中一个更令人担忧的场景。

Walk me through I don't know if it I wanna say the nightmare scenario, but one of the more concerning scenarios there.

假设特朗普决定不攻击伊朗的发电厂，而伊朗政权则回应以无人机和导弹袭击区域能源基础设施。

So let's imagine a situation where Trump doesn't decide to attack Iranian power plants, say, and the regime responds by unleashing drones and missiles on regional energy infrastructure.

你提到过霍尔木兹海峡，现在的情况是，你关闭了一条水道。

I mean, you've mentioned with The Strait that what's going on with The Strait is that you've closed a waterway.

所以如果你重新开放它，东西就能再次顺利通过了。

So if you reopen it, things can just start moving through it again.

但如果你破坏了大量价值数十亿美元的能源设施，这些设施不可能在一天或一周内重建起来。

But if you damage a bunch of multibillion dollar energy installations, you can't rebuild those in a morning in in a week.

那么这会带来怎样的长期影响呢？

So what does that create as a possible long tail?

我认为人们心里都认为，能源价格的动荡会在战争结束的那一刻就结束了。

I think people in their heads have the idea that the energy price disruption ends the moment roughly the war ends.

什么样的战争会让这种情况不成立？

What would a war look like where that would not be true?

我认为最主要的是，风险感知仍然存在，这使得人们更难顺利通行。

I think the main thing would be either that the risk perception is still there, which makes it harder for people to move through.

美国明天可以说：我们已经完成了该做的事，现在要撤走了。

The US tomorrow could say we've done what we need to do, and we're leaving now.

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.

除非伊朗表示，你知道，伊朗和以色列也有发言权，而不仅仅是美国，否则你不会看到油轮交通恢复。

You're not gonna see tanker traffic restart unless Iran says, you know, Iran and Israel have a vote in this also, not just The United States.

所以，如果内塔尼亚胡说我们还没完，或者伊朗说他们不这么认为，那么油轮交通就不会恢复。

And so if Netanyahu says we're not done yet or Iran says we don't feel the same way, then you're not gonna see tanker traffic go through.

因此，你需要让人们相信，通过海峡是安全的。

So you need to get to a place where people have confidence that it is safe to move through the straight.

然后你就会有重要的环节。

And then you have major pieces.

几天前，特朗普总统威胁要攻击贾兹岛，这是负责伊朗大部分石油出口的关键能源设施。

President Trump a few days ago threatened to attack Carg Island, which is this major piece of energy infrastructure that is responsible for most of Iran's oil exports.

如果这个设施遭到攻击，我们知道伊朗会如何回应。

If that were attacked, we know what Iran would do in response.

他们会攻击其他地方的一个重要能源设施。

They would attack an important piece of energy infrastructure somewhere else.

在2019年9月，胡塞武装袭击了沙特阿拉伯的关键石油设施阿布卡克。

In 09/2019, the Houthis attacked Abqaq, this critical oil installation in Saudi Arabia.

令人惊讶的是，沙特能够如此迅速地恢复运营，但当时的损失本可能更严重。

And it was remarkable how quickly the Saudis could get that back up and running, but the damage could have been much worse.

因此，如果你采取这样的行动，可能会导致每天数百万桶的供应中断，这是前所未有的。

And so if you do something like that, you could see millions of barrels a day of disruption that we haven't seen yet.

顺便说一下，这次事件前，沙特每天出口约700万桶石油，现在他们正通过一条管道绕过霍尔木兹海峡，将石油输送到红海，日出口量降至四五百万吨。

By the way, Saudi was exporting about 7,000,000 barrels a day before this, and now they're getting to four or five through a pipeline to bypass the Strait Of Hormuz and send it to the Red Sea.

红海上有一个叫延布的港口。

There's a port called Yanbu in the Red Sea.

这个港口很脆弱。

That's vulnerable.

我们不久前刚看到胡塞武装在红海对油轮造成的破坏。

And we saw what the Houthis could do to tankers in the Red Sea not too long ago.

但到目前为止，红海地区还没有发生过袭击。

We haven't seen attacks there yet.

因此，如果这类能源基础设施遭到破坏，再回想起一周前对卡塔尔的袭击，卡塔尔方面表示，他们约20%的设施受损，修复需要三到五年。

So if that sort of energy infrastructure is damaged, again, coming back to the attack on Qatar a week ago, the Qataris have said for the roughly 20% of their project that was damaged, it's gonna take three to five years to repair.

也许他们能在两到三年内完成，但这可不是几周或几个月的事。

Maybe they can do it in two to three, but that's not weeks or months.

那么我来回答最后一个问题是。

Then I'll answer our final question.

你向观众推荐哪三本书？

What are three books you recommend to the audience?

鉴于我们今天的讨论大量涉及物理限制和像霍尔木兹海峡这样的瓶颈，我推荐大家阅读埃德·康韦的《物质世界》，这本书很好地提醒了我们那些从未想过的重要材料——比如铜和沙子——对全球经济有多么关键。

So given how much this conversation has been about the physical constraints and choke points like The Strait of Hormuz, I would recommend that people read an excellent book called Ed Conway's Material World, which is a really great reminder of how important things we never think about, like copper and sand are to the global economy.

直到出了问题，我们才会想到这些。

We don't think about it until something breaks.

这本书清晰地表明，而此刻正在实时展现的，正是我们对这些被视作理所当然的材料有多么依赖。

And what that book makes clear, and what this moment is illustrating, I think, real time is just how dependent we are on all of those materials that we take for granted.

我还把它和让·巴蒂斯特·弗雷佐的《更多、更多、更多》放在一起推荐。

I put that alongside a book called More More and More by Jean Baptiste Fressoz.

我想我念对了他的姓氏，他是一位法国学者，这本书解释了为什么能源转型如此困难。

I think I'm saying his last name correctly, a French academic and scholar, which explains why it is so hard to have an energy transition.

如果回顾历史，我们以空前的速度增加了清洁能源，且基本满足了全球能源需求的增长。

If you go back over time, we have added clean energy at an unprecedented rate, and it's met most of the growth in global energy demand.

但石油、天然气和煤炭的使用量仍在持续上升。

But oil use, gas use, coal use, they are all still going up as well.

他很好地梳理了历史，指出我们常有一种误解，认为工业革命意味着煤炭取代了木材，因为我们不再使用木材作为燃料。

And he nicely walks through history and shows things like we have this narrative we think that the industrial revolution meant coal replaced the use of wood because we stopped using wood as a fuel.

但事实上，我们需要大量木材来加固和建造煤矿，也需要木材制作铁轨下的枕木，因为铁轨才是运输煤炭的关键。

But then we needed all the wood to reinforce and build the coal mines, and we needed the wood for the little ties that go on the railways because the rails were what moved the coal.

因此，由于木材被用于其他用途，其需求反而上升了。

So wood demand went up because we ended up using it for other things.

这提醒我们，为何要找到降低石油需求的方法如此困难。

And it's really a reminder of why it is really hard to find ways to make things like oil demand go down.

接下来，我想谈一件与能源完全无关的事情。

And then I'm gonna end on something that has nothing to do with energy.

但鉴于关于能源和伊朗的前景如此黯淡，我认为有必要为我们的世界留出一点喜悦的空间。

But given how bleak this outlook about energy and Iran has been, I think it's worth making space for a little bit of joy in our world.

任何读过我每周邮件的人都知道，我总能找到办法在邮件里提到布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀。

And anyone who reads my weekly emails knows that I always find a way to work a reference to Bruce Springsteen into them.

因为如果你喜欢快乐，就应该去现场观看布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀的演出，下周他开启新巡演时，你就可以再次去看了。

Because if you like joy, you should go see Bruce Springsteen Live, which you can do again starting next week when he kicks off his new tour.

我觉得《将我从当下拯救》这本书和电影一样出色。

So I would read Deliver Me from Nowhere as good as the movie was.

这本书甚至更好，更深入地探讨了我们想成为的人与社会期待我们成为的人之间的张力。

The book was even better, going much deeper into sort of the tension between who we want to be and what society expects us to be.

贾森·博尔多夫，非常感谢你。

Jason Bordoff, thank you very much.

谢谢。

Thank you.

谢谢你能邀请我。

Thank you for having me.

《埃兹拉·克莱因秀》本期节目由安妮·加尔文和杰克·麦克多夫制作。

This episode of The Ezra Klein Show is produced by Annie Galvin and Jack McCordoff.

事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯、凯特·辛克莱尔和玛丽·马奇·洛克尔完成。

Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair and Mary March Locker.

我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·格尔德，额外混音由艾哈迈德·扎霍达和艾萨克·琼斯负责。

Our senior audio engineers, Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Ahmad Zahoda and Isaac Jones.

我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

节目制作团队还包括玛丽·卡西翁、罗兰·胡、莫尔娜·金、克里斯滕·林、埃梅特·凯尔德克和简·科贝尔。

The show's production team also includes Marie Cassione, Roland Hu, Morena King, Kristen Lin, Emmett Keldeck, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由丹·鲍威尔和帕特·麦卡斯克尔创作。

Original music by Dan Powell and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由克里斯蒂娜·西米列夫斯基和香农·巴斯塔负责。

Audience strategy by Christina Cimilewski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》音频制作总监是安妮·罗斯·斯特雷瑟。

The director of New York Times pinning audio is Annie Rose Stresser.