世界如何看待美国，与亚当·图兹对话

是的。

Yeah.

我在结论中提到了这一点。

I I I say it in the conclusion.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

我在第一页就感受到了。

I felt it in the first page.

是的。

Yes.

我觉得，我迫不及待地想看到你提到结论的那部分，因为整本书都像是在追问：未来发生了什么？为什么其他地方的人在创造未来？

Like, I couldn't wait to get to the conclusion that you said it because that whole book felt like a question about what happened to the future and why is it that other people are making it.

但回到你最初的观点，很有意思的是，当你在北京与人交谈时，他们会强烈反驳这种观点，因为他们会指出美国经济中两个极具活力的来源。

But to go back to your original point, very interesting that when you talk to people in Beijing, they will push back hard on this idea because they will point to two sources of really extraordinary dynamism in The US economy.

一个是科技，另一个是页岩气开采。

One is tech and the other one is fracking.

第三个你可以再加上金融工程。

And the other one you might add thirdly would be financial engineering.

这些都是美国资本主义展现出非凡活力的领域，几乎没有受到监管或阻碍，并且具有改变世界，或至少自诩能改变世界的力量。

And these are all zones in which American capitalism unfolds an extraordinary dynamism and doesn't encounter much regulation or obstacle and is world changing or at least has pretensions to be world changing.

所以这就是你在北京会听到的说法。

So that's what you'll hear in Beijing.

你知道吗，你在说什么呢？

You know, what are you talking about?

我们还在学习中。

We're still learning.

在美国，你常听到的关于这个问题的答案是，暂且不谈页岩气开采，它有一些独特之处，但科技和金融工程反映了我们当前体系的现实：我们在比特和字节上行动非常自由，是的。

Well, the answer you often hear about this in in America, put aside fracking for a minute, which has some distinctive qualities, but tech and financial engineering reflects this reality of our system now, which is that we move very freely with bits and bytes Yeah.

但在原子层面却行动迟缓。

And very sluggishly around atoms.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，王丹那种观点也认为，我们在法律事务方面非常擅长。

So the Dan Wang kind of thesis also about we're very good at lawyering.

因为金融工程就是用数学进行的高级法律操作。

Because financial engineering is sophisticated lawyering with math.

对吧？

Right?

基本上，你先找到一个法律上的漏洞，然后反过来用数学手段去操作。

Basically, you find a legal ring call, and then you you do the you do the math work all the other way around.

你先做数学运算，然后再去找相应的法律漏洞。

You do the math and then find the legal ring call.

最终，像苹果公司这样，设计在美国、制造在中国的产品，正是这种区别的象征。

And after all, then the apple, you know, apple designed in California made in China is is emblematic of that kind of distinction.

另一点是，作为一个欧洲人，我经常思考的是，美国政治在其深层结构中如此僵化，如此害怕变革，可以说被上世纪六十年代那场巨大的社会变革——民权运动——所创伤。

The other thing is, and this is a point that I think about a lot also as a European, is that American politics in its deep fabric is so static, so afraid of change, so you could say traumatized by the last big, big change, which was the civil rights movement of the sixties.

而中国政府，尽管由共产党执政，却不断重塑党的性质和执政方式，对吧？

Whereas Chinese government, though the CCP governs, it continuously reinvents what the party is and how it governs, right?

他们这种围绕细胞结构的持续创新，现在已经深入到甚至每个家庭层面。

They have this churning innovation around the cell structure that goes down right into literally to household level now.

他们之所以能够实施新冠疫情封控，原因在于他们在私人住宅小区中建立了这套体系。

The reason why they were able to do COVID lockdowns and the way they're able to is they've built out in private housing estates.

你可以把这看作是中国中产阶级的核心。

Like, you think of this as the heart of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

为什么共产党会在这里？

Why is the CCP there?

因为共产党是中国大部分中产阶级的心脏，对吧？

Because the CCP is the beating heart of a large part of the Chinese bourgeoisie, right?

因此，他们成功实现了持续创新。

So they've managed to continuously innovate.

这绝不是一种僵化停滞的勃列日涅夫式静态政党结构。

It isn't just a kind of fossilized Brezhnefite static party structure.

这非常有活力。

It's very dynamic.

作为欧洲人，我必须说，欧盟体系中有一些元素，尽管充满挫败感，但也具有变革的开放性，对吧？

And as a European, I have to say there's elements of the EU system, which in all of their frustratedness are also kind of open for change, right?

例如，当他们应对新冠疫情时推出了大规模的绿色和科技刺激计划，就必须创新出共同债务发行机制才能实现。

When they, for instance, responded to COVID with a really big green and tech stimulus, they had to invent common debt issuance to be able to do that.

总体而言，我认为一个政体需要不断重新思考，这是健康的。

And broadly speaking, I think it's healthy for a polity to have to constantly rethink.

而在美国，我们进行了大规模的刺激，但本质上只是短暂的糖分亢奋，因为这是唯一能政治化的东西。

Whereas in The US, we did a great big stimulus, but basically it was a simple sugar high, because that's the only thing you could politic.

这也是唯一能通过行政手段实现的，因为必须通过国税局或发放支票这样简单的方式进行。

And it's the only thing you could administratively engineer, cause it had to go out basically via the IRS or checks, something as simple as that.

你们无法像欧洲人和中国人在新冠危机期间那样构建复杂的治理架构。

You weren't able to do the complex governance architectures that the Europeans and the Chinese produced during the COVID crisis.

当欧洲出现问题时，你会看到欧元区危机；但在好的时刻，它在政治上具有我们在美国看不到的活力。

When this goes wrong in Europe, you get the eurozone crisis, but in good moments, it's politically dynamic in the way that, we don't see in The US.

这很有趣。

It's funny.

我觉得这样说美国有点过于苛刻了。

I think that's in a way too harsh on The US.

好吧。

Okay.

说得有理。

Fair enough.

有两个原因。

For two reasons.

第一，我想到了唐纳德·特朗普，他彻底重塑了一个政党，并以非常不同的方式执政。

One, I think about Donald Trump who has reinvented an entire political party and is governing in a very different way.

第二，在金融危机及其之后，你对此有很多研究，我们的确在债务发行和美联储的行动上采取了一些非常激进的措施。

But, two, during the financial crisis and after, and you've tracked a lot of this, I mean, we did some very aggressive things in terms of debt issuance and what the Fed is doing.

我认为美国确实存在一些创新和活力的领域，但问题是，新冠危机期间本应出现的失业保险创新在哪里呢？

And I I think there are there are zones of innovation and dynamism in The US, but like, where was the unemployment insurance innovation that should have happened during the COVID crisis?

我们都清楚他们做不到。

We both know they couldn't do it.

所以他们最终只能发支票。

So they ended up just doing checks.

而美国真正需要做的，是建立一个名副其实的全国性失业保险体系，而不是现在这种杂乱无章的局面——纽约有系统，但佛罗里达却几乎没有。

Whereas what America actually needs to do is to build a national unemployment insurance system worthy of the name, instead of having this extraordinary hodgepodge where New York has a system, but Florida really doesn't.

这对于一个拥有三亿三千万人口的富裕社会来说，是极不相称的。

Like that's unbecoming of 330,000,000 people in a in affluent society.

但你知道，如果你是拜登政府，明明有那么多其他事情要处理，又何必耗费政治资本去推动这件事呢？

But, you know, why would you burn the political capital to try and get that done if you're the Biden administration when you've got so many other things to do?

关于中国的这种观念有点奇怪，因为过去几年里，中国的立场反复剧烈变动。

So there's something strange about this conception of China because it has moved very fast back and forth in the last couple of years.

对吧？

Right?

你刚提到了拜登。

You just mentioned Biden.

拜登政府任期结束之际，在经历了多年对中国崛起的吹捧和对中国威胁的恐惧之后，人们开始觉得中国可能正在走向衰退。

End of the Biden administration, after many years of China hype and China fear, there's a sense that actually China might now be in decline.

习近平正在行使可怕的威权权力。

Xi is wielding terrible authoritarian power.

你看到中国科技巨头和初创企业创始人突然消失，比如马云最终回来了，但共产党高层的一些人却被从会议中带走了。

You see Chinese tech CEOs and startup founders suddenly disappearing like Jack Ma who ends up coming back, but you have parts of the upper echelons of the Communist party being marched out of meetings.

事实上，就在前几天，我们看到最高将领被实质上罢免了。

In fact, just now, the other day, we saw the the top general functionally defenestrated.

人们觉得中国曾长期拥有有效的威权治理，但现在威权体制一贯会发生的问题正在上演。

There is a sense that China had effective authoritarian government for quite some time, But now the thing that always happens with authoritarian government is happening.

领导层脱离现实，开始内斗。

And the leadership is out of touch, and it's turning on itself.

而随着人口结构变化，继续有效治理这个极其复杂的国家的能力将会减弱。

And the capacity to continue governing this very, very complicated state well and, you know, as a demographics change is gonna weaken.

我记得在拜登时代末期，曾与杰克·苏利文等人进行过采访，他们经常提到的一点是：嗯。

And I remember doing interviews with Jake Sullivan and others at the end of the Biden era, and one of their big things they would say Mhmm.

听着。

Is, look.

美国从未如此强大，我们的对手、敌对者和竞争者从未如此虚弱。

America's never been stronger, our opponents and and antagonists and competitors have never been weaker.

是的。

Yeah.

所以阿达尔·阿桑明确表示，别担心修昔底德陷阱，因为我们没有衰落，所以不会对你发动战争。

So Adal Asan literally said, don't worry about the Thucydides track because we're not declining so we won't start war with you.

如果你要超越我们，而我们正在衰落，那么你确实可能有理由担忧。

If you were gonna overtake us and we were declining, dot dot dot, you might very well have reason to be concerned.

但既然我们没有衰落，就放松吧。

But since we're not, relax.

不会爆发战争。

There isn't gonna be a war.

这种对如何认识中国的主流看法发生了迅速转变，这就是为什么你永远无法

This is a rapid change around in the conventional wisdom on how to think about China, is why you can never

不要相信这个国家对中国的一般性看法。

trust conventional wisdom on China in this country.

但现在这已经成为一种普遍看法。

But but now this is a conventional wisdom.

现在是个糟糕的时期。

It's a bad time.

我不该？不。

Should I not No.

现在他们很强大，知道自己在做什么，这已经成为普遍看法。

It's a it's Now a that they're great and they know what they're doing is now the conventional wisdom.

嗯，

Well,

但道德上并不伟大，

Not great morally,

但这是明智的。

but But it's a wise.

我认为，对于我们任何人——我当然也包括在内——来自西方的人来说，要对中国保持一个稳定、客观的分析立场，实在是非常困难。

I think it's truly difficult for any of us, and I absolutely include myself, coming from the West to steady a stable analytical position on China.

我们在这份着迷甚至着魔之间左右为难。

And we are torn between a kind of fascination and indeed infatuation with it.

毕竟，这是人类历史上最戏剧性的社会经济转型，但我说的不是绝对意义上的全部历史。

And it is after all the single most dramatic transformative socioeconomic transformation in the history of our species, but I'm not full stop in history.

而另一方面，又会有一种‘但这怎么可能成功呢？因为……因为……因为……’的想法，你可以列出一长串理由，我也可以和我在哥伦比亚大学的自由派同事坐在一起，我们都能列出这样的清单。

And on the other hand, a kind of, oh, but it can't possibly work because because because, and you can make the list, and I can sit with my liberal colleagues at Columbia and, like, we can all make the list.

对吧？

Right?

我认为，我们基本上需要把所有偏见都留在门外，甚至更深层次地，我们需要认识到：无论怎样，中国正在发生的一切，都是那个大写的‘N’。

And I think we basically need to check all our prejudices at the door and at even deeper level, I think we need to recognize the fact that what's happening in China, one way or the other, it's the big N.

相比之下，我们今天所有的历史经验，在样本规模上都只是小写的‘n’。

All of our history today is small N in terms of sample size by comparison with what they're doing there.

他们所称的二十一世纪马克思主义的根本信念就在于：如果政治是实验性的、由经验驱动的，他们相信成功与失败才是真正的试金石，而如今他们认为自己正在成功——那么在一个14亿人口的社会里，从五十年前的贫困状态一路崛起至今，这本身就是一场实验。

This is the fundamental foundation of their belief in what they call twenty first century Marxism, is that if politics is experimental and driven, they believe by experience and success and failure, and they right now think they're succeeding, then doing that in a society of 1,400,000,000, raising yourself out from the kind of poverty that they were in fifty years ago to where they are right now, is simply the experiment.

这是对所有关于世界理论的实际历史检验。

This is the actual historical test of all theories about the world.

因此，我们所有的理论——比如中等收入陷阱理论——都只是某种次要的前言，对吧？

So all of our theories that we have, our middle income trap theory, all of this is really just the kind of minor preface, right?

我们凭什么将中国与数据集中的某个欧洲小国相提并论，说‘你可能会变成意大利那样’？

And where do we even get off placing them alongside some small European country in the dataset where we say, oh, well, you could end up like Italy.

毛泽东曾 famously 对意大利共产党说：在任何经典文献里都没有说意大利能存活到二十一世纪。

Famously Mao said like to the Italian communist party when they were talking about nuclear war, there's nothing in the scripture that says that Italy survives into the twenty first century.

因此，我们必须对这种经验保持谦逊，不要轻易地做出正反两方面的过度推断——无论是我们对自己失望、过度美化他们的成就，还是相反，对他们的政治抱有蔑视、恐惧、甚至鄙夷和不信任，并将这些情绪转化为一种社会科学的必然性。

So we have to be willing to be humble, frankly, in relation to this experience and not quickly extrapolate one way or the other, either our disappointment of ourselves and our like glamorization of what they've done or the converse, namely our scorn, our fear, our contempt even, mistrust of their politics, and turn that into a kind of social scientific necessity.

这真的很难做到，这里没有安全的避风港。

It's really difficult to do, there's no safe space here.

在我看来，这与20世纪30年代和40年代许多进步人士面对斯大林主义时所面临的困境极为相似——最终，这彻底决定了第二次世界大战及其战后格局的历史走向。我们西方人认为战后建立的‘美好世界’，在很大程度上依赖于苏联和中国以巨大牺牲所参与的这场战争。

To me, it's deeply analogous to the dilemmas that many progressive faced in the 1930s and 1940s when faced with Stalinism, which in the end ended up being utterly decisive for the history of the World War II and the aftermath, the good world that we built, we, that is the West, built, we think, good after '45, depended critically on a war fought with huge sacrifice by both Stalin Soviet Union and the Chinese.

在过去的几年里，你在中国旅行了相当长的时间。

You spent a fair amount of time traveling China in the past couple of years.

当我追踪你从那里回来后的评论时，正如你刚才说的，人们能听出来，我觉得这对你来说是一段令人脑洞大开的经历。

And as I've tracked your commentary coming back from it, and and people could hear it in what you just said, I feel like it has been a bit of a mind bending experience for you.

当然了。

Oh, for sure.

是的。

Yeah.

我听过你说过，比如，现代工业组织的整个前史，不过是眼下正在那里发生的一切的前奏。

And I've heard you say things like, you know, the whole prehistory of modern industrial organization is just prelude to what is happening there right now.

所以，某种程度上，我正在看着你努力应对

So there's some way in which I'm watching you try to grapple

是的。

Yeah.

一种让人感觉非常非人性的规模。

With scale that feels very inhuman.

你有时候听起来，就像刚服过致幻剂一样。

You sometimes sound to me like somebody's just done psychedelics.

是的。

Yes.

我的意思是，今年夏天，我意识到我们正处在看着金字塔正在建造时的境地，而不是建成后。

I mean or I this summer, I had this moment where I realized we're in the position of people watching the pyramids being built, not afterwards.

所以，从四五年前你刚开始写亚当二的大量文字、崩溃以及你的疫情著作那时起，你能告诉我你看到了哪些东西？或者有哪些数字在你的图表本中出现过？

So so describe to me what from where you were four or five years ago, the the Adam two's writing deluge and and crashed and your pandemic book, what are some things you saw or some numbers in you know, that that have passed through your chart book?

是什么帮助你传达了你自己思维在‘中国中心论’、权力以及将这些融入你对世界及其秩序的理解过程中所经历的转变？

What helps you convey the sort of portal your own thinking has gone through on China centrality and power and what it means to absorb that into your view of the world and its order?

我的意思是，谈到2008年、2009年，就是刺激计划的规模。

I mean, when it comes to o eight, o nine, it's just the scale of the stimulus.

我的意思是，你提到的电力、高铁，都是在2008、2009年之后建成的。

I mean, you were referring to the the electric, you know, the high speed rail is built in the aftermath of o eight, o nine.

当人们回顾那次刺激计划时，众所周知，回顾奥巴马的刺激计划，虽然它在历史上规模庞大、意义重大，甚至超过新政，我们普遍认为它确实产生了积极影响，但在美国，你能指出哪些具体成果是来自奥巴马刺激计划的？

That's, you know, when they look back at the stimulus, famously, you look back at the Obama stimulus, though it was large and by historical standards, highly significant larger than the new deal, and we think really did make a positive difference, what could you point to in America that resulted from the Obama stimulus?

你要是个专家才能知道，在中国，铁路系统是世界上独一无二的。

You'd have to be an expert to know in China, it's a railway system unlike any in the world.

对吧？

Right?

所以这背后有一种戏剧性和规模。

So there's a drama and scale.

我觉得我书里有这个数字。

I think I have this number in my book.

他们建了大约两万三千英里的高速铁路，而我们连加州500英里的项目都没能建成。

They've built something like 23,000 miles of high speed rail while we were failing to build the 500 miles of the California project.

当我们说高速时，指的是时速200英里以上，你坐着喝咖啡，咖啡都不会晃出来。

And when we say high speed, we're talking 200 plus miles an hour, and you can sit with a cup of coffee and it will not move.

就像丝绸一样顺滑。

Like it's smooth as silk.

很多欧洲人也能做到，但中国和日本更厉害，而中国人不仅掌握了技术，还做得规模更大。

Many Europeans can do this too, but the China and the Japanese, but the Chinese have acquired their technologies and done it even larger.

还有2010年代初的刺激计划，他们在三年内使用的混凝土比美国整个二十世纪还多。

Then there's the stimulus of the early 2010s when they built more concrete in three years than The United States in the twentieth century.

当你去那里时，你会亲眼看到。

And when you go there, you see it.

我觉得，如今中国人的住宅中，有88%甚至可能达到89%都是自九十年代初以来新建的。

Like 88, I think, maybe 89% of all homes that Chinese people today live in have been built since the early nineties.

所有的住宅、房屋、人们居住的地方，几乎都在三十年内建成了。

Every home, every house, every place where people live and reside, all in thirty years, essentially.

我的意思是，这其中也隐含着破坏，对吧？

I mean, there's also the destruction that's implied by that, right?

传统中国城市的消逝，以及中国游客来到欧洲时那种渴望目睹古老事物的迫切与饥渴。

The erasing of the traditional Chinese city, the thirst and the hunger that you see in Chinese tourists when they come to Europe to actually see something old.

对我而言，越来越多的问题都聚焦在气候上，以及中国以惊人的速度推进绿色能源建设——如今，这正是拜登政府在我看来最核心的问题。

And then more and more for me, it's all about climate and the just staggering speed with which China has begun to build out green energy such that now, and this is the thing that the Biden administration for my mind, this is the central question.

到2020年代初，中国已经具备了部署足够太阳能发电和日益增长的电池储能系统的能力，足以让全球走上气候稳定之路。

China by the early 2020s was in a position to roll out enough solar and increasingly also battery backup to actually get the world onto a climate stabilization track.

中国已建立起工业能力，能够为气候稳定的关键组成部分——虽然不是全部——实现全球范围的落地。

The Chinese have created the industrial capacity to actually get a key component, not the whole thing, but a key component of climate stabilization on track for the entire planet.

而西方政治面对这一情况的根本失败，就是说：不，非常感谢。

And the fundamental failure of Western politics in the face of that is to say, no, thank you very much.

我们只想就这件事、那件事和别的事争论不休。

We'd like to argue about this, that, and the other.

我们不太喜欢这种过多的补贴。

We don't really like this, too much subsidy.

而我们目前无法组织起所需的全球政治力量来资助并推广这项技术，你知道的，像布莱恩·迪斯这样的人在谈论绿色马歇尔计划，谈论地热工程和小型模块化核反应堆。

And we cannot right now organize the global politics necessary to fund that, to roll it out, you know, and you've got Brian Deese and people like that talking about green marshal plans, and they're talking about geothermal engineering and small SMR nuclear reactors.

但他却说：不行。

And he's like, no.

就在你眼前，每年就有能力安装大约一千吉瓦的新太阳能电池板。

In front of your nose, there is the capacity to do about a thousand gigawatts of new solar panels every single year.

而且这还没算上我们的任何帮助，纯粹是中国本土的努力。

And that's without us even helping in any way, that's just the local Chinese effort.

这完全是变革性的。

That's utterly transformative.

这就是产业政策，而不仅仅是像你所说的，他们能否完成波士顿-华盛顿走廊这样的项目？

That is industrial policy, not just at the level of, you know, can they do the Boswash Corridor?

这实际上是在为我们提供整个地球所需的太阳能发电能力。

That's literally providing what we need to farm solar power for the entire planet.

所以你在这里做的类比是，你提到了二战中的俄罗斯。

So the analogy you're making here, you mentioned the Russians in in World War two.

众所周知，没有苏联，就不可能赢得二战。

You know, as people know, there is no winning World War two without the Soviet Union.

嗯，其实也是可以的，但那会非常残酷，而且不会让我们对自己感觉良好，因为那将涉及核击大片区域

Well, there is, but it's really ugly, and it would not have left us feeling good about ourselves because it would involve nuking a large part

德国。

of Germany.

所以这里的类比是针对气候问题。

So the analogy here is to climate.

如果你想所谓的赢得应对气候变化的斗争，就必须让中国成为核心。

And if you want to, quote, unquote, win the climate change fight, it would require making China central.

嗯，谁知道呢？

Well, who knows?

但我们显然没有足够努力去探索其他选择，而这个方案简直就是自行车上的那张100美元钞票。

But we're certainly not making a concerted enough effort to explore other options, and this one is all literally the thou you know, the $100 bill on the cycle.

而且我们还征收高额关税。

And and we're heavily tariffing.

美国根本不进口任何中国生产的太阳能电池板。

America doesn't import any Chinese solar panel.

欧洲人值得一提的是，他们90%的太阳能电池板都来自中国，因为你还从哪儿能弄到呢？

The Europeans, to their credit, take 90% of their solar panels from China because where else are you gonna get them from?

而且他们正在积极推动。

And they are pushing.

如果你去问拜登政府的前官员，那些诚实的人会承认，他们完全清楚自己在做什么——为了政治原因故意拖慢美国的能源转型，因为他们觉得除此之外别无政治交易的可能。

And if I mean, you speak to Biden administration veterans and the honest ones will admit that they knew exactly what they were doing, which was retarding America's energy transition for a political reason because they didn't think there was a political bargain to be done any other way.

等等。

Well, wait.

等等。

Wait.

等等。

Wait.

我认为，他们并不是这么想的。

That that's not, I think, what they think they were doing.

我前几天刚和他们谈过，他们确实就是这么想的，但关键是，关键是

I spoke to them just the other day, and that's exactly what they But but the way the way

他们向我描述的方式是，是的。

they describe it to me Yeah.

并不是他们认为无法达成政治妥协。

Is not that they don't think there's a political bargain to be made.

他们实际上相信，向乔·拜登进言时，将这一领域让给中国会丧失关键的地缘政治权力。

They actually believed, I think, going up to Joe Biden, that it would be losing a key level of geopolitical power to cede this to China.

他们认为，这其中蕴含着权力。

That they think there was power in this.

你不相信这一点。

You don't buy that.

我认为有两种不同的观点，这取决于你是更关注气候问题的人，还是最终站在杰克·苏利文阵营的人。

I think there are two different versions, and it depends whether you're more climate centered person or whether you're ultimately in the Jake Sullivan camp.

我完全同意你的看法。

I totally agree with you.

还有一个更狭隘的版本，那就是我们确实需要在这个技术领域展开竞争。

There is the even narrower version, which is that we actually need to compete in this technological space.

我认为杰克·苏利文阵营的观点是，确实如此。

I think the Jake Sullivan camp had a view that Absolutely.

比起加速绿色转型，维持对中国的权力优势更为重要。

Was more important to maintain power over China than to accelerate the green transition.

他们一直把绿色转型看作是……

And and they always saw the green transition.

他们基本上是从马佐卡图那里得来的这个观点。

They basically got it from Mazokatu.

对吧？

Right?

所以，核心理念是需要围绕一些使命来组织政策并动员联盟，而这是一个绝佳的使命。

So the idea is you need missions around which to organize policy and motivate coalitions, and this was a great mission.

是的。

Yes.

它本身并不是。

It wasn't in and of itself.

我认为，如果你想想波德斯塔这样在气候领域有更长期经验的人，他们才是那些阐明权衡取舍的人。

I think if you think about Podesta and people like that, who have a much longer track record in the climate space, they're the people who articulate the trade offs.

但他们并不是

But they were not

被采纳的那些人。

the ones that were bought.

主导者。

The shots.

不。

No.

这让我想起我一开始问你的问题：你认为特朗普政府认为权力的基础是什么？

And so this brings me to something I was asking you at the beginning, which is what do you think the Trump administration believes power would be based on?

而且我认为我们都可以同意，权力的基础是能源。

And and one of the things I think we can all agree power is based on is energy.

但对于特朗普政府来说，它指的是石油燃料。

But for the Trump administration, it is petrol fuels.

是的。

Yeah.

碳氢化合物。

Hydrocarbons.

是的。

Yeah.

碳氢化合物。

Hydrocarbons.

是的。

Yeah.

对于中国来说，尽管它目前也在大量使用碳氢化合物，但未来将转向其他方向。

For China, which is nevertheless doing a lot of, like, hydrocarbons, but it is in the future.

我的意思是，你把它们称为一个电力国家。

I mean, you describe them as an electrostate.

这场竞争的一部分将围绕能源展开。

Like, part of the fight is going to be energy.

在人工智能领域也是如此，它将受到能源供应的限制。

That's true on AI, which is gonna be, you know, rate limited by energy.

无论你从哪个角度看，能源都将至关重要。

No matter what you look at, energy is gonna be key here.

让我感到特别震惊的是，特朗普政府虽然大谈能源，却在抑制未来能源来源的发展，同时又试图增加我们可获取的石油数量。

And one of things that is so striking to me about Trump is that they talk a lot about energy, but they're kneecapping the energy sources of the future even as they are trying to increase the amount of oil we have access to.

中国似乎正在走另一条路。

China seems to be doing something else.

这本质上是自相矛盾的，而能源这一概念并未缓解这一矛盾，因为在实际中，我们需要石油来应对一系列问题，主要是交通运输和部分石油化工。

It's fundamentally contradictory, and it's not helped by this concept of energy, which is in practice, need oil for one set of issues, mainly transport and some petrochemicals.

我们需要天然气用于石油化工、供暖和发电。

We need gas for petrochemicals, heating, and power generation.

而在电力生产领域，太阳能和煤炭正在正面竞争。

And then we've got solar and coal competing head on in the electricity generation space.

此外，美国处于一种极其矛盾的境地：它既是巨大的石油消费国，也是巨大的石油生产国。

And furthermore, America's in this profoundly conflicted position, which is that it's both a huge oil consumer and a huge oil producer.

因此，与沙特阿拉伯明确希望油价高涨不同，美国唯一会压低油价的原因是担心会触怒其消费者。

And so unlike the Saudis who unambiguously have an interest in high oil prices, the only thing that would dial that down is they're worried they put their consumers off.

美国则处于两难之间。

America's like betwixt and between.

所以，你放开委内瑞拉，对吧？

So you unlock Venezuela, right?

谁会抱怨呢？

And who complains?

抱怨的是页岩油公司，因为他们最不需要的就是市场上出现更多石油，这会让油价进一步跌破当前水平。

It's the shale people that complain because the last thing in the world they need is more oil on the market, which would cut the price even further than it currently is at.

因此，这种冲突和不一致的层面就存在。

So there's that dimension of conflict and incoherence.

而在另一方面，你面临的是整个困境：人工智能是你的主要方向，还是科技本身是产业政策科技领域的核心？唯一的共同点就是电力。

And then on the other side, you have the whole dilemma of AI is your big play, or just tech is your big play in the industrial policy tech space, the single common denominator is electric power.

认为天然气，更不用说核能，能够填补这一缺口只是幻想，因为我们无法快速获得燃气轮机。

And it's just a fantasy to think that gas, let alone nuclear, is going to fill that gap because we can't get the turbines, the gas turbines quickly enough.

因此，全球各地的能源管道中，充斥着特朗普政府试图妖魔化的东西——比如太阳能、风能和现在也负担得起的电池储能系统。

So the pipeline, quite reasonably everywhere in the world, is full of the sort of thing which the Trump administration is trying to anathematize, like solar and wind and battery backup now, which is also affordable.

所以这非常矛盾。

So it's deeply contradictory.

而在边缘地带，你能看到他们在转变。

And around the edges, you see them shifting.

我的意思是，《纽约时报》曾发表过一篇很好的报道，讲述了特朗普政府如何悄然推行了一种‘电池外交’。

I mean, the Times had a rather good report on the way in which a quiet battery diplomacy has actually emerged in the Trump administration.

因为如果你去和军人，比如现代军队的人聊聊，他们会携带二十到三十磅重的电池。

Because if you talk to the military people, like modern army guys, carry twenty, thirty pounds worth of batteries.

实际上，特种部队的有效行动范围很大程度上取决于他们何时需要为电池组充电。

Like the actual effective operational range of the special forces is largely determined by when they need to recharge their battery packs.

因此，高性能电池技术对各个领域的能源需求越来越关键，而如果没有电动汽车这一巨大需求来源，就很难维持一个经济上可行的电池产业。

So high-tech battery technology is just crucial increasingly for every dimension of power, and you can't really sustain an economically viable battery industry without the big source of demand, which are electric vehicles.

我是贾德森·琼斯。

I'm Judson Jones.

我是《纽约时报》的记者兼气象学家。

I'm a reporter and meteorologist at The New York Times.

二十多年来，我一直报道极端天气，而由于气候变化，极端天气正变得越来越严重，及时准确的天气信息也变得越来越重要。

For about two decades, I've been covering extreme weather, which is getting worse because of climate change, and it's becoming more important to get timely and accurate weather information.

因此，我们通过定制的简报，提前最多三天告知您可能影响您或您关心的地区的极端天气。

That's why we send these customized newsletters letting you know up to three days in advance about extreme weather that could impact you or a place you care about.

在《纽约时报》，您可以确信我们发布的每一条内容都基于我们所能获得的最准确、经过验证的科学信息，因为我们希望您能根据这些信息实时做出关乎日常生活的决策。

At The Times, you can be confident that everything we publish is based off the most accurate scientific and vetted information available to us because we want you to be able to make real time decisions about how to go about your life.

这种工作让订阅《纽约时报》变得如此有价值，也是您支持基于事实的独立新闻的方式。

This is the kind of work that makes subscribing to The New York Times so valuable, and it's how you can support fact based independent journalism.

如果您想订阅，请访问 nytimes.com/subscribe。

So if you'd like to subscribe, go to nytimes.com/subscribe.

在拜登政府时期，你经常听到外交政策圈的人说，我们应该将世界划分为民主国家轴心和专制国家轴心。

During the Biden administration, one thing you began to hear a lot from foreign policy hands was that we should understand the world a split into axis of democracies and an axis of authoritarians.

于是你有了俄罗斯、中国，有时还会扩展到伊朗，甚至更远一点。

So you have this Russia, China, then sometimes it would be expanded to Iran, you know, sometimes beyond that, even a little bit.

有时你会听到朝鲜。

Sometimes you'd hear North Korea.

叙利亚也被包括在内。

Syria as well was thrown in

有时如此。

at times.

那么，您认为这种划分在多大程度上真实反映了中国？即中国应被视为一个意识形态上的专制项目，而它与普京的联盟正是基于这一点？

So to what degree do you think that that tells you something real about China, that it should be understood as an ideologically authoritarian project, and that's what the alliance with Putin is about?

那么，在多大程度上，这种观点只是美国自由派自我安慰的一种方式，反而阻碍了你们理解各方之间的实际动机？

And to what degree is that a a sort of self comforting way for at least American liberals to view the world that is not helping you understand what the incentives are back and forth?

这确实是一种不利于理解世界的视角，因为它本质上是以否定的方式定义世界。

It's definitely an unhelpful way to understand the world because, essentially, it defines the world in negative terms.

这些国家唯一的共同点就是他们不像我们，于是就认为他们全都一样。

The only thing those people have in common is they're not like us, and so then they must all be the same.

从这个角度出发，根本就是极其无益的。

And that's just a profoundly unhelpful place to start from.

俄罗斯和中国真的立场一致，而且难以拆散吗？

Is it true that Russia and China align and that they will be hard to break apart?

确实如此。

Absolutely.

但这根本不是一种身份认同的关系。

But it's really not a relationship of identity.

这更像是一种对共同问题的共识关系。

It's a relationship more of like a common perception of problem.

我曾与北京的一位中央委员会成员交谈，他一直在谈论普京与习近平的关系。

And I was speaking to a central committee member in Beijing, and he was going on about the Putin Xi relationship.

后来我打断了他，问：难道你们共同的根本点不就是对1989年及那之后发生的事的理解吗？

And at some point, I interrupted him and said, don't you think the fundamental thing they have in common is their understanding of 1989 and what happened there?

谈话顿时停了下来，他只是点了点头。

And the conversation stopped, and he just said, nodded.

好吧。

Okay.

行了。

Fine.

我们明白了。

We we get it.

我们想法一致。

We're on the same page.

这才是共同点。

That's the common thing.

你能不能描述一下那个

Why don't you describe what that

共同点在于，普京和中国人都认为苏联解体是一场绝对的世界历史性灾难。

The common thing is that Putin and the Chinese regard the collapse of the Soviet Union as an absolute world historic disaster.

普京已经明确说过这一点。

Putin has said as much.

对吧？

Right?

这是现代历史上最严重的灾难，中国人也同意。

It's the most greatest catastrophe that's happened in modern history, and the Chinese agree.

当然，中国人对苏联共产党堕落的分析可以追溯到赫鲁晓夫的讲话，当时他谴责了斯大林的暴力行为。

And, course, the Chinese have a diagnosis of the degeneracy of the Soviet party that goes all the way back to Khrushchev's speech, where he denounced Stalin's violence.

对他们来说，这就是所谓的‘历史虚无主义’，即否定自己的历史。

And this for them is what they call historical nihilism, which means a rejection of your own history.

即使那段历史是苦涩和暴力的，中国人也不否认这一点，但你不能以一种道德化的方式与之划清界限。

Even if that history is bitter and violent, and the Chinese don't deny that it was, you can't just distance yourself in a moralistic way from it.

因此，习近平和他的干部们从根本上坚信这样一种观点：苏联政权内部存在一种堕落，导致在1989年那个时刻，像戈尔巴乔夫这样软弱、深受西方思想影响的人掌权并导致崩溃。

And so Xi Jinping and his cadres are fundamentally committed to this idea that there was a degeneracy inside the Soviet regime that led to that moment in 'eighty nine that somebody like Gorbachev as weak as him, so infected by Western thinking, be in power and collapse.

相比之下，当然，中国发生的情况是，在1989年，邓小平和他周围的干部们在他们看来有勇气清除与天安门广场示威者立场一致的党内人员，并采取了必要的行动。

By contrast, of course, what happened in China is that in 1989, Deng Xiaoping and the cadre around him had the, in their view, guts to oust the party people that were aligned with the Tiananmen Square demonstrators and do what was necessary.

那是一场灾难，你最终走到了那一步，不是从人道主义生命损失的角度来看，而是因为党不得不让解放军——党的军队——的枪口对准人民，这是你永远不希望发生的事情，但在当时的情况下这是正确的做法。

It was a disaster that you ended up in that point, not from the point of view of humanitarian loss of life, but because the party had to turn the guns of the PLA, which is the party's army, on the people, which you never wanna have to do, but it was the right thing to do under those circumstances.

而这种对世界及其后续影响的共同理解将中国和俄罗斯团结在一起，因为它创造了单极时刻，即美国权力的日益失控——这一进程经由科索沃战争和中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件，再到2003年及之后——在他们共同反对从1989年诞生的那个世界的过程中，他们深深地、深深地联系在一起。

And that common understanding of the world and its subsequent consequences unites China and Russia, because what it does is to create the unipolar moment, the increasing unhinging of American power, which runs by way of Kosovo and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia, and then to 2003, and then on from there, that in their common opposition to that world that emerges from 'eighty nine, they are deeply, deeply bonded.

除此之外，很大程度上是务实的，中国对苏联和俄罗斯怀有非常复杂的感情。

Beyond that, it's largely pragmatic and China has deeply ambiguous feelings about the Soviet Union and Russia.

毕竟苏联曾在多个时期对中国表现出高度侵略性。

The Soviet Union was after all highly aggressive towards China at various points.

毛泽东对苏联的怀疑和恐惧是非常认真的。

Mao was very serious in his suspicion and fear of the Soviet Union.

中共内部没有人沉溺于那种自由主义的无稽之谈，比如因为普京和我们一样——他也没有中共这样一个拥有一亿党员、组织成极其强大的科层机构、在每个重要组织都设有党务干部的政党？

And no one in the CCP indulges in kind of liberal nonsense about, well, Putin's the same as us because he's also not does Putin have a CCP, a 100 party of a 100,000,000 people organized in incredibly powerful Kedar apparatus, where there is literally a party official in every single major organization?

当然不是。

Of course not.

他们根本没法比。

They're not even close.

世界上没人有这种东西。

Like no one in the world has that.

因此中国是独特的，他们越来越把俄罗斯视为一个有用的楔子。

So China is unique and they regard Russia increasingly, I think, as a useful wedge.

我不认为他们真的非常需要俄罗斯的能源，但拥有它确实有帮助。

I don't think they really, really need Russia's energy, but it certainly helps to have it there.

你之前提到，中国在绿色科技方面非常先进，但它仍然是有史以来最大的化石燃料消费国，主要依赖自己的煤炭，但天然气和石油也很有帮助，如果能从俄罗斯获得，就能以便宜的价格获得，而且没有西方的附加条件——即便他们本来也不会从西方购买，他们去海湾地区采购，而对方也乐于提供。

You were mentioning earlier on, of course, China is hugely advanced in green tech, but it still is a massive, it's the largest fossil fuel consumer we've ever seen, mainly rely on its own coal, but gas and oil are helpful, and if you can get them via Russia, you get them cheap and you get them without Western strings, not that they would buy from the West anyway, they go shopping in The Gulf and they're only too happy to provide.

但我觉得，这种联盟正是在这种层面上紧密维系的。

But I think that's the level at which that alliance, you know, sits tight.

他们对现代历史有着足够宽广、连贯且独立的看法，无需通过与普京相似、与美国对立来定义自己。

They have a sufficiently capacious and coherent and independent view of modern history not to need to define themselves as like Putin, cause not like America.

所以，如果共产主义威权工业巨兽——无论对错——是美国常看待中国的方式，认为中国夺走了我们的工作，那么中国现在如何看待美国呢？

So if communist authoritarian industrial juggernaut is rightly or wrongly the way America often sees China, which has taken our jobs, how now does China see America?

我的意思是，这是一种持续演变的态势。一方面，正如我之前所说，他们看到的是力量，要让他们看到其他东西非常困难。

I mean, it's a continuously evolving so on the one hand, as I was saying earlier, they see strength, and it's very difficult to persuade them to see anything else.

他们认为美国——我是说，我这里只是基于一个样本，但这位是中央委员会成员，属于党内前200名左右的高层人物，身处政党结构和智库体系的核心——他们深信美国的手伸向了每一个领域，深信关于乌克兰战争最阴谋论的观点，比如这场战争最终是美国策划的，目的是将欧洲更紧密地绑在自己身边，诸如此类。

They believe America's I mean, this is I mean, I'm speaking from talking from a sample of one, but a central committee member, so top 200 or so type person, highly placed in the party structure and think tank organization, deeply convinced that America has its finger in every pie, deeply convinced of the most conspiratorial views of the Ukraine war, like that this is America's doing ultimately, and they are orchestrating this to tie the Europeans closer to them and all this sort of thing.

另一方面，他们感到困惑。

And on the other hand, bemused.

他们确实提到，有一个为国务院服务的智库，曾经试图每天追踪特朗普的动向。

And they they literally said they had a think tank working for the state council that was trying to track Trump on a daily basis.

但在第二任期的几个月后，他们放弃了。

And after a couple of months in in term two, they gave up.

他们转而使用一些非常粗略的心理学经验法则来揣测特朗普的行为动机。

And they just used these really crude sort of psychologizing rules of thumb about what make him tick.

到目前为止，这套方法对他们来说效果还不错。

And so far, after all, it's kinda worked well for them.

可以说，中国在这场对比中脱颖而出，相比之下，拜登政府对中国采取的是高度意识形态化且纪律严明的立场。

Like, you'd have to say that China has come out of this by contrast with the disciplined, I would say, highly ideological kind of position the Biden administration was rolling out on China.

他们展现出一种务实和善于谈判的态度，甚至在关税水平上也低于印度。

They're getting a level of pragmatism and deals making the even a tariff level, right, which is lower than India's.

他们根本没想到事情会这样发展。

Like, they don't think they imagine that that's how this would play out for them.

你认为这是为什么？

Why do you think that is?

我原本不会想到，对印度的关税会高于对中国。

I would not have imagined the tariff on India would be higher than the tariff on China.

我认为，对于特朗普政府，一直存在两种理论，而我们都看到了这两种情况。

I mean, I think there's always been two theories of a Trump administration, and we saw them both.

我总是回到2020年，因为我认为那是第二任期特朗普政府的雏形所在。

Again, I always go back to 2020 because that's where I think we see the seeds of this second Trump administration.

一种观点是，老板喜欢做交易，他特别喜欢和有实力、有气派的大人物谈生意，而习近平正好符合这个条件。

And one is the boss wants to do deals, and he loves doing deals with a big guy with a nice palace, and Xi Jinping ticks the box.

他是另一个真正的大人物。

He's the other really big guy.

所以如果你跟他做交易，那在定义上就是你能做的最大交易。

So if you go do a deal with him, it's the biggest deal you can do by definition.

我真的认为，听起来可能很荒谬，但我觉得这是个根本性的动机。

And that's, I really think, I mean, it sounds ridiculous, but I think that's an absolutely fundamental motivation.

我们上次在第一阶段协议中就看到了这一点，简直粗俗得离谱，连贸易经济学家都难以理解。

And we saw it in the phase one deal the last time around, like utterly crude, bizarre, trade economists can't even fathom it.

就像是大豆和猪肉。

Like it's like soybeans and pigs.

这跟现代贸易政策相比简直疯狂。

Like it's bonkers compared to modern trade policy.

然后特朗普政府中还有另一个更鹰派、更经典的新保守主义派别，可以说是类似马可·卢比奥的那一派。

And then there's another element in the Trump administration, which is more hawkish, more classically neocon, say it's a kind of Marco Rubio group.

然后我认为还有一种撤退型的J。

And then I think there's a retrenchment kind of J.

D.

D.

万斯，我们赶紧离开这里，回到西半球吧。

Vance, let's get the hell out of Dodge, of settle back into the Western Hemisphere.

我认识的一些军方人士也在阅读这些美国文件，同样难以理解这一点。

Military people I know who've been reading these documents in The US that is struggling to figure this out as well.

他们现在还搞不清楚美国对台湾的真实立场是什么。

They can't quite figure out what the position on Taiwan actually is at this point.

但我们没有看到我所说的那种长期、高度战略性的产业经济战。

But we are not seeing the long range, highly strategic industrial economic warfare, I called it.

我仍然认为，拜登政府对中国实施的本质上就是这种战争。

I still think it's essentially that, that the Biden administration was engaged in against China.

他们真的以为能靠专家式的操作搞定一切，搞清楚哪些芯片不能给中国，从而在人工智能竞赛中占据优势。

They really thought they could wonk the hell out of this and figure out which chips not to give the Chinese so that we'd ridden the AI race.

他们真的相信这一点。

They think they really believe that.

哦，他们真的这么认为。

Oh, they believe that.

是的。

Yeah.

而且很多时候，很多人都说这很荒谬，因为你无法阻止人们绕过你设置的任何障碍，他们总会找到创新的方法。

And lots of people at times said that's silly because you can't because people will innovate around whatever blockage you put there.

我认为确实需要很多条件，但无论如何，特朗普政府上台后直接说：这些芯片给你们。

I think that there But anyway, that's You need a lot of things, but the the the Trump administration then just come in and be like, here are the chips.

对。

Yeah.

令人惊讶的是

With surprisingly

一堆劣质芯片，然后他们自己内部争论，是否真的做了一笔精明的交易，只给了对方一堆垃圾货，真是够吵的。

crap chips, and then they argue amongst themselves whether they've, like, oh, done a really cunning deal and only given them the rubbish ones Well loud.

对。

Yeah.

看着这一切真是疯狂。

It's it's it's wild to watch.

你知道，我一开始问你的问题是，今年达沃斯在多大程度上并非发生了什么事件终结了旧秩序。

You know, one of things I I began by asking you was the degree to which Davos this year it's not that something had happened at Davos ended the old order.

更确切地说，我认为这是一个关键时刻，特朗普的表现、卡尼的表现，让人们意识到某件已经发生的事。

It's more that it was a moment, I think, when Trump's performance, Karni's performance, it was a moment of recognition of a thing that had happened.

你是否觉得即将到来的事已经成型了？

Do you feel that what is coming has shaped?

是否已经出现了另一种秩序，还是我们只是处于一个可能非常危险的过渡期，一切都尚未结构化或稳定？

There's another order visible, or are we just in possibly quite dangerous interinium where where nothing is quite structured or stable.

我认为，我的观点是，我们甚至根本没处在过渡期。

I think I mean, I'm like, I'm dying on the hill that we're not even in an interregnum.

因为过渡期意味着之后会有一个新的统治秩序。

Because an interregnum implies another regnum afterwards.

它暗示了一种历史观，认为当前只是其中的一个间隙，而我不明白我们为何有理由做这样的假设。

It implies a vision of history which has this as an ellipse between And I don't see why we would feel that we're entitled to make that assumption.

你知道，为了更具体地谈全球金融霸权，我们有一个从英国主导模式转向美国模式的例子。

You know, in terms of global financial hegemons to make it more concrete, we have one example of the transition from a British centered model to The US model.

我们为什么假设一定会有什么东西接替呢？

Why do we assume that we something follows?

你可以把这些事情追溯到荷兰人和热那亚人，但我就是不认同。

You can do these weird things where you extend this back to the Dutch and the Genoese, but I I just don't buy it.

看看我们讨论气候政治时所依赖的那条曲线。

Look at the curve on which we think climate politics.

它在这条曲线上看起来像什么？

Does it look on that curve?

因为这条曲线只朝一个方向发展，而且只会变得更加剧烈的动荡。

Because it's one way and it's just going to more extreme levels of disturbance.

如果我们认真看待这种历史观，并将其与我们唯一一次相对顺利的金融权力过渡联系起来，那为什么我们会认为，最显而易见的未来展望是：二十年后，我们 somehow 会形成某种新秩序呢？

Like if we take that vision of history seriously and link it to the fact we have one instance of a financial transition that went reasonably well, Why would we think that the most obvious way of thinking what comes next is, oh, well, twenty years down the line, we'll somehow have some kind of new order.

我不明白。

I don't get it.

我认为，人们之所以这么想，是因为在全球化世界中，许多不同参与者都希望有一套他们大致能理解并遵循的规则。

Well, I think the reason people would think it is that there is a desire among many different players simultaneously in a globalized world to have rules that they roughly understand how to play by.

许多人利润的实现都依赖于这套规则。

Lots of people have their profits bound up in that.

许多人的政治稳定也依赖于这套规则。

Lots of people have their political stability bound up in that.

因此，你会看到马克·卡尼身上有这种倾向，中国也是如此——其中一个关键点就是，大家都希望有可预测性。

And so you see it with Mark Carney, in a way you see it with China, which is one of things to be fairly predictable, that there is a desire for predictability.

特朗普，以及某种程度上普京，但更确切地说是特朗普，作为主要大国的领导人，其独特之处在于他完全不追求可预测性。

What what makes Trump and in some ways Putin, but I would say specifically Trump quite unique as a world leader of a major power, is he has no desire for predictability.

但全球绝大多数经济参与者，比如在达沃斯发言的中国官员，都更倾向于讲求可预测性。

But most of the global economy you talk about the Chinese officials who speak Davos better than Yeah.

就连达沃斯的官员现在也这么做了。

Even the Davos officials now do.

是的。

Yeah.

他们和许多人一样，就像马克·卡尼在担任央行行长时期那样，希望找到一种方法，让交易变得合理。

They have a desire as many others do, as Mark Carney going back to his days as a central banker does, to say, well, we gotta figure out some way of making the transactions make sense.

但我觉得你这么说很有道理。

But I mean, I like the way you put it.

我确实认为这是一种纯粹的渴望式思维。

Like, I would definitely think it's it's literally desiring thinking.

它本质上基于某种哲学人类学或社会学的观点，认为人们需要稳定，因此稳定就会自然出现，对吧？

It's literally based on the idea that there's some sort of philosophical anthropology that says people need or sociology that says people need stability, so therefore stability will somehow emerge, right?

尽管会有一些有权势的人有动力去推动它。

Although there'll be very powerful people motivated to make it.

如果你从这个层面提出论点，确实很难反驳。

If that's the level at which you pitch the argument, it's hard to disagree with.

我只是不知道这之后会引出什么。

I just don't know what follows from that.

马克·卡尼本人在2019年那篇非常有趣的杰克逊霍尔论文中提出，多极秩序——不是单一秩序，而是多个相互重叠的秩序——可能是存在的。

What Carney himself argued back in 2019 in this very interesting Jackson Hole paper, should maybe link it in the show notes or something, it's really worth going back to, is that it could be the case that a multipolar order, which isn't a single order, but is multiple different orders that are overlapping.

因此，这与简单的霸权非常不同，更像是一种网络结构，可能具备单极秩序所不具备的稳定性特征。

So very unlike a simple hegemony, more like a kind of mesh, could have stability properties that say a bipolar order doesn't have.

他在那篇论文中论证道，未来的利益最好通过寻找新的单极行为体或维持两极体系来实现，而应通过稳定与秩序网络的扩散来实现。

That's how he argues in that paper is that the interests of the future will be best served not by looking for a new unipolar actor or perpetuating a bipolar system, but in the proliferation of networks of stability and ordering.

所以当德国人问我时，德国人对这种秩序思维非常着迷。

So when Germans ask me, Germans are really addicted to this order thinking.

甚至有一种德国经济学流派叫做秩序自由主义。

There's even a school of German economics called order liberalism.

我总是试图反驳这一点，说如果你在寻找秩序，你永远也看不到它。

I always try and like push back on this and say, if you're looking for order, you'll never see it.

但如果你关注的是秩序的尝试、行动，正如你所说，这种实用主义方法其实无处不在。

But if you're looking for ordering attempts, actions, the pragmatic approach, as you say, it's all around us already all the time.

因此，我认为这种世界图景——一个充满秩序尝试的世界，但并不保证这些尝试最终会汇聚成一个连贯的新网络——我确实觉得很有吸引力。

So I think that kind of image of the world, I do find a world full of ordering attempts without necessarily any promise that they all add up to a coherent new mesh.

而我实际上觉得这几乎很有吸引力，因为毫无疑问，我们从未生活在过这样一个前所未有的星球上。

And that I actually find almost attractive because surely I mean, we have never been in a planet like this before.

我们从未拥有过三十或四十个极其能干的主权国家参与者。

We have never had 30 or 40 incredibly highly competent nation state players.

这确实是前所未有的新情况。

This is really novel stuff.

鉴于你对中国工业成就的惊叹，是的。

Given your sense of awe at what China is doing industrially Yeah.

他们推进的速度、正在构建的电状经济体，你对这一局势的看法并不是我们正从美国主导的秩序机械性地过渡到中国主导的秩序。

The the speed with which they're moving, the creation of the electrostate they're building, your view of the situation is not that we are in a mechanical transition from an American order to a Chinese order.

而是

It's that

我认为这不仅错误且不可能成立。

I think that I think that's not just wrong and implausible.

而且这很危险，因为它会立即触发美国的警报。

It's also dangerous because it immediately sets the American alarm bells off.

对吧？

Right?

如果我们用这些术语来讨论，这正是推动所有极端鹰派立场的原因。

If we speak in those terms, that's what motivates all of the ultra hawkish position.

如果，你知道，如果这是唯一的选择，那么这种势力范围的模式——也许特朗普政府中的一些人赞同的——可能只是比直接在这场问题上发生全面对抗这种最糟糕的第六或第七种选择稍好一点的第三或第四种替代方案。

And if, you know, if that is the option, then this sort of spheres of influence kind of model that maybe some people in the Trump administration approve of may be a third or fourth best alternative to the sixth or seventh worst kind of option, which will be flat out confrontation over this question.

不，我不这么认为。

No, I don't see that.

广泛的影响力，是的。

Pervasive influence, sure.

各个网络层面的努力，绝对如此。

Individual network efforts, absolutely.

中国人有着令人惊叹的远距离输电愿景，计划将东盟连接成一个统一的电力系统，但在我看来，这并不等于全球霸权。

Chinese have got these extraordinary visions of ultra long distance electricity transmission wiring up ASEAN in a single electricity system, but it doesn't add up to global hegemony to my mind.

除此之外，我只是说，我正在学习中文，而它显然不是一种显而易见的通用语言。

Apart from anything else, simply I mean, I'm in the business of learning Chinese and that it is not an obvious lingua franca.

它并不像这样。

It's not liking this.

我的意思是，二十世纪中期的美国霸权是极其独特的，而单极时刻更是如此。

I mean, American hegemony is, in the mid twentieth century, is extraordinarily unique and even more the unipolar moment.

从历史角度看，这些是极为独特的现象。

There are extraordinary unique formations in historical terms.

我没有理由从这一点推导出我们下一步将走向何种历史模式。

I don't see any reason to derive from that some sort of historical model of where we go next.

那我来提最后一个问题是。

Then I'll ask our final question.

您会向观众推荐哪三本书？

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

我的第一本推荐是中国经典作品，不是古代经典，而是现代经典—— arguably 第一部现代中文中篇小说《狂人日记》，这是一部非凡的第一人称叙述，讲述一个人苏醒后逐渐相信自己身处一个食人世界时的谵妄状态。

So my first is a Chinese classic, not not an ancient classic, but a modern classic, arguably the first modern Chinese novella, Lucian's Diary of a Madman, which is the most extraordinary kind of first person account of the delirium of a person waking up into a world where they begin to convince themselves that is a world of cannibalism.

它是对二十世纪初中国社会的复杂隐喻。

And it's a complex metaphor about Chinese society in the early twentieth century.

这些作品篇幅很短，但却极其出色，心理上极具吸引力。

They're very short, but they're utterly brilliant and psychologically compelling.

所以我的第二个推荐是乔纳森·查特温的《南方之旅》，这本书精彩地记录了1992年邓小平南巡的故事——那是在1989年天安门事件镇压之后，他重新启动改革开放计划的关键时刻。

So my second suggestion is Jonathan Chatwin's book, The Southern Tour, which is an extraordinary account of Deng Xiaoping's tour of Southern China in 1992, in the moment when after the repression of Tiananmen Square in '89, he revives the reform and opening up project.

这是中国经济改革进程中具有传奇色彩的时刻，正是这一进程造就了现代中国。

So this legendary moment in the economic reform process that has made modern China.

而第三个推荐是诗歌。

And the third suggestion is poetry.

我热爱诗歌。

I love poetry.

我很难找到时间从头到尾读完小说，但我喜欢诗歌那种浓缩的力量与活力。

I struggle to find time to read novels from start to finish, and I like the compressed power and energy of poetry.

这本书来自我的一位朋友，柏林的朋友瑞安·鲁比。

And this is by a friend, a Berlin friend, Ryan Ruby.

它叫做《语境崩塌》，实际上是一首包含诗歌历史的诗作。

It's called Context Collapse, and it is literally a poem containing a history of poetry.

这是一首非凡的长诗，前几天晚上我和他喝酒时还问起过它。

So it is an extraordinary long form poem in which he and I was asking about it over drinks the other night.

他为什么要这么做？

Why did he do it?

这是一种狂热的尝试，用诗歌来书写这种形式的历史，以及它在现代文化中的语境崩塌。

It's this delirious effort to write in poetry, a history of the form and the collapse of its context in modern culture.

这真是一部杰作。

It's truly a tour de force.

亚当·图韦，非常感谢您。

Adam Toews, thank you very much.

谢谢您邀请我。

Thank you for having me.

本集《Issacraland Show》由罗兰·胡制作。

This episode of the Issacraland Show is produced by Roland Hu.

事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯和凯特·辛克莱尔完成。

Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair.

我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·盖尔德，额外混音由阿明·扎霍达完成，我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Amin Zahoda, our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

该节目的制作团队还包括安妮·加尔文、玛丽·卡西翁、马里娜·金、杰克·麦科迪克、克里斯滕·林恩、埃梅特·凯尔贝克和简·科贝尔。

The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Marina King, Jack McCordick, Kristen Lynn, Emmett Kelbeck, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由阿曼·萨霍塔和帕特·麦卡斯克尔创作。

Original music by Ahman Sahota and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由克里斯蒂娜·塞马卢斯基和香农·巴斯塔负责。

Audience strategy by Christina Cemaluski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》观点音频的总监是安妮·罗斯·斯特拉瑟。

The director of New York Times opinion audio is Annie Rose Strasser.