我请一位前特朗普政府官员为这场战争辩护

所以你的观点是，理解这一点的方式是，在特朗普政府外交政策的大框架下，他们确实对美国卷入可能导致政权垮台并长期承诺其中的战争持怀疑态度。

So your view is that the way to understand this is that within the sort of broad space of the Trump administration's foreign policy is, yes, they are skeptical of American getting involved in wars that will lead to the collapse of regimes and and and being committed to that.

但对他们来说，伊朗的核计划是一种独特的威胁。

But to them, Iran's nuclear program was such a distinctive threat.

是的。

Yes.

他们必须这么做。

They needed to do this.

是的。

Yes.

我能理解这一点。

I can understand that.

我真的很担心这样一个世界：在我看来，我们根本没有做好规划，也没有与美国民众或国会充分沟通，以获得他们对这一行动计划的支持。

I really worry about this world in which it just doesn't seem to me we have done the planning or talked to the American people or congress to get them committed to this plan of action.

你如何看待这一层面的问题？

How do you think about that dimension of it?

即使是伊拉克战争，当时也有更多的公众辩论。

Even in the Iraq war, there was a lot more public debate.

你知道，当时有人作证讨论我们需要多少兵力。

You know, we had people testifying about how many troops we would need.

在国情咨文中，关于伊朗的只提到寥寥几句。

In the State of the Union, there were only a couple sentences on on Iran.

在我看来，这比美国人民所准备接受的承诺要大得多。

It feels to me like a larger commitment than the American people were quite prepared for.

我认为这场战争还没结束，而且我们几乎每天都能看到哈格斯塔夫部长的新闻发布会。

Well, I don't think it's over, and I think we've seen press conferences almost every day by secretary Hagstaff.

这场战争的条款将由我们每一步来决定。

The terms of this war will be set by us at every step.

任务目标明确：摧毁伊朗的导弹、无人机及其生产设施，歼灭其海军和关键安全基础设施，切断其获得核武器的途径。

The mission is laser focused, obliterate Iran's missiles and drones and facilities that produce them, annihilate its navy and critical security infrastructure, and sever their pathway to nuclear weapons.

伊朗永远不可能拥有核弹，只要我们在，就绝不可能。

Iran will never possess a nuclear bomb, not on our watch, not ever.

由参联会主席凯恩

By chairman of the joint chiefs, Kane

此次行动再次以明确的军事目标展开，旨在彻底摧毁伊朗今天及未来向外投射力量的能力。

The operation was again launched with clear military objectives designed to dismantle Iran's ability to project power outside of its borders both today and in the future.

我们多次看到总统阐述他的四大目标。

And we've seen the president speak and articulate over and over and over his four objectives.

所以我认为这场战争还没有结束。

So I don't think it's over.

国会刚刚就战争权力决议进行了辩论。

Congress just debated the war powers resolution.

所以我真的觉得这场战争还没有结束。

So I I just I don't think it's over.

我觉得，你知道，现在局势正在展开，而且总统确实频繁发言。

I I think, you know, it's unfolding now, and certainly the president talks a lot.

但我觉得，回到我们关于特朗普外交政策根本性转变的总体讨论，他们可能会认为，对伊朗的打击凸显了全球机构在应对美国安全威胁——或他们所认为的美国安全威胁——方面的失败。

But I think, you know, to go back to the overall discussion here about fundamental shifts in Trump foreign policy, I think they would argue that part of the strikes on Iran illustrate the failure of global institutions to actually deal with threats to US security or what they see as threats to US security.

因此，这是一种更广泛的批评和一系列行动，旨在抵制这些机构通常的行为或不作为方式。

And so it's a broader critique and a broader set of actions designed to push back on the way that those institutions tend to act or not act.

这实际上引出了你最近提出的一个观点，我认为这对这里的思考非常重要。

This actually gets to an argument you've made recently that I think is important for thinking about here.

你曾在《外交事务》上发表了一篇题为《全球主义幻觉》的文章。

You wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs called the globalist delusion.

给我讲讲这篇文章的核心观点。

Tell me about the argument of that.

当然。

Sure.

那篇文章的观点是，对于如何看待世界以及应对全球问题，存在两种相互竞争的视角。

The argument there was that there are two competing ways of sort of looking at the world and how to approach problems in the world.

一种是更传统的全球主义方法来处理这些问题。

One is a more traditional globalist approach to those problem sets.

也就是说，世界上存在各种全球性问题，我们需要全球性的解决方案。

So, essentially, that means there are global problems that unfold all around the world, and we need global solutions.

有一位联合国秘书长曾用过一个说法，你知道的，‘没有护照的问题’。

There was a phrase that, a UN secretary general used, you know, problems without passports.

意思是这些问题在全球范围内发生，无论是碳排放、移民还是贫困，它们遍布世界各地，因此我们需要全球性的解决方案来应对这些问题。

The sense that these problems unfold around the world, whether it's carbon emissions or migration or poverty, and they happen all around the world, and so we need global solutions to those problems.

但还有另一种看待世界的方式，它确实承认世界上存在各种问题，但解决这些问题的最佳方式并非采取全球思维，而是将国家置于首位的思维。

But there's another way of looking at the world, which might acknowledge that there are problems, sure, there are problems that exist around the world, but the best way to approach them is not with a global mindset, but with a mindset that puts the state first.

我认为，无论是特朗普第一任期还是第二任期，特朗普政府明显倾向于将国家视为世界上主要的运作力量。

It's clearly, I think, the proclivity of the Trump administration, both Trump one and Trump two, to put the state first as kind of the key operating force in the world.

对特朗普及其身边的人来说，这是一件好事。

And to Trump and those around him, that's a good thing.

对吧？

Right?

但在2025年国家安全战略中，他们明确指出，民族国家是世界上权力和行动的主要来源。

But in in the 2025 National Security Strategy, they stated pretty clearly the nation state is a is the primary source of power in the world and of action in the world.

所以我听到的一个观点，实际上我觉得这比左派更深刻地分裂了右派，那就是他们接受了这种说法。

So one argument I've heard that actually feels to me like it's splitting the right much more than the left is that they bought this.

对吧？

Right?

他们完全奉行美国优先。

They are full in on America first.

我们必须把国家放在首位，而他们认为这不仅仅关乎美国的直接利益或以色列的直接利益。

We have to put the state first, and they feel that this is less about America's direct interest and Israel's direct interests.

你怎么看待这个似乎正在分裂MAGA阵营的观点？

How do you think about that argument that has seemed to be splitting MAGA?

我认为这符合美国的最佳利益，也是美国明确表达过的立场，我认为总统已经清楚表明，他既从美国的利益也从以色列的利益出发来看待这个问题。

I think it's in America's best interest, also stated interest, and I think the president has made it clear that he sees this in both America's interests and Israel's interests.

所以，当你通过联合国时，会出现这样一种观点：你得到的不是行动，而是程序。

So then you have this argument that one thing happening when you go through the United Nations is it instead of getting action, what you get is process.

你得到的是官僚主义。

You get bureaucracy.

这一直是人们对联合国的批评，而你也在文章中提出了这样的批评。

You get I mean, this is a long time critique of of the United Nations, a critique you're you're making in the in the article.

能跟我讲讲这种想法吗？

Tell me a little bit about this thinking here.

因为即使是之前的共和党总统，比如布什，他们也会大张旗鼓地去联合国，最终还是以‘愿意联盟’的名义出兵伊拉克。

Because even kind of previous Republican presidents like Bush, they sort of made a big show of going to the UN, eventually went into Iraq with a I think it was a coalition of the willing it got called back then.

而且，你知道，像奥巴马这样的不同总统，最终也都会绕开它。

And, you know, different presidents, this happened with Obama too, would would eventually go around it.

但当时有一种感觉，认为向国际社会阐明立场、争取国际社会支持是有价值的。

But there was a feeling that there was a value in trying to make the case to the international community, trying to bring the international community along.

这带来了合法性。

It brought legitimacy.

它或许有助于约束其他国家，形成了一种所有人都必须经过的程序维度。

It maybe helped restrain others, created a a sort of dimension everybody was supposed to go through.

你为什么说这不符合美国的利益？

Why do you say that's not in America's interest?

我不是说这不符合美国的利益。

I'm not saying it's not in America's interest.

我说的是，仅仅进行表演性的讨论是有代价的。

I'm saying that there are costs to just doing performative discussions.

而且，我认为特朗普更愿意指出这种无所作为、反复做相同事情的做法，并更加关注实际成果。

And, essentially, I think Trump is much more willing to call out inaction, consistently doing the same things, and to focus more on outcomes.

所以，是的，我们有与盟友和志同道合的国家沟通和分享信息的利益，但我不认为我们需要花大量时间与古巴打交道，当古巴还坐在人权理事会里的时候。

So, yeah, we have an interest in communicating and sharing information with allies and partners with like minded nations, but I don't know that we need to spend a lot of time with Cuba when Cuba's on the human rights council.

我的意思是，特朗普只是愿意指出许多虚伪之处，并直接问：我们难道不能在这里做得更好吗？

I mean, I think Trump is just willing to call out many hypocrisies and just ask, well, can't we do better here?

我认为在很多方面，他并不认为这些机构是解决问题所必需的。

And I think in in many ways, he doesn't see these institutions as necessarily necessary to solving problems.

因此，这就是我们认为与盟友和伙伴存在分歧的地方。

And so that's where I think we see some of the differences with our allies and partners.

我们的欧洲盟友——我有很多欧洲朋友，也经常与欧洲大使们交流——他们在某种程度上对这种做法感到不安。

Our European allies, and I have great European friends and talk to a lot of the European ambassadors, they're uncomfortable with this in a sense.

他们通常从一个前提出发：我们应该首先通过多边全球机制来开展工作。

They start from a premise that we should be working through multilateral global first, generally.

我的意思是，我在做一般性概括。

I mean, I'm generalizing.

通常，这是他们的出发点。

Generally, that's their starting point.

而特朗普的出发点并不是这样。

And Trump's starting point is not that.

他的出发点是：解决这个问题的最佳方式是什么？

It's what's the best way to solve this problem?

也许是两个人坐在桌旁。

Maybe it's two people at the table.

也许是三个人，但很可能不是三十个人。

Maybe it's three people, but it's probably not 30.

我认为我的文章试图详细说明，即使在全球机构所追求的结果方面——比如消除贫困、粮食安全、气候变化——这些机构也并未奏效。

And I think my article really tries to go through and show how even in terms of the outcomes that global institutions want, the things that are important to them, whether it's eradication of poverty, food security, climate change, they haven't worked.

所以，这篇文章的范围比特朗普更广。

So the article was broader than Trump.

我认为这与特朗普对国际机构的看法是一致的。

I think it's aligned with Trump's view of international institutions.

但总体而言，我们需要一个更好的操作系统来实现更好的解决方案。

But overall, we need a better operating system to get to better solutions.

所以，我一直在思考特朗普对行动的偏好，我认为这对他来说无疑是真实的，是的。

So one thing I was thinking about around Trump and his preference for action, which I think is undeniably true to him Yeah.

在我看来，对某些人来说，这既有吸引力的一面，也有不利的一面。

And I think in some ways to people is attractive, there's an upside and a downside to that.

大量流程的弊端当然是会被流程拖累，这种情况经常发生。

The downside of a lot of process is, of course, you just get weighed down in process, and it happens all the time.

某些流程的好处在于，这正是为什么我们有国会这样的审议机构，因为它们迫使你进行深思熟虑。

The upside of some process, I mean, this is why we have deliberative institutions like congress, is that they do force you to deliberate.

它们迫使你真正建立支持。

They would force you to actually build support.

它们迫使你质疑自己的假设。

They would force you to question your assumptions.

你对美国利益的判断是否立即准确？

Is your sense of America's interest immediately right?

你对这可能需要什么的判断是否经过充分验证？

Is your sense of what this might require fully vetted?

你是否倾听过那些可能知道你所不了解的信息的声音？

Have you listened to voices that might know things that that you don't?

而且，正如我们前面所说的，我觉得很明显的一点是，特朗普在这里做出了一个决定。

And, I mean, to what we were saying earlier, you know, the the thing I felt I think is pretty clear is Trump made a call here.

他们并没有进行大量的情景规划。

There's not been a huge amount of scenario planning.

他们也没有进行大量的预先审议。

They've not done a tremendous amount of predeliberation.

会发生什么？

What's gonna happen?

他们现在正在应对，并且愿意处于这种模糊的反应状态中。

They're now reacting to, and they're willing to be in this kind of ambiguous reactive space.

难道这些不同的声音——尤其是国会和美国民众——不会带来好处吗？他们能确保你为采取这样的行动获得了足够的支持，确保你已充分考虑了可能发生的各种情况，而不是在事情出错时独自承担后果，或仅仅与以色列一起承担。

Is there not an upside to these different you know, certainly congress and the American people in terms of making sure that you actually have brought enough support for doing something like this and making sure you've thought through the things that might happen and you're not left holding the bag alone or just alone alongside Israel, things begin to go wrong.

自1973年以来，每一位总统都曾表示《战争权力决议》违宪。

Well, every president since 1973 has said the war powers resolution was unconstitutional.

每一位总统都是如此。

Every single president.

没有一位总统愿意让自己的宣战权力受到限制。

No president wanted a constraint on his ability to declare war.

许多保守派法律学者，以及其他一些人则认为，实际上国会拥有这项权力。

And lots of conservative legal scholars, but others will argue that essentially, congress has power.

国会掌握着财政大权，但并不意味着——这是一场由来已久的宪法争议，早在特朗普之前就已存在。

It has power of the purse, but it does not I mean, this is a this is a long standing constitutional debate that completely predates

特朗普。

Trump.

过去的总统在处理伊朗问题时，比特朗普更显著地经过了国会程序。

Past presidents have gone through congress much more significantly than Trump did with this Iran.

我认为这无可争议。

I don't think that's arguable.

我的意思是，我看着布什在伊拉克的做法。

I mean, I I I watch Bush in Iraq.

但再说一遍，我们现在正处于第五天中间。

Like, But, again, we're in the middle we're five days into

但布什是在开战前这么做的。

But Bush did that before he started the war.

这正是重点。

That's the point.

特朗普绝对不应该在开战前这么做。

Trump absolutely should not have done that before the war.

这并不是说，我只是单纯不同意。

It is not I mean, I I just I just disagree.

没关系。

That's fine.

但那就去论证这个观点。

But then make that case.

这个观点是，这样做会放弃巨大的行动安全优势。

Well, the case is that it would have given up huge operational, I mean, security.

我的意思是，他们本可以——整个袭击的要点就是在伊朗人还不知道会发生什么之前就行动，出于行动安全的考虑，以最佳方式创造条件，就是华盛顿常说的那句话，我不太喜欢的说法——为军事成功铺好路。

I mean, they would have I mean, the whole point of the strike was to go in before the Iranians knew what was going to happen for operational security reasons, to set the conditions in the best way, that Washington phrase that I don't like, set the table in the best way for military success.

我认为特朗普之所以做出这样的选择，是因为他不想放弃这种行动安全，而且时机如此敏感和紧迫，这就是我认为他做出这个决定的原因。

I think Trump made the choice he did because he didn't want to give up that operational security, and the timing was so sensitive and so narrow that that's why I think he made that decision.

我之所以追问这一点，是因为无论是对委内瑞拉还是这里，他都在没有赢得美国民众或国会支持的情况下，迅速做出决策。

The reason I'm pushing on this is both with Venezuela and with here, He's making decisions to go very fast before he's built support among the American people or congress.

这改变了美国行事的方式。

That is a change in the way America is acting.

这种改变是好是坏，我认为需要时间来理解，但这确实是一个真正的转变。

Whether that change is good or bad, I think will take time to understand, but that seems like a real change.

他愿意承担风险，本质上是把承担风险的意愿置于程序之上。

He's willing to take risk, and he's basically elevating a willingness to take risk over process.

如果两年后委内瑞拉的局势好转了，数百万离开家园的委内瑞拉人纷纷回国，人们会说这是个错误吗？

If in two years, the situation in Venezuela is much better, Venezuelans who the millions who've left their homeland go back, Will people say that's a mistake?

大概不会。

Probably not.

而且，他还在向美国民众传达信息。

And in addition, he is speaking to the American people.

我的意思是，特朗普在电视上发声。

I mean, Trump is on TV.

他正在召开新闻发布会。

He's giving press conferences.

正如我所说，国防部也在电视上亮相。

And as I said, the Department of War is on TV.

他们正在解释正在发生的事情。

They're explaining what's happening.

他们正在说明行动的进程。

They're explaining the, the course of action.

他们正在解释军事目标和宗旨。

They're explaining military targets, goals.

这件事正在发生。

It's happening.

所以，从内部来看，你真的认为在这些冲突发生前国会没有作用吗？

So, internally, you really don't believe there's a role for congress before these conflicts?

我相信总统可以直接向美国人民阐明立场，而国会的作用在于掌控财政拨款。

I believe the president can make a case directly to the American people, and congress's role is the power of the purse.

国会的立场是，一旦我们开战，如果他们不喜欢，就可以切断资金。

Congress The case for congress is once we have gone to war, if they don't like it, they can remove the money.

国会没有宪法赋予的宣战权力。

Congress does not have a constitutional role in the declaration of war.

国会拥有切断战争经费的权力，这一点他们已经威胁要采取，而总统无需获得许可。

Congress has a role in cutting off funds for wars, which it is threatened to do, and the president doesn't have to get permission.

但没错，你们可以进行辩论。

But, yes, you can debate.

你可以认为这是他的决定，以及他想如何处理这件事。

You can decide that's his choice and how he wants to do it.

我的意思是，这里我要引用宪法。

I mean, here I will quote the constitution.

国会拥有宣战的权力。

The congress shall have power to declare war.

颁发捕获许可和报复令，并制定关于陆地和海上捕获的规则。

Grant letters of mark and reprisal and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

总统是陆军的总司令，但宣战的权力属于国会。

The president shall be the commander in chief of the army, but it is congress that has the power to declare war.

从宪法上讲，国会拥有宣战的权力，但问题是，总统在国外部署军事力量时，是否必须先获得国会宣战授权。

Constitutionally, congress has the power to declare war, but the issue is whether or not a president who deploys military force abroad needs to do so only after having congress declare war.

一些宪法学者，比如罗伯特·特纳和约翰·余，他们并非法律专家，但认为问题在于“宣战”一词的含义，以及“宣战”与总统在全球部署美军能力之间的区别——而美国总统已经这样做了至少两百次，具体次数取决于你从何时开始计算，但至少有几十次、上百次之多，且从未经过正式宣战。

There are arguments by constitutional lawyers, which I'm not, like Robert Turner and John Yu, who argue that the issue has to do with the term declaration and what was meant by declare versus the president's ability to deploy US forces around the world, which US presidents have done, like, 200 times depending on when you start looking hundreds at least dozens and dozens and dozens of times without a declaration of war.

所以核心问题是：总统每次部署美军时，是否都必须征得国会同意？

So the issue is more, does the president have to go to congress every time he deploys US forces?

而这场辩论在于，什么构成宣战，以及部署美军或在国外使用美军武力之间的区别。

And the debate is about what constitutes a declaration of war versus a deployment of US troops or the use of US military force abroad.

在战争中，你认为国会的角色是什么？

What to you is Congress's role in war?

国会确实有宣战的权利。

Congress does have the right to declare war.

国会参与战争的根本角色在于它掌握财政大权，控制着进行战争所需的资金，这实际上是非常强大的。

Congress' fundamental role in war is that it has the power of the purse, and it controls the money that you need to execute wars, and that's really, really powerful.

话虽如此，国会通常不希望切断对美国士兵的经费支持。

Having said that, Congress often does not want to cut American soldiers off from funding.

所以我理解这一点。

So I understand that.

对吧？

Right?

这是越南战争后彻底切断资金支持的后果之一，许多人对此非常批评，认为我们最终的结果部分是因为我们无法支持自己扶植的政府，而且所有资金都被切断了。

It was part of the post Vietnam debacle of cutting money off completely, and a lot of people are very critical of that and say that the outcome partly that we ended up with was because we couldn't support the government that we had put in and that all money was cut off.

因此，过去国会曾利用其财政权来影响战争的结果。

So congress in the past has used that power of the purse to affect the outcomes of war.

但国会本身也可以成为总统寻求讨论的平台，尽管总统并无义务向国会请求宣战。

But congress itself can be a form for discussion if a president so uses it, but the president is not obliged to go to congress to ask for a declaration of war.

我理解你的观点，显然长期以来，两党的总统都曾部署美军并使用武力，而未正式宣战。

I take your point that, obviously, presidents of both parties for a long time have done deployment of US forces and application of of of force without declarations of war.

你这就触及到一个问题：究竟什么才算得上是战争？

You get into this, like, what is a war really?

是的。

Right.

但我之所以坚持这一点，是因为我认为，让美国人民参与他们必须出资和参战的战争，这其中蕴含着智慧。

But I think the the reason I am pushing on this is that it feels to me that there is wisdom in bringing the American people along into a war that they're gonna have to fund and fight.

而且别忘了，也不能把联合国排除在外。

And that when you cut not forget cutting the UN out of it.

当你把国会和公众排除在外时，对于像对伊朗开战这样重大的行动，这绝非小事，我认为我们这里不是只进行了一次小规模打击。

When you cut congress and the public out of it, for something that can be quite significant, going to war in Iran is not a small thing, and I don't think we just did a little strike here.

我们被告知接下来会有数周的轰炸，并且听说唐纳德·特朗普也开放了地面部队介入的可能性。

We're being told there are multiple weeks of bombing coming, and we're being told that, you know, Donald Trump is open to boots on the ground.

在没有充分征询公众意见的情况下采取行动——而通常这种征询是通过国会进行的——我不禁怀疑这是否明智。

And doing that without the public being significantly consulted, which would typically happen through congress, I wonder about its wisdom.

我认为宪法中保留宣战权是有其深意的。

I I take that declaration of war power to be there in the constitution for a reason.

这可不是对一个恐怖分子据点的小规模打击。

This was not like a little strike on a terror cell.

这是美国在推翻一个外国政权，并可能要为之后发生的一切承担责任。

This is America decapitating a foreign regime and possibly taking responsibility for what comes next.

我认为总统应该向美国人民说明他正在做什么以及打算做什么，但我觉得现在已经在这样做了。

I think there should be an explanation to the American people of what the president is doing and intends to do, but I I think that that is going on now.

所以我想我们之间的分歧可能在于是否必须通过国会正式程序，以及如何实际去国会进行类似国情咨文那样的说明。

So I think maybe our difference is the formality of through congress, but you know, and how to actually do go to congress and do another type of state of the union.

也许那正是你更倾向于的做法。

Maybe that's probably something that you would prefer.

他没有

He didn't

我的意思是，我希望他能阐明立场，努力让美国人民了解他们即将卷入的事情。

I I mean, I think I would prefer that he makes the case and tries to bring the American people into what they are getting into.

对我来说，我们讨论的不是形式问题。

To to me, we're not talking about a formality.

我更关心的不是正式的宣战声明，而是我们已经承诺走向一个可能升级的局面，而美国国内对此并没有进行充分的审议。

I care less about the literal declaration than I do about the fact that we're committed toward that feels like it's going to escalate, and that there was not a significant deliberation of that in The United States.

是的

Yes.

但我觉得，传统的审议过程——即具体的细节讨论——通常发生在白宫的战情室里。

But I think traditionally that deliberation, the nuts and bolts deliberation happens at the White House in the Situation Room.

我认为，对这些空袭的讨论和理由已经反复阐述过了。

I think the discussion and the rationale for the strikes were articulated over and over.

我理解你的观点，埃兹拉，认为应该更多地去国会说明情况，我能理解你的立场，但我觉得这样做并不违宪。

I can see your point, Ezra, that explaining those, going to congress more, I can see your point of view, but I think it's not unconstitutional to do that.

我认为这是总统的决定。

I think it's a president's choice.

而且我认为有必要再次指出，美国历史上只有过五次正式宣战，非常少。

And I do think it's important that to note again that I think there have been five declarations of war in American history, very few.

我认为自1941年以来就没有过。

I think none since 1941.

所以我认为，这是我们多年来一直存在的一个问题和紧张来源。

So I think it's a a problem and a source of tension that we've seen for many, many years.

我仅从新闻报道中了解到，卢比奥国务卿确实去国会了。

My understanding just from reading the news reports is that secretary Rubio did go to the Hill.

有八人小组，他确实与他们进行了交谈。

There's the gang of eight, and he did speak with them.

但我认为，在行动前过多解释计划，与保护行动安全之间存在一种艰难的张力，而这确实会危及美国人的生命。

But I think there is a, a difficult tension between explaining too much of what you're going to do before you do it and then risking operational security, which really does risk American lives.

所以我认为，这场对话还没有结束。

So I I don't think the dialogue is over.

我认为，我们陷入这种情况的时间越长，就越需要进行更多这样的对话，提供更多的解释。

I think that the longer we're in this, the more we need, the more those conversations should be having, explanations, you know, should be given.

我认为美国人民会支持这一点。

I think the American people are do that.

那么，您如何看待这种策略的弊端——我们在没有充分公开辩论的情况下介入并推翻政权？

So what do you see as the downsides of this strategy where we are moving in and sort of decapitating regimes without a lot of sort of public debate beforehand?

这种做法有什么负面影响吗？还是说这只是以往总统们应该做但没做的事？

Is there a downside to it, or is this just something that past presidents should have done but didn't?

不。

No.

当然，存在不确定性。

Of course, there's uncertainty.

但如果你反过来想，伊朗拥有核武器的弊端是什么？

But if you flip it and say, what is the downside to a nuclear Iran?

毒品贩子持续强大又会带来什么后果？

What is the downside to the continuing strength of drug cartels?

我的理解和解读是，他愿意承担风险，现在就设定条件，以使美国在未来处于更有利的位置。

My understanding and my interpretation is he's willing to take risks to set conditions now to put The United States in a better place going forward.

他愿意承担这些风险。

He's willing to take those risks.

此外，我认为他在应对中国、俄罗斯方面，实际上大幅增强了威慑力，让人们所谓的‘侵略者轴心’陷入被动。

In addition, he is de facto hugely increasing deterrence, I think, in terms of China, in terms of Russia, in terms of putting, you know, what people call the axis of aggressors sort of on their heels.

谁知道呢？

And who knows?

几年后，我们可能会处于一种人们说‘好吧’的境地。

In several years, we might be in a position where people say, okay.

突然间，我们面对的是一个弱化得多的侵略者轴心。

Suddenly, we're facing a much weakened axis of aggressors.

这和一年前的情况看起来完全不同了。

Looks totally different than it they did, you know, a year ago.

我确实同意你的一点是，他非常愿意承担风险，并且愿意像其他总统所不做的那样去承受风险。

One thing I definitely agree with you is he's very willing to take risks, and he is willing to absorb risk in a way that other presidents are not.

所以，如果你像过去那样身处国家安全委员会的 Situation Room，你会如何看待这里的风险？

So if you were in the situation room around the NSC as you've been in the past, how would you have thought about the risks here?

你提到过，我们有可能消除伊朗的核计划，或者推翻并建立一个更顺从的政权。

You you've talked about the pros that we could get rid of the Iranian nuclear program, either topple or create a more pliable regime there.

你最担心的是什么？

What would you worry about?

作为一名外交政策专家，你目前最担心的是什么？

What are you currently, as a foreign policy person, worried about?

我认为战争中总是存在不确定性，即使我们在电视上收到简报时，感觉一切都确凿无疑，我依然感到担忧。

Well, I think there's always uncertainty in war, and so I am worried even when when we do get the briefings on TV that there's a sense of absolute certainty that you know?

因为战争，正如每个人都知道的，以及那些著名理论家所说的，总是存在摩擦。

Because war, as everyone knows and as the famous theorists say, it's there's always friction.

总是存在不确定性。

There's always uncertainty.

所以你无法确定。

So you don't know.

是的。

Yeah.

我本人会更担心战后规划和相关思考。

I would worry I personally would worry more about the postwar planning and thinking about it.

我写过一本关于这个的书，叫《战争与治理艺术》，书中研究了美国15次军事干预的案例，探讨了我们总是不得不应对政治不稳定或未能实现稳定的问题。

I wrote a book about that about, called war and the art of governance, which looked at about 15 case studies of America's military interventions and how we always had to deal with problems of political instability and stabilization or not.

所以我个人会希望深入思考这一点，但我不知道他们是否也在这么做。

So I personally would be wanting to think about that, but I don't know that they're not.

最终，如果无所作为的风险高于采取行动的风险，显然白宫正是因此决定推进此事。

And in the end, if the risk is higher of inaction rather than action and clearly, the White House thought that that's why they chose to go forward.

我们不知道伊朗会发生什么。

We don't know what's going to happen in Iran.

目前事情正在发展中。

Things are playing out now.

我们也不知道其他群体将会如何反应。

We don't know what's going to happen with the other populations.

但最终，问题是：新政权会像前政权那样糟糕吗？

But in the end, the question is, is the regime going to be as terrible as the previous regime?

我们不知道。

We don't know.

从你研究过的这些不同干预案例中，有哪些经验教训？

What are some of the lessons of the the book you've already looked across those different interventions?

我认为，基本上，每当美军派兵驻扎时，都不得不持续应对政治稳定和经济重建的问题。

I argued that, basically, the US military, whenever it had boots on the ground, essentially, always had to deal with problems of political stabilization and and economic reconstruction consistently.

他们并不想这么做。

They didn't want to.

军队从来就不想做这件事，所以从来都没有真正做好过相关规划。

The army never wanted to, so there was never actually great planning for it.

但在美国历史上，确实有过一些时期我们做了更多规划，而且这些案例广为人知，比如二战时期的案例。

But there were periods in American history where we did do more planning, and, actually, those cases are well known, the World War two cases.

所以像德国、日本、韩国，除非是意大利。

So Germany, Japan, South Korea, unless they're known Italy.

当时我们深度参与了战后意大利的事务。

We were very involved in postwar Italy at the time.

如果没有美国的介入，共产党就会接管意大利，因此我们进行了深入的政治干预。

Without American involvement, the communists would have taken over Italy, and so there was very deep political involvement.

但这些活动一直被视为我们所说的‘非战争行动’。

But these activities were always seen as what we called operations other than war.

它们从未被一致地视为战争的一部分。

They were never consistently seen as a part of war.

所以我只关注了那些一贯的教训、主题和我们始终面对的一系列问题，这可能正是他们对派遣地面部队如此谨慎的原因。

So I just looked at consistent, lessons and themes and a consistent set of problems we dealt with, which probably is why they are very wary about putting boots on the ground.

对吧？

Right?

因为我们最终可能不得不应对大量这些问题。

Because we would end up probably having to deal with a lot of those problems.

我认为特朗普的观点是，他已经找到了一种无需派遣地面部队的方式来实现这一点。

I think Trump's view is that he has figured out a way to do this without boots on the ground.

对吧？

Right?

在委内瑞拉确实这么做过，成功扶植了马杜罗的继任者，你知道的，我们似乎对这个人有很大影响力。

Certainly did that in Venezuela and was able to identify a successor to Maduro, who, you know, we seem to have a lot of influence over.

我认为，他当然希望在不派地面部队的情况下实现这一点。

And I think, certainly, his hope was to do this without boots on the ground.

你认为他没错吧？我们真的能在不派地面部队的情况下做到吗？

Do you think he's right that we can do it without boots on the ground?

嗯，如果他改变主意，我会非常惊讶。

Well, I would be very surprised if he changed his mind about that.

对吧？

Right?

我会非常非常惊讶。

I'd I'd be very, very surprised.

但问题是，我们能否在不派地面部队的情况下塑造伊朗的下一届政府？

But the question is, can we shape the next government of Iran without boots on the ground?

我不知道。

I don't know.

我认为我们可以做很多事情，其他人也可以在支持伊朗的其他力量方面发挥作用，我认为我们应该做这些事情来支持伊朗的更好力量，

I think there are a lot of things we can do and and others can do in supporting other forces in Iran, and I think we should be doing those things to support, you know, the good forces in Iran, better forces in

这些事情具体指什么？

those things look like?

我的意思是，从星链服务到提供通信能力，到按需提供经济资源，还有许多其他方面，包括情报领域和非情报领域的行动，与该地区如今对伊朗相当不满的海湾国家等其他盟友和伙伴合作。

I mean, everything from Starlink to providing the ability to communicate, to providing economic resources as needed, and there's a whole host of things, probably in the intelligence domain, nonintelligence domain, working with other allies and partners in the region, the Gulf States that now seem to be pretty upset at Iran.

所以我认为有很多事情可以做。

So I think there are lot of things.

我认为波斯人约占伊朗人口的60%，因此还有其他重要的族群。

I think the question is the Persians are about 60% of the Iranian population, so there are other significant populations.

然后会发生什么？

And what happens?

我不知道会发生什么。

I I don't know what will happen.

我们很多人担心会出现类似1991年库尔德人遭遇的情况：美国鼓动他们起来反抗，推翻萨达姆·侯赛因，而我们在轰炸削弱了政权之后，他们却被屠杀。

Many of us are worried about a scenario like what happened with the Kurds in 1991 where America exhorted them to rise up and take back their government and take down Saddam Hussein after we weakened the regime in in in bombings, and he slaughtered them.

而现在，伊朗革命卫队和其他势力在该国拥有这些武器。

And and right now, the Iranian, you know, revolutionary guard and others have the weaponry in that country.

是的。

Right.

即使我们向人们提供星链互联网接入和某些情报共享，但 unarmed、分裂的反对派和民族运动要对抗一个如今正拼命维持权力的、武装到牙齿的国家机器，这无疑会引发极其可怕的暴力。

And even if we were giving people Starlink Internet access and giving them, you know, some intelligence sharing, the idea that unarmed fractured opposition and ethnic movements could rise up against a very, very heavily armed state structure now fighting desperately to hold on to power certainly seems to raise the possibility of absolutely horrible violence.

嗯。

Mhmm.

你对此怎么看？

How do you think about that?

但这种情况确实发生过，就在去年十二月和一月，有三万到四万伊朗人丧生。

Well, it happened, right, with thirty thousand, 40,000 Iranians dying December, January.

这些是相关数据。

Those are the figures.

这在奥巴马时期就发生过。

It's happened under Obama.

许多美国前总统曾鼓动伊朗人民起义，而伊朗人民因此遭到屠杀。

Many American presidents previously have exhorted the Iranian people to rise up, and the Iranian people have been slaughtered.

所以现在，随着政权严重削弱，可能会有不一样的结果。

So there's a chance now that with a significantly weakened regime, there could be a different outcome.

我仍然认为美国不应该派地面部队进入伊朗，但有其他方式可以促成更好的政治结果。

I still don't think American boots should be on the ground in Iran, but there are different ways to orchestrate a better political outcome.

我们作为一个国家，已经决定不把治理这件事做好，无论这是否不可能。

We have decided as a country not to really do the governance stuff well, very well, whether it's impossible or not.

但我觉得我书中的观点是，我们作为一个国家，并没有在二战之后的案例基础上，形成一套连贯的思考方式，以更好地帮助特定国家的正义力量。

But I think the point of my book was to show that we haven't, as a country, decided that we wanna really think about this after those World War two cases in a consistent way that would give us a better chance of helping good forces in particular countries.

如果出现一种支离破碎的、或许还不算内战的场景——暴力频发，政权内部部分势力试图维持权力，街头充斥着各种冲突——这对美国利益意味着什么？

What do you think it means for American interests if you have a scenario where you have a kind of fractured maybe not even civil war ish scenario, but but violence, parts of the regime trying to maintain power, you know, a lot of kind of fighting in the streets.

我们不想派地面部队。

We don't wanna put boots on the ground.

我的意思是，伊朗出现混乱，就像我们在利比亚看到的那样吗？

I mean, is chaos in Iran in the way that we saw in, say, Libya?

因为正如你提到的，

Because as you mentioned,

利比亚就是一个完美的例子。

this is something that Well, Libya is a perfect example.

从美国利益或保守现实主义的角度来看，你如何看待这种情况？

Is that how would you think about that from the perspective of American interests or conservative realism?

从纯粹的人道主义角度来看，这不符合任何人的利益。

Well, from a purely humanitarian perspective, it's not in in anyone's interest.

对吧？

Right?

许多利比亚人已经丧生。

You have a lot of Libyans who've died.

还有大量移民前往欧洲。

You've had migrants who've gone to Europe.

你已经看到了全面的混乱，空袭引发了动荡，并持续产生连锁反应和混乱。

You've seen total disruption, for strikes that went in and led to chaos and continue to have these ripple effects and chaos.

我认为美国不希望看到这种情况。

I don't think America wants to see that.

我认为对以色列来说，情况是不同的。

I think for Israel, it's a different situation.

但最终，如果伊朗的军事能力被削弱到无法再像过去那样对以色列和美国构成威胁——尤其是对以色列，也包括该地区其他国家——那么这就会演变成一场人道主义灾难。

But in the end, if Iran's military capabilities are degraded to such an extent that Iran does not present the kind of threat that it has presented to Israel and The US in the past, especially to Israel, but also other states in the region, then it becomes a humanitarian kind of disaster.

但伊朗的军事实力将长期处于削弱状态，需要很长时间才能恢复，特别是如果我们继续成功摧毁他们的弹道导弹发射器并持续打击其关键军事目标的话。

But Iran is the degraded military power that will take a long, long time to regroup, especially if we're continue to be what seems to be pretty successful in removing their ballistic missile launchers and continuing to strike their key key military targets.

这很不幸。

It's unfortunate.

没有人希望看到长期的混乱，但这也并非必然。

No one wants to see prolonged chaos, but it's also not guaranteed.

我的意思是，或许还存在实现更好结果、带来更多稳定性的机会，也许海湾国家可以更积极地参与，帮助这种稳定局面的形成。

I mean, there could be opportunities for a better outcome, more stability, maybe more involvement by the Gulf States in helping that stability emerge.

你知道，他们也应该考虑这个问题，进行规划，思考一下更好的结果会是什么样子。

You know, they should be thinking about this too, planning too, and thinking about what would a better outcome look like.

我想再多谈一谈这件事的国际法层面。

I wanna talk a little bit more about the international law dimension of this.

我认为，人们普遍感受到，我们正走出一个时代——即使那个时代并不总是公正的，但人们默认的是，大国不会侵犯彼此的领土。

And one thing that people broadly speaking, I think, sense is we are moving out of a period when even if it was not always fault, the assumptions was you will not have great powers kind of breaching each other's borders.

像俄罗斯入侵乌克兰、美国打击委内瑞拉和伊朗领导层这样的事情，不会再被默认接受。

You will not have things like Russia invading Ukraine, America, you know, taking out the Venezuelan and Iranian leaderships.

而我们现在正进入一个全新的阶段。

And we're moving into something else.

在你看来，我们正在进入什么时代？

In your view, what are we moving into?

如果旧秩序正在消亡，那么正在诞生的是什么？

If the old order is dying, what is being born?

我认为，我们正进入一个认识到旧秩序能力极为有限的时代。

I think we're moving into a period which recognizes that much of the old order was quite limited in what it could accomplish.

如果你无法在多个领域实现真正改善人民生活的成果，最终就会滋生愤世嫉俗的情绪，尤其是在民主国家中。

And if you don't actually achieve outcomes across a range of areas that improve the lives of people, you end up creating cynicism, especially for democracies.

因此，我认为我们正进入一个认识到必须从国家层面开始的时期。

So I think we're moving toward a period in which there's a recognition that you have to begin at the state level.

我并不反对建立联盟。

I'm not against building coalitions.

我认为确实需要建立联盟，但要与志同道合的盟友和伙伴合作，同时保持扩大合作范围的可能性，共同应对问题。

I think you do, but you build coalitions with like minded allies and partners, keeping open the option of of increasing that pool, and working on problems together.

因此，我们正从一个不默认采取全球方式、全球一致思维的时期过渡。

So we're moving from a period that doesn't default to a global approach, a global groupthink.

这很困难，因为现有体系中存在许多既得利益。

And that's hard because there are many, many vested interests in that architecture.

我们从一个由大约15个组织组成的联合国，发展到了今天数百个组织。

We went from a UN that was about 15 organizations to hundreds today.

这些机构规模庞大，但本质上并不民主，因为很难获得救济途径。

These are expansive entities that don't they're not fundamentally democratic in the sense that they're it's very hard to have recourse.

对吧？

Right?

这正是许多欧洲人感到沮丧的原因。

That's part of the frustration that many Europeans are feeling.

这就是为什么你在欧洲看到民粹主义兴起，人们对欧盟官僚体系感到极度不满，觉得自己的声音被忽视。

That's why you see the rise of populism in Europe, huge frustration with the bureaucracy of the EU with their voices not being heard.

这是一种回归到辅助性原则的感觉，也就是说，你尝试在地方层面解决问题。

It's a sense that it's back to this principle of it's a kind of, you know, the word subsidiarity where you go and try to solve problems at the local level.

我认为这并不是坏事，对民主制度来说也不是坏事，因为大多数民主国家不仅希望改善本国公民的生活，也关心其他国家的公民。

And I don't think that's a bad thing, and it's I don't think it's a bad thing for democracies because most democracies want to improve not only the lives of their own citizens, but also they do care about other citizens.

难道我们不是也在远离一个没有规则的世界吗？

Well, aren't we also moving away from a world here without with rules?

所以，我经常听到的一个问题，也是我一直在思考的问题是，你知道，弗拉基米尔·普京说乌克兰政府腐败。

So I guess one question I often hear and one question I I wonder about is, you know, Vladimir Putin said the government of Ukraine is corrupt.

它满是纳粹。

It's full of Nazis.

这对俄罗斯构成威胁，我们必须除掉它。

It poses a danger to Russia, we need to take it out.

这就是他入侵乌克兰的借口。

And that's how he justified his invasion of Ukraine.

我们说，你知道，伊朗政府很糟糕且危险，我认为它确实很糟糕且危险。

We are saying, you know, the government of Iran is bad and dangerous, and I believe it actually is bad and dangerous.

但我们没有去联合国，也没有试图说服其他人相信这一点。

But we didn't go to the UN and try to convince other people of that or anything of that nature.

如果中国说，嘿。

If China says, hey.

看。

Look.

台湾政府对我们构成威胁或正在密谋反对我们，我们岂不是正步入马克·卡尼所引用的修昔底德所说的那种境地：强者为所欲为，弱者忍气吞声。

The government of Taiwan poses a threat to us or plotting against us, are we not just moving into the way Mark Carney put it, quoting Thucydides, the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.

但这种情况本来就在发生。

But that's happening anyway.

联合国并没有约束俄罗斯。

The UN didn't constrain Russia.

联合国无法约束这种力量。

The UN doesn't constrain that kind of power.

所以这个论点正是承认了这一点。

So this argument is recognizing that.

这实际上回到了我们最初的讨论，即承认这是一个事实。

It sort of goes back to our original discussion, recognizing that that's just a fact.

联合国也不会约束中国。

The UN is not gonna constrain China.

如果中国决定武力夺取台湾，能够约束它的将是威慑力。

What's gonna constrain China if it decides to take Taiwan is deterrence.

对吧？

Right?

我们多年来一直在努力构建这些措施，至少十年来一直在认真思考如何阻止中国采取这种行动。

All the stuff that we're trying to build up, these, you know, decades now, at least a decade of a a serious consideration of how to deter China from doing that.

这并不意味着你不需要进行对话或双边谈判。

It doesn't mean that you don't have discussions, bilateral negotiations.

但如果你期待联合国在这一领域能发挥巨大作用，我认为最终只会落空，进而导致某种愤世嫉俗的情绪，并且反而会助长俄罗斯更加肆无忌惮。

But having these expectations that the UN can really do a lot in that domain, I think, creates ends up just being not realized and then ends up creating a certain type of cynicism and also just tends to empower Russia to do more.

联合国改变不了他们的想法，过去也改变不了。

Their mind is not going to be changed by the United Nations and wasn't.

所以你不认同有些人所说的观点，即在两次世界大战之后，从联合国到欧盟、北约等各类多边机构，实际上成功减少了国家间的跨境冲突和侵略行为。

So you don't buy what what some people say, which is that in the aftermath of the world wars, these various multilateral institutions from the UN to the EU and others, NATO, were actually successful in reducing the amount of cross border conflicts of nations invading each other.

是的。

Yes.

它并没有阻止所有事情，但我确实认为有充分证据表明，这种行为在国际事务中已不像过去那样普遍了。

It didn't prevent everything, but I do think there's good evidence that this became less of a normal part of human and, international affairs than it was.

某种程度上，这恰恰证明了该体系的成功——俄罗斯对乌克兰的所作所为不再被视为理所当然。

It was it, in some ways, spoke to the success of that regime that what Russia did with Ukraine wasn't just considered the normal state of things.

强国侵略弱国。

Strong countries invade weaker countries.

这被视为对国际法的严重违反，随后我们召集了大量其他国家，实施制裁并试图为此付出代价。

It was understood as a profound violation of international law that we then assembled a large group of other countries to impose sanctions and to try to impose a cost on this.

而担忧的是，即使抹去一个不完美的机制，也会成为一种许可，嗯。

And the fear is that a world where you wipe out even something imperfect acts as a license Mhmm.

让这种行为成为典型的流程和普遍预期，而这确实很重要。

For this to become the typical sequence and typical expectations, and that does matter.

不。

No.

我并不是在主张联合国应该消失。

I'm not arguing that the UN should go away.

绝对不是。

Absolutely not.

但我认为，自1945年以来，这个机构经过二三十年的发展，已经成为一个庞大而松散的官僚体系，而且这不仅仅是联合国的问题。

But I think the institution as it evolved from 1945, let's say, twenty, thirty years out, it's a large sprawling overall bureaucracy, and it's not just the UN.

还有世卫组织。

There's the WHO.

这是一种以全球优先的方式来解决问题的思路。

It's more of an approach of a global first approach towards solving problems.

联合国应作为一个讨论和信息共享的平台存在，但我认为，至少在维护欧洲和平方面，真正关键的是北约。

The UN should exist as a forum for discussion, for information sharing, but I would argue that what was really key to preserving peace in Europe at least was NATO.

北约正是我们应该支持的那种组织——更多这类以区域为重点的机构和联盟，因为你们真正有所投入。

And NATO is exactly the kind of organization that we should be supporting, More of these regionally focused bodies and alliances where you're actually you have some skin in the game.

你们在其中投入了资金。

You're putting money into it.

我的意思是，现在欧洲人正在向北约投入更多资金，建设实际能力。

I mean, now the Europeans are putting more money into NATO, creating actual capabilities.

我认为这种情况更多发生在国家层面。

And I think that that happens more at the state level.

因此，我认为我们最好能精简、缩减并剥离许多这些层级，聚焦于更核心的要素，但我认为，对于这些组织能否产生实质性的行动成效，我们不应抱太大希望。

So I think we would be better off refining, reducing, peeling back a lot of those layers, looking at more of the essentials, but I would say having much less hope that you can actually get significant operational impacts from these organizations.

我想以一个在外交政策中常常看似最根本的分歧来结束：是什么让美国强大。

I wanna end on what often seems to me to be the very fundamental disagreement in in foreign policy, which is what makes America strong.

美国的力量是否直接源于我们的威慑能力、武器装备以及投射武力的能力？

Is American strength the direct product of our capability for deterrence, of our weaponry, of our ability to project force?

还是源于我们在一个以我们为最强主导者的全球秩序中与其他国家合作、组织大量国家以符合我们利益、并制定有利于我们的规则的能力？

Is it a product of our ability to work with other countries inside a global order that we are the strongest player within and sort of organize, you know, large groups of countries in our interest and have rules that sort of favor us?

是两者兼而有之吗？

Is it both?

在你看来，是什么让美国变得强大？

What, in your view, makes America strong?

让美国强大的是我们这个共和国、自由、民主，以及我们作为一个国家所代表和秉持的价值。

What makes America strong is our republic, freedom, liberty, what we stand for, what we are as a country.

我们是世界上最好的国家。

We are the greatest country in the world.

我们有缺陷。

We are flawed.

我们有诸多问题，但我真心相信，我们是世界上最好的国家。

We have problems, but I truly believe we are the greatest country in the world.

这就是美国力量的核心：我们的宪法，我们对自由、对解放、对成为一股力量的坚持。

And that's what is the core of American strength, our constitution, our standing up for liberty, for freedom, for being a force.

我的意思是，美国在人道主义援助方面的贡献比世界上任何其他政体都多。

I mean, Americans give more in terms of humanitarian aid than any other sort of polity in the world.

美国人真的很慷慨。

Like, Americans are are generous.

但与此同时，让我们的国家伟大的，是一些确保我们能长期维护这种伟大的能力，其中一部分正是军事力量。

But combined with that, what makes our country great are certain capabilities to ensure that we can protect that greatness over time, and some of that is very much military power.

还有经济实力。

Economic strength too.

所以，所有这些因素共同造就了美国的伟大，但这一切都始于我们作为一个国家的本质，而我深信这一点。

So all of those things make America great, but it does start from what what we are as a country, which I believe in.

那么，我们最后一个问题。

Then always our final question.

你会向观众推荐哪三本书？

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

K。

K.

这些书并不是按出版时间排序的。

Well, they're not in any order of, not in terms of publication.

虽然我目前正在读一本两年前由罗伯特·B.出版的书。

Although I am reading right now a book, I think, published two years ago by Robert B.

佐利克写的《美国在世界中的角色》。

Zoellick called America in the World.

这是一本关于美国外交史的好书，而且每章都很短，这一点很好。

It's a great book about America's diplomatic history, and, it's nice because each chapter's short.

所以对于那些喜欢睡前读十页书的人来说，这本书再合适不过了。

So for those of you who like to read, you know, 10 pages before bed, it's perfect.

你真的会觉得自己有所收获。

You can actually feel like you've accomplished something.

但它也与我们正在庆祝的250周年纪念活动密切相关。

But it's really also pertinent to the 250, you know, celebrations we're having.

你会了解到所有外交上的成功。

You learn about all of the diplomatic successes.

我特别注意到，早期的外交很大程度上是关于亲自访问各国、与人物建立联系。

And I am struck by how much of it early on really is about bespoke, going to countries, personalities.

我认为佐利克在开篇就谈到了人物个性和情感的重要性，这显然与当今我们所见的复杂个性和强烈情绪密切相关。

I think Zoellick in the beginning talks about the importance of personalities and emotion, and I think it's obviously quite relevant to today where we see difficult personalities and a lot of emotion.

第二本书是我因为秘鲁的缘故从书架上取下的，就是埃尔南多·德索托的《资本的秘密》。

A second book, I just took back from my bookshelf because of, Peru, but the mystery of capital by Hernando De Soto.

我认为这本书也提醒我们注意西半球一些持续存在的问题，比如社会主义与资本主义之间的张力，而埃尔南多·德索托特别强调了土地所有权的重要性。

And I think it's also interesting to remind us of sort of some perpetual problems in the Western Hemisphere, the tension between, you know, socialism and capitalism, and and Hernando De Soto specifically speaks about the importance of titles to land.

这本书讲的是私有财产、所有权，以及资本主义运作的一些基础。

So it's about private property, ownership, and some of the foundations of what makes capitalism work.

第三本是威尔·因博登写的里根传记，因为特朗普经常提到里根和‘以实力求和平’。

And then third, the Reagan biography by Will Inboden because also, Trump invokes Reagan a lot, Peace Through Strength.

不过实际上，我后来才知道，‘以实力求和平’最初是尼克松的提法，后来被里根采用，现在又被特朗普沿用。

Although, actually, Peace Through Strength was, I learned, you know, first a Nixon phrase, which then Reagan used and now Trump is using.

所以这三本书。

So those are three books.

然后第四本小说，今年夏天我特别喜欢的是芭芭拉·金索沃的《恶魔铜头》。

And then a fourth fiction book that I loved this summer was is demon copperhead by Barbara Kingsolver.

我非常喜欢这本书。

I love that book.

纳迪亚·沙德洛，非常感谢您。

Nadia Schadlow, thank you very much.

谢谢你，埃兹拉。

Thank you, Ezra.

很高兴能来这里。

Pleasure to be here.

本集《以色列康乔》由安妮·加尔文制作。

This episode of The Israel Concho is produced by Annie Galvin.

事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯、凯特·辛克莱尔和玛丽·玛格·洛克尔完成。

Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker.

我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·格尔德，额外混音由阿曼·萨霍塔完成。

Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Aman Sahota.

我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

节目的制作团队还包括罗林·胡、玛丽·卡西翁、玛丽娜·金、杰克·麦科迪克、克里斯滕·林、艾玛·凯尔贝克和简·科贝尔。

The show's production team also includes Rollin Hu, Marie Cascione, Marina King, Jack McCordick, Kristen Lin, Emma Kelbeck, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由卡罗尔·萨布罗和帕特·麦卡斯克尔创作。

Original music by Carol Saburo and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由克里斯蒂娜·西梅列夫斯基和香农·巴斯塔负责。

Audience strategy by Christina Cimilewski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》待播音频的总监是安妮-罗斯·斯特拉瑟。

The director of New York Times pending audio is Annie-Rose Strasser.