战争的巨大谎言

你必须置身于战争的情境中。

You must inhabit the scenario of a war.

如果唐纳德·特朗普试图让美国人民为这场战争做好准备，他们会说不。

If Donald Trump had tried to prepare the American people for this, they would have said no.

你知道，如果他出来发表一系列演讲，说现在是我们必须推翻伊朗政权的时候了，那根本行不通。

You know, if he had gone out and given a series of speeches, now is the time we must remove the Iranian regime, it wouldn't have worked.

所以我觉得你说得对。

And so I think you're right.

这种自吹自擂，我是唐纳德·特朗普。

This this kind of vainglorious, I'm Donald Trump.

我会斩杀所有巨龙。

I will slay all the dragons.

你知道吗？

You know?

我们一直对马杜罗、哈梅内伊和古巴政权心存不满。

We've had these grievances with Maduro, with Khamenei, with the Cuban regime.

我会把他们全部清除掉。

I'm going to remove all of them.

你知道吗？

You know?

我认为，以色列和国内一些鹰派人物看到了这种虚荣心，他们去找他，知道他不太愿意如此背离自己的基本盘去做这件事。

I think that there's a vanity to that that Israel and some of the hawks in this country saw, and they went to him knowing that he was reticent to kind of break from his base this much and do this.

但他们诉诸了比他短期政治本能更宏大的东西——这将使你成为一位历史人物。

But they appealed to something bigger than his short term political instincts, which is this will make you an historic figure.

我认为，内塔尼亚胡自至少我执政以来，就一直希望有一位美国总统来做这件事，

And I think BB Netanyahu has wanted to get an American president to do this since, you know, at least when I was in government,

而他确实做到了。

and he has.

所以，我认为你刚才讲述的这个故事中，还有一点很重要，那就是对伊朗的认知是逐步积累的。

So one thing that I think is important in that story you just laid out is also there's been a learning about Iran that has been successive.

美国退出了核协议，并实施了最大压力的制裁。

So America pulled out of the nuclear deal, added the maximum pressure sanctions.

伊朗对此几乎无能为力。

Iran wasn't able to do very much about that.

苏莱曼尼被暗杀了。

There was the assassination of Soleimani.

对此并没有发生重大的报复行动。

There was no significant reprisal for that.

你看到以色列彻底摧毁了真主党。

You saw Israel decapitate Hezbollah.

你看到当时对伊朗核设施的轰炸。

You saw the then bombing of the Iranian nuclear sites.

我认为这里一个重要变化是，人们越来越觉得伊朗并没有人们原先以为的那么可怕，也没有能力像以前认为的那样进行反击，而以低成本做到这些是过去人们未曾预料的。

And I do think something that has been significant here is a growing sense that Iran was not as fearsome as was believed and did not have the capacity to strike back as had been believed, but that you could do this at low cost, which was not what people thought before.

这让我有点抓狂，因为我觉得这是真的。

This drives me a little crazy because I think it's true.

但我们就拿内塔尼亚胡来说吧。

But let's just take Netanyahu.

一直以来的说法是，他们高大威猛，是狂热的疯子，正站在核武器的边缘，并建立了一个庞大的轴心来对付我们。

The argument was always that they're ten feet tall, that, you know, they're absolute maniacs who are on the precipice of a nuclear weapon, and they've built this massive axis that is coming for us.

但我从不相信这一点。

And and I never believed that.

我从不认为伊朗如此强大，我更不相信他们拥有进攻能力，会发动一场针对以色列的先发制人战争。

I I never believed that Iran was as all powerful, and I I certainly never believed that they had offensive you know, that they were gonna launch some preemptive war against Israel.

你知道的？

You know?

他们关心的是政权的生存。

They they are interested in regime survival.

这一直是我的判断。

That was always my assessment.

甚至一些代理团体的存在，也是为了把冲突挡在伊朗之外，这是伊朗的策略。

And that even, you know, some of the proxy groups were meant you know, the Iranian doctrine was keep this out of Iran.

你知道的？

You know?

把冲突控制在伊拉克和黎巴嫩。

Keep the conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon.

所以，过去让我对华盛顿和以色列内部对伊朗的鹰派建议感到愤怒的是，无论哪种论点都会导致战争。

So part of what used to drive me crazy about the hawkish prescriptions on Iran from inside Washington and Israel is that either argument led to war.

如果伊朗真的很强，我们就必须除掉它，因为你知道，必须阻止它，因为它正处在采取行动的边缘；或者它很弱，所以我们能除掉它。

If Iran is really powerful, we must take them out because, you know, they must be stopped because they're on the precipice of doing something, or they're weak so we can take them out.

而且，听我说，我认为首先应该持有一种观念，那就是战争是坏事，应该避免。

And and, look, I I do think it's fair saying, first of all, that we should have a mindset that war is bad and should be avoided.

这应该是一个法律和价值观上的立场：相比战争本身，存在更理想的结局。

That should be a a legal and values proposition that there are preferable outcomes to war itself.

我对此的另一个问题是，这种思维有着惊人的短视，因为你也在传递这样一个信息：伊朗曾与美国达成核协议。

The other problem I have with this, Ezra, is there's an incredible short term thinking about this because you're also sending the message that, okay, Iran was in a nuclear deal with The United States.

他们当时遵守了该核协议，结果却被轰炸了。

They were complying with that nuclear deal, and they then got bombed.

无论伊朗未来出现什么样的政权，我都认为它极有可能想要拥有核武器。

Whatever Iranian regime emerges from this, I think, is very likely to want nuclear weapons.

所以这种情况不会发生。

So this doesn't happen.

如果你现在坐在利雅得，甚至迪拜或阿布扎比，你会想：美国是我的安全保障者，但看看我们刚刚从这个安全保证中得到了什么。

If you're sitting in Riyadh or even Dubai and Abu Dhabi right now, you're thinking, well, the Americans are my security guarantor, and look at what we just got out of that security guarantee.

我们得到了一场战争，而他们几乎就是发动了这场战争。顺便说一句，我不相信是沙特在推动这件事。

Like, we got a war that they launched pretty much I don't buy the that the Saudis are pushing for this, by the way.

我看到他们否认了这个报道，而且我认为他们对此非常谨慎。

I I saw them deny that report, and I think they were very reticent about this.

现在他们为什么不去搞核武器呢？

Why wouldn't they get nuclear weapons now?

这就像，归根结底，美国人似乎愿意拿我们的安全做赌注，或者将其置于以色列安全之下。

It's like, well, we we can't you know, at the end of the day, the Americans are are kind of willing to play with our security, you know, or deprioritize it as against Israel's security.

其他潜在的核扩散国也会想：看看朝鲜和伊朗的对比。

Other would be proliferators are gonna think, you know, look at North Korea versus Iran.

因此，这些都会产生第二层影响。

And so there's these second order effects.

对吧？

Right?

其中一个就是核扩散，其后果可能不会在明年显现。

And one of them is nuclear proliferation where the consequences might not be manifest next year.

但我不知道，五年后，我认为这种行为并不会让我们更安全。

But, I don't know, five years from now, I I I don't think that this kind of action will have made us safer.

如果你真的相信核不扩散，那么最好通过外交手段来加强它，而不是仅仅因为某个政权软弱就将其推翻。

I'd much rather you know, if you actually believe in nuclear nonproliferation, it's much better to to have that be something you fortify diplomatically than you just remove a regime because it's weak.

我想谈谈你刚才说的关于沙特的事情。

I wanna pick up on what you just said about the Saudis.

《华盛顿邮报》有一篇报道，引用了至少四位了解这些对话和谈判的消息人士。

So there was a Washington Post report that cited at least four sources that had knowledge of the conversations and negotiations.

报道基本上说，沙特在公开场合一直反对我们，拒绝让我们使用其基地。

What it basically said was that in public, Saudi Arabia has been against us, has denied us use of their bases.

但在私下里，穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼和沙特政府的高层人士一直在私下敦促特朗普采取行动。

In private, Mohammed bin Salman and top people in the Saudi government have been privately pushing Trump to act.

这是一些你如果长期关注这些问题就会经常听到的事情。

This is something that, you know, if you've been around these issues for a while, you've heard a lot about.

以色列人总是说，没有人像沙特阿拉伯那样希望伊朗政府倒台。

The Israelis talk all the time about how nobody wants the Iranian government gone like Saudi Arabia.

所以你不相信当时真的发生了这种情况吗？

So you don't buy that that is what was happening?

我对这一点持怀疑态度，因为我听到的是不同的说法。

I'm skeptical of it because I was hearing different things.

你知道，你看到卡塔尔、土耳其、埃及，还有阿曼，显然都在努力避免这种结果。

You know, I certainly you saw Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt along with Oman, obviously, trying to avert this outcome.

埃及的情况让我觉得很有意思，因为埃及如果没有沙特作为主要支持者，就采取这样的立场，这让我感到怀疑。

The Egypt thing was interesting to me because the idea that Egypt would take that position without Saudi Arabia, you know, as a chief sponsor supporting them in that makes me question it.

你还能看到沙特外交政策中，近年来与伊朗关系的缓和。

You also see in Saudi foreign policy, you saw rapprochement with Iran in the last few years.

我认为穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼——我一直以来对他都持严厉批评态度，所以任何听过我过去言论的人都知道，我对这个政府毫无好感。

I think Mohammed bin Salman, who I've been hugely critical of so this is anybody who's listened to me over the years, I have no, you know, love for that government.

但我认为，他主要关心的是稳定。

But I think, you know, he's principally interested in stability.

现在，我认为很有可能的是，他们对此持保留态度。

Now here what I think is quite possible is they were reticent of this.

他们不喜欢自己地区出现如此规模的不稳定。

They don't like instability of this scale in their region.

他们也不喜欢对能源基础设施可能造成的破坏。

They don't like the potential disruptions, obviously, to energy infrastructure.

但当他们看到事情不可避免时，可能会转变态度，说：好吧。

But when they see an inevitability to it, they may have kind of come around and been like, okay.

我们会跟你们谈谈这件事。

Like, we'll talk to you guys about this.

你知道，最可能的情况是，他们有些犹豫不决。

You know, they're they're they I think the most likely scenario is that they're a bit ambivalent.

因为再次强调，他们的安全理念就是稳定、稳定、稳定，而这种情况看起来并不像稳定。

Because, again, like, their security paradigm is is stability, stability, stability, and this doesn't feel a lot like stability.

我不是说这是当前最重要的问题，但以色列在这一行动中的核心地位

I'm not saying this is the biggest issue in this moment, but the centrality of Israel in the operation

是的。

Yeah.

让我对这将对反犹太主义产生什么影响感到担忧。

Has raised some concerns for me about what this is gonna mean for antisemitism.

对。

Yeah.

你看到MAGA右翼以及其他地方的大量言论，认为以色列对唐纳德·特朗普有影响力，或者这根本就是某种以色列的阴谋。

You see the amount of talk on the MAGA right, but elsewhere as well that, you know, Israel's leverage over Donald Trump or that, you know, this is all just some kind of Israeli plot.

我有点怀疑，内塔尼亚胡在我看来似乎是在赌博，为了短期利益而冒险。

I wonder a bit about the there are many ways which Netanyahu looks to me to be gambling Yes.

赌上以色列在美国政治地位的长期可持续性，以及在反犹太主义急剧上升的时代，世界对这一局势的普遍看法。

For short term position over the long term sustainability of both Israel's political position in America, but also just the generalized view of the world at a time of very, very sharply rising antisemitism about what is going on here.

我不知道最终会如何发展，也不确定这意味着什么，但确实让我感到不安。

I don't know how it nets out or what it ends up meaning, but it certainly has me nervous.

我也觉得不安。

It has me nervous too.

而且这其中有两个方面。

And and there's two aspects to that.

一个是地区层面，另一个是这里。

One is in the region, and one is here.

我只想简单说一下，在地区层面，我当初对《亚伯拉罕协议》持批评态度，那时我说这些话几乎是异类。

I'd just say briefly in the region, like, I was critical of the Abraham Accords at the time, and I was a bit outlier to say the least about that.

因为你知道，唐纳德·特朗普把这描绘成一项重大的和平协议，但实际上它并没有解决该地区的任何冲突。

Because, you know, Donald Trump framed this as a big peace deal when in fact it didn't resolve any of the conflicts in the region.

看看之后发生了什么。

And look at what's happened since.

局势变得更加暴力了。

It's been much more violent.

如果你和该地区的人交谈，他们会说，等等，不对劲。

And if you talk to people in the region, they see that, oh, wait a second.

这一切都是关于以色列在该地区的霸权。

This has all been about Israeli hegemony in this region.

而这正让那些原本愿意与以色列共存的阿拉伯国家感到不安。

And that is making the Arab states who were prepared certainly to live with Israel.

我认为沙特阿拉伯根本不会对以色列构成任何威胁。

I don't think Saudi Arabia, like, had any threat to pose to Israel.

但他们越来越担心以色列拥有如此大的行动自由度这一态势。

But they're increasingly concerned about a dynamic where there's this degree of freedom of action for Israel.

那么，这会是什么样子呢？

So what does that look like?

从长远来看，这种情况在该地区会如何演变？

How does that evolve in the in the long term in the region?

我认为在这里，你说得对。

I think here, you're right.

我真的很担心这一点，因为你看。

I I really worry about this because look.

这并不是我说以色列推动了唐纳德·特朗普这么做。

This is not me saying Israel pushed Donald Trump to do this.

内塔尼亚胡昨天出去说，我四十年来一直希望这件事发生，现在终于让特朗普做到了，你知道的，他现在也在和我们一道这么做。

Bibi Netanyahu went out, I think, yesterday and said, I wanted this to happen for forty years, and finally, Trump did it, you know, and he's doing it with us too.

但过去美国一直非常谨慎，避免与以色列进行联合军事行动，部分原因就在于此。

But The US used to be very careful not to do joint military operations with Israel in part for this reason.

这是一个巨大的转变。

This is a very big break.

这太重要了，人们需要认真思考这一点。

This is a huge I mean, people need to think about this.

比如，过去进行联合演习这种事情，人们都会非常谨慎地权衡，因为我们不想让人觉得以色列和美国完全是一体的，这种看法在双方都有影响。

Like, it was you know, just to do joint exercises, you know, was something people calibrated carefully because we didn't wanna make it look like that that Israel and The United States are one and the same for reasons they go in both directions.

但关键是，美国人正在观察这件事，他们看到我们正陷入一场战争，而这场战争看起来像是以色列希望我们参与的。

But here's the thing is Americans are looking at this, and they're seeing that we are in a war that seems like it's something Israel wanted us to do.

似乎大部分好处都落到了以色列头上。

Seems like the benefits accrue mostly to Israel.

你知道，那个弹道导弹项目对美国并不构成威胁。

You know, the the the ballistic missile program does not pose a threat to The United States.

伊朗没有能够打到美国的洲际弹道导弹。

There is no ICBM from Iran that can reach The United States.

所以，我们很多行动其实是在消除对以色列的威胁。

So so a lot of what we're doing is removing threats to Israel.

如果事情搞砸了，谁会背锅？

If it goes poorly, who is going to get blamed?

你知道的吧？

You know?

我觉得，一些愤怒情绪可能会转向以色列。

I I think that some of that anger will go in the direction of Israel.

我觉得我们有必要讨论这个问题，因为一旦缺乏公开的辩论和讨论，它就会流向阴暗的角落。

And I think it's important for us to talk about this because when there's not debate and discussion about it, it migrates to the darker corners.

对吧？

Right?

你当然能在MAGA运动中看到这一点。

And you're seeing that certainly in MAGA.

我认为，其中一个原因是，这让人感觉与特朗普自我宣传的方式出现了几乎难以解释的背离。

Well, I think one reason this has fed conspiracies is it has felt to many people like such a almost inexplicable break from how Trump sold himself.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，你知道，早在2023年，特朗普就说，这些全球主义者想要耗尽美国的所有力量、鲜血和财富，去海外追逐怪物和粉丝文化，同时让我们对他们在本国制造的混乱视而不见。

So, I mean, you have, you know, back in 2023, Trump's saying, these globalists want to squander all of America's strength, blood, and treasure, chasing monsters and fandoms overseas while keeping us distracted from the havoc they're creating here at home.

非常到位。

Very on point.

J。

J.

D。

D.

万斯在那年撰写了一篇《华尔街日报》的评论文章，标题为《特朗普最好的外交政策：不发动任何战争》。

Vance writes a Wall Street Journal op ed that year titled Trump's best foreign policy, not starting any wars.

图尔西·加巴德当然在卖‘不与伊朗开战’的T恤。

Tulsi Gabbard, of course, sells no war with Iran T shirts.

现在，特朗普开始在左右两派都引发更多冲突和介入。

Now you have Trump kinda start more as certainly conflicts, engagements, left and right.

Axios报道，特朗普在2025年一年内授权的军事打击次数，就已经超过了拜登四年的总和。

Acorn axios, Trump has now authorized more military strikes in 2025 alone than Biden did in all four years.

所以我认为，对很多人来说，他们都在困惑：该如何调和特朗普本人以及围绕他的运动——包括所有那些顾问——与我们现在所看到的一切之间的矛盾？

So I I think for a lot of people, there has been this how do you reconcile both Trump and the movement that was around him, right, all the people advising him with what we're seeing now.

上周末有人问我，你知道，白宫内部究竟是哪个派系希望发生这一切？

I got asked over the weekend by somebody, you know, what what was the faction inside the White House that wanted this?

是的。

Yeah.

我发现要回答这个问题其实挺难的。

And I found it actually hard to answer that question.

我们还没有看到太多报道说马可·卢比奥希望这件事发生。

We have not seen a lot of reporting saying Marco Rubio wanted this to happen.

你知道吗，J。

You know, J.

D。

D.

万斯似乎并没有。

Vance appears to have not.

是的。

Yeah.

相反，我们现在谈论的是以色列和林赛·格雷厄姆，他现在已经没什么影响力了。

Instead, we're talking about Israel and Lindsey Graham, who's not that influential anymore.

也许是穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼。

Mohammed bin Salman, maybe.

我觉得很多人都很困惑，不知道该如何解释特朗普本人为何要冒这个风险。

I think a lot of people have been very confused with how to, like, how to explain Trump himself taking this risk.

我也有过同样的思考过程，埃兹拉。

I had the same mental exercise, Ezra.

我们来逐一看看这些民调吧。

And let's just go through it if you look at all these polls.

这在政治上极其不受欢迎。

It's wildly politically unpopular.

顺便说一下，即使最高领导人被杀后，这一趋势依然成立。

And by the way, that continues to hold even though the supreme leader got killed.

而最高领导人被杀，将成为这次行动的顶点。

And the supreme leader being killed will be the high watermark of this operation.

你知道吗？

You know?

你再也找不到另一个能被特朗普拿来当街示众的人了。

There's not another person that you can kill that Trump can say is a head on a pike.

对吧？

Right?

如果你再看看那些想继承MAGA运动的人，也就是那些展望共和党未来的人，J。

Then if you look at the people that want to inherit MAGA, right, who who are looking ahead at the Republican Party, J.

D.

D.

万斯似乎想尽量避免与此事牵连。

Vance seems to want to have very little to do with this.

塔克·卡尔森正在猛烈抨击这件事。

Tucker Carlson is railing against this.

你知道的，世界上那些赛·班农式的人物，对这件事并不热衷。

You know, the sea bannons of the world, they're not enthusiastic about this.

共和党并不会朝这个方向发展。

The Republican Party is not going in this direction.

所以，特朗普做这件事并不是因为它会大受欢迎。

So this is not something that Trump is doing because it's gonna be wildly popular

他并不想要它。

to didn't want it.

参联会。

Joint chief staff.

参谋长联席会议显然在放出消息，泄露说他们并不想这么做。

Joint chiefs of staff was clearly putting out, leaking out, you know, that they didn't wanna do this.

马可·卢比奥更关注这一地区，比如委内瑞拉和古巴，他们正试图通过极限施压迫使这些国家屈服。

Marco Rubio is much more focused on this hemisphere, you know, Venezuela and Cuba, which they're trying to, you know, strangle through maximum pressure.

民主党并不支持这一做法，尤其是那些展望民主党未来的人。

The Democratic Party is not for this and particularly the people anticipating the future of the Democratic Party.

谁支持这个呢？

Who is for this?

这仅仅是一小部分选民的支持。

And it it's a very small set of constituents.

基本上只有以色列，以及国会或国家安全机构中那些强硬且长期持鹰派立场的人。

It is basically Israel, and then it is kind of hardline, long standing hawks in congress or in kind of the national security establishment.

顺便说一句，特朗普说他不喜欢的那些人，反而支持这个。

By the way, the people that Trump said he didn't like are for this.

我的意思你明白吧？

You know I'm saying?

约翰·约翰·博尔登，所以他

John John Bolden, so he's

是的

Yeah.

没错

Exactly.

对

Yeah.

试图迫害的人却在外面为它辩护。

Trying to to persecute is out there defending it.

所以很难不这样看待这件事

So so it is hard to look at this and not

所以，他提到要解雇约翰·博尔登，部分原因是不是因为约翰·博尔登一直希望我攻击伊朗？

So wasn't part of the reason he talked about getting rid of John Bolton, that he's like, John Bolton always wanted me to attack Iran?

伊朗

Iran.

伊朗。

Iran.

对吧？

Right?

因此，很难不得出结论：内塔尼亚胡和以色列在这方面推动的作用在某种程度上是决定性的。

And so it is hard to not conclude that Bibi Netanyahu and Israel's kind of push for this was determinative in some way.

因为，再说了，唯一对特朗普有吸引力的论点，就是你之前提到的那个——让你成为历史人物。

Because, again, like, the only appeal to Trump that made any sense is kind of the one you made earlier, where you become a historic figure.

你知道的？

You know?

而且，我的意思是，我确实觉得他内心有一部分就是觉得，这些政府几十年来一直让人头疼。

You and finally I mean, I I do think there's a part of him that's just like, these governments have been a pain in the ass for decades.

对吧？

Right?

自1959年革命以来的古巴，自1979年革命以来的伊朗，自查韦斯主义革命以来的委内瑞拉。

Cuba since the fifty nine revolution, Iran since the seventy nine revolution, Venezuela since the Chavista revolution.

我将是那个最终了结这些恩怨的人。

I'm gonna be the one who finally settles all these scores.

有些部分其实是独立于以色列的。

Like, there's some of that that is separate from Israel.

但很难不认为，如果以色列没有这样推动的话，埃兹拉，我们来反过来看。

But it is hard to not conclude that if Israel wasn't put it this way, Ezra, take the counterfactual.

以色列政府并没有推动这件事。

The Israeli government was not pushing for this.

那这件事还会发生吗？

Would it have happened?

我想谈谈这件事为何可能不会像唐纳德·特朗普所承诺的那样，或他认为自己承诺的那样，保持有限范围。

I wanna talk about the ways in which this might not remain limited in the way Donald Trump has either promised a country or I think promised himself.

我觉得这源于几个月前持续十二天的轰炸。

So I see this as following from the twelve day bombing some months ago.

结果发现，那次轰炸还不够。

It turned out that didn't do enough.

当伊朗加速发展弹道导弹、重建核计划时，情况变得明朗了——这个核计划很可能并没有像唐纳德·特朗普最初声称的那样被彻底摧毁。

And when it was clear that Iran was racing forward with ballistic missiles, reconstituting a nuclear program that probably was not obliterated in the way Donald Trump had initially said it was.

因此，我们现在被卷入其中，而伊朗正在违抗他。

And so we were now involved, and Iran was defying him.

事情并不是简单地被彻底摧毁了。

It wasn't just that it was obliterated.

那种摧毁，实际上是他向他们下达的一种命令，要求他们彻底清除这些项目。

That obliteration was a kind of command from him to them that that was gone.

他们在谈判桌上并没有做出足够的让步。

They weren't giving up enough at the negotiating table.

此外，我认为这一点对特朗普来说在某种程度上也很重要，那就是伊朗正在动员自己的人民。

Also, I think this was meaningful to to to Trump on some level, was now soldering its own people.

你知道，他也不喜欢这一点。

You know, he didn't like that either.

是的。

Yes.

我想承认他这里可能有一些人道主义的动机。

I I want to give him credit for some humanitarian impulse potentially here.

所以我们现在更加深涉其中了。

So now we're involved even more so.

我们现在已动能摧毁了该政权及其大部分力量，但很多事情可能失控。

Now we have kinetically destroyed much of the regime and its power, but a lot could spin out of control here.

因此，我对特朗普认为自己设定的这个限制是否稳定，持非常怀疑的态度。

So I am very skeptical that the limit Trump seems to think he has put on this is stable.

而且我想知道，像你这样比我更有经验的人，对此有什么看法。

And I'm curious, as somebody with more experience here than than I have, what you think of it.

我觉得你说得对。

I think you're right.

以色列人有这种说法，虽然不是正式的教条，但本质上是这种术语。

And the Israelis have this it's not a doctrine, but essentially this terminology.

他们称之为‘割草’。

It's called mowing the lawn.

你听说过这个吗？

Have you heard this?

是的。

Mhmm.

这——而且说实话，我甚至不喜欢在涉及战争和人类时使用这样的说法，但本质上，‘割草’策略就是，如果某个地方构成威胁，你就偶尔进去把草割掉。

Which is and again, I I hate even using phrases like this when it comes to war and and human beings, but essentially, the mowing the lawn strategy is that if there's a place that poses a threat, you occasionally just kinda go in and cut the grass.

你定期轰炸那个威胁。

You you bomb the threat periodically.

而且，显然，黎巴嫩就是一个以色列人实施这种策略的完美例子。

And and, obviously, like, Lebanon would be a a perfect case of where the Israelis pursued

他们的情况。

their situation.

关于哈马斯说了这些。

Said this about Hamas.

对。

Yeah.

这最终结果如何？

How did that ultimately work out?

没错。

Exactly.

而且这存在风险，这就是为什么我说我们实际上一直在与一种观念作战——即曾经存在所谓的十二天战争，而现在又有了另一场战争。

And there is a risk like, and this is why I say we we have been at war with the like, the idea that there was something called the twelve day war, and now there's a different war.

不。

No.

不。

No.

事情根本不是这样运作的。

Like, that's not how these things work.

一旦你轰炸了一个国家，你就把这种永久战争的模式带入了那里。

Like, once you bomb a country, you're bringing this forever war paradigm to it.

所以我认为，很可能会像十二天战争那样成为终点，如果特朗普在一周、两周或三周后停止轰炸伊朗，我们几个月后又会因为某些我们不喜欢的事情而重新开始。

And so I think it is quite possible that in the same way that the twelve day war was the end of the story, if Trump stops bombing Iran in a week, two weeks, three weeks, that we're back doing that in a few months because something happened that we don't like.

然后你开始在伊朗街头看到大屠杀，或者出现难民外流，或者继续看到对海湾地区随机的袭击，我们真的就什么都不做吗？

And then you start to get massacres in the streets of Iran or you start to get refugee outflows or you start to continue to see kind of ways of random attacks at The Gulf, are we really gonna do nothing?

但如果我们一次次地卷入其中，你知道，我们就被拖入了泥潭。

But then if we're getting back and back in, you know, then we're, you know, getting pulled into quicksand.

我们难辞其咎。

We are implicated.

你知道的？

You know?

我们已经深陷其中。

We are involved.

我的意思是，这场对话的共同点是，埃兹拉，我们需要摒弃这种短期思维，认为存在所谓的十二天战争，或者认为杀死领导人就能解决问题。

I mean, the common thread to this conversation, Ezra, is, like, we need to just get this short term thinking that that there's such a thing as twelve day wars or that you solve a problem when you kill the leader.

这种想法完全不对。

Like, that that's not how any of this goes.

我认为，与最近的过去相比，美国重大外交政策行动缺乏公众讨论，这一点确实令人震惊。

I think it is genuinely striking and a break with certainly the recent past how little public deliberation there is over quite major American foreign policy actions.

你知道，布什政府确实通过欺骗手段将美国拖入了伊拉克战争，但它也花了很长时间试图说服国民，让民众相信对伊拉克开战是值得的，我们还就动用多少美国军队进行了辩论。

And, you know, the Bush administration did lie its way into war with Iraq, but it did also spend a long time trying to persuade the country that war with Iraq was worth doing, and we debated how much of the American military it would take.

在没有任何公开讨论、没有任何重大的公众或国会审议的情况下，就做出这类承诺、这类行动、这类风险，这究竟意味着什么？

What does it mean to be entering into these kinds of commitments, these kinds of projects, these kinds of risks without really any public debate, any significant public or congressional deliberation of what might happen.

你不会看到大批军方人员反复前往国会，推演各种可能的情景。

You don't have a bunch of members of the military repeatedly going to Congress and going through scenarios.

我不想把所有问题都归咎于程序不完善，但公众和国会之所以被咨询，是有原因的——因为如果最终需要更多投入，你确实需要这种支持。

Don't want to place everything here on process being poor, but there's a reason that the public and congress are consulted because if it ends up requiring more engagement, then you actually need that support.

不。

No.

我认为程序与结果是相关的。

I think process is related to outcome.

如果你无法向美国民众说明理由，无法引导公众舆论支持战争，或者无法向国会提出充分理由，那么你所能做的最重要的一件事，就是要求国会必须进行投票，因为他们根本不会投票支持——毕竟公众舆论就是如此。

And if you can't make a case to the American people to sway public opinion in the direction of a war or make a case to congress I mean, the the single most important thing you could do to keep America out of more wars is actually require congress to take a vote because they're not gonna vote for it given that we're public opinions on this.

因此，这种越来越将国会和公众意见完全边缘化的冲突循环，对民主而言是极具腐蚀性的。

And so I think it's incredibly corrosive to democracy to have this kind of loop of of conflict that is increasingly sidelining Congress and public opinion entirely.

我还觉得有一件事更危险，伊兹拉，那就是我们一直都在想，我们什么时候才能知道特朗普会糟糕到什么地步？

I also think there's something even more dangerous, Ezra, which is we keep you know, I know a lot of people are thinking, when are we gonna know how bad it's gonna get with Trump?

假如你所担心的事情其实已经发生了呢？

Like, what if the things that you fear are already happening?

我们现在有一位总统，他显然重返职位后，希望军队能比他第一任期时更直接地听从他的指令——而第一任期时，军方高层甚至五角大楼的一些官员还曾多次抵制他。

Like, we already have a president who clearly came back into office wanting the military to be more directly responsive to him than it was in the first term when the military leadership and even some of the Pentagon leadership stood up to him more and more.

我们已经看到他清洗了军队高级将领。

We have seen him, you know, purge the top of the military general officers.

我们还看到他向高级将领们说：嘿。

We have seen him address the general officers and say, hey.

美国的城市可能成为军事训练场。

American cities might be military training grounds.

现在我们又看到，他在短短几周内多次采取军事行动，我只举几个例子。

Now we've seen him, within a matter of weeks undertake multiple military I'll just give you a few.

我们在圣诞节当天轰炸了尼日利亚。

We bombed Nigeria on Christmas Day.

我们以完全虚假的借口在加勒比海炸毁船只，声称这些船只与美国的毒品走私有关，甚至可能犯下了战争罪。

We were blowing up boats in The Caribbean on totally false pretenses that it had something to do with, like, drug trafficking in The United States and potentially committed war crimes.

我们绑架了委内瑞拉的领导人。

We abducted the leader of Venezuela.

我们现在刚刚杀死了伊朗的最高领袖，并试图推翻其政权，也许我们并没有。

We now just killed the supreme leader of Iran and are trying to topple that regime, maybe we're not.

这些事情都在三个月内发生了。

These are all things that have happened within three months.

对吧？

Right?

与此同时，我们看到国防部告诉人工智能公司Anthropic：如果五角大楼无法无视你们关于大规模监控美国民众的服务条款，你们将被禁止参与任何政府业务。

And at the same time, we see the Department of War telling Anthropic, an AI company, that you will be banned from any business of the government if the Pentagon can't ignore your terms of service against mass surveillance of Americans.

我之所以提到这些，是因为民主制度最终的制衡机制，本应是总统与军队这一机构之间的分离。

And where I'm going with this is the ultimate guardrail in democracy is supposed to be the separation between the president and kind of the military as an institution.

如果军队这一机构可以直接为唐纳德·特朗普的利益服务，而无需任何公开辩论，也无需国会投票批准其行动，那么还将有多少国家遭到轰炸？如果他援引《叛乱法》，这支军队最终又会在美国境内做些什么？

And if the military of an institution can directly serve the interest of Donald Trump with no public debate about what it's doing, no congressional votes on what it's doing, how many more countries are going to bomb, and what is that military gonna end up doing in The United States, you know, if he invokes the Insurrection Act?

这并不是在贬低军队。

And that's not to impugn the military.

而是在批评特朗普正在将这一切引向何方。

That's to impugn where Trump is taking this.

所以我认为，那些更黑暗的场景，不只是极客们在担心。

So I think the darker scenarios, it's not just process nerds.

我们需要授权使用武力，也需要向国会进行简报。

Like, we need to have authorizations for use of military force, and, you know, we need briefings to Congress.

不是这样的。

It's no.

军队究竟是一个完全听从总统个人好恶的机构，还是一个保持政治中立、同时对国会和总统都负责的机构？

Like, is the military an institution that just completely serves the whims of the president, or is it an institution that is apolitical, that is equally responsive to Congress and the president?

因为这些问题将在特朗普政府接下来的两年多时间里变得至关重要。

Because those questions are gonna matter a lot how the next two and three quarters years of the Trump administration

尽管我认为重要的是要说明，国会并没有被无视。

Although I think it's important to say it's not that Congress is being defied.

国会已经弃权了。

Congress has abdicated.

是的。

Yes.

那就是。

That's

是的。

yes.

是的。

Yes.

迈克·约翰逊并没有出来抱怨。

Mike Johnson is not out there complaining.

他是在支持这一点。

He is supporting this.

我的意思是，特朗普在很多方面都与过去形成了颠覆性的断裂，但尤其在不向国会寻求授权就开展相当危险的行动这一点上，更是不断升级。

I mean, there are many ways in which Trump is a disruptive break with the past, but the escalation of not going to Congress for quite dangerous operations.

我的意思是，这在奥巴马时代就已经是总统的行为了。

I mean, that was president in the Obama era.

我的意思是，这种情况已经持续了很长时间，嗯，这个

I mean, this has been growing for a very long Well, the

奥巴马外交政策中受到最多批评的一件事，就是叙利亚化武红线事件。

thing that Obama probably gets the most grief for in his foreign policy was the Syria red line incident.

但有趣的是，埃兹拉，你有这种化学武器——你能描述一下那是什么吗？是的。

But what was interesting about that, Ezra, is you have this chemical- Can you describe what that is Yeah.

奥巴马曾表示，如果叙利亚政权使用化学武器，那就是一条红线。

We have this, Obama has said it'd be a red line if the cyber regime uses chemical weapons.

随后发生了大规模的化学武器使用事件。

Then there's a massive chemical weapons use.

我们当时正准备轰炸叙利亚。

And we were preparing to bomb Syria.

我们确实准备了。

We were.

我的意思是，我当时参加了会议。

I mean, I was in meetings.

我以为我们要轰炸叙利亚了，正在审阅打击方案之类的事务。

I thought we were gonna bomb Syria and, you know, going through strike packages, that kind of stuff.

然后，奥巴马做出了一个决定，基本上说：我要把这个决定交由国会投票。

And then, you know, Obama makes this decision essentially to say, I'm gonna put this to vote in Congress.

除非国会投票授权，否则我们不会对叙利亚开战。

I'm not gonna go to war with Syria unless Congress votes to authorize it.

几乎立刻，国会中对此的支持开始消散。

And almost immediately, the support for that begins to evaporate in congress.

就连像马可·卢比奥这样强硬派的人物，也不愿投票授权对叙利亚使用武力。

Even people like Marco Rubio, who were hawks, would not vote to authorize use of military force in Syria.

奥巴马的观点是，如果国会——作为我们宪法体制下人民的代表——不希望我们卷入另一场叙利亚战争，并承担由此带来的后果，那我们就不该行动。

And Obama's point was if congress, the representatives of the people, as envisioned under our constitutional system, don't wanna get us into another war with Syria and be responsible for the consequences of whatever happens, then we shouldn't do it.

我们的制度就是这么设计的。

That's how our system's designed.

现在很多人指出，我们本应做更多来阻止阿萨德，对此我表示认同。

Now a lot of people, you know, pointed out that we should have done more to stop Assad, and and that's, you know, I I agree.

我对这些观点表示理解。

I'm sympathetic to all those arguments.

但我同样理解奥巴马的观点，那就是如果人们不想打仗，我们就不必开战。

But I'm also sympathetic to Obama's argument, which is if people don't want the war, we don't have to fight it.

特朗普在竞选中所触及的，正是精英阶层——尤其是国家安全精英——与公众意见之间的鸿沟。

And part of what Trump was tapping into in his campaigns was the the gap between elites, in particularly national security elites, and public opinion.

这个鸿沟确实很荒谬，埃兹拉。

And it is a crazy gap, Ezra.

我亲身经历过这个临界点。

I've lived at the precipice of it.

比如，国家安全精英在两党内部的讨论和策略，与美国民众希望政府关注的重点之间，存在着一种严重不健康的脱节。

Like, the conversations and the strategies in both parties of national security elites versus what the American people want their government to be focused on is a deeply unhealthy gap.

而特朗普所做的一切，就是让这个建制派不再存在。

And all Trump has done is, okay, that establishment is no longer there.

就只是他一个人。

It's just him.

这就像美国例外主义的全部，美国力量的整个体系——我称之为‘体制’，不管你怎么叫它——现在全都集中在一个人的头脑和手中。

It's like all of American exceptionalism, all of the apparatus of American power, this you know, I called it the blob, whatever you wanna call it, this edifice is now just in one man's head, in one man's hands.

他非但没有解决他声称要解决的问题，反而让情况变得更糟，因为现在一切都取决于唐纳德·特朗普了。

And that's instead of solving the problem he said he was running to fix, he's made it worse because it's just up to Donald Trump now.

这引出了一个问题：国际法是否还以任何有意义的方式存在？没有。

This gets to the question of whether international law still exists in any meaningful No.

根本不存在。

Way.

它已经不存在了。

It does not.

这意味着什么？

What does that mean?

这意味着至少对美国来说，国际法没有任何约束力。

It means that it implies in no way to The United States Of America at least.

我们完全忽视了它。

We are completely ignoring it.

根本不存在什么，我的意思是，这就是它为何不存在的方式。

There is no like, I mean, here's how it doesn't exist.

过去，当美国做一些，比如说，模糊国际法边界的事情时，你还是会出面提出论据。

In the past, when The United States would do things that, let's just say, stretch the boundaries of international law, you would still show up and make a case.

你知道的？

You know?

这是为什么这构成了迫在眉睫的威胁，或者你知道的？

Here's why this was an imminent threat or here you know?

他们甚至都不费心了。

They don't even bother.

而且如果你看看，因为发动战争本身就违反了国际法。

And if you look at even because the the act of going to war violates international law.

如果你无法证明存在迫在眉睫的威胁，或你是在某种形式的自卫，或者你必须获得联合国授权，你知道，联合国安理会的批准。

If you cannot demonstrate that there was an imminent threat, that you're acting in some form of of self defense or that you have to get UN sanction, you know, UN Security Council approval.

如果没有这些前提，你们就是在违反国际法。

Absent those things, you're violating international law.

但即使在战争行为中，美国目前也在制裁国际刑事法院，而这家机构本应是执行战争法的最高权威机构。

But even in the conduct of war, you know, The United States is currently sanctioning the International Criminal Court, which is the kind of preeminent body that is enforcing the laws of of war.

这传递了什么样的信息，关于战争行为本身？

What message does that send, you know, about the conduct of war?

因为我们这么做，是因为他们试图对内塔尼亚胡以战争罪提起指控。

Because we're doing that because they tried to indict Bibi Netanyahu for war crimes.

但如果你基本上是在说，这些法律对我们全然无效，那么在某个时刻，俄罗斯和中国也会说：那这些法律也对我们无效。

But if you're basically saying that none of the laws apply to us, at a certain point, Russia and China say, well, then they don't apply to us either.

如果在战争与和平这些最重要议题上，关于是否开战、如何作战的国际法，对所有大国都不适用，那它们又如何适用于任何人呢？

And if international law on the most important matters of war and peace and the conduct of war, whether to go to war and how you fight a war, if those laws don't apply to any of the big powers, how do they apply to anybody?

我一直想知道

I've wondered how

我们的某些盟友——你原本以为他们更重视国际法——的反应，实际上是否反映了他们共同意识到，这套体系已经不复存在。

much the reaction from some of our allies who you might have thought of as more committed to international law has actually reflected a collective recognition that it is gone.

所以加拿大的马克·卡尼对这一点非常支持。

So Mark Carney in Canada was very, very supportive of Yeah.

特朗普采取了行动。

Trump strikes.

澳大利亚确实给予了真正的支持。

You know, real support from Australia.

德国坚定地站在我们这边。

Germany was pretty foursquare behind us.

我认为这反映了一些人对伊朗政权的看法，但我一直感到震惊。

You know, I think this reflects some of their feelings about the Iranian regime, but I have been struck Yeah.

令我惊讶的是，那些我认为其影响力部分源于对这些维护集体或多边方式的机构的承诺的国家，竟然完全没有任何抗议。

By the complete absence of outcry from countries that I think, you know, part of their power has to become from commitment to these institutions that maintain a kind of collective or multilateral approach to these questions.

你怎么看这一点？

What have you made of that?

我也对此感到震惊。

I've been struck by it too.

我认为特朗普依赖的一点是，如果我所针对的人没什么朋友，我就有更多空间。

I think part of what Trump counts on is if the people I'm taking out don't have a lot of friends, I have more room.

对吧？

Right?

无论是马杜罗，还是伊朗政权。

If it's Maduro, if it's Iranian regime.

不过，我对这一点感到非常失望。

I'd say I'm very disappointed in it, though.

马克·卡尼，我是众多认为他在达沃斯的演讲重要、有趣且反映了当前局势的人之一，他的演讲也指明了一条通往这场危机之后某种新出路的方向——即，如果那些中等强国、仍然遵守某些国际法并希望在冲突等问题上维持一些规范的负责任国家能够开始彼此联合，也许这会成为美国在特朗普之后重新回归的一个契机。

Mark Carney, I was one of many people that thought his speech at Davos was important and interesting and kind of reflective of what's happening and also kind of pointed a path to some emergence of something on the other end of this, that essentially if the middle powers, the kind of more responsible countries in the world that still follows at least some international laws and want some norms around conflict and other things, If they began to kind of stitch together, maybe that could be a place that The United States could kind of rejoin on the back end of Trump.

但如果马克·卡尼真要走这条路，如果他本质上是在说：贸易需要规则，但轰炸伊朗就随你便，那我认为这会严重削弱他自己的论点。

If Mark Carney is going to carve this out, though, if he's essentially gonna say, we need rules on trade, but if you bomb Iran, go for it, I think it hugely undermines Mark Carney's own argument.

这只会让他的立场显得虚伪。

It just makes it seem cynical.

这让人觉得他真正关心的只是贸易，你知道的，或者我只关心格陵兰，因为它是欧洲领土。

It makes it seem like all he's really concerned about is trade, you know, or all I'm concerned about is Greenland because it's European territory.

对吧？

Right?

你可以证明，这些年来我为此承受了大量非议。

And you can attest that I've taken a lot of grief for this over the years.

但我只是相信，如果我们认为国际法和规范很重要，它们就必须普遍适用。

But I just believe that if we think that international law and norms are important, they really have to apply universally.

我们不能只是说，嗯，它们不适用于伊朗、古巴和委内瑞拉，因为我们不喜欢它们。

Like, we can't just say that, like, well, they don't apply to Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela because we don't like them.

你知道的。

You know?

二战后，美国建立了这套体系，因为我们意识到，如果不约束所有人，就会重蹈第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战的覆辙。

The United States built this system after World War two because we recognize that if you don't constrain everybody, you are going to have a repeat of what happened in World War one and World War two.

你开始制造例外。

You start to create carve outs.

人们会钻进这些例外里，从而引发一系列冲突，最终导致世界大战。

People start to move into those carve outs, and there's cycles of conflict that lead ultimately to a world war.

我认为人们需要更多地正视我们正在步入的现实。

I think people need to inhabit the reality that we're moving into more than they are.

如今，国际法已经没有任何约束力了。

There are no constraints from international law anymore.

世界上正出现一股狂热的民族主义浪潮。

There is a rampant trend of nationalism in the world.

像美国的唐纳德·特朗普、中国的习近平、俄罗斯的弗拉基米尔·普京、以色列的内塔尼亚胡、印度的莫迪、土耳其的埃尔多安，这些都是民族主义者。

There are leaders like Donald Trump in The United States, Xi Jinping in China, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Bibi Nenya in Israel, Narendra Modi in India, Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey.

这些人都属于民族主义者。

These are nationalists.

在没有国际法约束的情况下，民族主义必然导致更多战争，而这些战争又会引发更多战争。

Nationalism, absent international law, always leads to more war, and those wars beget more wars.

让我来为另一方立场说几句：国际法曾纵容伊朗镇压本国人民、资助地区内的恐怖主义代理势力，你知道的，这些行为遍布整个地区。

Let me strong man the other side of the case here, which is international law, the international law that allowed Iran to slaughter its own people, to repress them, to fund terrorist proxies, you know, all throughout the region.

你说国际法本应约束以色列和美国，但面对一个几十年来一直把‘消灭以色列’和‘消灭美国’作为口号、并资助企图实现这一目标的势力的国家，国际法真的该去约束它们吗？

You're saying that international law was should have restrained Israel and America against a country that had for decades now made one of its rallying slogans death to Israel and death to America, and in fact was funding players who wanted to do just that.

其中一个关于国际法的批评是，国际法被一些流氓政权用作盾牌——这些政权在各种方面都无视国际法的准则，但当他们面临自己招致的后果时，却又躲在国际法背后？

That one of the critiques you'll hear from the critics here of international law is that international law has been used as a shield by rogue regimes, regimes that do not follow its dictates in all manner of ways, but then hide behind it when they face the consequences that they are bringing down upon themselves?

我想首先要说的是，伊朗已经付出了代价。

I guess I'd say first and foremost, Iran has paid consequences.

我们花了七年时间谈判伊核协议。

We worked on the Iran nuclear deal for seven years.

我之所以说七年，是因为在奥巴马政府初期的几年里，我们基于伊朗违反《核不扩散条约》这一国际法事实，建立了一个多边制裁框架。

And the reason I say seven years is that for several years at the beginning of Obama administration, we built a multilateral sanctions framework around Iran based on the fact that they were violating the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, international law.

所以我们没有说：‘哦，没关系。’

So we didn't say, oh, it's fine.

你可以违反国际法。

You can violate the international law.

我们说：不行。

We said, no.

我们推动联合国安理会通过决议，作为奥巴马政府‘极限施压’运动的基础，其目的是促使伊朗改变行为。

We got UN Security Council resolutions that became the basis of a maximum pressure campaign in the Obama administration, but it was meant to leverage a change of behavior from the Iranians.

你必须通过核协议逐步遵守国际法，承诺永不研制核武器。

You have to kind of come into compliance with international law via nuclear deal in which you are committing to never build a nuclear weapon.

你必须接受对你核计划的严格监控与核查。

You are submitting to intense monitoring and verification of your nuclear program.

顺便说一句，我们仍然因为它们支持代理人而对其实施其他制裁。

By the way, like, we still had other sanctions on them over their support for proxies.

我不喜欢世界上许多国家内部发生的事情。

I don't like what goes on inside a lot of countries in the world.

有一种奇怪的现象，我们正在将‘这足以成为对这些国家发动战争的理由’这一观念正常化。

There's something peculiar that we are normalizing the idea that that is sufficient basis to go to war in those countries.

当弗拉基米尔·普京这样做时，我们并不认同。

We don't like it when Vladimir Putin does it.

当弗拉基米尔·普京说，乌克兰民选总统在2014年被一场抗议运动推翻，而这场运动部分由国家民主基金会资助时。

When Vladimir Putin says, hey, the elected president of Ukraine was ousted in a protest movement in 2014 in part by people that were funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.

我不认同这种说法。

I don't agree with that narrative.

但我们怎么能说弗拉基米尔·普京没有权利入侵那个国家呢？

But how can we say that Vladimir Putin does not have the right to invade that country?

但如果我们看到其他国家内部有我们不喜欢的事情，我们就认为自己有权利介入。

But if we see things that we don't like inside of other countries, we have the right to do that.

我认为人们看到的是，如果你真正相信人权，那么你就必须在所有地方都应用这一规范框架。

And I think what people see is that if you truly believe in human rights, then you have to apply that normative framework across the board.

你知道吗？

You know?

许多同样这些人，当涉及到伊朗国内发生的事情时，突然变成了人权倡导者，但他们对西岸当前发生的事情却一字不提；对贾马尔·卡舒吉在沙特驻土耳其领事馆被残忍杀害的事也保持沉默；对埃及总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西关押六万名政治犯并让他们遭受可怕待遇的事实也毫无反应。

And a lot of the very same people that are suddenly human rights advocates when it comes to what's happening inside of Iran have nothing to say about what's happening in the West Bank right now, had nothing to say when Jamal Khashoggi was chopped up in the Saudi consulate inside of Turkey, have nothing to say about the fact that Al Sisi, the president of Egypt, has 60,000 people who are political prisoners suffering horrific treatment.

所以，你必须做到普遍且一致，否则我很难认真对待你的论点。

So you either have to be universal and consistent, or I have a really hard time listening to your arguments.

我看到很多民主党人，某种程度上，国际社会的反应也是如此，他们在对伊朗政府的正当厌恶与对违反国际法、缺乏公众讨论或国会批准的反感之间陷入瘫痪。

I've seen a lot of Democrats, and to some degree, think the international response too, then somewhat paralyzed between their legitimate loathing of the Iranian government and their dislike, distaste for the process of violation of international law, the absence of public deliberation or congressional approval.

但我认为这导致了他们回应方式的混乱。

But I think it has created a kind of muddle in their response.

对吧？

Right?

他们是在说这本该发生吗？

Are they saying this should have been done?

这事儿发生了是好事，但他们不喜欢它发生了？

It's a good thing that it happened, but they don't like that it happened?

他们是在说唯一的问题在于程序不当吗？

Are they saying that the only problem with it was poor process?

如果特朗普去国会寻求授权，也许他们会同意他这么做。

If Trump had gone to Congress, maybe they would have given him the authority to do it.

你觉得民主党人应该如何回应这件事？

How do you think Democrats should respond to this?

因为现在，我看到很多领导人关注的并不是这件事本身对错，而是促成这件事的程序是否正当。

Because right now, I've seen many of the leadership really focusing not on was this a right or wrong thing to do, but was the process that led to it the right or wrong process.

是的。

Yeah.

他们说了你提到的所有事情，但我对此有很大异议，因为最终人们并不太关心这个过程。

They're saying all the things that you said, and I have a huge problem with this because ultimately people are not that interested in the process.

如果一个不太关注此事的人听到民主党领袖查克·舒默在一次关于即将爆发的伊朗战争的简报后说，他们必须更充分地阐述理由，你会怎么想？

If someone who doesn't follow this super closely, here's the Democratic leader like Chuck Schumer saying, coming out of a briefing about the potential war in Iran that feels imminent, and he says they have to make their case more or something.

这听起来像什么？

That what does it sound like?

这听起来像是在回避问题。

It sounds like a dodge.

作为一个政党，你真正相信的是什么？

What do you actually believe as a political party?

我刚刚在我们奥巴马群组的微信聊天里和一个朋友聊了这件事，埃兹拉，这你不会感到意外，我说，想象一下。

I was talking to a friend of mine from the do this thing in our Obama group text, Ezra, which wouldn't surprise you, which I said, imagine if.

对吧？

Right?

所以想象一下，奥巴马总统在深夜度假时，通过社交媒体发布声明宣布对伊朗开战，并轻描淡写地提到美国人将会阵亡。

So imagine if president Obama announced a war on Iran from a vacation property in the middle of the night on a social media post, made casual remarks about the fact that Americans are gonna die.

事情就是这样。

It is what it is.

然后在短短两天内，你就已经开始看到美国士兵伤亡、美国飞机坠落、全球性的经济动荡。

And then within, like, two days, you're already seeing American casualties, American planes falling into the sky, huge global economic disruptions.

共和党一定会完全统一立场。

The Republican Party would have been absolutely unified.

而部分原因在于，奥巴马的行动空间如此有限，是因为作为一个政党，他们能够对奥巴马所做的任何事情提出反对意见。

And, you know, part of it is that Obama had so little room for maneuver is that that they, as a political party, were able to make an argument against whatever the thing that Obama was doing.

民主党不明白，仅仅说‘我们要一个程序、一个投票程序’是不够的。

The Democratic Party doesn't understand that it's not enough to just say, we want a process voter procedural vote.

我们支持罗伊·卡纳、托马斯·马西的决议，但大多数美国人根本不知道这是什么。

We're gonna support the Roe Kana, Thomas Massey resolution that most Americans have no idea what that is.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，我支持它，但这根本起不了作用。

I mean, I support it, but it's not gonna do anything.

我认为大多数美国人并不知道，这次投票是关于国会是否必须授权已经发生的事情。

And I think most Americans don't know that it's a vote on whether or not Congress has to authorize something that has already happened.

这只会让你显得……你知道的。

It just makes you look you know?

而且，我完全支持这项努力。

And, again, this I'm totally supportive of that effort.

我不是在批评雷尔·康和托马斯·马西，但关键是，你到底支持还是反对这个？

I'm it's not a criticism of real con and Thomas Massey, but the point is is that, like, are you for this or against it?

如果你反对，为什么你不公开说这是鲁莽的，这是对唐纳德·特朗普竞选总统时承诺的背叛——他说我们不需要更多战争，为什么我们要花这么多钱？

And if you're against it, why are you not all out saying that this is reckless, that this is a betrayal of what Donald Trump said when he ran for president, that we don't need more wars, that why are we spending money?

这项开支将达到数百亿美元。

The price tag of this is gonna be in the tens of billions.

这些钱本可以用于支付《平价医疗法案》的补贴。

That's money that could pay for the ACA subsidies.

你知道的。

You know?

是的

Yeah.

至少是这样

At least.

这就是你现在的医疗补贴

There's your health care subsidies right now.

我们的医疗补贴正在被用于对伊朗的战争

Our health care subsidies are being spent on a war in Iran.

唐纳德·特朗普并没有维护你的利益

Donald Trump is not looking after your interest.

他关注的是中东一些宏大的野心

He's looking after some kind of grandiose ambitions in The Middle East.

尤泽，这个政治立场很容易阐明

This is a very easy political case to make, Ezra.

说到底，我们本该在国内搞建设，而不是在国外，这再简单不过了

Like, this is the easiest thing in the world that we should be nation building at home, not abroad.

你知道吧？

You know?

我是在马杜罗之后看到这个的。

I saw this after Maduro.

我认为这反映了伊拉克战争爆发前及战后初期发生的情况，即人们似乎存在某种困难。

I think it reflected what happened both in the run up and immediate aftermath of the war in Iraq, which is that I think that there is a difficulty people have.

也许他们自己并不会为了这样的事而发动战争。

Maybe they would not themselves go to war for this.

也许他们并不会支持为这样的事而开战。

Maybe they would not have supported a war for something like this.

但当对象是一个残暴的独裁者时，你有什么理由反对呢？

But when it is against a brutal dictator, on what grounds are you opposing it?

对吧？

Right?

反对它，是不是就是在支持这个政权的延续？

Is opposing it supporting the continuation of the regime?

我认为，这正是你所提到的许多民主党人以及一些世界领导人陷入困境的地方。

And I think that's where a lot of the Democrats you're talking about are getting caught or some of the world leaders are talking about are getting caught.

所以，除了我们可以在一个地方花钱而不是另一个地方之外，我认为这其实是一个更深层的问题：人们该如何去谈判，又该如何反驳那些部分由人道主义理由所要求或正当化的战争？

So aside from we can spend money in one place versus another, I think it's this quite deep question of how do people negotiate, and how do they argue against these wars that are partially demanded or justified on humanitarian grounds.

我的意思是，正如你提到的，伊朗政权杀害了成千上万甚至数以万计自己的人民。

I mean, the Iranian regime, as you mentioned, just killed thousands or maybe tens of thousands of their own people.

当时有伊朗人在街头游行，但他们这样做并不安全。

There were Iranians marching in the streets, it was not safe for them to to to do so.

我对这个问题其实有自己的答案，但我很好奇你的看法。

I sort of have my answer to this, but I'm curious for yours.

我的答案是，战争本身就应该尽量避免。

My answer to this is that war itself is something to be avoided.

这听起来可能是个显而易见的观点，但其实不然。

And that may seem like a obvious point, but it's not.

我的意思是，为了稍微激进一点地说，我认为在9·11事件之后，我们已经把军事行动的频繁使用变得习以为常了。

Like, we I mean, to be a little provocative on this too, I think that post nine eleven, because we've normalized so much use of military action.

因为我觉得，埃兹拉，我们坐在这里讨论‘如果我们不轰炸这个政权，就是在维持它掌权’，这完全是荒谬的。

Because I could argue, Ezra, it is completely insane that we're sitting here and having a conversation about, like, that if we don't bomb a regime that we're therefore keeping it in power?

但这个政权真的会向我们汇报吗？

But does it report to us?

你知道的。

You know?

我认为，美国人比他们的政治精英、国家安全精英，甚至某些媒体讨论更本能地理解这一点。

And I think what Americans kind of intuitively get better than their political elites, their national security elites, and even some of the kind of media conversation in this is they get this.

他们明白战争是可怕的。

They get that war is terrible.

战争有风险，即使它在纸面上是出于善意，也会给必须参战的美国人、支付战争费用的美国纳税人，以及你声称想要帮助的战争另一方人民带来糟糕的结果。

War has risks that even if it's well intentioned on paper, it leads to bad outcomes for both the Americans who have to fight it, the American taxpayers to pay for it, and pretty much the people on the other end of the war that you're saying you're trying to help.

我们试图帮助伊拉克人。

We're trying to help the Iraqis.

我们试图帮助阿富汗人。

We're trying to help the Afghans.

我们试图帮助利比亚人。

We're trying to help the Libyans.

现在我们试图帮助伊朗人。

Now we're trying to help the Iranians.

我想说的更具挑衅性的是，当相关国家的人是棕色人种时，这种情况似乎就会发生。

And I guess the provocative thing I wanna say too is that this seems to happen when the countries in question are brown.

我认为自9/11以来，出现了一种去人性化现象：哦，看，又一个中东国家的政权做了我们不喜欢的事。

I think there's a a dehumanization since 09/11 where it's like, oh, look at this Middle East the next Middle Eastern country up that the regime does something we don't like.

我们就去轰炸他们。

We're go and just bomb them.

我的意思是，如果报道属实，美国或以色列在一所学校里杀害了超过一百名女孩。

I mean, we killed, if reports are accurate, some either The US or Israel, over a 100 girls at a school.

但这在美国并不是什么大新闻。

And it's not really a big story in The United States.

实际上，我认为把这一点联系到国内，像这种在9/11之后对世界另一端人群的异化心态，我认为这种异化已经回到了国内。

And I actually think to tie this back home, like, I don't think that that mentality, that othering of people who are on the other side of the world after nine eleven, I think that othering has come home.

我认为，能够实施大规模驱逐行动，通常针对棕色和黑色人种，这与我们在外交政策中看到的对暴力的去人性化和麻木化密切相关。

I think that the capacity to have the mass deportation campaign that is generally targeting brown and black people is kind of tied to this dehumanization and desensitization of violence that that we see in our foreign policy.

像9/11之后，我们对许多群体进行了他者化。

Like post nine eleven, we othered a lot of populations.

如果你留意的话，我知道我们有点跑题了，但我觉得这非常相关。

And if you if you watch, I mean, I know we're going a little far afield, but I I think this is really relevant.

我注意到在奥巴马政府时期，福克斯新闻上的他者化，原本只是针对中东恐怖分子，后来变成了针对跨越南部边境的人，最终演变成一个巨大的他者。

I noticed in the Obama administration, like, the othering on Fox, you know, that was once just about Middle Eastern terrorists, but then it's about the people crossing the southern border, and then and then it comes one big other.

你知道吗？

You know?

因此，我认为这是一种相当极端的观点：如果美国不对中东某个政府发动战争，我们就等于在纵容一切。

And so I think it's a pretty it should be seen as a pretty extremist proposition that if The United States doesn't go to war with some government in the Middle East, we're somehow condoning everything.

我对贾马尔·卡舒吉事件感到非常愤怒。

I was really mad about the Jamal Khashoggi thing.

我从未想过我们应该轰炸穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼来回应这件事。

At no point did I think we should bomb, you know, Mohammed bin Salman for that.

我同意其中很多观点。

I agree with a lot of that.

我想补充一点，我认为这一直贯穿于我们的对话中，这也是我对这个问题的回答：战争本质上是不可控的。

And I wanna offer maybe one other thing that I think has been threaded through our conversation, and it's sort of my answer to this question, which is war is inherently uncontrollable.

是的。

Yeah.

我们一开始总是被灌输一种幻想，认为我们可以决定自己要做什么。

That the fantasy that we are always offered at the beginning is that we can choose what it is we are going to do.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我们可以控制自己所创造的局面。

That we can control the situation we are going to create.

随着我们开发出更精确的武器、更强的空中力量、更多的无人机以及更远距离发动战争的能力，这种对控制的诱惑对领导者和其他人来说变得愈发强烈。

And as we have developed even more precision weapons and more air power and more drones and more ability to wage war at a distance, the seduction of that control for leaders and for others has become all the more potent.

但历史告诉我们，我们根本无法控制它。

But that the history of this is we do not control it.

是的

Yeah.

正如你提到的，在利比亚、阿富汗和伊拉克，我们可能以为自己是在帮助人民。

And as you mentioned, Libya, with Afghanistan, with with Iraq, we might think we are helping the people.

但如果我们引发了一场内战，很可能有七万、十万、二十万、三十万人在这场战争中丧生。

But if we set off a civil war, you could easily have 70,000, a 100,000, 200,000, 300,000 people die in that war.

是的

Yeah.

而且我们从未表现出任何意愿，首先，承诺占领该国以确保这种情况不会发生。

And we have shown no interest in, number one, saying we will occupy the country to make sure that doesn't happen.

而且，正如我们在伊拉克所学到的，即使我们决定占领该国，也无法阻止这种情况发生吗？

And nor, as we learned in Iraq, even if we do decide to occupy the country, can we keep that from happening?

是的

Yeah.

我的意思是，唐纳德·特朗普是最早试图从阿富汗撤军的人之一，而这一过程最终在拜登政府时期完成。

I mean, Donald Trump was one of the people who started trying to withdraw from Afghanistan, which then completed in the Biden administration.

再次，即使我们愿意投入更多的鲜血和财富来控制局势，长期来看仍无法掌控此类事件的结果。

Again, the inability over a very long time to control the outcome of something like this, even when we were willing to put much more of our blood and treasure into controlling it.

因此，在我看来，战争最大的谎言之一就是你会从中得到你想要的东西。

And so to me, one of the great lie of war is that you will get what you want out of it.

是的。

Yeah.

特朗普让我感到非常恐惧的一点，是他对此如此轻率。

Among the many things that scares me so much about Trump is how blithe he is with that.

是的。

Yeah.

你根本感觉不到这件事让他有任何失眠。

You don't feel like this has cost him any sleep at all.

是的。

Yeah.

如果情况恶化，我认为他会转身说：好吧，我给了伊朗人机会。

And if it goes badly, I think he will walk away and say, well, I gave you Iranians your chance.

你没有拿下它。

You didn't take it.

是的。

Yeah.

或者你没能成功拿下它。

Or you didn't succeed in taking it.

嗯，没错。

Well, yes.

我觉得你说得完全对。

I think you're exactly right.

我的意思是，在白宫待了八年，还有整个后911时期，我逐渐意识到一件事：美国军队可以摧毁任何东西。

I mean, one thing I became very aware of over eight years in the White House, but also in this whole post nineeleven period, is that the US military can destroy anything.

对吧？

Right?

它可以消灭任何目标，但却无法操控其他国家的政治，也无法重建被摧毁之后的东西。

It can take out any target set that it has, but it cannot engineer the politics of other countries or build what comes after the thing that is destroyed.