以色列右翼分割加沙的计划

国际边界曾经是神圣不可侵犯的，但如今已不再如此。

It's that international borders used to be sacred, but it's no longer the case.

当你看到俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，再将这一行为放大一千倍——因为哈马斯和真主党在伊朗的所作所为甚至比俄罗斯更残暴，你就不能只依赖国际保证或边界安全，而必须在任何有危险的地方主动出击。

And when you see Russia invades Ukraine, and you multiply it by a thousand because Hamas and Hezbollah in Iran are not even Russia, they're way more monstrous, you can't trust only international guarantees or borders, and you have to be wherever there is a danger.

这是10月7日带来的主要教训。

This is the main lesson from October 7.

特朗普对权力、地缘政治和条约等的看法，与他之前的共和党和民主党人截然不同。

Trump's view of power of strength of geopolitics, of treaties, of of all of it, is very different than Republicans and Democrats who preceded him.

但你刚才提到一点，我很想听听你进一步探讨：特朗普主义以及欧洲许多国家右翼民粹政党的崛起，如何影响了以色列政治，以及它对什么是可能的、什么是可取的这一认知？

But you just got something I'd be interested to hear you reflect more on, which is how does Trumpism, the rise of right wing populist parties in many other countries, particularly in Europe, how has that affected Israeli politics, its sense of what is possible, what is desirable?

当我回溯到2016年，在3月超级星期二之后，特朗普实际掌控了共和党，内塔尼亚胡当时对他的团队说：要像特朗普那样。

So when I go back to 2016, following Super Tuesday in March 2016, when Trump actually took over the Republican Party, Netanyahu told his staff, be like Trump.

他反复说了这三句话：要像特朗普那样。

He he repeated those three words, be like Trump.

随后，内塔尼亚胡从电视上的内塔尼亚胡转变为社交媒体上的内塔尼亚胡。

And then Netanyahu shifted from the TV Netanyahu to the Facebook Netanyahu.

明白吗？

Okay?

从内塔尼亚胡这位资深政治家来看，想想看，不是里根，而是比他更乏味的人，比如乔治·布什，他却变成了唐纳德·特朗普。

From Netanyahu, the elder statesman, think about, I don't know, not Ronald Reagan, but even more boring than this, George Bush, something like this, he turned into Donald Trump.

现在，他可不是唐纳德·特朗普。

Now, he is no Donald Trump.

他受过更好的教育。

He's way more educated.

他的英语更好，但确实变了。

He got better English, but but it changed.

在我看来，正因如此，以一种荒谬的方式，以色列的右翼或民粹主义右翼、激进右翼的力量，远小于美国、英国、法国和德国。

And in my opinion, this is why in an absurd way, the right wing in Israel or the power of the populist right, the radical right wing in Israel is way smaller than in The US, The UK, France, and Germany.

为什么？

Why?

因为你们仍然拥有右翼的奠基人——本雅明·内塔尼亚胡。

Because you have you still have the founding father of the right, Benjamin Netanyahu.

内塔尼亚胡相当于一价双得。

Netanyahu is two at the price of one.

他既是那位能争取到美国同意攻击伊朗、吞并戈兰高地并承认耶路撒冷的元老级政治家，同时也是那位对左派恶语相向的内塔尼亚胡。

He's both the elder statesman that gets the agreement of The US to attack Iran and for annexation of the of the Golan Heights and the recognition of Jerusalem, and at the very same time, he is the Netanyahu that speaks viciously about the left.

所以，一旦内塔尼亚胡辞职，我认为以色列极右翼的代表力量将会激增。

So once Netanyahu resigns, you'll see a spike, in my opinion, in the representation of the far right in Israel.

我不知道有多少人意识到，斯莫特里奇和本-格维尔两人加起来在以色列只获得了10%的选票。

I don't know how many people are aware of the fact that both Smotrich and Bengeville combined got only 10% of the popular vote in Israel.

10%。

10%.

不妨跟如今英国的改革派做个对比。

Just compare it to the reform part in The UK these days.

是的。

Mhmm.

我认为特朗普第一任期内最重要的外交政策成就就是《亚伯拉罕协议》。

So Trump's, I think, most significant foreign policy success of his first term was the Abraham Accords.

嗯。

Mhmm.

这基于内塔尼亚胡、库什纳等人以及一些海湾国家认识到，即使不改变以色列与巴勒斯坦的关系，也有可能与周边阿拉伯国家建立一种交易性关系。

And that's based on Netanyahu and and him and Kushner and and others realizing, and this comes from some of the Gulf states too, that there is a transactional relationship that is possible with surrounding Arab states

对。

Right.

而且这种关系的建立无需改变以色列与巴勒斯坦的关系。

Absent any change in Israel's relationship with the Palestinians.

没错。

Exactly.

而且在很大程度上出乎许多人的意料，整个这一时期《亚伯拉罕协议》依然维持着。

And I think somewhat to the surprise of many, the Abraham Accords hold through this whole period.

你最近写到，以色列战略事务部长罗恩·德默尔——被视作内塔尼亚胡最亲密的盟友之一——认为，以色列与沙特阿拉伯、印度尼西亚，甚至叙利亚签署和平协议的可能性现在提高了。

So you recently wrote that Ron Dermer, Israel's minister of strategic affairs, a person who counts as Netanyahu's among his closest saints, believes the chances of Israel signing peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and even Syria have now increased.

他们相信，随着停火协议的达成，《亚伯拉罕协议》的扩展已近在咫尺。

There's a belief there that they're now with the ceasefire on the cusp of an expansion of the Abraham Accords.

对。

Right.

为什么？

Why?

好的。

Okay.

过去两年里发生了一场巨大的斗争，但很少被人提及。

So there is a gigantic fight over the last two years, which is rarely spoken.

10月7日袭击的主因，即尽可能多地杀害犹太人，就是为了阻止正常化进程，阻止亚伯拉罕协议的达成。

The main idea behind October 7, behind killing as many Jews as possible, was to stop the normalization process, the Abraham Accords from happening.

当时距离沙特阿拉伯与以色列签署和平条约仅剩十二天。

It was twelve days before Saudi Arabia was to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

原定日期是2023年10月19日。

The due date was 10/19/2023.

亚伯拉罕协议的核心理念，是反对自由派认为要让以色列融入中东、实现正常化就必须通过拉马拉——巴勒斯坦首都——这一观点。

Now the whole idea of the Abraham Accords were based on denying the liberal idea that the way to have Israel involved in the Middle East with normalization, this way go through Ramallah, the Palestinian capital city.

许多阿拉伯国家拒绝将它们与美国的商业关系甚至整体关系建立在这样一个想法上：一位名叫阿巴斯的年迈且非民选的独裁者将决定整个政权的条款。

Many, many Arab countries refused to base their commercial relationship, their even relationship with The United States on the idea that a very old unelected dictator named Abbas is going to actually set the terms of the entire regime.

这就是以色列与阿联酋之间和平协议的核心理念，在我看来，这一发展的重要性仅次于1967年的六日战争。

And that was the idea behind the peace agreement between Israel and the Emiratis, which is, in my opinion, the most important development in Israel's history save only the the Six Day War in 1967.

因此，作为一名右翼人士，我几周前曾反对吞并定居点，因为我从阿联酋的朋友那里听到，这会让他们难以承受。

And that's why I, as a right winger, I wrote against annexation of the settlements a few weeks ago because what I heard from my friends in The UAE is that it would be too much on their plate to digest.

这是一方面。

This is one thing.

现在，除了军事行动之外，以色列对10月7日事件最好的回应，就是扩大亚伯拉罕协议，从而从战略上——甚至不谈道德层面——证明10月7日是一次失败。

Now, apart from the military operation, the best Israeli answer to October 7 would be to expand the Abraham Accords, thus proving that strategically speaking, not even morally speaking, but strategically speaking, October 7 was a failure.

因此，在我看来，以色列的努力应集中在与沙特阿拉伯、印度尼西亚和叙利亚扩大和平协议上；据我所知，与叙利亚的协议有可能不仅仅是安全协议。

And that's why in my opinion, Israel's efforts should be based on expanding the peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Syria, and from what I hear, there is an option that the agreement with Syria would be more than merely a security agreement.

这些协议现在基于什么？

What are these agreements now based on?

我的意思是，我觉得这正是我想引出的一点：长期以来，以色列与其邻国的关系被理解为某种意识形态上的关系，但‘意识形态’这个词又不完全准确。

I mean, I think this is partially what I'm trying to draw out that for a very long time, the relationship between Israel and its neighbors was understood to be ideological isn't quite the right word.

是的。

Right.

但基于对以色列与巴勒斯坦人关系的道德和伦理状况的评估。

But based on an assessment of the moral and ethical condition of Israel's relationship with the Palestinians.

对。

Right.

而且出现了一种转向更加交易性质的双边协议的趋势。

And there's been a move towards these bilateral agreements that are much more transactional.

因为在我看来，是的。

Because, in my opinion Mhmm.

阿联酋之所以与以色列签署和平条约，是因为他们不再将中东视为犹太人与穆斯林的战场，而是极端分子与温和派之间的对抗。

The the Emiratis signed a peace treaty with Israel because they no longer saw the Middle East as a battlefield of Jews versus Muslims, but of radicals versus moderates.

或者说是什叶派与逊尼派，以及犹太国家之间的对抗。

Or if you want a Shia versus Sunni and the Jewish states.

这正是其背后的主要理念。

That was the main idea behind it.

但即使在

But even in

这些国家，也出现了巨大的愤怒，是的。

these countries, there has been a huge amount of anger Right.

对加沙的破坏和死亡人数感到愤怒。

Over the devastation and the death toll in Gaza.

那么，各方在交易哪些筹码呢？

So what are the chits being traded back and forth?

关键是，10月7日之后情况发生了变化。

So here's the thing, because there was a change following October 7.

在10月7日之前，沙特人想要的，用不那么外交的说法，就是对巴勒斯坦问题表示一下口头支持。

Prior to October 7, all the Saudis wanted was, I'll put it in an undiplomatic way, a lip service regarding the Palestinian question.

明白吗？

Okay?

在10月7日之前，沙特人想要的是一些非常模糊的承诺，甚至连斯莫特里奇和本-格维尔都会同意。

Now, prior to October 7, the Saudis wanted something quite vague that even Smotrich and Benghevi would green light.

10月7日之后，他们仍然希望得到更多。

Following October 7, they nonetheless wanted a bit more.

我不清楚这‘更多’具体指什么。

Now I don't know what this more is.

我推测，某种象征性、假设性地让巴勒斯坦权力机构参与加沙地带的构想，可能是沙特阿拉伯将 normalization 建立在此基础上的协议内容。

I suspect that the idea of the Palestinian authority somehow symbolically, hypothetically being involved in Gaza Strip would be part of the agreement was that Saudi Arabia would base the normalization on this idea.

因此，这将成为沙特阿拉伯与以色列关系正常化中的巴勒斯坦要素。

So this would be the Palestinian ingredient of the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

但作为一名评论员，我的错误在于：在10月7日之前，我以为内塔尼亚胡的主要成就在于扼杀了巴勒斯坦建国的构想。

But my mistake as a commentator was that prior to October 7, I thought that Netanyahu's main achievement was that he choked the idea of Palestinian statehood.

我仍然认为，在我们有生之年不会出现一个巴勒斯坦国，但10月7日之后，这个构想确实有了现实的存在感。

I still think that there is not going to be a Palestinian state in our lifetime, But following October 7, there is a presence to this idea.

不过，另一个相反的趋势是，嗯。

One of the things going the other direction though Mhmm.

以色列已经发展成为技术和武器的顶尖研发国。

Is Israel has become such a capable developer of technology and weaponry

对。

Right.

尤其是高度先进的武器系统，这似乎成了一种——我不想称之为软实力。

And then highly technological weaponry in particular, that it seems to become a kind of I don't I don't wanna call it soft power.

我想称其为中等实力，它是许多协议的基础，既包括以色列成为你安全保护伞的一部分，也使其成为与美国建立更紧密关系的中转站，尤其是在唐纳德·特朗普执政时期。

I wanna call it medium power that is at the base of many of these agreements, both that Israel is part of your security umbrella, and it's a way station also to a closer relationship with America, particularly under Donald Trump.

但即使在欧洲，那里大量公众舆论和国家层面的立场都转向反对以色列。

But even in Europe where a tremendous amount of public opinion and state level opinion has turned against Israel.

对。

Right.

以色列作为向欧洲出售武器的国家。

Israel as a seller of weaponry to Europe.

德国对以色列实施了武器禁运，但还是决定购买价值20亿欧元的导弹。

Germany puts an armed embargo on Israel, but buys decided to buy missiles in €2,000,000,000.

所以那里正在发生某种变化，这似乎成了一种筹码，甚至更像是某种基础。

So something is happening there that has become a kind of bargaining chip or more than almost like a foundation it seems to me.

没错。

Exactly.

以色列如何理解在巴勒斯坦问题上不发生重大变化的情况下维持关系。

Of how Israel understands it is going to maintain relationships without substantial change amidst the Palestinians.

而且这非常具有特朗普式的交易特征。

And and this is a very sort of Trump ish transactional

我不太喜欢以色列先是中东的情人，现在又成为欧洲情人的说法。

I'm not a big fan of the idea of Israel being first the mistress of the Middle East and now the mistress of Europe.

你能解释一下这是什么意思吗？

Can you say what that means?

也就是说，我们并没有和沙特阿拉伯或阿联酋等国家正式结盟，但会在没人看见的时候私下见面。

That is to say that we are not married to, I don't know, Saudi Arabia or The Emirates, but we meet at night when no one sees.

这些关系都是秘密进行的。

The relationships are all clandestine.

没错。

Exactly.

现在，欧洲背后隐藏着一个危险的想法，因为我认为内塔尼亚胡未能理解以色列所经历的国际危机的深度，因为他比你我知道更多关于真实关系的情况。

Now, here is the dangerous idea behind it in Europe because I think Netanyahu failed to understand the depth of the international crisis Israel has gone through because he knew more than you and me know about the real relationships.

明白吗？

Okay?

因为他知道有多少欧洲国家迫切需要以色列的技术和武器。

Because he knew how many European countries beg for Israeli technology and weapons.

但在软实力方面，软实力基于你的品牌非常强大的理念。

But when it comes to soft power, soft power is based on the idea that your brand is very strong.

而对以色列来说，情况恰恰相反：当以色列几乎沦为孤岛国家时，对以色列技术和武器的需求却在上升。

And in with Israel, it was exactly the other way around, that while Israel turned almost to be a Pariah state, consumption of Israeli technology and and weapons went up.

因此，我认为如果以色列想提升影响力，就应该在品牌建设上投入更多。

And that's why I think Israel should invest more in its branding if you want

但我觉得这不仅仅是品牌问题，不过我知道这确实引出了一个问题，即我目前对以色列地缘政治的解读是：它在交易性关系中蓬勃发展。

to think it's more than branding, but but I I know that does open up that that does open up that question, which is that my read of Israel's geopolitics right now is that it is thriving where the relationships are transactional.

没错。

Right.

而在基于价值观的关系中，以色列却正在遭受损失，这一点正开始体现在美国身上。

And it is suffering where the relationships are more values based, and and that's beginning to include America.

所以，是的。

So Mhmm.

我们刚刚有了《纽约时报》与西耶纳的一项民调，这是自1998年以来首次提出这个问题：更多美国人同情巴勒斯坦人而非以色列人。

We just had a New York Times Siena poll, which for the first time since our polling is asked this question going back to 1998, you had more Americans sympathizing with the Palestinians than the Israelis.

但这项民调的样本范围很窄。

Now the poll is very narrow.

我觉得大概是35%对34%。

I think it was something like 35, 34.

是的。

Yeah.

但你看看这项民调中的年龄分组：65岁以上的美国人中，47%更同情以色列人，26%同情巴勒斯坦人。

But you look at the age split in that poll, And, Americans over 65, 47% are more sympathetic to the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians.

而在18至29岁的人群中，61%更同情巴勒斯坦人，19%同情以色列人。

Between 18 and 29, 61% are more sympathetic to the Palestinians and 19% to the Israelis.

我认为人们倾向于认为这只是左翼的立场，但右翼评论员梅根·凯利曾告诉塔克·卡尔森，所有30岁以下的人都反对以色列。

And I think there's a tendency to say it's just a leftist thing, but Megan Kelly, the right wing commentator, she has told Tucker Carlson that everybody 30 is against Israel.

没错。

Right.

告诉我你是怎么理解这一点的。

Tell me how you're understanding this.

我的意思是，美国到底发生了什么？

I mean, what what's going on in America also?

这就像欧洲和其他地方，数字甚至比这还要糟糕，对吧？

It's like Europe, other places, the the numbers look much worse even than that Right.

对以色列而言。

For Israel.

你如何看待这个问题？

How do you see this?

说实话，现在下结论还为时过早。

To be honest, it's too early to call.

我不确定这是否是代际问题，是否会随着时间推移而改变。

I don't know if it's something generational, that it's something that's going to change with time.

你知道，过去你大学毕业时，学校深受卡塔尔大学的资金支持，那时你会更理解这种状况。

You know, years past, you leave university, they're heavily funded by Qatar University, and you you understand situation more.

有一件事。

One thing.

其次，这场战争。

Second, the war.

如今，全世界都在关注苦难。

Today, the world is focused on suffering.

你受的苦越多，获得的同情就越多。

The more you suffer, the more sympathy you get.

记得10月8日那天，埃菲尔铁塔、帝国大厦、布伦瑞克门都亮起了蓝白旗帜。

Now, remember October 8, when the Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Building, Braneru Gate were lit with a blue and white flag.

说实话，作为以色列人，最让我感到恐惧的画面并不是塞德罗特和基布兹的全景，而是看到埃菲尔铁塔亮起蓝白灯光——那一刻我想，天啊，我们竟如此凄惨，连法国都给了我们合法性。

And to be honest, the image that frightened me the most as an Israeli wasn't the whole pictures from Sederot and the Kibbutzim, but to see Eiffel Towerly, was blue and white because I said, wow, we look so miserable that even in France we got legitimacy.

好吗？

Okay?

现在，我们赢得了战争。

Now, we won the war.

我们彻底赢得了这场战争。

We decisively won the war.

我可以花几个小时向你解释，为什么绑架比巴斯一家并用双手杀害他们，不能与以色列空袭导致的巴勒斯坦儿童死亡相提并论。

I can explain you for hours why abducting the Bibas family and murdering them with bare hands is not something that you can compare to the death of Palestinian children from Israel bombardments.

然而，我完全明白，这些图像的力量如此强大，足以说服数以百万计的TikTok粉丝，因此我认为，对以色列来说，最紧迫的事情首先是结束战争，进入一个新的正常化与和平阶段，让以色列在媒体上获得正面报道，甚至更好——根本不再被提及。

However, I'm fully aware of the fact that the images are so strong that I can convince millions and millions of TikTok followers, and that's why I think the the most dramatic thing for Israel is first and foremost to end the war and to move to a new phase of normalization, peace, having Israel either mentioned positively on the press or even better not mentioned at all.

你看到内塔尼亚胡上了几个播客，突然间你就发现，内塔尼亚胡其实并没有掌控这个媒介。

You see that Netanyahu went for a few podcasts, and all of a sudden you could see that Netanyahu I mean, he didn't really control the medium.

对吧？

Right?

这是他第一次

For the first time, he'd

他上了NELK Boys的节目，那是一个我说不好怎么形容的男性空间播客，特朗普曾经多次上过那个节目。

He went on the NELK Boys, which is a sort of, don't I know how to describe it, a manosphere podcast that Trump has been on many times.

他们遭到了自己听众的强烈批评

They got so much backlash from their own listeners

是的。

Right.

因此他们不得不道歉。

That they needed to apologize.

其中一人说，他被告知邀请内塔尼亚胡就像邀请现代版希特勒，他还进一步表示，他认为这个说法很有道理。

And one of them said he was told that having Netanyahu on is like having a modern day Hitler on, and he went on to say he thought that was a good point.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我的意思是，在这个国家，这是一种右翼的暗语。

I mean, that's a right wing coded in this country.

这发生了些不同的事情。

That's something different happening.

我同意。

I agree.

所以我认为造成了损害，而且是永久性的损害。

So I think there was a damage, a permanent damage.

但我仍然觉得这比人们想象的要小。

I still think it's smaller than people think.

现在它具有弹性了。

Now it's elastic.

公众舆论是有弹性的，尤其是在涉及以色列和巴勒斯坦的问题上。

The public opinion is elastic, especially when it comes to Israel and the Palestinians.

这不是堕胎、武器，或者我不知道的，特朗普。

It's not abortions or weapons or I don't know, Trump.

这是你可以改变主意的事情。

It's something that you can change your mind on.

人们往往忘记，在赎罪日战争之后，以色列在美国和欧洲的声誉都下滑了，随后还有石油禁运等事件，而在1982年第一次黎巴嫩战争后，以色列在美国的立场也一度非常低落。

People tend to forget that following Yom Kippur war, Israel's rating fell both in The States and Europe, following the oil embargo, etcetera, and that Israel's positioning in The States was very low following the first Lebanon war in 1982.

同样是关于在人口密集的巴勒斯坦地区进行长期战争的画面。

The very same picture of a very long war in highly populated Palestinian areas.

所以我认为这种情况可能会改变，但我们不能再基于二十世纪的价值观来构建我们与美国的关系，因为即使是福音派，新一代也不再从圣经事件的视角看待以色列，而是从社会正义的视角来看待——就像非裔美国人过去曾将犹太人视为摩西带领人民走出埃及的象征，但过去几十年里，他们却将以色列视为白人殖民主义势力。

So I think it can change, but we can't base, and this is something more dramatic, we can no longer base our relationship with The United States on the values of the twentieth century, because even evangelicals, the new generation, doesn't see Israel through the lenses of a biblical happening, but through the lenses of social justice, Exactly like the African American community used to see the Jews as, you know, Moses coming from slavery in Egypt, and over the last few decades, they see Israel as a white colonialist power.

所以还有很多工作要做，而比这更重大的事情似乎

So there's a lot to work on, And So something bigger than that seems

对我来说，它已经发生了变化。

like it has changed to me.

而且

And

我感觉自己有

I I feel like I have a

对美国政治的深刻理解。

good sense of US politics.

是的。

Yes.

这不仅仅是民调的问题。

And it's not just the polling.

而是围绕以色列的政治中什么是可被接受的。

It's what is considered conceivable in politics around Israel.

我们现在身处纽约市。

And right now, we're in New York City.

佐兰·马曼尼极有可能成为下一任市长。

Zoran Mamdani is likely to become very very likely to become the next mayor.

他关于以色列的立场，放在几年前，会让你完全无法当选。

His views on Israel that would have made you absolutely unelectable Mhmm.

我认为，在全国几乎任何地方，尤其是在这个犹太人口众多的纽约市，都是如此。

I think in almost anywhere in the country, but particularly in New York City, a very Jewish city, just a couple of years ago.

这不仅仅是他很可能赢得选举。

And it's not just that he is going to win the election most likely.

更重要的是，他向许多其他民主党人展示了一种可能性：他们可以表达出与自己对以色列真实政治立场更接近的观点。

It is that what he is showing a lot of other Democrats is that they can express something closer to where their politics in Israel have actually gone.

对吧？

Right?

安德鲁·库莫曾极力利用以色列问题来攻击他。

Andrew Cuomo tried very hard to weaponize Israel against him.

完全失败了。

Completely failed.

埃里克·亚当斯当时是以打击反犹主义或终结反犹主义的竞选纲领参选的。

Eric Adams, was running on the combat antisemitism or end antisemitism ballot line.

完全落空了。

Completely filled.

在地球上最犹太化的城市。

In the most Jewish city on earth.

在地球上最犹太化的城市。

In the most Jewish city on earth.

所以，或者至少是拥有最多犹太人口的城市。

And so or at least city with the most Jews on earth.

没错。

Exactly.

这改变了局面。

That shifts things.

我认为这之所以改变局面，其中一个原因是，我们一直在讨论这件事如何在右翼发生，但内塔尼亚胡在过去二十年里，彻底站到了右翼一边，开始刻意加剧以色列与美国之间的对立。

And one reason I think it shifts things, one one thing that it is getting at is we're talking about how this is happening on the right, but Netanyahu really over the past years, twenty years, threw in with the right and began to choose to polarize Israel and America.

对吧？

Right?

绕过奥巴马，直接接触共和党国会。

Going around Barack Obama to the Republican Congress.

以色列曾短暂地与拜登相处，而拜登属于更老一代的右翼人士。

Israel had a bit of an interinium with Joe Biden, who was a much older generation Right.

他是民主党人，但持有老一代民主党人对以色列的个人看法。

Of Democrat and had an older Democratic generation's views on Israel personally.

对。

Right.

这是拜登与自己政府内许多工作人员对这一问题的处理方式存在显著分歧的议题之一，我认为他在这一问题上比自己团队的立场更右。

It's one of the the issues where Biden was quite, I think, to the right of his own administration on on how a lot of his staff would have liked to approach this issue.

以色列似乎在押注很多

Israel seems to be betting a lot

对。

Right.

押注于共和党在美国持续保持主导地位。

On continued Republican dominance presence in in America.

如果你设想下一代民主党人掌权，而以色列在冲突和危机时期仍需要美国的支持，我认为情况将变得截然不同——不仅因为立场的转变，还因为

That if you imagine the next generation of Democrats being in power here, Israel needing American support in a time of of of conflict and and crisis, it seems to me it's going to look very, very, very different both because of the views, but also because

对。

Right.

我认为现在的美国民主党人不再认为他们必须比实际情况更亲以色列。

I don't think American Democrats anymore believe that they have to be more pro Israel than they actually are.

两年前，在战争爆发前，我见过当时的以军总参谋长，他告诉我，当他们购买战斗机时，这些战机的预期使用寿命是四十年。

Two years ago, before the war, I met with the IDF chief of staff back then, and he told me when when they are to buy air jets jet fighters, its life expectancy is forty years.

四十年。

Four o.

他说，当我们决定购买哪种战斗机时，必须考虑到在未来四十年、十届总统任期内，会出现一位对以色列实施武器禁运的美国总统。

And he said that when we decide which fighter jet to buy, you take into account that in the next forty years, 10 turns, there is going to be a US president that would put an armed embargo on Israel.

这是他在2023年说的。

That's what he said in 2023.

现在，我认为你和我会同意，如果你和我都认同，假如卡玛拉·哈里斯当选，而以色列入侵了加沙市，我们早就该看到这种情况了。

Now, I think you and me would agree, you and I would agree that had Kamala Harris got elected and Israel invaded Gaza City, we would have already already seen it.

对吧？

Right?

所以，这种可能性确实存在。

So yes, it's there.

我认为，问题在于我

I think that the question of whether I

觉得我们当时已经站在这种局面发生的边缘了。

think we were on the cusp of that already happening.

这是个好观点。

That's a good point.

没错。

Exactly.

而且这又是一个鸡生蛋还是蛋生鸡的问题。

And then again, it's a chicken and egg question.

我不认为内塔尼亚胡应该为以色列成为党派议题而受责备，因为美国的每一个议题，包括天气，都变成了党派之争。

I don't think Netanyahu is to be blamed to for the fact that Israel became a partisan issue, because each and every topic in The US including the weather became partisan.

所以也许也许他

So maybe maybe he

应该说，他做出了选择。

should Well, he made choices.

我特别见证了奥巴马政府时期发生的这一切。

I watched this happen particularly in the Obama in particularly in the Obama administration.

但

But

告诉我一些事。

tell me something.

当奥巴马第一次当选时，我记得人们说他内心深处并不同情以色列。

When when Obama got elected for the first time, I remember people say that he doesn't have the sympathy for Israel in his kishkas, in his guts.

对吧？

Right?

顺便说一下，奥巴马当选时，内塔尼亚胡还没重返办公室。

By the way, Obama got elected before Netanyahu came back to office.

当奥巴马和内塔尼亚胡第一次会面时，奥巴马告诉他，西岸连一块砖都不能动，而且还安抚了伊朗政权。

And when Obama and Netanyahu met for the first time, Obama told him not even one brick in the West Bank, and he appeased the Iranian regime.

所以我完全同意。

So I fully agree.

跳双人舞需要两个人，但我认为……

It takes two to tango, but I think

但内塔尼亚胡做出了一系列战略决策，因为他不想承受压力，或者至少想看看奥巴马是否真有能力对他施压。

it was But Netanyahu made a series of strategic decisions because he did not want to take pressure, or at least he wanted to see if Obama was really capable of bringing pressure on him.

听我说。

Look.

我是个美国犹太人。

I'm an American Jew.

我骨子里对以色列的感情更深，这么说吧。

I have more Israel in my Kishke, so to speak.

好的。

Okay.

但我认为，如果以色列当初听从了关于定居点的建议，情况会更好。

But I think Israel would have been better off if they had listened to settlements.

现在我明白，你和我对这个问题的看法不同。

Now I recognize that you and I have a different view on this.

有一点不同。

Slightly.

但即使在过去的两年里，西岸的定居点建设速度也迅速加快

But even in the last two years, there's been a rapidity of settlement construction in the West Bank

对。

Right.

据莫尔所说，这超过了过去二十年的任何时期。

That outpaces the last, I think, twenty years according to More

比以往任何时候都多。

than more than ever.

比以往任何时候都多。

More than ever.

所以，存在一种情况，以色列做出了一个战略性的政治决定：嗯。

So there is a world in which Israel made a strategic political decision Mhmm.

意思是：我们要确保美国民主派感受到与我们的共鸣，感受到我们考虑了他们的某些关切，因此我们会为了这个原因在某些事情上自我克制。

To say, well, we wanna make sure that the democratic side of the aisle in The US feels kinship here feels we're taking into account some of their concerns, and we're gonna hold ourselves back on certain things for that reason.

以色列决定不这么做。

Israel decided not to do that.

对。

Right.

在很多方面，拜登最终被羞辱了，就像被人当面拍了一巴掌。

And in many ways, like, kind of pat on their face, Biden ended up humiliated.

我认为以色列方面，特别是内塔尼亚胡这边，确实做出了重大决定，如果换了别的总理，事情本可能有不同的发展。

I think there were real decisions here on the Israeli side, particularly on Netanyahu's side, and you could have imagined it playing out differently with different prime ministers.

但约旦河西岸就是约旦河西岸，这很简单。

But West Bank is West Bank is easy.

那伊朗呢？

How about Iran?

你有没有想过，如果约旦河西岸这么简单，以色列为什么没这么做？奥巴马时期呢？

Do you see any scenario in which Obama But if West Bank is easy, why didn't Israel do No.

说起来容易。

It's easy to speak about it.

是的。

Mhmm.

但民主政府与以色列之间的分歧，并不是民主政府与内塔尼亚胡之间的分歧，因为每个以色列人都认为，自大屠杀以来，伊朗是对犹太人生存最大的威胁。

But the differences between democratic administrations and Israel is not between democratic administrations and Netanyahu, because each and every Israeli saw Iran as the biggest threat to the Jewish existence since the Holocaust.

我们现在知道，奥巴马和拜登从未考虑过攻击福杜，甚至不允许以色列发动攻击，我想卡玛拉·哈里斯也不会这么说。

Now, we know that Obama and Biden didn't consider for a second to attack Fodou, for instance, or even to allow Israel to attack, and I guess Kamala Harris wouldn't say either.

这不仅仅是关于简单的巴勒斯坦问题，而是比这大得多的事情。

So it's not only the easy Palestinian questions, it's something really bigger than this.

奥巴马上任后，安抚了敌人，却得罪了朋友。

President Obama came to office and he appeased enemies and pissed off friends.

我认为几乎不言自明的是，民主党人对什么是安全的来源有着不同的看法。

I I think it is almost axiomatic that Democrats have a different view of what creates security

而不是我所认为的。

than I put

有什么不同。

what different do.

是的。

Yeah.

内塔尼亚胡总理，我理解，追随特朗普政府的做法确实令人着迷，因为他的敌人就是你的敌人，这是最亲以色列的立场。

Prime Minister Netanyahu, I understand it's addictive stuff to inhale the Trump administration because you have the most pro Israeli approach because his enemies is yours.

我知道这上瘾，但也许这个问题可以通过一位不同的总理和一位不同的总统来解决。

I know it's addictive, but maybe this problem is to be fixed with a different prime minister and a different president.

我认为，当我展望这一问题的未来，并试图将我们这场对话的两个部分结合起来时，以色列正在大力推动定居点建设并控制约旦河西岸。

I think when I look forward into the future of this and when I try to put together the two parts of this conversation we've been having, you have Israel pursuing a lot of settlement building and control of the West Bank.

暴力事件已经大大增加。

There's been a lot more violence.

你看到以色列对加沙大部分地区进行了无限期的重新占领。

You have the indefinite reoccupation of much of Gaza.

将这些与这些民调数据、这里的民意变化结合起来看。

You combine that then with these poll numbers, these changes in support here.

这不仅仅是以色列可以等待战争结束的问题。

And it's not just like Israel can wait for the war to end.

它正在把自己置于一种结构性位置，使得外界很可能会——而且可能非常成功地——将其视为南非式的种族隔离制度。

It is setting itself up in a structural position where the effort is going to be and possibly quite successfully to make it into apartheid South Africa.

对吧？

Right?

而这就是以色列在两地保持如此多控制权时所采取的战略，也是它为自己打开的风险。

And that that is the the strategy and also the risk it has opened up for itself by maintaining so much control in in both places.

是的。

Yeah.

你怎么看这个问题？

How do you think about that?

以色列和南非之间的主要区别在于，南非的非裔美国人或黑人社区并没有试图屠杀每一个白人。

The the main difference between the Israel and South Africa is that African American or the black community in South Africa didn't try to massacre each and every white.

那里的情况并非如此。

It wasn't the case there.

当我们谈论南非时，让我们设想一下，如果宗教领袖与纳尔逊·曼德拉达成协议，却最终发现曼德拉、亚西尔·阿拉法特实际上发动了第二次因提法达，一场针对白人的战争，杀害了1200名白人，并向开普敦和约翰内斯堡派遣自杀式炸弹袭击者。

And here, we speak about South Africa, but let's imagine that the clerics signed an agreement with Nelson Mandela only to find out that Nelson Mandela, Yasser Arafat, actually initiated a second intifada, a war against the whites killing 1,200 of them and sending suicide bombers to Cape Town and Yohannesburg.

我理解这种说法，认为情况是不同的。

I understand the argument that it's a that it's a different situation.

我想说的是，国际社会所看到的是，大约有七百万巴勒斯坦人没有任何自决权

What I'm saying is that the international view that you have, you know, roughly 7,000,000 Palestinians without any self determination

不。

No.

他们有一个民事的。

They have they have a civil one.

他们拥有的比现在更多，但他们认为这对他们来说更重要。

They got more than they have now, and they decided that it's more important for them.

他们两次决定，无论是在西岸还是加沙，对他们而言，杀死尽可能多的犹太人比获得更多独立更为重要。

They decided twice, both in the West Bank and in Gaza, that it's more important for them to kill as many Jews as possible than to get more independence.

这是我们西方人无法理解的地方。

That's the thing that we, Westerners, fail to understand it.

我不断问自己，为什么安全机构在10月6日没能意识到这场袭击即将发生？

Why I keep asking myself, why did the security establishment failed on October 6 to understand that this attack is imminent?

我的回答是，我可以跟你聊上几个小时关于那些SIM卡和预警信号等等，但归根结底，他们没能理解有些人奉行的是‘双输’策略。

And my response, I mean, I can speak to you for hours about, you know, those SIM cards and alerts, etcetera, but at the end of the day, they fail to understand that there are people who have a lose lose policy.

我们理解的是‘双赢’策略。

We know win win policy.

这对所有人都有好处。

This is good for all.

我们了解赢输策略，比如俄罗斯对乌克兰，俄罗斯试图夺取某些东西。

We know win lose policy like in Russia versus Ukraine that Russia tries to take something.

这是邪恶的，但还能接受。

It's evil, but it's digestible.

我们无法理解一种双输的局面，在这种局面中，我知道我会遭受痛苦。

We fail to understand a lose lose situation in which I know I'm going to suffer.

我知道我的人民将会死亡。

I know my people are going to die.

我知道加沙最终会变成一片废墟，但我仍想尽可能多地杀死犹太人和以色列人。

I know Gaza is going to line ruins at the end of this war, yet I want to kill as many Jews and Israelis

尽可能多。

as possible.

我认为很多——我不想替哈马斯发言，但我觉得，你所描述的这种局势之所以看起来不稳定，是因为他们准确地感受到了自己正在失去一切。

I think many I don't wanna speak for God knows Hamas, but I think that another way of saying why this does not seem stable to me, the the situation you've described, is that, I mean, they felt accurately, like they were losing.

而且，你知道，我们之前讨论过，你说过，这不是一个暴力循环。

And that, you know, we talked about you said like, look, this is not a cycle of violence.

这其实是单方面制造的，我曾在节目中邀请过许多巴勒斯坦人。

It's, you know, it's one side creating I've had many Palestinians on the show.

我们在报道中也接触过许多他们。

I've talked to many of them in our reporting.

对他们来说，暴力是每天都在发生的。

You know, to them, the violence is every day.

这种暴力是持续不断的。

It is ongoing.

在加沙和约旦河西岸，这种暴力从未停止。

It is ceaseless in Gaza and in the West Bank.

对吧？

Right?

他们将自己所处的状况理解为一种结构性暴力，而我并不反对他们的观点。至于是什么造成了这种持续的压力，如果你把一个对以色列越来越缺乏同情的国际社会，与以色列对这两个地区更强的控制力结合起来，我同意这与南非的情况有许多不同之处。

They understand the condition they are living in as a condition of of structural violence, and I don't And disagree with them on the thing that is going to create the the ongoing pressure, if you combine an international community that is less sympathetic to Israel, but Israel having much more control of these two places, I agree that it has many differences from the South African situation.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

是的，但那个形象。

It is But The image.

你在谈论那个形象。

You speak about the image.

我的意思是，我在谈论形象和现实两方面。

I mean, I'm speaking about both the image and the reality.

好的。

Okay.

人们的想法是，你永远只会面临一种情况，即大约七百万人口。

The the people are going the idea that forever you will just have a situation where you have 7,000,000 ish people.

五百万。

Five.

好的。

Okay.

实际上，我包括了以色列境内的阿拉伯人，他们的处境与他们不同。

Well, I'm including actually Arabs in Israel who have a different situation than than they

来自不同的转变、离婚或不同政党。

get from a different shift, divorce or different parties.

人们以不同的方式讨论这个问题。

People debate this in different ways.

我不打算深入探讨太多。

I don't mean to go into it too much.

这似乎是一种情况，以色列长期来看将面临巨大麻烦，不仅在国际声望上，对吧。

That that that seems like it is a situation in which Israel is gonna have a lot of trouble in the long term with not just international standing Right.

但最终还会涉及制裁和其他问题。

But eventually questions like sanctions and other things.

是的。

Yes.

在10月7日之后，我得出结论：以色列最首要的问题是巴勒斯坦问题。

I came to the conclusion following October 7 that Israel's number one problem is the Palestinian one.

我以前认为问题是伊朗，但现在不是了。

I thought before that it's the Iranian one, it's not.

然而，为了获得合法性，我不能给予那些视我为必须以各种方式彻底消灭的邪恶敌人的许可。

However, I cannot, in order to get legitimacy, giving a license for people who see me, treat me as an evil enemy that should be eliminated in each and every way.

这才是关键所在。

That's the main thing.

所以我认为我们应该耐心等待新一代的到来。

So I think we should wait patiently for a new generation to come.

我认为我们这一代最紧迫的任务，无论是在美国、以色列，还是在阿联酋，都是让巴勒斯坦权力机构的教育体系不再以仇恨为基础，而是以西方价值观和温和的伊斯兰教为核心。

I think that the most urgent mission of our generation, both in The US and in Israel, in in The UAE, is to base the education system in the Palestinian authority not on hatred, but on Western values, on moderate Islam.

我知道这是可以成功的。

I know it can succeed.

怎么做呢？

How?

因为这正是阿联酋和沙特阿拉伯所发生的事情，他们改变了这两个国家穆斯林的思想。

Because this is exactly what happened in The UAE and in Saudi Arabia, and they changed the minds of Muslims in both countries.

你会发现反犹主义的水平在下降。

You see a decline in the levels of antisemitism.

既然我不是种族主义者，我不认为伊斯兰教的宗旨是尽可能多地杀害犹太人、憎恨尽可能多的美国人，并在9·11事件发生时像加沙那样在街头欢呼并分发糖果，我认为这需要时间。

And since I'm no racist, I don't think that Islam is about killing as many Jews as possible and hating as many Americans as possible and cheering and give candies in the streets when nine eleven's disaster happened, as it happened in Gaza, and I think it takes time.

这需要时间。

It takes time.

我认为这需要大约二十年。

It takes, I would say, twenty years.

如果从今天开始，二十年后，你会看到你在所谓约旦河西岸、犹大和撒马利亚，以及加沙地带所看到的巨大变化。

In twenty years from now, if we start today, you'll see a major change in both what you call the West Bank, Judah and Samaria, and in Gaza Strip.

我认为，许多人在以色列关心的问题是，以色列是否看到自己的政治在其他国家正在崩溃。

I think the the question that many people wanna see change in Israel here is whether or not if Israel sees its politics collapsing in other countries.

对吗？

Right?

特朗普总统之后，一位民主党人赢得了选举，而且欧洲现在以某种抽象的方式承认了巴勒斯坦国的独立。

You have after president Trump, a Democrat, win office, and and there's a recognition that Europe has now, accepted Palestinian statehood in some abstracted way Mhmm.

而且人们觉得，以色列无法再凭借其现有的政治立场维持这里的支持。

And a sense that Israel cannot maintain support here with the politics it has had.

我觉得这种情况可能会朝两个方向发展。

I could see that going one of two ways.

在某些领导人和特定条件下，我看到的是以色列试图为国际舆论留出表达空间，并改变其政策。

I could see that going under certain leaders and under certain conditions towards trying to create some space for the international opinion to express itself and a change in Israeli policy.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我也可能看到以色列变得更加内向，更加专注于武器研发，减少对其他国家的依赖。

I could see it in Israel becoming more inward looking, more focused on weapons development, trying to be less reliant on others.

我的意思是，内塔尼亚胡曾说过一句有趣的话，他说以色列必须适应国际孤立的现实。

I mean, there was an interesting quote I thought from Netanyahu where he said that Israel is gonna have to adapt to international isolation

是的。

Right.

成为一座雅典式的超级斯巴达。

Become an Athens and a super Sparta.

关于武器采购方面。

In terms of weapon acquiring.

是的。

Yes.

所以告诉我，考虑到国际社会的愤怒如此强烈和全面，以色列人肯定在思考这个问题。他们是怎么想的？

So tell me about I'm sure people in Israel are are thinking about this somewhat given how aggressive the and total the international anger has been.

那两条路径是什么？

What are those two paths?

我不认为以色列人会改变他们对巴勒斯坦建国的态度，因为这根本不是关于外交。

I don't see any chance that Israelis are going to change their mind regarding Palestinian statehood because it's not about diplomacy.

也不是关于公众舆论。

It's not about public opinion.

而是关于恐惧。

It's about fear.

人们看到了10月7日发生的事，他们不会愿意给敌人从耶路撒冷或特拉维夫的家中发动袭击的五分钟，最多十分钟。

People saw what happened on October 7 that they will not be willing to give an opportunity for these five minutes from their home in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, ten minutes the most.

这是一方面。

This is one thing.

谈到合作，我认为可能会有一个政党说：好吧，我们确实累了。

When it comes to cooperation, I think there is room for a party that would say, okay, we're quite tired.

我们想休息几年。

We want to rest a few years.

我们会做好准备。

We will be prepared.

我们的士兵会守护一切，但我们想喘口气，国际的空气、经济的空气等等。

Our soldiers would guard everything, but we want to breathe some air, international air, economic air, etcetera.

我认为，下一届政府会把我说的这种因素视为一个重要组成部分。

And that's the next I think the next government would see a significant ingredient as I just described.

要么在2026年10月，要么在这之前，如果本届政府垮台，就会举行选举。

There will be either in October 2026 or sometime before then if this government falls elections.

以色列的政治结构与美国政治不同。

Israeli politics isn't structured the way US politics are.

在这里，我们习惯于以两大政党相互竞争的视角来看待问题。

Here, we're used to thinking in terms of two parties that battle it out.

而在那里，它是两个由不同政党组成的联盟。

There, it's two coalitions of different parties.

对。

Right.

帮我梳理一下反内塔尼亚胡联盟是如何形成的。

Walk me through the anti Netanyahu coalition that's developed.

看起来它将由纳夫塔利·贝内特领导，是的。

It it looks like it would be led by Naftali Bennett Yes.

在以色列政治中，他传统上被认为是内塔尼亚胡的右翼。

Who traditionally in in Israeli politics was understood on Netanyahu's right

在安全问题上。

In terms of security.

在安全问题上，当然在早期，他对内塔尼亚胡至少声称对两国方案持开放态度的做法提出了严厉批评。

In terms of security, certainly at an earlier point, was harshly critical of how open Netanyahu at least claimed to be to a two state solution, for instance.

没错。

Exactly.

你有本尼·甘茨，他在2023年11月时，普遍被认为是以色列下一任总理的有力人选。

You have Benny Gantz, who in November 2023, I think was widely considered to be a plausible next prime minister for Israel.

现在他的蓝白联盟未能达到议会席位的门槛。

Now his blue and white coalition Under the threshold.

未能达到代表资格的门槛。

Is under the threshold for representation.

是的。

Yes.

亚维尔·利伯曼，他在2018年是一位极右翼的国防部长。

Avigar Lieberman, who's a quite far right wing defense minister in 2018.

叶air·拉皮德，对，他是较为中间派的思想家。

Yair Lapid, right, who is one of the more centrist thinkers.

是的。

Yes.

叶air戈兰，代表以色列左翼，也属于这个联盟。

Yair Golan, who represents the left in Israel and is inside this coalition too.

占8%的选票。

8% of the popular vote.

是的。

Yes.

这个群体将如何执政？

How would that group govern?

他们会在哪里不同？

Where would they differ?

不会。

Won't.

一个10岁的孩子问我，你为什么不投票给中间偏左？

10 year old child asks me, why don't you vote for the center left?

我告诉他，因为他们是左派。

I told him because they are leftists.

所以他问，什么是左派？

So he said, what is a leftist?

所以我很难向他解释，因为二十年前，左派主张撤离你祖父居住的定居点。

So I had hard times to explain to him because twenty years ago, it was he's for evacuating the settlement where your grandfather lives.

明白吗？

Okay?

如今，没有人认真提出要撤离定居点。

Nowadays, no one really offers seriously to evacuate settlements.

那么如今以色列的分水岭在哪里？

So what is the watershed line in Israel these days?

是中间偏左吗？

Is it a center left?

纳夫塔利·贝内特就是中间派，没错。

Naftali Bennett is the center Exactly.

关键是这样。

Now here's the thing.

右翼所说的那个邪恶可怕的左翼，究竟是谁，他们打算击败内塔尼亚胡？

Who is this awful monstrous left that is going to try to defeat Netanyahu according to to the right wing?

是纳夫塔利·贝内特，前耶舒亚委员会（定居点运动）的首席执行官。

It's Naftali Bennett, the former CEO of the Yeshua Council, the settlement movement.

亚伊尔·拉皮德，他自己就是定居者，曾说过以色列应该像纽伦堡审判那样绞死每一位阿拉伯裔议员。

Avigdor Lieberman, a settler himself, who once said that Israel should hang each and every of the Arab Knesset members, like in Nuremberg.

明白吗？

Okay?

还有本尼·甘茨，我的意思是，称他为左翼并不准确，我的意思是……

And Benny Gantz, who's not I mean, calling him a leftist is not I mean

我不认为左翼会承认他是自己人。

I don't think leftists would claim him.

没错。

Exactly.

反过来也一样。

And and vice versa.

嗯嗯。

Mhmm.

好的。

Okay.

所以这关乎身份认同。

So it's about identity.

首先，我相信你越虔诚，就越倾向于投票给右翼。

First and foremost, what I believe is that the more religious you are, the more you tend to vote for the right wing.

关于司法改革的真正争论，其实并不是关于司法改革本身，而是以色列究竟是更犹太化还是更民主化。

That's the real the the debate over the judicial reform was not about the judicial reform, but about whether Israel is more Jewish than democratic or more democratic than Jewish.

而这里的右翼就是内塔尼亚胡的联盟。

And the right wing here is the Netanyahu coalition.

没错。

Exactly.

现在这简直是个奇迹：以色列所谓宗教犹太裔塞法迪裔、相对较低阶层群体的领袖，竟然是一个世俗的无神论亿万富翁，耶路撒冷一位教授的儿子。

Now it's a, you know, it's quite a miracle that the leader of the so called religious Jewish Sephardic relatively lower class camp in Israel is this secular atheist millionaire, the son of a professor from Jerusalem.

你知道，

You know,

我们对美国政治中的这些特殊性很熟悉。

we're we're acquainted with these peculiarities in American politics

这并不是重点，这种特殊性并不成立，因为身份政治并不是我相信的东西。

at It's this not point, don't peculiarity because the politics of identities is not something that I believe in.

我认为这是一种觉醒式的表述方式，人们并不会投票给和自己相似的人。

I think it's a woke way of describing things and that people don't vote for someone like them.

如果你是只鸟，你就会投票给一只鸟。

If you have a bird, you'll vote for someone with a bird.

这太荒谬了。

It's ridiculous.

你会投票给那个最能代表你价值观的人。

You vote for someone that you believe would represent your values the most.

所以这就是瓦多沙的立场，因此在我看来，那些根本不属于右翼的极端正统派政党——他们反对定居点、反对吞并——却仍是内塔尼亚胡联盟的基本组成部分，因为这关乎犹太性。

So this is the Wadosha line, and that's why that's why in my opinion, the ultra orthodox parties who are not part of the right wing at all, are anti settlement, anti annexation, are a basic part of Netanyahu's coalition because it's about Judaism.

但我还想提出另一点。

But I would like to offer something else.

我们在2020年从一个以安全为核心的世代，转向了以身份认同为核心的世代。

We moved in 2020 from one generation, the security generation, towards the identity generation.

而这正是以色列连续经历了五次选举的原因。

And that's exactly the point where Israel went through five consecutive election campaigns.

为什么？

Why?

这就像是NBA的夏季联赛。

It's like the summer league in the NBA.

明白吗？

Okay?

你还在努力适应你的新球队，但这需要时间，因为你以前是芝加哥公牛队的球迷，现在却成了纽约尼克斯队的球迷。

Where you still try your to get accustomed to your new basketball team, but it takes time because you used to be for the Chicago Bulls, and now you are for the New York Knicks.

是什么样的身份认同分界线造成了这种局面？

What was the dividing identity line that created that?

只是宗教身份是这种方式

It's just religious identity is the way

你是这么看的吗？

you see it?

就是宗教这一方面。

The the religious one.

我给你举个例子。

And I'll give you an example.

明白吗？

Okay?

就安全问题而言，阿维克托·莱布伦是以色列最鹰派的人物。

Aviktor Lebron, in terms of security, he's the most hawkish figure in Israel.

他的选民是前苏联移民，比本-格维尔更鹰派。

His voters are former USSR immigrants who are more hawkish than Bengevir.

但当你谈论国内事务、公民社会问题时，他们比叶air戈兰和叶air拉皮德更世俗。

But when you talk about domestic issues, about civil society issues, they are more secular than Yair Golan and Yair Lapid.

这就是为什么亚维格多·利伯曼从所谓的右翼转向了所谓的左翼。

That's why Avigdor Libran moved from the so called right wing to the so called left.

尽管他并不是左翼，因为这不是我们过去所熟知的左翼。

Although he's not leftist because it's not the left we used to know.

纳夫塔利·贝内特也是如此。

The same applies for Naftali Bennett.

在安全问题上，是的，他的对外吞并政策据称比内塔尼亚胡更鹰派。

In terms of security, yes, his foreign annexation is allegedly more hawkish than Netanyahu.

但谈到公民社会事务、国内问题等，他是温和派、小犹太帽选民的领袖。

But when it comes to civil society things, etcetera, and domestic issues, he's the leader of the moderate, small Yamulka voters.

小犹太帽选民是谁呢？

Small Yarmulke voters in Who good

他们相信，比如在安息日星期六也运营公共交通。

who believe in, for instance, public transportation during Saturdays, during the Shabbat.

这才是主要的变化。

This is the main change.

让我们谈谈2021年击败内塔尼亚胡的上一届联合政府。

Let's speak about the last coalition to defeat Netanyahu in 2021.

它被称为‘变革联盟’。

It was called the coalition of change.

但当你试图深入分析所谓的‘变革’究竟在哪里时，你会发现它在加沙政策上毫无变化，在伊朗政策上毫无变化，在定居点政策上也完全一样。

But when you try to really analyze where the change is, you couldn't find the change in the policy towards Gaza, which was the same in the policy towards Iran, which was the same in the policy towards settlements, which was exactly the same.

甚至在经济方面，它也不是一个追求社会正义的联盟，反而比内塔尼亚胡的右翼联盟更加鹰派、更加资本主义。

Even in terms of economy, it wasn't a social justice coalition, but even more hawkish, more capitalist than Netanyahu's right wing coalition.

所以真正的变化，仅仅是内塔尼亚胡总理妻子萨拉·内塔尼亚胡的居住地址换了。

So the main change was changing the living address of Sarah Netanyahu, the prime minister Netanyahu's wife.

因此，根本没有任何改变。

So there was no change.

这就是为什么你看到以色列的政治体系自我重塑了。

And that's why you see Israel's political system reshaped itself.

如果你是美国人，期待政策上有任何改变，那你一定会大失所望。

If you are American, hoping for a change in terms of policy, you'll get quite disappointed.

针对巴勒斯坦人。

Towards the Palestinians.

针对巴勒斯坦人，针对加沙。

Towards the Palestinians, towards Gaza.

我甚至可以说，由贝内特、利伯曼、亚伊尔·戈兰等人主导的联盟根本不可能签署这份特朗普停火计划，因为右翼会置他们于死地。

I would say even more than this, that a coalition controlled by Bennett, Liberman, Yair Golan Yair, etcetera, would never be able to sign this Trump ceasefire plan because the right wingers would kill them.

内塔尼亚胡会说，这是向哈马斯投降。

Netanyahu would say this is a surrender to the to Hamas.

你认为内塔尼亚胡有很大可能在下一次选举中幸存下来吗？

And do you think there's a good shot that Netanyahu just survives next election?

是的。

Yes.

但我必须解释一下以色列政治的某些特点。

But I have to explain something about Israeli politics.

在美国，当你面临特朗普对哈里斯时，其中一人必须获胜。

In The US, when you have Trump versus Harris, one of them must win.

对吧？

Right?

因为有人必须在选举人团中获得270票。

Because someone has to get 270 votes on the electoral college.

在以色列，你可能赢、输，或者选举结果悬而未决。

In Israel, you can either win, lose, or having the election undecided.

为什么？

Why?

因为以色列有传统上不参与联合政府的阿拉伯政党。

Because in Israel, have Arab parties that traditionally do not take part in coalitions.

四年前曾有一个例外，但那是在新冠疫情这一国内危机期间。

There was one exception four years ago, but it was under the, you know, the COVID crisis, which was a domestic issue.

只要以色列与穆斯林世界保持着复杂的战略关系，我就看不到任何以阿拉伯非犹太复国主义或有时反犹太复国主义政党为基础的联合政府可能形成。

As long as Israel has its complicated strategic relationship with the Muslim world, I don't see any coalition formed on the basis of a of an Arab non Zionist or sometimes anti Zionist party.

因此，如果他们获得120个席位中的至少10席，那么只要拿到61席，你就赢得了选举。

Hence, if they get at least 10 seats out of the 120 so if you get 61 seats, you won the election.

对吧？

Right?

如果你只有61票，超过120票的一半，你就赢了选举。

If you're a baby, you won the election, 61 out of a 120, out of majority.

但如果你拿到50票，你并没有赢，但也没有输，因为你阻止了中间偏左阵营组建联盟。

But if you get 50, you didn't win the election, but you didn't lose it either because you blocked the center left change block from forming a coalition.

根据每一项民调，达成加沙协议后，内塔尼亚胡至少获得了51票。

According to each and every poll, the deal reaching Gaza, Netanyahu got 51, at least.

内塔尼亚胡未能赢得绝对多数席位。

Netanyahu lost the outright majority.

但由于10月12日的停火以及伊朗和真主党被击败，内塔尼亚胡暂时保住了自己的位置，当然了。

But as a result of October 12 ceasefire and the Iran being defeated and Hizballah being defeated, Netanyahu secured himself from not losing the election for the time being, of course.

他一再超过对手，现在下结论还为时过早，但我认为，除非发生某种重大变故，否则内塔尼亚胡在下一届选举中直接落败的可能性很小。

Time and again, he outnumbers his opponents, and it's too early to call, but I would say that something dramatic would have to happen in order for Netanyahu to directly lose the next election.

你觉得他的政府能撑到2026年10月吗？

Do you think his government will stand until October 2026?

不，但我的意思是，上一个在以色列完成完整任期的联合政府是1988年。

No, but I mean the last coalition to survive a full term in Israel was in 1988.

我知道这对美国人来说听起来很奇怪，但在以色列，没有固定的任期。

I know it sounds weird for Americans, but in Israel, there are no fixed terms.

因此，内塔尼亚胡实现了大多数政府都无法达成的目标——挺过了任期的第四年，也就是最后一整年，这真是太了不起了。

So Netanyahu succeeded in the mission that most of the governments failed to reach the fourth year, the final year of his term, and it's amazing.

没人相信这一点，就连内塔尼亚胡本人在10月7日之后的那天也不相信。

No one believed it, including Netanyahu himself the day after October 7.

那么，作为我们最后一个问题，你会向那些对政治感兴趣的人推荐哪三本书？

And then now as our final question, what are three books you'd recommend to the Yeah.

所以我推荐两本英文书、两本以英文写的书，还有一本希伯来语的书。

So I recommend two English books and two books in English and one in Hebrew.

第一本是《意外的总统》，讲的是杜鲁门总统头四个月的经历，作者是A.J.巴姆，我想是这样。

The first is The Accidental President about president Truman's first four months by AJ Baum, I think.

一本很棒的书。

Great book.

第二本不是一本关于总统的书，而是关于如何撰写总统历史的书，名叫《未完成的爱情故事》，作者是多丽丝·古德温。

The second is not exactly a book about presidents, but a book about the history of how to write history of presidents, it's An Unfinished Love Story by Doris Goodman.

多丽丝·基恩斯·古德温。

Doris Kearns Goodwin.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

但没错，古德温之所以如此，是因为她曾嫁给总统约翰逊，也是肯尼迪总统的特别顾问，这本书精彩地探讨了如何书写历史。

But yeah, Goodwin because, yes, she was married to president Johnson, president Kennedy's special adviser, and it's a brilliant book about how to write about history.

第三本是用希伯来语写的书，是我父亲写的。

And the third is a book in Hebrew, and it's a book written by my father.

书名叫《弥赛亚》，讲的是大卫·本-古里安。

It's called the Messiah in It's about David Ben Gurion.

本-古里安是以色列的建国之父，像乔治·华盛顿和我不确定的托马斯·杰斐逊的结合体。当时他被视为一位非常世俗的左翼领导人，但我父亲揭示了他内心深处有多么犹太，以及右翼人士事后应该如何对他心生敬仰。

Ben Gurion was the founding father of Israel, a mixture of George Washington and, I don't know, Thomas Jefferson, and he was a very he was considered a very secular leftist leader at the time, but my father reveals how deep inside he was very Jewish and how the right wing should fall in love with him in retrospect.

如果你想了解以色列，那么最好尽快学习希伯来语，并亲自阅读原文。

And if you want to understand Israel, so it's better for you to study Hebrew, to learn Hebrew as fast as possible and read it.

阿米特·塞加尔，非常感谢。

Amit Segal, thank you very much.

非常感谢你。

Thank you so much.

本集《以色列家族秀》由杰克·麦科迪克制作。

This episode of The Israel Clan Show is produced by Jack McCordick.

事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯负责，凯特·辛克莱尔和玛丽·马奇·洛克协助。

Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker.

我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·格尔德，额外混音由艾萨克·琼斯完成。

Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Isaac Jones.

我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

节目的制作团队还包括安妮·加尔文、玛丽·卡西翁、罗兰·胡、玛丽娜·金、克里斯滕·林、艾玛·卡尔德克和扬·科贝尔。

The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Roland Hu, Marina King, Kristen Lin, Emma Kaldec, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由Ahman Sahota和Pat McCusker创作。

Original music by Ahman Sahota and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由Kristian Samuliewski和Shannon Busta负责。

Audience strategy by Kristian Samuliewski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》观点音频的总监是Annie Roestrasser。

The director of New York Times opinion audio is Annie Roestrasser.