特朗普不了解的伊朗事宜

9·11事件后，伊朗一度站在了美国一边。

After nine eleven, Iran is for a moment on the side of The US.

它提供了情报。

It's offering intelligence.

它反对塔利班和基地组织。

It's against the Taliban and and and Al Qaeda.

时任国务卿科林·鲍威尔在联合国与伊朗外长握手。

Colin Powell, then the secretary of state shakes hands with the Iranian foreign minister at the UN.

你知道，9·11事件是一个地缘政治上的颠覆性事件，其后续往往能带来巨大变化。

And, you know, nine eleven was a geopolitically disruptive event, and a lot can change in the aftermath of them.

那么当时究竟发生了什么？如果当时那些可能性是真实的，它们又是如何破灭的？

So what was happening then, and how did that set of possibilities, if you think they were real, fall apart?

伊朗与美国关系的故事，本质上是一段错失机遇的历史，充满了误解，而这一事件就是其中之一。

So the story of Iran US relations is really a history of missed opportunities, and is replete with misunderstandings, and and this episode is one of them.

令人震惊的是，当时确实存在开启新篇章的真正机会。

It's quite stunning that, there was a real opportunity for a new beginning.

现在回头看，这确实令人震惊，因为卡西姆·苏莱曼尼——伊斯兰革命卫队圣城军的指挥官——是第一个抵达阿富汗、为美军战斗机登陆并推翻塔利班的行动做准备的人。

Now in retrospect is really quite something when you think about the fact that Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Expeditionary Force, the Guz Force, was first man to arrive in Afghanistan to prepare it for US fighter jets to land in the operation to get rid of the Taliban.

这位指挥官正是2020年被特朗普总统暗杀的人。

Same commander that President Trump assassinated in 2020.

但伊朗认为，即使是在军事和情报层面与美国合作，共同清除一个共同的敌人，也将开启一个新的篇章。

But Iran believed that by cooperating with The United States, even at the military level, intelligence level, to get rid of a common foe would be the beginning of a new chapter.

但突然之间，一切发生了变化。

And then all of a sudden.

自9月11日以来，这些政权一直相当安静，但我们了解它们的真实本质。

Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, but we know their true nature.

2002年，在他的国情咨文演讲中。

In 2002, in his State of the Union speech.

朝鲜政权一边让本国人民挨饿，一边积极发展导弹和大规模杀伤性武器。

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens.

伊朗积极追求这些武器，输出恐怖主义，同时一小撮非民选的当权者压制伊朗人民对自由的渴望。

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

伊拉克继续公然表现出对美国的敌意，并支持恐怖主义。

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.

布什总统将伊朗列为邪恶轴心的一员。

President Bush designated Iran as a member of the axis of evil.

像这样的国家及其恐怖主义盟友构成了一个正在武装自己、威胁世界和平的邪恶轴心。

States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world.

这关闭了进一步改善关系的大门。

And that shut the door, to, further improvements of relations.

朝鲜对邪恶轴心演讲的回应是加速其核计划。

North Korea responds to the axis of evil speech by accelerating its nuclear program.

最终，朝鲜的武器现在是核能。

Eventually, Tesla weapon is now nuclear power.

美国入侵了伊拉克，而伊拉克并没有核武器。

The US invades Iraq, which had no nuclear weapons.

后来，利比亚放弃了其核计划，卡扎菲最终在美国空袭中被推翻，并死在沟渠里。

Later on, Libya will give up its nuclear program, and Qaddafi will eventually be decapitated from power in US airstrikes and will will die in a ditch.

那么，其他被列为邪恶轴心的国家的核经验，是如何影响伊朗的政治和思维的呢？

So how do the nuclear experiences of other countries that are named into the axis of evil, how does that end up shaping Iranian politics and and thinking?

这并不是一条线性的路径，因为伊朗在上世纪80年代中期，两伊战争期间，重新启动了其核计划，主要是出于对萨达姆可能使用核武器的恐惧——毕竟萨达姆已经使用过化学武器等大规模杀伤性武器，并被认为正在研发核武器。

So that's not a linear line in the sense that, you know, Iran, revived its nuclear program in the mid nineteen eighties during the Iran Iraq war, primarily out of fear that Saddam was going to use nuclear weapons against them because he had already used weapons of mass destruction in the form of chemical weapons and was believed to be developing nuclear weapons.

但根据美国情报，伊朗有组织地推进核武器研发的行动在2003年停止了。

But you see based on US intelligence that the organized Iranian push to develop nuclear weapons stopped in 2003.

2003年发生了什么？

What happened in 2003?

萨达姆被推翻，威胁消失了。

Saddam was toppled, a threat was gone.

因此，这是伊朗战略计算的第一阶段：直接威胁已消除，但他们仍可继续采取模糊策略，发展这种双重用途技术，整合所有必要要素，以便在未来某个时刻，如果需要核武器，只需做出一个快速的政治决定，就能跨越临界点，研制出核武器。

So that's the first phase in Iranian calculation, that the immediate threat was gone, but they could now continue to hedge, their nuclear policy, basically develop this dual use technology, put all the elements together, and then maybe at some point down the road, if they needed nuclear weapon, it will be a quick political decision to cross the Rubicon and develop a nuclear program.

他们还将核计划作为与西方谈判的筹码，以争取解除制裁。

They also used, their nuclear program as leverage at the bargaining table with the West to try to get sanctions relief.

这远早于他们看到卡扎菲的下场，也远早于他们看到朝鲜如何被特朗普总统以极大的尊重对待。

So this was way before they saw what happened to Qatafi, and way before they saw how North Korea was treated with tremendous amount of respect by President Trump.

这就是为什么我相信，经过这段经历，尤其是乌克兰战争之后，乌克兰曾放弃其核武器以换取安全保证，结果却被俄罗斯入侵。

And this is why I do believe that now that they have gone through this experience, especially even after the Ukraine war, that Ukraine also gave away its nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees only to be invaded by Russia.

他们得出结论：为了获得最终的威慑力——核武器，他们已经付出了代价，既包括多年来因制裁带来的经济代价，也包括安全上遭受攻击的代价。

They have concluded that they've paid the price of a nuclear bomb as the ultimate deterrent, both economically through years of sanctions and also from a security perspective being attacked.

我认为，哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉关于核武器的宗教法令，可能已经随着他的去世而失效。

And I think that the religious edict that Ayatollah Khamenei had against nuclear weapons probably died with him.

如果这个政权能够幸存下来，并且在他的儿子在战争结束时仍担任最高领袖，我几乎可以肯定，该政权将决心发展核武器，因为纵观所有历史上的领导人及其自身经历，他们都明白，这是确保自身生存的唯一途径。

And if this regime survives and if his son remains the supreme leader at the end of this war, I almost have no doubt that the regime will be determined to try to develop nuclear weapons because every historic president that you look at and their own experience teaches them that that's the only way to try to create a shield for their own survival.

我想回到这个观点，但在我们继续之前，我们应该谈谈伊核协议，你曾参与协助谈判或弥合分歧。

I wanna come back to that thought, but I think before we sit there for a moment, we should talk about the Efahede nuclear deal, which you had some role in helping to negotiate or try to bridge the gaps on.

这一协议发生在奥巴马时期，是在布什政府之后，此前伊朗曾试图在2003年与布什政府展开谈判，但被忽视了。

This happens under Obama, happens after the Bush administration, after sort of there's an Iranian effort to have negotiations with Bush administration that is sort of ignored in 2003.

奥巴马上台了。

Obama comes in.

他承诺对伊朗采取不同的策略。

He is promised a a different approach to Iran.

与其困于过去，我已向伊朗领导人和人民明确表示，我的国家准备向前迈进。

Rather than remain trapped in the past, I've made it clear to Iran's leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward.

现在的问题不再是伊朗反对什么，而是它想建设怎样的未来。

The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build.

我认识到，要克服数十年的不信任将十分困难，但我们将以勇气、正直和决心继续前进。

I recognize it will be hard to overcome decades of mistrust, but we will proceed with courage, rectitude, and resolve.

请告诉我，是什么样的思考过程促成了伊核协议（JCPOA）？

Take me through the thinking that leads to the JCPOA.

直到2015年才达成协议，因此在此之前有大量准备工作和深入思考。

That doesn't happen until 2015, so there's a lot of preparatory work and a lot of thinking that goes in before that.

但奥巴马政府对伊朗的基本立场是什么？

But but what is the basic orientation of the Obama administration towards Iran?

听我说。

Look.

我认为在第一任期内，奥巴马总统听取了那些告诉他伊朗不会对压力做出反应的人的意见。

I I think in his first term, president Obama listened to those who were telling him Iran doesn't respond to pressure.

它会对巨大的压力做出反应。

It responds to huge pressure.

因此，如果你动员国际社会对伊朗实施严厉的经济制裁，切断其与以美国为主导的全球金融体系的联系，施加国际制裁，甚至让俄罗斯和中国也在联合国层面支持制裁，最终伊朗人会屈服，并同意放弃获取核燃料循环技术——这种技术具有双重用途，既可以用于核反应堆燃料，也可以用于制造核武器。

And so if you mobilize the international community to put massive financial sanctions on Iran, cut them off of, The US, dominated global financial system, bring international sanctions against them, even the Russians and the Chinese, if they join at the UN level to impose sanctions, eventually, the Iranians will come to their knees and they would accept to give up on having access to nuclear fuel cycle technology, which is dual use technology with which you can fuel reactors or nuclear weapons.

在第一任期即将结束时，我认为奥巴马总统足够明智，意识到仅靠施压而没有开放渠道和合理结局的策略是徒劳的。

And towards the end of his first term in office, I think President Obama was smart enough to understand that it's not going to work, that a pressure centric approach without an open door and without some sort of a reasonable endgame is an exercise in futility.

于是他决定改变策略，派遣比尔·伯恩斯和杰克·苏利文前往阿曼，与伊朗进行秘密谈判，并在此过程中做出了首次让步。

And he decided to change course and sent Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan to Oman for secret negotiations, with the Iranians in which he made the first concession.

这一让步是：自2003年核危机爆发以来，美国首次承认‘零浓缩’不是一个现实的目标，并允许伊朗在其本土拥有一个非常有限、但受到严格和严密监控的核计划。

And that concession was that for the first time since the beginning of the nuclear crisis in 2003, The US agreed that zero enrichment is not a realistic policy goal and allowed Iran to have a very limited, but very tightly and rigorously monitored nuclear program on its own soil.

这最终促成了2015年的《联合全面行动计划》。

And that's what eventually led, to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.

但在2011年至2015年期间，要达到这一阶段花费了很长时间和大量努力，而这正是关键所在。

But between 2011 and 2015, it took a long time and a lot of work to get to that stage, but that is what made the difference.

《联合全面行动计划》的核心理念是什么？

What was the theory of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

我认为，即使在美国，关注这件事的人也不多，而且大多数人根本不知道该如何看待它，因为人们对它的作用或不作用存在巨大分歧。

I think to the extent people follow this even in America, which I think most people didn't, it was hard even to know what to think of it because people so disagreed on what it did or didn't do.

它被宣传为一项能阻止伊朗获得核武器的协议。

It was sold as a deal that would prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

它也被批评为一项无法阻止伊朗获得核武器的协议。

It was criticized as a deal that would be unable to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

以色列在这场博弈中的主要利益是阻止伊朗获得核武器，但在内塔尼亚胡领导下，他们强烈反对这项协议。

Israel's main interest in all this is that Iran doesn't get nuclear weapons, but they were aggressively opposed to the deal under Netanyahu.

你知道，内塔尼亚胡竭尽全力想要破坏这项协议。

And, you know, Netanyahu did everything he could to to scuttle it.

这项协议并不是告别武器，

This deal won't be a farewell to arms.

而是告别军控。

It would be a farewell to arms control.

中东很快将遍布核触发装置。

And The Middle East would soon be crisscrossed by nuclear tripwires.

一个小型冲突可能引发大规模战争的地区，将变成一个核火药桶。

A region where small skirmishes can trigger big wars would turn into a nuclear tinderbox.

那么《联合全面行动计划》里包含了什么？

So what was in the JC POA?

它的实际技术手段是什么？更广泛的理论依据又是什么？

What was the actual both technical approach and and what was the broader theory of it?

《联合全面行动计划》是一份159页的复杂文件，但归根结底，它只是一个非常简单的协议。

So the JCPOA is a 159 page, very complex document, but it really boils down to a very simple bargain.

通过核限制和透明措施，换取经济激励。

Nuclear restrictions and transparency measures in return for economic incentives.

就这么简单。

That's really it.

伊朗同意限制其核计划，逆转核活动，运出97%的核材料，拆除大部分离心机，接受世界上任何其他国家从未接受过的核查方式，本质上让自己成为例外——因为在核不扩散条约成员国中，基本上只有两类国家。

And Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program, roll back, its nuclear activities, ship out 97% of its stockpile, dismantle most of its centrifuges, accept the kind of inspections that no other country in the world has ever accepted, and basically make itself an exception to the norm because among proliferation treaty member states, you basically have already two classes.

一类是核武器国家，另一类是非核武器国家。

One are nuclear weapon states and one are non nuclear weapon states.

但伊朗同意在限制和透明度措施方面为自己设立一个独特的类别。

But Iran agreed to create a category of its own in terms of restrictions and transparency measures that he had agreed to.

因此，这确保了伊朗在至少十五年内无法拥有核武器。

So this guarantees that Iran would not be able to have a nuclear weapon for at least a period of fifteen years.

但许多这些限制都有到期日，意味着它们会在一段时间后失效。

But a lot of these restrictions had sunsets, meaning that they would expire after a period of time.

这是因为没有任何国家愿意永远让自己成为例外。

And that is because no country would ever be willing to make itself an exception to the norm forever.

这等于放弃了一项国际权利，而那个上台时以维护伊朗独立为宗旨的政权，曾经历了一场血腥战争，损失了五十万人，只为保卫国土不丢失一寸。

That is giving up a right internationally, that again, the regime that had come to power based on the concept of trying to safeguard Iran's independence went through a very bloody war in which it lost half a million of its people in order not to lose an inch of the country.

它并不想放弃这项权利。

It didn't want to give away that right.

而《联合全面行动计划》确实保障了这项权利。

And the JCPOA did secure that right.

但这意味着问题只是被推迟了，并未得到永久解决。

But it meant that the can was only kicked down the road and was not the problem was not resolved forever.

当时我常说，这个问题的另一面是，好消息是我们达成了一项核协议，坏消息是我们只有一项核协议，它并没有真正解决我们与伊朗在弹道导弹计划和其代理人问题上的其他分歧。

The other problem with it at the time I used to say the good news is that we have a nuclear deal, the bad news is that we only have a nuclear deal, that it didn't really address other areas of disagreement with Iran about its ballistic missile program, about its proxies.

但奥巴马政府的理念是，先解决最紧迫的问题，然后在此基础上建立信任、改善关系，再尝试解决其他分歧。

But the concept for the Obama administration was that you resolve the most urgent problem, and then maybe based on that you can build trust and improve relations and then try to address other areas of disagreement.

但我们从未真正有机会，因为该协议于2016年1月生效，而特朗普总统在11月当选，他一走进椭圆形办公室，就开始破坏这项协议。

But we never really got a chance because the deal was implemented in January 2016, of course President Trump was elected in November and as soon as he walked into the Oval Office, he started undermining the agreement.

所以当你提到这项协议保证伊朗在至少十五年内无法获得核武器时，共和党人曾说，他们会秘密进行。

So when you say the agreement guaranteed that Iran would not get a nuclear weapon for at least those fifteen years, you know, one thing that Republicans said was they'll just do it in secret.

他们会建造秘密设施。

They'll create secret facilities.

他们会把设施建在地下。

They'll be underground.

我们不知道该去哪里检查。

You know, we won't know where to inspect.

那么，当时有哪些保障措施呢？

So what were the safeguards there?

自二战以来，整个核检查体系一直旨在核查可用于制造炸弹的裂变材料。

So the entire nuclear inspection regime since the Second World War has always been designed to look at the fissile material, nuclear material with which we can make a bomb.

在伊核协议中，首次明确了对设备的核查机制。

For the first time in the JCPOA, mechanisms were defined to also look after the equipment.

因此，对于伊朗核计划中所有用于铀浓缩或其他相关设备的每一个螺丝和螺栓，都部署了在线智能探测器，并有检查员可随时访问，24小时不间断。

So every knot and bolt that goes into centrifuges, which would enrich uranium or any other machinery involved, in Iran's nuclear program, there were online smart detectors, there were inspectors who had access to them 20 fourseven.

伊朗根本不可能作弊；正如我所说，从2016年1月协议实施，到伊朗在美方退出后一年开始逐步违背承诺——也就是2019年5月——期间，情况一直如此。

There was literally no way, that Iran would be able to cheat and when the deal was being implemented for, as I said, from January 2016 until Iran started rolling back its, commitments, a year after The US withdrew from it, so that's May 2019.

国际原子能机构进行了极其严格的监测，并发布了季度报告。

The IAEA conducted very rigorous monitoring and issued quarterly reports.

在这一时期，共发布了大约15份报告。

So there were about 15 reports in this period.

在所有这些报告中，国际原子能机构都确认伊朗完全履行了协议下的所有承诺。

And in all of them, the IAEA confirmed that Iran was fully committed to all of its commitments under the agreement.

现在，我们当然可以选择不相信国际原子能机构，但就连美国情报机构，甚至特朗普政府自己的情报官员也表示，没有证据表明伊朗偏离了协议；而这一点，当然无法同样适用于美国。

Now we can choose not to believe, the IAEA, but even The US intelligence, even the Trump administration's own intelligence officials were saying that there is no evidence of Iranian divergence from the agreement, whereas, of course, the same could not be said about The United States.

所以这项协议还有一层政治考量，那就是它试图逐步建立美伊之间一种新的关系，将伊朗更深入地融入国际体系，逐步解除部分制裁，促进经济发展，或许还能加强伊朗政权内部的温和派力量。

So there's also a political theory to the deal, which is that it was the beginning of trying to create a different relationship over time between The US and Iran that it would pull Iran further into the international system, unwind some of the sanctions so there's more economic development, maybe strengthen moderates inside the regime.

你是如何看待协议的这一面的？

How did you think about that side of the deal?

在某种反事实的历史中，如果希拉里·克林顿赢得了2016年大选，或许会有时间进一步推进这项协议。

In some counterfactual history where Hillary Clinton wins the twenty sixteen election and there there's sort of time to build on it.

你认为这里是否存在另一种可能的路径？当然，也有人认为，这只会给伊朗提供资金和时间，以加强其代理网络。

Do you think that there was a a possible other path here, or there's also, of course, those who say this would have just given Iran, you know, money and time to strengthen proxy networks.

这将使伊朗获得更多自由来追求其目标。

It would have given it more freedom to pursue objectives.

你如何看待在这一协议基础上，哪些是可能实现的，哪些是不可能实现的？

How do you think about what was possible and what was not possible building on that deal?

所以我来告诉你我是怎么看待这个问题的。

So I I tell you how I perceived it.

在我看来，当时的伊朗尽管经历了多年的制裁、管理不善和腐败，但仍拥有一个占伊朗社会约65%的中产阶级。

In my view, Iran at the time was a country that despite years of sanctions, mismanagement, and corruption, still had a middle class, that was about 65% of the Iranian society.

任何接触过伊朗中产阶级的人都知道，他们思想极为开明，亲西方，甚至亲美国，尽管多年来一直遭受国家反美宣传的影响。

And the Iranian middle class, for anyone who's been in touch with them, is extremely open minded, pro Western, even pro American despite the years of being subject to anti American propaganda by the state.

温和派基本上是西方在该地区最好的盟友。

Moderate is basically the West's best ally in that part of the world.

我的设想是，如果能在十年内实现5%的经济增长，就能将这个中产阶级的比例从65%提升到大约85%。

And my concept was that if you get 5% economic growth over a period of ten years, you can grow this middle class from 65% to around 85%.

而这恰好与伊斯兰共和国统治精英——1979年革命的原始雅各宾派——因自然规律逐渐离世的时间重合。

And that would coincide with the time that the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic, the original Jacobines of the nineteen seventy nine revolution are dying out just by the force of nature.

于是，这两种趋势将交汇，国家在本质上将处于更有利的位置，能够向更好的方向过渡，即使这种过渡需要一定程度的动荡。

So you have a situation in which these two lines will cross one another and the country by definition would be in a better position to transition to something better, even if that transition requires a degree of upheaval.

这就是我的理念，这就是变革理论：它并非指望在一两年内奇迹般地让伊朗彻底改变所有政策，而是希望将两国引向一条更好的路径，在逐步建立信任后，最终能够解决协议中的其他问题，使国家在哈梅内伊去世时，拥有足够的基础来推动国家走向更美好的未来。

So that was the concept, that was the theory of change, that it wasn't supposed to magically, in a year or two, make Iran change all of its policies, but it was supposed to put the two countries on a better pathway in which eventually with building trust, they would be able to address other areas of this agreement and again put the country on a trajectory that when Khamenei would die, there would be enough material to work with to put the country on a better trajectory.

当特朗普上台并赢得选举后，他不顾自己政府内部分人的反对，撕毁了这项协议，开始推行他所谓的‘最大压力’政策。

When Trump instead takes office when he wins the election, he, somewhat over the objection of some in his own administration, rips up the deal and begins a policy of what he calls maximum pressure.

我们将实施最高级别的经济制裁。

We will be instituting the highest level of economic sanction.

任何帮助伊朗追求核武器的国家都可能遭到美国的严厉制裁。

Any nation that helps Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons could also be strongly sanctioned by The United States.

美国不会被核讹诈所挟持。

America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail.

所以我们已经讨论了伊核协议的理论基础。

So we've talked about what the theory of the JCPOA was.

那么，最大压力政策的理论是什么？

What is the theory of maximum pressure?

不仅它的政策内容是什么，其背后的政治思维又是什么？

Both what is the substance of that policy, but what is the political thinking beneath it?

我认为，前国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥曾非常清晰地阐述过最大压力政策的理论：伊朗必须在养活自己的人民和继续被美国视为有问题的政策之间做出选择。

Well, I think the theory of maximum pressure was once very clearly described by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who said Iran should reach a stage that it should choose between feeding its own people or continuing the policies that are problematic from the perspective of The United States.

这从根本上颠覆了我向你描述的理论，因为它实际上削弱了中产阶级，同时加强了伊斯兰共和国中的强硬派。

And so that really turned the concept that I was describing to you on its head fundamentally, in the sense that it really weakened, the middle class and strengthened the hard men in the Islamic Republic.

而在这一时期，根据美国国务院和情报界的说法，革命卫队的力量比以往更加强大。

And in this period, again, according to the United States State Department and Intelligence Community, the Revolutionary Guards has become even more powerful than before.

因此，通过所谓的‘极限压力’，我们彻底改变了局势，削弱了我们最好的盟友，同时加强了最恶劣的对手，而这一政策本应迫使伊朗就范。

So we completely changed the dynamics and weakened our best allies and strengthened our worst adversaries in that system through maximum pressure, which was supposed to bring Iran to its needs.

如今，伊朗人不仅没有屈服，反而在各个领域全面加倍推进。

Now the Iranians not only didn't surrender, but they doubled down across the board.

他们加大了对代理势力的支持。

They doubled down in supporting proxies.

他们在地区内变得更加咄咄逼人，对本国人民也更加压制。

They became more aggressive in the region, more repressive towards their own people.

他们重启了核计划，先是逐步推进，随后急剧升级，达到了我们过去无法想象的水平，比如将铀浓缩至60%，部署先进的离心机，而这些最终不可避免地导致了我们当前所面临的冲突。

They resumed their nuclear program, first gradually and then really ratcheted up, significantly and reached levels that we could not even imagine in the past, like enrichment to 60% or having, advanced centrifuges, which eventually, of course, ended up, in the conflict that we're currently in.

交易金融市场的过程可能非常孤独。

Trading the financial markets can be a lonely pursuit.

所以当你想知道如何在平台上开启深色模式，或如何存入资金时，能与真人沟通很有帮助。

So when you want to know how to turn on dark mode in your platform or to how deposit into your account, it's good to speak to a real person.

在Capital.com，我们的团队精通德语、法语、意大利语、西班牙语以及许多其他语言。

At capital.com, our team speak German, French, Italian, Spanish, and many other languages.

联系我们，我们很乐意为您解答交易相关问题。

Get in touch, and we'll be happy to help answer your trading questions.

Capital.com。

Capital.com.

发现一家懂您语言的经纪商。

Discover a broker that speaks your language.

差价合约具有高风险。

CFDs involve a high level of risk.

百分之八十三的散户投资者亏损。

Eighty three percent of retail investors lose money.

我认为，导致我们如今处于这一局面的中东关键转折点之一，当然是10月7日。

One of the sort of rupture moments in The Middle East that I think leads to where we are now in this period is, of course, October 7.

许多人认为哈马斯是伊朗的代理人，完全受伊朗控制，而伊朗也是其主要资金提供者。

Hamas is understood by many to be an Iranian proxy, fully under Iran's control, but but Iran is a a major funder of it.

依您所见，伊朗与10月7日行动之间的关系是什么？

What, to your understanding now, is the relationship between Iran and the October 7 operation?

他们知道多少？

How much did they know?

他们批准了这次行动吗？

Did they give it the green light?

他们和辛马尔之间有什么沟通？

What was the communication between them and Sinmar?

因为这会彻底颠覆这一切。

Because that explodes all of this.

没错。

Right.

这正是你能够看到伊朗政策重大缺陷的时刻——作为国家，它将地区外交政策外包给非国家行为体，因为归根结底，他们的根本利益完全不同。

So this is precisely when you can see the major shortcoming of Iran's policy of, as a state to subcontract its regional foreign policy to nonstate actors because they have fundamentally different interests at the end of the day.

你可以看到，哈梅内伊在10月7日之后迅速出面，试图与事件划清界限，尽管他支持哈马斯。

And you could see that Ayatollah Khamenei very quickly after October 7 came out and tried to create distance, even though he supported Hamas.

但他想表明伊朗并未参与。

But he wanted to say the Iran was not involved.

但事实上，到那时为止，这种区别已经毫无实际意义，因为哈马斯显然处于伊朗的势力范围内，得到了伊朗的资金、训练和支持。

But the reality is that it really was a distinction without a meaningful difference by that point because Hamas was clearly in the Iranian orbit, was clearly financed, trained, and supported by Iran.

因此，到那时，以色列不仅要打击哈马斯，还要打击所有支持哈马斯的势力。

So, by that point, Israel was going to go after not just Hamas, but everybody who supported Hamas.

所以，以色列会针对伊朗，而伊朗却未能相应调整其战略，没有意识到所谓的‘章鱼战略’早在2021年、甚至10月7日之前就已经存在——该战略不仅针对地区内的伊朗武器，还直接瞄准章鱼的头部，即德黑兰。

And so, Israel was going to come after Iran, and Iran failed to adopt its strategy accordingly, not realizing that the so called octopus doctrine that was already in place even way before October 7 as of 2021 of going after not just Iranian arms in the region, but the head of the octopus by targeting Tehran directly.

伊朗人在每个环节都未能调整策略，屡屡判断失误。

The Iranians failed to adopt, their strategy, at every point, they miscalculated.

他们要么在需要谨慎时采取了大胆行动，要么在需要大胆时过于谨慎。

They either responded in a bold way when they had to be cautious, or were too cautious when they had to be bold.

这最终造成了导致这场战争的局势。

And this created the circumstances that led eventually to this war.

当你说到他们判断失误时，这种误判具体体现在哪里？

When you say they they miscalculated, what was the nature of the miscalculation?

他们对以色列或对唐纳德·特朗普有什么误解？

What did they not understand about Israel, or what did they not understand about Donald Trump?

他们并不想在这里。

They did not wanna be here.

那么，他们所采取的行动中，是什么样的误判导致了这种失准？

So in the moves they made, what was the misperception that led them to miscalibrate?

这是一连串的误判，但让我们先从一个事实说起：伊朗人在2023年试图建立一种被称为‘防火墙’的机制，其理念是同时在四个战线上对以色列发动攻击。

So, I mean, it's a series of miscalculations, but let's start with the fact that, you know, the Iranians were trying to put in place in 2023 a mechanism that they called the Ring of Fire, which was this concept of being able to open four fronts against Israel all at once.

这个理念认为，以色列将难以应对如此多线作战，根本无法将其影响力投射到邻近地区之外。

And the concept was that this would be so difficult for Israel to deal with that it would never be able to project power beyond its immediate near abroad.

他们在2023年4月测试了这一构想，结果得出结论：自己尚未准备好，还达不到目标。

They tested this concept in April 2023 and the Iranians concluded that they're not ready, they're not there yet.

当然，他们未能将这一情况告知辛瓦尔，也未能阻止辛瓦尔采取行动，我认为其中一个原因是：2020年苏莱曼尼被暗杀，他过去与这些领导人以及伊朗在该地区的所谓‘抵抗轴心’代理网络有着个人联系，拥有足够的魅力和权威去引导他们朝自己希望的方向行动，而他的去世为辛瓦尔这类人提供了更多自行其是的空间。

And of course they failed to communicate that to Sinwar and they failed to hold Sinwar back and I think, one explanation in that was that the elimination of Soleimani in 2020, who had personal relations with a lot of these leaders and the so called axis of resistance, this network of proxies that Iran has in the region, and had the charisma and the authority to be able to push them in the directions that he wanted, did provide more space for freelancing for people like Sanwar.

这是第一个错误。

So that was the first mistake.

第二个错误是，我认为哈梅内伊虽然与10月7日的行动保持了距离，但最终还是认可了它，并没有试图阻止真主党卷入这场冲突，因为哈梅内伊将大量政策委托给了真主党领导人纳斯鲁拉，他真心相信这位阿拉伯人比远在一千公里外的波斯人更懂这片土地的局势。

The second mistake was, you know, I thought Khamenei took distance from October 7, but did endorse it, and did not try to hold Hezbollah back from entering into this conflict because Khamenei was giving and was subcontracting a lot of these policies to Nasrullah, the leader of Hezbollah, he truly believed in his strategic vision and he taught that as an Arab in that part of the world, he understands it better than Persians a thousand kilometer away.

我认为，这也是一个错误。

And that too, I think, was a mistake.

而最大的错误是，当以色列开始以更激进的方式打击伊朗在叙利亚的资产，甚至不断升高目标，击毙前线指挥官时。

And then the biggest mistake of all was that when Israel started going after Iran's assets in a much more aggressive way, especially in Syria, and went higher and higher up the ranks, killing commanders in the field.

最终，在2024年4月，他们袭击了大马士革的伊朗领事馆，杀死了在那里的一名高级伊朗军事官员。

And eventually, in April 2024, they targeted Iranian consulates in Damascus and killed senior Iranian military officials who were there.

正是在这一刻，哈梅内伊决定放下谨慎，转而采取大胆行动。

And that's the moment that Khamenei decided to put aside his cautiousness and become bold.

他向以色列发射了数百枚导弹和无人机。

And he fired hundreds of missiles and drones towards Israel.

这是首次从伊朗本土直接攻击以色列。

For the first time, a direct attack from Iranian soil towards Israel.

这开启了与一个远比伊朗更强大、更先进的军事力量直接对抗的道路，我认为，事后看来，这是一个重大错误。

And that opened the path to direct confrontation with a military power that is much more capable and much more superior than Iran, which I think, and again, in retrospect was a major mistake.

但他这样做并没有真正展示出实力，只是表明了他愿意跨越红线。

But he did it in a way that it also didn't really signal strength, it just signaled willingness to cross a red line.

但他提前释放了信号，以便尽量减少以色列的伤亡，避免局势升级。

But he telegraphed it in advance so that there will be minimum Israeli casualties and fatalities so that this doesn't escalate.

但所有这些，如果放在一起看，是一连串的误判，最终导致了哈梅内伊在战争初期被杀。

But these are all, again, if you put them together, it's a chain of miscalculations that led to Khamenei's killing at the beginning of this war.

那么在这段时间里，核计划发生了什么？

And and what is happening with the nuclear program during this period?

在这段时间里，核计划进展迅速，因为伊朗人再次犯了一个重大误判，未能与拜登政府恢复协议。

So during this period, the nuclear program is advancing very quickly because the Iranians, again, in a major miscalculation, failed to revive the agreement with the Biden administration.

我的意思是，各方都有责任。

I mean, there's plenty of blame to go around.

我认为，拜登在与2015年签署伊核协议的鲁哈尼总统短暂的任期重叠期间，错失了恢复协议的机会，因为他摆姿态、过于犹豫，这严重损害了与伊朗的关系。

Biden, I think, missed an opportunity to revive the deal, in the short overlap that he had with president Rouhani who had negotiated the JCPOA in 2015 because, he postured and was too hesitant, and that burned a lot of bridges with the Iranians.

然后在2022年，伊朗和俄罗斯未能重启协议。

And then in 2022, the Iranians and the Russians were responsible for not reviving the agreement.

但自那以后，伊朗迅速加速了其核计划。

But since then, Iran quickly accelerated its nuclear program.

每当以色列试图通过破坏或秘密行动阻止这一进程时，伊朗反而更加拼命地加速计划，以至于到特朗普总统走进椭圆形办公室时，JCPOA中有一个被称为‘突破时间’的指标。

And every time Israel tried to set it back through sabotage or covert operations, the Iranians even doubled down in accelerating the program to the point that, of course, by the time president Trump walked into the Oval Office, there is a metric in the JCPOA which is a so called breakout time.

这个时间指的是浓缩出足够制造一枚核武器的铀所需的时间。

This is the amount of time that it takes to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon.

当特朗普总统在2017年走进椭圆形办公室时，由于JCPOA的存在，这一时间仍超过十二个月。

That timeline when President Trump walked into the Oval Office in 2017 as a result of the JCPOA was more than twelve months.

但在2025年1月，当特朗普总统再次走进椭圆形办公室时，这一时间已缩短至六天。

In January 2025, when president Trump walks into the Oval Office, that timeline is six days.

说实话，我一直以来都不太明白这个‘突破时间’到底是什么意思。

I've never quite understood what this breakout line means, if I'm being honest.

因为如果时间只剩下六天，而伊朗领导人某种程度上已经认定拥有核威慑能带来安全——要知道，这是2025年1月的情况。

Because if the timeline is six days and Iran's leaders have on some level concluded that there is safety to be found in having a nuclear deterrent, you know, that's January 2025.

在那之后的至少几个月里，他们并没有遭到攻击。

They're not attacked for at least some months after that.

那么，他们为什么不干脆直接越过这条线呢？

So why didn't they just run over the line?

还是说这六天的期限并不足以制造出一枚核武器？

Or is the six day line not everything you need for a nuclear weapon?

是的。

Yeah.

你说得对。

So you're right.

这就像有了做蛋糕的原料，但你还需要把它烤成蛋糕。

It's, this is like having the ingredients for a cake, you still have to bake it into a cake.

武器化过程需要六到十二个月，具体时间取决于你相信哪个时间线，以及你想要的是一个粗糙的核装置还是更精密的核武器。

That's the weaponization process that takes, between six to twelve months depending on which timeline you wanna believe, and depending on whether you wanna have a crude nuclear device or a more sophisticated one.

但这个过程可以在任何设施、任何地下实验室中秘密进行。

But that can happen in secret in any facility, in any underground laboratory.

可以被监控的部分是铀浓缩环节，这部分是在国际原子能机构的监督下进行的。因此，突破时间才如此重要，因为我们试图阻止原料的准备，因为我们知道武器化环节不会以可见的方式进行。

The parts that could be monitored is the enrichment part, which was done under the IEA supervision And that's why the breakout time was important because we were trying to prevent the ingredients from being prepared because we knew that the weaponization part would not be done in a visible way.

所以某种程度上，唐纳德·特朗普认为，阻止伊朗拥核的唯一方法就是先发制人——就像几个月前我们看到的那十二天的轰炸，或者最近与贾里德·库什纳和史蒂夫·伍科夫进行的时断时续的谈判，这些谈判本有可能成功吗？

And so then on some levels, Donald Trump right that the only way to stop Iran from going nuclear is to attack first the the twelve day bombing that we saw some months ago and and now what we're in, or were these negotiations that were happening on and off most recently with Jared Kushner and Steve Woodkoff, could they have succeeded?

当时还存在可行的外交途径吗，还是已经彻底结束了？

Was there still a diplomatic path that was viable, or was that over now?

所以，埃兹拉，我看了贾里德·库什纳和史蒂夫·惠特科夫在谈判结束后的一些简报，现在我认为这些谈判从一开始就注定要失败。

So, look, Ezra, I've looked at some of the briefings that Jared Kushner and Steve Whitkoff have done since the end of the negotiations, and I've now concluded that these negotiations were always doomed to fail.

他们去谈判时，期待的不是一项复杂的技術协议，而是伊朗方面给出一个非黑即白的答案。

They went in expecting not a complex technical deal, but a yes and no kind of answer from the Iranians.

我惊讶的是，史蒂夫·利特戈居然对伊朗能够自行制造离心机感到震惊。

I was shocked that, you know, Steve Lithgow was surprised that the Iranians were able to manufacture their own centrifuges.

他还描述了伊朗的一种先进离心机——IR-6型号，称其为世界上最强的离心机，但这并不正确。

And he describes one of Iran's advanced centrifuges, the IR six model, which is a pretty powerful centrifuge as probably the most powerful centrifuge in the world, which is not true.

因此，他们对技术的理解根本不到位。

So the technical understanding was never really there.

他们从未真正具备耐心去寻找双方都能接受且可对外展示的解决方案。

The patience to find solutions that would be mutually tolerable and presentable was never really there.

他们甚至经常不带专家参加这些谈判。

They often didn't take even experts with them to these negotiations.

所以他们并不认真。

So they were not serious.

他们并不专业。

They were not professional.

除非伊朗愿意基本上投降，否则这些谈判是不可能成功的，而这一点从未被纳入考虑范围。

And it was not going to work unless and until Iran was willing to basically capitulate, and that was never on the books.

因此，回顾来看，我认为这些谈判根本不可能成功。

So in retrospect, I think that these negotiations could have never worked.

但让我问一个反事实的问题：如果特朗普政府派出了更认真的谈判代表会怎样？

But let me ask a counterfactual question, which is what if the Trump administration had sent more serious negotiators?

如果特朗普没有派他的房地产朋友和女婿，而是派了像马可·卢比奥手下那样的国务院专家，结果会怎样？

What if instead of Trump's real estate buddy and his son-in-law, he had sent, you know, under Marco Rubio, the state department does have a lot of expertise.

那里有这样的人才。

There are people there.

他们本可以派出一位在这一问题上更有经验的特使。

They could have sent a special envoy who had, you know, more experience with this question.

伊朗人会对此持开放态度吗？

Would the Iranians have been open to that?

你认为伊朗方面有诚意吗？还是说，除了特朗普一方对谈判不够认真之外，伊朗方面此时也不够认真？

Do you think there was openness on the Iranian side, or do you think, in addition to the Trump side not being that serious about negotiations that the Iranians at this point weren't that serious?

他们目睹了特朗普政府撕毁了奥巴马政府与他们达成的外交协议。

I mean, they'd watched the Trump administration tear up a diplomatic agreement they had made with the Obama administration.

他们当时正承受着来自以色列和美国的巨大压力。

They were now under tremendous pressure from Israel and The United States.

也许他们只是在拖延时间，同时暗中推进，最终某一天跳出来声称：谈判失败了，而我们现在已经拥有核武器。

You know, maybe they were biding for time, you know, at the same time that they would then eventually one day pop up and say, well, the negotiations failed and we have a a weapon now.

这正是以色列对可能发生情况的看法。

That was certainly Israel's view on what would happen.

我相信伊朗人实际上非常渴望达成协议，我之所以这么认为，是基于我在这一过程中积累的经验。

Well, I do believe that the Iranians were actually desperate for a deal, and I base that, again, based on experiences I've had with this process.

伊朗方面主动提出倡议的情况非常罕见，你可以问问任何参与过这一进程的欧洲或其他国家的谈判代表。

It's been very rare, and you can ask any European or or other negotiator who's been involved in this process, for the Iranians to come up with their own initiatives.

他们通常更倾向于对别人的提议做出反应。

They often prefer to react to other people's ideas.

但在这次谈判中，他们却不断提出一份又一份的工作文件，主动提出建议，希望达成协议。

And yet in these negotiations, they were coming up with one working paper after another, putting ideas on the table in the hope that it would work.

我相信，他们愿意向特朗普总统提供的让步，远超过他们当初给奥巴马总统的，也许不是去年，但今年绝对是这样，如果他愿意的话，本可以达成一个更好的核协议。

I do believe that they were willing to give President Trump way more than they gave President Obama, maybe not last year, but certainly this year, and he could have gotten a better nuclear deal if he wanted to.

但再说一遍，这并不是关于细微的改进。

But again, it was not about marginal improvements.

这关乎伊朗向美国的条件屈服。

It was about Iran surrendering to America's terms.

从伊朗政权的角度来看，比遭受美国打击更危险的，就是向美国的条件屈服。

And from the Iranian regime's perspective, the only thing that was more perilous than suffering from a US strike would have been surrendering to US terms.

因为所有这些历史背景——这个政权存在的根本理由，即维护伊朗的独立、不被奴役，尤其是不向一位美国总统低头——都将被彻底破坏。

Because again, all of this history of, you know, the sort of the raison d'etre of this regime, of safeguarding Iran's independence, of not being subjugated, especially by an American president, all of that would be undermined.

而对于一个政权而言，它在这几十年中，从革命初期的极高民意支持率，下滑到如今仅依赖大约5%到10%的伊朗社会核心支持者，它根本无法承受疏远这些核心支持者，否则它将失去一切立足之本，这就是为什么它绝不可能向美国投降。

And for a regime that in the process in all these years has also lost, you know, starting from that very high point of popularity at the beginning of the revolution, to a point that it now relies on maybe five to 10% of the Iranian society who constitutes its core constituents, it cannot afford to alienate them because then it has nothing to stand on, and and that's why it could not ever afford to capitulate to The United States.

但如果特朗普想要比奥巴马更好的协议，那确实是有机会的。

But if Trump wanted a better deal than what Obama got, that was certainly on the books.

我认为特朗普的考量部分在于，他明确表示过，伊朗政权在国内也面临巨大压力。

I think part of Trump's calculation, I mean, he said this explicitly, is that the Iranian regime was under tremendous pressure at home as well.

这不仅仅是以色列的问题。

It wasn't just Israel.

这也不仅仅是美国的问题，尽管美国的制裁确实产生了重大影响。

It wasn't just America, although the sanctions from America were were meaningful here.

当时爆发了大规模抗议活动。

There were huge protests.

伊朗政权在今年一月就已杀害了数千名伊朗抗议者。

The Iranian regime had killed thousands of Iranian protesters, you know, just in January.

在美国，人们普遍认为伊朗政权已经足够虚弱，如果美国施压、发动空袭，摧毁并削弱其施加武力的能力，可能会引发另一场革命。

And there was a sense certainly in America that it was weak enough that if America pushed, if it bombed, if it began to to destroy and degrade the regime's capacity to exert force, that there might be another revolution.

特朗普明确呼吁伊朗人民起来推翻他们的政府。

Trump explicitly invited the Iranian people to rise up and take their government back.

那么，目前如何评价国家与社会之间的关系呢？

So what can be said right now of the relationship between the state and the society?

你说，到目前为止，这个政权的支持率只有百分之五到十。

You say this is a regime with only five to 10% support, you know, by this point.

现在这个政权不仅缺乏广泛支持，也失去了以往的领导力。

Now it's a regime that doesn't have much support and does not have the leadership it has had for some time.

它很脆弱吗？

Is it weak?

它会崩溃吗？

Will it crack?

是否有可能从底层爆发一场伊朗革命？

Is there some possibility of a Iranian revolution coming up from the ground?

这实际上是一个美国误判的例子，因为伊朗政权确实因其最近对本国人民的大屠杀行为，造成了无法修复的裂痕。

Well, so this is now an example of American miscalculation because it is true that the Iranian regime, especially with its recent act of massacre against its own people, created the kind of rupture that is really unrepairable.

但即便如此，它仍然是一个根深蒂固且深具韧性的政权。

But nevertheless, it is a regime that is very entrenched and is also deeply benched.

你知道，必须理解有两个因素维持着这个政权的存在。

You know, one has to understand that there are two elements that keep this regime in place.

一个是其政治精英和安全部门看不到任何备选计划，没有退出通道，也没有对未来的设想。

One is the fact that its political elite and security establishment don't see a plan b, don't see an exit ramp, don't see a day after for themselves.

这些人不像巴列维时代的精英，他们没有在蔚蓝海岸、瑞士阿尔卑斯山或南加州的别墅。

These are not the Shahs elite who had their villas in Cote D'Azur or in Swiss Alps or in Southern California.

这些人无处可去。

These people have nowhere to go.

第二是，当然，用炸弹和导弹可以削弱军事能力、杀死政治领导人，但你无法制造出一个可行的政治替代方案。

Second is that, you know, with bombs and missiles, of course, you can degrade military capabilities and kill political leaders, but you cannot manufacture a viable political alternative.

而今天伊朗并不存在这样的替代方案。

And that alternative does not exist in Iran today.

没有任何反对派拥有基层动员能力和组织力量。

There is no opposition with a ground game, with organizational capacity.

因此，无论伊朗政权多么虚弱或多么遭人憎恨，要推翻它都非常困难，尤其是仅靠空中力量而没有地面部队的情况下。

And so for these two reasons, regardless of how weak the Iranian regime is or how hated it is, it is very difficult to get rid of it, especially through the sole use of air power without boots on the ground.

自这场袭击开始以来，伊朗的战略一直是将战争在时间和空间上扩大。

Iran's strategy since the beginning of this assault has been to expand the war in both time and space.

因此，他们无法有效打击以色列或美国，但可以打击巴林。

So they cannot effectively strike Israel or The United States, but they can strike Bahrain.

他们可以打击，你知道的，阿联酋。

They can strike, you know, The UAE.

他们可以打击迪拜。

They can strike into Dubai.

因此，他们正在点燃整个阿拉伯世界，我认为这正在破坏他们与许多国家的关系，而且政权内部似乎也因此出现了分歧。

So they are setting much of the Arab world on fire, which is, I think, destroying many of their relationships, And there seem to be some schisms in the regime around this.

有一位领导人曾道歉，但他们仍在继续发射导弹和无人机。

There was an apology from one leader, but they are continuing the the missiles and the drones.

你如何理解这一战略？

How do you understand that strategy?

他们从中得到了什么，或者没得到什么？

What do they get out of that or not get out of that?

这对他们有效吗？

Is it working for them?

我的意思是，你如何评估我们现在所处的状况？

I mean, how would you assess where we are at this point?

我认为伊朗的战略可以这样概括：他们知道自己在武力上处于劣势，但他们认为自己能比以色列和美国撑得更久。

Look, think the Iranian strategy is can be summarized in this way that they know that they're outgunned, but they think that they can outlast Israel and The United States.

确实，美国和以色列作为世界上最强的军队和该地区最强大的军事力量，在给伊朗造成痛苦方面占据优势，但伊朗人相信他们对痛苦的承受能力更强。

It is true that The US and Israel, as the world's most powerful army and the region's most powerful military, have the upper hand in terms of inflicting pain on Iran, but the Iranians believe that they have a higher threshold for pain.

去年为期十二天的战争中，伊朗大约损失了一千名公民，但他们却将这场战争描绘为胜利，因为他们挺过来了。

The twelve day war last year, Iran lost about a thousand of its citizens and yet it portrayed that war as a victory because it survived.

如果有一千名美国人或以色列人伤亡，这根本不可能被说成是胜利。

If there are a thousand American or Israeli casualties, there's no way that this could be portrayed as a win.

而这一次，我认为伊朗人根据十二天战争的教训，决定以横向方式升级冲突，分散痛苦。

And this time, the Iranians, I think based on the lessons of the twelve day war, decided to escalate in a horizontal manner and spread the pain.

他们不仅将痛苦扩散到该地区其他地方，还波及了全球经济，导致能源价格飙升。

Spread the pain not just to the rest of the region but to the global economy that has resulted in energy prices shooting up.

而这仅仅是因为该地区的能源出口现在受到了干扰。

And this is only because the export of energy out of the region is disrupted now.

如果这场危机持续下去，生产也受到影响——无论是因为国家因储存空间饱和而不得不停产，还是因为生产设施遭到袭击并被摧毁，都会导致市场出现长期短缺，油价肯定会突破每桶200美元，这将给世界经济带来灾难。

If this crisis continues and production is also affected, either because countries would have to shut down production as storage spaces fill up or that they would have to if production facilities are targeted and destroyed and then you would have long term shortages in the market, definitely the price of oil will go above $200 a barrel and that will be an economic disaster for the world.

这一策略还基于拉长时间线，因为同样根据那场十二天战争，他们意识到还存在另一个短缺：拦截弹的数量不足，无法有效击落他们的弹道导弹和无人机。

And it's a policy that is also based on stretching out the timeline because again based on the twelve day war they realized that there is another shortage, which is a shortage of interceptors to shoot down their ballistic missiles and drones.

因此，在这场战争的最初几天里，他们试图尽快耗尽海湾国家、以色列和美国的拦截弹库存，以便在他们部署更强大的导弹时，能更有效地打击目标，从而按自己的条件结束战争。

And so in the first few days of this war, they have tried to deplete the Gulf States interceptor arsenal as quickly as they could, as well as Israel and The United States so that once they bring out their more powerful missiles, they can hit targets much more effectively and end the war on their terms.

这是他们的计算，我不确定这种策略能否经得起时间的考验，而且美国完全有可能通过摧毁他们的发射装置，彻底消除其报复能力，尤其是针对以色列的能力。

Now, this is their calculation, I am not sure if it stands the test of time and, you know, it is quite possible that the US might be able to completely neutralize their retaliatory capacity, especially against Israel, by taking out their launchers.

所以这可能最终成为伊朗的又一次误判，但有一点他们可以长期做到，我们已经在乌克兰看到了类似的情景：他们可以持续向海湾国家发射无人机，并针对霍尔木兹海峡的航运目标发动攻击。

So it might turn out to be another Iranian miscalculation, but one thing that they can do over a long period of time, and we've already seen this movie in Ukraine, is that they can probably continue to fire drones into the Gulf States and target shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz.

而美国可能遏制这一局势的唯一方式，就是入侵伊朗南部海岸，派遣地面部队。

And the only way that The US can maybe stem this is to invade the Southern Shore of Iran and put boots on the ground.

而这本身显然会带来政治和人道层面的深远影响。

And that has obviously political and human implications of its own.

所以目前来看，我认为伊朗人认为这场冲突已经演变成一场消耗战，而他们比美国和以色列更有耐力。

So, for now, the Iranians, I think, believe that this has turned into an attritional conflict, and they have more staying power than The United States and Israel.

但即使这场战争最终以类似去年的方式结束——即当特朗普总统决定叫停时，双方都会宣称自己取得了胜利：他会说，我杀死了最高领袖，削弱了伊朗的军事和核能力，问题在可预见的未来得到了解决；而伊朗则会因为自己幸存下来而宣布胜利。

But even if it ends in the way more or less that it did last year, which is that both sides would come up with a narrative of victory when President Trump decides to pull the plug, he would say, killed the supreme leader, I degraded Iran's ministry and nuclear capabilities, and the problem is solved for the foreseeable future, and the Iranians will declare victory just by the fact that they survived.

但这将造成一个非常不稳定的局面，可能在几周或几个月后再次爆发。

But that would create a very unstable situation, which is vulnerable to opening up again, a few weeks or a few months down the road.

实际上，这正是我一直感到困惑的问题。

Well, that's actually the situation I've been wondering about.

如果战争在短期内以进一步削弱伊朗军事能力告终，但该政权依然由霍梅尼之子领导，那么最终留下的是什么？

If the war ended in the near term with a bit more degradation of Iran's military capabilities, but fundamentally this regime now operating with Khomeini Sun, its leader, then what is left behind here?

我们究竟达成了什么？

What has been achieved?

你认为这种政权最终会变成什么样？

What kind of regime do you think that might turn out to be?

我认为，如果这场战争结束时，特朗普总统唯一能做到的，就是用另一个独裁者取代了前一个，并留下一个受伤、愤怒且决心绝不让此类事情再次发生的国家。

Well, I think if at the end of this war, all president Trump has been able to achieve is to replace one hominy with another and leave behind a country that is wounded and angry and determined that this should never happen again.

这是一个非常危险的局面，因为你知道，我们仍然拥有近半吨60%浓缩铀的库存，足以制造十枚核弹头、四枚类似广岛类型的简易核武器以及数十枚脏弹。

It's a very dangerous situation because, you know, we still have a stockpile of almost half a ton of 60% enriched uranium, which is enough for 10 nuclear warheads and four Hiroshima type rudimentary nuclear weapons and dozens of dirty bombs.

我认为，除非这场战争最终能达成某种谈判协议，否则战争的结束方式无法解决这个问题，而目前看来，这种协议几乎不可能出现。

I don't think the way this war ends would take care of that problem unless there's some sort of a negotiated settlement at the end of it, which at this point looks very unlikely.

这个问题依然存在。

That problem is still there.

正如我之前告诉你的，很有可能一位更年轻的哈梅内伊会认为他父亲在是否迈出最后一步、发展终极威慑力量的问题上犹豫不决是错误的，并试图去这么做。

And as I told you, you know, it is quite possible that a younger Khamenei might decide that his father was wrong about hesitating to take the last step of going for the ultimate deterrent and might try to do so.

而这本身，就可能成为另一次袭击的导火索。

And that in and of itself could be the cause of Spalli for another attack.

因此，这种情况可能会持续更长时间，显然也让海湾国家感到非常不安，因为它们希望看到稳定，以便实现其长期经济发展计划。

So this can go on for much longer and obviously is very unsettling to the Gulf countries, which would like to see stability in order to fulfill their long term plans for economic development.

如果这个政权继续存在，那对伊朗人民来说无异于背后一刀——总统特朗普曾向他们承诺援助正在路上，结果却只是留下了一个受伤、更加愤怒、可能也更具有攻击性和压迫性的政权。

If this regime stays in place, it would also be a stab in the back to the Iranian people to whom President Trump promised that help is underway and has only managed again to leave behind a wounded and angrier and probably more aggressive and repressive regime in place.

因此，这将是一个非常艰难的结果。

So it would be a very difficult outcome.

这让我想起了第一次海湾战争结束时的情况，当时萨达姆虽然被击败，但仍然掌权。

It kind of reminds me of where things ended up in at the end of the first Gulf War, which, Saddam was, defeated but remained in power.

在1991年到2003年期间，主要策略是遏制，实施制裁并削弱萨达姆。

And during that period from '91 to 2003, the name of the game was containment, was imposing sanctions and weakening Saddam.

但在那段时间里，伊拉克社会的结构被彻底撕裂，因此即使萨达姆被强行推翻，要重建这个国家也变得极其困难。

But in that period, the fabric of the Iraqi society was torn apart, so even when Saddam was forcibly removed, it became very difficult to put the country back together.

而且，美国为此付出了巨大的代价——鲜血、财富和声誉。

And again, America paid a very high price for that in blood, treasure, and reputation.

不过，还有其他路径吗？

Are there other pathways, though?

我的意思是，看看现在的情况，伊朗政权似乎并不处于崩溃边缘，而且也不清楚那会意味着什么。

I mean, as I look at where things are now, the Iranian regime does not appear to be on the verge of collapse, and it's not clear what that would mean.

并没有任何有组织的反对力量崛起来接管权力。

There's not some organized opposition rising up to hand power too.

你可以想象局势可能会以某种方式破裂，引发内部冲突、内战或派系争斗，但在我看来，任何平稳过渡到另一个政权的想法都不可行，还是说我忽略了什么？

You could imagine things cracking in a way that created internal conflicts, civil wars, factional battling, but the idea of some smooth transition to some other regime does not seem viable to me, or is there something I'm missing?

不。

No.

我认为你的怀疑是有道理的。

I think your skepticism is well placed.

我认为特朗普总统的理想方案——他多次提到过——就是委内瑞拉模式，即除了两个人之外，所有人都保留了职位。

I think president Trump's ideal scenario and he has said this repeatedly and that's why I'm characterizing it in this way is a Venezuela model, in which he says everybody kept their job except two people.

伊朗的问题在于，委内瑞拉的情况是，美国政府在采取军事行动之前就已启动了协商过渡；而现在，这种协商必须在军事行动之后才能进行。

The problem in the case of Iran is that in Venezuela I think the administration started the negotiated transition prior to taking military action whereas now that kind of negotiation would have to ensue military action.

由于特朗普总统已经三次欺骗了伊朗人，双方几乎没有信任可言。

And there's very little trust because President Trump has burned the Iranians three times now.

他在2018年退出了与伊朗的协议，去年和今年又在谈判期间轰炸了伊朗，因此我认为任何伊朗官员都不会信任他。

He got out of a deal with them in 2018, he bombed them in the middle of negotiations last year and this year, so no Iranian official I think is gonna trust him.

他还以一种羞辱的方式对待委内瑞拉，比如在维基百科上把自己描绘成委内瑞拉新总统，并强迫委内瑞拉将石油卖给以色列而不是古巴。

He also humiliated Venezuela in the way that he portrayed himself as the new president of Venezuela in Wikipedia and forced Venezuela to sell its oil to Israel instead of Cuba.

因此，所有这些因素都会让任何伊朗政治家难以相信，自己在向特朗普总统低头后还能生存下来。

So all of those things would make it very difficult for any Iranian politician to think that they would be able to survive bending a knee to President Trump.

如果他以更聪明的方式处理，也许会有一个可行的委内瑞拉模式，但我认为这已经不现实了。

If he had played it in a smarter way, maybe there would have been a viable Venezuela scenario, but I don't think that's really available.

因此，我们只剩下两种选择：要么是1991年后的伊拉克，要么是继续升级冲突，以我们迄今为止从未见过的方式彻底摧毁这个国家。

So all we're left with is either Iraq post '91 or continuing this and ratcheting it up in ways that we haven't seen so far during this conflict in a way that would actually break the state.

当然，美国有能力做到这一点。

Of course, The US has the power to do so.

但这样做的后果很可能是利比亚在卡扎菲被推翻后的局面——国家将沿着族群和教派的裂痕分裂，或在相互竞争的军阀之间陷入混乱，就像苏丹目前发生的状况一样。

But then what that leaves behind is probably Libya post Gaddafi's removal in which you would have the country breaking apart along ethno sectarian fault lines or in between rival generals, similar to what is happening in Sudan right now.

这将给整个地区和世界安全带来灾难。

And that will be disaster for the rest of the region and the world security as well.

因此，唯一剩下的出路是现在达成停火，随后进行更合理的谈判，目标是达成一系列对双方都有利的小型协议，或者提出一个突破性的方案，将政治变革也纳入议程。

So all is left as some sort of a soft landing is a ceasefire now, followed by some more reasonable negotiation aimed at either a series of smaller deals that would be beneficial for both sides or an out of the box idea in which political change is also put on the table.

因为尽管此时这听起来难以想象，但如果伊朗政权能够幸存，它也将面临极其艰难的治理挑战。

Because as much as that's hard to imagine at this moment, if the Iranian regime survives, it would have a real hard time governing.

要知道，即使在战争之前，这些人就已经在为维持基本运转而苦苦挣扎了。

Mean these people were really struggling to keep the lights on, even prior to the war.

而现在，由于这场冲突的成本，他们将很难维持统治，因此从他们的角度来看，生存本身就是胜利，但这还不足以支撑他们持续下去。

And now with the cost of this conflict it will be very difficult for them to govern, so survival is certainly victory from their perspective, but it's not enough for sustaining themselves.

而这时，可能会出现某种谈判的机会。

And that's when there will be potentially a chance for some sort of negotiations.

但同样，这需要一种根本不同的方法，而特朗普总统迄今为止并未表现出任何意愿或能力去推进这种做法。

But again, it will require a fundamentally different approach that President Trump so far has demonstrated no sign that he has the appetite or the ability to pursue.

此外，这里还有一个大国竞争的因素，以色列会将其引入议题：如果伊朗能够挺过这场危机——这可不是一件容易的事，这简直像是大卫对抗歌利亚——如果他们真的挺过来了，我认为俄罗斯和中国会对伊朗产生不同的看法。

And then there is another great power competition element here that Israel will add to the table, which is if Iran survives this, you know, which is not a mean feat, mean it's a David Goliath kind of situation and if they survive it, I think Russia and China will start looking at Iran in a different way.

我们已经知道，俄罗斯一直在帮助伊朗，并针对美国在该地区的资产采取行动。

We know already Russia has been helping Iran and targeting US assets in the region.

我们知道中国一直在向伊朗提供武器和财政支持，但他们尚未真正迈出关键一步，没有全力支持伊朗作为对抗美国和美国对中东主导地位的盾牌，而世界上大部分的碳氢资源仍位于该地区，并将在可预见的未来继续如此。

We know China has been providing Iran with weapons and with financial support, but they haven't really gone the extra mile of trying to, like, go all in in supporting Iran as a shield against The United States and against US domination of the Middle East where hydrocarbon resources of the world are still the majority are located there and will be for the foreseeable future.

这同样未必是好事，因为它使伊朗沦为大国竞争的战场，而美国却没有任何计划，除了遏制之外。

That too is not necessarily a good outcome because it turns Iran into an arena of great power competition without the United States having any plan other than containment.

因此，你的意思是，就像美国认为俄罗斯如今被拖入乌克兰战争一样，俄罗斯和中国也可能视此为一个机会，将美国拖入一场无休止的冲突，分散我们的注意力，消耗我们的导弹和拦截器，耗尽我们的资源。

And so you're saying that in much a way that the United States thinks one thing that has happened to Russia is it is now bogged down in Ukraine, that it could look to Russia and China like this is an opportunity to bog The United States down in an unending conflict that would distract us, that would take our missiles and our interceptors, that would spend down our capital.

我的意思是，其他阿拉伯国家对正在发生的事情并不满意，你知道，不需要地面部队也能陷入一场泥潭。

I mean, other Arab states are not happy about what is happening to them, that, you know, you don't have to have ground troops to be engaged in a quagmire of sorts.

正是如此。

Precisely.

还有另一个需要考虑的因素，那就是尽管阿拉伯海湾国家和伊朗的邻国对伊朗向他们发动袭击感到愤怒，但它们也对美国挑起这场冲突感到不满。

And there is also another consideration here, which is that as much as the Arab Gulf states and and Iran's neighbors are angry at at Iran for firing at them, And they're also angry at The United States, by the way, for starting this.

它们还担心，一旦没有力量能够制衡以色列，以色列就将能够超越国界投射其影响力和实力。

They're also worried about a region in which there is no power left to challenge Israel's ability to project its influence and power beyond its borders.

它们当然反对伊朗的霸权，但也对以色列在该地区的霸权感到不安，它们认为伊朗的崩溃将是这一前景的最后障碍。

They were against Iranian hegemony for sure, but they're also uncomfortable and against Israeli hegemony in the region and they see the collapse of Iran as the last obstacle to that prospect.

这也是我们必须考虑未来走向的另一点。

And this is also another thing that one has to consider about what comes next.

美国似乎真的在没有明确结局、没有实际计划的情况下卷入了这场冲突。

America really seems to have entered into this without forget an endgame, without actually a plan.

最初的视频曾呼吁伊朗人民起来反抗。

The initial video invited the Iranian people to rise up.

有人在讨论武装库尔德人，以发动一场族裔叛乱。

There's been some talk about arming Kurds to have a a sort of ethnic insurgency.

我认为，如果爆发内战或大规模难民潮，导致周边政权不稳，我们确实会在意。

I think we do care if there's a civil war or a out migration crisis that destabilizes nearby regimes.

我们与这些阿拉伯国家保持着关系，而它们非常不希望这种情况发生。

We do have relationships with these other Arab states that very much do not want that to happen.

但说实话，我完全无法理解唐纳德·特朗普原本以为会发生什么，以及他现在认为会发生什么。

But I cannot actually, for the life of me, tell what Donald Trump thought would happen and what he now believes will happen.

我对你的解读完全同意，以色列。

I couldn't agree more with with the way you're reading it, Israel.

我认为美国是跟着以色列卷入了这场冲突，希望‘第二天’能迅速到来，并奇迹般地让局势好转。

I think The US followed Israel into this and was hoping that the day after would arrive very quickly and would magically work in a way that things would be better.

问题会自己解决。

The problem would solve itself.

但希望不是一种战略。

And hope is not a strategy.

美国对事后的计划毫无策略，而以色列方面的意图在我看来非常明确。

The US does not have a strategy for the day after, and the game I think is very clear on the Israeli side.

无论结果如何，只要伊朗被削弱但尚未垮台，那就没问题。

Whatever comes out of this, if Iran is weak and wounded but still standing, that's fine.

几个月后，仍然会有足够的理由再次‘割草’。

There will be enough reason to mow the lawn again a few months down the road.

如果政权崩溃，国家陷入内乱，那也没关系。

If, the regime collapses and the country descends into civil strife, that's also fine.

那离以色列太远了。

It's too far away from Israel.

其他国家将不得不应对难民或不稳定局势外溢的后果。

Others would have to deal with the consequences of refugees or instability spilling over borders.

如果奇迹般地伊朗君主制得以恢复，或伊朗重新融入西方阵营，那也行。

If magically the Iranian monarchy is restored or Iran rejoins the western orbit, well, so be it.

那也挺好。

That's fine too.

无论这次会有什么结果，以色列都对此感到安心。

Whatever outcome comes out of this, think Israel is comfortable with.

但美国尚未真正理解这一点，也不了解我们最初对话中提到的那些长期连锁反应。

But The United States has not taught this true, is not aware of the kind of long tail of events that we started this conversation with.

短期的胜利，即使能够实现——而就目前这场冲突而言，我甚至不确定是否真能实现——但即便如此，有时也会在将来反噬你。

That how short term victories, even if they are achievable, and at this point in the conflict, I'm not even sure of that, but even if they are achievable, sometimes come back to haunt you down the road.

我认为我们可以在这里结束。

I think that is a place to end.

这总是我们的最后一个问题是。

Always our final question.

你向观众推荐哪三本书？

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

我首先想推荐的书是《波斯人：伟大国王的时代》，作者是劳埃德·卢埃林-琼斯。

So the first book I wanna recommend is called The Persians, The Age of the Great Kings by Lloyd Llewellyn Jones.

这是一本非常有趣的书，因为大多数关于古代波斯的故事或历史都基于希腊史料。

And this is a really interesting book because most of the stories that have been written or histories that have been written about ancient Persia have been based on Greek sources.

但这位作者真正做的是，他直接查阅了波斯方面的原始资料。

But what this author has done is that he's actually gone to the Persian sources.

你可以看到，通过波斯原始文献和书籍所叙述的历史，与希腊人对伊朗的认知实际上大相径庭。

And you see how the history recounted through the original references and Persian books is actually quite different than the way that the Greeks perceived Iran.

这也有助于你理解，我们在这集中谈到的许多问题——埃兹拉——并非新近出现，伊朗自古以来就是西方眼中的‘他者’，一个西方始终难以理解的风向标国家，无论是希腊人、罗马人、奥斯曼人还是欧洲人，都曾如此。

And it helps you also understand that a lot of the problems that we're talking about, Ezra, in this episode are not new, that Iran has always been the other of the West, this bellwether state that the West has had difficulty understanding, whether they were Greeks or Romans or Ottomans and Europeans and so on.

第二本书是罗伊·莫塔赫德赫所著的《先知的披风：伊朗的宗教与政治》，这本书同样罕见地做到了一点。

The second book is The Mantle of the Prophet, Religion and Politics in Iran by Roy Mottahedeh, also does something rare.

它为伊朗社会增添了丰富的细节，帮助你理解后革命时代的伊朗，包括其内在矛盾、社会趋势与文化，真正打破了非黑即白的刻板印象，而美国政策常常忽视这些复杂性，这正是导致美国屡屡犯错的原因。

It adds texture to the Iranian society and helps you understand the post revolutionary Iran with all of its contradictions and societal trends and and culture, and it really defies this caricature of things being black and white, and how sometimes, US policy completely papers over all of these things and and that's why it results in The US committing mistakes.

最后一本书虽然不关于伊朗，但它再次契合了这一趋势：当各方都固守自己的叙事——无论是受害者的身份还是道德的优越感时，冲突便会长久延续。

And finally is a book, that is not about Iran, but it kind of again brings fits into this trend that these conflicts endure when every side clings to their own narrative, whether it's victimhood or virtue.

这本书名为《明日即昨日：以色列与巴勒斯坦的生死与和平追求》，作者是侯赛因·纳尔加和罗布·瓦利。

It's called Tomorrow is Yesterday, Life, Death, and Pursuit of Peace in Israel Palestine by Hussein Narga and Rob Vali.

我特别欣赏这本书的一点是，它帮助你理解，在这样复杂的情境中，各方都有足够的责任可言。

And one thing I really appreciate about this book is that it helps you understand how in complex situations like this, there's plenty of blame to go around.

悲剧的发生往往不是因为某一方邪恶或犯错，而是因为各方都犯了诸多错误，最终形成了我们无法解开的死结。

How tragedies that happen are not often the result of one side, being evil or or making a mistake, but that there is plenty of mistakes by everyone that leads to the kind of Gordian knots that we are unable to untie.

阿里·瓦埃兹，非常感谢您。

Ali Vaez, thank you very much.

非常荣幸。

Great pleasure.

本集《以色列家族秀》由杰克·麦科迪克制作，米歇尔·哈里斯和凯特·辛克莱尔负责事实核查，资深音频工程师为杰夫·盖尔德，额外混音由艾萨克·琼斯和阿曼·萨霍塔完成。

This episode of Israel Clan Show is produced by Jack McCordick, fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair, Our senior audio engineers Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Isaac Jones and Aman Sahota.

我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

节目制作团队还包括安妮·加尔文、玛丽·卡西翁、玛丽娜·金、罗兰·胡、克里斯滕·林、艾玛·凯尔贝克和扬·科贝尔。

The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Marina King, Roland Hu, Kristen Lin, Emma Kelbeck, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由玛丽安·洛萨诺和帕特·麦卡斯克尔创作。

Original music by Marian Lozano and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由克里斯蒂娜·西梅列夫斯基和香农·巴斯塔负责。

Audience strategy by Christina Cimilewski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》待播音频的制作人是安妮-罗斯·斯特瑟。

The director of New York Times pending audio is Annie-Rose Strasser.