伊朗会终结特朗普主义吗？

他是个建设者，而普京则是从一个战败且蒙羞的国家的官僚体系中崛起的人物，他渴望恢复那种昔日的伟大。

He's a builder, and Putin is the a guy who rose through the bureaucracy of a of a defeated and humiliated country and sort of, like, wants to restore something of that greatness to it.

特朗普是一个拥有巨大自我的人，他在20世纪80年代的纽约崭露头角。

Trump is a person with a just a tremendous ego who kind of blossomed in in New York in the nineteen eighties.

我认为他们对‘大人物’这一身份的理解在心理层面截然不同，因此你对他们的期待也会有所不同。

I think they're very that their idea of being the big man is quite different psychologically, and so what you can expect of them is gonna be is gonna be different.

让我问你一下

Let me ask

关于你对特朗普以及这种运动本质上是民主的这一理论，我想多了解一些。

you more about your theory of Trump and and this kind of movement as fundamentally democratic.

我的意思是，你面对的是一个第一次参选就输掉普选票、第二次参选又输掉选举、几乎从未真正受欢迎的人。

I mean, so you're dealing with Trump with someone who lost a popular vote his first time running, lost the election second time running, has very rarely been popular.

他的大规模减税法案一直不受欢迎。

His big tax cut bills have been unpopular.

他在2020年之后确实试图推翻一次合法的选举。

He did try to overturn a legitimate election after 2020.

他看起来既不真正认同民主意志，也不代表这种意志。

He's not seemed like a person who is either himself committed to democratic will, but also who represents it.

你和一些其他人的写作中贯穿了一个观点，即他代表了民主意志，但像我这样的人看到他时，却觉得他通常非常不受欢迎。

And something threaded through your writing and and other people's writing like this has been that that he represents democratic will when people like me look at him and think he's tends to be very unpopular.

他最大的选举胜利是在普选票中仅领先一点五个百分点。

His biggest electoral win is a point and a half in the popular vote.

这如何能回应民主所面临的问题呢？

How is this an answer to a problem of democracy?

我认为，有很多关心民主、经常谈论民主的人，是通过民主方式选出了他。

I think that he was democratically elected by a lot of people who care about democracy and who speak about democracy a lot.

我认为那些集会上的很多人正是在做这样的事，而这也是我认为他们投票支持他的原因。

That's what I think that a lot of those people at those those rallies were doing, and that that's what I think they were voting for.

但我很难区分不同总统谁更象征着民主。

But I have a hard time distinguishing different presidents as symbolizing democracy more than others.

他们都是通过选举产生的。

They're all elected.

你知道的。

You know?

但他们选择他，是因为那些觉得自己被排除在决策过程之外的人，他们非常在意这一点，于是选了他。

They but he was chosen by people who cared a lot about who felt, let's say, excluded from the decision making process and picked him for

就是这个原因。

that reason.

我同意，他们觉得他是确保他们的意愿得以实现的回应。

I I agree that they felt that he was an answer to making sure their will was done.

我想我试图让你和我一起思考的矛盾在于：如果你眼前看到的是一个人民意愿得不到体现的国家，那么这位总统——通常获得的支持率远低于多数，从未赢得过普选多数——他如何能解决这个问题呢？

I think the tension I'm trying to get you to sort of think through here with me is if what you see before you is a country where the will of the people is not being done, how is this president who tends to be either voted for or approved of by certainly less than majorities, never won a popular vote majority, how is he an answer to that?

我不，对不起。

I don't I I'm sorry.

我只是不认为这是

I just don't think that's

根本不是问题。

a problem at all.

我认为我们有一个制度，你知道，这是一个共和国。

I think that we have a system, which is, you know, it's a republic.

行政首脑是通过某种多数制选举产生的，也就是说，通过选举人团这一过滤机制。

The the elective the the the executive is elected by a sort of a majoritarian, you know, let's say, a filtered majoritarian filtered through the electoral college.

有时候这个制度会产生只获得相对多数票的总统，有时候也会产生输掉普选票的总统。

And sometimes that system produces presidents who only have a plurality, and sometimes it produces presidents who have lost the popular vote.

克林顿在1992年到1996年间获得了42%或43%的选票。

Clinton from 1992 to '96 had 42 or 43.

他本人，我的意思是，在1995年俄克拉荷马城爆炸案之前，一直处境艰难。

He too, I mean, was in in in very difficult straits up until, you know, I would say the Oklahoma City bombings of nineteen ninety five.

也就是说，他在执政的头三年里支持率一直很低。

That is he was really, you know, underwater for the first three years of his business.

但没人说他不合法，我不是说他不合法。

But no one said he wasn't I'm not saying he's illegitimate.

我不是说他不合法。

I'm not saying he's illegitimate.

是的

Yeah.

这不是我的观点。

That's not my view.

让我感兴趣的是这篇文稿，想和你梳理一下我的理论。

The thing that interested me about the piece was to, like, lay out my theory with you.

哦。

Oh.

是的

Yeah.

你一直认为，我们在美国和欧洲看到的右翼民粹主义形式，是试图进行民主（小写的“民主”）复兴。

You have a long running argument that the forms of right wing populism we are seeing here and across Europe are efforts at democratic, small d, democratic restoration.

所以我想请你告诉我，我哪里理解错了，因为我真的很好奇。

And so I saw you and and tell me which part of this I have wrong because I'm genuinely interested.

在我看来，你在这篇文章中基本想表达的是：特朗普主义之所以会瓦解，是因为特朗普本应代表人民的意愿，但他却在推动一场这场国家中几乎无人广泛支持的战争。

I saw you as basically saying in this piece, the reason this will break what Trumpism is or means or could mean is that Trump is supposed to be an element of the popular will, but he is pursuing this unpopular war that nobody in this country really in any broad sense has asked for.

一方面，我某种程度上同意这一点。

And on the one hand, I sort of agree with that.

但另一方面，不是因为他不合法，而是因为他通常不受欢迎，他的主要倡议往往也很不受欢迎，所以我很难把他看作人民意志的工具。

And on the other hand, not because he's illegitimate, but because he is typically unpopular and his major initiatives have often been quite unpopular, I find it strange to understand him as an instrument of popular will.

他是个非常有争议的人物和总统、领袖，很好地代表了一些人

He's a very divisive person and president and leader who represents some people very well

嗯。

Mhmm.

却非常糟糕地代表了另一些人。

And others very, very poorly.

但在你对 populism 作为一种小写的民主的构想中，他似乎不太契合。

But in your in your vision of populism as sort of small d democratic, he seems an awkward fit.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为，不幸的是，我们正经历一个总统很难让所有人都满意的时期。

I think I I mean, I think that we unfortunately are passing through a period when presidents have a hard time pleasing everybody.

我的意思是，确实有几位广受欢迎的总统，但我想说的是，这标志着特朗普主义的终结。

I mean, there there are a few broadly popular presidents, but I think that what I said was that this was the end of Trumpism.

我的意思是，这个联盟曾经有机会改变国家的对话方向，但现在已不复存在。

I mean, of this coalition as something that really had an opportunity to sort of shift the conversation or the direction of the country.

这与认为他代表了整个国家的民主精神毫无关系，尽管我

It really had nothing to do with thinking that he symbolizes something democratic for the whole country, although I

我认为对于他的追随者来说，他确实如此。

think he probably does for his followers.

你曾把特朗普描述为一个民粹主义者。

You've described Trump as a populist.

我认为民主派对特朗普的看法是，他是个假装成民粹主义者的准威权主义者。

I think the the democratic view of Trump is he's a wannabe authoritarian posing as a populist.

我想知道你对此怎么看。

I'm curious what you think of that.

他最近确实表现出了更多这方面的倾向，但他深受一个与政治完全不同的行业的塑造，所以我很难认同这种看法。

He's certainly shown more more of that affect lately, but he's so shaped by a a totally different industry than politics that I have a hard time seeing it.

事实上，每次观察特朗普时，我都注意到他的许多行为并不是一个规则制定者的行为，而更像是一个认为规则是由别人制定、自己只需从中获利的人。

And in fact, I'm always struck looking at Trump by the way a lot of his actions are not those of a rule maker, but those of a guy who still thinks that the rules are actually being made somewhere else and that he needs to get something out of it.

比如，我要从阿联酋这笔交易中捞点好处。

Like, I'm gonna get something out of The UAE on this deal.

我要从卡塔尔那里得到点什么。

I'm gonna get something out of Qatar.

你可以把这说成是为国家省钱，但实际上是为了让我弄到一架飞机之类的东西，这根本不是

It's gonna you can sell it as saving the country money, but it's it's gonna get me a plane and things like it's not

他常常更像是在向别人索取让步，而不是在命令别人做事。

he he he often seems more like someone ringing concessions out of someone than like someone ordering things someone around.

我觉得这有一定道理：他更想让人向他进贡，而不是致力于有条不紊地集中权力。

I think there's some truth to that that more than he wants to engage in a structured deliberate effort to cohere power around him, he wants to have people paying him tribute.

他表现得好像自己比实际拥有更大的权力，但正是通过这种表现，他得以从系统中榨取大量利益——比如那些与他家人有生意往来的人，以及那些在他推行关税政策时与他互动的其他国家。

He sort of acts like he has more power than he has, but in acting that way, he's able to ring a lot out of the system, out of, you know, people who might be engaging in business deals, at least with his family around him, and from and from other countries in the way he has pursued his tariffs.

他并没有设立一系列复杂的双边贸易协定并提交国会通过。

He's not setting up a bunch of complex bilateral trade deals and passing them through congress.

他只是与国家达成协议，然后宣布这项协议。

He's just coming to a deal with the country and then announcing the deal.

在对大学的攻击中，他并没有推动一项全面的高等教育改革通过众议院和参议院。

In his attacks on universities, he's not pushed a comprehensive higher ed reform through the house and the senate.

他正在与各个大学分别达成协议。

He is coming to individual deals with individual universities.

尤瓦尔·莱文，这位保守派知识分子，我相信你认识，是的。

Yuval Levin, the conservative intellectual, who I'm sure you know Yeah.

我非常喜欢尤瓦尔·莱文的一句话，他说特朗普是‘零售式执政’，而非‘批发式执政’，我认为这确实很有道理。

Here's this line that I like where he says that Trump governs retail, not wholesale, and I think there's real truth to that.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，奥巴马与伊朗达成的协议，也是以类似方式处理的。

I mean, the, Obama's deal with Iran, believe, was done in a in a similar way.

就是你去和领导人谈判，然后回来，这就是协议。

It was just you go and you bargain with the leaders and you come back and here's the deal.

我认为这从未被批准为一项条约。

I don't think that was ever ratified as a as a treaty.

你知道的。

You know?

所以特朗普并不是唯一一个这样做的，但我觉得你提到的大学案例中，他一年前确实取得了不少成果，但我觉得这种策略正逐渐达到极限。

So Trump is not alone in that, but I think that the instance you mentioned of of the universities, he really got a lot of results out of that a year ago, but I think that that strategy is really reaching its limits.

我的意思是，我认为那些敢于对抗他的大学处境都还不错。

I mean, I think the universities that have stood up to him have fared fairly well.

但我还认为，这对特朗普有吸引力的原因之一是，这让他能够主动行动，而不必等待其他机构采取行动。

But I also think one reason it's appealing to Trump is that it allows him to act as opposed to having to wait on all these other institutions to act.

我的意思是，你把更广泛的所谓‘深层政府’描述为它的问题在于缺乏民主。

I mean, you you sort of frame the broader state, what can get called the deep state, as its issue is that it is undemocratic.

而我认为特朗普对它的不满在于它行动太慢。

Whereas, I think Trump's issue with it is that it is restraining slow.

我的意思是，我写过一本叫《富足》的书，主要讲的是这种体制常常让民主党人无法推进事务，因为他们陷于程序主义，即使这些程序他们自己也可能支持，但最终还是无法实现他们想要的目标。

I mean, I wrote a book called Abundance, is very much about the way this kind of state often holds Democrats back from doing things because they get caught up in proceduralism that they themselves might even support, but they still are not getting what they want done.

我认为特朗普身上也明显体现出这种倾向——去年夏天，他在对伊朗进行了十二天的轰炸后，受到了我们之前提到的那些MAGA阵营人物的批评，他回应说：‘考虑到是我提出了‘美国优先’，而且这个术语也是在我上台后才出现的，所以决定权应该在我手里。’

And I think you see this tendency with Trump quite a bit, after the the sort of twelve day bombing of Iran last summer, when he was getting criticized, from kind of some of these figures we've been talking about in MAGA, he said, well, considering that I'm the one that developed America first and considering that the term wasn't used until I came along, I think I'm the one that decides that, that being what it actually means.

我认为特朗普倾向于不希望身边有复杂的框架，而只想自己做决定。一方面，这并不像我所说的那种民主复兴；另一方面，这又非常符合他本人的本质和一贯风格。

And I think Trump's tendency to not want to have, like, complex frameworks around him instead to just be the decider himself, On the one hand, does not feel like I mean, and I I think you're agreeing with this democratic restoration to me, and on the other hand feels very intrinsic to who he is and who he has been.

是的。

Yes.

我认为当特朗普把美国卷入那场战争时，现在看来简直像什么都没发生一样。

I think that when Trump brought The United States into that war, it seems like nothing now.

美国当时 famously 只参与了那场战争四十分钟。

And The United States was famously The United States was only in that war for forty minutes.

你知道吗？

You know?

但我们当中没有人——至少我肯定不认为，你可以随意进入一场战争，然后又随意退出。

But none of us, or at least certainly not me, I I I don't assume that you can enter a war and then get out at will.

我认为这就是你不会轻易开战的原因，因为战争的结束远比任何人想象的都要复杂得多。

I think that's why you don't go into a war because they're really, really much more complex to get out of than anyone ever thinks.

但他结束了那场战争，然后说：好了。

But he ended that war and said, okay.

我们结束了。

We're done.

我们结束了。

We're done.

这看起来像是一种神奇的事情。

And and it seemed like a kind of a magical thing.

你知道吗？

You know?

如果他没能做到这一点，我们一年前就可能已经展开这场对话了，但他做到了。

If he hadn't been able to do that, we could have had this whole conversation a year ago, but he was able to do that.

但当时令人担忧的是，这是他第二次独自为全世界做出决定，但这种决定完全由他掌控其实是一种幻觉，因为在那十二天结束时，以色列正处在如今所处的境地。

The worrisome thing though at the time was that was the second episode where he made the whole decision for the whole world himself, but it was really an illusion that that decision was in all in his hands because at that moment, at that end of twelve days, Israel was kind of reaching the point that it's reaching now where it seems to be.

如果不是因为反火箭弹压制弹药耗尽，至少也是在节约使用，因此它对伊朗的攻击变得非常脆弱。

If it's not running out of anti rocket suppressant, you know, ammunition, it's at least conserving them, and so it's getting very vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

所以，如果有人有意继续，他们本可以一直打下去。

And so they could have kept going if someone had been of a mind to.

我认为中国在解放日关税问题上也是如此。

And I think the same is true of the Chinese with the liberation day tariffs.

威胁切断对我们的稀土贸易，在华盛顿被视作一种极其严重的威胁。

The threat to cut off its trade of rare earths with us was really perceived as quite a grave threat in Washington.

如果你不是100%确定它能成功，就不该去尝试，因此2025年特朗普令人担忧的地方在于，他对自己单方面执政的能力有些过于自信，没有把国家的命运交由他人掌控。

It's nothing you'd want to try if you weren't a 100% sure it was gonna work, and so that was the worrisome thing about Trump in 2025, that he was he was a little bit overconfident in his ability to do this kind of unilateral governing without placing the country's fate in someone else's hands.

我认为这触及了一个哲学上相当复杂的问题，那就是我认真对待保守派和有时自由派的批评，即行政国家在某种程度上牺牲了民主监督。

I think this gets to a a sort of philosophically quite complicated place, which is I take seriously the conservative critique and sometimes the liberal critique that the administrative state comes at some cost of democratic oversight.

但另一方面，世界运作的复杂性和规模如此之大，很难想象如果没有这些跨越不同政府、并非完全政治化的深厚经验储备，我们该如何有效应对；这些储备的存在，部分是为了提供建议，部分是为了防止总统和国家陷入他们本不希望卷入的困境。

And on the other hand, the world operates at a sufficient level of complexity and vastness that it is hard to imagine how you would effectively apprehend it without these deep reservoirs of experience that persist across administrations that are not meant to be wholly political and whose, you know, advice is partially there and and whose procedures are partially there to keep presidents and and countries from getting into trouble they did not necessarily want to be in.

是的。

Yeah.

人们有一种倾向于把事情视为理所当然。

And there is a certain tendency to take things for granted.

如果这些情况持续太久，人们就会把它们当作自然法则。

If if they persist for too long, there's a tendency to take them as laws of nature.

比如，我们一度认为这种专业知识是美国政府固有的，也是政府行政体系固有的部分。

Like, we sort of thought that this expertise was something that was inherent in American government, and it's inherent in the administrative state part of the the government.

那么，你是否比两年前对这个国家机构更有好感了呢？

So is there some part of you that is feeling more warmly towards that state than you were two years ago?

我认为我从来不会对任何事情完全热情或完全冷漠。

I don't think I ever feel totally warmly or totally coldly towards anything.

我承认行政国家的优点，尽管我也认同一种观点，即它已经发展到让许多普通美国人觉得，试图影响国家方向可能是徒劳的。

I recognize the virtues of the administrative state, although I share the sense that it had been developed to the point where a lot of ordinary Americans felt that it was maybe futile to try and influence the direction of the state.

我的意思是，我看过你和克里斯·鲁福以及柯蒂斯·亚尔文就狗狗币进行的一场圆桌讨论。

I mean, had seen a a roundtable you did with with Chris Rufo and and Curtis Yarvin around Doge.

狗狗币从一开始就没有明确定义，虽然确实很模糊，但人们却对狗狗币寄托了特定的期望，我认为你

Doge was ill defined from from the beginning, vaguely defined certainly, but people latched on particular hopes to Doge and I think And you

那时所有人都更倾向于拆解行政国家，或者至少我是这么感觉的。

all were higher at that moment on sort of taking the administrative state apart or at least that's the impression I got.

你当时说，效率是Doge必要的烟幕，因为

And and you said then that efficiency was a a necessary smokescreen for Doge because

唯一的其他选择是说，这种行动是一场意识形态清洗。

The only alternative was to say that this operation is an ideological purge

那就是它的本质。

That's what it was.

这正是它的本质。

Which is what it was.

那就是它的本质，我在听。

That's what it And I I listen.

向公众呈现一个比‘我们省钱’更不可接受的故事，是很难的。

So there's a a much less acceptable story to present to the public than we're saving money.

我认为

And I think

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我并没有以任何串通的方式这么说，但我认为Doge的主要目的并不是提高效率。

I I mean, I don't think I said that in any kind of collusive way, but I don't think Doge was primarily about efficiency.

你这么认为吗？

Do you?

我的意思是，我认为这些节省的金额

I mean, I don't think the savings

我认为Doge根本就不是关于效率的。

I don't think Doge was about efficiency at all.

我认为这些节省的金额并不显著。

I don't think the savings were significant.

是的，这些节省的金额并不显著。

Well, the savings weren't significant.

我当时在实时理解Doge，现在依然这样理解：它是为了打破行政国家抵抗唐纳德·特朗普的意志，我认为我曾提到过，这是为了使公务员产生创伤。

What I understood Doge as in real time and what I still understand it as now was an effort to break the will of the administrative state to resist Donald Trump, to, I think talked about it as traumatizing the civil servants.

我理解了特朗普身边的人为这样做所提出的论点，他们觉得在第一任期内受到了阻碍，有些他们当选后本应完成的事情没能实现。

And I understood the arguments that people around Trump made for doing this, their feeling that they were slowed down in the first term, that there were things that they were elected to do that they were not able to do.

另一方面，这种方式的实施以及背后的意识形态，几乎完全否定了专业性、程序和知识的必要性，而这些可能实际上在第一任期内阻止了一些糟糕的事情发生。

And on the other hand, the way it was done and the ideology behind it came with such a almost dismissal of the idea that there was expertise, procedure, knowledge that was needed and necessary and maybe in fact had Yeah.

阻止了第一任期内一些糟糕事情的发生。

Stopped terrible things from happening in the first term.

我认为我们现在正在经历这些后果的一部分。

And I think we're sort of living through some of the aftermath of that now.

我想他们主要把这看作是为对手带来永久政治优势的来源，是当民主党在野时可以用来安置进步派的地方，我认为他们就是这么看待的。

I would say just probably the way they primarily looked at it was as sort of a source of permanent political advantage for for their opponents as a place where progressives could be parked when democrats were out of power, and and I think that that's the way they looked at it.

我不确定他们是否有一套关于专业性的理论，但也许他们确实有。

I'm I'm not sure they had a theory of expertise, but they may well have.

让我问你一下，作为一位长期研究欧洲右翼运动的人。

Let me ask you as somebody who's done a lot of work on European right wing movements.

你认为特朗普和MAGA，或者特朗普领导下的共和党，与欧洲所谓的民粹右翼有何相似之处和不同之处？

How you think Trump and MAGA or the Republican Party under Trump, how it is similar and how it is different to what gets called the populist right in Europe?

我认为，我们常犯的一个错误是把特朗普看作独一无二的。

A sort of mistake we often make here, I think, is to see Trump as a one of one.

但还有其他运动与他有相似之处，甚至在他之前就已存在，并且在他之后也发生了变化，而你对此做了大量研究。

But there are other movements that have echoes and have predated him and have, you know, changed since him, and you've done a lot of work writing about them.

是的。

Yeah.

那么，你认为特朗普与欧洲的类似人物有哪些相似之处，又有哪些不同？

So how do you see Trump as being similar, and how do you see him as being different than his analogs in in Europe?

我认为德国的情况非常值得研究，即德国选择党，因为它确实是一个民粹主义政党。

I think I think the the German case is very interesting to look at, the AFD, because that really is a populist party.

他们有着不同的制度体系。

They have a different different system.

对吧？

Right?

他们右翼中的民粹派是一个独立的政党。

The populist wing of their right is a separate party.

这不是一个两党制系统。

It's not a two party system.

但你知道，它本可以是的。

But, you know It would be

就像这里的MAGA运动不属于共和党一样。

like if MAGA here was not part of the Republican Party.

它是一个独立的政党。

It was its own party.

没错。

That's right.

所以让我觉得德国非常相似的一点是，德国有一整套民主约束机制，这些机制主要源于二战和大屠杀，就像我们对结社自由等的限制源于奴隶制和种族隔离的历史一样。

So the one thing that struck me as very similar about Germany is that Germany has a You know, they have a whole set of constraints on democracy that have come down as a result of of World War two and of the Holocaust more more than anything, you know, just as a lot of our constraints on free association and and things come from our experience with slavery and and segregation.

我在研究德国时注意到，由于他们的罪行不是我们的，我们反而能更坦然地面对它们。

One thing that struck me in studying Germany is that we have a tendency because their misdeeds are are are not ours, and we can face them more squarely.

我们倾向于认为德国选择党比特朗普更加激进。

We have a tendency to look at them, at the AFD, as being a more radical party than than Trump.

如果要我说出极右翼德国选择党的主要动因，我会说那正是唐纳德·特朗普经常提到的一句话：我们难道不能也谈谈自己国家好的一面吗？

I would say if I had to name the main impulse behind the AFD, it would be something that I've heard Donald Trump say a lot, which is, can't we talk about the good part of our country too?

我的意思是，我们国家出了很多伟大的作曲家，等等等等。

I mean, we we we produced a lot of great composers, etcetera, etcetera.

所以我认为，这确实是德国人与唐纳德·特朗普在文化上的一个共同点。

So I do think that that is something culturally that the Germans have in common with, with Donald Trump.

法国的情况则恰恰相反。

France is sort of the opposite issue.

在法国，由于法西斯主义对他们来说是个极其可怕的概念，而且他们在二战期间确实有过合作主义运动。

Everyone in France, because fascism is, sort of like such a horrifying proposition to them and because they did have a collaborationist movement during during World War two.

因此，人们倾向于把任何他们认为过于保守的人称为法西斯，但我根本不认为国民阵线是法西斯主义的。

Everyone tends to call there anyone they think is unduly conservative a fascist, but I don't see the the national front really as fascist at all.

他们几乎没有法西斯主义的特征。

They'd have very few fascist traits.

他们从未主张通过任何非选举民主的方式上台。

They've never called for for coming to power through anything except elective democracy.

真正驱动他们的是移民问题。

What's really motivating them is is immigration.

这是他们运动的核心与灵魂。

That's the the heart and soul of their movement.

某种程度上，我认为这不仅适用于特朗普的运动，可能在每个州都是如此，但特朗普本人也是如此。

In a way, I think that's true of maybe not in every state Trump's movement, but that's true of Trump too.

然后是英国脱欧，奈杰尔·法拉奇的改革党。

And then Brexit is, Nigel Farage's reform party.

尽管我们似乎没有与欧盟类似的对应物，但实际上我们有。

Even though it seems like we have no analogy to the European Union, we actually do.

我认为，欧盟在欧洲人对民粹主义的思考中所扮演的角色，正如同我们的行政国家一样。

The European Union plays the same role, I think, in in European thinking about populism that our administrative state does.

它是一种外部权威，本应通过民主程序决定的事务，却被转交给了专家。

It's a kind of outside authority to which decisions which we formally think should be decided through democracy get shunted off onto experts.

当你观察这些

When you look at these

这些运动，当你审视这些论点时，你觉得它们本质上是程序性的吗？

movements and you look at these arguments, do you see them as fundamentally procedural?

这关乎民主。

It's about democracy.

这关乎行政国家。

It's about the administrative state.

这关乎深层政府。

It's about the deep state.

还是你觉得它们是在试图实现某种目标，真正重要的是你能达成什么目的？

Or do you see them as trying to achieve an end, that it's really about what goals you can achieve?

也许在一些欧洲案例中，实际上在这里也是如此，这关乎移民问题。

Maybe in some of the European cases, and actually here too, it's about immigration.

这关乎国家的人口构成。

It's about the demographic composition of the country.

这关乎国家的宗教构成，人们感到有一种意愿，也许并不一定是多数人的意愿，但确实在传统上曾是多数群体中更强烈，这种意愿是关于他们感到被挫败，面对一股他们无法通过投票赶下台、却正将国家导向他们不再认同的方向的力量。

It's about the religious composition of the country, and the feeling is that there is a will that is, you know, maybe not even majoritarian, but maybe it is stronger among the people who traditionally were the majority in a state or in a country, and that it is about their feeling of being foiled and being up against a force that they cannot quite vote out of office, but is leading to a country they no longer recognize.

是的。

Yeah.

然后这在民族主义和移民等问题上尤为突出。

And then it comes up particularly with nationalism and immigration and things like that.

你知道，二战后人们往往像你所说的那样，从程序角度看待问题。

You know, post World War two people tend to look at things very procedurally, as you say.

所以，是的，我确实倾向于寻找这些运动中的程序性共性；而且，鉴于这些运动的参与者主要是婴儿潮一代和X世代，我认为它们也倾向于程序化。

And so, yeah, I do tend to look for procedural commonalities in these movements, and to the extent that these movements are made up of baby boomers and and Gen Xers, I think they tend to be procedural too.

所以，当你跟像国民阵线这样的人交谈，问他们想如何限制移民时，你可能会说：‘你所谓限制来自非洲的移民，具体是什么意思？’

So in fact, when you talk to people in the, you know, like the the national front about sort of like, you know, how they wanna restrict immigration, and you say, what do mean you wanna restrict immigration from Africa or something?

他们会说：‘不。’

They say, no.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

他们非常防御性，而且如你所说，注重程序。

They're they're very defensive, and as you say, procedural.

过去，你可以提出各种各样的目标，希望国家实现。

There used to be a whole variety of of goals that you could say you wanted your country to achieve.

对吧？

Right?

它们曾经有点像是为了上帝的更大荣耀之类的。

They they were sort of like, you know, to the greater glory of God or whatever.

现在，人们往往只把它们看作民族主义的。

Now they tend to be people tend to look at them only as nationalistic.

但我认为有两个例外，人们在这种情况下不太注重程序。

But there are two exceptions to this, I think, where people are less procedural.

明白吗？

Okay?

一个是东欧。

And one is in Eastern Europe.

在东欧，人们之所以不会，是因为他们对政治体系的控制本来就很少，也没有像我们这样养成从政治程序角度思考政治的习惯。

In Eastern Europe, you don't because people didn't have as much control over the political system at all, They haven't acquired the habit of thinking about politics in terms of political procedure the way we have.

另一个是年轻人。

And the other is among young people.

那些太年轻、没从严格遵守规则和按部就班中获得过巨大好处的人，不像婴儿潮一代和X世代那样。

The people who are too young to have, like, drawn big benefits from just obeying the rules and and following the order the way, you know, boomers and xers did.

让我感到震惊的一点是

One thing that struck me

关于这一点，我认为特朗普本质上是非常不讲程序的。

about that is that Trump is, by his nature, very unprocedural.

我对欧洲的情况了解不如你多，但他一直非常直截了当。

And I know less about the European context than you do, but he's been very straightforward.

他移民目标的一部分，至少是关注人们来自哪里。

At least part of his immigration goals is where people come from.

他曾说过不希望来自垃圾国家的人。

He's talked about not wanting people from shithole countries.

不管X世代和婴儿潮一代是否注重程序，在我看来，至少许多特朗普支持者喜欢他的地方，就是他打破了程序。

And that, you know, whether Gen X and the boomers are procedural, it has seemed to me that one of the things that many of Trump supporters, at the very least, like about him is that he is an answer procedure.

我不认为人们喜欢他的原因是觉得他是个小写的民主派。

I don't think that what appeals to people about him is that they think he is small d democratic.

我认为人们喜欢他的原因是他做事干脆利落，而且直接告诉你他的想法。

I think what appeals to people about him is that he just does things, and he tells you what he thinks.

他说话的方式似乎并不是基于媒体培训、官僚体系，或者你从民主党与共和党那里常听到的那种制度性表达。

He doesn't seem to be talking to you in the language of media training or, you know, bureaucracy or the sort of institutional grammar that you hear from both Democrats and Republicans actually.

在他的第二任期内，相较于第一任期，他更清楚地认为自己掌权了，会做自己认为最正确的事。

And in his second term, much more than in his first, that the way he understands it is he's in charge, and he's gonna do what he thinks is best.

对一些人来说，这种以行动和权力为导向的领导方式令人反感，但对另一些人而言，却极具吸引力，因为它在深层意义上仿佛回到了另一个时代。

And there is not for all, for some it's repellent, but for others, there is something very compelling about that action oriented, power oriented leadership that feels in a very deep way like a throwback to another time.

你实际上在一篇文章中提到过，我认为是那篇关于特朗普作为历史中的黑格尔式伟人的文章。

You actually mentioned in I think it was this piece, a piece about Trump as a kind of Hegelian great man of history.

是的。

Yes.

我在约翰·朱迪斯一篇精彩的文章中提到过，他将特朗普描述为一个历史性的催化剂。

I I mentioned in a tremendous essay by by John Judis who talks about Trump as a as a historic catalyst.

而且作为

And as

一种秩序之间的断裂。

a sort of a rupture between orders.

是的。

Yes.

作为一种对这种自由主义制度秩序的打破，转向其他东西。

And as a rupture of this kind of liberal institutionalist order into something else.

对。

Right.

他并不是说特朗普一定知道自己在扮演这个角色，或者理解他所引发的变革。

By which he does not mean to say that Trump necessarily knows he's playing this role or understands the the transformation he's bringing about.

你从这一点中得出什么结论？

What do you take from that?

你认为他打破了什么，转向了什么？

What do you think he's a rupture into?

天哪。

Goodness gracious.

我的意思是，这些似乎有时就在我们眼前逐渐成形。

I mean, these are the things that seem to be sometimes forming before our eyes.

你知道吧？

You know?

有时候你会觉得，权力确实正在从政府向企业等实体转移。

Sometimes you get the impression that that there's an actual shift of power from governments to corporations and things like that.

比如，《纽约时报》有一篇文章谈到，越来越多的科技公司正在自产电力。

Like, there's an article in the Times about how more and more tech companies are producing their own power.

对吧？

Right?

它们不再依赖公共电网。

They're not they're not on the grid.

它们简直像是在拥有自己的电网。

They're sort of like they're owning a grid.

它们正在承担起政府的又一项职能。

They're taking on yet another attribute of a government.

所以，我们完全可以想象，我们正从以国家为主转向以企业为主。

So it's it's been possible to imagine that, you know, that we're going from states to corporations.

所以我不确定。

So I don't know.

事物不断形成又消解，我还没看到我们最终会走向何方。

Things form and unform, and I don't really see the final version of where we're heading yet.

你2021年写过另一篇文章，基于一位法国政治理论家的著作，我认为这或许提供了另一个视角。

There's another piece that you wrote in 2021 working off of a a book by a French political theorist that I think maybe offers another dimension of this.

那篇文章的核心观点是，美国和西方世界正在重新异教化。

The the argument of that piece was that America and the West were repaganizing.

能给我详细讲讲这个观点吗？

Walk me through some of that argument.

我认为那是尚特尔·德索尔兹的著作，那是一篇极具争议的论文。

I think that was, Chantel del Solz's book, which was a very provocative essay.

她是一位天主教哲学家，但她的基本方法是，你看。

She's a she's a Catholic philosopher, but her basic way of proceeding is, you know, look.

我们曾经有众多围绕宗教、尤其是基督教、在法国则是天主教建立的制度。

We had all these institutions that were built around religion and specifically Christianity, and in France, specifically Catholicism.

它们现在正在被瓦解。

They're now being undone.

这对一种文明意味着什么？

What does this mean to a civilization?

她说，最好的看待方式是，上一次这种情况发生时，正是这些机构通过瓦解异教机构而建立起来的时候。

She said, well, the best way to look at it is the last time this happened, which is the when these institutions were being constructed out through the undoing of the pagan institutions.

因此，这基本上是一种类型学的比较历史，比如从公元四世纪到二十一世纪。

And so that was basically a typological comparative history of, like, let's say, the fourth century AD to the twenty first century.

我承认，我忘了自己当时是从哪里借鉴的。

And I confess I forget where what I drew from that.

我念给你听这段话。

I'll read you the paragraph in it.

我对这样的论点很感兴趣。

I'm interested in such arguments.

我念给你听那段引起我注意的话。

I'll I'll read you the paragraph that caught my eye.

你写道，神秘灵魂的巧妙方法是将当前的文明变迁置于过去一千六百年间类似事件的背景下考察。

You wrote, Mystical Soul's ingenious approach is to examine the civilizational change underway in light of that last one sixteen hundred years ago.

基督徒给罗马帝国带来了她所谓的规范性颠覆。

Christians brought what she calls a normative inversion to pagan Rome.

也就是说，他们推崇罗马人鄙视的东西，谴责罗马人珍视的东西，尤其是在性与家庭相关的问题上。

That is a prized much that the Romans held in contempt and condemned much that the Romans prized, particularly matters related to sex and family.

如今，基督教对西方文化生活的渗透正在被剥离，暴露出其此前掩盖的大量异教冲动。

Today, the Christian overlay on Western cultural life is being removed, revealing a lot of the pagan urges that it covered up.

我不确定整个说法是否准确，我会把异教与基督教的争论留给学者们去探讨，而且我也没在思考一千六百年前的事。

I don't know about the whole I'll leave scholars of paganism and Christianity to to debate if if these are the right terms, and and I'm not thinking about things sixteen hundred years ago.

但对我来说，这实际上很好地描述了特朗普的实质——他对此前主导价值观的规范性颠覆。

But to me, that actually describes a lot of what Trump is, is normative inversion of the values that dominated before him.

他是一种回归，回归到一种更强烈阳刚、父权制、伟人攫取一切、随心所欲表达的时代，而所有这些战后建立的制度、说话方式和礼节，当他打破它们时，恰恰构成了他吸引力的重要部分。

He's a sort of return to this much more highly masculine, patrimonial, the great man takes what he want and grabs what he want and says what he wants and all these sort of postwar institutions and ways of talking and niceties that when he violates them, that's very much part of his appeal.

他就是这种颠覆，每次他打破这些规范，都在证明自己摆脱了它们的束缚。

He's this kind of inversion, and every time he violates them, he is proving himself free of them.

但对我来说，特朗普的一点在于，当他谈到自己在第五大道开枪也不会失去支持者时，他说‘我就是MAGA，我说了算’，我认为他吸引力的一部分在于，我们在美国政治中已经压抑了人们对某种强人领袖的渴望。

But to me, one thing about Trump and when he talks about his ability to shoot somebody in 5th Avenue and not lose his supporters, when he says it's sort of I am MAGA and what I say goes, is I do think part of his appeal is that we have sort of pushed down the, in American politics, you know, the desire for a certain kind of strongman leader.

我们通过制度、规则和这部美妙的宪法，驯服了这些想法。

And we've tamed many of those ideas in institutions and rules and this beautiful constitution.

特朗普能够做到这一点，而他对最铁杆支持者的吸引力也在于此——他们不会因为这个问题或那个问题而离开他，因为他所代表的是一种领导力、意志、力量和冲动的形式，这种形式几乎具有神话般的象征意义，而非任何具体的政策主张。

And part of what Trump both is able to do and part of his appeal certainly to his most hardcore supporters, why I don't think they break with him over this issue or that issue, is that he's more about a form of leadership and will and strength and impulse that he is representative of on an almost, like, mythopoetic level than he is about any kind of individual set of policies.

这很有趣，但我明白你的意思，我认为他确实喜欢展现强大。

It's interesting, but I I see where you're going with it, and I think he he does like to be strong.

他有一种对力量的观念。

He has an idea of strength.

我并不认同你的观点，即他的追随者正是在寻找这一点。

I tend not to agree with you that that's what his followers are looking for from him.

我认为，这正在缓慢但持续地让他失去支持者。

I think that it it costs him followers slowly, but but surely.

我认为，正如鲍勃·迪伦所说，你要想生活在法律之外，就必须诚实。

And I think that if you're going to, you know, as Bob Dylan said, you know, to live outside the law, you must be honest.

事实上，作为一个四处游荡、自定规则的人，你必须有一套自己的准则。

And in fact, to live as a sort of like roving sort of like man who makes his own rules, you have to have a kind of a code.

所以当特朗普像那样评论罗布·雷纳的时候。

And so when Trump does things like say what he said about Rob Reiner.

昨晚在好莱坞发生了一件令人悲伤的事。

A very sad thing happened last night in Hollywood.

罗布·雷纳是一位饱受折磨、挣扎不已，但曾极具才华的电影导演和喜剧明星，他与妻子米歇尔一同离世，据称是因为他长期患有名为‘特朗普失调症’（简称TDS）的、无法治愈且严重损害心智的疾病，这种病让他对他人造成了巨大愤怒。

Rob Reiner, a tortured and struggling, but once very talented movie director and comedy star has passed away together with his wife, Michelle, reportedly due to the anger he caused others through his massive, unyielding and incurable affliction with a mind crippling disease known as Trump Derangement Syndrome, sometimes referred to as TDS.

他因对唐纳德·J·特朗普总统的狂热痴迷而让许多人发疯。

He was known to have driven people crazy by his raging obsession of President Donald J.

随着特朗普政府不断超越所有目标与期望，他的偏执情绪也达到了前所未有的高度。

Trump, with his obvious paranoia reaching new heights as the Trump administration surpassed all goals and expectations of greatness.

在黄金时代的美国到来之际，或许前所未有地，愿罗布和米歇尔安息。

And with the golden age of America upon us, perhaps like never before, may Rob and Michelle rest in peace.

在罗布·雷纳去世后，一些共和党人已对您在真实社交平台上的言论表示谴责。

A number of Republicans have denounced your statement on true social after the murder of Rob Reiner.

你坚持你那篇帖子的观点吗？

Do you stand by that post?

老实说，我根本不喜欢他。

Well, I wasn't a fan of his at all.

就特朗普而言，他是个精神失常的人。

He was a deranged person as far as Trump is concerned.

他说过

He said

我认为这可能是他整个总统任期的关键时刻。

Which I actually think might be the hinge moment of his entire presidency.

如果你认为生命和死亡就是这么回事，如果你认为人类生命只值得如此尊重，那么公众确实需要重新评估，在涉及生死的问题上——包括战争——还能在多大程度上追随你。

If that's your idea of life and death, if that's your idea of how much respect human life deserves, then the public kinda has to reassess its idea of where it can follow you in matters that involve life and death, including war.

而且他一而再、再而三地这么做，第二次是针对莱恩，上周末罗伯特·穆勒去世时他又这么干了，这真的非常越界。

And I I mean, the fact that he's done this again and again, he did it the second time with Ryan or he did it with, Robert Mueller over the past weekend when he died, that's really transgressive.

我觉得没人真正理解这一点。

I don't I don't think it's clicking with anybody.

但这似乎并没有削弱他的支持率，而且这一直像是他性格的一部分。

But it doesn't seem to cost him much support, and it has always felt like part of him.

我记得他关于阵亡将士家属说过的话，当时有人在民主党全国代表大会上反对他，谈到约翰·麦凯恩，说他更喜欢那些没有被俘虏的英雄。

I remember the things he said about gold star families when, you know, one opposed him at the Democratic National Convention talking about John McCain and saying he prefers heroes who weren't captured.

我的意思是，这种越界行为确实令人震惊。

I mean, that the transgression look.

我认为唐纳德·特朗普经常说的话，尤其是他关于莱纳的言论，既恶毒又令人反感。

I think what Donald Trump says routinely and certainly what he said about Reiner was vicious and repulsive.

但我必须承认，我看不出

But I have to admit, I cannot see

我知道。

I know.

而且民调显示，这并没有对他造成任何影响。

And a poll that it changed anything for him.

但这真的很有趣。

But it's so interesting.

那么对你来说，为什么这件事如此关键？

So why for you is it such a hinge?

因为我觉得这很有趣，我也跟一些进步派朋友聊过这个，但他们看不到这一点。

Because it I it's I say it's interesting because I have talked to progressive friends about this too, and they don't see it.

他们只是觉得特朗普一直在说些疯狂的话。

They just think Trump is saying crazy things all the time.

我认为这跟2016年民主党全国代表大会上涉及金星家庭的事情非常不同，当时民主党提到了一个家庭，试图利用他们儿子的死亡来攻击特朗普。

I think this is very different than, you know, the Gold Star family sort of thing had to do with the Democratic National Convention in 2016 where the Democrats brought up a family, and they were trying to use the death of this family's son to run down Trump.

那是一种政治手段，就像特朗普竞选团队在班加西领事馆遇袭事件中利用死亡一样。

It was kind of a political trick, you know, the way the Trump campaign did the same thing with the deaths in the Benghazi consulate in Libya.

但那完全是另一回事。

But that was very different.

我认为那只是特朗普在对抗一种政治伎俩。

I think that was just Trump standing up to a political trick.

而这次则是一种真正的不敬。

This is actually a kind of a an irreverence.

你明白我的意思吗？

Do you know what I mean?

所以你的论点并不是这些事现在在民调中严重损害了他，因为显然对他的基本支持者来说并没有显著影响。

So your argument is not so much that these things are hurting him in the polls now because they're clearly not with his own base in any significant way.

我的意思是，从罗布·莱纳到现在，他的民调数据几乎完全一致。

I mean, if you look from Rob Reiner to now, his polling is extremely similar.

嗯。

Mhmm.

但你认为，存在某种道德、政策、腐败或越界行为的累积效应，让你觉得他正在积累压力，或许正以缓慢的方式逐渐下滑。

You're saying though that there is some set of moral policy, corruption, transgressions, and in some accumulative way that that you feel he is building a pressure and that at some point, and maybe it's doing so in a slow way, he is going down slowly.

但确实存在一种真正的可能性——人们不想要这样，他的支持者也不想要这样。

But there is, like, the real possibility of a crack up, that people don't want this, that his people don't want this.

是的。

Yes.

我认为他的支持者并不想要这样。

I think that his people don't want this.

所以我知道我是个奇怪的、痴迷于民调的前华盛顿人，那你认为为什么

And so just because I know I'm a weird polling obsessed, former Washingtonian, why do you think then

我们在那里看不到呢？

we don't see it there?

在民调中？

In the polls?

在民调中。

In the polls.

嗯，我觉得

Well, I

可能存在一种质性的重新洗牌，而我们确实生活在一个高度两极分化的国家。

think there's maybe a qualitative realignment, and we do live in a kind of a polarized country.

那么他们还会去哪里？

And so where are they going to go?

人们会转向共和党内部或共和党之外的哪种倾向？

To what other tendency in the Republican party or outside the Republican party are people going to go?

现在的人很难像过去那样在意识形态光谱上轻易转变。

It's very hard for people to move along an ideological spectrum the way they could in the older days.

如今，不同政治愿景之间的鸿沟巨大，而没有人能代表这种中间地带。

There's a big gap between different visions of politics now that no one represents.

因此，我认为当这种转变显现时，会是一种量子式的跃迁。

And so I think it'll be more of a quantum movement when that movement makes itself apparent.

我也在想，特朗普正在拉扯着这个运动的纽带，我认为他能通过人们对他个人的忠诚，以及某种程度上对他的恐惧，在共和党内将大量力量凝聚在一起。

I also wonder as Trump kind of pulls at the bonds of this movement that I think he is able to hold quite a lot together through people's personal commitment to him, their personal fear of him to some degree in the Republican party.

但问题是，当‘美国优先’如今涵盖了从塔克·卡尔森到马可·卢比奥，再到马克·莱文，以及所有那些某种程度上声称代表它、或曾被特朗普允许代表它的人时，它究竟意味着什么？

But the question of what America first is when it ranges now from Tucker Carlson to Marco Rubio to Mark Levine to, you know, all the other people who, in some level, are claim to speak for it or who Trump at some point has allowed to speak for it.

你之前对J.做了一个非常有趣的专访。

You did a very interesting profile of J.

D.

D.

万斯在俄亥俄州参议员竞选期间。

Vance when he was running for senate in Ohio.

我很好奇，作为一个更偏向新右翼知识层面的人，你认为除了这位领袖之外，还有谁能将这种运动维系在一起吗？

I wonder as somebody who is sort of more on the the intellectual side of the new right, if you think this is something anybody else can hold together outside of this one leader.

很多政客其实得益于毫无履历，他们进入政坛时没有亏欠任何人，没有得罪过谁，也没有积累起选民的怨恨。

A lot of politicians are really helped by having no resume whatsoever and to arrive in politics without owing anyone everything anything or without having stepped on anybody's toes or without having, you know, accumulated resentments from voters.

奥巴马就是一个明显的例子。

Obama is an obvious example of that.

我认为，特朗普幸运地赶上了共和党因小布什而陷入危机的时刻，

Trump, I think, lucked out in landing on the Republican Party when it was brought into such crisis by George W.

但我真的看不到支撑这个政党团结起来的原则。

Bush, but I don't really see the principle on which the party is being held together.

一个有趣的现象是，这可能是一个比我们时间允许讨论的更大的话题——如今似乎已经没有了当年里根时代那种让大量原本不关心政治的中产阶级与共和党保持联系的经济理论。

An interesting thing, it's a much larger subject probably than we have time to deal with it, but there doesn't seem to be a replacement for the economic theory that kept a lot of largely apolitical sort of, like, middle class people attached to the Republican Party throughout the the Reagan years.

所以，没有，我看不出有什么替代意识形态，因为我根本还没看到替代体系的出现。

So, no, I don't see the replacement ideology because I don't really see the replacement system quite yet.

我看不出这场变革之后，这个体系会是什么样子。

I don't see what the system is gonna look like after this transformation.

对我来说，如果你告诉我，到十月的时候特朗普的支持率已经大幅下滑，只剩下34%或32%，这就是我会想到的原因。

This to me is a way that if you told me by October, Trump had really fallen, that he was at 34 or 32%.

在我看来，特朗普吸引力的很大一部分在于，人们认为他是个商人，认为他能在一个他告诉你、你也相信已经腐败的体系中运作。

This to me is where it would come from, that I do think among the many parts of Trump's appeal was that he was understood to be a businessman, understood to be somebody who could work within a system that he told you and you believe was corrupt.

而且，2020年败选后，拜登上台，通胀飙升，人们愤怒了，于是他们想起了特朗普时代的经济——也就是疫情前那段相当不错的时期。

And, I mean, after losing in 2020, Joe Biden came in and inflation went up and people were furious, and they remembered the Trump economy, you know, so the pre pandemic one as pretty good.

是的。

Mhmm.

我们拭目以待会发生什么。

And we'll see what happens.

但如果这场战争持续下去，油价涨到每桶175美元，各种问题开始爆发，

But if this war keeps going on and we get to oil at a $175 a barrel and things begin breaking.

我不认为人们愿意为特朗普的这种冲动付出代价，让他引发一波通胀和物资短缺，我不确定在一场几乎没人要求的战争中，这种局面能否撑得住。

I don't think people are willing to pay a cost for Trump's impulse here and to have him create a surge of inflation and scarcity, I'm not sure is survivable for a war that very, very few people were asking for.

我觉得你说得对。

I think that's right.

我认为这就是为什么他一直小心翼翼，拼命讨好市场的原因。

And I think that that's why he's been moving so gingerly and trying to sweet talk the markets so much.

我觉得再过几周，我们就能更清楚地知道，我们是否正朝着你所描述的那个方向发展。

I think we'll know a lot more in a couple of weeks about whether we're heading to that point that you described.

如果一年后我们坐在这里，发现特朗普主义远未结束，对你来说，复苏会是什么样子？

What would recovery look like to you if in a year we're sitting here and it turns out that Trumpism is very much not over?

你是觉得你会看到什么，或者哪些信号能表明经济重新焕发生机？

Either what do you think you will have seen or what would be the signals of revived health?

我认为复苏会体现在经济层面。

What I think a revival would look like, it would be an economic thing.

那就是封闭边境这类政治主张，不知为何，会在经济上产生共鸣，而此前它并未成功。

That is the economic part of the closed border type politics would click for some reason that it hasn't already.

也就是说，你会看到劳动力市场趋紧。

That is you would have a tight labor market.

你会看到劳动力市场底层五分之一群体的工资出现显著增长。

You would have dramatic wage growth in the lower part of the, you know, the lower quintiles of the labor market.

你甚至可能会看到一种关税制度，通过关税来收取一定数额的国家收入，从而对美国制造业形成轻微的偏好，但又不会过度扭曲国际贸易。

And you might even have, you know, a tariff regime where tariffs were being used to collect a certain amount of, you know, the national revenue that they were creating a slight preference for for manufacturing in America, but without distorting international trade unduly.

而这可能意味着他们不得不回归某种类似的统一关税制度。

And that would probably mean that they would have to return to something like a uniform tariff.

我不是在建议这是种政策，但我想说的是，如果你看到特朗普主义复兴，这将是其中重要的一部分

I mean, I'm not suggesting this as a policy, but I'm saying that if you had a Trump revival, that would be a big part of

很可能。

it probably.

我觉得这可能是

I think that's a

就此结束是个不错的选择。

good place to end.

接下来是我们最后一个问题。

Then also our final question.

你会向观众推荐哪三本书？

What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

我认为每个人都应该读《古拉格群岛》。

I think everyone should read The Gulag Archipelago.

我认为这是一本非常棒的书。

I think that that is such a wonderful book.

这是亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴写的。

I I and this is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

这本书讲述的是他在苏联劳改营的经历，但远不止于此。

It's a it's a story of his time in the, you know, a Soviet prison camp, but it's so much more than that.

它共有三卷。

It's three volumes.

书中包含了俄罗斯的历史。

It's got a history of Russia.

书中也涵盖了苏联的历史。

It's got a history of the Soviet Union.

书中还有诗歌。

It's got poetry.

这本书在某种程度上非常广博，就像鲍斯韦尔的《约翰逊传》一样。

It's it's really a a very capacious book in a way that, say, Boswell's life of Johnson is.

既然我们在谈论政治，如果让我推荐一本最好的政治类书籍，那可能是安东尼·卢卡斯的《共同之地》。

Since we're talking about politics, I think if you ask me to name the best political book, it would probably be J.

《共同之地》讲述的是波士顿的校车接送问题，这也是我童年时期记忆中的第一个政治事件。

Anthony Lukas' Common Ground, which is a book about busing in Boston and, which is kind of the first political event that I have any memory of from being a child.

如果我要推荐一本棒球相关的书，一本真正改变了我对体育和写作看法的书，那就是吉姆·布顿的《球四》。

And then I guess if I could recommend a baseball book, a book that really sort of changed the way I, I don't know, look at both sports and writing is ball four by Jim Bouton.

我不知道你是否读过这本书。

I don't know if you know that book.

我没读过。

I don't.

吉姆·布顿在20世纪60年代初曾是扬基队的20胜投手，他有过两个辉煌的赛季，打进过世界大赛，但后来伤了手臂，六年之后，他努力复出。

But Jim Bouton was a 20 game winner with the Yankees in the early sixties, and he and and he had two great years, went to the World Series, blew his arm out, and six years later, he fought and tried to make a comeback.

他自学了蝴蝶球，并以扩张球队西雅图飞行员队的身份重返赛场——这支队伍如今是密尔沃基酿酒人队——他还坚持写日记。

He taught himself the knuckleball, and he came back with an expansion team, the Seattle pilots, which are now the Milwaukee brewers, and he kept a diary.

他是个非常古怪的人，有点知识分子气质，反对越南战争，还写到了球员们服用的药物。

He was a very, very weird guy and kind of an intellectual and an opponent to the Vietnam War, and he sort of wrote about the drugs that the players were taking.

这本书相当八卦，但文笔优美，核心其实有一个精彩的故事，尽管它只是记录了一个棒球赛季的日记。

It was a very kind of salacious book, but it's a really beautifully written book with a kind of great plot at the heart of it, actually, even though it's just a baseball season diary.

克里斯·卡德威尔，非常感谢您。

Chris Caldwell, thank you very much.

谢谢你，埃兹拉。

Thank you, Ezra.

本集《以色列家族秀》由杰克·麦克科迪克制作。

This episode of The Israel Clan Show is produced by Jack McCordick.

事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯、凯特·辛克莱尔和玛丽·玛格·洛克尔完成。

Fact checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker.

我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·格尔德，额外混音由阿曼·萨霍塔完成。

Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Aman Sahota.

我们的执行制片人是克莱尔·戈登。

Our executive producer is Claire Gordon.

该节目的制作团队还包括安妮·加尔文、玛丽·卡西翁、玛丽娜·金、罗兰·胡、克里斯滕·林和艾玛·卡尔德威尔。

The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Marina King, Roland Hu, Kristen Lin, Emma Caldwell.

原创音乐由阿曼·萨霍塔和帕特·麦卡斯克尔创作。

Original music by Aman Sahota and Pat McCusker.

观众策略由克里斯蒂娜·西马卢斯基和香农·巴斯塔负责。

Audience strategy by Christina Cymaluski and Shannon Busta.

《纽约时报》拼接音频的总监是安妮-罗斯·斯特拉瑟。

The director of New York Times Pinning Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser.