伊朗抗议活动这次有所不同

《经济学人》。

The Economist.

您好，欢迎收听《经济学人》情报。

Hello, and welcome to the intelligence from The Economist.

我是罗斯·布洛尔。

I'm Rosie Bloor.

我是杰森·帕尔默。

And I'm Jason Palmer.

每个工作日，我们都会为您提供关于塑造您世界事件的全新视角。

Every weekday, we provide a fresh perspective on the events shaping your world.

中国与其近邻之间的紧张关系是一个长期存在的问题。

Tensions between China and its near neighbors are a perennial concern.

作为我们‘世界前瞻’系列的一部分，我们的记者将解释今年中国对台湾、日本及其他地区的可能动向。

As part of our world ahead series, our correspondent explains what we might expect to see in the country's behavior this year towards Taiwan, Japan, and beyond.

而尼诺·洛雷罗一生致力于研究等离子体——这种神秘的物质第四态，希望利用它实现清洁的核聚变能源。

And Nino Loreru spent a career studying plasma, that mysterious fourth phase of matter, hoping to harness it for clean fusion energy.

我们的讣告编辑回忆了这一努力是如何被一位久违的同学打断的。

Our obituary's editor recounts how that effort was cut short by a long ago classmate.

不过，首先，

First up, though,

伊朗的动荡始于12月28日，当时德黑兰的电子产品经销商罢工，抗议货币急剧贬值。

The unrest in Iran started on December 28 when electronics vendors in Tehran went on strike to protest a currency that was in freefall.

而昨晚，这些抗议活动的规模显著扩大。

And last night, those protests grew in size significantly.

格雷格·卡尔斯特罗姆是《经济学人》的中东记者。

Greg Carlstrom is a Middle East correspondent for The Economist.

尽管全国互联网中断，但仍出现了大量视频，显示不仅在德黑兰，而且在全国各地的城市都有大批人群走上街头。

Despite a countrywide Internet shutdown, videos have emerged of huge crowds on the streets not only in Tehran, but in cities across the country.

抗议者高呼‘去死吧，阿亚图拉’和‘国王万岁’，指的是被推翻的伊朗君主。

Protesters chanted things like death to the Ayatollah and long live the shah, referring to the deposed monarch of Iran.

视频中还出现了抗议者在市中心纵火、试图攻入各省府政府大楼的场景。

There were videos of protesters setting fires in city centers, attempting to break into government buildings in provincial cities.

这些并不是我们在伊朗见过的最大规模抗议，但它们似乎是自2022年以来最大规模的抗议，而且恰逢伊朗政权看起来比以往任何时候都更脆弱之际。

These are not the biggest protests we've seen in Iran, but they do seem like the largest ones since 2022, and they come at a moment when the Iranian regime looks more fragile than ever.

我们在这档节目中花了相当多的时间，格雷格，讨论伊朗的抗议活动以及它们在多大程度上可能或不可能改变现实情况。

We have spent quite some time on the show, Greg, talking about protests in Iran and the degree to which they may or may not change the facts on the ground.

这些抗议与你提到的2022年骚乱有何不同呢？

How are these different from the ones, you know, in particular, the twenty twenty two riots that you mentioned?

我认为它们的不同之处不仅在于规模，更在于抗议的性质。

I think they're different not only in size, but in the nature of the protests.

2022年的那些示威活动始于一名年轻女性因未遵守国家规定的着装规范而被捕，随后在警方拘留期间死亡。

Those demonstrations in 2022, they began after a young woman was arrested for failing to observe the state mandated dress code and subsequently died in police custody.

因此，随后的示威活动中，女性，尤其是中产阶级女性，占据了很大比例。

And so the demonstrations that followed had a large presence of women, particularly middle class women.

这场运动被称为‘女性、生命、自由’，其焦点至少在初期主要集中在社会问题上。

The movement was called women life freedom and the focus, at least initially, was predominantly on social issues.

而我们过去两周所看到的这些抗议，则更多是由经济不满所驱动的。

Whereas what we're seeing now with these protests over the past two weeks, they are driven more by economic grievances.

出来抗议的人，至少在最初，并不是中产阶级女性，而是失业的年轻男性。

The people who are coming out to protest, at least in the beginning, it's not middle class women, it's jobless young men.

这是一个传统上相对支持政权的群体，但政权一直未能为他们带来实质改善。

And this is a constituency that traditionally has been fairly pro regime, but it hasn't been able to deliver for them.

因此，这些人愤怒到如今纷纷走上街头抗议。

And so those people are angry enough that they are now coming out to protest.

这是一个不同之处。

That's one difference.

我认为第二个重大不同在于国家如何应对这些抗议活动。

And then I think the second big difference is how the state is trying to respond to these protests.

当然，在这两种情况下，政权都动用了其惯用的镇压手段：切断互联网、派武装暴徒上街、逮捕人员、恐吓民众。

Of course, in both cases, it's pulled out its usual repressive toolkits, shutting off the Internet, sending armed thugs into the streets, arresting people, intimidating people.

2022年时他们就这么做过。

It did that in 2022.

今天他们又在重复同样的做法。

It's doing that again today.

但在2022年的抗议活动中，政府还曾做出一些战术性让步。

But during the protests in '22, it was also able to make some tactical concessions.

它停止了强制女性佩戴头巾的法律执行，将道德警察从街头撤回，让人们感觉他们赢得了一些成果。

It stopped enforcing the law around mandatory headscarves for women, pulled the morality police back from the streets, they'd let people feel like they had won some gains.

这次，他们不能再这样做了。

This time, they can't do that.

国家无法快速解决伊朗的经济问题，因此目前陷入了困境。

The state doesn't have any quick fixes for Iran's economic problems, and so it's really in a bind right now.

除了试图通过镇压来摆脱危机外，它真的不确定该怎么做。

Aside from trying to just repress its way out of this, it's really not sure what to do.

那么，这些失业的年轻男子具体在抗议哪些经济问题呢？

Well, what are the economic problems that, in particular, these jobless young men are railing against?

光是这些问题就能填满一整期节目，但如果你看关键数据，货币已经崩溃了。

We could fill an entire episode with those, but if you look at the headline numbers, the currency has collapsed.

里亚尔在过去一年里几乎贬值了50%。

The real has lost almost 50% of its value just in the past year.

它对美元的汇率已跌至约150万，创下历史最低点。

It's trading near 1,500,000.0 on the dollar, which is an all time low.

这显然加剧了通货膨胀，而通胀率多年来一直保持在两位数。

That has obviously fueled inflation, which has been in the double digits for years.

目前通胀率已超过40%，而食品价格的涨幅更高。

It's above 40% right now and it's higher for food.

达到了70%甚至更高。

It's 70% or more.

这其中当然部分源于美国对伊朗实施的制裁，尤其是针对其石油产业，但很多问题也是结构性的。

Some of this is of course due to The US sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, particularly on its oil industry, but a lot of it is also structural.

这与该政权的政治经济模式有关，而该模式充斥着腐败。

It has to do with the political economic model of this regime which is shot through with corruption.

经济的很大一部分由军队、革命卫队或拥有大型基金会的神职人员主导，这些基金会收购公司并掌控经济的很大一部分。

Large parts of the economy are dominated either by the military, the revolutionary guard, or by clerics who own large foundations that buy up companies and oversee big chunks of the economy.

因此，这不仅仅是伊朗领导人常说的制裁或西方的问题。

And so it's not just an issue of sanctions or the West as Iran's leaders like to say.

这也是他们如何构建国家经济的问题。

It's also a problem of how they've set up the country's economy.

那么，除了清除障碍之外，伊朗领导人还能做些什么来解决这些问题呢？

So apart from clearing out the rock then, what could Iran's leaders do to address these problems?

从短期来看，他们没有多少好的选择。

They don't have many good options in the short term.

我认为，看看总统马苏德·皮扎斯基安在过去几周内试图做些什么，很有说明性。

I think it's telling to look at what Masood Pizaskian, the president, has tried to do over the past couple of weeks.

他宣布的主要经济政策基本上是一次补贴改革。

The big economic policy that he's announced is basically an effort at subsidy reform.

他正在取消一种为进口食品和其他必需品的公司提供优惠汇率的制度。

He's doing away with a system where Iran offered a preferential exchange rate to companies that imported food and other essential goods.

他正在废除这一制度，并将节省下来的资金用于直接向伊朗民众发放现金补贴，每人每月1000万里亚尔，原则上，这是一个不错的主意，直接现金转移通常是帮助穷人最有效的方式。

It's scrapping that system and it's using the money that it saves to do direct cash transfers to Iranians, 10,000,000 rials per person per month, which in principle, it's a fine idea, direct cash transfers are usually the best way to get money to poor people.

但我们现在讨论的每月1000万里亚尔，按今天的汇率只值7到8美元。

But what we're talking about here, 10,000,000 rials a month, is worth between 7 and $8 at today's exchange rate.

这足够买几升食用油或一袋大米，但买不了别的东西。

It's enough to buy a few liters of cooking oil or a bag of rice, but not much else.

所以这笔钱微不足道，同时，通过改革补贴体系，政府将引发食品价格进一步上涨。

So it's a pittance and at the same time by overhauling the subsidy system, the government is going to trigger even more inflation for food prices.

过去几天，我们已经看到一些主食的价格大幅上涨。

We've already seen prices for a few staples jump over the past few days.

这对普通人不会有太大帮助，一些人觉得，在多年未见的最大动荡面前，政府只能拿出这种方案，简直可笑甚至侮辱人。

So it's not going to make a difference for ordinary people, and some of them find it laughable or insulting that in the face of the biggest unrest in years, this is all the government can come up with.

所以你刚才谈到了总统和政府所采取的一些经济措施。

So you've talked there about some economic approaches that the president, the the government essentially is making.

那么最高领袖呢？

What about the supreme leader?

你说得对。

And you're right.

在伊朗体系中，真正重要的是这个人。

That's really the person that matters in the Iranian system.

总统自己实际上已经表示，我无能为力。

The president himself has essentially said, I'm powerless.

别看我。

Don't look at me.

我说了不算。

I don't call the shots.

阿里·哈梅内伊，这位近四十年来一直担任最高领袖的人，是伊朗的最终决策者。

Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader for almost four decades now, he is the ultimate authority in Iran.

而正是他在这些抗议活动中被指名道姓，这与以往不同，人们高呼‘打倒阿亚图拉，恢复沙阿’。

And he's the one that is being pointed out in these protests, unlike prior ones, down down with the Ayatollah and back with the Shah.

这传达了一个令人困惑的信息。

That that's a confusing message.

没错。

Right.

我们正在听到伊朗各地传来的这些呼声。

We're hearing these calls from people across Iran.

你以前在抗议活动中也听过这些口号，但我认为，特别是那些支持沙阿的口号，这次更多了。

You've heard those chants in previous rounds of protests as well, but I think particularly the ones that are focused on the Shah, there are more of those this time.

看起来，前沙阿、被废黜君主65岁的儿子礼萨·巴列维，如今在伊朗国内获得了更多支持。

It seems as if Reza Pahlavi, the 65 year old son of the previous shah, the deposed monarch, does have a bit more support now inside of Iran.

他昨晚呼吁人们在晚上8点抗议，并且今晚又呼吁采取类似行动。

He urged people to protest last night at 8PM, and he's called for similar action tonight.

这是他首次号召伊朗民众在国内动员起来，而人们似乎对此作出了回应。

It's the first time that he's made such a call for Iranians to mobilize inside of the country, and people seem to have responded to his call.

有些人真心支持他。

Some people genuinely support him.

有些人可能只是觉得他是我所能想到的唯一有知名度的反对派人物，所以我才喊他的名字表示支持。

Some people probably just think he's the only brand name opposition figure that I can think of, and and so I'm going to chant in support of him.

还有一些人只是觉得喊他的名字是一种挑衅政权、惹恼他们的办法。

And some people just think that chanting his name is a way to poke a finger in the eye of the regime and upset them.

所以这并不是统一的。

So it's not monolithic.

那么，谈论君主制的回归，作为对政权的挑衅，是否有效呢？

And so is it working as a as a finger in the eye of the regime talking about the return of the monarchy?

不仅仅是抗议者在谈论试图推翻哈梅内伊大阿亚图拉。

It's not just protesters who are talking about trying to bring down Ayatollah Khamenei.

伊朗政权内部的一些人也开始谈论这个问题。

It's also people within the Iranian regime who are beginning to talk about this.

人们正在讨论：我们是否应该除掉最高领袖以挽救这个体制？

There is a conversation about should we get rid of the supreme leader in order to save the system?

你知道，比如革命卫队是否应该试图夺取权力？

You know, should the Revolutionary Guard, for example, try to seize power?

他们是否应该找另一位伊朗政治体系中的人物，来扫除大阿亚图拉，推行一些改革以安抚抗议者，同时保留政权的基本框架？

Should they find another figure from the Iranian political system who might be able to sweep aside the Ayatollah, implement some reforms to appease protesters, but keep the foundations of the regime intact.

有趣的是，我认为自从美国在委内瑞拉突袭抓捕尼古拉斯·马杜罗以来，这一辩论在过去一周内升温了，那次行动看起来非常类似。

And interestingly, I think that debate has picked up over the past week since that American raid in Venezuela to capture Nicolas Maduro, which looked like a very similar sort of thing.

对吧？

Right?

除掉总统，以保留体系的其余部分。

Removing the president in order to leave the rest of the system intact.

伊朗一些人正在考虑，是否应该在本国尝试类似的做法，将最高领袖推到一边，为体系寻找一位新领导人。

You have some people in Iran wondering if they should try something similar in their own country, push the supreme leader aside, and find a new leader for the system.

我的意思是，考虑到去年的轰炸行动等等，你认为美国对伊朗采取或不采取行动现在还有意义吗？甚至是否值得担忧？还是这真的只是一个内部问题，会自行解决？

I mean, given last year's bombing raids and and what have you, do you think what do the Americans do about or to Iran matters at this point or even the worry about it, or is this really an internal concern that will shake itself out internally?

我认为在许多层面上，这都是一个内部问题。

I think on many levels, is an internal concern.

伊朗人走上街头抗议，并不是因为他们希望唐纳德·特朗普做些什么，也不是因为他们指望美国的支持。

Iranians are not out in the streets protesting because they want Donald Trump to do something or because they are counting on American support.

他们走上街头，是因为半个世纪以来伊斯兰共和国的治理失败，他们已经忍无可忍，觉得再没有什么可失去的了。

They are doing it because after half a century of misrule by the Islamic Republic, they're fed up and they feel like they have nothing left to lose.

但我认为，对于政权的权衡而言，美国会或不会采取什么行动确实重要，并影响着他们的判断。

But I think for the calculations of the regime, what America will or will not do does matter and does affect those calculations.

我们已经多次听到特朗普发出威胁，称如果伊朗杀害抗议者，美国已经严阵以待，随时准备出手相助。

We've heard Trump now several times issue threats saying that if Iran kills protesters that America is locked and loaded and ready to come to their rescue.

这究竟意味着什么尚不明确，但我认为，考虑到美国大约六个月前轰炸过伊朗，以及美国最近在委内瑞拉的所作所为，这种美国介入的阴影正在加剧政权内部的争论。

It's not at all clear what that means, but I think the specter of American involvement given that America did bomb Iran about six months ago, given what America just did in Venezuela, I think it is sharpening these debates within the regime.

他们希望以某种方式维持伊斯兰共和国的整体架构。

They want to keep the edifice of the Islamic Republic intact somehow.

如果存在美国将采取行动、颠覆这一架构的风险，这可能会加速关于替换最高领袖、换上一位能维持体制根基之人的讨论。

And if there is a risk that America is going to act, that it's going to do something that will bring down that edifice, that might accelerate this talk of trying to replace the supreme leader and replace him with somebody who can keep the foundations intact.

格雷格，非常感谢你参与我们的节目。

Greg, thanks very much for joining us.

谢谢你，杰森。

Thank you, Jason.

许多美国军方官员认为，2027年在中国的日历上是一个重要的年份。

Many American military officials reckon 2027 is an important date in China's calendar.

那将标志着中国人民解放军成立一百周年。

That will mark a centenary since the creation of the People's Liberation Army.

有些人认为，这是中国领导人习近平希望做好入侵台湾准备的截止时间。

And some think it's the time by which China's leader Xi Jinping wants to be ready to invade Taiwan.

所有这些都可能意味着今年可能是至关重要的一年。

All of which could mean that this year may be a crucial one.

中国确实在大量生产装备。

China's certainly been churning out a lot of kit.

中国为纪念这一时刻展示了非凡的军事实力。

An extraordinary military display by China to commemorate

中国似乎正在以历史性的速度扩大其军事 arsenal，但作为我们《世界展望》系列的一部分，防务编辑沙什ank·乔希探讨了更可能的情景并非全面战争，而是对中国台湾及其他对手持续增加政治、经济和军事压力。

China appears to be expanding its military arsenal at a historic pace, But as part of our World Ahead series, defense editor Shashank Joshi discusses whether the more likely scenario is not fully fledged conflict, but a steady increase in political, economic, and military pressure against Taiwan and other foes.

中国人民解放军，即中国武装部队，多年来一直稳步加强对台湾周边的空中和海上压力。

The People's Liberation Army, the PLA, China's Armed Forces, have escalated air and maritime pressure all around Taiwan steadily for several years.

2025年，他们在台湾海峡进行了实弹演习。

2025, they conducted live fire drills in the Taiwan Strait.

他们模拟了对岛屿的封锁。

They simulated a blockade of the island.

因此，所有这些行动的结果是，中国从演习或演练转向实际封锁所需的时间，比几年前要短得多。

And so the result of all of this is that China could pivot from an exercise or a drill to a real blockade in much, much less time than it would have taken just a few years ago.

现在，沙什纳克，人们非常关注明年会发生什么，部分原因是美国军方似乎执着于一种观点，即习近平希望在2027年——中国人民解放军成立一百周年之际——能够收复台湾。

Now, Shashnik, there's a lot of attention on what happens in the next year, partly because American military officials seem fixated on the idea that Xi Jinping wants to be able to retake Taiwan by 2027, which is the centenary of the People's Liberation Army.

所以，罗斯，有趣的是，如果你去华盛顿特区，你会听到大量这种说法。

So the interesting thing, Rosie, is that if you go to Washington DC, you'll hear this data lot.

没有任何中国官员曾经这样说过。

No Chinese official has ever said it.

中央情报局前局长比尔·伯恩斯确实表示，习近平已命令解放军在2027年前做好准备。

The last director of the CIA, Bill Burns, did say that Xi Jinping had ordered the PLA to be ready by 2027.

因此，这在某种程度上是美国情报机构的主张。

So it's sort of an American intelligence claim.

但这并非凭空捏造。

Now it's not pulled out of thin air.

正如你所说，这部分与解放军成立一百周年的纪念日有关。

It is partly, as you say, the the centennial of the PLA's founding.

这可能是原因之一，但也与解放军为自己设定的一些具体而详细的军事时间表有关。

That's probably part of it, but it's also linked to some of very specific and detailed military timelines the PLA has set for itself.

例如，它希望到2020年成为一个配备适当装甲车辆等装备的机械化部队，并且实现了这一目标。

So for example, it wanted to be a mechanized force with proper armored vehicles and things by 2020, and it achieved that target.

它希望在2035年实现全面现代化，而2027年则是他们所谓的中间目标——请原谅我使用这个术语。

It wanted comprehensive modernization by 2035, and 2027 was a middle target for what they called and forgive me for the jargon here.

他们称之为智能化战争。

They called it intelligentized warfare.

这实际上意味着什么，罗斯，就是人工智能、信息网络、数据，和你在西方军队中看到的许多相同的东西。

What that means really, Rosie, is AI, information networks, data, lots of the same thing you see in Western armies.

他们希望到这个时间点，所有这些装备都能在解放军中准备就绪。

That's the date by which they wanted all that stuff to be ready in the PLA.

那么，这一切在现实中意味着什么？

So what does all of that mean on the ground?

我们可能会在明年看到解放军采用什么样的战术？

What sorts of tactics might we see the PLA use in the year ahead?

我认为我的一位同事称之为‘蟒蛇战略’。

Well, I think one of my colleagues called it an anaconda strategy.

本质上，这个策略不是进行大规模两栖登陆或发动袭击，而是对台湾进行封锁。

And essentially, the idea is instead of conducting a full scale amphibious invasion or instead of conducting strikes, you squeeze Taiwan.

你从经济、政治和军事上加大压力，这方面已有许多实例。

You intensify the pressure economically, politically, militarily, and there's all manner of examples of that.

例如，中国持续向台湾外岛派遣气象气球。

So for instance, China continues to send weather balloons over Taiwan's outlying islands.

它还持续向台湾本岛派遣无人机。

It continues to send drones over the main island.

这些无人机 presumably 在执行侦察任务，但也在某种程度上暴露了台湾的弱点。

These are presumably conducting surveillance, but they're also, in a way, exposing Taiwan's weakness.

它们展示了台湾无法做出有效回应的能力。

They're showing its inability to respond.

我认为今年，我们还将看到中国的航母打击群越来越多地围绕台湾航行，绕行其东部，这是过去从未发生过的事情，这将削弱台湾空军。

I think this year, we're also going to see China's aircraft carrier strike groups increasingly travel around the island, circumnavigating it, going east of it, something they'd never did in the past, and that will wear down Taiwan's air force.

我认为最有趣的是我们在欧洲看到的现象——海底数据电缆被以神秘原因切断。

And I think the most interesting thing is something we've seen in Europe, which is undersea data cables being cut for mysterious reasons.

我们也在台湾周围的水域看到过类似的情况。

We have also seen a little bit of that in the waters around Taiwan.

因此，我认为自2023年以来，台湾周围的海底电缆至少发生了11次原因不明的损坏。

So undersea cables, I think, around Taiwan suffered unexplained damage at least 11 times since 2023.

我无法向你确切保证，罗斯，是中国人民解放军或中国船只所为，但如果中国在试探切断台湾与世界其他地区通信的方式，以在冲突或封锁中使其瘫痪，我并不会感到意外。

I can't tell you for certain, Rosie, the PLA did this or Chinese ships did this, but it wouldn't surprise me if there was some Chinese involvement in experimenting with severing Taiwan's communications from the rest of the world in a way that would paralyze them in a conflict or in a blockade.

但这些战术针对的并不仅仅是台湾，对吧？

But it's not just Taiwan that's being targeted with these sorts of tactics, is it?

当然不只是台湾。

It definitely isn't just Taiwan.

当我想到亚洲这片处于全面武装冲突阈值之下的灰色地带博弈时，尤其是展望2025年，我真正想到的是菲律宾和南海。

So when I think of this jockeying in the gray zone, that whole space under the threshold of full scale armed conflict in Asia, and I think of 2025, really think of The Philippines and the South China Sea.

我们看到的是一场围绕名为黄岩岛的地点发生的对峙。

And what we saw is a confrontation around this place called Scarborough Shoal.

这是一个有争议的礁石，在与中国菲律宾对峙期间，中国海警船与另一艘中国海军军舰发生了碰撞。

It's a contested outcrop, and a vessel from China's coast guard collided with another Chinese PLA warship during a confrontation with The Philippines.

这些对峙的激烈程度可见一斑，我认为这展现了中国日益咄咄逼人的海军战术。

That's just how rough these confrontations were getting, and I think it showed you China's increasingly aggressive naval tactics.

这表明，他们于2024年8月与菲律宾签署的降低风险协议并未如预期般发挥作用。

What it tells you is that a risk reduction pact that they signed with The Philippines back in August 2024 just isn't working as it should.

我认为，随着菲律宾接替马来西亚担任东盟主席——这个由十个东南亚国家组成的组织——他们将利用这一平台，对中国的施压加大，促使其签署一项名为“行为准则”的协议。

And I think as The Philippines takes over from Malaysia as the chair of ASEAN, this club of 10 Southeast Asian countries, they're gonna use that as a platform to put much more pressure on China to sign on to something called a code of conduct.

但当然，这也会将美国卷入其中，因为菲律宾是美国的条约盟友。

But this will, of course, also drag the Americans in because The Philippines is a treaty ally.

而且，沙什ank一直是我们节目中常谈中日紧张关系的话题人物。

And Shashank feels like a perennial on the show that we've talked about tensions between China and Japan.

我们可能会在解放军那里看到哪些动向？

What kinds of things might we see from the PLA there?

去年年底，日本和中国之间爆发了一场相当严重的外交争端。

There's been a fairly serious diplomatic spat between Japan and China at the end of last year.

日本新首相高市早苗公开谈论了日本在可能发生的中国对台入侵中的潜在角色，这激怒了中国，中方已以一些非常强硬的方式作出回应。

Japan's new prime minister, Takaiichi, talked publicly about Japan's potential role in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that made the Chinese very angry, and they've responded in some very aggressive ways.

去年年底，中国战斗机曾将雷达锁定在日本飞机上，这在飞机对飞机的遭遇中是一种非常敌对的行为，因为它可能意味着你即将向对方发射导弹。

At the end of last year, Chinese fighter jets locked their radars onto Japanese planes, and that is a very hostile act when it comes to plane on plane encounters because it can signal that you're about to have a missile fired at you.

中日之间还长期存在关于日本所称的尖阁诸岛的争端，这些岛屿位于东海，目前由日本控制。

There's also a long standing Sino Japanese dispute over what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands, islands that it controls in the East China Sea.

2025年，中国海警创下了在尖阁诸岛领海内持续滞留时间最长的纪录。

In 2025, China's coast guard set a record for the longest ever intrusion into the Senkaku's territorial waters.

他们追踪日本渔船后，停留了大约92小时。

They stayed something like ninety two hours after pursuing Japanese fishing boats.

日本方面和专家担心，今年如果中国想施加压力，可能会在尖阁诸岛建立永久性的海军存在。

And the Japanese and and experts are concerned that this year, if China wants to put the pressure on, they could, for example, establish a permanent naval presence in the Senkaku's.

他们可能会试图在这些争议水域附近开采资源，就像他们在南海其他地方所做的那样。

They could try to exploit resources near the disputed waters in those islands as they have done elsewhere in the China Sea.

而且，沙什ank，你一直密切关注着这一切。

And, Shashank, you watch this all the time.

你正在观察中国人民解放军活动的持续变化。

You're watching this steady change in PLA activity.

我们最终会看到什么结局呢？

What are we ultimately going to see at the end of this?

嗯，罗斯，我认为答案是我们不知道，但这给了中国多种选择。

Well, I think the answer, Rosie, is we don't know, but it gives the Chinese options.

这并不排除他们在本十年结束前，通过大规模两栖登陆作战强行夺取台湾的可能性。

It doesn't preclude them from launching a full scale amphibious assault over the Taiwan Strait to take the island by force at some point before the end of the decade.

他们正在大量生产驳船和两栖舰艇。

They are churning out barges on this show, amphibious ships.

但关键是，通过在这一阈值之下施加压力，他们为自己保留了多种选择：骚扰该岛，让岛内民众感到无法自卫，从而不得不在胁迫下与大陆统一，或者实施封锁，切断岛屿的燃料、粮食和通信供应，最终迫使其投降。

But the point is, by also putting the pressure on below that threshold, they give themselves options, options to harass the island, options to make the island's population feel as if it's unable to defend itself, and it has no choice but to unify with Mainland China under coercive terms, or indeed a blockade that would effectively cut the island off from supplies of fuel, from supplies of food, from communications, and that would ultimately lead to its capitulation.

中国可能希望在不造成重大流血的情况下实现目标。

The Chinese may hope without major blood having to be shed.

我认为这一切的挑战在于，美国军方正在为可能发生的台海战争做准备。

I think the challenge in all of this is America's military is preparing for a potential war over Taiwan.

他们正在增加弹药储备。

It's building up munition stockpiles.

它正在改变其在亚洲的态势，并且知道如何应对冲突。

It's changing its posture in Asia, and it would know how to respond to a conflict.

应对秘密切断电缆并不容易。

It's not so easy to respond to surreptitious cable cutting.

应对飞机和船只的骚扰并不容易。

It's not so easy to respond to harassment by aircraft and ships.

这正是这种压力的目的。

And that's the point of this kind of pressure.

这种压力程度太轻，不足以引发军事回应，但随着时间推移，它会削弱台湾人民的士气和力量。

It's too limited to warrant a military response, but over time, it can sap the morale and the strength of the Taiwanese people.

我认为，这正是它成为如此棘手挑战的原因。

And I think that is what makes it such a difficult challenge to be dealing with.

沙什ank，非常感谢你。

Shashank, thank you very much.

谢谢你的邀请，罗斯。

Thanks for having me, Rosie.

当努诺·卢雷罗在葡萄牙中部城市维泽乌长大时，他从小就立志成为一名科学家。

When Nuno Lurero was growing up in the central Portuguese city of Vizhou, he knew from very early on that he wanted to be a scientist.

安·罗是《经济学人》的讣告编辑。

Anne Rowe is The Economist's obituaries editor.

这在他小学里很特别。

That was odd in his primary school.

大多数小男孩想当警察或消防员，但他从一开始就清楚自己的志向。

Most little boys wanted to be policemen or firemen, but he knew from the very start.

到中学毕业时，他已经确定要专攻物理学。

And by the time he got to the end of secondary school, he knew he wanted to specialize in physics.

这段时间里，他一直在探索物理学中一个让他着迷的领域——等离子体。

All this time, he was carving out a particular corner of physics that fascinated him and this was plasmas.

等离子体是继固态、液态和气态之后的第四种物质状态。

Plasma is the fourth state of matter after solid, liquid and gas.

在等离子体中，电子和离子构成一种超高温、始终沸腾的‘汤’，总是处于湍流状态，他决定这将是一个绝佳的研究方向，因为如果科学家能够实现等离子体中的核聚变，就可能带来重大突破。

In plasma, the electrons and ions make up a sort of soup that's super hot and always on the bubble, it's always turbulent and this he decided would make a fine branch of study because there was always the possibility that if scientists could manage to effect fusion in plasma.

聚变能源可以为世界提供廉价且持续的电力。

Fusion energy could provide the world with cheap continuous power.

然而，试图实现这一点极其困难。

This was however an incredibly difficult thing to try to do.

因为等离子体会按照自己的方式行动。

Because plasma goes its own way and does its own thing.

我们最熟悉的等离子体是太阳风和太阳耀斑，它们有时会突然爆发，产生极光（如北极光和南极光），并干扰通信卫星。

The plasma we're most familiar with is the solar wind and the solar flares from the sun which just burst out sometimes quite sharply and cause auroras like the northern lights and the southern lights and disrupt communication satellites.

但我们也通过观察海洋和海浪的运动，熟悉了湍流现象。

But also, we're familiar with turbulence just by looking at the sea and the way the waves move with the water.

要利用这种现象来产生能量，极其困难。

This is something that is incredibly hard to harness to make energy.

事实上，在实验室中实现这一目标的唯一方法是使用一种名为托卡马克的装置，它是一个内部可加热至数百万度的容器，通过磁场试图稳定等离子体。通过保持等离子体稳定并处于受控温度，人们始终希望实现聚变反应；但事实上，等离子体自有其意志，总按自己的方式运行，因此极难追踪。卢雷罗教授一生的大部分时间都在构建数学模型和动力学代码，以帮助他追踪等离子体的行为，判断是否在稳定化方面取得进展。他完全适应了麻省理工学院的环境。

And in fact, the only way to do it in a laboratory is to use a device called a tokamak, which is a vessel which can be heated to millions of degrees inside and uses magnets to try to keep the plasma steady By keeping it steady and at one controlled temperature there's always the hope that fusion might occur but in fact plasma has a mind of its own and does its own thing so that it's extremely difficult to track it and most of professor Lourero's life was spent trying to construct mathematical models, kinetic codes that would help him track how the plasma was behaving and see if they were making any progress towards keeping it steady He fitted right in at MIT.

他是一位相当优雅的人物，不像那里许多研究人员那样穿着牛仔裤和T恤。

He was rather an elegant character He didn't wear jeans and a t shirt like a lot of the researchers there.

他穿着相当时尚的夹克，戴着眼镜，显得有些猫头鹰般的睿智，口中仍带着曾在帝国学院时留下的英国口音。

He wore rather stylish jackets and looked quite owlish in his glasses and still had traces of a British accent from the time he'd spent at Imperial.

他作为一名教师广为人知，因为他对所教授的学科充满活力与热爱。

And he was well known as a teacher because he was absolutely fizzing with energy and love of his subject.

他走进教室，立刻开始在黑板上写满数字，并鼓励学生尽最大努力，不要只挑简单的题目，而要挑战最困难的问题，因为等他们真正研究等离子体物理时，就必须面对这些难题。他尤其推崇阿尔贝·加缪的一篇名为《西西弗斯的神话》的散文，文中讲述了希腊神话中西西弗斯被宙斯惩罚，不断将巨石推上山顶，却每次眼看它滚落的故事。

He'd walk into a class and immediately start chalking numbers on the board and he would challenge his students to try to be the best they possibly could be and not to simply tackle easy problems to tackle the hardest possible things because with plasma physics that's what they were going to have to do and he was especially keen on an essay by Albert Camus called The Myth of Sisyphus which told the story of the Greek king in Greek mythology who was condemned by Zeus to push a boulder up a hill and see it roll down every time.

他认为，即使西西弗斯不断失败，他依然在追求高峰，依然是一个幸福的人，值得效仿的榜样。

He felt that Sisyphus, even if he kept failing, was still aiming for the heights and was still a happy man and a model to be emulated.

在

In

他的课堂上，还有另一位学生，没人知道他是否特别注意到，名叫克劳迪奥·曼努埃尔·内韦斯·瓦伦特。

his class, there was another student who no one knows whether he particularly noticed who was called Claudio Manuel Neves Valente.

他是一位才华横溢的学生，性格相当安静。

He was a brilliant student, rather a quiet chap.

他在卢雷罗教授任教期间全程在场，并且是班上成绩最优异的学生。

He was there the whole time that professor Lurero was there and he was the top of the class.

努诺·卢雷罗以20分中的16分毕业，而瓦伦特则以20分中的19分毕业，成绩极为出色，随后他进入布朗大学深造，但几个月后似乎退学并消失了。与此同时，努诺·卢雷罗正以他的实验在麻省理工学院掀起风暴。当瓦伦特再次出现时，是在12月，他突然出现在布朗大学，开枪打死两人、伤及九人。之后，他仍在逃亡中，出现在努诺·卢雷罗居住的马萨诸塞州布鲁克莱恩，向他连开数枪，然后逃离，最终在另一个州自杀。关于瓦伦特杀害努诺·卢雷罗的动机，有多种说法。

Nullo Lurero graduated with a 16 out of 20 average but Valente graduated with a 19 out of 20 average an extraordinary amount and he went on to Brown University but then after a few months there he seemed to drop out and disappear meanwhile of course Nuno Larrero was taking MIT by storm with his experiments When Valente next appeared, it was on December, when he suddenly appeared at Brown University, killed two people and injured nine after that still on the run he appeared in Brookline Massachusetts which was where Nuno Lurero was living and pumped several bullets into him and then fled away and eventually killed himself in another state There were many motives suggested for the killing of Nuno Luerero.

也许这只是职业嫉妒，但他自己的研究却暗示了另一种可能：在整个宇宙中，只要有等离子体存在——而等离子体几乎遍布整个宇宙——就必然存在无法解释、也无法控制的湍流和爆炸。

Perhaps it was just professional jealousy but his very own work suggested a different thought all over the universe wherever plasma was and it was almost the entire universe there were bound to be turbulences and explosions which could not be explained and which could not be controlled.

安妮撰文悼念已故的努诺·卢雷罗，享年47岁。

Anne wrote on Nuno Loredu, who's died aged 47.

本期《智慧》节目到此结束。

That's all for this episode of the intelligence.

本节目的编辑是克里斯·伊姆佩和杰克·吉尔。

The show's editors are Chris Impey and Jack Gill.

我们的副编辑是莎拉·洛伦朱克，音效设计是威尔·罗。

Our deputy editor is Sarah Lornejuk, and our sound designer is Will Rowe.

我们的高级制片人是罗里·加洛韦和亨丽埃塔·麦克法兰，高级创意制片人是威廉·沃伦。

Our senior producers are Rory Galloway and Henrietta McFarlane, and our senior creative producer is William Warren.

我们的制片人是乔纳森·戴和安娜·哈娜，助理制片人是卡纳尔·帕特尔，本周额外制作协助来自艾米莉·伊莱亚斯和本吉·盖。

Our producers are Jonathan Day and Anna Hanna, and our assistant producer is Kanal Patel with extra production help this week from Emily Elias and Benjie Guy.

我们明天再见，继续收听周末情报节目。

We'll all see you back here tomorrow for the weekend intelligence.

本周，我们将探讨各国如何纪念阵亡士兵的方式发生了多大变化。

This week, we'll be looking at how much has changed when it comes to how nations honor their fallen soldiers.

‘不抛弃任何一人，每个人都应得到妥善安葬’这种观念是相对较新的。

The idea of no man left behind and everyone getting a proper burial is kind of new.

从越南到华盛顿，我们审视了为致敬那些付出终极代价的人们而不断演变的努力。

From Vietnam to Washington, we look at the ever evolving efforts to pay respect to those who have paid the ultimate price.