TIVP056：Meta（META）：Meta是否再次被低估？嘉宾：丹尼尔·马赫克与肖恩·奥马利

所以我想问你，你觉得这些投资在盈利不确定性方面，是否和现实实验室相当，只是规模更大一些？

So my question for you is whether you see these investments as being on par in terms of uncertainty of profitability as reality laps, but maybe just on a bigger scale.

这就是这些AI押注的噩梦情景吗？

Is that kind of the nightmare scenario here with these AI bets?

当我思考Meta的AI努力时，第一反应就是Lauma。

I mean, when I thought about Meta's AI efforts, Lauma was the first thing that came to my mind.

它是Meta对GPT和Gemini的回应，根据某些排名，你可以说它可能是与主流模型相比的前五名之一，但很可能其价值并不高。

It's Meta's answer to both JGPT and Gemini, and depending on the ranking, you could say it's probably a top five model compared to the usual suspects, but that is just likely not worth that much.

肖恩和我每天都使用AI工具。

Sean and I use AI tools daily.

虽然我不把自己称为超级用户，但考虑到我们花在这些工具上的时间，我们可能确实算得上是，但我从未尝试过Lama。

And while I wouldn't describe myself as a super user, I think just given the sheer amount of time we spend with those tools, we probably kind of are, and not once did I try Lama.

你不会去选第四好的模型。

You you just don't go for the fourth best model.

最近，Meta最资深的AI研究员之一扬·勒孔声称，他们在基准测试中使用了不同的模型，以让模型看起来比实际更好，他还对大语言模型整体，尤其是Meta的AI努力提出了严厉批评。

And just recently, one of Meta's longest standing top AI researchers, Jan Le Koon, claimed that they used different models for the benchmarks to make the model look better than it actually is, and he was also very critical of LLMs in general and especially Meta's AI efforts.

我可能应该说，他并不是一位普通的AI科学家。

And I probably should say that he's not your average AI scientist.

他可以说是AI领域的教父级人物。

He's somewhat of the godfather of AI.

不过，你还是得对这些说法打点折扣，因为Meta在AI领域的招聘攻势，也是因为扎克伯格认为当前团队尚未达到他期望的发展轨迹，而扬·莱昆当时正是这支团队的领导者。

I guess you still have to take it all with a grain of salt, though, since Meta's hiring offensive in the AI sector was also due to Zuckerberg thinking that the current team is not yet on the trajectory that he wanted them to be on, and Jan Lecun was more or less leading that team.

所以当扎克伯格任命更年轻的亚历山大·王负责新的AI项目时，莱昆实际上被边缘化了。

So he was kind of degraded when Zuckerberg put the much younger Alexander Wang in charge of the new AI efforts.

但这只是窥见Meta及其AI部门内部持续外泄的纷争的一瞥。

But that's just kind of a peek behind the scenes at the drama that's been leaking out from Meta and their AI department.

说实话，最近几天乃至几周传出的很多新闻都显得非常个人化。

A lot of the news that came out in in both recent days and also the weeks feels very personal, to be honest.

但即便如此，据说亚历山大·王本人对目前的进展也并不完全满意，这似乎表明Meta的AI努力——更准确地说，是大语言模型和超级智能项目——尚未完全步入正轨。

But, I mean, even Alexander Wang is supposedly not entirely happy with how things are going, and it just seems as if Meta's AI efforts, or more precisely, the LLM and the superintelligence efforts, are just not fully on track.

除了Llama之外，Meta在AI应用方面实际上相当成功。

And beyond Lama, Meta's actually quite successful using AI.

可以说，它是为数不多已经从人工智能投资中获得显著回报的公司之一。

It's arguably one of the companies one of the only companies that has already seen significant returns on its AI investment.

因为其主要应用场景是所谓的注意力与分发系统，这个系统决定了Instagram上推荐的内容——哪些视频会出现在Reels中、你会看到哪些广告，等等。

Because the main use case is the so called attention and distribution machine that basically decides what gets recommended on Instagram, so what shows up in the reels, which ads you see, all of that stuff.

因此，Meta最大的人工智能产品就是其整个应用家族，通过不断优化预测用户会观看、点击、分享，最终也会购买的内容。

So the biggest AI product Meta has is the family of apps itself, getting better at predicting what people will watch, click, share, and in the end also buy.

根据Meta的说法，端到端的人工智能广告工具已经实现了每年超过600亿美元的营收规模。

And according to Meta, end to end AI powered advertising tools have achieved an annual run rate of exceeding $60,000,000,000 already.

在我们与Clay一起制作了《我们研究亿万富翁》第26期关于顶级股票的节目后，我开始更多地思考自己对Meta应用的使用，并意识到一件让我略感震惊的事。

And after we did the top stocks for twin 26 episode on We Study Billionaires with Clay, I thought more about my personal use of Meta's apps and just realized something that honestly shocked me a little.

我会稍微跑个题，但我认为这相当有趣。

I'll go on a little tangent here, but I I think it's quite interesting.

我一直对腕表情有独钟。

I always had a thing for watches.

我想这可能源于我祖父，他曾经收藏过一些手表。

I guess it's coming from my grandpa who used to have a little watch collection.

我当然不是最有知识的。

I'm certainly not the most knowledgeable.

很长一段时间里，我更看重它们的外观，而不是真正深入了解并为自己买几块手表。

And for a long time, it was more about liking the looks of them than actually getting into it and buying some watches for myself.

但当我大学刚开始赚钱时，我时不时存下一点钱，想着总有一天会遇到一款我喜欢的表并买下来。

But when I first started making some money in college, I put a bit aside here and there with the idea being that one day I might find a model that I like and I'll buy it.

作为价值投资者，我从未真正买过一块，而是把所有这些钱都投入了我的投资组合。

Being the value investor I am, I never actually bought one and instead put all of that money into my portfolio.

但在过去几个月里，我又重新对这个话题产生了兴趣，并开始研究一些款式。

But in the last couple of months, I got back into the topic and started looking at some models.

从那以后，Instagram 不断向我推送手表店的广告，一家接一家。

And since then, Instagram bombarded me with ads for watch shops, one shop after another.

我对复古手表感兴趣，也就是那些经典款式的表。

And I'm interested in in vintage watches, so classy models.

这是市场中的一个小众领域，我说的都是实话。

That's a niche part of the market, and I'm not lying.

过去几周，我的Instagram使用频率确实增加了。

My Instagram usage has literally increased in the last few weeks.

我大部分时间在Instagram上都是在浏览广告。

And most of the time I spent on Instagram was going through the ads.

是的。

Yes.

我打开Instagram，并不是为了看段子或短视频，而是专门去看他们推给我的广告。

I went on Instagram, not for the memes or the reels, but to look through ads that they've shown me.

在其他社交媒体甚至网站上，我都觉得广告是一种干扰甚至破坏用户体验的存在。

And with every other social media or even website, I feel like ads are this disruptive or worsening thing for the user experience.

但在Instagram上，我打开应用就是为了看广告，因为广告推送得太精准了，已经成了我购物体验的一部分。

On Instagram, I literally opened the app to look at the ads because the targeting was so good that it just became a part of my shopping experience.

我当时并没有意识到这一点，但当我回过神来时，感到非常震惊。

And I didn't even realize it while I was at it, but I was shocked when I thought about this.

而且我其实并不怎么使用社交媒体。

And I'm not even on social media a lot.

你知道，我从来没有用过TikTok。

As you know, I never had TikTok.

即使当我意识到自己在Instagram上花费了十分钟以上时，我也会决定出去散步，让头脑清醒一下，而不是无休止地刷屏。

And even when I realized I look at an app like Instagram for more than ten minutes, I just decide to to go outside and go for a walk to clear my head instead of doomscrolling.

而现在，我竟然打开Instagram只是为了看广告。

And now here I was opening Instagram just to look at ads.

这也展示了在Instagram上投放广告的品牌种类之多。

And it also shows you the vast range of brands that advertises on Instagram.

我的意思是，罗杰斯、百达翡丽、欧米茄，还有几十家古董店。

I mean, I'm talking Rolex, Patek Philippe, Omega, and dozens and dozens of vintage shops.

这听起来真的和Netflix很像，因为它的算法太厉害了。

It honestly sounds a lot like Netflix to me where the algorithm is so good.

人们发现自己会去Netflix，让系统推荐看什么，而只在其他流媒体平台上观看自己明确感兴趣的具体节目。

People found themselves going to Netflix to have it tell them what to watch while only going to other streaming apps for specific shows they already knew they were interested in.

这是一种非常巨大却极其微妙的优势。

And that's a really massive advantage that shows up very subtly.

而且，其他人使用Instagram或其他Meta产品，是因为他们知道其广告定向效果非常好，能够找到他们真正感兴趣的内容。

And to the extent that others go to Instagram or other meta products because they know that ad targeting is so good and they'll find things they're genuinely interested in.

我的意思是，这确实很有前景。

I mean, well, I that's very promising.

我以前从未这样想过，但我能理解你的意思。

And I'd never really thought of it that way, but I can see what you mean.

我认为人们很容易低估广告领域仍然存在的巨大发展空间。

I think it's easy to underestimate how much runway there still is in advertising alone.

正如你所说，现在似乎每个主要品牌都在Instagram上投放广告。

And as you said, it it already feels like every major brand advertises on Instagram.

当然，这种情况已经持续多年了。

And, of course, that's been true for years.

然而，尽管如此，Meta在美国和全球市场上的份额仍在持续增长。

Yet despite that, Meta continues to take share both in The US and globally.

事实上，Meta在美国内的广告市场份额增长速度，远超其他任何规模相当的公司。

And in fact, Meta has been growing its share of US advertising faster than almost any other company at its scale.

而且，除此之外，该业务还受到强大的结构性顺风推动。

And on top of that, have a very strong structural tailwind behind the business.

自2016年以来，美国广告总支出已翻了一倍多，而其中相当一部分仍停留在电视、印刷和广播等传统渠道。

Since 2016, total US ad spending has more than doubled, and a meaningful portion of that spend is still sitting in these legacy channels like TV, print, and radio.

随着这些资金持续向线上数字平台迁移，Meta 仍然是这一趋势的主要受益者之一。

As that money continues to migrate toward digital outlets online, Meta remains one of the primary beneficiaries of that trend.

当你把这两股力量——市场份额增长和整体市场的扩大——结合起来时，天啊，这根本不需要复杂推演。

And you put those two forces together, share gains and a growing overall market, and gosh, it's just not hard to underwrite.

未来多年，广告业务至少将保持两位数的增长。

Double digit growth at a minimum in the ads business for many years to come.

我唯一希望看到的是，

The only thing I

我想看到的是，其实我很喜欢这一点，因为它表明我仍然保留了一些隐私：他们也会给我推送一些我这辈子根本买不起的手表。

like to see, and I actually like it because it shows that I have still some privacy, is that they also show me watches that I could never afford in my life.

所以我想，好吧。

So I thought, okay.

幸运的是，他们对我的了解并没有那么多。

Well, fortunately, they don't know that much about me.

但为了让你对广告和不同的社交媒体应用有一些背景了解，我实际上经常使用Reddit来了解一些手表型号的背景信息，不得不说，这非常有帮助。

But just to give you some perspective probably on advertising and different social media apps, I actually used Reddit quite a bit to get some background on some of the watch models, and I must say it was very helpful.

那里的内容非常好。

The content over there was great.

但我一条相关的广告都没看到。

I didn't get a single ad though that matched the topic.

所以我不知道这是因为算法还不够好，还是因为Reddit上根本就没有这个领域的广告品牌。

So I don't know whether that's because the algorithm is not yet as good or whether there are simply no advertising brands in that space on Reddit.

我认为潜力绝对是巨大的，我敢肯定，很快我们就会看到更多品牌，尤其是中小企业在Reddit上投放广告，这显然是好事，因为Reddit是我们投资组合中的一项持仓，自从我们买入以来表现极为出色，这都是因为你做了推介，而我当时还在怀疑。

I think the potential is definitely huge, and I'm pretty sure it's probably only a matter of time before we see many more brands and especially SMBs advertise on Reddit, which is obviously good because it's one of our portfolio holdings, which performed phenomenal since we bought it because you did the pitch, and I was still doubting it.

但你告诉我，丹尼尔，相信我。

But you told me, Daniel, trust me.

这个应用上的广告会随着时间变得越来越好，我觉得这就足够了。

The ads on that app will only get better over time, and I think that will do.

我仍然觉得，对于我正在寻找的这些小众复古手表来说，这里本该比Meta做得更好。

I still feel like this should have been an even better place than Meta should have been for, especially these niche vintage watches I was looking for.

所以简而言之，我知道这有点跑题了，但Meta的广告算法确实非常出色，其中很大一部分归功于AI对其的持续优化。

So long story short, and I know this has been somewhat of a tangent, Meta's ad algorithms are just incredibly good, and a big part of that is AI improving them.

我们不能忘记，就在几年前的2021年，苹果的iOS隐私变更对Meta造成了根本性影响。

And we shouldn't forget that just a couple of years ago, in 2021, Apple's iOS privacy changes caused pretty fundamental change for Meta.

在这些变更之前，像Instagram这样的应用可以轻松追踪你在不同应用和网站上的行为；而更新之后，这些应用必须征得用户同意，显然大多数用户都拒绝了， opting in 率只有大约20%到30%。

Before those changes, apps like Instagram could just track your behavior across different apps and different websites, and after the update, these apps had to ask for consent, obviously, most users declined with opt in rates of about 20 to 30%.

这导致了广告定位效果变差，转化率下降，因此广告主也不愿再支付以前那样高的价格。

And this led to both worse targeting, but also lower conversion rates, and therefore, advertisers were unwilling to pay the same prices as before.

2022年，每条广告的平均价格下降了16%，仅仅一年后，又进一步下降了9%。

And the average price per ad in 2022 declined by 16%, and just one year later, declined it by another nine percent.

这些降幅部分也与Instagram Reels的成功有关，现在你可以在Instagram上看到这些短视频。

And in part, those decreases also had to do with the success of Instagram's Reels, which are these short videos that you can see on Instagram by now.

它们非常有效地维持了用户的参与度，从而增加了广告投放量，但其变现程度尚未达到传统信息流广告或故事广告的水平。

They've been very effective at keeping people engaged and thereby increasing ad volume, but they weren't yet monetized to the same extent as the typical in feed ads or the ads that you see in the stories.

但这种情况已经改变了。

That has changed, though.

通常，当大量新的广告库存出现时，广告价格最初会下降，因为竞拍这些广告位的竞争变得不那么激烈。

Generally, when a lot of new ad inventory opens up, ad prices will drop at first because the auctions for them are just less competitive.

但在更低的价格下，广告位对广告主来说显然更有吸引力，因此他们会迅速提高出价。

But at a lower price, the ad space is obviously even more interesting for advertisers, so they bid up prices quickly.

这就是当你看到Instagram推出新功能、增加应用内广告数量时，反复出现的循环。

And that's sort of the cycle that you see again and again when Instagram has new features, increases the amount of ads that you can show on the app.

广告业务的逆转在我们屏幕上展示的另一张图表中也非常明显，任何正在观看的人都能看出来。

The turnaround in the ads business is also very evident in another graph we're showing here on screen for anybody watching.

你看到了2022年出现个位数的下滑，主要是由广告价格下降驱动的，而2023年则迅速复苏，增长率稳定在20%以上。

You saw mid single digit declines in 2022, basically driven by lower ad pricing followed by was a pretty speedy recovery in 2023 with growth stabilizing over 20% from there.

归根结底，Instagram是变现社交媒体的黄金标准，在我看来，没有任何其他应用能像它这样高效地进行广告投放。

So at the end of the day, Instagram is the gold standard for monetizing social media and there is no other app as effective for advertising in my opinion.

最终，广告主会接受价格上涨。

Ultimately, advertisers will take price increases.

当Meta在2022年经历大幅回调时，扎克伯格正是这么做的。

That's exactly what Zuckerberg did when Meta was in this huge correction in 2022.

如果你现在把股价叠加到我们屏幕上的这张图表上，就能清楚地看到它如何跟随广告业务的增长率变化，这其实并不令人意外，因为我们都知道Reality Labs在业务中并不占重要地位，而且是一个巨大的亏损部门。

If you now layer the stock price over that chart that we have on screen, you can clearly see how it follows the growth rate of the ads business, which I don't think is too surprising since we know the Reality Labs is really not part of the business in a meaningful way and is a huge loss making machine.

但即便如此，它对总收入的影响仍然很小。

But even still, the impact on the top line is pretty minimal.

广告业务无疑是推动Meta股价的关键。

The ads business is definitely what drives Meta stock.

这很明显。

That's obvious.

我感到惊讶的是，这个看似成熟的业务依然能保持如此高的增长速率。

And I find it amazing how this seemingly mature business is still pulling in growth rates like this.

再说一遍，你提到的应用程序已经覆盖了35亿用户，而在此之前，广告位也并非没有被有效利用。

Again, you talk about apps that already reach three and a half billion people, and it's not like ad space wasn't used effectively in the years prior.

对吧？

Right?

但从长期趋势来看，广告展示量的增长正在放缓，这在某种程度上是预期之内的。

But the longer term trend of impression growth is slowing down, as you would expect at some point.

2023年全球广告展示量增长约为30%，到2024年降至最低6%，如今又回升至中个位数水平。

Worldwide impression growth in 2023 was around 30%, then dropped to as low as 6% in 2024, and is now back in the mid teens.

而这一趋势被几乎所有地区价格的显著上涨所抵消。

And this trend has been offset by significant increases in price across basically all regions.

但从长远来看，Meta似乎需要新的增长动力，才能维持至少20%以上的增长率。

But in the long run, it seems Meta would probably need some new catalyst to keep growing at least at these rates above 20%.

在未来几年，仅靠展示量和价格的提升，实现个位数中段的增长应该是可以达到的。

Low teens is likely achievable just by volume and also price increases alone in the next few years.

但如果你想维持这样的高增长率，可能还需要其他东西。

But if you wanna keep up these growth rates, you probably need something else.

根据克莱对Meta的简短推介，让我印象深刻的两个潜在增长动力是AI内容和对WhatsApp的变现。

From Clay's brief meta pitch that he made, two possible catalysts that stuck with me that could achieve us are AI content and then monetizing on WhatsApp.

许多美国人可能根本无法理解WhatsApp的规模有多大。

And so many Americans will probably not appreciate the size of WhatsApp.

我知道我本人确实没有。

I know that I certainly did not.

在我们最近几次一起去蒙大拿和葡萄牙的旅行中，当我想要联系丹尼尔时，我不得不使用WhatsApp，因为我的iMessage很可能被忽略。

And on our last few trips together to Montana and Portugal, when I wanted to reach Daniel, I had to go over to WhatsApp because there's a good chance that my iMessage would be ignored.

我这么说并不是为了讽刺。

And I don't say that to be snarky.

只是我发现，丹尼尔和许多美国以外的人并不像我们那样依赖iMessage。

It's just that Daniel and many others outside The US I've come to find just do not rely on iMessage in the same way.

他们不习惯在那里查看短信。

They're not used to checking for text there.

起初这对我来说难以想象，但我现在已经真正理解了这是一种现实。

And that was sort of unfathomable to me at first, but I've really come to appreciate that that is a reality.

在全球范围内，WhatsApp是排名第一的即时通讯应用，拥有约30亿月活跃用户。

Globally, WhatsApp is the number one messaging app with about 3,000,000,000 monthly active users.

令人难以置信的是，Meta在2014年仅以200亿美元收购了这家公司。

And incredibly, Meta bought the company for only $20,000,000,000 back in 2014.

但那时，它大约有两亿用户。

But at that time, it had about 200,000,000 users.

所以在过去十年里，它的用户基数是WhatsApp的15倍以上。

So they have more than 15 x the user base of WhatsApp over the last decade.

这简直就是最成功的投资了。

And that's the home run of all home runs right there.

而且说实话，很长一段时间里，它其实并没有赚钱。

And and so part of the truth is that for the longest time, it didn't really make money, though.

它确实为生态系统带来了好处，但要真正称得上是巨大成功，人们也会期望它能为公司带来丰厚收益。

It benefited the ecosystem, but to really call it a home run, you would expect it to make money for them as well.

那么，考虑到他们为人工智能投入的巨大资本支出。

Well, now considering the huge CapEx that they put into AI.

我想这也是Meta现在全力推动WhatsApp变现的部分原因。

And I guess that's part of why Meta is doubling down on monetizing WhatsApp now.

我的意思是，其核心消费者产品仍然基本是无广告的。

I mean, the core consumer product remains largely ad free.

变现主要来自WhatsApp商务功能，企业可以创建经过验证的企业资料，并与客户互动，将消息作为客户服务或商业渠道使用。

Monetization primarily comes from WhatsApp Business where, basically, companies can create verified business profiles and then interact with customers and use messaging as a customer support or commerce channel.

更大的企业会向Meta支付消息API费用，我们说的是交易类消息，比如订单确认、发货更新和客户服务互动。

Then larger businesses pay Meta for messaging APIs, so we're talking transactional messages like order confirmations, shipping updates, customer service interactions.

目前这带来了大约100亿美元的收入，占WhatsApp当前总收入150亿美元的三分之二左右。

And this currently brings in about $10,000,000,000 in revenue, which is about two thirds from the overall 15,000,000,000 that WhatsApp's currently generating.

我觉得很多人对WhatsApp的使用体验会非常不同。

I feel like many people will have very different experiences with WhatsApp.

我知道你说过，WhatsApp对你来说是个充斥着陌生人消息的垃圾应用，我想对许多美国人来说也是如此。

I know you said WhatsApp is pretty scammy app for you with messages from people that you don't know, and I guess it's like that for many Americans.

那里有更多人使用iPhone，所以使用iMessage更有意义。

Way more people have iPhones there, so using iMessage just makes a lot more sense.

对我个人而言，情况正好相反。

For me personally, it's the other way around.

正如你所说，iMessage也常常充斥着垃圾信息，而且我可能会错过那里的消息，正如你提到的，对此我深感抱歉。

As you just said, iMessage tends to be pretty scammy, and I might miss messages there, as you said, which I'm very sorry for.

而WhatsApp界面非常简洁安全，我想这也是为什么我对一些人所看好的WhatsApp巨大增长前景感到有些犹豫。

While WhatsApp is just very clean and safe, and I guess that's also why I was a bit hesitant about the huge growth prospects that some people saw on WhatsApp.

我不希望在WhatsApp上被用于工作事务或被公司联系。

I don't wanna be reached on WhatsApp for professional things or by companies.

对我来说，WhatsApp是我与朋友和家人发消息的原因。

For me, WhatsApp is why I text with friends and with family.

当我等待包裹时，收到的消息可以发到iMessage上。

And when I'm waiting for a package, the message that arrived can go to iMessage.

当我完成订单时，通知消息可以——我不知道——发到我的邮箱，但我不希望这些消息出现在WhatsApp里？

And when I complete an order, the message can, I don't know, go to my email, but I don't want those messages in WhatsApp?

好的。

Okay.

我认为可以说，我今天确实学到了不少东西，尤其是关于其他人如何看待iMessage和WhatsApp。

Think it's safe to say I'm definitely learning a few things today, especially about how other people think about iMessage and and WhatsApp.

确实很有趣，两个使用相同产品、iPhone以及苹果设备生态系统的用户，竟然会对如此基础的应用产生如此截然不同的使用认知。

And, yeah, it's just fascinating that two people using the same product with the iPhone and and product ecosystem with Apple devices generally can land on such totally different perceptions of how to interact with pretty fundamental apps.

对吧？

Right?

所以我不确定。

And so I don't know.

我认为，对于那些不使用这款应用的美国人来说，仅凭数据就能看到巨大的潜力。

I think it should be easy though for Americans who don't use the app to see huge potential just on the numbers alone.

我们在这个节目中经常谈到拥有不同视角的好处，尤其是不同的消费者视角。

We talk about the benefit of having different perspectives a lot on the show, especially having different consumer perspectives.

我们生活在不同的国家，我认为在这种情况下，这些不同的视角有助于我们更好地理解Meta。

We live in different countries, and I think this is a situation where those different perspectives helps us a lot in understanding Meta.

几周前我们谈到Snapchat时，曾提到它的广告投放有多糟糕，以及它如何严重损害了用户体验。

And when we talked about Snapchat a few weeks ago, we mentioned how terrible the ad placement was and how it made the user experience so much worse.

所以，丹尼尔，我想问你的是，你认为WhatsApp也会发生类似的情况吗？

And so I guess my question for you, Daniel, is do you think something similar could happen to WhatsApp?

当他们试图实现盈利时，会不会破坏像你这样的人与WhatsApp之间的关系，改变他们对它的认知，甚至促使人们回归iMessage或其他第三方平台？

As they try to monetize it, are they gonna actually damage the relationship that folks like yourself have with WhatsApp and how they perceive it and maybe push people back to iMessage or some other third party platform?

我希望他们不会。

I hope they don't.

我真的希望他们不会。

I really hope they don't.

但你知道，Snapchat的广告是在聊天板块里的。

But, I mean, Snapchat's ads, they're in the chat section.

在我看来，这简直是糟糕的用户体验。

And in my opinion, they're just a terrible user experience.

对我来说，当私人聊天之间突然弹出广告时，感觉就像严重侵犯了隐私。

To me, it feels like just this massive invasion of privacy when there's a random ad popping up between private chats.

我从来不想点开这些广告，但通知实在太烦人了，有时候你不得不点开。

And I never wanted to open them, but the notification was so annoying that sometimes you just have to open them anyway.

根据WhatsApp的说法，他们不会在聊天板块投放广告，而聊天板块当然是这款应用最重要的部分。

And according to WhatsApp, they won't place ads in the chat section, which is the most important part of the app, of course.

所以，他们改在状态板块投放广告，对于不了解WhatsApp运作方式的人来说，WhatsApp状态本质上相当于Instagram的动态。

So instead, they will be in the status section, and for anyone who doesn't know how WhatsApp functions, WhatsApp status is essentially the equivalent of Instagram story.

所以我们说的是那些在24小时后消失的短暂照片和视频更新。

So we're talking short lived photo and video updates that disappear after twenty four hours.

实际上，这个功能也没那么久远。

Actually, this feature is not even that old.

它只是几年前才推出的。

It was only introduced a couple of years ago.

但对我来说，直觉上这并不像是一个特别强大的广告位，因为至少从我个人的观察来看，我不认识多少40岁以下的人使用WhatsApp状态功能。

And intuitively, to me, this doesn't feel like a particularly powerful ad surface though, because at least anecdotally, I don't know many people under the age of 40 who use WhatsApp status.

然而，看看报告的数据，它在欧洲和美国以外的国际市场可能要大得多，因为Meta声称WhatsApp状态每天有大约15亿活跃用户，并称其为全球观看量最大的故事类产品。

Then again, looking at the reported numbers, it might be a much bigger thing in international markets outside of Europe and outside of The US, because Meta claims that WhatsApp status has roughly 1,500,000,000 daily active users and describes it as the most viewed story product in the world.

如果这是准确的，那么我的结论是，状态功能在新兴市场显然更为重要，在这些地方，WhatsApp不仅仅是一个聊天应用，更可能成为主要的社交沟通平台。

And if that is accurate, then my takeaway is that status has to be far more relevant in emerging markets where WhatsApp is not just a messaging app, but probably more like the primary social communication platform.

这当然对覆盖范围有利，但也意味着你从这些广告中获得的大部分曝光量将来自ARPU（每用户平均收入）显著较低的地区。

And that's obviously great for reach, but it would also mean that the majority of impressions that you can get from these ads will come from regions with significantly lower ARPU or average revenue per user.

在印度、巴西或东南亚大部分地区，广告曝光的变现能力与在美国或西欧地区根本无法相提并论。

Ad impressions in India, Brazil, or large parts of Southeast Asia, they simply don't monetize the same way as they would in The US or Western Europe.

另一种通过WhatsApp变现广告的方式是所谓的‘点击发送消息’广告格式，目前这是Meta增长最快的广告格式之一。

And another way to monetize ads via WhatsApp is the so called click to message ad format, and these are currently one of Meta's fastest growing ad formats.

同样地，我之前其实并不了解这个功能，因为我并不使用Facebook，而这些横幅广告大多出现在那里，而且我认为这又是一个主要在国际市场上流行的特性。

And once again, I didn't really know about this feature before because I'm not on Facebook where most of these banners are, and also because it's, I think, more of an international thing, once again.

它的运作方式是，你可能会在Facebook上浏览，然后看到一个你喜欢的产品广告，广告上会有一个小按钮，写着‘好吧’。

The way it works is that you might go through Facebook, for example, then you see an ad for a product that you like, and then there's a little button that says, okay.

在WhatsApp上给我发消息吧。

Well, message me on WhatsApp.

如果你点击了，就可以在WhatsApp上与商家交谈，询问更多问题，从而可能促成交易。

And then if you do that, you can talk to the people in the shop on WhatsApp to just ask more questions, and potentially, that leads to a sale.

实际上，在我做关于Meta的研究时，我正在使用Instagram，也看到了带有这种按钮的广告。

And, actually, while I did my, let's say, research on Meta, I was on Instagram, and I saw an ad where I also saw such a button.

虽然不是直接针对WhatsApp，但它是针对Messenger的。

It wasn't for WhatsApp directly, but it was for Messenger.

所以显然，这种功能现在已经不仅限于国际市场，也进入了欧洲。

So apparently, they're not only in international markets, but also in Europe by now.

嗯，根据你刚才说的关于WhatsApp的盈利策略，以及他们目前还处于广告业务的早期阶段，一个合理的估计可能是每用户平均收入1.5美元。

Well, just based on what you've told me about WhatsApp's monetization strategy and the fact that they are sort of in the early innings of doing ads, probably a reasonable estimate would be maybe a dollar 50 in ARPU.

我认为，如果把这种‘点击发送消息’的功能也算进去，收入可能会翻倍，但目前Meta还没有公布太多相关细节，而且这部分流量并不是来自原本就在WhatsApp上活跃的用户。

I think it would probably be about double that if you include this click to message part, but I don't think there are many details available on that yet from Meta and it's not really traffic that is monetized from users who started on WhatsApp.

所以这取决于你是否想把这部分收入算作WhatsApp的收入，还是Facebook的收入，这就涉及到一些会计上的细节和复杂问题了。

So it it depends on if you wanna count that as revenue from WhatsApp or revenue from Facebook, and that's where you get into some kind of the accounting weeds and nitty gritty.

但如果你把1.5美元乘以30亿用户，那差不多就是45亿美元的收入。

But if you take that 1.5 multiply it by 3,000,000,000 users, you are talking about $4,500,000,000 in revenue essentially.

但对Meta来说，这其实算不上什么大数目，听起来有点不可思议，但我们要记住，这是一家市值1.5万亿美元的公司。

And that's actually not a lot for Meta, which seems kind of crazy to say, but we are talking about a 1,500,000,000,000 company here just as a reminder.

所以，这些都只是估算，也许WhatsApp上的广告表现会比这好得多。

So again, these are all estimates and maybe ads will be significantly more successful than that on WhatsApp.

我认为可以合理地说，我们并不期待这项盈利努力能带来惊人的成果。

I think it's fair to say that we don't expect wonders coming from this monetization effort.

它或许能小幅提升并推动业务增长，但绝不会像扎克伯格希望Reality Labs那样带来革命性的改变。

It may incrementally improve and drive the business on the margins, but this is not gonna be totally revolutionary in the way that Mark Zuckerberg hopes that Reality Labs will be.

我认为WhatsApp的盈利模式更有趣的地方在于企业消息服务。

Where I think WhatsApp monetization becomes more interesting is business messaging.

Meta一直明确表示，它将WhatsApp视为一个企业通信平台，而非广告产品。

And Meta has been very clear that it sees WhatsApp less as an ad product and more as a business communication platform.

如今，新兴市场数以百万计的企业已经将WhatsApp作为与客户互动的主要方式之一，用于客户服务、订单确认、配送更新以及各种基本咨询。

Today, millions of businesses in emerging markets already use WhatsApp as one of their primary ways to interact with customers for support, order confirmations, delivery updates, and just any kind of basic inquiries.

即使丹尼尔更希望这些消息能发到他的iMessage上，但大型企业仍会向Meta支付费用，以获取WhatsApp的消息API，尤其是用于交易类消息。

Even if Daniel would prefer those messages go to his iMessage, But larger businesses pay Meta for access to WhatsApp's messaging APIs, especially for transactional messages.

作为参考，这部分收入目前约占WhatsApp 150亿美元总收入的三分之二。

And for context, this is about two thirds of WhatsApp's $15,000,000,000 in revenue right now.

从长远来看，Meta的愿景是将WhatsApp打造成一个全球性的客户互动平台，你可以这样理解。

And the long term vision is to turn WhatsApp into kind of a global customer interaction layer is maybe how you'd think of it.

因此，企业可以付费向用户发送消息、管理客户关系、开展对话式电商，并越来越多地使用AI辅助系统大规模响应客户。

And so businesses could pay to message users, manage customer relationships, run this conversational commerce, and increasingly use AI powered assistance to respond to customers at scale.

在这种模式下，从企业角度来看，WhatsApp开始更像是一个嵌入在全球最大消费者通讯应用中的客户关系管理（CRM）或客户服务渠道。

And in that model, WhatsApp starts to look more like a CRM or customer service channel from the business's perspective embedded directly into the world's largest consumer messaging app.

如果这个模式成功，其经济收益可能会非常可观。

If that works, the economics could be very attractive.

也就是说，企业消息的收入通常是持续性的、用户粘性高、利润率更高，而且比广告业务受经济周期影响更小。

Mean, the business messaging revenue is typically recurring, relatively sticky, higher margin, and less cyclical than advertising.

考虑到WhatsApp的规模，即使每笔企业互动的变现金额很小，长期来看也可能带来数百亿美元的收入。

And given WhatsApp's scale, even modest monetization per business interaction could translate into tens of billions of dollars over time.

这或许正是利用我们观众的好时机。如果你来自巴西、印度或其他国际市场，请随时在评论区告诉我们你是如何使用WhatsApp的。

This might actually be a good time to to try and utilize, I would say, our audience because if you're from international markets like Brazil, India, or elsewhere, just feel free to leave a comment and tell us how you use WhatsApp.

我认为这会是非常有价值的见解。

I think that would be a very valuable insight.

因为如果有一件事是我学到的，那就是WhatsApp作为一款全球性应用，在不同国家和文化中的使用方式截然不同。

Because if there's one thing I learned, is that WhatsApp is, because it's a global app, used completely differently by so many different countries and and cultures, basically.

我询问了我们内在价值社区中的国际成员，他们是如何使用WhatsApp的，以及在他们的国家有哪些趋势，这让我对WhatsApp的变现潜力有了全新的认识。

I asked international members in our intrinsic value community how they use WhatsApp and what the trends are in their home countries, basically, and this gave me a whole new appreciation for the monetization possibilities of WhatsApp.

事实证明，WhatsApp商业服务在印度已经非常庞大，在拉丁美洲也正在兴起。

It turns out that WhatsApp business is already a huge thing in India, up and coming in Latin America.

甚至在欧洲的一些地区，你已经能看到企业这样做了。

And even in some parts of Europe, you already see businesses doing that.

而这里一个巨大的因素，不出所料，又是人工智能。

And a huge factor here, surprise surprise, is AI once again.

我认为我天真地只从自己的消费者行为出发，来证明 WhatsApp 商业版在这里欧洲还未成气候。

And I think I naively focus on on just my consumer behavior to justify WhatsApp business is not yet a big thing here in Europe.

我以为这只是因为 WhatsApp，正如我所说，主要用于和朋友家人聊天，用户不希望它和商业、购物等内容混在一起。

I thought it was just because WhatsApp is, again, as I said, used to talk with friends and family, and users don't want it to be mixed up with business, shopping, or whatever.

我的意思是，我只是基于个人经验而已。

I mean, I just know it from my personal experience.

当我旅行时使用 WhatsApp 商业版，我非常讨厌那些企业账户把我和他人私人的聊天记录都遮住了，我几乎都忘了它们，因为所有这些商业聊天都挡在前面。

When I was traveling somewhere and I used WhatsApp Business, I just hated the fact that it had all these business accounts hiding the chats that I personally have with other people, and I basically forget about them because I have all these business chats in front of them.

我不喜欢这样，但可能对大多数人来说并非如此。

I just didn't like it, but probably that's not the case for most people.

我的意思是，正如我们的一位成员指出的，真正的原因很可能更可能是劳动力成本。

I mean, as one of our members pointed out, the actual reason is probably more likely to be labor costs.

因此，欧洲人并不太了解这个功能，是因为大多数WhatsApp商业用户都是中小型企业，他们不得不雇人来专门回复这些消息。

So the fact that people in Europe don't really know that feature is since most WhatsApp Business customers are small and medium businesses, so they have to pay someone who is essentially just answering these messages.

在劳动力成本较低的国家，你可以这么做，但在劳动力成本高的国家，这并不划算。

And you can do that in countries with low labor costs, but it doesn't really make sense in countries with high labor costs.

因此，这可能是AI的另一个应用场景：如果你部署AI聊天机器人来处理这些对话，就有可能打开整个欧洲市场，而这也为WhatsApp商业带来了更高的利润率。

So that would probably be yet another use case for AI because if you implement AI chatbots to handle these conversations, you could potentially open up the entire European market, which also offers much higher margins for for WhatsApp business.

一些分析师——可能是那些更乐观的分析师——认为，这至少是一个每年1000亿美元的商机。

So some analysts, probably the ones on the more bullish side, say that this is at least a $100,000,000,000 annual opportunity.

我可能更倾向于观望，但谁知道呢？

I'm probably more in the camp of wait and see, but who knows?

我的意思是，经过十多年后，也许Meta终于找到了如何将WhatsApp变现的方法。

I mean, after more than a decade, perhaps Meta has finally figured out how to monetize WhatsApp.

我仍然想说的是，我不确定过去十年里，他们只是不想变现WhatsApp，因为这话题被反复讨论过很多次，但他们始终没能成功实现变现。

The one thing I would still say is I'm not really certain that for the last decade, they just didn't want to monetize WhatsApp because it has been a topic for many, many times, and they just didn't end up actually at least successfully monetizing it.

所以，我不确定这究竟是因为他们根本不想变现，还是只是没能如愿以偿地实现。

So I'm not really certain if it's about they never wanted to or just never really worked out the way they hoped.

好的。

Okay.

我认为我们已经涵盖了Meta面临的各种可能性，也就是那些能带来潜在上行空间的业务，包括现实实验室和WhatsApp，这些都超越了核心广告业务。

I think we covered the different call options that you see for Meta, know, the things that provide potential optionality to the upside, including Reality Labs and WhatsApp beyond this kind of core advertising business.

而支持这些可能性需要不同程度的成本投入。

And there are varying degrees of cost to support that optionality.

这可能是我对现实实验室最乐观的评价了。

And that's probably the most generous way I can put it, at least for Reality Labs.

但不如我们转而谈谈核心应用家族——Facebook和Instagram，以及AI如何影响了它们的最新数据？

But how about we go ahead and talk about the core family of apps, Facebook, Instagram, and how AI has impacted the latest numbers there?

考虑到用户数量，未来用户增长似乎不太可能成为这里的主要驱动力。

And given the user count, it seems unlikely that user growth will be a major driver of future growth here.

增长正在放缓，而如今活跃用户已经超过35亿，很难想象还有多少扩张空间，但你依然能看到巨大的营收增长潜力。

Growth is slowing and at over 3,500,000,000 active users today, it is kind of just hard to imagine how much room there could be left to expand into, and yet you still see room for incredible top line growth.

上个季度，Meta通过增加广告展示次数和提高广告展示价格的组合方式，使整体广告业务增长了26%。

In the last quarter, Meta grew the overall ads business by 26% through a mix of increasing ad impressions and raising prices for those impressions.

以这样的速度，Meta在未来几年内超越谷歌搜索业务，成为全球最大的广告业务，这并不令人意外。

At these rates, it's not unlikely that Meta will surpass Google search business within the next few years as being the biggest advertising business on earth.

这太惊人了。

It's incredible.

Meta能够在这场变革中保持其应用的相关性，并持续提升变现能力，真是不可思议，而这一点很容易被忽视——但事实上，该股票在2022年因多种因素下跌了。

It's just incredible how Meta has managed to keep its apps relevant through all the change and just keep improving monetization, and I think it's very easy to miss, but the stock went down in 2022 due to many factors.

是的。

Yes.

回头看，这无疑是过去七年中最佳的买入机会之一，但当时确实有充分的理由认为Meta的时代已经过去了。

In hindsight, it was one of the best buying opportunities in a max seven stock ever, but there was a good argument to make that Meta's time has has come.

如今，TikTok和Instagram共存对我们来说再正常不过了，但当时这一趋势看起来相当显著。

I mean, today, it's normal for us that TikTok and Instagram just coexist, but that was one of the threads that seemed pretty, pretty substantial at the time.

在我们与克莱的对话中，他提到Reels已经成长为一项500亿美元的业务，考虑到它仅在2020年底推出，这简直太出色了。

And in our episode with Clay, he mentioned that Reels has become a $50,000,000,000 business, which is outstanding considering it was only introduced in late twenty twenty.

这正是让我震惊不已的事实之一。

It was one of the facts that just blew me out of the water.

我之前没意识到它已经发展得这么庞大了，而Reels在增加用户在Instagram上的停留时间方面表现得非常出色，几乎完全抵消了TikTok的威胁。

I wasn't aware of how big of a business it already is, and Reels has just done an incredible job of increasing users' time spent on Instagram and has essentially fought off the TikTok thread at all.

用户在应用上花费的时间越多，Meta就能展示越多广告。

And the more time users spend on the app, the more ads Meta can show.

如果Instagram Reels在大约四年的时间里产生了约500亿美元的年经常性收入，那么它显然在这段时间内推动了大部分收入增长。

And if Instagram Reels has generated about $50,000,000,000 in ARR and has been around for about four years, it was apparently responsible for the majority of top line growth in that time period.

我这么说并不是意味着这是坏事。

And I don't say that as necessarily a bad thing.

这只是意味着，当这个功能趋于成熟时——我认为很快就会到来——增长可能就需要来自其他地方。

It just means that when this feature reaches maturity, which I think it will soon, then growth would probably need to come from somewhere else.

而且，如果你希望保持超过20%的增长速度，那么这个‘其他地方’很可能就是我们之前在这档播客中讨论过的某个选项。

And at least if you want to keep growing faster than 20%, that somewhere else is likely to be one of the options that we have discussed earlier in this podcast.

我认为这是Meta投资逻辑的核心部分，因为以当前的价格，你并不需要20%的增长率就能获得对Meta的良好回报。

And I think this is a main part of the Meta thesis because at today's prices, you don't need 20% growth to make a good return on Meta.

它目前的估值相对于谷歌、苹果和亚马逊有显著折价，同时却实现了最高的增长率，尤其是在最近几个季度。

It's trading at a significant discount to Google, Apple, and Amazon while delivering the best growth rates, especially in recent quarters.

因此，Meta将继续成为企业广告的最佳平台，而且是全球范围内的。

So Meta will keep being the best place for companies to advertise, and that's globally.

尽管广告市场波动不定，可能会有某些年份表现较弱，但更多内容、更多广告展示次数以及价格上涨等因素，足以推动收入实现至少两位数的增长，即使没有WhatsApp或AI等其他业务的额外贡献。

So while the ad market is volatile and there might be some weaker years here and there, the mix of more content and more impressions and just the price increases should, without a problem, lead to at least double digit revenue growth even without any of the call up ups such as WhatsApp or AI exceeding.

这基本上就是这项投资如此具有吸引力的原因，尽管我们在本期节目中几乎贬低了所有其他潜在增长选项。

And that's basically what makes this investment so attractive despite us basically badmouthing most of the call options on today's episode.

在讨论估值之前，我还想谈两件事。

Before we get to the valuation, there are two things I still wanna talk about.

一是通过AI增加的内容，以及Meta整体的资本支出和AI投资。

The increase in content through AI and Meta's overall CapEx expenses and AI investments.

当我推荐Adobe时，我曾认为AI会成为Adobe的利好因素，因为整体内容创作量会增加。

Back when I pitched Adobe, I argued that AI would be a tailwind for Adobe due to the overall increase in content creation in aggregate.

类似的动态也适用于Meta。

A similar dynamic applies to meta.

AI显著降低了内容创作的门槛。

AI meaningfully lowers the bar to creating content.

当内容创作变得更简单时，Instagram 和 Facebook 上发布的内容会更多。

And when content creation becomes easier, more content will be posted on Instagram and Facebook.

更多内容增加了可用于训练和优化推荐系统的数据量，从而提升 Instagram、Facebook 和 Reels 上的用户参与度和使用时长。

And more content increases the amount of data available to train and refine their recommendation systems, which can improve engagement and time spent across Instagram, Facebook, and Reels.

更高的参与度扩大了广告库存，并提高了变现效率。

Higher engagement then expands available ad inventory and improves monetization efficiency.

因此，Meta 主要通过这些间接效应来实现 AI 的变现，而不是通过打造最优秀的 AI 模型并从中获利。

So Meta primarily monetizes AI through these second order effects rather than by building the best AI model and making money off of it.

那么问题来了，这种增量收入能带来多少？是否足以证明 Meta 目前在 AI 上的巨大投入是合理的。

The question then is how much incremental revenue this can generate, whether it justifies the huge investments Meta is currently making in AI.

是的。

Yeah.

我不想扫大家的兴，但很遗憾，我认为没人能给出这个答案。

I don't want to I don't want to dampen the mood here, but, unfortunately, I don't think anyone has that answer.

我的意思是，也许我们首先应该澄清一下。

I mean, perhaps we should first clarify.

再次强调，马克·扎克伯格是一位多么杰出的首席执行官和资本配置者。

Once again, what an outstanding CEO and also capital allocator, Mark Zuckerberg is.

我觉得，由于元宇宙的失败以及他固执地将才华倾注于现实实验室，这一点有时被忽视了。

I feel like that gets ignored sometimes due to the metaverse disaster and his also stubbornness and pouring brilliance into reality labs.

但Meta成立于2004年，至今只有二十一年。

But Meta was founded in 2004, which is only twenty one years ago.

因此，它远比苹果、微软、亚马逊甚至Alphabet这些同行年轻。

So it's by far the youngest among peers like Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon, and and even Alphabet.

它是唯一一家在不到二十年内实现接近一千亿美元毛利润的公司。

It was the only company that reached close to a $100,000,000,000 in gross profit in less than twenty years.

准确地说，是十七年。

17 to be precise.

而且它也是唯一一家在这一时期内实现近五千亿美元运营利润的公司。

And it was also the only company that reached almost $50,000,000,000 in operating profit in that timeframe.

所以扎克伯格确实懂得如何在不花太多钱的情况下扩大业务规模。

So Zuckerberg definitely knows how to scale a business without spending a lot of money.

问题是，这种能力似乎在过去几年里消失了。

The problem is that it seems that this skill has disappeared in the last few years.

我的意思是，Meta 一直都有资本支出周期。

I mean, Meta has always had CapEx cycles.

第一个重大周期是在2010年代初，它必须适应移动优先的新世界，然后当内容从文字转向图片和视频时，又经历了一次。

The first major one was when it had to adjust to the new mobile first world in the early twenty tens, and then another one when the content moved from text to photo and video.

这需要更多的计算能力，因此Meta建设基础设施的成本变得更高。

And that took more computing power, so it became more expensive for Meta to build out that infrastructure.

但通常情况下，随着收入增长加速，资本支出下降，资本支出占收入的百分比会迅速降低。

Usually, though, CapEx as a percentage of revenue came down quickly as both revenue growth accelerated and then CapEx declined.

但这种情况已经改变了。

And that has changed.

由于元宇宙计划和Reality Labs，除了我们之前提到的原因外，2022年市场恐慌还源于收入下滑和资本支出增加的双重影响。

With the metaverse efforts and Reality Labs, beyond the reasons we mentioned earlier, the market panic in 2022 was also driven by a combination of revenue decline and higher CapEx.

自那以后，收入增长再次显著加速，老实说，但资本支出的增长甚至更快。

And since then, revenue growth has accelerated again significantly, honestly, but CapEx growth has been even faster.

它再次放缓了。

It hasn't slowed down again.

随着在人工智能领域的大量投资，Meta作为高利润率、尤其是资本密集度低的公司时代，可能在未来几年内不复存在。

And with significant investments in AI, the times in which Meta is a high margin and especially a capital light company might be over for at least a couple of years still.

可以说，Meta最近在挖角竞争对手人才和进行重大收购方面引起了相当惊人的关注。

It's safe to say that Meta has made some pretty insane headlines recently trying to poach talent from competitors and making just some big acquisitions in the space.

我们说的是高达3亿美元的薪酬包，用于吸引全球顶尖的AI研究人员；140亿美元投资名为Scale AI的公司；以及最近Meta斥资20亿美元收购了中国初创公司Manus。

We're talking about pay packages of up to $300,000,000 for the world's best AI researchers, a $14,000,000,000 investment in a company called Scale AI, and just recently, Meta spent $2,000,000,000 to acquire the Chinese startup Manus.

Manus其实相当有趣。

Manus is actually pretty interesting.

我的意思是，像JGPT和Gemini这样的工具，主要是通用型辅助工具。

I mean, tools like JGPT and Gemini, they are primarily general purpose assistance.

你向它们提问，它们生成回答，或许帮你写点东西或推理解决问题，但基本就这些了。

So you ask them a question, they generate an answer, and maybe help you write something or reason through a problem, but that's mostly it.

它们是被动型的，正如你所说的。

They are reactive, as you might say.

当涉及到让他们为你完成任何任务时，他们大多数时候都做得非常糟糕。

And if it comes to them doing any kind of task for you, they honestly do a terrible job most of the time.

如果你跟他们说，嘿。

If you tell them, hey.

你能帮我处理这个Excel表格吗？

Could you work in this Excel sheet for me?

他们会搞砸的。

They'll mess it up.

相比之下，Manners 的设计核心是让AI代理真正端到端地执行任务。

Manners, by contrast, is built around the idea of basically having AI agents that actually execute tasks end to end.

因此，代理不只是用文字回应，而是能将任务分解为多个步骤，然后使用工具、提取数据、运行流程，并不断迭代以达成目标。

So instead of just responding with the text, a agent can break a task into different steps, then use tools, pull data, run processes, and iterate toward an outcome.

例如，与其解释如何分析数据，一个Manus风格的代理可能会直接运行分析、更新文档，或触发后续问题。

So, for example, instead of explaining how to analyze data, a Manas style agent might actually run the analysis, update a document, or trigger follow-up questions.

因此，对于Manners来说，这种区别很重要，因为像Manners这样的代理能自然地融入商业消息、客户支持，以及WhatsApp或Instagram上的各种内部工作流程——这些场景的目标不仅仅是回答问题，而是真正解决问题。

So the difference matters for Manners because agents like Manners fit pretty naturally into business messaging and then also customer support and all these internal workflows on WhatsApp or Instagram where the goal isn't just to answer questions but to actually resolve issues.

因此，能够完成交易并大规模处理对话。

So complete transactions and handle conversations at scale.

从这个角度看，Manus 在某种程度上补充了 Meta 的 AI 战略，它不太关注对话质量，而更注重任务完成，这才是我能直接创造经济价值的地方。

And in that sense, Manus kind of complements Meta's AI strategy by focusing less on conversation quality and then more on task completion, which is where I can directly create economic value.

我实际试用过，不得不说它思考的时间相当长。

I've actually given it a try, and I must say it's thinking for a long time.

如果你给它一个任务，它大概需要十到十五分钟。

If you give it in a task, it will take about ten to fifteen minutes.

而结果的好坏，取决于你的提示词质量，通常效果还不错。

And depending on how good your prompt was, the results are pretty good.

我还不确定是否仍会说，你能明显看出一个代理在进行深度思考并解决问题。

I don't know yet if I would still say that you see that an agent is critically thinking and then resolving a problem.

它现在的思考过程，仍然和 Gemini 或 CHAPT 差不多。

It still feels like the thinking process is similar to what Gemini or CHAPT do as well.

但它更适合用来分配实际任务，比如把内容生成为 PDF，而 CHIPT 在这方面并不擅长。

It's just better for giving it an actual task and then, for example, say, put this into a PDF, which is something that CHIPT is not very good at.

现在回到投资方面的问题。

Now getting back to the investment side of things.

资本支出与折旧的比率有助于解释一家公司处于投资周期的哪个阶段。

The CapEx to depreciation ratio helps explain where we are in the investment cycle of a company.

因此，当资本支出明显远高于折旧时，这表明资产规模仍在快速扩张，而由此带来的折旧影响尚未完全显现。

So when CapEx runs well above depreciation, which it clearly does now, it tells you that the asset base is still expanding rapidly, and the depreciation hit from this build out hasn't yet fully arrived.

这一点很重要，因为它意味着当前的利润仍受益于一定程度的时间滞后。

And that's important because it means current earnings are still benefiting from somewhat of a time lag.

因此，在未来几年，折旧占收入的百分比将上升，我们已经能看到这一趋势，至少在一定程度上是这样，因为目前这一比例正缓慢上升至9%至10%的区间。

So over the next few years, depreciation as a percentage of revenue will go up, and we can see that already, least to some extent, because it's currently creeping up to the range of, like, nine to 10%.

这就是当前AI支出在会计上的体现，未来几年这一支出可能还会继续增加。

So that's the accounting manifestation of today's AI spending, which will probably only increase in the years ahead.

你也能从投资回报率中看到资本密集度。

You also see the capital intensity in ROIC.

当Meta在AI数据中心、服务器和基础设施上大量投入时，这些成本并不会一次性计入损益表。

When Meta spends heavily on AI data centers, servers, and infrastructure, those costs don't hit the income statement all at once.

相反，这些成本会被资本化为资产负债表上的固定资产。

Instead, they are capitalized on the balance sheet as property and equipment.

这实际上立即增加了ROIC公式中的分母。

That effectively immediately increases the denominator of the ROIC equation.

因此，这些投资带来的好处——更好的广告定位、更高的用户参与度、新的AI驱动产品——需要一段时间才能反映在营业利润中。

So meanwhile, the benefits of those investments, better ad targeting, higher engagement, new AI driven products, those will take time to show up in operating income.

因此，在一段时间内，你将看到投资资本急剧上升，而利润却滞后，这会导致ROIC下降。

So for a period, you have a sharp rise in invested capital while profits comes at a lag, which serves to lower ROIC.

要让ROIC恢复到之前较高的水平，必须发生两件事。

And to get ROIC back to earlier higher levels, two things have to happen.

首先，利用率必须提高。

First, utilization has to rise.

AI基础设施需要更密集地使用，从而在不需要同样速度的新资本支出的情况下，推动额外的收入和营业利润。

The AI infrastructure needs to be used more intensively so that it drives incremental revenue and operating profit without requiring the same pace of new capital spending.

其次，投资周期必须趋于成熟。

Then secondly, the investment cycle has to mature.

资本支出需要接近折旧水平，这意味着Meta不再那么积极地扩张其资产规模。

CapEx needs to fall closer to depreciation, meaning Meta is no longer expanding its asset base as aggressively.

当营业利润的增长快于投资资本时，无论是由于利润率提升，还是收入在相对固定的基础设施上增长，ROIC都会自然恢复。

And when operating income goes faster than invested capital, either because margins improve or revenue scales on a relatively fixed infrastructure, ROIC then naturally recovers.

简而言之，当前较低的ROIC（投资资本回报率）——这是我们与每家公司讨论时都非常看重的指标——反映的是前期投入与延迟回报之间的时间错配。

So in short, today's lower ROIC, returns on invested capital, a very important metric we like to discuss with every company we recover, reflects a timing mismatch between upfront investment and delayed returns.

回归正轨的关键在于Meta必须证明这些回报确实能大规模实现。

The path back depends on Meta proving that those returns actually materialize at scale.

但关于ROIC我们就聊到这里。

But that's enough ROIC.

我们来谈谈估值。

Let's talk about valuation.

我认为今天需要厘清的主要问题是：在当前股价下，这笔资本支出是对股东的威胁，还是Meta股价如此低廉，以至于其强大的广告业务足以带来优异回报，无论未来几年我们看到多少资本继续投入AI资本支出和现实实验室？

I think the main thing to figure out today is whether this CapEx spending is a threat to shareholders at these prices or whether Meta is so cheap that its strong ad business is enough to deliver a great return really regardless of the capital intensity that we end up seeing over the next few years continuing to flow into AI CapEx and Reality Labs.

研究美国大型科技股的一个好处是，市场上已经有很多现成的研究报告。

The good thing about covering one of the American mega caps is there's a lot of research on them out there already.

如果你研究的是像Chapters Group这样的公司，那就完全不一样了，我几周前就做过这样的分析。

It's totally different if you cover a company like Chapters Group, which I did a couple of weeks ago.

如果是这种情况，你已经有大量的研究资料了。

And if that's the case, you have a lot of research already.

你可以参考其他分析师的许多模型。

You can look at many models from other analysts.

我通常的做法是，看看这些模型，尤其是几年前的那些，然后将它们与实际情况进行对比。

What I like to do then is that I look at those models, especially the ones from a couple of years ago, and then compare them to how things actually played out.

有趣的是，尤其是MetaBalls在2022年，它们对Meta的估值偏低判断完全正确，但大多数却在投资和资本支出上严重误判。

What's interesting is that, especially MetaBalls in 2022, have been completely right about its undervaluation, and yet most of them have been massively wrong about investments and CapEx.

许多人预期Meta的资本支出会大幅下降，使其重新成为一家轻资产的现金机器。

Many expected them to come down significantly and for Meta to basically return to becoming an asset light cash machine.

而正如我们所知，这种情况并没有发生。

And as we know, that didn't happen.

如今，投资已达到历史最高水平，因此所有那些深入到八份以上电子表格、细致分析每一个小项目的模型，最终都没能准确预测出投资、利润率或利润。

Investments are at all time highs now, so all these models that went over sometimes eight spreadsheets going into the details of every single little position ultimately couldn't figure out investments, margins, or profits either.

所以这就是为什么我们倾向于保持模型的简洁性，这也是我们在深度分析中经常讨论的内容。

So that's kind of why we tend to keep our models simple and something that we often talk about in our deep dives.

构建能够预测每一个财务细节的复杂模型感觉很棒，但归根结底，像Meta这样的公司，即使在最简单的模型中也应当显得便宜。

And it feels great to build these very complex models that predict every single financial position, but at the end of the day, a company like Meta should look cheap even in the simplest models.

否则，这个机会很可能并不大。

Otherwise, the opportunity is likely not that great.

我设计这个模型想要验证的主要问题是：假设Meta的营收增长缓慢至个位数低段，且到2030年其利润率与今天基本持平，那么Meta今天是否仍处于低估状态？

And the main idea I wanted to test with my model is whether Meta is cheap today, assuming its top line growth was slow to the low teens and margins in 2030 are essentially the same as today.

这种情况基本上会发生在看涨期权未能实现的情况下，届时你仍需对人工智能、AR眼镜及所有硬件进行类似水平的投资。

So this would basically happen if the call options don't work out, and you have at least a similar level of investments into AI and the AR glasses and all of the hardware.

这种情况是有可能发生的。

And this could happen.

我的意思是，如今巨额的资本支出最终会转化为折旧，而这将在未来几年对利润率造成压力。

I mean, the heavy CapEx investments today will flow into depreciation, and this is what will pressure margins in the years to come.

我们已经知道这一定会发生。

We already know this will happen.

如果未来三到四年内没有巨额回报，那么利润率显著高于当前水平的可能性就很小。

And if there is no huge payout in three to four years from now, it's just unlikely to have significantly higher margins than today.

在我的模型中，营业利润从2025年的约800亿美元增长到2029年的1350亿美元以上。

And in my model, operating income still grows from roughly $80,000,000,000 in 2025 to over a $135,000,000,000 by 2029.

而且，利润率在这一时期后期才会有明显提升，即便如此，也仅能达到2024年的水平。

And, again, margins don't expand meaningfully until later in the period, and even then, they only reach 2024 levels.

对于自由现金流，我假设从营业利润到自由现金流的转化率为保守的70%到80%。

For free cash flow, I'm assuming, I would say, a conservative seven to 80% conversion from operating income to free cash flow.

我说这是保守的，因为历史上这一比率已经更高了。

I say conservative because in history, it has been higher than that already.

这再次反映了较高的资本支出，以及与AI基础设施相关的营运资金需求。

And this reflects elevated CapEx once again, and then working capital needs tied to AI infrastructure.

在这些假设下，自由现金流从约450亿美元增长到约950亿美元，在预测期内翻了一番。

Under those assumptions, free cash flow grows from roughly 45,000,000,000 to about $95,000,000,000, so it doubles over the forecasted period.

假设股份小幅下降1%到2%，这与Meta历史上进行的股票回购一致，再加上估值倍数处于二十多倍的中位水平，折现率为8%——这是我们讨论大型美国上市公司时通常使用的数值——这些因素共同推导出每股约700美元的公允价值。

And assuming slight share declines of one to two percent, once again in line with historical share buybacks that Meta has done, and the next multiple in the mid twenties, a discount rate of 8%, which is what we usually use when we talk about these large cap US companies, this all would imply a fair value of about $700 per share.

这意味着从当前价格出发，包括股息在内，回报率将达到低双位数，勉强达到我们12%的门槛收益率，但仍然不像Meta在2022年时那样极其便宜。

And that would mean a low double digit return from today's prices, including dividends, technically cleaning our hurdle rate of 12%, but still not as incredibly cheap as Meta has been obviously in 2022.

但根据你的基准情景，Meta看起来大致估值合理。

But it sounds like based on your base case, Meta looks roughly fairly valued.

那么更乐观的情景呢？

What about a more optimistic scenario?

对吧？

Right?

我们总是喜欢在这里分析看涨和看跌的情景。

We always like to think about the bullish and bear cases here.

是的。

Yeah.

即使在更乐观的情景下，你也不需要假设任何离谱的前提。

So even in a more optimistic scenario, you don't need to underwrite any outlandish assumptions.

我不是假设个位数的收入增长，而是预计未来两到三年内增长更快，使预测期内的复合年增长率接近20%。

Instead of low teens top line growth, I assume more growth over the next two to three years, leading to a CAGR closer to 20% in the forecasted period.

如果我们假设Meta到2030年能将运营利润率恢复至45%，即使不采用基础情景中更高的退出倍数，其股价今天也可能达到约1000美元。

And if we assume Meta can return to just 45% operating margins by 2030, you could get a stock worth about $1,000 today, even without a higher exit multiple as in the base case.

因此，在这些假设下，我仍然不认为Reality Labs能够盈亏平衡，甚至差得远，额外的收入和利润率增长很可能来自WhatsApp的变现。

So under these assumptions, I still don't expect Reality Labs to break even, not even close, and the additional revenue and margin growth would most likely come from monetizing WhatsApp.

而且，一般来说，如果你想要估算Meta当前的价值，假设他们直接停止对Reality Labs等领域的巨额投资，那么在未来几年内，仅通过削减这些投资，他们的运营收入就能增加约180亿美元。

And, generally, if you, for example, would want to figure out what Meta is currently worth, if they just shut down the huge investments in, for example, Reality Labs, it's about 18,000,000,000 that they would have more in operating income if you just basically cut down these investments over the next couple of years.

你将能达到约50%的利润率。

It's about 50% margins that you would reach.

所以，如果你想构建一个乐观情景，并假设在未来几年大幅减少对这些领域的投资，你应当模型化每年约2个百分点的利润率提升，以在2029至2030年达到约50%的水平。

So if you want to do an optimistic case and you want to model that you invest significantly less money in the next couple of years into those segments, you should probably model about 2% margin increases over time to get about 50% at the 2029, 2030.

作为这个投资观点的总结性评论，让我有些犹豫的是，扎克伯格对Reality Labs和人工智能投资的固执坚持。

And as somewhat of a closing remark on this pitch, I guess what makes me a bit hesitant is Zuckerberg's stubbornness into these investments in reality labs and AIs.

我相信这源于他希望始终站在技术发展前沿的驱动力，但有时看起来却有些绝望。

I believe it just is his drive to stay at the forefront of technological development, but it seems kind of desperate at times.

我的意思是，仿佛他深知Meta终将需要超越现有的应用家族，而迄今为止，Meta在社交媒体之外的投资都未能取得良好成效。

I mean, it's as if he knows that Meta needs to expand beyond the family of apps at some point, and until now, investments outside of social media just simply didn't work out well for Meta.

我并不是在反对自己的观点。

And I'm not arguing against my own pitch here.

我认为从现在开始，Meta将带来非常稳健的回报。

I think Meta will deliver very solid returns from here.

如果任何看涨期权实现，你可能会看到类似谷歌的暴涨。

And if any of the call options work out, you might see a Google like rally.

最糟糕的情况可能是，过去几年的投资都打了水漂，而Meta在经历几年较低的利润率后，将重新回归通过Instagram和Facebook印钱的模式。

The worst case is probably that the investments of the last few years are gone, and that Meta, after a few years of lower margins, will just return to solely printing money through Instagram and Facebook.

老实说，我觉得这也不算太悲观。

And, honestly, that doesn't sound too bearish to me either.

所以，是的，我就是觉得今年我们做投资组合决策会变得困难得多。

So, yeah, I just have the feeling that it will become way more difficult for us this year to make portfolio decisions.

我觉得这是真的，因为我们现在已经建立了一个更稳固的投资组合，那是我们在2025年全部投入构建的，现在必须把这些新机会与我们已经深入研究并投资的业务进行对比。

I think that's true because now that we have a more established portfolio that we spent all of 2025 building out, we have to contrast these new opportunities with the businesses we've already covered in-depth and invested in.

通过这个视角，我不确定。

And through that lens, I don't know.

我还不确定这个项目目前足够突出。

I'm I'm not sure that this one stands out enough to me yet.

一方面，我记得当初觉得TikTok会摧毁Facebook和Instagram，而他们却把Reels打造成如今这样的业务。

On the one hand, I remember thinking that TikTok was gonna destroy Facebook and Instagram and for them to turn Reels into the business that they have turned it into.

我认为这非常、非常了不起。

I think it's very, very impressive.

我不愿与扎克伯格对赌，但如果我们从媒体行业中学到了什么，那就是广告收入即使对于Meta这样规模的公司，每年也可能大幅波动。

And I don't wanna bet against Zuckerberg, but also if we've learned anything from working in the media business, is that advertising can fluctuate a lot from year to year, even for players as big as Meta.

所以对我来说，我可能更愿意在广告收入出人意料地遭遇糟糕年份后买入股票，而不是在经历了过去几年非凡上涨后的温和回调时买入。

So for me, I think I would probably be more excited to snap up shares on the back of maybe an unexpectedly rough year in advertising than during just a modest pullback after what's been truly an incredible run-in the last few years.

我不知道这会是六个月后还是五年后，但市场择时是个有点敏感的话题。

And I don't know if that's six months or five years from now, but market timing is a bit of a dirty word.

但对我来说，这正是等待足够安全边际的真正含义。

But that really is just to me what it means to wait for a wide enough margin of safety.

在这种情况下，直觉上，我不确定安全边际是否足够宽。

And in this case, intuitively, I'm just not sure the margin of safety is wide enough.

举个例子，我是这么想的：为什么要在投资组合中增加3%的Meta仓位，而不是再给现有的Alphabet持仓增加3%呢？

And for example, the way I think about it is why add a 3% portfolio position in Meta over, say, just adding another 3% to our existing holding alphabet.

也许这么说有点调皮，但老实讲，当你在讨论两个主要由人工智能和广告驱动的科技巨头时，我不确定同时持有两者相比加倍押注我们更了解、更有信心的那一家有什么优势。

And maybe that's kind a cheeky thing to say, but honestly, when you're talking about two mega caps driven primarily by AI and advertising, I don't know if I see the advantage in having exposure to both as opposed to just doubling down on the one we know the best and have more confidence in.

正如我所说，我不知道下一次广告市场回调何时到来，但这类事件可能是我看到Meta股价被严重错估、值得我们满仓买入的时候。

And as I was saying, I don't know when that next ad market pullback will come, but that is probably the type of event where I could see Meta's shares getting mispriced enough to warrant a full position from us.

但除此之外，在当前价格下，我不确定自己会对这家公司的业务足够兴奋，尤其是考虑到虚拟现实、人工智能资本支出以及其他各种投入，我最多只愿意把它当作一个跟踪性仓位。

But otherwise, at current prices, I'm not sure that I could get excited enough about the business, especially with all the virtual reality and AI CapEx and all this other stuff going on, that I would wanna make it more than just a tracking position at most.

我认为再次强调一点很重要：我们真的在从长期角度思考。

I think it's important to once again point out that we are really trying to think long term here.

所以也许谷歌目前略微高估，而Meta略微低估，但我们考虑的是未来十年想持有哪家公司。

So perhaps Google is slightly overvalued right now, and probably Meta is slightly undervalued right now, but we are thinking about what company we would want to own for the next ten years.

如果我思考谷歌，老实说，对Meta的研究让我明白了一件事：我绝对想持有谷歌。

And if I think about Google, and honestly, if the research of Meta has shown me one thing, it's that I definitely want to own Google.

无论你从哪个角度看，无论是什么产品或行业，谷歌总是存在，并且几乎在当前或未来几年内推出的每一款产品中都位居榜首。

It seems that Google, no matter what you look at, what the product is, what the industry is, Google is always there, and it's at the top of almost any product that will is either released right now or that will come out in the next couple of years.

所以，是的，我确实认为Meta目前可能被低估了，未来几年它的回报率很可能达到我们12%的门槛。

So, yeah, I definitely think that Meta is probably undervalued right now, and it probably would clear our hurdle rate of 12% going forward in the next couple of years.

但它是否显著优于我们投资组合中目前持有的公司呢？

But is it significantly better than the companies that we currently own in our portfolio?

我对这一点不太确定。

I'm not so certain about that.

我的意思是，就今年的投资组合决策整体框架而言，将再配置视为错误或短期行为并无帮助，因为在投资组合的初期阶段，目标是先启动起来，这意味着在覆盖到优质公司时就立即买入，同时我们也清楚，随着时间推移，我们很可能会发现更优质的公司。

I mean, as a general framework for portfolio decisions this year, I don't think it's helpful to frame reallocations as mistakes or short term thinking because in the early phase of the portfolio, the goal was to get things started, and that meant adding high quality companies as we cover them, knowing full well that over time, we would likely come across businesses that are even higher quality.

但这并不意味着最初的投入是错误或糟糕的决定。

And that doesn't mean the initial investment was a bad idea or a mistake.

它只是反映了封闭式投资组合的现实——没有新的资金流入。

It simply reflects the reality of a closed portfolio where no new capital is coming in.

在这种情况下，每一个新想法都必须在某种程度上与现有持仓竞争。

And in that setup, every new idea has to, to some extent, compete with existing positions.

有时这意味着用一家我们个人认为长期风险收益比更优的公司，来取代一家非常优秀的公司，不是因为前者是错误或失败了，而是因为资本成本和机会成本确实很重要。

And sometimes that means replacing a very good company with one that we personally believe has an even better long term risk reward profile, not because the first one was a mistake or it has failed, but because capitalist costs and opportunity costs actually matter.

但就这件事而言，我认为我对这家公司的看法比你更乐观，也许这次的分析甚至稍微偏负面了，因为我们只关注了各种假设情况，而没有强调其出色的广告业务。

But regarding matter, I think I'm more bullish on the company than you, and maybe this pitch was even slightly more negative because we only focused on the what ifs instead of the fantastic ads business.

但我很有信心。

But I'm quite confident.

再次强调，它有可能达到我们12%的门槛回报率。

Again, it could clear our 12% hurdle rate.

然而，我目前并没有看到我们投资组合中哪一家公司值得被Meta取代。

However, I don't immediately see a position in our portfolio that I would want to swap for Meta.

我想今年我们需要更仔细地审视我们投资组合中的公司实际运营表现，然后将它们与我们的候补公司进行对比。

I guess we will have to take an even closer look this year at how our portfolio companies perform on an operational level and then compare them to our waitlist companies.

就我个人而言，我认为Meta现在在我们的候补名单上排名非常靠前。

And personally, I think that Meta is far up on our waitlist now.

但好吧。

But alright.

要不我们来预告一下下一期的线索？

How about we give the hints for the next episode?

是的。

Yeah.

所以实际上，下周的推介是另一家社交媒体公司。

So actually, next week's pitch is another social media company.

但我想大多数观众都没听说过这家公司，这听起来似乎与成为一家优秀的社交媒体企业背道而驰，但我相信你们会明白我的意思。

But it's one I'm guessing most of the audience has never heard of, which sounds a bit antithetical to being a good social media business, but I think you'll see what I mean.

而且实际上，这将是我们首次涉足医疗健康领域。

And actually, will that this is going to be our first foray into the healthcare sector.

所以，如果你只关注这两个线索，我想你大概能猜出我具体指的是哪家公司。

So if you focus on just those two hints, I think you can probably figure out exactly which company I'm talking about.

医疗健康领域是很多人向我们提到过的，但到目前为止，我们还没有介绍过该领域的公司，因为我们觉得这个行业太复杂了。

The healthcare sector is something that a lot of people pointed out to us, and until now, we haven't covered a company there because we thought it's just too complex.

但我认为你下周要看的这家公司会非常有趣，而且，是的，我对此非常期待。

But I think the company that you look at next week will be a pretty interesting one, and, yeah, I'm pretty excited for it.

所以，我想今天就用一句名言来结束吧，当然，会是谁呢？

So I would say I will close it for today with a quote by, of course, who else?

马克·扎克伯格，他说过：快速行动，打破陈规。

Mark Zuckerberg, and he said, move fast and break things.

我可能不会建议将此作为普遍的人生准则，但最近听了大量关于他的访谈后，我惊叹于一个在二十多岁就成为全球最富有的人之一的人，依然每天充满干劲，致力于颠覆一切，并愿意为此冒险。

I probably wouldn't recommend that as general life advice, but after listening to many interviews with him lately, I think it's just astonishing how someone who has become one of the richest people on the planet in his twenties still has such a drive to work every day and disrupt everything, and is willing to risk on it.

但，是的，我们目前还不愿对Meta承担风险。

But, yeah, we are not willing to take the risk with Meta yet.

就此，我们期待下周日与您在下一期节目中再见。

And with that, we hope to see you next Sunday in the next episode.

祝你今天愉快。

Have a good one.

感谢收听TIP播客。

Thanks for listening to TIP.

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