TIP600：与汉密尔顿·赫尔默一起掌握商业持久性与战略大师课

你正在收听《TIP》。

You're listening to TIP.

在本期节目中，我采访了汉密尔顿·赫尔默，聊聊教育者身份如何帮助他提升战略与投资能力，权力与运营卓越之间的区别，他是如何提炼出七大权力模型的，我们会深入剖析这七大权力，更新一些案例，探讨为什么在收益容易被发现的今天，壁垒依然如此关键，知识产权究竟算不算一种权力，还有更多内容。

In today's episode, I'm talking to Hamilton Helmer about the power of being an educator and how it helped him improve at Strategy and Investing, the differences between power and operational excellence, how he formulated his seven powers, a deep dive into all seven of his powers, updated case studies for some of the powers, why barriers are so important when benefits are much easier to find, how intellectual property is and is not a power, and so much more.

我最早是在研究迈克尔·波特的五力模型时，第一次了解到汉密尔顿·赫尔默的。

I first learned about Hamilton Helmer when researching Michael Porter and his five forces.

顺着这条线索，我找到了他的那本精彩著作，从中汲取了大量宝贵见解。

That rabbit hole led me to Hamilton's great book from which I've taken so many great lessons.

我决定写投资相关内容，部分原因就是想通过分享自己的心得，来更深入地理解这个领域。

Part of the reason I decided to write about investing was to learn more about it by sharing my lessons with others.

而汉密尔顿，作为斯坦福大学经济系的教授，早已在最高层次上做到了这一点。

And Hamilton has done this at the highest level possible as a professor at Stanford University's economics department.

我问他，教学经历如何让他成为更出色的战略家和投资者，他的回答完全没有让我失望。

I asked him how this experience made him a better strategist and investor and his answers did not disappoint.

如果你对护城河、竞争优势、它们带来的收益，以及支撑护城河强大的那些微妙细节感兴趣，这期节目一定会让你收获满满。

If you enjoy learning about moats, their competitive advantages, the benefits they provide, and all the subtle nuances that go into what makes them strong, you're gonna take a lot from this episode.

好了，不多说了，咱们直接进入与汉密尔顿·赫尔默的这场精彩对话。

Now, without further delay, let's get right into this great conversation with Hamilton Helmer.

你正在收听的是《投资者播客》。

You are listening to the investors podcast.

自2014年以来，我们一直研究金融市场，阅读那些对白手起家的亿万富翁影响最大的书籍。

Since 2014, we studied the financial markets and read the books that influence self made billionaires the most.

我们让你时刻掌握信息，做好应对意外的准备。

We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected.

接下来，有请您的主持人凯尔·格里夫。

Now for your host, Kyle Grieve.

我是主持人凯尔·格里夫。

I'm your host, Kyle Grieve.

今天，我们请来了汉密尔顿·赫尔默。

And today, we bring Hamilton Helmer onto the show.

汉密尔顿，欢迎来到我们的播客。

Hamilton, welcome to the podcast.

非常荣幸。

My pleasure.

很高兴能来。

Glad to be here.

您写了一本关于竞争优势的杰出著作，叫《七种力量：商业战略的基础》。

You wrote an exceptional book on competitive advantages called seven powers, the foundation of business strategy.

这本书对我影响很大，让我在研究企业时对竞争优势有了全新的理解，我有很多问题想请教您。

I have many questions about this book as it had a big impact on how I view competitive advantages when I research a business.

不过我想先从您的个人经历聊起。

But I want to start the conversation by discussing a little bit more about your backstory.

您曾在斯坦福大学教授商业战略长达十年。

You taught business strategy at Stanford for a decade.

这段教学经历是如何帮助您提升战略思维和投资能力的呢？

How did this experience help sharpen your abilities in strategy and investing?

教学真的很有收获。

Teaching is great.

斯坦福确实很棒，说实话。

And Stanford's great, frankly.

对我来说，关键就在于，我特别享受这些年来和学生们之间的互动。

It was for me, the heart of the matter was I just enjoyed my interaction with all my students over the years.

他们让我对世界的看法更加深入，也希望我反过来也启发了他们。

They stimulated me in how I thought about the world and hopefully I stimulated them.

我觉得这算是我的第二段职业生涯，因为在那之前，我做了很多年的战略顾问，自己创办了咨询公司，帮企业思考战略问题。

And I think it follows it was sort of a second career for me because it followed many, many years as a strategy consultant where I started my own business strategy in helping companies think through their strategy.

战略其实很简单。

And strategy is simple.

归根结底就一个问题：什么能带来持久的成功？

There's only one question is what creates durable success, right?

所以我的人生有点单调，过去四十年，我一直在思考、教学和投资围绕这个问题。

And so my life is a little boring in the sense that I've sort of thought, taught, and invested around that issue for forty years.

教学的一个重要启示是，如果你不能把一件事讲清楚，那说明你自己还没真正搞懂。

And so teaching was if one of the lessons of teaching is that you can't explain something properly unless you understand it really well yourself.

所以这迫使我重新回到最根本的原理，试着把问题讲清楚。

So it really forced me back to sort of first principles and trying to explain it.

如果你在思考理论，而我本质上是个理论派，这真的特别有价值。

And if you're sort of trying to think through theory, and I'm essentially a theorist, that's just incredibly valuable.

再加上和这么多聪明、有动力、充满活力的人交流，简直太有启发了。

Then to have all these very bright, motivated, engaging people to interact with just as very stimulative.

你是Strategy Capital的联合创始人兼首席投资官，我知道‘七种优势’这个概念是你投资策略的核心。

So you're the co founder and chief investment officer of Strategy Capital, and I know the seven powers concept is a key to your investing strategy.

我很想了解你是怎么提出这七种优势的，以及它们如何指导Strategy Capital的投资实践。

And I'd love to know more about the history of your formulation of these seven powers in regard to how you run Strategy Capital.

如果战略的核心问题是：为什么有些公司能长期成功？那你自然会想，这应该对判断一家公司未来表现有帮助。

If the principal question of strategy is why are companies durably successful, You would think that that would probably have some value in thinking about whether a company was going to do well.

如果一家公司表现优异，你也会觉得它的股价迟早会反映出来。

And if a company does well, you would think that's reflected somehow in its price over time.

所以这听起来确实和投资息息相关。

And so that sort of sounds like it has an impact on investing.

我当股票投资者的时间，比当战略顾问还要长。

And so I've been an equity investor longer than I've been a strategist.

我二十多岁就入行了。

So I started in my 20s basically.

具体多少年了，我就不说了。

I won't tell you how many decades that's been since.

这两者其实一直相辅相成。

And so they sort of went hand in glove in a way.

投资逼着你去认真思考，到底什么才能创造价值。

And I think investing forces you to a discipline of thinking about what creates value.

所以，这么多年来，我一边和企业实际运营者打交道，一边在战略咨询中分析公司表现，同时和学生交流、写文章。

And so I think that the interaction of working with operating companies and smart business people over a duration of a career in strategy consulting of trying to examine companies and how they're doing and interacting with students and writing.

这些经历一起让我对这些问题有了更深入的思考。

Those things all contribute to sort of thinking about these things more carefully.

可以说，这些经历至关重要。

So it's been instrumental, I'd say.

那我们接着聊聊七个力量吧。

So let's move on to seven powers.

我很喜欢你对‘力量’、‘优势’和‘壁垒’这种简洁的概括。

I really liked the simplicity of power, a benefit, and a barrier.

现在市面上不少企业短期都有优势，但因为缺乏壁垒，这些优势很快就被别人赶超了。

It seems like there is no shortage of businesses with benefits for the short term, but these benefits are able to be arbitraged away due to the lack of a barrier.

你是怎么形成书中这么清晰的‘力量’概念的？

How did you develop this concept of power that you outlined so well in your book?

首先，我想强调一下你对这一点的领悟很重要。

Well, first of all, I I just wanna flag the importance of your takeaway from that.

你的结论其实和书里表达的意思很接近，虽然我不确定是不是完全一样。

I mean, you've you've reached a conclusion which is maybe expressed well in the book, I'm not sure.

但你抓住了一个关键点：优势很常见，而壁垒却不多见。

But it is a very important observation, which is that benefits are common and barriers are not.

企业里任何降低成本的举措，或者任何提升产品的方法，都会带来一些好处。

And every cost reduction measure in a business or every measure to improve your product, there are benefits to all of those.

这些可能对利润有影响，也可能没有，但这就是收益的特点。

They may or may not be material to the bottom line, but that's the nature of benefits is that.

所以这类东西很常见。

And so they're something that are frequent.

如果你追求持久的成功，那就得特别突出才行。

And then if you're interested in durable success, you want to do especially well.

这就需要你做点真正能带来价值、而且别人很难模仿的事情。

And that requires having something that you've done that does move the needle and value that way, but that others have a more difficult time mimicking.

因为这个世界竞争激烈。

Because the world is a tough place.

一个合理的预设是：只要能被复制，就一定会被复制。

And if it can be, not a bad presumption is if it can be competed the way it will be.

你也许会碰上对手信息不足、不够聪明，侥幸过关，但你不能把公司命运押在这上面。

You might get lucky and the competition is ill informed or not very clever, But you don't want to bet your business on that.

所以最好假设，竞争对手的模仿能力非常强。

So better to assume that our competitive arbitrage is very effective.

所以这意味着，如果福利是常见的，而壁垒并不常见，那我们就得关注壁垒本身。

And so that means if benefits are frequent and barriers are not, it means looking at the barrier.

我想你之前问的是，这个观点是怎么形成的。

And so I think your question was around how did that formulation come out.

这个提炼过程花了很长一段时间，才简化到现在的样子。

And it was over a very long period of time to sort of distill it to that level of simplicity.

就像我之前跟你说的，我在经济学圈子里被归为熊彼特主义者——约瑟夫·熊彼特是19世纪末一位非常独特、有趣的经济学家，活跃于20世纪上半叶。

As I mentioned to you earlier, I'm in economic circles at what you call as a Schumpeterian, which is Joseph Schumpeter was this very quirky, interesting economist late 1800s, and then went through the first half of the twentieth century.

他对什么才是真正推动经济增长的原因，有着不同的看法。

And he took a different view of what really drives economic growth.

他的核心观点是——

And his bottom line.

至少在他早期的理论中，他的观点后来随着学术研究有所演变。

This is at least in his earlier views, which his views sort of change over the period of the scholarship.

但早期他认为，企业家才是推动经济增长的核心。

But the early view was that entrepreneurs are the heart of what creates economic growth.

我在读研的时候很幸运，能跟着世界上最有洞察力的人之一学习，研究增长的根源这些问题。

And everything I was fortunate in grad school to work under one of the most insightful people in the world about the origins of growth and so on.

我离开的时候，也留下了同样的感受。

And I think I came away with very much that same impression.

所以，如果你在思考我所理解的这套理论，那你不妨问自己：既然你已经理解到这一步了，

And so if you're thinking about what I think about as sort of the theory of all this, the question you ask yourself is, Okay, well, you've come down to that understanding.

那这对创业者或创始人有什么实际用处呢？

Why is it useful to entrepreneurs or to founders?

而这个问题的答案，最终会把你引向启发式方法。

And the answer to that ultimately takes you back to heuristics.

你必须能把这些内容提炼得足够简洁。

You have to be able to distill it sufficiently.

所以，你提到的投资、教学这些事，关键就在于把东西提炼到位，才能得出容易记住的启发式原则——这就是理论工作者的挑战。

And so the things that you mentioned, investing and teaching and so on, distilling things properly so that you can get reasonably memorable heuristics out of it is the theorist challenge.

而这，正是我一直在专注的事情。

And so that's what's occupied me.

你在书里谈了很多关于战略的内容，但你也特别用自己的方式给它下了定义。

So you talk a lot about strategy in this book, but you also make sure to define it in your own way.

对于那些容易把这两个词搞混的人，你怎么区分战略和权力呢？

How do you contrast strategy and power for those who might confuse the two terms?

正如我所说，战略只有一个目标。

So strategy is, as I say, it has one objective, I think.

那就是理解什么是持久的成功，尤其是企业的成功，对吧？

Understanding the elements of durable success, a company success, right?

所以这个定义是包容性的。

So that's inclusive.

而权力是其中关键且必不可少的一个要素。

And power is a key, an essential ingredient in that.

但逻辑上讲，它只是必要条件，而不是充分条件。

But it is, logicians would say, independently necessary but not sufficient.

创造价值的三个要素是权力、市场规模和运营卓越。

So the three elements that create value are power, market size, and operational excellence.

而这三者各自都有其特定的特征。

And each of those has its own descriptors.

说到权力，我认为这是创始人和公司最终能够主动构建并掌握的部分。

And I'd say the thing about power is that it's the thing that the founder and ultimately the company can create and has some control over.

市场规模就不一样了，公司无法控制。

Market size, ultimately not.

运营卓越这一点，公司确实能掌控。

Operational excellence, they do have control over it.

这对战略至关重要。

And it's critical for a strategy.

但从静态分析的角度看，它最终会被市场套利掉。

But it is also something that from a statics perspective is arbitraged out.

所以从成功结果的角度来说，你不能指望靠它来让公司变得更好。

So from the point of view of kind of successful endpoints, it's something that you normally can't look to as saying that will make you a better company.

但它确实是必不可少的。

It's essential.

所以如果你有一个出色的会计系统，没有它，你根本撑不下去。

So if you think of having a great accounting system, if you don't have it, you're toast.

但这也很容易被模仿。

But it's also something that's easily mimicked.

当你从静态视角转向动态视角时，这个问题就复杂多了，因为运营卓越实际上对实现竞争优势至关重要，并且在合理的时间跨度内是不断变化的。

Now when you move from statics to dynamics, that conversation gets more complicated because operational excellence actually is fundamental to achieving power and is different over the timeframes of reasonable dynamic timeframes.

但竞争优势是理解这个问题的绝佳起点，因为它揭示了那种企业可以主动掌控的持久成功要素。

But power is a great way to start theory about this because it tells you about that element of durable success, which is sort of controllable by the company.

既然我们对竞争优势有了更清晰的认识，那我们来聊聊你书中提到的几种力量吧。

So now that we have a better understanding of power, let's jump into some of the powers that you outline in your book.

先从规模经济说起。

Let's start with scaled economies.

你在书中用奈飞和百视达的例子说明，奈飞如何通过独家内容和原创剧集，把规模变成强大的竞争优势。

You used the case study of Netflix versus Blockbuster in your book to show how Netflix could leverage its ability in exclusives and originals, which allowed it to utilize scale as a powerful source of leverage.

现在奈飞已经发展得更成熟了，竞争也比以前激烈得多，你觉得它现在的护城河还像当年那么坚固吗？

Now that Netflix is a more mature business with lots more competition than it once had, do you think that its barrier is as strong now as it once was?

对我来说，感觉没什么太大变化。

For me, it seems like it hasn't changed much.

我觉得外部环境和人们对现状的认知变化很大，以前有一阵子，奈飞的股价涨得特别猛。

I think the external environment and people's awareness of what's going on has changed a lot in the sense that there was a while Netflix sort of experienced this huge stock price run up.

大家都觉得，只要搞流媒体，价值就很高。

And everybody sort of thought, oh, you kind of get into streaming and it's worth a lot.

好像只要这么做就行。

And that's what you do.

于是很多人跟风入场，这在商业上其实很常见。

And then a lot of people did that of herd instinct, which is normal in business.

套利就是这样发生的。

That's how arbitrage takes place really.

现在大家终于明白了，光做流媒体，并不等于能赚钱。

And now I think there's a realization that just because you stream, it doesn't make money.

我觉得目前只有奈飞在这一块真正赚到了钱。

I think Netflix is the only one making money at it.

如果你看看Disney Plus，或者我不确定，我觉得亚马逊Prime的财务数据并没有单独公布。

So if you look at Disney Plus or I don't know, I don't think Amazon Prime's financials are broken out.

总的来说，它是目前表现最好的那个。

In general, it's the one that's doing well.

所以我觉得这一点没变。

And so I don't think that's changed.

但你能看到市场竞争的正常周期。

But you can see the normal cycles of competition.

Netflix率先启动了这个模式，执行得也非常出色，抓住了先发优势，而这在商业中并不总是如此。

So Netflix sort of initiated this and executed very well and took advantage of that initiation, which isn't always the case.

第一个进入市场，并不保证你就是最后的赢家，对吧？

It's first in doesn't guarantee that you end up the winner, right?

我觉得大概是一半一半的概率。

I'd say it's kind of fifty-fifty.

这其实也呼应了我之前说的，运营卓越很重要，建立优势很关键，因为公司最终都会出问题。

And that ties back to that earlier comment of mine about operational excellence and the importance of establishing power because companies break down.

这方面最典型的例子就是Apple III，对吧？

The poster child example of that is the Apple III, right?

当时苹果本有机会主导个人电脑市场。

Apple was poised to own the PC market.

但要做到这一点，他们得有出色的产品、高效的生产线，还有合理的价格。

But to do so, they had to have great products and efficiently designed factories and all that and appropriate pricing.

可他们在这些方面全都搞砸了。

And they dropped the ball on all those fronts.

Apple III彻底失败了，给IBM PC腾出了机会窗口。

And the Apple III was just a disaster and it created a window of opportunity that the IBM PC jumped into.

这说明了运营能力有多重要——不一定是第一个进场的就能赢。

And that's an example of operational excellence, making it not the first in be the winner.

但Netflix可不是这样。

But Netflix wasn't like that.

我觉得他们在运营上非常出色。

They were, I would say, operationally excellent.

他们拥有极其出色的领导力，组建了一支非常优秀的团队。

And they had just phenomenal leadership and built up an incredibly good team.

他们对业务的每一个关键环节都格外关注。

They were very, very attentive to all the levers of their business.

因此，他们在这一领域赢得了大量的市场份额。

And so they built a lot of market share in that business.

我觉得竞争态势非常激烈。

And I think the competition has been dramatic.

我的意思是，各大巨头纷纷涌入，如果你要列举竞争对手，大概不会想到亚马逊、苹果、谷歌、迪士尼这些公司吧？

I mean, huge companies jumping in, if you had to think of the competitors you probably wouldn't normally want to have, think of Amazon, Apple, Google, Disney, right?

Netflix面对的正是这些对手，但他们表现得非常出色。

And Netflix that's has been up against, but they've done very well.

我们先休息一下，听一听今天节目的赞助商信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

你在关于网络效应的章节里提到了一个我从来没听说过的公司，叫Branch Out，真是个绝佳的案例。

So you've given excellent case study of a business I've never heard of called Branch Out in your chapter on network economies.

这个企业的失败，是因为在扩张过程中没能守住自己的护城河。

The end of this business was due to its inability to maintain its barrier as it attempted to scale.

当时Branch Out没法从LinkedIn和Facebook拉走用户，因为那些人喜欢把生活和工作分开来看。

Branch Out was unable to draw customers off of LinkedIn and Facebook at the time because users of these social networks liked having their personal and professional lives separate.

一旦Branch Out意识到自己无法突破临界点，结局就已经注定了。

Once Branch Out realizes, their inability to reach a tipping point spelled out their end.

在早期阶段，你会看重哪些具备网络效应潜力的企业的关键特质？

What are some key traits that you look for in earlier stage businesses that have potential power in network economies?

最关键的是价值主张。

Well, the key thing is the value proposition.

对吧？

Right?

得有个反馈机制，意思是只要你在这儿，我就更受益。

There's a feedback mechanism that basically means if you're on the network, I'm better off.

而且这种机制得经常发生才行。

And then that has to be and that happens with some frequency.

但第二点是重要性。

But then the second thing is materiality.

在我们这个行业里，有时候我们会笑谈人们总在说飞轮效应，大概就是这种东西。

Is there are lots of we sort of laugh in our business sometimes that people always talk about flywheels, which is sort of like this.

你做点什么，把它做得更好，然后变得更强，如此循环。

You do something and make something better and you get better and so on.

这种例子很多，但往往并不关键。

And there are a lot of those around, but often they're not material.

所以你要找的是，需求的性质是否真的能形成这种反馈机制——你上了这个网络，我就更有利。

And so what you'd look for is the character of the demand being satisfied in a way that where there is this feedback mechanism, that if you're on the network, I'm better off.

比如你有电话，我就更有理由装电话，因为现在能联系到你了。

So you have a telephone, I'm better off with having a telephone because I can now reach you.

你在用Facebook。

You're on Facebook.

我也在用Facebook。

And I'm on Facebook.

因为你是我朋友，这让我觉得更有价值。

And that makes it more valuable to me because you're my friend.

所以你要看这一点。

And so you look at that.

然后你得判断，这种影响是实质性的，还是只是微不足道的。

And then you try to determine or try to understand whether that's a material effect or rather minor effect.

对。

Yeah.

我特别喜欢这一点，因为现在‘飞轮’这个词太流行了，好多公司都在用。

I really like that because flywheel is such a buzzword now and and so many businesses use it.

但我特别欣赏你把重点放在了‘实质性’上，因为这才是真正告诉你飞轮有没有起作用的关键，而不是光说些空话。

But I really liked how you you brought into the the the material portion of that because that's kind of what tells you that the flywheel is actually doing something versus just saying some words.

没错。

Yeah.

这非常关键。

That's very important.

你之前提到过‘壁垒与收益’这个框架，我觉得这一点很有意思。

I find that you mentioned earlier the construction of barrier and benefit.

但其实并没有这个框架，我觉得这反而更有用。

There isn't, which I think is useful.

不过，我跟别人聊的时候，常用另一个框架，它和‘壁垒与收益’完全对应，是一一映射的关系。

But oftentimes when I'm talking to people, I use a alternative construct, which is identical in the sense that it maps one to one to barrier and benefit.

那就是可持续、有优势、有影响力。

And that's sustainable, superior, and significant.

其中，‘有优势’和‘有影响力’对应的是收益，‘可持续’对应的是壁垒。

And so with superior and significant, that's the benefit and sustainable barrier.

我之所以用这个三S的表达方式，是因为它更清晰。

And the reason I can't it's like all three s formulation.

这样做的好处是，它能突出‘实质性影响’这个关键点。

And the reason that's useful is it calls out significant materiality.

在你和帕特里克·奥肖内西的播客对话中，你提到过，网络效应在早期阶段，从损益表上看往往显得不吸引人，因为初创企业的利润很难体现。

So in a podcast episode with Patrick O'Shaughnessy, you mentioned that the earlier stages of network effects can look unattractive on a profit and loss statement as profits are hard in the early innings of a business.

有哪些公司在这方面做得特别出色，是你特别欣赏的？

What are some businesses that navigated this path very well that you admire?

嗯，主要是那些大公司。

Well, sort of big ones.

比如Facebook，这很明显。

I mean, Facebook, obviously.

Facebook在上市前，它的利润表看起来可不太好看，对吧？

Facebook's P and L didn't looks kind of ugly before they went public, right?

甚至在他们还没完全搞清楚广告模式、还没真正落地之前就是这样。

And even I think, and before they sort of figured out the ad model and put it into effect.

Google也是个例子。

Google's another one.

我觉得推动Google的一个关键因素是网络效应的吸引力——用户最初搜索时，系统会观察之前的人在得到某些搜索结果后是怎么做的，然后用这些数据来优化后来同样问题的搜索结果，这一点在早期根本看不出来。

You know, I think one of the things that drives Google is attractiveness, network economies, the initial aspect of learning how to follow what prior askers of a particular question did once they got certain search results, using that to enable superior search results for others as they asked the same question later on as wasn't evident.

所以我认为，我来提一个假设。

And so I think, and I'll make a hypothesis.

我不确定这是否准确，但我先提出一个假设。

I don't know if it's true, but I'll make a hypothesis.

只要是网络型业务，依赖网络效应的，在早期阶段都会面临如何把网络搭建起来的种种艰难抉择。

You identify any network business, network businesses powered by that, the early stage will be fraught with these decisions about trying to get the network up and running.

这非常具有挑战性，而且早期的利润表往往很难看。

And that that's daunting and often has ugly P and Ls.

所以，反向定位可能是你整本书里我最喜欢的一个观点。

So counter positioning was probably my favorite power that you discussed in your whole book.

我知道这也是你最钟爱的。

I know it's your favorite as well.

我一开始有点难理解，但越读你的书，越听你讲这个概念，我就越能明白它的意思。

It was one that was a little hard for me to understand at first, but more I read and reread your book and listened to you talk about it, the more I started understanding it.

我喜欢这个模式，因为它既适用于亚马逊这样的科技巨头，也适用于像In N Out这样朴实无华的小企业。

I like this model as it can be used in high flying tech names like Amazon or boring simple businesses like In N Out.

你能简单说说，这种模式的力量在哪，而现有企业又该用什么策略来应对那些打破常规、试图颠覆市场的新入局者？

Can you briefly discuss the power and what incumbents' best strategies are in order to combat incoming businesses with radical new models that are attempting to succeed by breaking the mold?

是的

Yeah.

这其实是个很简单的道理。

It's a fairly simple proposition.

当你刚开始创业时，常常会面对一些令人望而生畏的对手——那些规模远超你的巨头。

It's just that if you're starting up a business, you'll often some of the most daunting combination are behemoths that are much larger than you are.

但它们既有优势，也有劣势。

But they have an advantage and a disadvantage.

它们拥有全部的资源和能力。

So they have all their resources and all their capabilities.

但潜在的劣势是，它们已经有一个成熟的业务在运转。

But a potential disadvantage is they already have an established business.

这其中有很多经济学家所说的代理问题。

And there are a lot of what economists call agency effects of that.

你不会愿意轻易放弃现有的东西。

You won't want to give that up.

而企业里的权力分配、决策方式，都深受这种影响。

And the distribution of authority in the business, the way decisions are made is very shaded by that.

你可以想象，董事会里有人提议：咱们就这么干吧。

You can imagine a boardroom meeting saying, let's do this.

但马上有人反对：不行不行，这行不通。

And somebody said, no, no, no, that's not going to work.

所以‘行不通’的原因，往往是因为这会损害我们现有的业务。

And so not work is tied to that it damages our current business.

以前我们聊过Netflix，你想想Blockbuster和Netflix的例子。

So you used to think of, talked about Netflix before, you think Blockbuster and Netflix.

你可以想象，Blockbuster的董事会里有人提议：要不我们也学Netflix那样做？

You can imagine a boardroom meeting at Blockbuster saying, well, let's just start doing what Netflix says.

不行不行，我们还有那么多实体店，不能让顾客流失到线上去。

No, no, no, we have all these stores out there and we don't want to take away from the traffic to our stores.

这会彻底打乱我们的生意模式。

That's just going to upend our business.

这些考量非常真实且常见，也完全符合商业逻辑。

And so those considerations are very real and frequent and make good business sense.

因此，现有企业因为担心新业务模式会冲击自身现有业务，往往不敢轻易模仿竞争对手。

And so incumbents are inhibited from competitive reaction of mimicking the new business model by reluctance that's created by the impact on their current business.

记住，做经济决策时，不确定性本身就会对你产生影响。

And remember, when you're making economic decisions, your uncertainty affects you.

你是在用确定的利润，去换一个不确定的结果。

So you're trading a certain profit for an uncertain outcome.

这就让决策变得更加困难了。

And so that makes it extra hard even.

这种现象其实非常普遍，我觉得可以说是经常发生。

And that turns out to be a very important thing that happens often, I'd say.

所以，正如你提到的，这确实是我最欣赏的一种权力来源。

So it is, as you mentioned, it is my sort of favorite source power.

也许是因为我提出了这个概念，但更重要的是，它确实很常见。

Maybe because I invented the concept, but also it is frequent, I'd say.

这个障碍非常、非常大。

And the barrier is very, very significant.

那有没有哪家公司成功克服了竞争对手的反制策略？

So what's a good example of a business that was able to overcome counter positioning by a competitor?

这其实是在说这个障碍有多强。

This is a statement about the barrier.

我注意到你发给我这个问题，是想让我回答。

I saw you sent me that question to ask me.

我想不出有哪家公司能做到。

I couldn't think of one.

我问过公司里其他对这类问题特别有见解的人。

I asked there are other people in my company that are also extremely thoughtful about this kind of stuff.

他们也想不出来。

They couldn't think of one either.

这恰恰说明了这种力量有多强大。

And that speaks to the intensity of the power of that.

我可以给你一个最近的例子，有个人看起来每一步都做对了，但还是没成功。

And I could give you a recent example of someone who it appears to me did all the right things and still wasn't successful.

比如大众前CEO尼施，我虽然不认识他，但很佩服他的思考深度，他确实把该做的都做了。

So if you look at the dethroned CEO of Volkswagen, Herr Niesz, who I don't know personally but admire his thoughtfulness, he did all the right things.

他明确说，电动车革命即将到来。

He basically said the EV revolution is coming.

这彻底颠覆了我们的商业模式。

This completely upends our business model.

如果我们不在这方面做到顶尖，那真的会出大问题。

If we don't become great at that, we really have a problem.

要做到这一点，就必须在软件上真正下功夫，因为电动车的核心是集成软件平台。

Becoming great at that, that means that we have to become really good at software because an integrated software platform is essential for EVs.

所以我们得大力投入，把公司的发展方向彻底转向这个方向。

And so we have to invest a lot in that and make a commitment in company trajectory that we're going to do this.

他想得很清楚，也敢说真话，结果却丢了工作。

And he was thoughtful about it, outspoken, and lost his job.

这并不罕见。

And that's not atypical.

这就让你体会到这种权力的强度有多高。

So that just gives you an idea of the intensity of that type of power.

你可以想象其中牵涉的种种问题。

And you can imagine all the things going on.

我的意思是，董事会里坐着强大的工会代表。

I mean, there are powerful labor unions that sit in this board.

他们会说：哦，这个新方向会导致岗位减少。

And they would say, oh, well, this new direction that there won't be as many jobs.

这确实是一种极具影响力的权力。

And it is an intense form of power.

是的。

Yeah.

就你刚才举的例子来看，对现有企业来说，做出这样的改变会引发无数连锁反应，除非你亲身经历，否则很难完全意识到这些影响。

It seems with that, example you just gave too that there's so many different second order effects of making a change for the incumbents that looking in you might not even really account for unless you

这确实让人望而生畏。

It's daunting.

这并不是说他们经营得有多差。

It's not a comment about how badly they run their business.

就是真的太让人望而生畏了。

It's just how daunting.

我的意思是，你其实看得出来。

I mean, you could see it.

我不知道你是不是太年轻了，不记得诺基亚当年有多风光。

I don't know if you're maybe too young to remember the days that Nokia was a great business.

然后iPhone出现了。

And the iPhone came along.

那变化是明摆着的。

It was completely observable.

他们能清楚看到市场份额在流失。

They could see loss of market share.

情况也类似，iPhone 是以软件为核心的产品，而诺基亚则是以硬件为核心。

And it was a similar situation is that the iPhone is a software centric product and that Nokia is a hardware centric product.

他们拥有庞大的供应链和整个基于硬件工程模式的业务，要转向软件工程模式，难度非常大。

And they had all these supply chains and their huge business that was all based on their engineering model, moving that to a software engineering model is very hard.

你看索尼就成功做到了，但简直是险之又险。

I mean, you can see in Sony, they managed to overcome that, but only by the skin of their teeth.

因为 PlayStation 是个数字业务，而他们原本是个模拟时代的公司。

Because the PlayStation was a digital business and they were an analog company.

当时他们想做的那些事，内部遇到了很大的阻力。

And there was a lot of pushback about doing the kinds of things they were thinking of doing.

索尼有几位非常出色的领导者，在不同层级上推动了这场变革，但差点就没能成功。

And they had some amazing leaders, a couple of different levels at Sony that pushed this through, but they almost didn't do it.

但这个例子恰恰说明了逆向定位的力量，因为那是全新的业务。

But that was an example of counter positioning exactly because it was a new business.

它并没有威胁到他们原有的业务。

It didn't threaten their old business.

所以这并不是成功应对反定位的例子。

So that isn't an example of successfully fighting counter positioning.

这更像是成功转型的案例，也就是成功启动了另一项业务。

It's more a successful example of transforming, which is successfully starting another business.

但其中一些要素是相似的，比如公司内部的阻力。

But some of the elements are similar in that there was corporate in resistance.

你提到的另一个重要力量是转换成本。

So another great power that you discussed is switching costs.

你在书中举了苹果的例子，说明它是如何通过iTunes让客户难以转向其他平台的。

You give the example of Apple in your book and how it used iTunes on its customers to prevent them from switching to another platform.

否则，用户就会失去之前的所有购买内容。

Otherwise, they'd forfeit their prior purchases.

虽然现在苹果已经不再有这种类型的转换成本了，但我认为苹果依然拥有很强的转换成本。

This type of switching costs no longer exists specifically with Apple, but I would say Apple definitely still has switching costs.

你能简单谈谈这种力量吗？解释一下，即使苹果所处的行业变化很快，它为什么还能持续利用转换成本？

Can you briefly discuss this power and explain how Apple is able to continually utilize switching costs even though its products are in some rapidly changing industries?

切换成本这个话题挺有意思的。

Switching costs is an interesting one.

我给你讲个跟苹果相关的故事吧。

And I'll give you a story that sort of fits with Apple.

我坐飞机去夏威夷，快降落的时候。

I was on a plane to Hawaii, and we got near landing.

我一直在用手机听一些下载好的音乐。

And I've been listening to something on my phone, some downloaded music.

我想拿手机，结果怎么也找不着。

And I went to get my phone and I couldn't find it.

我心想，它到底去哪儿了？

And I thought, where is it?

降落前我必须得找到它。

I need to find this before I land.

可我就是怎么都找不到。

I just couldn't find it.

所以我最后想，唉，肯定是掉在座位缝里了。

And so I eventually thought, well, it must have fallen down in the seat somewhere.

于是我就站起来，真把飞机上的座椅给拆了。

So I got up and I actually ended up taking the seat apart on the plane.

可还是没找到。

And I still couldn't find it.

不过幸运的是，这趟航班是从旧金山飞来的，我身后坐着一位搞科技的人。

But fortunately, I guess it's because the plane was from San Francisco, I had another sort of techy type person behind me.

他也主动帮我一起拆座椅。

And he started helping me take the seat apart as well.

我的意思是，我们拆得实在有点过分，空乘都快烦了。

I mean, we really The stewardess was getting a little irritated.

我们真把那座椅给拆得七零八落。

We were disassembling this thing.

但他自己也带着一部iPhone，手电特别亮，能照进座椅的缝隙里。

But he had another iPhone with him, and so he had a very intense light that he could shine on the innards of the chair.

结果我们发现，手机其实是掉进座椅的机械结构里了。

And we discovered that the phone had actually fallen down between in the chair mechanism.

之前我几次想把座椅放倒，都没成功，当时还挺烦的，没想到是手机卡在那儿了。

And then all those attempts that I had made to recline the chair, the seat, that I was a little irritated because the seat wouldn't recline properly.

我其实是在不知不觉中把我的iPhone压坏了。

I actually was destroying my iPhone.

我是真的把它压坏了，不是那种开玩笑的‘压坏’。

So I crushed it, and not in a good sense of crush.

下飞机的时候，我就知道得换个新手机了。

And so I got off the plane knowing I had to get a new phone.

当时我就在想，我到底要不要再买个iPhone？

And there was a question, well, do I want to get an iPhone?

但答案很明确，我所有的东西都跟iPhone绑在一起了。

And the answer is everything for me was set up on an iPhone.

连很多文件、账户，全都存在里面了。

I even had saved many of the things and all the accounts and everything.

那我是不是该买个谷歌Pixel之类的？

And so would I get a Google Pixel or something?

不，不行。

No.

换平台的成本对我来说太高了。

The cost to me of switching was extremely high.

他们的定价简直离谱，苹果的硬件利润率真的惊人。

And the price they charge, which is phenomenal, I mean Apple's hardware margins are astonishing.

你充分利用了这一点，而我根本无能为力。

You capitalized on that and not a thing I could do about it.

我觉得这对苹果来说至今依然成立。

I think that continues to be true for Apple.

这个例子我太喜欢了。

I love that example.

我最后还是买了一部手机。

I did get a phone.

我确实买了一部新iPhone。

I did get a new iPhone.

一拿到手就能马上用起来。

And it was up and running immediately.

是的，这正是它最棒的地方。

Yeah, that's the beautiful part about it.

我们之前聊过反向定位的问题。

Talked about counter positioning.

整个过程中唯一麻烦的是，我得说服那家AT&T门店的销售员，让他们直接给我换机，跳过所有常规的佣金流程、套餐选择那一套，那些他们通常在你换手机时硬塞给你的东西。

Only hard part of the process was I had to persuade the salesperson that was an ATT store that was doing it, that they could simply give me a replacement and bypass all the normal commissions and choose the plan nonsense and all the stuff that they try and put you through when you go on for a phone.

这一步确实挺折腾的，但能理解。

That was the friction in the process Makes sense.

AT&T的换机成本。

AT and

T的换机成本。

T's switching costs.

切换成本最强大的作用之一，就是像你刚才说的，让企业对产品拥有定价权。

So one of the most powerful effects of switching costs is the ability, like you just mentioned, for the business to have pricing power for its products.

但这也可能带来第二层影响：如果客户觉得被高价宰了，哪怕换平台更痛苦，他们还是会生气。

But this can have the second order effect of making customers angry if they feel they're being overcharged for a specific product, even though switching would be even more painful.

你怎么看待切换成本对企业与客户关系的影响？

How do you view switching costs in relation to a business's relationship with its customers?

是啊，这确实挺棘手的。

Yeah, it is fraught with that.

我工作里特别开心的一点，就是能接触一些很有创意、聪明又有趣的创业者，我特别欣赏他们做的事。

And one of the pleasures of my work is that I get to interact with company founders who I find imaginative, intelligent, fun to deal with, and I love what they're doing.

所以经常有人问我，切换成本能不能主动去设计？

And so I'm often asked this question about switching costs, about can I initiate them somehow?

我通常的回答是：别想着怎么把客户绑住。

And the response that I often give is that the wrong way to think about this is I'm going to lock in my customers.

正确的思路应该是：我能为客户提供什么真正有价值的东西，让这种价值自然形成依赖，而不是事后去设陷阱留住他们。

The right way to think about this is what can I do for my customers that creates value that then has a lock in characteristic rather than sort of how do I retro lock them in?

我认为，从一开始就该这么想才对。

And that is the correct perspective, I think, how you do it in the first place.

后来你也可以通过始终专注于为客户创造价值，来一定程度上缓解这种困境，虽然不能完全避免。

And then later on, so you can somewhat but not completely avoid this difficulty by always thinking about value creation for your customer.

这和前面说的其实是相辅相成的。

And that goes hand in hand with it.

至于像ERP、甲骨文这种切换成本极高的公司，情况就有点复杂了。

Now for super intense switching costs companies like ERP, like Oracle or something, it's a little difficult.

他们是靠不断加更多服务来解决的。

I mean, they do it by offering more and more services and stuff.

但这种矛盾是天然存在的，你必须面对它。

But that conflict is kind of built in and you have to deal with it.

作为生意人，得把握好这个平衡。

There's a balance as a business person.

你希望客户满意，但也想从他们身上赚到该赚的钱。

You want your customer satisfied, but you also want to make what money you can from them.

所以这种矛盾是存在的，你得学会去平衡它。

And so there is that conflict and you have to manage it.

但至少这是一种能稍微缓解问题的方法。

But that's one way to sort of at least help a little bit.

这个说法我很喜欢。

I like that.

你实际上是重新定义了这个问题，这个见解太棒了。

That's kind of you kind of reframing the question and that that's a great insight.

我特别欣赏你用蒂芙尼来诠释品牌这个概念。

So I loved your definition of branding through the lens of Tiffany's.

蒂芙尼把品牌当作一种资产，能给顾客带来积极的情感，从而让他们更愿意为产品支付高价。

Tiffany's uses branding as an asset that confers positive emotions to the customer, which leads to an increased willingness to pay up for a product.

但这种力量在持久性上很难衡量，因为很多零售商都处在高度竞争的行业里。

This is a tougher power to identify in terms of durability because many retailers are in highly competitive industries.

你提到，那些已经存在十年的品牌，已经展现出它们的实力。

You point out that the ten year brand has displayed signals its strength.