TIP823：从铁路到人工智能：市场泡沫背后的永恒模式，嘉宾凯尔·格里夫

由于美国人不能投资古巴，这只基金想出了非常巧妙的方式来获得敞口。

Since Cuba was illegal for Americans to invest in, the fund came up with very, very creative ways to get exposure.

比如投资那些位于佛罗里达或加勒比地区、有可能在古巴开放后从中获利的企业。

These included things such as investing in Florida based and Caribbean based companies that maybe had a chance of benefiting from doing business in Cuba if it was eventually open for business.

据说，古巴基金的大部分资金其实都放在了国库券上，静静赚着利息，等着将来再出手。

And apparently, lot of the capital in the Cuba fund was actually just in T bills, which were accumulating interest in anticipation to invest at a later time.

所以，小规模的泡沫甚至根本不需要出现在公开市场上。

So tiny bubbles don't even actually have to happen in public markets.

伊萨纳指出，收藏品是另一个过去曾出现过小泡沫的领域。

Insana points out that collectibles are another area where tiny bubbles have formed in the past.

小熊布偶就是一个很好的例子。

Beanie Baby dolls are a great example of this.

小熊布偶的营销手段，是我见过最绝的之一。

So Beanie Babies had some of the best marketing gimmicks that I've ever seen.

而这套营销策略的幕后主脑，是一位名叫泰·华纳的先生。

And the mastermind behind the marketing strategy was this gentleman named Ty Warner.

他通过每年停产某些款式的布奇娃娃，人为减少供应量，制造了供需失衡。

So he created scarcity by retiring certain models of these Beanie Babies each year, effectively decreasing the supply, which created this supply and demand imbalance.

为了提升布奇娃娃的热度，他还和一些企业合作推出联名款，比如麦当劳，或者在职业体育赛事中搞赠品夜。

To help drive interest in Beanie Babies, he do kind of these product tie ins with businesses such as McDonald's or you have these giveaway nights at professional sporting events.

他最厉害的一招是宣布，到20世纪末就彻底停产布奇娃娃，这进一步推高了抢购热潮。

And one of his biggest schemes was to announce that Beanie Baby production would completely cease at the end of the twentieth century, which further increased the buying pressure.

书中提到，布奇娃娃的价格在巅峰时涨到了原价的一千倍，之后几十年一直稳定在高位。

The book outlines that the price of Beanie Babies went up a thousand times its face value at its apex and have now stabilized for decades.

但我其实不确定这个泡沫是否真的彻底破了。

But I'm actually not sure that the bubble ever fully popped.

在eBay上随便一搜，就能看到不少布奇娃娃还在卖一万美金以上。

A quick search on eBay shows a number of Beanie Babies still selling for over $10,000.

比如，戴安娜公主款的布奇娃娃，现在标价高达19500美元。

For instance, the Princess Diana Beanie Babies is listed for $19,500 today.

这里的关键教训是，不管是大泡沫还是小泡沫，都要想清楚：你是在真正投资——也就是捕捉价格和价值之间的差距，还是只是在投机，只盯着价格涨跌。

The key lesson here regarding big bubbles or tiny bubbles is to think about whether you are truly investing, which is based on capturing a gap between price and value, or if you're just speculating and focusing purely on price.

花两万美元买一个玩偶，很明显你关注的只是价格。

Buying a doll for $20,000 seems pretty obvious that you're probably just focusing on price.

你得确保自己关注的是基本面，而不是别人讲的那些故事。

You wanna make sure that you are focusing on the fundamentals and not necessarily purely on the narratives that people are telling you.

就像股票一样，任何资产都可能暴涨，也可能迅速崩盘。

Just like stocks, any asset can rise and quickly collapse in price.

要让本杰明·格雷厄姆在你耳边轻声提醒你，投资和投机之间的区别有多重要。

So make sure you're allowing Benjamin Graham to whisper into your ear about the importance of investing versus speculation.

不幸的是，小泡沫对散户投资者来说是个绝佳的陷阱。

Unfortunately, tiny bubbles are an excellent trap for retail investors.

这是因为参与者觉得自己赶上了早班车。

And that's because participants feel, you know, early.

他们觉得自己特别聪明。

They feel highly intelligent.

而这种感觉恰恰推高了价格，反过来又加深了他们的错觉。

And that unfortunately creates this velocity in price increase that only reinforces their illusion.

但如果你参与太多这样的小泡沫，很可能直接断送你的投资生涯。

But if you partake in too many tiny bubbles, you can easily end your career as an investor.

我自己是个集中型投资者，所以我不介意某些持仓上涨，占我总投资组合的比例越来越大。

Now as a concentrated investor myself, I'm fine having positions that go up and make up a larger and larger percentage of my total portfolio.

但与此同时，投资组合里也必须有一定程度的分散配置。

But it's also essential to have some sort of diversification embedded in the portfolio.

别做那种亏了一大笔钱，然后孤注一掷押在某个资产上想翻本的人。

Don't be the guy who loses a bunch of capital then goes all in on one asset hoping to make up your loss.

这简直是毁掉财富最快的方式。

That's a great way to just destroy wealth.

即使你专注于基本面、持仓集中，也别忘了留几笔其他投资来分散风险。

So even if you are concentrated and focused on the fundamentals, make sure that you have a few positions to spread your risk into.

永远要记住，根本不存在毫无风险的投资。

And it's always important to remember that there's no such thing as a risk free investment.

下一个可能史上最大的泡沫，其实是上世纪90年代的科技泡沫。

The next bubble is arguably the largest in modern history, and that's the tech bubble of the 1990s.

让我印象最深的是，这场泡沫中美国普通民众的广泛参与。

And what stands out to me most about this bubble is the massive participation of the American public.

这场泡沫不只是专业投资者在推高铁路股。

This bubble wasn't just professional investors bidding up railways.

而是普通家庭通过401(k)、共同基金和日内交易不断把钱投进市场。

It was your average household pouring money into the market via 401s, mutual funds, and day trading.

另一个很好的指标是看银行存款。

Another good indicator was to look at bank deposits.

当银行存款居高不下时，通常说明市场还不急着花钱或投资。

When bank deposits tend to be high, it generally tells you that the market is in no rush to spend or invest money.

但在科技泡沫期间，银行存款跌到了五十年来的最低点，而股票占家庭金融资产的比例却飙升到了58%。

But during the tech bubble, bank deposits fell to fifty year lows all while stocks grew to 58% of household financial holdings.

大众的广泛参与向科技股注入了巨额流动性，也让最终的市场崩盘对普通人造成了更沉重的打击。

The widespread participation injected a massive amount of liquidity into tech stocks and made the eventual collapse of the market all the more painful for everyday people.

我不太认同那种说法，认为科技泡沫和其他历史上的投机狂热有什么本质不同。

Now I don't really believe the narrative of the tech bubble was much different from other past manias.

无论是铁路、汽车工业、公路、运河，还是豆豆娃，这场狂热最特别的地方在于，市场起步得太早了。

Whether you look at things like railroads, automotive industries, cars, turnpikes, canals, or even Beanie Babies, where the big difference was in this mania was just how early the market was.

科技泡沫的根基是互联网将改变世界的说法，而事实确实如此。

The tech bubble was built around the narrative that the Internet would change the world, and it did.

但这种价值的创造是经过数十年逐步实现的，而不是在几个季度内完成的。

But that value creation unfolded over many decades and not over quarters.

可市场却把那些预期当成了马上就要实现的事情来定价。

But the market priced those expectations as if they were just around the corner.

估值的极端飙升，恰恰暴露了价格与价值之间的巨大脱节。

Now the extreme inclines valuation do a very good job of underlying the disconnect between price and value.

所以2001年3月，泡沫破裂前，纳斯达克的市盈率高达246倍，而历史平均水平只有40倍左右。

So in March 2001, before the bubble burst, the Nasdaq was trading at 246 times earnings compared to a historical range that was close to only 40 times.

比历史均值高出六倍的溢价，绝不是一点小偏差。

Now a six times premium to historical averages isn't just a minor stretch.

要为整个指数给出这么高的溢价，几乎是无法合理解释的。

It's basically impossible to justify a premium that high for an entire index.

关键是这一点。

And here's the thing.

公司如果真的改善了业务，市场给它重新估值，这本身没什么问题。

There's nothing wrong with a company getting a multiple rerating once the market, you know, verifies that the business is improving.

但整个市场在这么短的时间内，对如此多公司同时大幅上调估值，这简直闻所未闻。

But it's unheard of for a market to improve at that rate across a very broad number of companies.

再想想，指数里很多公司连像样的产品都没有，这时候你就会发现，市盈率在飙升，而这些公司的整体质量却在下滑。

Then when you consider that many companies in the index just didn't even have working products, you begin to see a picture where the multiples were going up while the average quality of the businesses inside of that index were actually declining.

所以1999年，经济学家罗伯特·萨缪尔森得出结论：77%的首次公开募股公司都还没盈利。

So in 1999, economist Robert Samuelson concluded that 77% of IPOs had no profits.

市场的投机情绪，正在把纳斯达克整体的估值越推越高。

The speculative energy in the market just was inflating valuations across the entire Nasdaq.

但这里还有其他因素在起作用。

But there are other forces at play here as well.

美联储降低了利率，帮助陷入困境的银行重新注资，摆脱经济低迷。

The Fed reduced interest rates to help troubled banks recapitalize themselves and pull themselves out of an economic slump.

这导致借贷成本下降，而低借贷成本显然是泡沫的关键因素。

And this created reduced borrowing costs, which are obviously key ingredients to a bubble.

能源成本也降低了，让人们有更多钱可以花在别的地方，比如炒股。

Energy costs had also come down, freeing up money to be spent elsewhere, such as gambling in stocks.

华尔街也在这场狂热中推波助澜。

Wall Street had its part in the euphoria as well.

因为很多互联网公司根本没法用传统的价值评估指标，比如自由现金流或利润，来衡量，它们根本就没有这些。

Since many of these .com businesses couldn't be evaluated using traditional value creating metrics such as, you know, free cash flow or profits because they just didn't have any.

于是华尔街的投资者们发明了新的评估标准。

So investors on Wall Street created new metrics.

他们不再分析这些公司的未来现金流，而是看网页浏览量和独立访客数。

Instead of analyzing the future cash flow of these businesses, they looked at things such as page views and unique visitors.

可供投资者关注的新项目也多得是。

And there wasn't any shortage of new opportunities for investors to look at either.

判断市场是否处于牛市的另一个明显信号，就是看首次公开募股的情况。

Another key sign that markets are in bull mode is to look at IPOs.

从1980年到1989年，每年平均有大约311家公司在股市上市。

So IPOs from 1980 to 1989 averaged about 311 IPOs per year.

而从1990年到2001年，这个数字飙升到了每年380家。

Now from 1990 to 2001, that number jumped to 380 per year.

科技泡沫破裂后，平均数回落到了大约200家左右。

So after the tech bubble exploded, the average dropped closer to 200.

这本书里用一个案例详细分析了莫尼什最成功的多倍回报投资之一。

Now, one of Monish provides biggest multi baggers was explained as a case study in this book.

那就是CMGI公司，因萨纳当初看到的是一家失败的互联网孵化器。

And this is CMGI, where Insana saw a failed internet incubator.

事后来看，莫尼什发现了机会，而别人在事前却没看出来。

After the fact, Monish saw an opportunity before the fact.

我不太确定CMGI给莫尼什带来了多少倍的回报，但这家公司的业务本质上是一家互联网控股公司。

Now I'm not sure how much of a multi bagger CMGI was for Monish, but what the business was was basically an Internet holding company.

它主要为互联网初创企业提供资金支持，然后帮它们上市。

So it would basically supply Internet companies with capital and then take them public.

它本质上就是一个公开的风投公司。

It was essentially just a public venture capital company.

莫尼什正好在最合适的时机抓住了这个机会，在2001年初股价从140美元暴跌到5美元之前就撤出了。

Monish wrote this idea at the exact right time and got out before it cratered from around $140 to just $5 in early two thousand and one.

CMGI的问题在于，它的商业模式根本无法持续。

Now the problem with CMGI was that it was just not a sustainable business model.

它的运作完全依赖互联网股票的泡沫。

It required a bubble in Internet stocks to function.

任何需要永远牛市才能存活的生意，都不可能长久。

And any business that requires an eternal bull market is just not gonna last very long.

虽然因萨纳欣赏金德伯格关于泡沫的理论，但他自己做了一些改进，我觉得反而更到位。

Now while Insana liked Kindleberger's framework about bubbles, he actually had his own spin on it, which I think is actually an improvement.

如果投资者掌握了这套框架，理论上就能预测泡沫，并在别人之前及时退出。

If an investor has this framework, they could theoretically speculate on a bubble and try to get out before everyone else does.

我觉得，莫尼什投资CMGI，可能就是想干这么一回事。

I think that this is maybe what Monish was trying to do with the CMGI bet.

为了帮你更好地理解如何应对泡沫，我们来梳理一下因萨纳对金德伯格框架的更新版本。

Now to help you better understand how to deal with bubbles, let's go over Insana's updated version of Kindleberger's framework.

因萨纳的框架和金德伯格的不同，它更关注泡沫的上涨阶段，而金德伯格的框架则同时涵盖上涨和崩盘。

So Insana's framework differs from Kindleberger's as it focuses much more on the rise of the bubbles, whereas Kindleberger's framework focuses on both the rise and the fall.

这是因萨纳泡沫的五个关键要素。

So here are the five ingredients of Insana's bubble.

第一个叫‘顿悟时刻’，就是当世界迎来一项令人振奋的发现或发明时。

The first one's called the eureka moment, which is when the world makes an exciting discovery or invention.

第二个是资金宽松。

Two is easy money.

这时候资金成本低，现金和信贷都很容易获得。

This is when there's a low cost of money and high availability of cash and credit.

第三个是政府扶持。

Third is government largesse.

指的是政府出台了一些有利的经济政策，比如税收优惠之类的。

This is where there's favorable economic conditions maybe tax incentives that are put in place by the government.

第四是良好的经济环境。

Fourth is auspicious economic conditions.

第五是外部刺激因素。

And fifth is an external stimulant.

我们之前已经讲过很多发现和发明，比如木板路。

Now, we've already covered many discoveries and inventions such as plank roads.

当然还可以包括铁路、汽车、互联网，甚至抵押贷款支持证券。

You can also include other things of course such as railroads, cars, the internet, or even mortgage backed securities.

接下来是低成本资金。

Next is easy money.

当信贷便宜时，企业就能以更低的成本融资扩张。

So when there's cheap credit, corporations can fund growth at a cheaper cost.

这意味着他们更可能借钱并增加支出。

This means they're more likely to borrow and spend even more.

当企业能更多地投资时，就有机会创造额外的股东价值，而股东当然喜欢这一点。

When a business can spend more on investments, there's a chance that they can create additional shareholder value, which of course, shareholders love.

当投资者愿意投入储蓄时，更多资金会流入市场，从而进一步推动交易达成。

When investors show a disposition to deploy their savings, more money comes into the market, which can further improve deal making.

如果一家公司估值很高，它就可以用股票作为支付手段，去进行更多收购或自我投资。

So if a company has a high valuation, it can then use its stock as currency to make additional deals or to invest in itself.

政府的扶持措施包括税收优惠、补贴，以及能强力推动某个行业的全新政策。

Now government largesse includes things such as tax incentives, subsidies, and new policies that can supercharge an industry.

比如在铁路热潮时期，政府曾向铁路建设者提供大量土地赠与。

For instance, during the railroad boom, there were these land grants that were granted to railroad builders.

在互联网热潮期间，还曾实施过税收豁免政策。

During the Internet boom, there was a tax moratorium.

这些看似微小的事件，日后可能产生巨大的连锁反应，吸引其他创业者前来趁势而为。

So these seemingly small events can have very outsized effects down the road when other entrepreneurs come in and try to take advantage of them.

接下来是有利的经济环境。

Next are auspicious economic conditions.

你知道，经济泡沫从来不会在衰退期出现。

Look, you know, bubbles don't happen when a country is in a recession.

这种情况发生在经济景气的时候。

They happen when things are going well.

当GDP增长强劲、失业率低、消费者信心充足，愿意花钱的时候。

When GDP growth is strong, when unemployment levels are low, and when consumers are optimistic and willing to open their wallets and purse strings.

如果失业率很高，泡沫就不太可能发生，因为钱根本没那么充裕。

If unemployment levels are high, chances are a bubble isn't going to happen simply because money isn't plentiful.

最后一点是外部推动力。

The last part here is about external stimulants.

这可能包括战争、政策调整、人口结构变化，甚至危机等宏观因素。

This can include macro factors such as war, regulatory changes, demographic shifts, or even crisis.

这些推动力会加速需求和关注。

These stimulants can accelerate demand and attention.

我更关注的是我称之为微观推动力的因素。

What I like to look for are what I call micro stimulants.

我曾经投资过一家没成功的公司，叫BQE Water，当时的核心逻辑是他们的硒产品能降低废水中的硒含量。

So in one of my investments that didn't quite work out for me called BQE Water, the thesis centered on their selenium product, which could reduce selenium levels in effluent water.

所以这次的推动力很简单，就是北美不再允许高浓度的硒排入水体。

So the stimulant for this was simply that North America would no longer allow selenium to be deposited into waterways at high levels.

BQE 的产品正好能直接解决这个问题，而且还有专利保护。

And BQE had an excellent product that would directly help with this issue, and it was backed by patents.

我喜欢这种类型的推动力。

I like these kind of stimulants.

就像我稍后会详细讲到的霍华德·马克斯一样，因萨纳认为，我们可以通过模式识别来发现类似泡沫的事件。

Now just like Howard Marks, who I'm gonna discuss in a little more detail here shortly, Insana believes that we can detect bubble like events through pattern recognition.

我们刚才讲的，就是他的模式识别框架。

His pattern recognition framework is what we just covered.

这里要清楚一点，我们永远不可能百分之百准确地预测未来。

It's important here to note that we can never predict things with 100% certainty.

我们能做的最好的事，就是识别出泡沫形成时反复出现的条件。

The best hope we can have is to recognize the recurring conditions in which bubbles form.

所以资产泡沫形成的三个关键条件是：技术创新、资金宽松，以及政府的慷慨支持。

So the first three ingredients necessary for an asset bubble to form are technological innovation, easy money, and government largesse.

要发现这些迹象，你只需要留心观察世界，比如读读报纸，看看各个行业和公司，分析经济指标，再找专家聊聊。

To identify these things, you just simply have to observe the world, you know, read newspapers, look at industries and individual companies, analyze economic indicators, and maybe consult with experts.

Insana说，只要你能识别出这三大要素，就能提前发现有潜力的投资机会。

Insana says that if you can identify those three ingredients, you can be ahead of the curve in finding high potential investments.

但如果你发现某个行业正具备这三大要素，并且确实在创造真实价值，那当泡沫破裂时，你该怎么保护自己呢？

But if you notice an industry with these three ingredients that are truly creating value, how do you make sure you protect yourself once the bubble pops?

我根本不想参与任何泡沫。

Well, I have no desire to participate in bubbles.

我更希望自家公司的股价能跟内在价值同步稳步增长。

I'd actually just prefer that my business's public market valuations simply increase at the same rate as their intrinsic value.

但现实往往不是这样。

But in reality, that's just not what happens.

股票每年的波动幅度平均接近百分之五十。

Stocks go up and down with nearly 50% variance on average each year.

有时候，涨幅甚至会远远超过这个数字。

And sometimes, they can obviously go up much, much higher than that.

所以考虑到这一点，投资者必须时刻留意，确保自己的投资没有陷入泡沫区域。

So with that in mind, investors must always watch to make sure an investment isn't in bubble territory.

当泡沫进入最后阶段时，Insana建议我们注意哪些信号？

What does Insana say to look out for when a bubble is getting into this terminal phase?

他提到有几个关键指标需要关注。

So he notes a few key indicators to watch for.

资金开始变得紧张。

Money turns tight.

之前鼓励投资的财政政策突然被取消。

Fiscal policies at once encouraged investments are repealed.

各种创新、发明和发现都未能兑现当初的承诺。

Innovations, inventions, and discoveries fail to deliver on their initial promise.

基本的经济状况也在恶化。

Underlying economic conditions deteriorate.

公众参与度达到顶峰，这往往意味着泡沫即将破裂。

And public participation peaks, which is a signal that the bubble is about to pop.

现在，资金从宽松变紧缩最简单的方式，就是利率上升。

Now the easiest way for money to go from easy to tight is just when interest rates rise.

利率上升意味着借贷成本增加，企业利润也会减少。

Rising interest rates means higher borrowing costs and less corporate profits.

所以这是投资者很容易就能注意到的一个信号。

So that's an easy signal that any investor can really look for.

但也要小心，别因为看到利率上升，就慌忙退出那些根本没在泡沫里的投资。

But it's also important not to get scared out of a position that's maybe not in bubble like territory just because you see rising interest rates.

我觉得利率上升不能只看表面，得结合其他信号一起分析，才能做出准确判断。

So while I think rising interest rates weren't a cursory glance, they need to be considered alongside other signals to be valid.

接下来是财政政策。

Next is fiscal policies.

Insana认为，1987年黑色星期一之前推出的财政政策，其实是引发那次股灾的原因之一。

So Insana argues that fiscal policy that was released before Black Monday in 1987 was actually one of the reasons for that crash.

当时的情况是，黑色星期一之前的繁荣，很大程度上是由杠杆收购热潮推动的。

The story here is that much of the boom leading up to Black Monday was actually fueled by the leveraged buyout boom.

这些杠杆收购的资金来自一种叫垃圾债券的东西。

And these LBOs were funded by something called junk bonds.

后来出台了一项法案，取消了垃圾债券的税收抵扣，导致收购公司纷纷受挫。

A bill was then introduced that actually repealed the junk bond deductibility, which sent buyout firms down.

当我们分析新技术未能兑现收益的原因时，其实不用往远了看，就拿我刚才提到的科技泡沫为例就够了。

Now when we analyze the failure of delivery of the benefits of new technologies, we don't have to look much further back than the example which I already gave, which was the tech bubble.

许多投资者被这些企业宣传中承诺的高额回报吸引住了。

So many investors were drawn to the potential profits that were promised in the narratives of these businesses.

但一旦大家清楚地意识到，这些故事更多是幻想而非现实，投资者就开始大量撤离。

But once it became completely apparent that these narratives were more dreams than reality, investors began exiting in droves.

经济环境的恶化，可以在更近的事件中看到，比如2008年金融危机。

Now the breakdown of economic conditions can be seen in a more recent event, such as the great financial crisis.

当时信贷冻结，资产价格下跌，房地产市场崩盘，全球GDP下滑，美国失业率飙升至百分之十。

During that time, credit froze, asset prices declined, the housing market fell, global GDP declined, and US unemployment rose to 10%.

抵押贷款证券的泡沫再也撑不住了，最终破裂。

The bubble in mortgage backed securities was no longer sustainable, so it eventually burst.

在金融危机期间，并没有出现明显的泡沫，因为当时的经济环境根本不具备催生泡沫的条件。

During the great financial crisis, there was no obvious bubbles that formed during that time simply because economic conditions were not set up to create one.

最后，我们迎来了最后一个信号——公众参与。

Finally, we reached the final signal, which is public participation.

关于这一点，我最喜欢的一个例子来自彼得·林奇。

One of my favourite anecdotes on this came from Peter Lynch.

他说，有一次在晚宴上，身边全是人围着他说投资的事。

He said he was surrounded by people at a dinner party.

到了第四阶段，他们又围住我，但这次不一样了。

In stage four, once again, they're crowded around me.

这次他们是来给我推荐该买什么袜子的。

But this time, it's to tell me what socks I should buy.

连牙医都给我出了三四个选股建议。

Even the dentist has three or four tips.

接下来几天，我翻了翻报纸，发现他推荐的那些股票全都涨了。

And the next few days, I look up his recommendations in the newspaper, and they have all gone up.

当邻居们开始指点我该买什么，而我后悔没听他们的建议时，这说明市场已经见顶，随时可能大跌。

When the neighbors tell me what to buy and that I wish I had taken their advice, it's a sure sign that the market has reached the top and is due for a tumble.

关于这一点，基本就说完了。

There isn't much more to add to this.

当然，这些信号确实值得留意，但某个领域出现泡沫，并不等于整个市场都在泡沫里。

Now, do think that all these signals are important to look for, but just because a segment of the market is in a bubble, does not mean that the entire market is.

当市场整体偏贵时，我喜欢看看自己的投资组合，找出哪些资产涨得最多。

When the market is expensive, I like to look at my own portfolio and see which of my assets have risen the most in price.

然后我会对比这些公司的内在价值增长了多少。

Then I compare it to the increases in the intrinsic value of those businesses.

比如我有几项投资在2025年翻了一倍，但这就能说明它们在泡沫里吗？

I have a few positions, for instance, that have doubled in 2025, but does that mean that they're in a bubble?

我不这么认为。

I don't think so.

我觉得只是它们可能稍微被高估了而已。

I think it just means that they're probably a little bit overpriced.

在这种情况下，有些投资者会选择获利了结，而像我这样的人，往往就什么都不做。

Now in this case, some investors might take profits, and some, like me, just do nothing.

如果你持有的资产本来就不便宜，价格却涨了五倍，而它的内在价值只增长了百分之十左右，那你真得高度警惕了。

When you have an asset that wasn't cheap to begin with and maybe went up five times in price and has only increased its intrinsic value by let's say 10%, then you need to get very, very worried.

我曾经遇到过一个完全符合这种情况的公司，叫InMode，不过我现在已经不持有它了。

One experience I had with this exact kind of scenario was a business called InMode, which I no longer own.

这家公司主要生产微创美容设备。

So this business makes minimally invasive aesthetic devices.

从我最初买入时的疫情低谷，到2021年底不到两年的时间里，这家公司表现得非常出色。

Now from the depths of COVID when I initially bought it until just late twenty twenty one, less than two years later, the company was doing exceptionally well.

那段时间，它的每股收益翻了一倍。

It doubled its EPS in that time.

我们先插播一段今天赞助商的广告。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

你对在线交易感兴趣，但还没迈出第一步吗？

Curious about online trading, haven't taken the first step yet?

你不是一个人在这么做。

You're not alone.

Plus500期货是个不错的入门选择。

And Plus500 futures is a great place to start.

期货市场变化很快。

The futures markets are moving fast.

通过Plus500，你可以交易原油、黄金、标普500、比特币等热门资产。

With Plus500, you can explore popular assets like oil, gold, S and P 500, Bitcoin, and more.

从加密货币到大宗商品，总有不少动态。

From crypto to commodities, there's always something happening.

平台操作非常简单，随时随地用手机就能交易。

The platform is super easy to use, so you can trade on the go right from your phone.

只需100美元就能开始，马上参与进来。

You can get started with just $100 and jump into the action.

看到感兴趣的机会了吗？

See something interesting?

账户开好后，点几下就能开始交易了。

Once your account is open, you can trade it in just a couple of clicks.

如果还没准备好，可以先用免费的模拟账户练习。

And if you're not quite ready yet, you can practice with a free demo account.

零风险，没压力。

No risk, no pressure.

Plus500有二十年经验，让交易变得前所未有的简单。

With twenty years of experience, Plus500 makes trading more accessible than ever.

去 plus500.com 了解一下吧。

Check it out at plus500.com.

期货交易有亏损风险，并非适合所有人，也不是所有申请人都能通过审核。

Trading in futures involves risks of loss and is not suitable for everyone, not all applicants will qualify.

Plus500，让交易更胜一筹。

Plus500, it's trading with a plus.

每个企业都在问同一个问题：怎么让人工智能真正为我们所用？

Every business is asking the same question, how do we make AI work for us?

坐等观望可不是办法。

Sitting on the sidelines is, of course, not an option.

你的竞争对手早就行动了。

Your competitors are already making their move.

但有了甲骨文的NetSuite，你今天就能用上AI。

But with Netsuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite是全球超过四万三千家企业信赖的首选AI云ERP系统。

Netsuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它把财务、库存、电商、人力和客户关系管理整合成一个统一的数据源。

It unifies your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into a single source of truth.

正是这种打通的数据，让AI变得更聪明。

And that connected data is what makes the AI smarter.

它不是猜测，而是真正懂你。

It doesn't guess, it knows.

自动处理日常事务，挖掘切实可行的洞察，帮你降低成本，快速做出果断决策。

Automating routine tasks, surfacing actionable insights, and helping you cut costs and make fast, confident decisions.

从软件和IT服务，到医疗、设备制造、金融服务，还有众多其他优秀的美国产业，NetSuite都能为您提供量身定制的解决方案。

From software and IT services to health care, equipment manufacturing, financial services, and many other great American industries, Netsuite delivers a customized solution for your business.

这不是事后加装的工具。

This is not a bolted on tool.

这是深度融入您业务系统的AI技术。

It's AI built into the system that runs your business.

如果我当初需要这样的产品，我一定会选它。

And if I had needed this product, it is exactly what I'd use.

如果您年收入达到七位数以上，可以免费领取他们的商业指南，了解AI如何真正发挥作用，访问 netsuite.com/tip。

If your revenues are at least in the 7 figures, get their free business guide, demystifying AI at netsuite.com/tip.

这份指南免费提供，访问 netsuite.com/tip 即可获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/tip.

网址是 netsuite.com/tip。

That's netsuite.com/tip.

在我加入投资者播客之前，我脑子里全是各种‘如果’的假设。

Before I joined the investors podcast, every what if you can imagine was running through my head.

要是我根本不适合这个受众怎么办？

What if I'm not the right fit for this audience?

要是我在镜头前紧张得说不出话怎么办？

What if I freeze up on camera?

要是我跟不上这里大家期待的分析水平怎么办？

What if I can't keep up with the level of analysis people here expect?

不过，我还是选择相信自己，这成了我做过最明智的决定之一。

Well, betting on myself anyways turned out to be one of the best decisions I've ever made.

说实话，要是当初有人像Shopify支持商家那样站在我这边，那段起步的日子肯定会轻松很多。

And I'll tell you, those early days would have been a lot less stressful with a partner in my corner the way Shopify is for the businesses that work with them.

Shopify是全球数百万企业的电商平台，也是美国十分之一电商交易背后的技术支撑。

Shopify is the e commerce platform behind millions of businesses around the world and 10 of all e commerce in The US.

从Allbirds、Gymshark这样的知名品牌，到刚刚起步的小众品牌，都在用它。

From household names like Allbirds and Gymshark to brands just getting off the ground.

你可以从他们的设计工作室开始，直接使用上百个现成模板，哪怕完全没有设计经验，也能轻松打造一个贴合品牌风格的精美网店。

You get started with their design studio, hundreds of ready to use templates that help you build a beautiful online store that actually matches your brand with no design background required.

它还内置了大量AI工具，帮你处理那些你根本没想到要做的琐事，比如写产品描述、拟定标题，甚至优化产品图片。

It's also packed with AI tools that handle the work you didn't realize you'd have to do, writing product descriptions, headlines, even enhancing your product photography.

那要是你遇到困难怎么办？

And what if you get stuck?

每月只需24.07美元，还能享受屡获殊荣的客服支持，随时帮你解决问题。

Well, is around $24.07 with award winning customer support to walk you through it.

是时候把那些顾虑变成现实了，现在就用Shopify吧。

It's time to turn those what ifs into with Shopify today.

前往 shopify.com/tip，注册每月1美元的试用。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial at shopify.com/tip.

访问 shopify.com/tip。

Go to shopify.com/tip.

就是 shopify.com/tip。

That's shopify.com/tip.

好的。

Alright.

我们继续回到节目。

Back to the show.

你可能会觉得，股价至少应该翻倍才对。

So you'd expect the stock price to at least double during the time.

但事实上，它涨了七倍，现在回头看，这明显是个信号，说明这只股票可能已经进入泡沫阶段。

But in reality, it actually went up seven x, which looking back now should have been a very good signal that this stock was probably in bubble territory.

即使到现在，五年过去了，股价也只相当于当年峰值的一小部分。

Now even today, five years later, the stock price is only a fraction of what it was at that all time high.

所以，如果我一路持有到泡沫破裂，回报会非常差。

So the returns if I had held through the entire bubble would have been very, very unattractive.

我可惜没在泡沫顶峰前卖出，但幸运的是，我赶在公司真正停滞之前离场了，还是赚了一笔。

I unfortunately carried it through and didn't sell anywhere close to the top of the bubble, but luckily, I still made a good return simply because I got out before the business really started to stagnate.

接下来我们继续说重点：小泡沫确实会发生，但有时它们是潜在风险的前兆。

Now let's continue with the point here that tiny bubbles can happen, but sometimes they are precursors to maybe some hidden dangers.

而这种风险，就和欺诈有关。

And that danger has to do with fraud.

泡沫的麻烦在于，当监管放松、投资者情绪高涨时，欺诈行为就容易滋生。

The unfortunate part about bubbles is that fraud can flourish when oversight tends to maybe be a little more lax and when investors' euphoria is intense.

九十年代末期，科技推动了快速增长，也带来了新的乐观情绪。

So the late nineties were a time of rapid growth and renewed optimism based on tech.

市场持续上涨，削弱了关键各方的怀疑态度，包括审计师、分析师、银行和投资者。

These rising markets helped weaken skepticism among key parties, including auditors, analysts, banks, and investors.

那时候，安然公司蓬勃发展，因为业务复杂性被误认为是高明的智慧。

At this time, Enron was just thriving because the increasing complexity of the business was mistaken for intelligence.

由于股价持续上涨，投资者完全放下了警惕。

And since the stock price continued to rise, investors just threw caution to the wind.

在投资者看来，安然的一个问题是，它的复杂性被当成了优势，而不是隐患。

Now one of the problems with Enron, according to investor perception, was that its complexity was seen as a feature and not a bug.

安然把自己包装成能源交易和宽带领域的创新者。

Enron positioned itself as this innovator in energy trading and broadband.

尽管实际上它只是在买卖大宗商品，却构建了一个自己正在转型为科技公司的故事。

And even though the business was really peddling commodities, it created a narrative based around how it was transforming itself into a tech company.

当时，其中一个关键市场被取消了监管。

Now during this time, one of its key markets was deregulated.

加州最近放开了市场，让安然能够在这片美国最大的电力市场中销售和交易电力。

California recently deregulated its market allowing Enron to sell power and trade electricity in one of the largest markets in The US.

当时监管机构并不知道，安然正在操纵加州的能源价格，最终给该州造成了约110亿美元的损失，但直到安然破产后，监管方才察觉到问题。

Now unbeknownst to regulators at this time, Enron was just manipulating energy prices in California, which ended up costing the state about $11,000,000,000, But the regulators didn't even catch on to this until after Enron went bankrupt.

安然的问题在于，它特别擅长掩盖欺诈行为。

Now the issue here with Enron was that they were really, really good at hiding its fraud.

它瞒过了监管机构和审计人员。

They hid it from regulators and auditors.

所以普通投资者根本无从知晓真相。

So, you know, the average investor just didn't have a chance.

那么，安然到底做了些什么呢？

So what exactly was Enron doing?

比如，把根本不存在的利润记作当期收入。

They did things such as booking imagined profits as current income.

他们用表外负债，让资产负债表看起来比实际情况健康得多。

They used off balance sheet debt to make their balance sheet look healthier than it was in reality.

他们还设立了表外合伙企业，这些企业实际上由安然内部人员暗中操控。

And then they had off balance sheet partnerships, which Enron insiders secretly ran.

他们把公司内部的交易算作真实交易，还把这些交易的费用算作自己的收入。

And they counted trading transactions within their own company, and they allowed those fees on those transactions to count as their own revenue.

在正常情况下，如果没人赚大钱，这些做法早就该引起怀疑了。

So in a typical environment when everyone wasn't getting rich, this may have raised questions.

但在当时不断膨胀的泡沫中，这些问题都被悄悄压了下去。

But in the increasing bubble at that time, these issues were just kind of swept under the rug.

所以我最大的教训就是，牛市里千万别掉以轻心。

So my big lesson here is to just not get complacent in bull markets.

公开市场里的欺诈行为其实一直都在发生。

Fraud happens all the time in public markets.

关键是要时刻保持警惕。

The key is to remember to stay vigilant.

当情绪高涨、直觉告诉你该放松警惕的时候，恰恰是你最应该保持警觉的时候。

It's when emotions are running high and your intuition tells you to just be lax is probably the time when you should actually be the most vigilant.

接下来，趋势观察的最后一章要谈的是未来可能出现的泡沫。

Now the final chapter of trend watching deals with potential bubbles in the future.

这本书出版于2002年，早于那次重大的金融危机。

The book was published in 2002 before the great financial crisis.

但有意思的是，罗恩当时就明确提到房地产可能形成泡沫。

But interestingly, Ron directly discussed real estate as a possible bubble.

所以他列了一个自己的检查清单：外部冲击？

So he created a checklist with his own framework: External shock?

对。

Yes.

货币刺激？

Monetary stimulus?

对。

Yes.

财政刺激？

Fiscal stimulus?

是的。

Yes.

经济状况？

Economic conditions?

有利。

Favorable.

投机性的公众参与？

Speculative public participation?

还没到那一步。

Not quite yet.

所以他已经开始察觉到一些迹象，房地产里可能正在形成一个泡沫。

So he was already starting to see some of the writing on the wall that perhaps inside of real estate, a bubble was beginning to form.

而最后一项——投机性的公众参与，还需要再过几年才彻底爆发。

And that final part, speculative public participation needed just a few more years to fester before things ended blowing up.

根据YCharts的数据，美国住房销售量直到2006年左右才达到峰值，当年卖出了七百万套住房。

So according to YCharts, US housing homes sales didn't peak until around 2006 at 7,000,000 homes sold.

这比2000年的五百万套有了明显增长。

That was up from just 5,000,000 in 2000.

泡沫破裂后，住房销量回落到大约四百万套的正常水平。

And after the bubble popped, sold homes normalized back to about a 4,000,000 range.

所以我说，公众的参与确实达到了非常投机的狂热程度，但那是在2006年才发生的。

So I would say public participation indeed reached a very speculative fervor, but not until 2006.

即使这些数据已经公开，市场仍有一段滞后时间，真正引发金融危机的恐慌情绪直到2007年年中才全面爆发。

And even after that data was public, it still had a lag time before fear gripped the market as a great financial crisis didn't actually start until mid two thousand and seven.

说实话，我很少用罗恩那种特定框架去分析泡沫，因为我信奉彼得·林奇的观点：如果你花超过三十分钟研究经济和市场预测，那其实已经浪费了十分钟。

Now, if I'm being completely honest, I don't think about bubbles much using Ron's specific framework simply because I subscribe to Peter Lynch's notion that if you spend more than thirty minutes analyzing economic and market forecasts, you wasted ten minutes.

所以我一般不会在宏观层面花太多时间纠结这些，我觉得把时间用在分析我旗下每一家企业的具体状况上，回报要高得多。

So I tend not to spend too much time on this at a macroeconomic level because I think my time is much, much better spent looking at the impacts on each of my individual businesses.

我在波兰有一家杂货店，在加拿大有一家信任建设公司。

I have a grocer in Poland, and I have a trust builder in Canada.

它们在宏观层面的担忧根本没什么共同点。

And they're just not going to have much macroeconomic concerns in common.

相反，我会关注每个国家的具体问题，看看哪些因素可能推动这些企业未来增长或下滑。

Instead, I look at what concerns in each of those countries can contribute to the businesses booming or declining in the future.

如果你经营的企业，或者与之相关的业务，价格开始飞速上涨，那确实值得用伊萨纳的框架来分析一下。

Now, think it's definitely worth using Insana's framework here in businesses that you own where maybe the businesses themselves or maybe the businesses that are associated with them begin increasing in price very, very rapidly.

但如果价格并没有明显飙升，就没必要用这个框架了，否则只会白白吓唬自己，时间用在别处更有价值。

But if they aren't really showing a rapid increase in price, there's no real need to use this framework because you're probably just gonna scare yourself and there's much, much better uses of your time.

目前我注意到一个正在形成的潜在泡沫，我觉得特别有意思。

So a potential bubble is forming today that I think is very fascinating.

虽然我并没有直接投资于它，但确实有间接的关联。

Now, while I don't have direct exposure to it, I do have indirect exposure.

所以它确实占用了我一部分思考的时间。

So it does take some of my thinking time.

接下来的这部分内容，我会用伊萨纳的框架来探讨人工智能是否正在形成泡沫。

And the rest of this episode will be devoted to discussing AI and whether or not it's in a bubble using Insana's framework.

所以在这期节目中，我们回顾了多个不同的泡沫，并梳理了每个泡沫中反复出现的模式。

So throughout this episode, we've gone through a number of different bubbles, and we've traced the recurring patterns that happen in each of these bubbles.

几乎每一个泡沫都是由人类行为、技术创新和资金容易获得这些因素推动的，最终都演变成投机狂热。

So nearly every bubble is driven by things like human behavior, technological innovations, access to easy money, which all ends up culminating in speculative excess.

虽然人工智能确实符合其中几条特征，但我还不确定我们已经完全走到那一步了。

And while AI ticks a few of these boxes, I'm not sure we're all the way there yet.

我当然无法百分之百确定人工智能现在就处在泡沫中。

Now there's no way that I can know AI is in a bubble with 100% certainty.

我所能做的，就是利用现有的工具，观察我们当前所处的位置，至少这能帮助我判断未来可能走向哪里。

All I can do is use the tools available to observe where we are today, which at least will inform me where we could be headed in the future.

但就像Insana在金融危机中的判断所显示的那样，你即使大体上是对的，泡沫也可能好几年都不会破裂。

But as Insana's call in the great financial crisis showed, you can still be mostly right, and yet the bubble won't pop for many years ahead.

人工智能最突出的地方，在于媒体和投资者对它的普遍关注。

Now where AI is strongest is in the general interest from the media and from investors.

有意思的是，几乎任何人都能接触到人工智能。

The fascinating thing about AI is that nearly anybody can touch it.

这可不是什么飘在空中的抽象概念或想法。

It's not some sort of abstract thought or idea just floating around.

它是实实在在的。

It's tangible.

你现在就能轻松用上人工智能，提高效率、学习新东西，或者自动化某个流程。

You can easily go and use AI right now to improve your efficiency, learn something new, or automate a process.

有个值得思考的问题是，AI可能属于哪种类型的泡沫。

One interesting area of AI to ponder is just what kind of bubble it could be.

霍华德·马克斯曾提出过两种泡沫。

So Howard Marks outlined two types of bubbles.

第一种叫转折型泡沫，某种程度上其实是积极的泡沫。

The first is inflection bubbles, which are in some ways good bubbles.

这类泡沫带来了真正改变人类的技术。

These are bubbles that deliver truly transformative technology to humankind.

至于投资者是赚是赔，那是另一回事，但核心技术本身对人类是好事。

So whether or not investors win or lose money is another story, but the underlying technology remains a positive for mankind.

铁路和互联网就是典型的转折型泡沫。

Railroads and the internet are great examples of inflection bubbles.

第二种是均值回归泡沫，也就是纯粹的坏泡沫。

Second is mean reversion bubbles, or just simply bad bubbles.

这类泡沫的特点是市场会剧烈上涨然后暴跌，但对社会实际上没有任何实质性的益处。

These are the types of bubbles where the markets tend to rise and drop precipitously, but there's actually no added benefit to society.

我觉得很明显，人工智能大概属于转折型泡沫的范畴。

So I think it's pretty evident that AI probably falls into the inflection bubble category.

虽然你可以认为转折型泡沫是好事，但这里有个我之前提到过的前提。

And while you can consider inflection bubbles to be good, that definitely comes with a caveat that I already mentioned here.

那就是，你依然可能在投资真正具有变革性的技术时亏钱。

And that's that you can still lose money investing into transformative technology that is actually transformative.

但转折型泡沫之所以算好事，是因为它激发了人们对这项技术的巨大关注。

But the reason that inflection bubbles can be considered good is just because of all the interest in that technology that it creates.

科学进步因此被压缩，从几十年缩短到几年之内。

Scientific progress ends up being compressed from decades to just years.

AI和其他许多过去的科技突破一样，根本找不到现成的历史参照来总结经验。

Now the thing with AI, like many other technological marvels from the past, is that there's just no simple historical benchmark to try and draw wisdom from.

AI到底更像铁路，还是更像互联网？

Is AI like railways or the Internet?

除非你能坐上时光机，直接穿越到未来，否则谁也说不准。

There's no way to know unless you can put yourself in a time machine and go into the future.

AI带来的不确定性主要体现在几个关键问题上。

The uncertainties in AI involve a few questions.

比如，谁会是AI最大的受益者？

Things like who's gonna be the biggest beneficiary of AI?

今天那些在AI基础设施领域领先的公司，会不会像早期的MySpace一样被彻底颠覆？

Which of today's leaders in AI infrastructure build out will be overturned like the early social media companies such as Myspace?

AI的利润最终会落到设备供应商手里，还是会因为价格战被冲得一干二净？

Will AI profits go to vendors or will they be competed away by price wars?

AI产品会是高度定制化的解决方案，还是会变成像日用品一样的大宗商品？

And will AI products be these specialized products or will they just be treated as commodities?

接下来要探讨的是货币政策。

The next area of exploration is regarding monetary policy.

经济政策的一个特点是，过去的货币政策可能会在多年后产生连锁反应。

The thing about economic policy is that the past monetary policy can have second order effects that happened years down the road.

如果我们回溯到2020年和2021年，那时候利率低到历史最低点，这带来了好几方面的影响。

So if we rewind back to 2020, 2021, when interest rates were rock bottom, this had several effects.

借钱变得很容易，手头宽裕的散户投资者就把钱投进了市场。

Money was easy to borrow, and retail investors flush with cash could invest it into the market.

所以今天AI的快速发展，部分原因就在于新冠疫情后那波额外流动性带来的滞后效应。

So today's AI build out can be partially explained by the lagging effects of that added liquidity that we ended up getting post COVID.

而且这些投资AI的公司本身大多是护城河很深的企业，账上现金充裕，主营业务也持续产生现金流。

And part of that is that companies funding it are also just wide moat companies that are flushed with cash on their balance sheets and generate cash from their operating business.

但光靠现金还是撑不起这么大的投入。

But the build out still can't be solely financed with cash.

所以摩根大通的分析师认为，当前AI基础设施的现金支出总额大约会达到5万亿美元。

So JPMorgan analysts believe that the current cash outlay for AI infrastructure will cost somewhere around $5,000,000,000,000.

但微软、谷歌、亚马逊、Meta 和甲骨文这几家公司的账上现金加起来也只有大约三千五百亿美元。

But companies like Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Oracle only have about $350,000,000,000 total on their balance sheets.

所以虽然有一部分资金能用现有现金支付，但要完成这些项目，还得借大量债务。

So while part of it can definitely be funded with cash on hand, there's gonna be significant amounts of leverage that are gonna be required to build it out here.

甲骨文、Meta 和谷歌最近刚发行了三十年期债券，平均票息率在5.7%左右。

Oracle, Meta, and Alphabet just issued thirty year notes with average coupon rates around 5.7%.

目前三十年期美国国债的收益率大约是4.7%。

Current thirty year treasury yields are around 4.7%.

也就是说，买这些债券的投资者只能比国债多赚1个百分点的收益，可这些投资的结果还充满不确定性，这利差实在太低了。

So investors in those bonds are only getting 1% returns above treasury yields, which is a pretty low spread given just how uncertain the results will be from these investments.

现在垃圾债券的收益率大概在7%到8%之间，但期限都没这么长。

Junk bonds right now yield around seven to 8%, but don't have these thirty year terms.

所以眼下资金根本谈不上便宜。

So money right now isn't the cheapest it's ever been.

我们已经不再是那个利率为零的时代了。

We aren't in, you know, that zero interest rate world anymore.

虽然你可以说，七大科技公司的股权成本下降了，因为它们的股价通常都享有溢价。

Although you can argue that the magnificent seven's cost of equity has gone down as those businesses tend to trade at premiums.

但市场上还有其他交易，可能让人觉得资金很容易拿到手。

But there are other deals out there that maybe do make it appear that money is easy to get a hold of.

所以马克斯在他的最新备忘录里提到了一笔交易。

So Marks highlighted a deal in his recent memo.

一家叫Thinking Machines的AI初创公司，由前OpenAI高管玛拉·马罗蒂创办，刚刚在种子轮融了大约20亿美元，估值达到100亿美元。

So a company named Thinking Machines, which is an AI startup by former OpenAI executive, Mara Marotti, just raised about $2,000,000,000 in its seed round at about a $10,000,000,000 valuation.

可这家公司的产品还没出来，甚至连投资者都搞不清楚他们打算做什么产品。

Yet, the company doesn't have a product nor do they even tell investors what plans they have for a product.

有一位投资人去听了马罗蒂的路演，她说：‘我们是一家汇聚了最顶尖AI人才的公司，但具体细节没法回答。’

So one investor went to a pitch with Maruti, and Maruti said, we're doing an AI company with the best AI people, but we can't answer any questions.

如果你觉得这已经够离谱了，那更惊人的是，就在今天，这家公司在首轮C轮融资还没落地（预计2025年10月左右）的情况下，又开始寻求新一轮融资，估值直接飙到500亿美元。

And if you think that's completely wild, with this first c round taking place sometime around October 2025, there's actually news today that the same startup is now seeking another funding round valuing the business at $50,000,000,000.

另一位前OpenAI科学家也融了20亿美元，估值320亿美元，可他的公司同样连产品影子都还没有。

Another former OpenAI scientist raised $2,000,000,000 for his company, again, with no product valuing at $32,000,000,000.

所以，也许资金的实际成本比国债收益率显示的还要低。

So perhaps money is cheaper than what treasury yields are telling us.

接下来我们来看看政府的慷慨支出或财政刺激措施。

Now let's turn our attention to government largesse or fiscal stimulus.

我认为这一点很清楚：政府正通过半导体补贴和云计算基础设施投入，间接支持人工智能基础设施的建设。

Here, I think it's pretty clear that the government is indirectly subsidizing the AO build out via things such as semiconductor incentives and cloud infrastructure spending.

在美国，《芯片法案》批准了近530亿美元的联邦资金，用于支持本国半导体制造和研发能力。

So in The US, the Chips Act authorized nearly 53,000,000,000 in federal spending to support US semiconductor manufacturing and research capacity.

这帮助了美光、英特尔、台积电、三星和德州仪器等公司投资建设美国本土的晶圆厂和研发实验室。

This has helped chip companies like Micron, Intel, TSMC, Samsung, and Texas Instruments fund US based fabs and r and d labs.

欧盟也有类似的芯片法案，提供了165亿美元的资金支持。

The EU has a similar chips act with 16 and a half billion in funding.

中国则投入了数额未公开的资金，用于加强半导体制造能力并获取新技术。

China has spent an undisclosed amount on shoring semiconductor manufacturing and on acquiring new technology.

所以，全球各国政府都在争相抢占这一领域的制高点。

So, you know, around the world, governments are fighting to get ahead in this game.

虽然这些投资并非直接针对人工智能，但间接上是相关的，因为AI的发展离不开这些先进芯片。

And while these investments aren't directly tied into AI, they are indirectly as the AI build out requires these advanced chips.

哪里有政府花钱，投资者就会往哪里聚集。

Where the government is spending money, investors will continue to flock to.

现在我们来看看，在伊桑娜的分析框架下，人工智能的两个相对薄弱的环节。

So now we get to two areas where I think AI is a little weaker as viewed through Insana's framework.

首先，泡沫往往在经济环境有利的时候最容易形成。

So the first is that bubbles are most likely to form under favorable economic conditions.

那么，今天的经济环境和五年前相比怎么样？

So what are economic conditions like today compared to five years ago?

我觉得现在的条件可能没那么好了。

I would say they are probably less favorable.

利率更高了，借贷成本也随之上升。

Interest rates are higher, which increases borrowing costs.

美国政府最近并没有像疫情期间那样大规模发放补贴。

The US government hasn't distributed handles lately like it did to address the pandemic.

所以，很多财政刺激措施都已经逐渐消退了。

So a lot of the fiscal stimulus has kind of faded away.

美国2025年的GDP增长率只有2.1%，是2019年以来最低的，除了新冠衰退期间。

The GDP growth in The US in 2025 was just 2.1%, which is the lowest since 2019 except during the COVID recession.

目前失业率大约在4%左右，高于2019年之后的任何一年，除了新冠之后的那两年。

Unemployment rates are currently around 4%, which is higher than any year since 2019 other than the two years immediately after COVID-nineteen.

所以，我觉得现在的经济状况并不算好。

So I wouldn't say economic conditions today are the best they've been.

最后一个因素是公众参与和投机行为。

The last factor is public participation and speculative behavior.

我提到过的一些私人交易，还有我之前说的三十年期债券，明显都带着投机色彩。

I would say with some of the private deals I've already highlighted along with these thirty year bonds that I spoke about, there is undoubtedly some speculative behavior going on.

一家连产品都没有的公司，几个月内就被估值三百到五百亿美元，这怎么看都像投机。

Firms with no products being valued at 30 to $50,000,000,000 within months definitely strikes a speculative note.

但看看IPO市场——这是反映大众投机行为的绝佳指标——并没有出现大规模市场泡沫的明显迹象。

But looking at IPO markets, which is an excellent indicator of bubble like behaviour among the masses, doesn't really show much evidence of a market wide bubble.

2025年IPO融资总额为380亿美元。

2025 IPO proceeds were $38,000,000,000.

这跟2021年的1420亿美元相比，简直不值一提。

This pales in comparison to twenty one's 142,000,000,000.

虽然自2022年以来IPO市场有所回暖，但依然远低于疫情前的水平。

And while the IPO market has heated up since 2022, it still lags the years preceding COVID.

IPO的总数量也只是略高于过去十年的平均水平，谈不上有多异常。

And the absolute number of IPOs is just slightly above the average for the decade, but nothing too alarmingly high.

你可能会说，‘七巨头’股价的上涨，正是公众参与泡沫的表现。

Now you could argue that the increase in the mag seven prices is part of a public participation in the bubble.

毕竟，这些公司现金流充沛，正在大力投资人工智能的未来。

After all, these are companies that are just gushing cash, and they're investing in the future of AI.

标普500指数的表现，跟等权重标普500指数截然不同。

The S and P five hundred's results look much different from those of its equal weighted counterpart.

因此，标普500的年均总回报率约为19%，而等权重版本只有11%。

So the total returns to the S and P five hundred has been around 19% per year compared with just 11% for the equal weighted S and P five hundred index.

但就算看这七家科技巨头的估值，整体来说确实偏高，但我绝不敢说它们已经陷入泡沫了。

But even when you look at the evaluation of the mag seven, I would say as a whole, yes, it's expensive, but I would be very, very hesitant to say that it's in bubble like territory.

对。

Sure.

你确实得为指数支付溢价，但这些公司的基本面更好。

You're paying a premium to the index, but these businesses, you know, they have better quality.

它们的护城河更宽，增长速度也快过美国平均企业。

They have wider moats, and they're growing faster than the average American business as well.

所以它们配得上这个溢价。

So they deserve to have a premium.

像英伟达这样的公司，市盈率（TTM）高达44倍，确实不便宜。

A company like NVIDIA, which trades at a trailing twelve months price earnings multiple 44 times is expensive.

对。

Sure.

但分析师预计，明年它的每股收益将增长近60%，这在一定程度上解释了为什么估值这么高。

Analysts But estimate it's gonna grow EPS nearly 60% next year, which helps explain that high evaluation.

但要注意，贵不等于泡沫。

Now it's important to remember that expensive doesn't mean bubble.

如果你看像英伟达这样的公司，分析师其实认为它的每股收益到2027年还能保持50%以上的复合增长率。

If you look forward to a business like NVIDIA, analysts actually believe that it'll continue to grow EPS well above 50% compounded into 2027.

所以如果看英伟达的前瞻市盈率，大概在24倍左右，其实比标普500的27倍还要低。

So if I look at the forward PE of NVIDIA, it's around 24 times, which is actually lower than the 27 times of the S and P 500.

这根本不像泡沫的样子。

This just doesn't really scream bubble to me.

但问题在于。

But here's the thing.

泡沫一旦起来，势头会变得非常快。

Bubbles can pick up momentum very quickly.

如果看历史经验，标普500里有不少公司，甚至一些目前还是私营的企业，都会编出一个故事，说自己正在转型成人工智能公司。

And if history is a precedent, there are plenty of businesses inside the S and P 500 or that are even currently private that can create a narrative based around it transforming itself into some sort of AI play.

其中一些公司确实是在做人工智能，但也有不少只是在猪身上抹口红，硬说自己是AI企业，想趁机炒作。

Now some of these businesses maybe are actually AI plays, but some of them will probably try to take advantage of the speculative markets by claiming they're an AI business when in reality they're just, you know, putting lipstick on a pig.

如果人工智能始终是市场的焦点，我们该怎么保护自己？

So how can we protect ourselves if AI remains top of mind for the market?

随着经济好转，大众参与成为现实，我们又该怎么办？

And as the economy improves and mass participation becomes a reality?

首先，我们必须明白，泡沫本质上是投资者心理的一部分。

First, we must recognize that bubbles are simply a part of investor psychology.

与其纠结人工智能算不算泡沫，不如好好理解投资者在它身上到底怎么行动。

Whether you want to label AI as being in a bubble or not is much less important than understanding just how investors are behaving around it.

所以多留意、多看新闻、跟其他投资者聊聊，观察大家对人工智能和AI股票的态度和行为。

So pay attention, read the news, talk to other investors, and observe how investors are behaving towards AI and AI stocks.

如果你觉得人工智能正在走向泡沫，有些投资者反而会把这当成机会，想进场抄底，赌一把时机。

If you think that AI is headed towards a bubble, some investors might see that as an opportunity to maybe try and get involved and try to time the market.

他们可能会觉得自己能比市场更早察觉异常，及时抽身离场。

They may tell themselves that they can get out of a position that begins getting into bubble like territory before the market does.

但这种玩法，其实很难玩得转。

But this is a pretty challenging game to play.

即使你判断出这是个泡沫，也没法准确知道它什么时候会形成，更没法预判自己对它的看法会怎么随时间变化。

Even if you're right on the bubble, there's no way of knowing just when it's gonna form or how your own perception of it will change over time.

所以一定要控制好仓位，保持冷静的评估，别让自尊心膨胀，否则日后会惹出一堆麻烦。

So make sure you size your positions right, stay disciplined on your evaluations, and don't allow your ego to inflate, which can cause several problems down the road.

接下来，你需要把三种风险区分开来。

Next, you need to separate three layers of risk.

第一种是技术本身的风险。

Layer one is a technology.

人工智能确实会是一项颠覆性的技术。

AI will truly be a transformative technology.

可能是我这一辈子见过的最重要的技术突破。

Maybe the biggest technological breakthrough of my lifetime.

但一定要记住，技术上的成功不等于投资上的成功。

But it's vital to remember that technological success does not equal investor success.

我的总体策略是避开那些还在大把烧钱搞AI基础设施的公司。

My general strategy is to avoid investments that are spending money on the AI build out.

在我看来，这纯粹是投机。

To me, that's just pure speculation.

我更愿意投资那些已经实际运用AI技术的公司。

I'd rather invest in businesses that are already leveraging AI capabilities today.

第二层是商业模式。

The second layer is the business.

说到谁能在这场AI竞赛中胜出，任何声称自己知道答案的人，我觉得多半是在瞎说。

When it comes to who's gonna win the AI race, anyone who claims to know the answer, I think, is probably just a liar.

过去那些大泡沫里，很多公司都想抢占市场，但真正能长期存活下来的寥寥无几。

In the big bubbles of the past, many entrants tried to win the market, but very few actually ended up surviving over time.

我们不妨看看美国的汽车行业。

Let's just look at the automotive sector in The US.

二十世纪初，美国有数百家汽车制造商。

So in the early nineteen hundreds, The US market had hundreds of car manufacturers.

那时候没有明确的赢家，就跟现在的AI行业一样。

And that's because there were just no clear winners, just like AI today.

在汽车业，进入门槛很低，创新速度也特别快。

In cars, there are no barriers to entry, and there was rapid innovation.

这听起来跟现在到处冒出来的那些AI初创公司简直一模一样。

Sounds an awful lot like these AI startups that are starting to pop up everywhere.

但今天，美国只剩下三家汽车制造商了，通用、克莱斯勒那些。

But today, there are only three car manufacturers, four General Motors and Chrysler.

当时的存活率不到百分之一。

The survival rate here was less than 1%.

所以如果你在考虑投资AI公司，就得问问自己：这家企业到底有没有真正的竞争优势，还是只是靠炒作撑着。

So if you're looking at an AI investment, you have to ask yourself whether the business that you're investing in is truly a business that has some sort of competitive advantage or if it's just purely based on hype.

我猜，这些新冒出来的公司里，大多数都是靠炒作撑场面的。

And my guess is the majority of these new businesses popping up are gonna be based on hype.

第三层，是分析价值。

The third layer is to analyze value.

泡沫就是在这一步形成的。

This is where bubbles form.

当投资者愿意为资产支付越来越高的价格时，泡沫就形成了，因为新来的投资者总觉得会有人以更高的价格从他们手里接盘。

When investors are willing to pay higher and higher prices for an asset, bubbles form because new investors come in thinking someone else will buy it from them at, you know, an even higher price.

股价里头包含了乐观情绪，所以必须深入理解它到底在反映什么。

The stock price embeds things like optimism, which is why it's imperative to understand it deeply.

我持有的企业确实跟AI有关，比如Lumine和Topicas，它们早就盈利了。

The businesses that I own are exposed to AI such as, you know, Lumine and Topicas are already businesses that are really profitable.

它们都有稳定的持续性收入来源。

They have recurring revenue engines.

所以我对持有这些公司非常安心。

So I'm very comfortable holding them.

它们不是那种没收入、纯靠炒作的初创公司，那种公司可能一夜归零，也可能涨一百倍。

They're not some sort of, you know, speculative pre revenue company, which could just as easily go to zero as it could go to 100 x.

所以我得认真琢磨它们的估值，看看有没有被错估的机会可以利用。

So I have to think long and hard about what they're valued at and if there's some sort of mispricing that I can take advantage of.

我常用的一个方法，就是看某个行业或企业历史上的平均数据。

One strategy that I like to use here is to just view data from a business or industry's historical averages.

我们之前已经对纳斯达克做过这个分析了。

We did this exercise already on the Nasdaq earlier.

如果你在关注人工智能公司，不妨看看它们过去盈利和现金流倍数的平均水平，再跟现在对比一下。

But if you're looking at AI companies, consider the historical averages for their earnings and cash flow multiples, and then just compare them to today.

是低于、持平，还是远高于历史均值？

Are they below, in line, or above historical averages?

一旦倍数达到历史均值的两倍，就得小心了。

Beware when the multiple is double its historical average.

下一个需要关注的点，还是跟价值有关。

The next point of concern is once again related to value.

你可能发现某家公司正借助人工智能实现转型。

You may have found a business that is utilizing AI to turn itself around.

因此，利润率有望大幅上升，过去那些市盈率数据可能不再那么有用，因为商业模式已经发生了根本变化。

As a result, profit margins are set to explode, and the historical PE numbers maybe just aren't as helpful as they once were simply because the business model has fundamentally changed.

这时候，你得给自己一个终值的现实检验。

Now you need to give yourself a terminal value reality check.

所以我喜欢在审视自己持有的任何企业时都这么做。

So I like doing this when I'm looking at basically any business that I own.

如果我觉得一家公司每年能增长15%，那五年后它会是什么样子？

So if I have a business that I think can grow at 15% per year, what does that company look like in five years?

我们就拿Lumine做个简单的例子吧。

So let's use Lumine as a very simple example.

要是想让他们的内在价值保持每年15%左右的增长，他们大概每年得收购三到五家公司。

In order for them to continue growing their intrinsic value around 15%, they're probably gonna need to add something like three to five new acquisitions per year.

也许这个数字以后还会提高，但为了简便，我们先用这个三到五家的估算。

Maybe that scales up over time, but let's just use that three to five year number here for simplicity sake.

五年下来，总共就是十五到二十五次收购了。

So in five years, that'll be a total of 15 to 25 acquisitions.

当我认真想想这件事，问自己：Lumine真能做到吗？

Now, when I think hard about that and I think is that possible for Lumine to do?

答案其实很明确。

The answer is very easy.

是的。

Yes.

我觉得他们完全能做到。

I think they could do that quite easily.

现在我们拿思考机器这家公司做个对比，它的估值是五百亿美元，要达到这个估值，公司到底需要做到什么？

So if we contrast that now to a business such as thinking machines and it's $50,000,000,000 valuation, what really needs to happen for the company to grow into that valuation?

虽然我不太认同用收入倍数来估值，但我猜这类公司在盈利模式还没成型之前，市场大概率还是会看收入倍数。

Even though I'm not a fan of valuing businesses on revenue multiples, my guess is that a business like this is probably gonna be evaluated on that while they figure out how to turn a profit.

比如一家年增长率20%的ARR业务，尤其是在有行业顺风、媒体热度高的领域，很容易就能拿到十倍ARR的估值。

So an ARR business growing, let's say 20% per year could easily fetch a 10 times ARR multiple, especially in an industry with tailwinds and a lot of media coverage.

这样的话，它在未来几年内就得实现五百亿美元的收入。

So in that case, it needs to generate $5,000,000,000 in revenue over the next few years.

这可能吗？

Is that possible?

我对自己的判断完全没有把握，所以才选择不参与其中。

I have zero conviction of my ability to make that decision, which is why I have no skin in the game.

所以，无论你是在看什么生意，是不是AI相关的，我都建议你冷静想想它未来可能值多少钱。

So whenever you're looking at any business, whether it's AI or not, I would recommend sense checking what you think it can be worth in the future.

如果某个估值根本说不通，比如我之前提到的雅虎例子——它需要180亿用户，而当时全球人口还远没到那个数，那你就知道，这种估值已经严重脱离现实，可能处在泡沫中了。

If it makes no sense such as that Yahoo example that I gave earlier where it required 18,000,000,000 users when the world's population was just a fraction of that, then you know that the evaluations become incredibly stretched and maybe in bubble territory.

接下来你可以试着识别出泡沫的迹象。

The next thing you can do is try to identify bubble behavior.

霍华德·马克斯在他最新的备忘录里说，自己并不是AI专家，我会在节目笔记里附上链接。

Howard Marks mentions that he's no AI expert in his latest memo, which I'll link to in the show notes.

但他特别擅长观察市场动态。

But he is a master at observation.

他喜欢用一些投资案例的小故事，来帮助自己理解投资者的心理。

He's someone who likes making these kind of deal making vignettes to help him better understand investor psychology.

这样他就能判断，自己该激进一点，还是该保守一点。

This allows him to determine if he should be aggressive or conservative.

结合我刚才提到的这些AI案例，我觉得，现在对AI公司过于保守，反而是个明智的选择。

Now given the AI examples that I've covered here, I would say that being overly conservative towards AI businesses today is probably an excellent idea.

如果你不想再依赖那些主观的观察，比如看有没有泡沫迹象，那就看看客观的数据。

Now if you wanna move away from more subjective observations such as, you know, looking at bubble like behavior, then just look at objective measures.

我之前已经讲过一些AI公司在公开和私人市场上的债务交易案例。

So I already went through some of the deals involving debt for AI companies in public and private sectors.

再看看其他交易，了解其他公司为债务、并购支付了多少钱。

So look at other deals and see what other businesses are paying for debt and for mergers and acquisitions.

他们出的价格是不是完全脱离了现实？

Does the price that they're paying defy reality?

如果是，那最好的选择就是直接避开。

Then that's a great signal to just take a pass.

那这些对我的投资组合管理到底意味着什么？

So what does all this really mean for how I actually manage my portfolios?

其实很简单。

It's quite simple.

首先，我会限制自己对热门叙事的投入，尽可能专注于基本面。

The first thing is that I cap my exposure to narratives, and I focused as exclusively as I can on the fundamentals.

我知道自己难免会犯错，因为完全不被叙事裹挟几乎是不可能的，但你必须尽最大努力聚焦于企业的基本面。

Now I know I'll screw up on that because it's impossible not to get caught up in narratives at some degree, but you have to try hardest to focus on the fundamentals of the business.

第二点是，我要确保我的赢家之所以增长，是因为这些企业的内在价值在持续积累，而不是单纯靠估值倍数的扩张。

The second is to ensure that my winners are growing specifically because the intrinsic value of those businesses are compounding and not purely because of multiple expansion.

如果我持有一家公司五年，内在价值却毫无增长，但股价涨了十倍甚至五倍，那情况就很危险了。

If I have a business that I held over five years and intrinsic value didn't grow at all, I get the share price went 10 x or five x even.

这其实说明，市场只是被某种叙事推动，投资者的兴趣越来越来自这个故事，而不是企业基本面的真实变化。

That's pretty scary because basically that just means that there's a narrative around the business and more and more investor interest is being generated by that narrative and not by the changing fundamentals of the business.

第三点，就是简单观察你所投资行业里正在发生的交易。

And the third one here is to just simply observe deals that are going on in your company's industries.

这些交易看起来合理吗？还是纯粹建立在空想的叙事之上？

Do they seem reasonable or are they based on dreamy narratives?

如果叙事正在支撑某个你所涉及的行业或企业，那就必须格外谨慎。

If narratives are propping up a business or an industry that your business is involved in, be extremely cautious.

即使是一家你非常喜欢的公司，卖出也可能是最好的选择。

Selling might be the best idea even if it's a company that you really, really like.