提示833： perimeter solutions（prm）：一次收购一个，打造细分市场垄断 | 凯尔·格里夫与肖恩·奥马利

客户关系很有黏性。

There's a stickiness to a customer relationship.

但要说清楚，两者之间确实也有不少差别。

But to be clear, there are definitely differences too.

Transdigm 的规模比 Perimeter 大得多，市值大约是它的十五倍。

Transdigm is a much larger business in Perimeter with a market cap that is about 15 times as big.

正因如此，Transdigm 拥有 Perimeter 目前还无法完全赶上或利用的规模优势。

And because of this, they have an advantage that Perimeter just can't quite fully make up for yet or or take advantage of yet, and that's scale economies.

也许有一天，Perimeter 能够拥有更大的规模来发挥优势，但要准确判断这些业务在 Perimeter 内部到底能有多少有机增长，其实挺难的。

And so there may come a day when Perimeter has much more scale to use to their advantage, but it's kind of hard to tell exactly how much organic growth these businesses really have while inside of Perimeter.

规模这个问题确实挺有意思。

The scale issue is definitely an interesting point.

我同意，因为 Perimeter 所处的行业都非常小众，可能永远都无法像 Transdigm 这样的大公司那样真正享受到规模经济的好处。

And I agree that since Perimeter operates in these really niche industries, there may never be a point at which they can truly take advantage of economies of scale as a larger business such as Transdigm can.

而且，由于这些业务彼此独立，也没有交叉销售的可能。

Now, since these businesses are disassociated from each other, there's also no cross selling potential either.

虽然收购一些小公司确实能帮助扩大IMS或MMT的产品线，把它们打包在一起，或许能在各自业务板块内带来一些交叉销售的好处。

Although bolt on acquisitions could definitely help increase you know maybe IMS or MMT's product offerings, bundling them might yield you know a little bit of cross selling benefits within their respective business segments.

但说实话，如果他们始终没能充分利用规模经济，我也不会感到意外。

But to be honest, I wouldn't be surprised if they never take a large advantage of economies of scale.

不过我觉得这也没关系，因为目前他们手里的业务似乎都还有不小的内生增长空间。

But I think that's really okay because it appears that the business that they have today all have some degree of organic growth left in them.

如果他们能持续积累更多现金，这些钱就会用来收购更多企业、更多小公司，进一步提升现有业务的价值，甚至回购自家股票。

And if they can continue to accrue more and more cash, that money will be put to work buying even more businesses, buying even more bolt ons, and then just adding value to their current businesses inside their portfolio, or even buying back their own stock.

正如我们之前说的，Perimeter经营的都是高度细分的行业，像SaaS那种规模效应，或者像Uber、Airbnb那样的网络效应，在这里根本行不通，因为他们的各个业务单元彼此完全独立。

Perimeter operates in highly niche industries, as we've said, where traditional SaaS like scale economies or massive network effects like those underlying companies like Uber or Airbnb, they just don't apply in the same way since their business units are completely dissociated from one another.

在Perimeter的不同业务板块之间，根本不存在交叉销售的机会。

Is no real opportunity for cross selling across the different segments within Perimeter.

不过，就像我们几次提到的，他们依然可以通过审慎的资本配置和连续收购来实现可观的规模，而不是单纯靠运营扩张。

And yeah, they can still achieve significant scale through disciplined capital allocation or serial acquisition, as we've alluded to a few times, rather than just pure operational expansion.

像Uber或Airbnb这类公司，大家都知道它们的打法，就是一步步扩展到与核心业务紧密相关或互补的新领域。

As you might expect with Uber or Airbnb, where you sort of know exactly what their playbook is and they're just incrementally expanding out into these different verticals that are, you know, closely related to or complementary of the core business that those companies run.

比如Airbnb，就拓展到了服务和体验领域，让你在旅行住Airbnb的时候还能顺便预订个按摩。

So like Airbnb, for example, expanding out into services and experiences so that you can book a massage while you're away on your trip at an Airbnb.

所以，通过专注轻资产模式，产生粘性强的持续收入，Perimeter就能积累大量现金，用于在现有业务板块内进行增值型的小型收购，或者像你提到的，积极回购股票。

And so by focusing on asset light business models that generate these sticky recurring revenue streams, They can accumulate a lot of cash, speaking about Perimeter here, to fund value add bolt on acquisitions within their existing segments or to aggressively buy back stock, which you mentioned.

这是一种截然不同的扩张模式，直接沿袭了Transdigm的打法，目标是在受保护的细分市场中，通过现金流复利实现长期价值创造。

And so it is sort of a different model for scaling, cloned directly from the Transdigm playbook, where the goal is long term value creation through compounding cash flows in protected niches.

而不是像Uber和Airbnb那样，去打造一个庞大的超级应用平台，走有机扩张的路子。

Then again, rather than building a single massive platform, a super app in the way that Uber and Airbnb are taking that approach to organic growth.

没错。

Yeah.

我还看到Perimeter另一个竞争优势，跟具体哪个业务板块都没关系，更像是一种稀缺资源，就是负责收购的顾问团队本身。

And another competitive advantage that I see for Perimeter that isn't actually tied to any specific segment, and I'd say this is more of a corner resource and that's just really the team that makes up the advisory team that makes these acquisitions.

到目前为止，他们在创造股东价值方面做得非常出色，自上市以来，股价年均复合增长率接近25%。

So they've clearly done just a really, really good job at creating shareholder value so far with shares compounding at nearly 25% annually since it went public.

对任何企业来说，这都是相当出色的投资回报。

This is a very very good return for any business.

当我看那些连续收购的企业时，我会问自己：如果它们收购了一家公司，为什么让这家收购公司来拥有它，比让原来的创始人或老板继续持有更好呢？

So when I look at serial acquirers, I like to ask myself, okay well if they were to buy a business, why is it better that the serial acquirer owns it versus just leaving it alone and having the original owner or founder of that business own it?

所以你得想想，这些连续收购方的管理团队到底带来了哪些增值？

And so you kind of have to look at, okay, well, are the value adds that the management of these serial acquirers adds?

在我看来，Perimeter 这类公司主要带来三点价值。

And kind of the ones that I see here for Perimeter are three.

第一点是，它们有能力买到真正顶尖的企业。

So the first one is the ability to just buy really, really exceptional businesses.

它们收购的公司全都盈利稳定，EBITDA 表现很好。

So the businesses that they do buy all generate EBITDA.

它们卖的产品都是客户离不开的关键产品。

They sell these mission critical products.

它们解决的是客户面临的难题，通常是行业龙头，而且本身就具备不错的内生增长潜力。

They solve challenging products for their customers and they tend to be industry leaders and have attractive organic growth prospects.

当然，我得承认，这一点未必是直接给被收购公司带来的增值，但对整个控股公司来说，绝对是巨大的优势。

So, okay, I will admit this isn't necessarily a value add specifically for the business, but for the holding company as a whole, of course, I think it's a major value add.

具体来看他们收购的这些企业，目标是实现15%的回报率，到目前为止他们已经超过了这个数字。

Now looking specifically at the businesses that they buy, you know, they are looking to basically target these 15% returns and so far have exceeded that number.

除此之外，他们还专注于那些本身已经盈利的企业，通过提升运营效率、降低成本等方式进一步改善利润率。

But on top of that, they're also focusing on businesses that are already profitable and that they can actually improve margins on by doing things like improving the efficiency of those businesses and finding ways to reduce costs.

另外，他们也在优化这些企业的定价策略，比如在消防产品领域，他们明显在向经常性收入业务方向转型。

Then just by increasing or improving the pricing strategy that the businesses have, like we said with the fire segment, obviously they've moved more and more towards the recurring revenue segment.

这一点可能原本的公司自己不会做，但现在的Perimeter Solutions会这么做。

That's an area where maybe you can make the argument that the original business wouldn't have done that, but Perimeter Solutions as it is now would do that.

第三点更多是针对母公司层面的，那就是去中心化管理。

And then the third here is more again towards the parent company and that's looking at decentralization.

通过任命合适的人选并放手让他们自主运作，成功打造了高度自治的模式，效果非常明显。

By putting the right people in charge than just letting them do their thing, have helped create autonomy that has clearly worked very, very well.

他们还很好地实现了激励机制的对齐，这点我们稍后会详细展开。

And they've also done a good job of aligning incentives, which we're going to go to in a little more detail later today.

我们已经讨论过，Perimeter Solutions是通过并购逐步发展起来的，目前仍在持续通过并购来拓展业务。

So we've already discussed how Perimeter Solutions has been built out by M and A and it sort of is in the process of building out its business through M and A.

那我们不妨仔细看看这些交易的具体情况，包括它们的细节，比如

So how about we take a closer look at what those deals look like and the details of them in terms of

这些交易对股东的收益提升有多大？

how accretive they have been to shareholders?

这个主意很好。

Great idea.

我们先来看看他们是如何一步步成为珀里米特解决方案公司的。

So let's first look at exactly how they became Perimeter Solutions.

珀里米特解决方案公司的消防业务板块，是在2021年以大约20亿美元收购的。

So Perimeter Solutions, the fire segment was purchased for about $2,000,000,000 back in 2021.

当时SK Invictus完全持有珀里米特解决方案公司，本质上只是一个控股平台。

As SK Invictus actually owned 100% of Perimeter Solutions, was basically just a holdings company.

2021年全年，消防业务板块实现了约2.61亿美元的收入和1.18亿美元的调整后EBITDA，这意味着收购价格大约是调整后EBITDA的17倍。

So for full year 2021, the fire safety segment generated revenue of approximately $261,000,000 and adjusted EBITDA of $118,000,000 This means the purchase price was somewhere in that 17 times adjusted EBITDA range.

请记住，消防业务本身是个不错的行业，我想今天我们已经说得足够清楚了。

Now keep in mind that the fire safety is a pretty good business to be in and I hope that we've made abundantly clear today.

虽然这不是个SaaS业务，但火灾每年都会发生。

While it's not a SaaS business, there are fires literally every year.

所以产品收入和持续性收入的占比都很高。

So there's a large component of both product revenue and recurring revenue.

自从收购以来，这个业务还实现了不错的内生增长。

Now the business additionally has had a very nice organic growth narrative that has happened since they bought it as well.

过去十二个月，这个业务板块的收入已达到约5亿美元，调整后EBITDA约为2.9亿美元。

So trailing twelve month revenue for this business segment is now about 500,000,000 with adjusted EBITDA of about $290,000,000.

最新季度的调整后EBITDA利润率也从45%提升到了60%。

So adjusted EBITDA margins have also expanded from about 45% to 60% as of the latest quarter.

他们把这业务经营得非常好，我之前也提到过，他们在合同重组上做得特别出色。

So they've done a really good job of improving this business and I already mentioned that they've excelled at restructuring the contract.

他们一直在增加持续性收入的比重。

They had this growing weighting towards more and more recurring revenue.

但也要注意，消防业务的利润率确实会有波动。

But it's also important to keep in mind that fire safety margins definitely are volatile.

所以利润率嘛，我看过过去几年的数据，波动挺大的，从27%到65%都有，尤其是最近两年，如果按季度来看的话。

So margins, you know, if I've looked over the past few years, they fluctuated from 27% to 65% just in the past two years if you look at it from

按季度来看。

a quarterly basis.

所以，我不想听到有人说我们太专注于大盘科技股了，因为今天我们要深入探讨的是阻燃行业和消防安全领域。

So I don't want to hear anybody say that we're too focused on large cap tech stocks because today we're doing a deep dive into the fire retardant industry and fire safety.

我们并不排斥翻遍各种不同类型的业务，去寻找内在价值。

So we're not averse to flipping over a lot of different types of rocks to find intrinsic value.

这里的利润率波动看起来是周期性的，因为火灾季节的特性导致第一季度通常是最弱的季度。

The margin swing here does seem to be cyclical due to the nature of fire seasons where Q1 tends to be the weakest quarter.

既然消防业务有这些固定成本，比如维持航空基地，如果产品没有被使用，阻燃剂也没被用到，利润率就会受到影响。

Then since the fire segment has these fixed costs, like maintaining the air bases, margins will suffer if they aren't using the product, they aren't using the fire retardant.

所以基本上，这就导致了杠杆率的上升。

So basically, there's a deleveraging that occurs.

但回顾一下Perimeter Solutions这笔交易，看起来现在的估值大约是调整后EBITDA的七倍。

But looking back at the Perimeter Solutions deal, it does seem like it only happened at about seven times adjusted EBITDA today.

对于一家在美国几乎处于垄断地位、而且面对的这个问题未来长期趋势向好的企业来说，这个价格简直低得离谱，毕竟森林火灾不会消失。

So that seems insanely cheap for a business that is a near monopoly in The US and and dealing with a problem that probably has a long term tailwind behind it in the sense that forest fires aren't going away.

如果问大多数人，他们都会觉得这类火灾只会越来越多。

If you ask a lot of people, they're likely to only increase with time.

是的，肖恩，你说得完全对。

Yeah, that's exactly right, Shawn.

如果你能给我找另一家现在以这么低的倍数交易、却拥有如此强大竞争优势和高进入壁垒的企业，我一定会非常感兴趣去深入了解。

If you could find me another business trading at this low of a multiple today that has this much of competitive advantage and barrier to entry, would be very, very interested in learning more about that.

话虽如此，我想去看看IMS里另一个业务板块的情况。

So with that said, I want to go and look at the other business unit that we can look at in IMS.

我之前说过，我对这个板块不太看好，因为很难看出它到底有什么真正的竞争优势。

So, so I said earlier that I wasn't crazy about the segment specifically because it's kind of hard to view what type of competitive advantages it really has.

但咱们还是来看看实际的数据怎么说。

But let's go over what the numbers actually tell us.

首先，要搞清楚这个业务目前的状况有点困难，因为IMS是和PS产品以及MMT合并在一起报账的。

So first, it was a little tougher to see where this business is today because IMS is consolidated specifically with the PS product as well as MMT.

但让我们回到2024年底，当时Perimeter Solutions以大约3300万美元收购了IMS，算是很小的一笔收购。

But let's go back to the end of twenty twenty four when IMS was purchased by Perimeter Solutions for just about $33,000,000 So a pretty small acquisition.

有趣的是，这笔交易完全没有附带任何或有对价，这在我接触过的很多连续收购者中并不常见。

Now interestingly, the business was actually purchased with no contingent considerations, which isn't very typical for many serial acquirers that I've looked at.

通常他们会设计交易结构，让原管理团队在被收购后也能分享一部分未来收益，这样能确保公司被收购后依然平稳运营。

Usually they structured the deal so that the existing management shares in some of the upside after they're acquired, which the hope is will ensure that the business continues to run smoothly after the acquisition is complete.

除了收购价格之外，要确定他们实际支付的估值倍数也相当困难。

Now, aside from the purchase price, it's really difficult to determine the multiple that they paid for the business as well.

在Perimeter公司2025年第一季度的财报中提到，由于最近收购了IMS，特种产品销售额增加了约750万美元。

So in Perimeter's Q1 twenty twenty five earnings release, it was noted that specialty product sales increased by about $7,500,000 due to the recent acquisition of IMS.

这大概意味着1.1倍的企业价值对收入倍数，但很遗憾，我们没有得到任何关于调整后EBITDA的数据。

Now this implies about a 1.1 EV to revenue multiple, but we don't unfortunately get any of that data for adjusted EBITDA.

Perimeter还另外完成了两笔小型收购，总金额达2200万美元。所以你看，这个业务板块其实挺小的，尤其是跟消防安全部门，甚至更近期收购的MMT相比。

So Perimeter has also made two additional tuck in acquisitions for a combined $22,000,000 So, you know, this business segment looks to be pretty small, especially compared to the fire safety segment or even MMT, which was purchased more recently.

我知道MMT——也就是医疗制造技术业务——是在2025年第四季度完成交割的。

So I know MMT, which is again the the medical manufacturing technologies business closed in Q4 twenty twenty five.

这事儿刚发生不久，但确实值得再仔细聊聊这次收购。

So that's very, very recent, but it is probably worth going over that acquisition in a little more detail.

毕竟，这是目前推动特种产品业务增长的最主要因素。

And it is after all the biggest driver right now in increasing this specialty product segment.

对。

Yeah.

这笔交易是在2025年12月宣布的，现金收购价为6.85亿美元。

So the deal was announced in December 2025 for $685,000,000 in cash.

关于MMT的预期，我之前提过，营收是1.4亿美元，调整后EBITDA是5000万美元。

Now the assumptions for MMT were as I mentioned revenue of $140,000,000 and $50,000,000 in adjusted EBITDA.

这样算下来，调整后EBITDA倍数大约是14倍，和Perimeter Solutions最初收购的消防业务属于同一水平。

Now this implies an adjusted EBITDA multiple of about 14 times putting it in the same general field as the original Perimeter Solutions fire safety business.

我之前提到，管理层说MMT的整合进展非常顺利，已经超过了最初的预期。

Now I mentioned earlier that management says that the acquisition of MMT is going very, very well and exceeding their initial projections.

所以第一年倍数可能会进一步下降，至于三到五年后会降到什么程度，现在还真不好说。

So probably that gets the multiple down in the first year and who knows just how much lower that number will go in say three to five years from now.

这笔业务对 perimeter 来说是一次重大转变。

Now this business looks like a major shift for Perimeter.

它显著提升了特种产品服务收入的占比。

It's helping to significantly increase the specialty products services revenue mix.

自交易完成以来，本季度的收入和调整后EBITDA都实现了三位数增长，调整后EBITDA利润率也提升了中个位数。

So since the deal closed revenue for the quarter and adjusted EBITDA have exploded by triple digits while adjusted EBITDA margins have also expanded by mid single digits.

到目前为止，一切看起来都相当有希望。

So you know it just looks really promising so far.

不过，和其他业务板块一样，由于部分业务板块具有周期性，要准确估算全年数据，还得等完整财年的财务报告出来才行。

However as with other areas of this business it's kind of hard to annualize these numbers until we get a full year of financials to look for just given the cyclicality of some of the business segments.

但我的第一反应是，这笔收购非常非常成功。

But my immediate reaction is this has been a very, very good acquisition.

这三笔业务都提升了 perimeter solutions 公司的整体价值。

So all three of these businesses have helped increase the value of Perimeter Solutions as a company.

我们完全可以有信心这么说。

Think we can say that fairly confidently in.

消防业务板块在被收购后明显提升并持续创造价值，这说明管理层有能力有效优化各个业务单元的绩效，实现长期的内生增长——这对一家频繁并购的公司来说非常关键，因为这相当于摊薄了收购成本，让企业不再过度依赖外部并购就能实现增长，最终还能腾出更多现金回流到现有业务和新收购的项目中。

And the fact that the fire safety segment has clearly improved and compounded its value since it was acquired is is a great sign that management is is going to be able to really optimize the the performance of these different business units and generate organic growth over time, which is a wonderful thing for a serial acquirer as it effectively cheapens the purchase price of those acquisitions and allows the business to grow in other ways beyond just being so dependent on mergers and acquisitions of other businesses and ultimately gives the business more cash to redeploy into its existing business segments and into those new acquisitions.

但你觉得这三笔收购之间有什么共同点吗？

But what, what similarities would you say that you see between these three acquisitions?

所以

So

我特别欣赏Perimeter在消防业务上实现的内生增长。

I really love the organic growth that Perimeter was able to get from the fire safety segment.

他们在这方面做得真的非常出色。

You know, think they just did a wonderful job on that.

如果他们能对MMT也做到类似的效果，那这笔收购估计也会很划算。

If they can do something even somewhat similar for MMT, then that acquisition will probably turn out to be cheap too.

不过我们还得再等等看，毕竟这是他们完全新进入的一个行业。

But we will need to wait and see as this is an entirely new industry that they're getting into.

不过这里有几件事特别吸引我。

So a few things really stand out to me here though.

首先，它们都实现了制造环节的垂直整合。

First, you have the vertical integration of manufacturing.

其次，它们的产品在技术门槛很高的细分领域里属于关键性、不可或缺的核心部件。

Then you have the fact that their products are mission critical and in technically demanding niche industries.

最后，它们全都是那种轻资产运营的业务。

Then finally, they're all really just capital light businesses.

我举几个例子，让大家直观感受一下它们到底有多轻资产。

Just to give you an idea of how capital light businesses all of them are.

2022年的时候，资本支出占营收的大概是2.4%，之后稳步上升，到了最新季度是4.6%，我觉得这个比例依然非常低。

In 2022, CapEx was about 2.4% of revenue, which has steadily climbed to a still very, very low in my opinion 4.6% in the latest quarter.

所以从资金配置的角度来看，这完全说得通。

So from a capital allocation perspective, this makes complete sense.

毕竟，你没必要把资金都压在现有的业务板块上，仅仅为了维持差不多的回报率。

Know, you don't necessarily want to tie up your capital in your business segments just to keep generating very, very similar returns.

如果不需要投入太多资金，就能获得相同甚至更高的回报，那说明资金配置做得非常出色。

If you don't need to reinvest much and can generate similar returns or even greater returns, then you're doing really good capital allocation.

这就是为什么巴菲特这么喜欢 Seas County 这样的企业。

This is why Buffett likes a business like Seas County so much.

不用往业务里投多少钱，却能持续产生越来越多的额外现金流。

Don't have to put much money back into the business and it just keeps generating more and more incremental cash.

今天我们提了好几次调整后的EBITDA，这个指标我其实不太认同。

We've mentioned adjusted EBITDA a few times today, which is a metric I'm not crazy about.

我不太喜欢它的原因之一是，很多企业用这个数字来掩盖他们没实现GAAP会计利润的事实。

One reason I'm not so fond of it is many businesses use this figure when they aren't turning a GAAP accounting profit.

从目前的情况看，Perimeter 正好符合这一特点，过去十二个月的净利润为负1.9亿美元。不过值得注意的是，自MMT交易完成以来，他们已经实现了GAAP盈利。

And from the looks of things, Perimeter does fit that bill with trailing twelve month net income coming in at negative $190,000,000 So it is worth noting that since the MMT deal closed, they have turned a GAAP profit.

但话又说回来，他们是不是在用这些非GAAP的调整数字，让公司看起来比实际更赚钱？

But still, is this a situation where they're using these manipulated non GAAP numbers to make the business look more profitable than than it actually is?

是的。

Yeah.

这是个好问题。

That's a great question.

现在讨论这一点再合适不过了，因为这确实是投资逻辑的重要组成部分。

And this is probably as good of time as ever to discuss exactly why that is because it's actually a big part of the thesis here.

所以和你一样，我个人也不太喜欢那些过度依赖调整后EBITDA指标的企业。

So just like you, I personally tend to stay away from businesses that overly rely on adjusted EBITDA numbers.

我第一次听说Perimeter Solutions是在2025年奥马哈的伯克希尔股东大会上。

So when I first actually heard about Perimeter Solutions, it was way back in Omaha in Berkshire in 2025.

当时给我介绍这家公司的投资者说，他之所以没投，主要是看中了Perimeter Solutions特有的一个激励机制，也就是所谓的创始人咨询费。

And the investor who was telling me about it basically said that the primary reason that he passed on investing on it was specifically because of this very unique incentive structure that Perimeter Solutions has called the founder's advisory fee.

这笔咨询费确实算作运营支出，但说实话，数额相当大。

Now this advisory fee is correctly added as an operating expense, but boy oh boy, it's a large, large expense.

在最新的季度里，销售额是1.25亿美元，而咨询费就高达7600万美元。

So in the latest quarter, it was $76,000,000 on a $125,000,000 in sales.

所以这家公司要想实现盈利，要么大幅扩大收入，要么就得降低这笔咨询费。

So in order for this business to just turn a profit, they need to really scale up revenue or reduce the advisory fee.

你可以把这笔咨询费看作是一项固定支出。

And you can really think of the advisory fee as a fixed expense.

所以这个费用下降并不是他们能直接控制的，后面我会再详细解释一下，希望我没讲得太乱。

So having it go down is not really a function that is under their control, which I'll go over in a little more detail as hopefully I haven't confused you too much.

天啊，我真没见过这样的项目。

Gosh, I'm not sure I've ever seen a line item like that before.

我很想再深入看看这个，我想我们后面会谈到的。

I would love to dig more into it, and I think we will.

不过我也想听听，你是怎么算出佩里米特的投入资本回报率的？毕竟当报告的净利润为负时，你该怎么看资本回报的变化趋势？

But I also want to hear a little bit about how you would get to an ROIC number for Perimeter, right, looking at the returns on invested capital and what direction that's been moving in when the reported net income is negative.

是的。

Yeah.

这个项目对我来说也是头一回见。

It's it's definitely a new line item for me as well.

不过确实如此。

But yeah.

创始人咨询费对利润表造成了巨大压力，但其实它跟佩里米特能否盈利没关系，因为这是一项非现金、非经营性的公允价值重估。

So the founder's advisory fee is a massive drag on the P and L statement, even though it doesn't actually have anything to do with the ability for Perimeter Solutions' ability to generate profits as it's a non cash, non operating fair value remeasurement.

所以，要得出一个有用的投入资本回报率，只能无奈地使用调整后的数据，只把顾问费中实际以现金支付的部分算进去，因为这部分费用既可以用股票支付，也可以用现金支付。

So the only way to really get a usable ROIC number is to just unfortunately use an adjusted number where we only use the cash that's settled in the advisory fee as it can be paid out both in shares and in cash.

这就是为什么它被算作非现金支出。

That's why it's a non cash expense.

如果我们做这个调整，税后净经营利润其实一直在稳步上升，因为管理层越来越倾向于用股票而非现金领取顾问费，同时公司业务也越来越好，赚钱越来越多。

So if we make this adjustment, NOPAT has actually risen steadily because management has been taking a larger and larger share of the founder's fees as shares rather than cash, as well as the business starting to get better and better and making more and more money.

我们可以整天争论期权形式的费用算不算真正的成本。

So we can argue all day whether the fee in options is a real expense.

我个人觉得算，但为了看投入资本回报率，我们还是得依赖这些调整后的数字，才能得出一个真正可用的数值。

I would argue that it is, but for the sake of looking at ROIC, we kind of just have to rely on these adjusted numbers to get a number that's actually usable.

如果我们这么处理，2025年的投入资本回报率大约是11%。

So if we do that, then we get a ROIC of about 11% for 2025.

这个数字比2024年的9%有所上升。

And this is trending up from about 9% in 2024.

不过这些数字得打个折来看，毕竟顾问费对数据的影响太大了。

But take these numbers with a grain of salt as the advisory fees obviously highly impact the numbers.

这确实让情况变得混乱了。

It really does muddy the water.

从资本配置的角度来看，创始人的顾问费规模太大，让我们很难准确评估这项业务的真实回报水平。

From a capital allocation perspective, the sheer scale of the founder's advisory fee makes it incredibly difficult for us to assess the true return profile of the business.

当非现金、非经营性的公允价值重估随着股价剧烈波动时——比如2024年两亿美元，2025年超过四亿美元——这完全扭曲了任何通用会计准则下的利润表或损益表。

When you have non cash, non operating fair value remeasurements that swing wildly based on the stock price, like the $200,000,000 in twenty twenty four and four hundred million plus in 2025, I mean, that just completely distorts any generally accepted accounting principles, profit and loss or income statement.

传统的投入资本回报率（ROIC）依赖于对营业利润的清晰判断。

So traditional ROIC, traditional returns on invested capital relies on a clear view of net operating profit.

如果还没说清楚的话，这里经济现实中的优质资产，被这些会计噪音严重掩盖了。

Here, the economic reality of their high quality assets is really very heavily obscured by accounting noise if we haven't made that abundantly clear.

即使我们用调整后的数据看到ROIC从9%上升到11%，但信息不透明的问题依然非常突出。

And even if we use adjusted metrics to show an upward trend from 9% to 11% in ROIC, the lack of clarity remains a major issue.

对于一个建立在严谨资本配置策略上的企业来说，股东和潜在投资者不得不持续调整数亿美元的管理费用，这确实让评估真正的资本效率变得非常困难。

So for a strategy built on disciplined capital allocation, having to continuously adjust for hundreds of millions in management fees does make it tough for shareholders and potential shareholders to evaluate the true capital efficiency of the business.

这话说得有点激动了。

That's a little bit of a rant.

说到这个，我们不妨聊聊，为什么创始人顾问费从一开始就存在，以及它的具体结构是怎样的。

On that note, maybe we should go over why the founder's advisory fee even exists in the first place and how it's structured.

创始人顾问费的设立，初衷是为了尽可能让管理层和股东的利益保持一致。

So the whole reason the founder's fee exists is basically to align management with shareholders as best as they thought.

也就是说，为了让管理层在资本配置上更加用心，这才有了这份创始人顾问协议。

So basically to give management more skin in the game if they allocate capital well and this spread the founder advisory agreement.

这个协议主要由两部分组成。

So it has basically two pieces to it.

第一部分是固定的年度顾问费用。

So the first piece is a fixed annual advisory amount.

它相当于IPO时设定股份总数的1.5%，每年大约是230万股，以普通股形式支付，也可以部分用现金，但至少一半必须用股票支付。

So it's a flat fee equal to about 1.5% of the shares set at the IPO and this comes out to about 2,300,000 shares per year and it's payable in common stock or partly in cash but it must be paid at least 50% in stock.

第二部分是浮动的年度顾问费用。

Second, you have this variable annual advisory amount.

这部分和Perimeter股价的上涨直接挂钩。

So this is based on the appreciation specifically in Perimeter's stock price.

如果股价超过某个最低门槛，他们还会获得股票或现金报酬，其中至少一半必须以股票形式支付。

So if the stock price exceeds a specific minimum, they are also paid in stock or cash again with at least 50% paid in stock.

他们能获得超过10美元部分市值增长的18%作为报酬。而固定年顾问费将在2027年12月31日到期。

They're paid about 18% of the increase in market value above $10 Now the fixed annual advisory amount expires on 12/31/2027.

我很高兴这项费用有终止日期，希望以后不会无限期延续下去。

So I like the fact that it expires and hopefully isn't going be continuing in perpetuity.

可变部分的顾问费则会在2031年12月31日到期。

The variable interest amount expires on 12/31/2031.

由于管理层必须接受大部分报酬以股票形式发放，股东的股权被稀释是完全可以预期的。

Now since management is required to accept a large portion of this compensation in shares, shareholders can absolutely be expected to be diluted.

正如你刚才提到的，2024年和2025年的创始人顾问费特别高，分别达到了两亿美元和四亿多美元。

Now, the founders advisory fees were especially large in 2024 and 2025, as you just alluded to at $200,000,000 and over $400,000,000 respectively.

但那是因为当时股价表现特别出色。

But that was when the stock performed exceptionally well.

讽刺的是，股价涨得越好，按会计准则计算的盈利反而越难看，因为公司得确认更大的费用负债。

In a gigantic paradox, the better the stock does, the worse GAAP earnings is actually going to look because the company has to book a larger liability for that fee.

咱们先休息一下，听听今天赞助商的消息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

作为投资者，有一件事我觉得被严重忽视了，那就是持续提升自己作为研究者的能力有多难。

One part of being an investor that I don't think gets enough attention is how hard it can be to continue to improve as an investment researcher.

对我自己来说，每次和行业专家或基金经理聊完一场精彩的对话，脑子里都会塞满各种想法。

And for myself, I often find that when I finish a great conversation with some industry expert or fund manager, my head is full of ideas.

但等我坐下来整理时，一半的内容已经记不清了。

But by the time I sit down to write it all up, half of them are already gone.

所以我一直在用 PlodNote Pro。

That's why I've been using PlodNote Pro.

这是一款小巧的设备，贴在手机背面，能录下对话，然后给我一份清晰可搜索的总结。

It's a small device that sticks to the back of my phone and captures the conversation and hands me back a clean searchable recap.

关键要点、后续问题、那些我本来想跟进的事情，它全都帮我整理好了。

And so the key points, the follow ups, the things I usually want to act on, it has all of that.

这样一来，我就不用忙着记笔记，反而能专心参与对话，不用担心笔记到时候自己都看不懂。

And that allows me to stay present in the room instead of scribbling notes that I won't be able to read back later.

我的字迹一向很差。

And I notoriously have very bad handwriting.

这彻底改变了我准备和跟进投资者的方式。

And so it's changed how I prep and how I follow-up with investors.

这款产品也是为认真对待每一次对话的人设计的。

It's also built for people who take conversations seriously.

企业级的安全保障。

Enterprise grade security.

如果你经常录制与客户或行业人士的通话，这一点也完全不用担心。

So if you're recording calls with clients or industry contacts, that's covered too.

如果你整天泡在会议、电话和访谈里，那真值得试试。

So if you live in meetings, calls, and interviews, we'll give it a look.

前往 plod.ai/wsb，使用代码 WSB 可享九折优惠。

Go to plod.ai/w s b and use code w s b for 10% off.

网址是 plod.ai/wsb，别忘了输入代码 WSB。

That's plod dot ai slash WSB code WSB.

在录音之前，一定要先征得对方同意。

And always get consent before you record a conversation.

有人说，你每天推迟使用AI，就会落后两天，而竞争对手却在加速前进。

They say every day your business is late to AI, you fall two days behind and the competition, they're only moving faster.

幸运的是，现在有了NetSuite Next。

Fortunately, there's Netsuite next.

你可能已经知道NetSuite了，这是一个AI驱动的商业套件，能安全地把你的所有数据、财务、库存、电商、人力和客户关系整合在一个可信的统一平台上，已有四万三千多家企业信赖它。

You probably already know Netsuite, the AI powered business suite that securely connects all your data, financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM all in one source of truth, trusted by over 43,000 customers.

NetSuite Next是下一个重大飞跃，因为现在的AI能帮你完成所有日常工作。

Netsuite Next is the next huge leap because now AI is built to do everything you do.

它会在你一整天的工作中自动提供定制化的洞察，AI助手会陪你处理那些琐碎事务。

It surfaces custom insights throughout your day, AI agents work alongside you on the routine stuff.

无论你有什么问题，只要像问同事一样直接问出来就行。

And anytime you've got a question about anything, you just ask like you're talking to a colleague.

我自己在用，真心推荐你也试试。

And I use it and really I think you should too.

这是第一次，你可以免费试用 NetSuite Next。

For the first time ever, you can try NetSuite Next for free.

如果你的年收入至少达到七位数，就去 netsuite.aitip。

If your revenue is at least in the 7 figures, go to netsuite.aitip.

适用于各行各业，随时准备进入董事会会议室，netsuite.aitip。

Built for every industry, ready for every boardroom, netsuite.aitip.

对在线交易感兴趣，但还没迈出第一步？

Curious about online trading, but haven't taken the first step yet?

你并不孤单。

You're not alone.

Plus500的期货业务是个很好的起点。

And Plus500 futures is a great place to start.

期货市场变化很快，通过Plus500，你可以探索石油、黄金、标普500、比特币等热门资产。

The futures markets are moving fast and with Plus500, you can explore popular assets like oil, gold, S and P 500, Bitcoin, and more.

从加密货币到大宗商品，市场总是充满动态。

From crypto to commodities, there's always something happening.

这个平台用起来特别简单，你随时都能用手机交易。

The platform is super easy to use, so you can trade on the go right from your phone.

只要100美元就能入门，马上开始操作。

You can get started with just $100 and jump into the action.

看到感兴趣的东西了吗？

See something interesting?

账户开通后，点几下就能交易了。

Once your account is open, you can trade it in just a couple of clicks.

如果还没准备好，可以先用免费的模拟账户练习。

And if you're not quite ready yet, you can practice with a free demo account.

零风险，无压力。

No risk, no pressure.

Plus500有二十年经验，让交易变得前所未有的简单。

With twenty years of experience, Plus500 makes trading more accessible than ever.

去 plus500.com 看看吧。

Check it out at plus500.com.

期货交易存在亏损风险，并不适合所有人，也不是所有申请人都能通过审核。

Trading in futures involves risks of loss and is not suitable for everyone, not all applicants will qualify.

Plus500，让交易更有优势。

Plus500, it's trading with a plus.

好了，我们继续回节目。

Alright, back to the show.

凯尔，我觉得我研究的公司越多，投资个股的时间越长，就越反感大幅稀释股权的情况。

I would say that the more companies I look at and the longer that I've been actively investing in individual stocks, the more strongly against significant dilution I feel, Kyle.

所以，听到这位创始人的顾问费这么高，你大概也不会觉得意外吧。

So it probably doesn't surprise you to hear that this founder's advisory fee is is very off putting.

不过说实话，我觉得你对这个费用也提不起什么兴趣。

I think to be fair to you, I I don't think you're exactly excited about it either.

从目前的情况看，你支付的是1.5%的固定管理费加上18%的业绩提成，这跟对冲基金按资产管理规模收取的费用结构几乎一模一样——1.5%是常年管理费，18%是超过门槛收益后的绩效分成。

But from the looks of it, you're paying a a one and a half percent, an 18% fee structure, which is basically very similar to what you would pay a management team to to manage funds in a hedge fund based on the AUM, which is this consistent management fee, the 1.5%, and and performance over a hurdle rate, which is the the 18%.

但这个安排对实际流通股数造成了什么影响？

But how has it affected the actual shares outstanding?

股东总数中的流通股数量有没有明显增加？

Are we seeing a significant uptick in the number of shares spread across the shareholder base?

是的。

Yeah.

所以你可能不会惊讶，我对这个顾问费的看法其实和你一致。

So you probably won't be surprised that yes, I tend to agree with your sentiment on this advisory fee here.

说到你的问题，实际情况其实没你想象的那么糟。

Getting to your question here, when you look at it, it's actually not as bad as you'd think.

这是因为Perimeter的资金配置策略中还包括股票回购，这确实有效缓解了股权稀释。

Mean, that's because part of Perimeter's capital allocation policy is to use share repurchases as well, which definitely helped to offset dilution.

如果看稀释后的总股本，从上市时的约1.57亿股，增长到了现在的1.65亿股。

So if you look at diluted shares outstanding, they've gone from about 157,000,000 at the IPO to 165,000,000 today.

考虑到管理层一直用这些顾问费增持股份，这个数字其实比我预想的低多了。

This is actually much lower than I expected given that management has been increasing its ownership stake specifically with these advisory fees.

再来看股票回购，他们从2022年起每年都在回购股份，这确实抵消了顾问费带来的稀释影响。

So just looking at buybacks a little bit more, they've been buying back shares basically on an annual basis since 2022, which has definitely helped offset the dilution from the advisory fee.

他们目前仍在继续回购股票，因为现在还有一项总额约一亿美元的股票回购计划在执行中。

And they currently are still buying back shares as they currently have a stock repurchase plan open right now to repurchase approximately a $100,000,000 in shares.

管理层从这笔顾问费中获得的这些股票，至少是留着没卖，真正把利益绑在一起了吗？

With the amount of shares that management has gotten from this advisory fee, have they at least held on to them to have skin in the game?

我的意思是，如果他们拿到股票后立刻就抛售，那我对这种利益一致性，甚至整个费用结构，都会很不放心。

I mean, if they accepted the shares and just immediately sold them, I would not feel great about the alignment or really just the overall fee structure in general.

是的。

Yeah.

我也不希望这样，肖恩。

I wouldn't either, Shawn.

但内部人士目前合计持有公司约13%的股份，其中首席执行官海萨姆·库里拥有约3%，我觉得这个比例相当健康。

But insiders actually own about 13% of the business with their CEO, Hytham Khouri, owning about 3%, which I think is quite healthy.

EverArc的创始人们在合并前各自投入了约1100万美元进入这家公司。

And the founders of EverArc all invested about $11,000,000 each into this business before it merged.

所以他们的股票并不是全靠期权得来的。

So they haven't gotten all of their stock from options.

其中一部分是在那次合并中获得的。

Some of it was owned as part of that merger.

所有高管的基本薪资都非常合理，介于35万到70万美元之间。他们有一个基于现金的激励计划，与公司的调整后EBITDA以及每位高管的个人表现挂钩。

Base salaries for all executives are very reasonable ranging between $3.50 and $700,000 They have a cash based incentive program that's based on the adjusted EBITDA of the business and the individual performance of each executive.

说实话，这个薪酬结构并不是我最喜欢的，尤其是考虑到咨询费和高管薪酬的安排。

The compensation structure here, you know, not my favorite given the advisory fee and the executive comp structure.

调整后EBITDA这个指标往往给数字操作留下了很大的空间，就像我们今天已经讨论过的那样。

Adjusted EBITDA tends to give a lot of room to get creative with numbers as I think we've already outlined a lot here today.

而且我也不太喜欢把这项指标作为考核业绩的依据。

And it's not my favorite KPI to base performance on.

我觉得我可以代表你说，肖恩，你的想法跟我差不多。

And I think I can speak for you, Shawn, that you think very similarly to me.

有趣的是，正如威廉·索恩迪克在他的《局外人》一书中提到的，基于每股股东价值创造的指标通常更受青睐，因为跟调整后EBITDA这类指标相比，财务数据更难被操纵。

Well, ironically, as William Thorndyke discusses in his book, The Outsiders, metrics based on value creation for shareholders per share of stock are typically much more preferable because it's harder to manipulate the accounting than with something like adjusted EBITDA.

这也是为什么巴菲特称EBITDA完全是胡说八道的原因。

And there's a reason Buffett called EBITDA utter nonsense.

这不仅仅是EBITDA，而是经过调整的EBITDA，具体指什么其实也不太清楚。

And so this is not just EBITDA, but it's adjusted EBITDA, whatever that means.

不过我们还没怎么聊过现金流的问题。

So we haven't spoken much though about cash flow.

而现金流才是真正反映EBITDA和调整后EBITDA想衡量的核心内容。

And that is really sort of at the heart of what EBITDA and adjusted EBITDA numbers are trying to capture.

通过剔除股票薪酬这类项目，来更清楚地看出企业的实际经营性现金流。

You're stripping out things like stock based comp to get an idea for the operating cash flows of the business.

以珀里米特解决方案公司为例，他们在2025年就产生了近2.4亿美元的经营性现金流入。

And looking at Perimeter Solutions, they have generated nearly $240,000,000 in cash from operations within 2025.

考虑到他们最近用现金收购了这家医疗制造技术公司，我推测他们应该是通过举债来完成这笔交易的。

And given their latest acquisition of this medical manufacturing technologies business and the fact that it was paid in cash, I would assume that they raised debt for the deal.

咱们详细看看珀里米特的资产负债表吧，你对他们的债务结构怎么看？

How about we go over Perimeter's balance sheet in more detail thirty:fifty how you think about the debt?

目前珀里米特手头有大约9100万美元的现金及等价物，比2025年底的3.25亿美元少了不少。

So currently Perimeter has about $91,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents, which is down from $325,000,000 at the end of twenty twenty five.

我猜他们在收购MMT的时候动用了这笔现金。

Now I assume they drew down on this cash award as part of the MMT acquisition.

长期债务目前大概在12亿美元左右。因为这次大收购让现金流数据变得不太稳定，有些数字也被掩盖了，所以很难判断这家公司的债务与自由现金流比率是否低于我设定的三倍警戒线。

Long term debt is currently at about $1,200,000,000 Now since cash generation is pretty volatile right now due to the big acquisition kind of obfuscating some of their numbers, it's really hard to see if this business is getting below my three times debt to free cash flow number.

不过我们知道他们的利息保障倍数是三倍。

But we do know they are surfacing their debt with an interest coverage ratio of three times.

这绝对不算高，但我觉得目前还在可控范围内。

It's definitely not super high by any means, but I think it's somewhat manageable for now.

跟其他所有通过收购扩张的公司一样，我猜只要他们还有好的投资机会，就会一直维持一定水平的债务。

As with all CRL acquirers, I would assume that they're going to continue to always carry some form of debt as long as they have ideas to invest in.

他们应该能够用账上的现金、现有业务产生的现金流，再加上杠杆融资来为这些新交易提供资金。

They should be able to fund these new deals with the cash that they already have on their books, cash generated from their current business, and then from leverage.

利息保障倍数只有三倍，这意味着如果业务遇到任何波动，容错空间非常小。

With that interest coverage ratio at three times, that is not a lot of room for error if the business hits really any turbulence.

所以归根结底，股东们最关心的是公司能否按时偿还债务，不出现违约。因为一旦违约，整个公司可能被迫破产，股东的权益也会归零。

So ultimately, shareholders, want to know that they can service their debt without missing any payments because if they miss payments, then the whole business could be forced into bankruptcy and the equity of shareholders could be wiped out.

我们不希望卷入这种局面。

That's something that we don't want to be a part of.

但考虑到这些创始人费用让他们的经营利润波动很大，而且我们也不太喜欢这些费用，你是否担心他们能否实现可持续且安全的增长？

But given how volatile their operating profits are because of these founder fees that we're not super fond of, are you worried at all about their ability to grow, let's say sustainably and safely?

是的。

Yeah.

所以我们得看看

So I mean, we have to look

他们获取资本的能力如何。

at this kind of in their ability to access capital.

我认为他们一直能以相当合理的利率获得融资。

I think that they've been able to access it at some very reasonable rates.

他们发行的高级票据利率在5%到6%之间，我觉得这个债务成本相当合理。

They have these senior notes that range from about 5% to six percent, which I think is quite a reasonable cost of debt.

而且他们最近刚发过债，说明贷款方在遇到新的优质收购机会时，很可能愿意继续给他们提供资金。

And the fact that they were recently issued means that their lenders are probably willing to give them more money if another good acquisition were to come up.

随着MMT收购带来的现金流增长，我认为他们目前的状况相当不错，有能力继续扩张。

With more cash generation likely to come online from the MMT acquisition, I think they are in a pretty decent position here to continue to grow.

但考虑到MMT交易的规模，如果他们再进行另一笔收购，肯定得靠杠杆来推动业务发展。

But given the size of the MMT deal, if they decide to make another one, well, would certainly have to use leverage to continue building this business.

如果你对杠杆感到不安，那这个生意可能不太适合你。

If you are uneasy with leverage, this probably isn't a business that you're going to find very interesting.

至于顾问费的波动，只要股价持续表现强劲，这部分就会继续拖累盈利，就像我们之前说的，股价越高，顾问费也越高。

On the advisory fee volatility, that's going to unfortunately just continue to be a drag on earnings as long as the stock price is doing very, very well, which as we mentioned pushes that advisory fee even higher.

现在，这取决于投资者是否愿意把它纳入自己的分析模型。

Now I think it's kind of up to investors whether they want to include it in their calculations.

在评估偿债能力时，可以考虑将其调整，但在估算公司内在价值时，最好把它剔除掉。

Think they can be adjusted for when looking at things like servicing debt, but should probably be removed when looking at the intrinsic value of the company.

如果把2025财年的这些费用调整掉，利息保障倍数大约是六倍，这样看起来更健康一些，也能让我们更全面地看待他们的偿债能力。

So if you adjust them for the fiscal year 2025, interest coverage ratio is about six times, which makes it a little bit better and at least we're zooming out a little bit to see how they can service that debt.

所以当我们讨论他们如何平衡

So as we're discussing their ability to balance

关于债务偿还，你能不能再详细说说，你觉得这个业务还有哪些其他关键风险？

debt payments, maybe you can paint some more color around the other key risks that stand out for you when you look at this business.

所以

So

虽然他们涉足的是一些非常小众的行业，就像我们之前提到的，这些行业监管都很严格，确实存在一定的风险。

while it does have products in super niche industries, like we've already mentioned here, they are very regulated industries and that can pose some risk.

但我认为，这并不是公司面临的最大风险。

But I actually don't think that's the biggest risk for the company.

对我而言，最大的风险其实根植于他们的商业模式本身。

So to me, the biggest risk is really embedded in their business model.

由于Perimeter是一家相对较新的公司，它不得不进入一些过去从未涉足过的行业。

So since Perimeter is a relatively new business, it's going to need to venture into industries where Perimeter hasn't really operated in the past.

以MMT为例，没错，这个业务看起来前景不错，根据我们目前掌握的信息，它的发展方向也基本是正面的，但我们目前只有一个季度的数据来评估它的表现。

So if we look at MMT for instance, yes, okay, the business does look promising and it's from all for all intents and purposes from the information we have now looks like it's moving in the right direction, but we only really have a quarter to assess how that's going.

虽然MMT不像消防设备板块那样具有明显的周期性，但短期内或长期内是否会出现周期波动，我们还无法确定，因为信息实在太少。

While MMT doesn't seem as cyclical as a fire safety segment, we can't rule out cyclicality in that business segment over shorter or longer time horizons because we just don't have that information yet.

而且为了资助这次收购，Perimeter 实际上把债务负担翻了一倍，就为了进入一个他们以前经验有限的行业。

And then on top of that to fund this acquisition, Perimeter effectively doubled its debt load just to enter an industry that it has limited previous experience in.

这也是为什么在我看来，那些历史悠久、业务多元化的大型商业地产收购方更具吸引力。

Now this is part of why larger, diversified CRE acquires with a longer history of success are in my opinion attractive.

比如 Lifeco 这家公司，他们最近进入了我们的内在价值投资组合，就是个很好的例子。

Know, a business like Lifeco, which recently made into our Intrinsic Value Portfolio is a great example.

他们有三个主要业务板块，已经运营了很长时间，而且有着非常出色的成功记录。

They have three primary segments that they've been operating in for a long time, and they have a very strong track record of the success.

如果他们想拓展到相邻的业务领域，他们也有丰富的专业知识可以借鉴。

They also have a wide range of expertise to draw on if they want to diversify into adjacent segments.

事实上，我们最近也看到了这一点，他们通过拆分系统解决方案部门的部分业务，新增了两个新板块。

And we've actually seen this recently with their addition of two new segments, which they accomplished by just splitting off parts of their system solution segment.

这让我想起Uber最近在测试新的商业模式，比如他们最近和Expedia的合作，涉及住宿业务，这也是我们最近在一次YouTube直播中讨论过的内容。

It reminds me a bit of Uber testing out new business models and and things like accommodations with their recent Expedia partnership, which is something we talked about on a YouTube livestream that we did recently.

我对这方面的信心确实不高，但我总体上还是看好Uber的业务。

And my conviction is definitely low on that front, but I do still like Uber's business anyways.

所以我们可以把这一点和Perimeter联系起来，因为他们进入了完全陌生的行业。

And so we can connect that back to Perimeter here by venturing into what is an entirely new industry.

这当然伴随着执行上的风险。

Obviously, always carries execution risk.

但关键的区别在于，我们至少知道这个资产能立刻为Perimeter带来稳定的收入和EBITDA。

The crucial differentiator here is that we at least know this asset will immediately produce solid top line revenue and an EBITDA for Perimeter.

没错。

Right.

接下来我想谈的这个风险，我知道肖恩你一直很关注。

And so the next risk that I will address is an area that I know Shawn you like to spend time on.

这主要涉及监管风险，也部分牵扯到法律风险。

And this is kind of deals specifically with regulatory risk and then partly with legal risk.

目前有一起未决诉讼，指控Perimeter和行业内其他大型企业，比如3M、杜邦和Amarex，导致了地下水和饮用水污染，还破坏了自然资源，并因Perimeter泡沫中使用的化学物质——主要是含氟化合物——造成人员伤害。

So there's currently an open suit alleging that perimeter along with other large businesses in the industry like three ms, DuPont and Amarex have caused groundwater and drinking water contamination Other things like damage to natural resources, injuries from exposure to chemicals specifically used in Perimeter's foams, which are mainly from a chemical called fluorine.

总的来说，我对诉讼的看法是：有时候它们真有影响，但很多时候从投资者的角度看，其实无关紧要。

So my thing with lawsuits just in general is that sometimes they matter and other times they don't really matter from an investor's perspective.

比如说，我见过太多股票了，股价一跌，就有一堆专门找茬的律师事务所出来，到处搜罗理由，想对某些公司提起集体诉讼。

For instance, you know, I can't tell you how many stocks I've seen where the stock price goes down and then you get these ambulance chaser law firms that look for a reason to do a class action lawsuit against some specific corporation.

这些案子基本都是走个过场，根本影响不到公司的实际业务。

You know, these are basically useless cases that don't really affect the underlying business.

但要是某场诉讼的赔偿金额大到能拖垮一家公司，或者彻底改变它的商业模式，那这就绝对是重要信号，不是什么无关紧要的噪音。

But if you have a lawsuit that will cost so much that it's gonna destroy a company or drastically alter its business model, well, then that's definitely a strong signal and not just some useless noise.

我本人对这个案子并不专业，但可以肯定的是，Perimeter 已经在逐步停止在泡沫材料中使用含氟化学物，就是为了避免再卷入这类诉讼。

So I'm not an expert on this case by any means, but I will say that Perimeter appears to be moving away from using flooring in its foam specifically to avoid further lawsuits in this area.

不过，既然他们还在不断签下政府机构的大单，说明这事儿对他们的商业模式影响其实没那么大。

Now, given the fact that they are still signing large contracts with governmental agencies, it doesn't seem like it's affected the business model all that much.

诉讼带来的另一个潜在风险，就是你得不断花大钱去打官司。

The other potential risk from lawsuits is just how much money you have to spend and and continually fighting them.

如果你所在的行业动不动就被告，那就几乎必须持续投入资金来应对这些诉讼，这不仅压低利润，还可能损害公司声誉。

And if you're in an industry exposed to many lawsuits, you almost have to maintain a steady stream of expenses just to fight these cases, which hurts margins and can do damage to the company's reputation.

所以，如果你在分析一家诉讼频发行业的公司的利润表，千万别把那些诉讼费用简单当成一次性支出就忽略掉——这些钱是常态，得算进企业的正常盈利水平里。

So if you're digging through a company's income statement in an industry that is ripe with litigation, you might not want to write off some of those lawsuit expenses as just a one time expense that you can ignore when you're trying to figure out what the normalized earnings of the business are going be.

实际上，这可能就是这家公司的常态。

Actually, that might be the normalized reality for that company.

是的。

Yeah.

对很多公司来说，这已经是常态了，虽然令人遗憾，但理解这些费用很重要，因为它们常常是持续发生的，你只能接受。

It's a it is completely a normalized reality for a lot of companies and it's unfortunate, but it's important to understand those fees because sometimes they are recurring in nature and unfortunately, you just have to live with them.

我们回头看看Perimeter的情况，杜邦和3M都曾面临过和解金额达数十亿美元的诉讼。

So if we look specifically back to Perimeter here, so if we look at DuPont and three ms, they actually both had lawsuits that were settled with multi billion dollar payouts.

显然，这些企业的规模不同，我也说不准这些诉讼和Perimeter目前的业务具体有什么关联。

Now, obviously these businesses have different levels of scale and I don't know how exactly these were associated with exactly what Perimeter is offering.

但不用说，这可是笔巨款，要知道Perimeter的市值才55亿美元，要是真要支付数十亿美元的赔偿，对它来说绝对是个灾难。

But needless to say, you know, that's a lot of money, You know, we're talking about a business here that has a market cap of $5,500,000,000 so having to pay multi billion dollars and a potential payout would not be good at all for Perimeter.

所以，就像你提到的，光看Perimeter现在支付的这些费用，根本没法准确判断。

So kind of to your point there, just looking at the fees that Perimeter is is, having to pay, it's kind of impossible to know.

如果他们真有这类支出——大概率是有的——但属于内部项目，应该会体现在销售、一般及行政费用里，2025年这项费用大约是7700万美元。

So if they had that, which they probably do, it's probably internal though, it would be in their SG and A line, which is at $77,000,000 or so for 2025.

所以，具体他们花了多少钱，其实很难说清楚，但这里还有一些别的信息我们可以参考。

So, you know, it's just kind of impossible to know how much exactly they are spending, but you know, there is some other information that we can look at here.

另外，在消防安全业务板块，你还得面对客户集中度的风险。

So to add additional risks to the fire safety segment you also run into customer concentration risks.

美国农业部林务局、美国内政部土地管理局和加利福尼亚州的收入，占了Perimeter相当大的一部分营收。

So revenue from the USDA Forest Services, the US Bureau of Land Management and the State of California represents a substantial portion of Perimeter's revenue.

我觉得应该超过了百分之五十。

I think it's somewhere above 50%.

这种集中度让PRM面临不少风险，比如客户拖欠款项、履约失败、条款重新谈判，甚至合同不续签。

And this concentration makes PRM subject to risks such as non payment, non performance, the renegotiation of terms, or even non renewal.

不过，要反驳这种集中度风险，我们可以看看Perimeter过去的情况，特别是坏账准备金，来确认客户有没有拖欠过款。

Now to argue against the concentration risk, I think we can look at Perimeter's past and specifically the allowance for doubtful accounts just to see if customers haven't paid them.

但你看，无论是2025年还是2024年，这个数字都微不足道。

But you know, if we look at this, the figure has actually been immaterial both in 2025 and 2024.

即使再往前看几年，也从来没超过一百万美元。

And even if we go back a few more years, it never actually exceeded a million dollars.

所以我觉得，跟收不到客户款项相比，续约风险才是这里最大的风险。

So I think the renewal risk would be the biggest risk here over not really getting paid by their customers.

你之前在这期节目里提到，我们一直叫作PS的五硫化二磷产品出现了一些疲软迹象。

So you mentioned earlier in the episode that the phosphorus pentasulfide product that we've been referring to as PS has shown some weakness.

我觉得这种疲软也给Perimeter带来了一些潜在风险，我们可能得聊聊。

And I think that weakness poses some sort of risk for Perimeter as well that we should probably talk about.

关于这一点，你有什么补充的吗？

What can you add to the conversation on that front?

是的。

Yeah.

所以在Perimeter最近的财报电话会议上，他们提到了位于伊利诺伊州Sogit的设施。

So in Perimeter's latest earnings call, discussed the Sogit, Illinois facility.

这个设施出现了严重的非计划停机时间，导致PS产品的性能下降。

Now this facility experienced significant unplanned downtime, which reduced the PS products performance.

所以基本上，他们在这个地点并没有控股。

So basically they just don't have a controlling interest in this location.

实际上这是个合作伙伴，但在Perimeter看来，他们没能把运营维持在应有的水平上。

It's actually a partner and they haven't been doing a good enough job in Perimeter's view at maintaining their performance levels.

据我了解，针对这个问题，Perimeter已经尝试接管这家工厂的运营，毕竟他们希望尽量减少停机时间。

So from what I can tell about this, event, Perimeter has basically attempted to actually take over operations of this plant as obviously they want to minimize this downtime.

他们所说的停机问题，其实还涉及安全方面的隐患，以及当前运营商面临的其他运营困难。

The downtime that they're referring to actually applies to some issues in safety as well as some operational challenges that the current operator is having.

但当Perimeter试图接管时，这个转让却被阻止了。

But when Perimeter tried to take it over, the transfer was actually blocked.

而且，不幸的是，Perimeter现在又陷入了某种程度的法律纠纷。

And once again, unfortunately Perimeter is engaged in litigation at some degree.

所以关键问题是，位于伊利诺伊州的Sogit工厂其实是他们在北美地区的主要供应来源。

So the main issue with that is that the Sogit facility in Illinois is actually their primary source in North America.

只要这个工厂持续表现不佳，就一定会对北美市场的PS产品造成负面影响。

So you know as long as it's underperforming it's going to have negative effects on the PS products in North America.

所以在2025全年和2026年第一季度，他们在这上面已经花了整整一百万美元的律师费。

So in full year 2025 and the first quarter of twenty twenty six, they spent out a million dollars in legal fees on this issue.

PS产品还在卖，收入也还在产生。

The PS product is it's still selling, know, they're still making revenue.

不过他们在去年的年报里提到，由于这次停机，特种产品的收入大概减少了200万美元。

But they did note in their annual from last year that they had about a $2,000,000 decrease in the specialty products specifically due to this downtime.

所以，即便这个问题持续存在，我觉得他们正在努力通过多元化来摆脱困境，希望他们能解决这个问题，这样也能给这个业务板块带来一些有机增长。

So, you know, even if this issue persists, I think they're doing a decent job of diversifying their way out of the problem and hopefully they can fix it, which hopefully will also give back a little bit of organic growth to that business segment.

接下来，我想谈谈Perimeter Solutions的一些潜在机会。

Next, I want to mention some potential for Perimeter Solutions.

这生意挺难搞的，想摸清它到底有多大市场，因为人家都在跨界做完全不相关的业务。

It's kind of a tough business to try and nail down an available market for since they are diversifying into completely unrelated businesses.

我觉得总潜在市场（TAM）其实挺大的。你看他们做的交易规模，跨度特别大，既有那种一千万美元的小收购，也有两亿美元买下第一家消防业务的大手笔。所以你看，他们不仅横跨多个行业，交易金额的范围也特别宽。

I think the TAM is going to be very wide Even when looking at deal sizes they've done, you know, they they've got tiny ones with these tuck in acquisitions for $10,000,000 and then they purchased that first fire safety business for $2,000,000,000 So they not only operate across many industries, but also have a pretty wide ranges of a purchase price.

而且，这还不是一家只做北美市场的公司。

Then on top of that, you know, this isn't a purely North American business.

消防业务是全球性的，不过说实话，大部分收入还是来自北美。

The fire segment is global, though I'd say most of its revenue comes from North America.

PS这个业务板块在全球各地都有销售。

The PS segment sells all over the world too.

所以说实话，他们到底能做多少笔收购，根本没法准确预测。

So, you know, this is a business where I think it's pretty much impossible to say just how many acquisitions they can make.

但我估计他们的市场潜力相当大。

But my guess is their market is quite large.

整个世界在某种程度上都算他们的市场，具体要看他们想拓展多少个业务平台。

Basically the entire world to some degree, depending on how many platforms they want to add is part of their market.

不过他们对收购标的的要求极其严格，这自然会大幅缩小可选范围。

But the fact that they have these very, very stringent investing criteria of the business they want, obviously is going to shrink it substantially.

但真要给这个数字定个具体值，我觉得根本不可能。

But in order to actually put a number on that, I honestly think it's completely impossible.

我之前试着算过一次。

I try doing it with this one.

我觉得特别有意思的是，把Perimeter和我们投资组合里的其他公司比如优步对比一下，今天不知怎么的我又老提起优步。

It's very interesting to me to contrast a business like Perimeter with some of our other portfolio holdings like Uber, which I keep talking about for some reason today.

像Uber这样的公司，目标市场和核心业务模式要清晰得多，基本就局限在出行和配送这两个板块。

With Uber, the addressable market and the core engine are much more transparent and, and let's say, clearly bounded within their mobility, which is ride hailing and delivery segments.

所以我们能很准确地追踪一些关键运营指标，比如总交易额，还有打车业务每年20%的增长，或者他们那种多产品交叉销售的飞轮效应。

So we can pretty precisely track operational indicators of success, like gross bookings and ride hailing expanding at a 20% year over year clip or their cross sell flywheel where you have multi product users.

比如那些既用Uber打车又用Uber Eats的用户，现在占了客户总数的三分之一，而且消费金额是普通用户的三倍。

So people that are using both Uber ride hailing and Uber Eats, which now make up a third of the customer base and and spend three times more.

他们的增长路径非常清晰，遵循典型的平台扩张模式，商户渗透还有很长的路可走，再加上Uber One会员订阅体系，已经拉来了数千万会员。

And so their growth follows a visible scaling marketplace playbook with a very long runway for for merchant penetration and a a subscription engine in Uber One that has driven tens of millions of memberships.

相比之下，像Perimeter这样频繁收购的公司，收购的都是些毫不相关的细分资产，从消防设备到高精度医疗制造机械，横跨好几个完全不同的行业。

And so by comparison, a serial acquirer like Perimeter is rolling out completely unrelated niche assets that vary pretty wildly across different sectors from fire safety to precision medical manufacturing machinery.

这就让他们的真正潜在市场规模变得几乎无法定义，更别提量化了。

So that makes their true TAM virtually impossible to define or quantify.

所以作为投资者，我们只能依赖管理层的资本配置能力来判断价值，而不是盯着某个明确行业的增长曲线。

And so that means that as investors, we have to underwrite the management team's capital allocation framework rather than a clear single industry growth runway.

你看好打车和外卖，还是不看好，就这么简单。

You're bullish on ride hailing and food delivery or you're not.

没那么简单。

It's not as simple as that.

确实，这给我们投资者带来了更大的压力。

And, yeah, that just makes it Puts more burden on us as investors, would say.

是的，我同意你的看法。

Yeah, I agree with you on that.

具体来看Perimeter，我觉得它没有明确的总潜在市场反而不是劣势。

And, know, looking specifically at Perimeter, I actually don't really think it's a weakness that Perimeter doesn't have a defined TAM.

他们显然有很多选择，可以自由转向任何他们看好的方向或机会。

You know, they clearly have a lot of options to move in whatever direction that they really want or wherever they're seeing really, really good opportunities.

这样反而让他们更能灵活应对变化。

And so I think this will keep them adaptive.

只要能发现高质量的企业或行业，哪怕现在跟他们的主营业务不完全匹配，他们也能轻松新增一个品类、搭建新平台，或者继续做更多小规模收购，来强化现有业务板块。

If they can find high quality businesses and industries that maybe aren't a traditional fit for the business as is today, they can just, you know, add a new category or add a new platform, or they continue to make on more and more bolt on acquisitions to improve their current business segments.

所以说，他们未来有很多可能性，只是很难精确量化这些可能性具体会是什么样子。

So the point being, they have a lot of optionality in what they can do in the future, but it's just kind of hard to put a number down on exactly what that looks like.

好的。

Okay.

行。

All right.

接下来是这期节目的环节，我们来估算一下这家公司的价值。

Well, it's the time of the episode where we try to figure out what the company is worth.

那么，Perimeter Solutions 的内在价值到底是多少呢？

So what is Perimeter Solutions intrinsic value?

你打算怎么思考并回答这个问题？

How do you go about thinking about answering that question?

对。

Yeah.

在讲内在价值之前，我先分享一些对这家公司的整体看法。

So before we go over the intrinsic value, just let me give you some general thoughts on this business.

我觉得这家公司本身有很多值得肯定的地方。

So I think there's a lot to like about in this business itself.

你知道吗，他们做了一些非常不错的收购。

You know, they've made some very good acquisitions.

而且出价都挺合理的。

They've paid pretty reasonable prices.

他们实现了收入的高速增长，同时保持了稳定且可观的利润率。

They've compounded revenue at a high rate and they've maintained high and steady margins.

他们系统化的收购方式是一种我特别喜欢的商业模式，因为它看起来完全可以复制。

Their systematic approach to making acquisitions is a business model that I really, really like as it feels repeatable.

从他们两个业务板块的增长就能看出来，这招效果很好，尤其是在消防安全这块。

And as you can tell from the growth in their two segments, it's worked out well so far, especially in the fire safety segment.

我特别推崇去中心化的管理模式。

I'm a really big fan of decentralized businesses.

如果你的激励机制设计得当，就能让值得信赖的人主动担起重任，而不是事无巨细地管着——后者往往导致失败，而不是成功，尤其是在快速扩张的企业里。

And you know, if you have the right compensation structure, you basically are allowing people that you trust to do the heavy lifting rather than micromanaging, which can often cause failure, not success, especially in businesses that scale up.

不过呢，我也有其他一些顾虑，第一个问题其实挺明显的。

But, you know, there are other issues I have, you know, the first thing I think is going to be pretty obvious.

这是创始人的顾问费。

It's the founder's advisory fee.

你本质上是在为持有股票而向共同基金支付费用。

You're essentially paying mutual like funds just to own a stock.

但我个人不太喜欢这种做法。

Now I'm just not crazy about that.

你可能会说，创始人确实配得上这笔费用，但对于那些在IPO时买入，或者2023年股价跌到仅3美元时才进场的投资者来说，他们根本不在乎这笔顾问费。

You can argue that the founders have earned that fee, know, for investors who bought at the IPO or when the price dropped to just $3 in 2023, they're not complaining about the founder's advisory fee at all.

另外，你还要考虑北美地区PS产品引发的诉讼和问题，这些在评估这家公司的业务时都不可忽视。

And then you have the lawsuits and the issues with the PS product in North America that I think you have to consider when you're underwriting this business.

说实话，创始人顾问费是我对这家公司最不满意的地方。

I'd say the founder's fee is easily the biggest issue I have honestly with the entire business really.

没错，这点我完全同意。

Yeah, no arguments there.

不过话虽如此，我还是想具体说说我对珀里米特解决方案公司的基本预期。

But with all that said, let me go over my base case specifically for Perimeter Solutions here.

所以我先假设收入每年增长大约15%。

So I first assume that revenue grows at about 15 percent.

这实际上比他们上市以来高达46%的历史增长率要低得多。

Now this is actually a pretty steep decline from historical growth rates that are actually really high at about 46% since they IPO ed.

我的想法是，他们未来可能少依赖并购，更多依靠内生增长来持续推动业务发展。

Now my assumption is simply that they rely maybe a little bit less on M and A growth and a little more on organic growth to just continue growing this business.

而且我之前投资过几家CRO收购方，知道并购的项目清单往往非常不稳定。

I also know from owning several CRO acquirers that pipelines for M and A can be very, very bumpy.

如果他们接连完成几笔小规模收购，收入增长可能会比投资者想象的停滞得更久。

And if they land, you know, a number of maybe smaller acquisitions and revenue growth can actually stall for longer periods of time than investors would like to believe.

我之前提到过，调整后的EBITDA利润率波动很大。

So I mentioned that adjusted EBITDA margins are very volatile.

所以在基准情景下，我假设利润率会稳定在历史区间的中点，大约达到51%。

So for the base case, I'm just assuming that they stick somewhere around the midpoint of historical numbers and reach around 51%.

他们以前甚至一度超过过60%。

So they've gone over 60%.

所以我觉得这个数字算是比较保守的。

So, you know, I think this is a reasonably conservative number.

如果他们能再找到几笔利润率更高的收购，也许还能再提升，但他们现在的利润率已经很高了。

If they can find a few more good acquisitions with higher margins, perhaps this climbs, but they already have pretty high margins.

所以我觉得这并不容易做到。

So I don't think that'll be a very easy task.

最后，我用了大约17倍的企业价值对调整后EBITDA的退出倍数。

Now finally, I apply an exit multiple about 17 times EV to adjusted EBITDA.

他们目前的交易倍数在19倍左右，但我感觉市场对这家公司有些过度乐观，当前的倍数明显偏高。

So today they're trading around 19 times, but I think that there's also some excitement about the corporation and the current multiple definitely seems a little higher than normal.

我觉得对于一家拥有持续增长的经常性收入、未来多年还能继续增长的公司来说，17倍是合理的。

So I think 17 times is reasonable for a business with growing recurring revenue stream that should continue to grow for many years to come now.

基于这些假设，我算出每股价值大约是62美元。

With that said, I get a value of about $62 per share.

在这些假设基础上，加上25%的安全边际，我得出的内在价值是46美元，相当于从当前价格出发约7%的回报。

With these assumptions and a 25% margin safety, I get an intrinsic value of $46, which represents about a 7% return from today's price.

那么，有哪些因素

So what are some of

会影响你的乐观和悲观情景？这些因素必须成立，公司才能达到最乐观或最悲观的估值。

the events that would factor into your your bull and bear cases and and have to be true for the company to, either, you know, reach its most optimistic valuation or its most pessimistic valuation.

关于悲观情景，我基本假设他们正在应对的一些诉讼可能会增加额外开支，迫使他们把精力放在非业务增长的领域，这自然会影响收入增长和利润率。

So starting with the bear case here, I'm basically assuming that some of the litigation that they're dealing with maybe add some more expenses, which makes them focus on areas outside of growing the business, which would then obviously impact things like revenue growth and margins.

但我仍然认为他们会实现有机增长，并进行一些规模较小的收购，虽然这些收购可能不像MMT那样的交易那样有显著影响。

But I still assume that they're going to grow organically, make a few smaller acquisitions that maybe don't move the needle as much as something like an MMT deal.

如果他们遭遇重大诉讼，显然也会导致估值倍数被压低。

And if they were hit with a big lawsuit, would also obviously mean a depressed multiple.

所以我在这边调低了倍数。

So I decreased the multiple on that end.

至于乐观情景，我假设他们会持续做出一些非常出色的收购。

For the bull case, I assume that they continue making some just really good acquisitions.

也许他们会决定进入消防和特种产品之外的全新业务平台，这无疑会大幅拓展他们的市场，让他们能收购更多企业。

Maybe they decide to add a whole new platform outside of the fire safety and specialty products segment, which will obviously vastly open up their market to owning more and more businesses.

我还假设他们能持续产生足够的现金流来回购股票，而且这次的力度更大，真正减少了总股本。

I also assume that they keep generating enough cash to buy back shares, but this time in a more meaningful way, which actually reduces their share count.

我觉得他们有可能把股本减少一千万美元左右。

I think they can get to maybe a reduction of $10,000,000 in shares.

当我综合评估这三个情景后，得出的股价大约是53美元，相当于10%的回报率。

So when I weigh all three of these scenarios, I get a price of about $53 which turns out to be a 10% return.

所以，说实话，回报不算差，但以现在的价格来看，还不符合我们内在价值投资组合的回报门槛。

So, you know, not bad, but right now the price I think just isn't right to meet our return hurdle for the Intrinsic Value Portfolio.

不过话说回来，这家公司的业务确实挺吸引我的。

That said, you know, this business does intrigue me.

如果你能把创始人费用带来的股权稀释因素也算进去，还是能像过去一样获得回报的。

If you can factor in the dilution from the founder's fee, you can still make a return as they have so far.

虽然我现在对当前的价格不感兴趣，但如果股价跌到二十美元出头，我可能会考虑建仓，但在此之前，我还需要再多做些研究，更深入地了解这家公司。

Now, while I'm not interested in current prices, if the business drops into the low twenties, I might consider opening a position, but I would probably have to continue doing a little more work and getting more and more familiar with the business.

是的。

Yeah.

我们很少会把一家公司完全归入‘太难搞’的那一类，彻底放弃。

It's not often that we totally write off a business as being a 100% in our too hard pile.

我觉得我们不应该对Perimeter Solutions这样做，即使股价大幅下跌，也不该直接无视，因为肯定存在一个让它变得非常有吸引力的估值水平。

And I I don't think we should do that with Perimeter Solutions here and and look away even if the stock declines significantly because there probably is a valuation where it becomes quite attractive.

对我来说，我通常对那些我能从消费者角度有一定洞察的公司最感兴趣，我能真切地感受到并理解它们为什么比竞争对手更有优势，以及它们是如何为客户创造价值的。

Generally for me, I I tend to get most excited about businesses where I have a certain degree of consumer insights into them and I can tangibly relate to and understand why the business is positioned well versus competitors and how they create value for customers.

这就是为什么我对Uber和Airbnb有偏好，这也正是人们称它们为‘偏见’的原因。

So that is why I have my biases towards Uber and Airbnb and also that's why they call them biases.

你知道，我尽量意识到这些是我们的偏见，而且这确实是我在投资中会陷入的一种模式，不管好坏。

You know, I try to be aware of the fact that those are our biases and that is sort of, an investing pattern that I fall into for better or worse.

所以很明显，这家公司并不适合用这种心态去看待。

And so obviously, this is not an easy company to bring that mindset to.

再加上债务和创始人费用，而且他们经营的业务本身就相当冷门，我觉得选择避开这一家会更稳妥。

And when you layer over the debt and the founder's fee, on top of the fact that these are just obscure businesses that they run, I feel more comfortable opting out of this one.

不过，它绝对是一个非常有趣的研究案例。

Mean, it's definitely a really interesting case study.

能跟威廉·桑代克扯上关系，挺酷的。

Very cool to have the William Thorndyke connection.

我们很欣赏他，但这家公司倒没让我特别想入手。

We're big fans of his, but not a business I'd be hugely excited to own.

好了，各位，今天的内容差不多就这些了。

Well, folks, that's, pretty much all we have for you today.

不过照例，我想最后送大家一句话。

But as usual, I'd like to leave you with a quote.

这句话出自威廉·桑代克。

This one coming from William Thorndyke.

两家公司的运营结果完全相同，但资本配置方式不同，最终给股东带来的长期回报也会截然不同。

Two companies with identical operating results and different approaches to allocating capital will derive two very different long term outcomes for shareholders.

从目前的状况来看，Perimeter 看起来是个不错的资本配置平台。

From the looks of it, Perimeter looks like a pretty good vehicle to allocate capital.

而这正是我们真正想要的：那些能够长期、妥善进行资本配置的企业。

And that's really what we're looking for Businesses that can properly allocate capital and do so for long periods of time.

感谢收听，我们下次再见。

Thanks for tuning in, and I'll see you next time.

感谢收听《投资者播客》。

Thanks for listening to TIP.

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