TIP837：Adobe、Lululemon、PayPal——我们最大的输家现在是买入时机吗？与 Daniel Mahncke 和 Shawn O’Malley

Stripe和私募股权公司Advent提出了以每股60美元收购PayPal的报价。

You have Stripe and the PE firm Advent put out an offer to buy PayPal for $60 per share.

在录制时，PayPal已经拒绝了那个报价，但这可能是正常谈判过程的一部分。

And at the time of recording, has already declined that offer, but that is maybe part of a normal negotiation process.

所以他们可能仍然愿意出售，但价格要更高。

So they may still be willing to sell, but only at a higher price.

考虑到如果我们当时坚持持有并等待这个报价，我们可能已经收回了相当大一部分损失，你会不会觉得没有坚持持有这个仓位是个错误？

Considering that we could have recovered a relatively large chunk of our losses if we had held on and waited for this offer, would you say it was a mistake not to hold on to the position?

因为，我的意思是，基本上这个情景发生就是安全边际，而且这已经包含在模型里了，确实提供了一层保护。

Because, I mean, the idea was basically that this very scenario playing out would be the margin of safety and that was baked into the model and it did provide a layer of safety.

是的，我觉得这是个很难回答的问题。

Yeah, think it's a tough question.

在我看来，有两种方式或者说是概念需要考虑。

There are two ways or perhaps concepts to consider in my mind.

第一个是机会成本的概念，我的意思是，投资在PayPal上的资金不能投资于其他任何股票。

So the first is the idea of opportunity cost, I mean, capital invested in PayPal cannot be invested in any other stock.

这听起来很简单，但在投资中却影响深远。

And it sounds quite simple, but it's also consequential in, you know, investing.

因为它不仅让你质疑某只股票是否能跑赢大盘，从而比买指数基金更好，还让你考虑是否有另一只股票风险相似但潜在回报更高。

And since it not only makes you question whether any given stock will outperform the market and therefore presents a better opportunity than just buying an index, but also whether there's another stock with maybe a similar risk profile, but a better potential return.

所以，机会成本基本上就是我们决定卖掉 PayPal 的原因。

So opportunity costs have essentially been why we did decide to sell PayPal.

我买这只股票时心里有明确的投资逻辑，也知道哪些指标和业务部门对我最重要。

And I had a clear thesis in mind when buying the stock, and I sort of knew which metrics and business units mattered most to me.

我也有一个期望看到的进展。

And I had an idea of the progress that I wanted to see.

但那个投资逻辑慢慢变弱，最后就崩了。

And that thesis slowly deteriorated, and eventually it broke, you know.

虽然我设的安全边际情景——就是你说的 PayPal 被收购——现在正在发生，或者至少在进行中，但我也知道这更像是一场赌博，而不是我最初的投资逻辑，因为正如你所说，PayPal 刚刚拒绝了每股60美元的收购报价。

And while my margin of safety scenario, which you just mentioned, the PayPal acquisition, is now playing out or at least it's in the process, I also knew that this would be much more of a gamble than my original thesis, because as you mentioned, PayPal just rejected the bid valued at $60 per share.

所以也许它能卖得更高，但也许 Stripe 会退出交易，那你就得找全新的买家了。

So perhaps it can get much more, but perhaps Stripe will just, you know, distance itself from the deal, and then you need to find a completely new buyer.

也许会有，但我觉得现在的重点在于，这已经变成了一场赌博，赌的是 PayPal 什么时候、以什么价格被卖掉。

And there might be one, but I think the point is this has turned into a gamble now of when and at what price PayPal will be sold.

面对这种不确定性，我觉得我们可能把资金投到其他地方会有更好的机会。

And with that uncertainty, I felt like we probably have better opportunities to allocate capital to.

为了让大家有个完整的了解，支持继续持有像 PayPal 和 Lululemon 这类股票的理由是，相信当初买入的价格足够便宜，从长远来看，最终总能回本或者赚到钱。

And just for the sake of giving the whole picture, the argument for why you should hold on to positions like PayPal, but also Lululemon, is to trust that you bought the asset at a cheap enough price that in the long run, you will make your money back or make a profit one way or the other.

这可能通过并购来实现，也可能通过股票回购，或者是新管理层接手后业务真正好转。

And so it could be through M and A, it could be buybacks, or it could be because the business actually turns around with new management.

所以在某种程度上，前提就是很难把一只股票和另一只直接做比较，你或许干脆就相信自己的安全边际结果会更稳妥。

And so the premise, some extent, would be that it's incredibly difficult to compare one stock against another, and you might just be better off to simply try and and trust your margin of safety outcome.

公平地说，什么决定最好其实也取决于你个人的具体情况。

To be fair, what decision is the best also can depend on your personal situation.

对吧？

Right?

丹尼尔和我现在的状态是，每年都要研究几十家企业。

Daniel and I are in a position where we research dozens and dozens of businesses each year.

这意味着我们很有可能找到前景更好的公司，然后把资金重新配置到回报更高的地方。

And that means there's a high likelihood that we can find a business with better prospects and then redeploy capital at better returns.

所以机会成本是非常大的。

So there's very significant opportunity costs.

如果你没有时间研究那么多股票，那么继续持有现有仓位可能比为了分散而分散、反而让投资组合变得更糟要明智得多。

If you don't have the time to look at that many stocks, it might just make sense to hold on to the position rather than diversifying into something for the sake of diversifying and maybe de worcifying your portfolio as they say.

另一个因素就是仓位大小。

And then another factor is position size.

在我的个人投资组合里，PayPal的仓位真的非常小，肯定比你的小，Daniel。

In my personal portfolio, PayPal was really, really small bet, smaller than yours for sure, Daniel.

所以我基本上就一直拿着，因为风险没那么大。

So I kinda just kept holding onto it because the stakes were a lot lower.

后来我是在收购消息公布的时候卖掉的，这样我挽回了一部分损失。

And then I actually sold on the news of the takeover offer, meaning I was able to recover a chunk of my losses.

那纯粹是运气好。

And that was simply dumb luck.

有时候投资就是这样。

And sometimes that's just how investing goes.

我想到的另一个因素是，你是否还在往你的投资组合里加钱。

Another factor that also comes to my mind is whether you still add capital to your portfolio.

我的意思是，我们在节目里建立的投资组合不会获得新的资金。

I mean, the portfolio we built here on the show doesn't get any new capital.

所以如果我们把5%的资金投在一只股票上，它实际上一直在和我们看的新企业竞争，因为要加仓就得卖掉现有的持仓。

So if we have 5% invested in a stock, it is quite literally always competing with new businesses that we look at, because adding to them means we have to sell another current holding.

这就是我们在这里以及我个人投资组合的做法。

And that's sort of the nature of what we do in our portfolio here, and my personal one.

当然，我每个月都会增加新的资金。

Of course, I do add new capital every single month.

所以，只要不往一个仓位加钱，同时往其他仓位加钱，我就能大幅改变我的投资组合构成。

So by just not adding capital to one position, while generally adding capital to others, I can change my portfolio composition quite substantially.

但我们在内在价值投资组合里做不到这一点，所以我们必须卖掉一个仓位才能加仓另一个。

And we can't do that with the Intrinsic Value Portfolio, so we need to actually sell one position to add to another.

说到这一点，在我们的内在价值投资组合里，Adobe 一直是那个不断赢得资本配置机会的持仓。

And on that point, one position that kept winning all of these capital allocation walls in our Intrinsic Value Portfolio has been Adobe.

我们加仓了 Adobe，我已经查了四次了。

We added to our Adobe position, and I had to look it up four times already.

而且我可以提前透露，我们从这个案例中学到的第一课是：只有在股价从我们的买入价下跌至少 15% 到 20% 时才应该加仓。

And I can also spoil that the first lesson we need to take from this is only double down when the stock is at least down 15 to 20% from our entry price.

因为我们一直在 3.80 到 3.15 美元的区间买入，现在回头看，可能买得有点贵了。

Because we kept buying in the range from $3.80 to $3.15, which looking back at it, might have been a bit too expensive.

事后看来，可能确实买早了，我也觉得我们在分批买入这家公司时可以做得更好。

It was probably early in hindsight, and I grew that we could have done a better job at dollar cost averaging into this company.

不过话说回来，Adobe 是我们最早加入投资组合的股票之一，而且我们一开始是 100% 现金起步，只想逐步加仓我们在节目里覆盖的公司。

To be fair though, Adobe was one of our first additions to the portfolio and we started the portfolio with a 100% cash and only wanted to add to companies that we covered on the show incrementally.

所以当时的情况是，投资组合里有一大笔现金闲置了一段时间。

So we had this situation where we're sitting on a lot of cash for a while in the portfolio.

所以我觉得，当时确实有一种潜意识里的压力，想要把资金配置出去，而不是半年甚至更长时间里持有 80% 以上的现金。

So there's definitely some subconscious pressure, I think, to allocate capital and not just sit on 80% cash or more for half a year or longer.

所以，当一家我认为质量很高的公司股价不断下跌时，我觉得这比投资其他我们不太看好的平庸公司更值得投入资金。

And so when a company that I considered to be very high quality kept getting cheaper, I saw that as a better opportunity to allocate capital than to invest into other mediocre businesses that we didn't have the same conviction in.

这就是我要跟你说的理由。

And so that is what I would argue for to you.

这又是公开管理投资组合、展示整个过程的另一个难处。

It's another one of those difficult realities of trying to manage your portfolio publicly and and showcasing the entire process.

如果只是你自己的个人账户，你可能不会那么急着配置资金。

You wouldn't necessarily feel the same pressure allocating capital quickly if it's just your personal account.

但当然，如果你是在帮客户管理资金，你可能会更早感受到这种压力。

But of course, if you're managing money for clients, you might feel the pressure even sooner.

所以我觉得我比你对Adobe更乐观一些，丹尼尔。

So I think I'm a bit more bullish on Adobe than you are, Daniel.

而且即使Adobe股价在300美元以上时，我也觉得它被严重低估了。

And Adobe seemed significantly undervalued to me even when it was trading at above $300 per share.

那时候的情况是，我们看到一家市盈率在二十出头的公司，利润率非常惊人，投入资本回报率很高，很大一部分业务是经常性订阅收入，而且营收增长达到两位数。

And at that time, the setup was that we were looking at a company with a price earnings ratio in the low twenties, an incredible margin profile, high returns on invested capital, a very substantial chunk of the business coming as recurring subscription revenue, and then double digit revenue growth.

顺便说一句，这些基本面没有任何变化。

And nothing about that has changed for the record.

唯一变的是市场愿意给Adobe的估值倍数，以及围绕它的市场叙事。

The only thing that changed is the multiple the market is willing to give to Adobe and the narrative surrounding Adobe.

对吧？

Right?

市盈率从22倍降到了11倍，这对你持仓的价值来说是个很好的买入机会。

It went from 22 times earnings to 11 times earnings, and that's a great way to have the value of your position.

所以我觉得你在个人投资组合里买入Adobe的时间其实比我晚，但你也把大部分仓位卖掉了。

So I think you've actually bought in in your personal portfolio later than I did, but you've also sold most of that position.

所以我很好奇你是怎么看待这个问题的，以及你是否不同意我刚才的思路，Daniel。

So I'm curious to hear how you you think about it and and whether you disagree with my thinking here, Daniel.

我通常不会这么想。

I generally don't.

我觉得让我改变看法的是，我看过了太多不同的SaaS公司，然后意识到它们可能都该归到‘难办’那一类里。

I think what changed for me is looking at so many different SaaS companies and just realize that perhaps all of them belong somewhere on the two hard pile.

至少那些我因为不是客户而无法理解的公司，比如。

At least the ones that I couldn't understand because I don't have an insight as a customer, for example.

而且显然，我们几乎每天都在用Adobe。

And obviously, we use Adobe almost on a daily basis.

但我也认为，我们不是Adobe未来十年或二十年所依赖的那种公司。

But I also believe that we are not the sort of company that Adobe, you know, banks on for the next ten or twenty years.

我们不是那种他们需要留住的大企业客户，以让他们的投资回报值得，也不是他们在AI能力上具有优势的地方。

We're not, you know, this huge sort of enterprise customer that they need to sort of keep as a customer to still make, you know, their returns, their investments worth it, and also just where they have an advantage over what AI can do.

我觉得我们使用的很多工具，在某个时候，可能也就是十年后，很可能会有一个AI工具。

I feel like a lot of the tools that we use, at some point, and it might be only ten years ahead, there will probably be an AI tool.

也许Adobe会成为那个AI工具的分发渠道，但也可能不会。

And maybe Adobe is a distribution for that, but maybe it's not.

我觉得未来有太多不可知的事情，所以这个赌注比一两年前更难下。

And I feel like there are so many just unknowable things about the future that it's a more difficult bet to make than just a year or two ago.

这又回到了理解市场对公司的看法，以及自己是否有不同观点的问题上。

And this sort of goes back to the point of understanding what the market sees in the company and whether one has a different view on that.

这显然是个比PayPal好得多的生意，可能也比Lulu曾经好得多。

It's a much better business, obviously, than PayPal and probably also Lulu ever were.

和这两家相比，你看不到大家常说的那种颠覆，从整体数字上看不出来。

And compared to those two, you don't see the disruption that everybody talks about when you look at the headline numbers.

我的意思是，你刚才说基本上只是倍数的问题。

I mean, you just talked about it was basically only the multiple.

如果你看Lulu和PayPal的股价走势图，然后把营收增长叠加在上面，你会发现这两家公司的相关性都很强。

If you look at both Lulu's and PayPal stock chart, then you just layer the top line growth over it, you will see there's a pretty strong correlation there for both of those companies.

但Adobe就不是这样。

And that's just not the case for Adobe.

Adobe过去四年每年增长约10%，而股价却下跌了70%。

Adobe has grown at about 10% per year over the last four years, while the stock is down 70% since then.

当然，营收增长不是一切，但研究表明，营收增长是长期股价走向的最佳预测指标。

Of course, you know, top line growth is not everything, but, you know, studies have actually shown that revenue growth is the best predictor for where the stock will be heading in the long term.

所以，在十年的长期来看，大约70%到75%的股价表现可以用营收增长来解释。

So over a ten year time horizon, about 70 to 75% of the stock performance can be explained by revenue growth.

当然，这些业务的主要担忧就是，由于AI带来的变化，未来收入增长会大幅放缓。

And the main fear, obviously, with these businesses is that exactly that revenue growth will slow down materially in the future due to changes that AI brings.

当这种担忧存在时，估值倍数就会崩塌。

And when that fear exists, the multiple collapses.

正如你刚才所说，这正是我们在Adobe身上看到的情况。

And that's exactly what we have seen with Adobe, as you just said.

顺便说一句，如果只看一年的表现，估值倍数是预测股票表现的最佳指标。

And by the way, multiples are the best predictor for stock performance if you just look at a one year performance chart.

所以这很可能解释了为什么今年SaaS公司股价下跌，尽管从表面数字来看，基本面并没有变化。

So probably that explains most of, you know, why SaaS companies this year have been going down, although, technically, you know, the headline numbers just didn't change.

我认为，从更积极的角度看，对Adobe的一个大胆论点是，它的大部分业务来自企业客户，这些客户希望完全控制创意成果。

And I think to go on the more the more positive side, the bold argument for Adobe is that most of its business comes from enterprise customers that want to have full control over the creative outcome.

这只有Adobe的工具才能保证，AI做不到这一点。

And that can only be guaranteed with Adobe tools, and AI cannot do the same.

所以AI总是概率性的，这一点我们已经讨论了很多，而且短期内不会改变，说实话，可能永远都不会改变。

So AI is always probabilistic, which we talked about a lot by now, and that won't change anytime soon, if ever, honestly.

而我个人对这个公司的担忧，主要来自两个方面，这也是我最后卖掉的原因。

And the problems that I personally have the position, which is why I sold in the end, mainly come from two things.

第一个问题是，那些不是好莱坞或者大型创意工作室的客户怎么办？

So the first is, what about all the customers that are not Hollywood studios or big creative studios?

我刚才提到了。

I just mentioned it.

你知道的，像那些小型设计公司，或者广告代理商。

You know, the the TIPs of the world, and maybe also ad agencies.

我觉得广告代理商对创作过程没有那么深的感情。

I don't think ad agencies have the same sort of love for the creative process.

如果他们能用更便宜的人工智能来完成工作，他们肯定会这么做。

And if they can use AI for a fraction of the cost, that's what they will do.

第二个问题是，如果Adobe失去了入门阶段的年轻专业人士，对公司来说也会是个很大的打击。

And then second, if Adobe loses the top of the funnel, which are, you know, young professionals, that would be a big hit for the company as well.

多年来，正是这些年轻专业人士习惯了Adobe，因为他们一直用这个软件来学习和工作。

So for years, that's what built the sort of skill mode where, you know, young professionals preferred working with Adobe since that's what they have been trained on.

最后一点，是我们一位智囊团成员提出的，我觉得很有道理。

Then lastly, and this is a point that one of our Mastermind members actually made, and I think it's a good one.

你得问问自己，现在是不是真的想跟AI对着干。

You gotta ask yourself whether you want to bet against AI right now in the first place.

这也是我反对大多数SaaS公司的理由。

And that's, you know, the argument for me against most SaaS companies.

我觉得有充分的理由说明，你应该避免持有那些因为潜在生存威胁而被市场惩罚的股票，这种威胁要么压缩它们的盈利倍数，要么让核心产品面临收入下滑的风险。

I think there is a good argument to be made that you should just avoid owning stocks that the market is punishing because of a potential existential threat to either their earnings power, which then compresses the multiple, or their core product, which then goes to the revenue hit risk.

尤其是当这种威胁是由技术创新驱动的时候。

And especially when that threat is driven by technological innovation.

而且我们知道AI会一直存在。

And we know AI is here to stay.

它不会停止进步。

Won't stop getting better.

最后一点深受巴菲特看待科技投资方式的影响，他接受存在这些可能摧毁投资逻辑的未知因素，因此更愿意在其他地方寻找低门槛的机会，这种心态很有启发。

That last point is very much inspired by historically how Buffett has looked at tech investing and accepting that there are these unknowns that could destroy the thesis and therefore wanting to look for one foot hurdles elsewhere is sort of the mindset.

不过话说回来，他刚砸了数十亿美元到Alphabet。

And yet, that said, he just invested tens of billions of dollars in Alphabet.

而且我们清楚，这次拍板的是巴菲特本人，而不是阿贝尔，这点挺有意思。

And we know that it was Buffet now and not Abel who was calling that decision, which is interesting.

基本上，他把自己对科技公司的疏忽认作是个错误。

And basically, he's called his negligence of tech companies a mistake.

所以，现在连巴菲特都意识到世界发生了重大变化。

So even Buffet is now realizing that the world has changed in important ways.

虽说投资谷歌可能是你在科技股里能做的最稳妥的选择，但价位真的不低。

And although I would say investing in Google was probably one of the safest bets on tech you can make, prices are high.

不过说真的，谷歌这季度的表现又让人眼前一亮。

But boy, I mean, what a quarter we just saw from Google again.

总之，我很高兴我们能在冬季那期里聊这个，因为回顾成功肯定更有意思。

And so anyways, I'm glad that we will be able to talk about that one in our winter episode because it's definitely more fun to revel in the the successes.

而且我们那次买得离底部非常近，后来它成了我们绝对最大的持仓，结果也确实很不错。

And we bought that one pretty close to the bottom and it made it our biggest position by far and then it's worked out well.

不过再看看Adobe，它显然没有达到Alphabet那样的质量水平，但它仍然是其行业内的市场领导者，而且领先优势很大。

But looking at Adobe again, mean it's clearly not at the same quality caliber of Alphabet, of course, and yet it still is the market leader in its industry by a very wide margin.

正如你指出的，财务状况并没有显著恶化。

And as you pointed out, there has not been a significant deterioration in the financials.

财务状况实际上并没有任何恶化。

There hasn't really been any deterioration in the financials.

显然，这可能是一个缓慢的过程，就像当年的报纸行业一样，当时并不是立刻就能看出它们会倒闭。

And obviously, this can be a slow process as it was with newspapers back in the day, where it wasn't just immediately obvious that those would go out of business.

但我仍然没有看到任何有意义的颠覆迹象。

But I still don't really see any meaningful signs of disruption yet.

尽管头条数字看起来非常亮眼，但AI原生收入同比增长了三倍，而且Fireflies AI创意应用的年度经常性收入接近3亿美元。

Despite the headline numbers that look really great, you also have these AI native revenue numbers that have tripled year over year and Fireflies AI creative app is nearing $300,000,000 in ARR.

所以这一切看起来都相当不错。

And so all that looks pretty good.

而且他们也在低端市场进行反击，这正是你刚才提到的担忧。

And they're also fighting back on the lower end of things too, which you highlighted as a concern a minute ago.

所以在他们最近的财报电话会议上，他们谈到了战略转型，更侧重于免费增值用户，这短期内会带来更多成本，因为你提供了大量不收费的AI积分。

And so in their latest earnings call, they talked about this strategic shift to focusing more on freemium users, which comes with incurring more costs in the short term because you're providing a lot of AI credits that you're not charging for.

但这也表明他们在长期内努力留住低端用户。

But it also shows that they're fighting to retain users on the lower end in the longer term.

基本上，他们向华尔街提供了一些指引，市场原本预期他们会更快提高免费增值用户的价格，但他们决定推迟这个计划。

So basically they had shared some guidance with Wall Street where the market was expecting them to raise prices on freemium users sooner, and they've decided to push back on that.

而且，我实际上认为这可以看作是他们在考虑更长远的发展，而不是做出短期决策来帮助下个季度或下下个季度的盈利，但最终可能会损害他们建立的用户漏斗和客户流入业务的流程。

And again, I actually see that as arguably evidence of them thinking much more longer term than making short term decisions that would help earnings next quarter or the following, but might ultimately undermine the funnel that they've created and the flow of customers into their business.

我们之前讨论过与Alphabet的比较，我实际上认为这个比较并非完全不恰当，因为就像我认为Alphabet作为搜索领域的主导者，最有能力将AI整合到搜索中一样。

And so we talked about the Alphabet comparison and I actually don't think it's a totally off comparison to make because just like how I thought Alphabet as the dominant player in search was best positioned to integrate AI into search.

即使这并不能保证成功，但也确实给了他们相当大的竞争优势。

And even though that wasn't a guarantor of success, it did give them a pretty competitive advantage.

我也认为我们不应该忽视Adobe的定位，以及他们大规模部署AI工具的能力。

I also think that we shouldn't dismiss Adobe's positioning and their ability to deploy AI tools at scale too.

他们在这方面有先发优势。

They sort of have the first shot at doing so.

如果他们做得不好，肯定会把市场份额输给竞争对手。

And if they don't do it well, they'll definitely lose market share to competitors.

关键在于，新技术不一定对现有企业构成威胁，只要他们管理得当。

And with the point being new technology does not have to be a threat to incumbents if they manage it well.

当然，这也不是必然的。

And again, that's not guaranteed.

历史上有很多公司没能围绕新技术进行创新的例子。

There's lots of illustrations historically of companies that have failed to innovate around new technologies.

但话说回来，当所有人都在用你的产品时，你确实有这种分发优势。

But again, you do have this distribution advantage when everybody is already using your products.

所以，如果你能想办法把最新的技术和工具融入你的产品，那么竞争颠覆的风险就会大大降低。

So if you can figure out how to bake in the newest technologies and tools into your products, then the risk of competitive disruption becomes much more minimal.

这正是我们上周私下聊过的，对吧？

That's exactly what we talked about last week off the record, right?

我是说，这些优势可能非常巨大。

I mean, there are these probably huge advantages.

在人工智能时代，这可能是最大的优势，那就是分销渠道。

It might be the biggest advantages in the age of AI, and that's simply distribution.

而Adobe在创意领域仍然占据着分销的主导地位。

And Adobe still dominates distribution in the creative space.

而且问题可能是，Adobe比Alphabet更感受到人工智能的威胁，至少我是这么认为的。

And probably the problem is that Adobe feels more threatened by AI, at least I would argue, than Alphabet ever has.

但我们很容易用后见之明来说这话。

But we could easily say that with the hindsight bias.

再说，去年我们买了谷歌，当时确实有很多人说我们傻。

Again, last year, we bought Google, and there were certainly a lot of people who told us that's stupid.

他们说搜索会死，而且谷歌在人工智能方面根本不知道自己在做什么。

Search will die, and they have no clue what they're doing in terms of AI.

所以，可能只是我的后见之明，觉得谷歌受到的威胁没有Adobe那么大。

So it might just be the hindsight bias of me thinking that Google has not been threatened to at least the same extent as Adobe has.

有一位可能同意这个观点的人，就是Value Forged Capital的Dev Cantasaria。

And one guy who would probably agree with that is Dev Cantasaria from Value Forged Capital.

他以前持有Adobe的股票，后来卖掉了。

He used to hold Adobe, and he sold the position.

他说了一些我觉得挺有意思的话，所以我想在这里引用一下。

And he said something that I found quite interesting, so I just wanted to quote him here.

他说，目前来看，生成式AI其实对Adobe的需求是有帮助的，因为AI生成的图片和视频还是需要用他们公司那些复杂的软件工具来编辑。

He said, for now, generative AI actually helps demand for Adobe as the initial AI images and videos still need to be edited using the company's sophisticated software tools.

不过从长远来看，我们预见到Adobe会被淘汰，除非是那些非常高端的应用场景。

Over the long term, however, we see a future where Adobe is rendered obsolete except for the very high end use cases.

即使这些影响还要很多年才会显现，我们还是想把投资资金放到别的地方去。

Even if the impacts are many years away, we look to put our investment dollars elsewhere.

我们可能可以争论很久，但作为投资者，你只能根据自己对未来的判断来做决定。

And we could probably debate for a while, but as an investor, you just gotta make a decision based on your assessment of the future.

我不知道未来会发生什么，而且说实话，我也没见过谁有预知未来的能力。

And I don't know what will happen, and personally, I don't know anyone else with a crystal ball either.

我觉得在聊Adobe的时候，还有最后一点我必须要说，那就是他们的管理团队。

I think one last thing that I just need to get off my chest when we talk about Adobe is the management team.

我之前提到过我在PayPal上犯的错误，就是没有对那些警示信号采取行动。

I talked about the mistakes I made with, you know, not acting up on the yellow flags I saw with PayPal.

现在Adobe也出现了很多类似的信号。

And now Adobe shows a lot of them as well.

你看，CEO最近离职了，而且没有继任者。

I mean, the CEO left recently without any successor.

几周后CFO也走了，现在又出现了你刚才提到的向免费用户大幅转变的情况。

Then the CFO followed just weeks later, and now you see this major shift towards freemium users you just mentioned.

所以可能我个人的经历让我现在对这些事情特别敏感，没法视而不见。

So perhaps I'm just personally too scarred right now from, you know, that experience to overlook those things.

虽然这算是个人偏见吧，但我总觉得这一切看起来有点不对劲。

I mean, talk about personal biases, but I feel like all of that is looking somewhat odd.

你知道吗，当我们把这三家公司都过了一遍之后，我突然意识到，直到我们一个接一个地说出来，我才真正注意到这一点。

You know, what strikes me now that we've gone through all three of these companies is that I didn't really notice it until we we said it back to back.

但每次都是管理层在改变投资逻辑，对吧？

But in each case, the management team is really shaping changes to the thesis, right?

Lulu赶走了自己的CEO，换上了临时联席CEO，而那时创始人还在公开跟自己的公司对着干。

Lulu push out its CEO in favor of interim co CEOs while the founder was publicly at war with his own company.

PayPal解雇了CEO，而他的CFO曾公开扬言与公司战略立场迥异。

PayPal fired their CEO and then had his CFO that was openly saying very different things about the strategy.

再看Adobe，传奇CEO退休了，但继任者都还没定。

And then now with Adobe, you have this legendary CEO retiring with no named successor yet.

就算用最平淡的原因解释——他只是年纪大了，毕竟他已经掌舵公司二十年了——可CFO几周后也走了，这时间点真是糟糕透顶。

And even if that's perfectly explainable by something as mundane as the fact that he was just getting older, he's already led the company for two decades, The fact that you have the CFO leaving weeks later really couldn't have been worse timing.

所以之前我们在蒙大拿的TIP峰会上做过一个关于组合管理经验的分享。

And so a while ago, we did a presentation at our TIP Summit in Montana about the learnings of managing this portfolio.

我们聊了很多关于管理团队的话题。

And we talked a lot about management teams.

而这恰恰再次印证了这些变量对我来说有多重要。

And again, this just reinforces how important those variables are to me.

让我难受的是，在这几个案例里，高层出事的时候，业务数据还没开始变得难看。

What bugs me is that in any of these cases, the trouble at the top showed up before the numbers actually took a turn for the worse.

再说一回，关键词还是后见之明。

Again, keyword, hindsight bias.

也可能是业务本来一直做得不错，后来CEO走了，然后才开始变差。

It might have been that, you know, business has actually performed well, and then the CEO left and started to get worse after that.

也可能是因为业务已经开始走下坡路了，CEO看到了而我们没看到，所以他选择走人。

And it might be that the CEO goes because the business is already deteriorating, and he sees it while we don't.

这个我们就不知道了。

We don't know that.

但我确实知道的是，在这个基础上采取行动很难，因为你需要找到我之前提的那些替代性领先指标，判断公司到底往哪个方向走。

But what I do know is that it's difficult to act on that, because you would need to find these, what I, you know, mentioned before, alternative leading indicators to tell you in what direction the company is going.

就拿报纸来说，这些指标可能是零售额，甚至可能是家庭市场渗透率跟人口增长的对比。

So for newspapers, such metrics were, you know, single corporate retail sales or maybe even household market penetration versus population growth.

因为很长一段时间里，报纸的渗透率都是和人口同步增长的。

Because for a long time, newspaper penetration actually grew alongside population.

但当那个相关性失效的时候，恰恰证明了年轻一代已经不再成为他们的客户了。

And when that correlation stopped, it just proved that younger generations were no longer becoming their customers.

而且这可能有点牵强。

And it could be very far fetched.

我承认这一点。

I gotta admit that.

但我不确定。

But I don't know.

在某种程度上，我觉得这和Adobe面临的问题有些相似，就是如何让新一代的创意人员使用它的平台。

To some extent, I see some resemblance here with Adobe's problem of getting this new generation of creatives onto its platform.

另外，其他可以关注的替代指标，虽然获取这些数据会非常困难，可能是总席位和实际设计机构产出量之间的差异。

And then other alternative metrics to look at, although getting that data will be incredibly difficult, might be the divergence between, you know, total seats and actual design agency output volume.

也就是说，付费企业席位许可证（这是Adobe很多收入的来源）与创意资产产出量之间的比率。

So the ratio of, you know, paid corporate seat licenses, which is how Adobe makes a lot of its money, to the volume of creative assets produced.

如果营销机构使用这些外部AI工具，你至少能感受到未来可能出现的客户流失，而目前因为Adobe有很多长期合同，你还看不到这一点。

If marketing agencies use these external AI tools, you would at least get a sense of the potential future churn that you can't yet see just because Adobe has a lot of these long term contracts.

不过，我只是在这里随便聊聊一些想法。

But anyway, I'm just spitballing some ideas here.

说到底，Adobe还是一个长期持有的标的。

In the end, Adobe is still a holding.

我对它有点纠结，但我也觉得它是个好价值，尽管现在的势头对它不利。

I'm conflicted on it, but I also believe it is good value, although the momentum is not in its favor.

而且我觉得，我们不应该太受当初买入价格的影响。

And I think we shouldn't be too affected by the price we paid for this company.

我们应该从今天的角度看它。

I think we get just gotta view it from today's perspective.

如果这样看，你看到的是一个远期市盈率只有八倍的公司。

And if you do that, you have a company trading at a forward PE of eight times.

它的财务状况仍然非常好，也有很多理由相信它在创意企业市场上的垄断地位其实是可以持续的。

You still have phenomenal financials and many good reasons to believe its monopoly like position on the creative enterprise market is actually sustainable.

我们确切知道的是，市场对高层人员流动有警惕，这是很合理的。

What we know for a fact is that the market, rightly so, is wary of turnover at the top of companies.

还有一个我们今天没提到但值得说的危险信号，就是内部人买入也不多。

And another yellow flag, we haven't pointed out today, but we should discuss, is the lack of insider purchases too.

也许是因为这两位高层知道自己很快就要离开，所以他们没有进行内部买入。

And perhaps because you had these two at the top knowing that they would be leaving soon, and that's why they didn't make any insider purchases.

但随着股价大幅下跌，管理层乐于动用公司资金进行回购，这在一定程度上让人感到安心。

But as the stock has gotten torn apart, management has been happy to deploy the corporate treasury toward buybacks, which to some extent is reassuring.

但话说回来，他们并不太愿意自掏腰包买自家股票。

But again, they haven't been as inclined to buy shares with money from their own pocket.

所以，如果Adobe的业务长期下滑，在这种情况下，我可能不会把CEO的离职看作是煤矿里的金丝雀，甚至CFO的离职也不算，因为他在半导体行业有背景，而那个领域因为AI而彻底爆发了。

And so if Adobe's business does decline long term, in this case, I probably wouldn't look back at the CEO's departure as having been the canary in the coal mine or maybe even the CFO's departure because he does have a background in the semiconductor industry and that space has absolutely exploded thanks to AI.

所以如果他只是有点害怕错过，想回到他职业生涯中一直从事的行业，我也不会感到意外。

So it wouldn't surprise me if he just simply had some FOMO and wanted to go back to the industry that he had spent the rest of his career in.

但真正值得警惕的可能是，管理团队其他成员缺乏内部买入。

But really, the carrying the coal mine might be the fact that there's this lack of insider buying from the rest of the management team.

这让我有些犹豫。

That gives me some pause.

如果我真的悲观一下，我完全能想象几年后我会把这件事当作一个教训来指出。

And if I get really pessimistic for a moment, I could definitely see myself pointing that out as a learning lesson in a few years from now.

所以我不知道这是不是以终为始的思考，但确实是提前想想我们可能会犯什么错。

And so I don't know if that's thinking with the end in mind, but thinking ahead about what we might see as a mistake.

不过除此之外，Adobe目前一切都还不错。

And so otherwise though, everything is so far so good with Adobe.

而且从定义上讲，我认为要想跑赢市场，确实需要对市场有逆向的看法。

And by definition, I do think you need to have contrarian opinions about the market to outperform the market.

这听起来可能像是我们因为对这家公司有锚定偏见，而找的一个懒散的借口。

And that might sound like sort of a lazy defense for clinging on to a company that we have some anchoring bias with.

我不一定会反对这种说法，但我认为，相对于公司实际业务的表现，目前推动股价下跌的那些指标太投机了。

And I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, But I think the indicators that are driving the stock down are so speculative at the moment relative to how the actual business has been performing.

现在这个时候，我肯定不会觉得离场是个好主意。

I certainly wouldn't feel good about heading for the exit at this point in time.

不过我们肯定会继续密切关注这家公司。

But we'll definitely continue to watch this one closely.

而且，你知道，如果我们看到数据实质性地改变了我们对公司状况的判断，就像我们之前对Lululemon那样，那我们就应该认真考虑减仓或者清仓了。

And, you know, if we see data that materially changes our assessment of what's happening with the business, as we saw with Lululemon, then we should definitely think about trimming or exiting the position.

就目前来说，它确实仍然在投资组合里。

For now, it definitely remains in the portfolio.

我们稍微休息一下，听一听今天的赞助商怎么说。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

对在线交易感兴趣，但还没迈出第一步？

Curious about online trading, haven't taken the first step yet?

你不是一个人。

You're not alone.

而Plus500期货就是一个很好的开始。

And Plus500 futures is a great place to start.

期货市场瞬息万变，通过Plus500，你可以接触到像原油、黄金、标普500、比特币等热门资产，还有更多选择。

The futures markets are moving fast and with Plus500, you can explore popular assets like oil, gold, S and P 500, Bitcoin, and more.

从加密货币到大宗商品，总有些事在不断发生。

From crypto to commodities, there's always something happening.

这个平台用起来超级顺手，你可以直接在手机上随时交易。

The platform is super easy to use, so you can trade on the go right from your phone.

你只需100美元就能开始，马上参与进来。

You can get started with just $100 and jump into the action.

看到感兴趣的东西了吗？

See something interesting?

账户开通后，只需几次点击就能交易。

Once your account is open, you can trade it in just a couple of clicks.

如果你还没准备好，可以用免费模拟账户练习。

And if you're not quite ready yet, you can practice with a free demo account.

没有风险，没有压力。

No risk, no pressure.

凭借二十年的经验，Plus500让交易比以往任何时候都更容易。

With twenty years of experience, Plus500 makes trading more accessible than ever.

去plus500.com看看吧。

Check it out at plus500.com.

期货交易涉及亏损风险，并非适合所有人。

Trading in futures involves risks of loss and is not suitable for everyone.

不是所有申请人都能通过审核。

Not all applicants will qualify.

Plus500，交易，加一点优势。

Plus500, it's trading with a plus.

大多数领导在自动化那些他们从未真正观察过的工作流程。

Most leaders are automating work they've never actually watched happen.

他们知道流程应该怎么走。

They know how the process is supposed to go.

有人曾经给他们讲解过一次。

Someone walked them through it once.

听起来很顺畅。

It sounded clean.

但实际日常运行的版本完全不同，而且没有人做错什么。

But the version that runs day to day looks completely different, and nobody's doing anything wrong.

这个差距比我们大多数人意识到的要大，这意味着关于修复什么、自动化什么或交给AI的决定，都是凭直觉，而不是基于数据。

That gap is bigger than most of us realize, and it means the decisions about what to fix, automate or hand to AI are running on gut, not data.

这正是今天的赞助商Scribe要解决的问题。

That's exactly the problem that today's sponsor Scribe was built to fix.

Scribe是一个工作流AI平台，财富500强中有94%的公司信任它，而Scribe Optimize就是你的AI路线图。

Scribe is a workflow AI platform trusted by 94% of Fortune 500 and Scribe Optimize is your AI roadmap.

它会被动地捕捉你的团队在你批准的业务应用中实际的工作方式。

It passively captures how your team actually works across your approved business apps.

无需访谈，无需手动绘制流程，并且无论工作流在哪里进行，即使从一个工具开始，在另一个工具结束，它都能跟踪。

No interviews, no manual process mapping and follows workflows wherever they go, even when they start in one tool and finish in another.

仪表盘实时显示正在发生的事情和时间去向，而不是上个季度别人做的报告。

The dashboard shows you what's happening and where the time is going live right now, not a report someone built last quarter.

它的“主要问题”视图不仅会标记出最大的低效环节，还会告诉你为什么会这样，并提供带有预计节省时间的内置AI建议。

And its top issues view doesn't just flag your biggest inefficiencies, it tells you why they're happening and gives AI powered recommendations with estimated time savings built in.

重要的是，它是一个领导层可见性工具，而不是员工监控。

Importantly, it's a leadership visibility tool, not employee monitoring.

它只在你管理员批准的应用上运行，用户级数据默认匿名化，敏感信息自动脱敏，并且永远不会离开你的防火墙。

It only runs on apps your admin approves, user level data is anonymized by default, and sensitive information is automatically redacted and never leaves your firewall.

想看看 Optimize 的实际效果，就去 scribe.howwsb，并提到 The Investor's Podcast，就能享受三十天无风险试用。

To see Optimize in action, head to scribe.howwsb and mention The Investor's Podcast for a thirty day risk free trial.

网址是 s c r I b e。

That's s c r I b e.

Howwsb。

Howwsb.

他们说，你的企业每在 AI 上晚一天，就会落后两天，而竞争对手只会跑得更快。

They say every day your business is late to AI, you fall two days behind and the competition, they're only moving faster.

幸运的是，有 Netsuite Next。

Fortunately, there's Netsuite next.

你可能已经知道 Netsuite，这个 AI 驱动的商业套件，能安全地连接你所有的数据、财务、库存、商务、人力资源和 CRM，全部集中在一个真实来源中，受到超过 43,000 家客户的信赖。

You probably already know Netsuite, the AI powered business suite that securely connects all your data, financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM all in one source of truth, trusted by over 43,000 customers.

Netsuite Next 是下一个巨大的飞跃，因为现在 AI 被设计来做你所做的一切。

Netsuite Next is the next huge leap because now AI is built to do everything you do.

它会在你一天的工作中浮现出定制化的洞察。

It surfaces custom insights throughout your day.

AI代理会帮你处理那些日常琐事。

AI agents work alongside you on the routine stuff.

而且任何时候你有任何问题，就像跟同事聊天一样直接问就行。

And anytime you've got a question about anything, you just ask like you're talking to a colleague.

我自己就在用，真的，我觉得你也应该试试。

And I use it and really I think you should too.

现在，你可以首次免费试用Netsuite Next。

For the first time ever, can try Netsuite Next for free.

如果你的收入至少达到七位数，就去netsuite.aitip看看吧。

If your revenue is at least in the 7 figures, go to netsuite.aitip.

为每个行业打造，为每间会议室准备，netsuite.aitip。

Built for every industry, ready for every boardroom, netsuite.aitip.

好了，我们回到节目。

All right, back to the show.

我们会在节目最后讨论一些经验和结论，但我觉得我可以先透露一个，就是我在准备这期节目时刚想到的。

We'll talk about lessons and conclusions at the end of the episode, but I think I can still spoil one that I just had when I did the research for this episode.

而且我也不知道为什么，但我觉得，因为覆盖了这么多公司，尤其是所有这些都是在公开场合做的，你会更经常地觉得需要坚持自己的立场。

And I don't know why, but it seemed to me that by covering so many companies, but especially by doing it all publicly, you feel the need to stand behind your positions way more often.

这意味着，所有那些负面消息，通常作为投资者，你甚至可能应该忽略它们，至少当它们不是根本性问题的时候，我们还是会去阅读，并且我们仍然有自己的看法，我们仍然公开地为公司辩护，或者也接受这是坏消息，我们可能会过早地卖掉公司。

And that means that all the negative news that come out that usually, as an investor, you might even should just ignore, at least when it's not fundamental, we still read through them, and we still have a stance on it, and we still publicly defend the company, or also just accept that this is bad news, and we might sell the company too early.

所以我觉得，这有点像我们关于PayPal的观点，如果我们确实对公司进行了深入分析，并且我们做到了，我们知道所有重要的事情，我们可能只需要更加信任我们的决策。

So I feel like, and that sort of goes to our PayPal point, if we do have, you know, deep dives into a company, and we do that, and we know everything that's important, we might just gotta put more trust into our decision making.

Adobe可能也是如此，所以我仍然觉得持有它很好。

And the same might go for Adobe, so I still feel very good about owning it.

而且迟早，在我的个人投资组合中，我也会再次持有它的仓位。

And sooner or later, I also, in my personal portfolio, will have a position again.

这更多是关于我们今天多次提到的机会成本。

It's more about what we mentioned today a couple of times, which is opportunity cost.

我需要一些资金，你知道，我卖了Adobe，把那些资金分配到了其他地方。

I needed some capital and, you know, I sold Adobe, allocated that capital somewhere else.

但随着时间的推移，我会再次买入它。

But over time, I will buy into it again.

好的。

Okay.

不过，我们换个话题怎么样？

But how about for a change?

我们聊一家公司，它的CEO在股价下跌后反而大幅增持，而不是选择离场。

We switch to a company where the CEO has actually doubled down massively since the stock went down instead of just leaving the boat.

而且幸运的是，我们一分钱都没亏，因为我们一开始就没投资这家公司。

And we fortunately also didn't lose a single cent because we didn't invest in the company in the first place.

你猜到我说的是哪家公司了吗？

Do you already have an idea of what company I'm talking about?

哦，我猜到了。

Oh, I do.

我猜到了。

I do.

你说的肯定是Trade Desk。

You gotta be talking about Trade Desk.

非常庆幸我们没买那只股票。

And I'm very glad we didn't buy that one.

我还记得它跌了40%那天，刚好是我们周日发完节目后的第一个交易日。

I still remember when it dropped 40% and literally the next trading day after we published the episode on a Sunday.

虽然我们当初决定不买，而且现在看来当初的理由也是对的，但不可否认，谁也没想到会跌得这么厉害。

And while we decided against it for what we now know were seemingly the right reasons, it's definitely fair to say that no one expected such a sharp decline.

我当然也没想到它会从高点跌掉80%。

I certainly didn't imagine that it would fall 80% from its highs.

其实昨天我又回听了那期节目，从这件事里我学到的第一课，就是要相信自己的直觉。

I actually listened back to the episode just yesterday, and the first lesson I wanna do from all of this is really just to trust your gut feeling.

更重要的是，要待在自己能力圈的范围之内。

And even more importantly, stay within your circle of competence.

我们当初没有建仓，主要就是觉得这家公司的业务太难理解了。

I mean, we primarily didn't start a position because we just felt like the business was too difficult to understand.

准确来说，当时你在那期节目里就是这么说的。

And to be precise, this is what you said in the episode back then.

我觉得我们应该，你知道，直接说出来。

I feel like we should just, you know, put it out there.

TTD对我来说有点难以接受。

TTD is just a bit difficult for me to to get comfortable with.

我完全说实话。

I'll be fully honest.

我本来以为在深入研究过Alphabet和Roku之后，理解The Trade Desk会更容易一些，但广告技术行业实在太混乱、太复杂了。

I was expecting for it to be easier for me to wrap my head around The Trade Desk after already having gone deep on Alphabet and Roku, but ad tech is just so very messy and complicated.

我只是觉得广告技术行业可能属于太难理解的范畴，而The Trade Desk作为需求方程序化广告的纯正标的。

I I just feel like the ad tech industry probably goes in the too hard pile and The Trade Desk as a pure play on demand side programmatic advertising.

你真的需要全面理解数字广告生态系统，并且从技术上了解幕后发生的事情，才能欣赏The Trade Desk的价值所在，以及什么可能让它未来竞争力下降。

You really need to understand the digital advertising ecosystem fully and and technically kinda know what's going on behind the scenes to appreciate what makes The Trade Desk valuable and and what can make it less competitive in the future.

所以这是一个有行业经验会非常有帮助的案例。

So this is one of those where having some industry experience would would be very helpful.

但第二个教训，对我们所有人，包括现在正在听这期节目的每个人来说，就是不要盲目相信估值模型。

But the second learning for all of us, including everybody who currently listens to this episode is, don't blindly trust valuation models.

模型的结果是什么根本不重要。

It doesn't matter what that outcome of the model is.

你要看的是，那些得出这个结果的假设。

What you need to look at are the assumptions that you made to get to the outcome.

当时那个模型里，我们还是因为公司质量好而假设了30倍的退出倍数，而现在呢，现金流倍数只有10倍。

In the model from back then, we still assumed a 30 times exit multiple because of the quality of the company, and the cash flow multiple today is just 10 times.

所以，尽管当时模型也显示股价被高估，但你知道，我们决定不买，并不是因为模型怎么说。

So despite that, the model back then still showed that the stock was overvalued at the time, but, you know, the decision not to buy it didn't come down to what the model said.

主要原因是我们觉得我们不了解这家公司。

It was primarily us thinking that we don't understand the company.

再说，如果你执意相信那个估值模型，它用的退出倍数太高，还依然说股票太贵，而就几个月后的今天，退出倍数已经只是我们当时假设的五年后数值的三分之一了。

And, again, if you will trust the valuation model despite having a way too high of an exit multiple and still saying it's too expensive, nowadays, just a couple of months later, the exit multiple is a third of what we assumed going out five years from now.

在准备这期节目的时候，我确实去翻看了我们的投资组合主文件，那里面有我们的持仓和收益率，也有我们之前聊过的所有公司模型的链接。

And in preparation for this episode, I did go through our master file for the portfolio, and that's where we showcase our holdings and returns and have the links to all the models that we've covered for all the companies on this show previously.

其中我注意到的一个点就是，好多一年前覆盖过的股票，我们估的公允价值和现在的实际股价，差别有多大。

And one of the things I looked at was how much of a discrepancy there's been for many of the stocks we covered from over a year ago between our estimate of fair value and what the current stock price is.

所以，除了Trading Desk之外，唯一一个我们估值远高于当前股价的股票就是Vital Farms。

And so the only bigger difference to the downside than with Trading Desk, meaning where our fair value estimate was much higher than the stock price today, that was Vital Farms.

那只股票也跌了很多。

And so that stock has come down a whole lot too.

但你说得对，当模型说一套，而你的直觉说另一套时，我通常会，虽然有点老套，但我会说你应该相信自己的直觉。

But to your point, when your model says one thing, but your gut says another, I would typically, not to be too cliche, say that you have to follow your gut feeling there.

如果一想到要拥有这家公司就让你觉得不舒服，而你只是因为财务模型说股票被低估才持有，那这很可能不是一个好决定。

If it makes you stick to your stomach to think about owning a business and you're only doing so because the financial model says that the stock is undervalued, that's really not probably going to be a very good decision to make.

对吧？

Right?

如果你不能从定性角度为持有这家公司找到充分的理由，那么数字怎么说都不重要，因为数字随时可能变。

If you can't make a good qualitative case for owning the business, then again, just it doesn't matter what the numbers can say because the numbers can change in an instant.

增长率少几个百分点，或者利润率压缩，这些都可能很快发生。

A couple percentage points less growth or margin compression, all that can happen very fast.

所以，从定性角度对决策感到安心，对我来说，通常是判断你是否应该持有某只股票的最佳标准。

And so feeling comfortable with the decision qualitatively to me is the best proxy for whether you should own a stock generally.

然后你用模型来帮你确定入场点，尝试做一个明智的判断，就是，嗯，以这个价格买入这只股票并持有五年、十年，成功几率确实对我有利，差不多就是这样。

And then you use the models to kind of help guide your entry point and try to make a informed bet on, okay, the odds of success are are really in my favor with buying this stock at this price if I'm gonna hold it for the next five, ten years or or whatever it is.

至少舒适感是建立在对业务理解的基础上的。

Comfortable in the sense of understanding the business, at least.

我觉得如果你做投资决策的时候感到不安，仅仅是因为市场的情绪或者对业务的看法，那这里面确实有值得深思的地方。

I think there's something to say about being uncomfortable when you make an investment decision simply because of the sentiment or the perception of the market of the business.

而且我觉得很多投资者都提到过，最好的投资恰恰是那些让他们最不安的。

And I think there are many investors who mentioned that the best investments were the ones where they actually felt the most uncomfortable.

我记得霍华德·马克斯说过，如果这事儿不让你胃里翻腾，那它可能就不是什么特别划算的买卖。

I think Howard Marks once said, If it doesn't make your stomach churn, it's probably not a great bargain.

最好的买家恰恰是在恐惧最大、前景最暗淡的时候出手的。

The Best Buyers have found precisely where the fear is the greatest and the future looks the darkest.

你必须愿意在买的时候感到身体不适。

You have to be willing to buy when doing so makes you feel physically ill.

但话说回来，我认为这主要还是归结到公众的看法上，而不是你自己对业务理解得有多透彻。

But then again, I think this is mostly going down to, you know, public perception, not about how comfortable you feel with the understanding of the business.

所以，在这个Trade Desk的故事里，另一个有意思的点是，几个月前，公司的联合创始人兼CEO杰夫·格林进行了大规模的内部买入。

So another interesting point in this Trade Desk story here was that there were actually massive insider buys a couple of months ago by the co founder and CEO of the company, Jeff Green.

三月份，他在公开市场上以每股25美元的价格买入了股票，总额接近1.5亿美元。

And so in March, he bought stock on the open market at $25 for almost a 150,000,000 in total.

但自那以后，股价又下跌了25%。

And since then, the stock has fallen another 25%.

这样一来，我们之前提到的Adobe那个信号就变得复杂了。

And so it sort of complicates the signal we're pointing to with Adobe.

缺乏内部买入不一定就是坏事，而大量的内部买入也不一定就是好事。

A lack of insider buying is not guaranteed to be bad, and significant insider buying is not guaranteed to be good.

但总的来说，这些信号还是挺有预测力的。

But generally though, they're pretty effective predictors.

历史研究确实表明，内部买入有很强的预测能力，而Trade Desk可能就是个例外。

Historical studies have definitely shown that insider buys have pretty strong predictive power and The Trade Desk may very well just be the exception to the rule.

也许一年后我们再来看，情况可能会有所好转。

And perhaps we'll look at it in a year from now and maybe things will turn around.

这种情况确实会发生。

That does happen.

Carvana从几年前标普500里表现最差的股票，到第二年变成了表现最好的。

Carvana went from the worst performer in the S and P a few years ago to the best the following year.

所以反转是有可能的，但我现在肯定不急着建仓，因为它还是属于那种“太难”的类别。

So it can happen, but I'm certainly not itching to start a position in the company today just because it still falls in that too hard pile.

我们确实尝试过。

We definitely tried.

我是说，自从你报道过它之后，我们被问过很多次要不要重新考虑，特别是现在价格低了很多，是不是比过去更有吸引力。

I mean, since you covered it, we've been asked many, many times whether we do not want to revisit it, and especially given the significantly lower prices today, whether it's not more attractive than it has been in the past.

在我投资生涯里学到的另一个教训是：不理解加上基本面恶化，这显然是现在的情况，这是最糟糕的组合。

And another lesson that I've learned from my investing journey so far is that a lack of understanding mixed with deteriorating business fundamentals, which is certainly the case here, is the worst possible combination that you could find.

如果我对一家公司不是每个细节都了解，但能理解大概八成，再加上一个大趋势或强劲的积极因素，那还是可能表现不错的。

If I don't fully understand every aspect of a company, but I get 80% of it, and I add to that a megatrend or a major positive tailwind, it can still work out quite well.

但以TTD为例，它的营收增长还在持续下滑。

But in TTD's case, you have a business where top line growth is continuously coming down.

我是说，2024年第一季度是28%，而2026年第一季度只有12%。

I mean, in q one of twenty twenty four was 28%, and q one of twenty twenty six was only 12%.

这样一来，要回答这家公司现在值多少钱，就难多了。

Then answering the question of what that company is worth today is so much more difficult.

如果我们假设未来五年营收增长保持在12%，利润率也差不多，那The Trade Desk现在可能确实便宜。

The Trade Desk is likely a bargain today if we can assume that 12% top line growth is what we're getting for the next five years, assuming a similar margin.

但问题是，过去两年增长都腰斩了，我该怎么去相信这个假设呢？

But how should I underwrite that assumption if growth more than halved in just the last two years?

如果你是广告技术领域的专家，那你的看法可能完全不同。

And if you're an ad tech expert, that might be totally different for you.

也许你对这家公司的理解要深得多。

Maybe you understand the business significantly better.

我不是说The Trade Desk现在估值不好，但对我们来说，它还是属于太难搞的那一类。

I'm not saying that The Trade Desk is bad value right now, but for us, it's just in the too hard pile.

去年是这样，今年依然如此。

It was there last year, and it's still there today.

而且我很有信心地说，明年它很可能还会在那里，即使股价是，我不知道，每股5美元。

And I have pretty high confidence of saying it will most likely be there next year too, even if it's at, I don't know, $5 per share.

如果说有什么的话，The Trade Desk的抛售如此剧烈让我感到惊讶，这让我觉得我对这家公司的了解比我想象的还要少。

If anything, my surprise at how dramatic the sell off in The Trade Desk has been made me feel like I understood the business even less than I thought.

因为它长期以来一直是一个优质的复利机器，我没想到这只股票会这么快就变得这么糟糕。

Because it has been such a quality compounder for such a long time that I wouldn't have thought that things could go this bad this quickly for the stock.

所以无论如何，这只能说明我对这家公司的理解有多差，而且肯定有更容易的挑战等着我们。

So anyways, that just shows probably how poorly I understand the business and that there are definitely easier hurdles for us to clear.

我们得承认，复利兄弟最近一年半过得不太好。

We got to admit, compounded bros did not have a good one and a half years recently.

我们可以继续沿着这个方向，谈谈我们投资组合中另一家目前下跌了约25%的公司。

And we could just, you know, keep going in that direction and talk about another business that is currently in our portfolio and is down about 25%.

那就是CoStar Group。

And that's CoStar Group.

我要说的是，对于这家公司，与其说是要弄清楚某种模式，不如说是因为它在我们投资组合中的时间并不长。

And I should say that for this company, it's not so much about figuring out any pattern state because it hasn't spent that much time on our portfolio.

所以，你知道，我认为股价下跌主要是波动和动量造成的。

So, you know, I believe the price decline is mostly just volatility and momentum.

它整个一年都在下跌，而且还在继续下跌。

It was going down the entire year, but it continues to go down.

不过，也许有些情况已经发生了变化，我们应该聊一聊。

And yet, maybe there are some things that have changed and that we should cover.

所以，是的，我觉得我们应该聊聊CoStar，你大概三个月前推荐过它。

So, yeah, I figured we should just, you know, talk about CoStar, which you pitched about three months ago now.

而且，因为我们的听众可能对CoStar不如对我们之前聊过的其他公司那么熟悉，你也许可以简单介绍一下，为什么CoStar当时让你觉得那么有意思。

And since it might be a bit less known to our audience than some of the other companies we talked about previously, you might just wanna give a quick pitch on why CoStar seemed so interesting to you.

对。

Yeah.

CoStar的投资逻辑现在还处于非常早期的阶段。

It's still really early in the CoStar thesis.

现在下结论说它好或不好，都太早了。

It'd be way too soon to write it off in one direction or the other.

要把CoStar理解清楚的话，基本可以把它看成商业房地产界的彭博终端。

But really the way to think about CoStar is that it's the Bloomberg terminal of commercial real estate.

它是靠四十多年的研究积累，加上实地走访、记录各种物业，才建起来的这样一个数据商业帝国。

So it's a data business empire built over forty years of research and physically visiting and cataloging properties.

这让他们对行业里的同类数据和分析有着近乎垄断的控制，而经纪人、贷款机构和投资者全都依赖这些数据。

And that gives them a monopoly like grip on the comps and analytics that brokers and lenders and investors all depend on in this industry.

所以其中那个核心数据业务，大概有50%的利润率。

And so that core data franchise carries about 50% margins.

而且公司整体是净现金的形象，营收已经连续60个季度保持了两位数增长。

And the business overall has a net cash balance sheet and then has strung together something like 60 quarters of double digit revenue growth.

所以说真的，这是家非常出色的公司。

So it really is an impressive business.

至于争议和股价为什么跌这么多，归根结底就是管理层在homes.com上砸了几十亿美元，那是往Zillow挑战的住宅门户网站。

And so the controversy and the reason the stock is down so much boils down to management having plowed billions of dollars into homes.com, which is this residential portal meant to challenge Zillow.

就算大家不太清楚homes.com是什么，那应该也大多听过Zillow。

And most people are probably familiar with Zillow if they don't know what homes.com is.

但这项投资把整个公司的营业利润拖成了负数。

But that investment has dragged the entire company's operating profits negative.

然后实际上，这吸引了一位激进投资者，他建议变革，还有丹·勒布，一位相当知名的投资者。

And then actually, it drew in an activist investor who was advising for change, and Dan Loeb, who's pretty famous investor.

所以这个论点基本上是，市场太专注于 homes.com 的现金消耗，以至于你以折扣价得到了这个商业房地产垄断数据业务的皇冠明珠。

So the thesis is basically that the market is so fixated on the cash burn tied to homes.com that it's handing you this crown jewel commercial monopoly data business at a discount.

用一句俗话来说，这就像把洗澡水连同孩子一起倒掉，CoStar 的情况看起来就是这样。

And for lack of a better words, the expression is throwing the baby out with the bathwater is really what it seems like has happened here with CoStar.

最简短的说明是，这是一家 SaaS 公司，这可能就是为什么我现在总是倒霉。

The briefest explanation of what happened is, it's a SaaS company, and that might explain why I just can't catch a break right now.

但我觉得当你提出这个建议时，对 homes.com 的投资已经放缓了。

But I think the investments into homes.com had already slowed down when you made the pitch.

所以他们还在那里烧钱，但速度比以前慢多了。

So they are still burning money there, but at a much slower pace than they used to.

我得承认，当你第一次向我推荐 CoStar 时，我有点被各种业务部门和一些其他警示信号搞得不知所措，主要是那些市场份额数字，对我来说有点奇怪。

And I gotta admit that when you first pitched CoStar to me, I was a bit overwhelmed by all the different business units and some other yellow flags, which were mainly about market share numbers that sort of seemed a bit weird to me.

虽然从技术上讲是垄断，但他们的市场份额其实很低。

They were quite low, although it is technically a monopoly.

而且他们的持股比例也很少。

And then they also have very little ownership.

CEO的持股比例也不高。

And then the CEO also has a pretty low ownership stake.

再加上CEO似乎有通过大规模投入来抢占市场份额的历史，这些都让我有些顾虑。不过，公平地说，他之前的尝试确实成功了。

Also the fact that the CEO seems to have a history of massive spending in order to win market share, All of that didn't help, although, to his credit, it worked out in previous endeavors.

但这可能也是他现在太固执，不愿意承认这场仗已经输了的原因，如果确实输了的话。

But that could also be why he is just too stubborn today to see that this fight is lost, if it is.

我的意思是，就连进来的激进投资者丹·勒布都已经离开了公司。

I mean, even Dan Loeb, the activist investor who came in, has already left the company.

虽然公开声明很简短，但我觉得很明显，他只是觉得自己对CEO安迪·弗洛伦斯或者公司方向没有任何影响力。

And while the public statement was quite brief, I think it became clear that he just didn't believe he could have any impact on the CEO, Andy Florence, and or the direction of the company.

如果我是CoStar的CEO，我觉得放弃这个赌注之所以这么难，部分原因在于Zillow这家公司实在太让人讨厌了。

If I were to sort of assume the perspective of CoStar's CEO, I think part of what makes giving up on this bet so hard is that Zillow is such a dislikable company.

他们的商业做法确实不太让人佩服，而且因为经营公司的方式惹上了很多官司，还被指控从CoStar那里偷窃和剽窃。

They really have some uninspiring business practices and have incurred lots of lawsuits for how they've run the company and lots of allegations of theft and stealing from CoStar itself.

所以这两家公司之间积怨很深。

So there is a pretty bitter rivalry between the businesses.

而且说实话，Zillow作为一家公司本来也经营得不太好。

And actually, Zillow has not formed well as a company anyways.

所以感觉现在正是颠覆的好时机，CoStar应该能进来直接接管这块业务。

So it feels like things are really ripe for disruption where CoStar should be able to come in and just take over that business.

但当然，Zillow有巨大的品牌知名度优势，这让事情说起来容易做起来难。

But of course, there's a massive amount of brand recognition working in Zillow's favor that makes it easier said than done.

所以看到像Dan Loeb这样的人对CoStar的论点失去信心，我确实有些犹豫，他主要是主张削减在homes.com上的开支。

And so it does give me some pause to see somebody like Dan Loeb lose faith in the CoStar thesis, where he was primarily arguing to cut spending on homes.com.

而且确实有人认为这可能是出于自尊心，就像我说的，Andy Florence和Zillow之间积怨很深。

And there definitely is some thought of this maybe being an ego thing where, like I said, there is a pretty bitter rivalry between Andy Florence and Zillow.

这可能不仅仅是出于最佳经济决策的考虑，而是出于一种小心眼，想要扳倒一个敌人。

And it may simply boil down to not as what is the best economic decision, but a sense of pettiness and wanting to take down sort of an enemy.

所以，综上所述，CoStar决定将去年对homes.com的净投资从8.5亿美元削减到今年的约3亿美元。

And so all that said, CoStar has decided to drop its net investment into homes.com from $850,000,000 last year to what will be about $300,000,000 this year.

然后到2030年，预计还会再减少1亿美元。所以即使削减开支的幅度没有完全符合丹·勒布的期望，但削减确实在发生，这让我有信心，不会永远否定整个业务。

And then in 2030, it's supposed to come down another $100,000,000 So even if the cutback in spending was not to Dan Lobe's liking, there is a cutback occurring which gives me confidence and not just writing off the entire business indefinitely going forward.

尤其是当剥离掉homes.com的投入后，估值对于CoStar这样拥有数据护城河的企业来说非常合理，这些护城河是通过几十年来拍摄北美数千座商业房地产建筑而建立的。

Especially when the valuation stripping out spending on homes.com is so reasonable for a business with the data moats that CoStar has that are built literally by photographing thousands of commercial real estate buildings across North America over several decades.

所以我们知道，最坏的情况——他们把一切都砸在homes.com上——不太可能发生，因为他们已经削减了开支。

So we do know that the worst case scenario of them just blowing everything on homes.com is very unlikely to come to fruition as they already cut back spending.

而且就像我说的，这个数据护城河是他们一栋楼一栋楼地积累起来的，AI显然无法替代。

And like I said, with this data moat that they've really built one building at a time, AI can obviously not replace that.

另外，丹·勒布批评的另一件事，也许值得我们关注，就是安迪·弗洛伦斯每年4000万美元的薪酬。

And still, other thing that Dan Loeb has criticized that maybe deserves some attention from us is Andy Florence's pay package of $40,000,000 a year.

我觉得他这一点说得很有道理。

And I think he does have a good point there.

不过，他暗示安迪赚得太多，可能对改善他们的关系没什么帮助。

It probably didn't help their relationship though, that he was suggesting that Andy makes too much money.

所以最后，对我来说，这归根结底是一个关于估值的故事。

So in the end, to me, it comes down to this being a story about valuation.

市场给homes.com赋予的负面价值已经变得相当离谱了。

And it has become pretty absurd how much negative value the market is ascribing to homes.com.

整个投资周期的成本大约在30亿到50亿美元之间，具体取决于你认为哪些纯粹是对homes.com的投资。

The entire investment cycle costs cost are about 3 to $5,000,000,000 depending on what you consider as solely being an investment in homes.com.

然而，市值却从400亿美元跌到了110亿美元。

And yet the market cap, however, has gone down from $40,000,000,000 to $11,000,000,000.

所以它造成了很大的，很大的损害。

So it's done a lot, a lot of damage.

这是一个非常粗略的计算，因为你还要考虑到CoStar的市盈率曾经很高，而如今市场对SaaS公司根本不给这样的估值。

And this is a very rough calculation since you also have to account for the fact that CoStar traded at a premium multiple, that the market is just simply not giving to SaaS companies these days.

但再说一遍，重点是，这笔对homes.com的投资对业务未来的实际财务和前景的影响，远没有股市所表现得那么严重，至少我是这么认为的。

But again, the point is that this homes.com investment is not even remotely as impactful on the actual financials and prospects of the business going forward as the stock market is probably making it seem, or at least that would be my opinion.

你之前提到我们在蒙大拿州TIP峰会上做的演示，其中一部分也是理解市场对股票或公司叙事的重要性。

You mentioned earlier the presentation that we gave in Montana for our TIP Summit, and part of that was also understanding the importance of the market's narrative about a stock or a company.

我只有在觉得自己理解了市场对这家公司不喜欢什么，并且我的看法不同，而且我有充分的理由相信自己是对的时候，才能对自己的决定有信心。

And I can only feel confident in my decision about a stock when I do feel like I understand what the market dislikes about the company when I look at it, and then when I have a different opinion, and I have good reasons to believe that I'm right.

只有这样，我才能自己判断投资这只股票是否有意义。

And only then can I figure out personally whether that makes sense to me to invest into the stock?

不得不说的是，在这个案例中，明显是homes.com让市场感到不满。

And I gotta say in this case, it's clearly homes.com what the market is bugged about.

但是，我觉得市场也在看更长远的东西，总体质疑他们是否还能见到CoStar产生的现金流。

However, I think the market is also looking beyond that, and it's just generally questioning whether they will ever see any of the cash flows that CoStar produces.

而且，我看得越多，越觉得这是个被严重错误定价的机会。

So and still, the more I looked at it, the more I felt like this is a massively mispriced opportunity.

所以我做完研究之后，确实比几周几个月前更有信心了。

So I actually got away from, you know, my research here feeling way more confident in it than I was just a couple of weeks or months ago.

我做了些计算，你也提到了一些关键点。

I've did some math, you just pointed out some of the points.

CoStar因为这次homes.com的押注而损失的价值，花费并不大，真的很荒谬。

The value that, you know, CoStar lost just because of this homes.com bet, and the spend is not that massive, is ridiculous.

如果非得给Home Start Combat一个负价值才能解释市值跌这么多，那这个负价值几乎得有几百亿。

If you would have to give Home Start Combat negative value just to make sense for the market cap to drop that much, it would be in the tens of billions almost.

所以我觉得它被低估的程度比我最初想的还要严重。

So I do believe it's way more mispriced than I first thought.

而且我大概一周前问你的时候，你看起来也不担心。

And and when I asked you about a week ago, you didn't seem to be worried either.

所以可能只有我自己需要更多说服力。

So it was probably only me who needed more convincing anyway.

而且我觉得现在股价便宜了这么多，肯定有助于增强信心。

And I think the fact that the stock is so much cheaper now, it certainly helps with that.

如果我要建议在当前价格下加仓Adobe或CoStar的话。

If I were gonna recommend adding more to either our Adobe or CoStar positions at current prices.

两者都有吸引力，但我可能会更倾向于CoStar。

Both are attractive, but I would probably prefer CoStar.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

那么，我们应不应该加仓呢？

Well, actually, then should we add to it?

我的意思是，如果你觉得它比Adobe更好，那仓位至少应该比1.5%大。

I mean, if you like it more than Adobe, it should probably be at least a bigger position than 1.5%.

再一个，仓位之所以这么小，有一部分是因为我以前想先熟悉熟悉它，现在我觉得我已经做到了。

And again, like, part of why it's so small is that I wanted to get more comfortable with it, and I feel like I've done that.

尤其是现在股价更低了，我们比买入价已经跌了25%。

And especially now that it's lower, I mean, again, we've lost 25% from our entry price.

我得说，我觉得现在这个机会好多了。

I gotta say, I feel a lot better about the opportunity here.

那你觉得，把仓位从投资组合的1.5%提高到3%左右怎么样？

So what do you think about maybe pushing it up from 1.5% of the portfolio to maybe 3%?

我们有足够的现金来做。

We've got the cash to do it.

所以我觉得没什么好犹豫的。

So I don't see a reason not to.

而且我们已经从过去的错误中吸取了一些教训，对吧，比如Adobe。

And and we are already learning some lessons from our mistakes in the past, right, with Adobe.

我记得我们说过不要在任何仓位上加倍下注，所以我们至少亏损了15%到20%，这有点随意。

I think we said not to double down on any positions and so we've had at least a 15 to 20% loss, which was sort of arbitrary.

但事实上，我们跌了25%，而且你比当初提出这个投资时更了解这家公司了，是的，我当然很乐意增加它在投资组合中的权重。

But the fact that we're down 25% lower and you're more comfortable with the business than when we first pitched it, yeah, I definitely would be happy to increase its weight in the portfolio.

好的。

All right.

听起来我们今天还做了一个投资组合的决定，这可不是我一开始录这期节目时打算的。

Sounds like we have even made a portfolio decision today, which I didn't intend it to when I started this episode.

但既然我们已经讨论完了今天想聊的大部分公司，不如我们聊聊从中得到的教训吧。

But having that and discussed most of the companies that I wanted to go through today, how about we go to some of the learnings from this?

我们在节目过程中已经提到了一些，但我还是觉得有些东西可以再聊聊。

We already mentioned some of them going through the episode, but I still think there's some stuff that we can talk about.

我觉得投资难的地方，也是我们今天在节目里学到的，就是每笔投资都不一样。

And I think the difficult thing about investing, and we learned that also in today's episode, is that every investment is just different.

你可以把PayPal的所有警示信号都指出来，然后再和Adobe那边的情况对比一下。

You can point out all the yellow flags of PayPal, and then you compare them to what we see with Adobe.

如果Adobe这笔投资失败了，你很容易会说，这也太明显了，我们根本没从PayPal的错误里学到任何东西。

And if the Adobe investment fails, you can easily say that it was so obvious and we didn't learn anything from our PayPal mistake.

但换个角度想，你也可以分析一下谷歌那笔投资，它也是在市场情绪最悲观的时候做的，可结果却完全不一样。

But on the other hand, you can analyze a Google investment, which was also done during peak negativity, and it turned out different.

所以我觉得这真的很难，这也是为什么很少有人能长期稳定地跑赢市场。

So I think it's very difficult, and that's why so few people can sustainably outperform the market.

你永远不知道短期内会发生什么。

You just never know what will happen in the short term.

这也是为什么价值投资者总是去买入那些即使最坏情况也能承受的公司。

And that's why value investors try to buy companies where even the worst case outcome is still tolerable.

我觉得PayPal就是个很好的例子，现在这个潜在的收购，以及它如何影响我们当时所认为的安全边际。

I think PayPal is a pretty good example of that with this potential acquisition now and how that factors into what we thought was our margin of safety at the time.

而且，如果Lulu出现类似的情况，我也不会觉得意外。如果你真的从现在开始持有它五年，最后结果还不错，我完全不会惊讶。

And I also wouldn't be surprised again if we saw something similar with Lulu, where if you actually held the stock for five years from today, I would not be surprised if things ended up being okay.

但问题只是，在事情已经发生剧烈变化之后，你是否还愿意硬扛这些损失呢？

But the question is just, are you willing to ride out those losses after things have already changed pretty dramatically?

还是说你只是为了持有而持有——比如我说过有五年的投资期限，所以现在无论如何都要拿满五年，等五年结束或许能回本？

Or are you just going to hold on to something for the sake of, hey, said I had a five year time horizon, so now I'm, you know, absolutely gonna hold on to it for five years and maybe at the end of five years, I'll break even on it.

那也未必是最好的投资方式。

That's not necessarily the best investment approach either.

所以Lululemon会不会被收购，我也不确定，大概率不会吧。

And so I don't know if it'll be an acquisition for Lululemon, probably not.

但肯定可能出现情绪和基本面的转变，尤其在中国继续增长的情况下，那可能会让估值彻底改变。

But certainly there could be a shift in sentiment, business fundamentals, especially as it continue to grow in China, and then that could all change the valuation dramatically.

所以并不是说你决定了买或卖一只股票，时间就静止了，对吧？

So it's not like, you know, you make the decision to buy or sell a company and then time just stops, right?

这些公司照样运转，股票照样交易。

These businesses continue to operate and continue to keep trading.

所以你得不断有意识和无意识地决定要不要持有不同的企业。

And so you're continuously having to make subconscious and conscious decisions about owning or not owning different businesses.

我觉得今天我们讨论中最让我喜欢的一点是，它展示了我们对投资组合中的持仓也可以有多纠结。

I think what I like most about our discussion today is that it shows a bit more how conflicted we can also be about the positions in our portfolio.

持有某家公司不代表我们对它没有负面看法。

Just because we own a company doesn't mean there's nothing negative we can point out.

我们两个人，或者算上Kyle三个人，对这些公司也可能有不同意见。

And the two of us, and three of us, if we include Kyle, can have different opinions on those companies too.

显然，我们知道你永远不会买PayPal，我也不会买Lululemon，但管理共同的投资组合就是这样。

I mean, we obviously know you would have never bought PayPal, and I would have never bought Lululemon, but that's life when we manage a shared portfolio.

赢得好的投资也是一样的情况。

And the same also goes for the winning bets.

我一直喜欢拿Reddit举例。

I always like to mention Reddit as an example.

起初我并没有被说服，但它后来成了我们最成功的选股之一，而且它也是我个人投资组合的一部分。

I wasn't sold immediately, and yet it turned into, I think, our most successful pick, and it's also part of my personal portfolio.

所以我们就是在互相学习。

So we just learn from each other.

而且我觉得这期节目还有一个我喜欢的地方，就是让我反思了我们作为投资者所做的所有决定，但同时也是作为公开分享投资组合和决策的投资者。

And I think something else that I liked about this episode is that it sort of made me reflect on all the decisions that we made as investors, but also as investors who publicly share their portfolio and their decisions.

我学到了管理自己的个人投资组合和把它公之于众之间有很大的区别。

I learned that there's a huge difference between managing your personal portfolio and then also putting it out into the public.

而且因为这样，你会遇到很多新的偏见需要去应对，也会犯很多错误。

And there are so many new biases that you have to sort of tackle, and so many mistakes that you can make because of that.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得对我来说，其中一个教训就是可能应该少操作一点。

I think one of the lessons for me certainly is to be maybe a bit less active.

我觉得去年我们不得不这样做，因为我们有那么多现金要配置。

I think we had to do that to some extent in the last year because we had to deploy so much cash.

但现在我们的投资组合基本上已经成型了，当然，它永远不会真正成型。

But now that we have a more or less finished portfolio, and obviously, it's never finished.

它总是在不断调整中。

It's always in process.

但我们现在有十五到十六个仓位，这正是我们最初的目标，我觉得有了这个，我们就可以更淡定一些，慢慢找新公司，真正把它们和我们现有的公司做比较。

But we have, you know, 15 to 16 positions, which is what we initially aim to, and I think having that, we can just be a bit more calm about, you know, finding new companies, actually comparing them to the companies that we have.

而且，当有疑问的时候，可能就多给我们自己持有的公司一些信任，不要对所有的负面消息都反应过度。

And then also, when in doubt, might just give a bit more credit to the companies that we own and not react to all the negative news that are coming out.

所以关于PayPal和Lulu这些公司，显然有很多可以说的，但我们买它们是因为我们花了很长时间研究。

So there's obviously a lot to say about PayPal and Lulu and all of those companies, but we bought it because we researched it for a lot of time.

我们在持有它们的过程中也学到了更多。

We also learned more about them while we own them.

我觉得这是一个被低估的点：你只有在真正做研究的时候，才能对一家公司了解那么多。

I think that's an underrated point that you can only understand so much about a company when you actually do the research.

当你真正把它们放在投资组合里几个月后，你会学到更多。

You learn so much more when you actually own them for a couple of months in your portfolio.

你会慢慢明白会有什么消息出来，股东之间怎么交流，CEO怎么沟通，不仅在财报电话会上，平时也是。

You sort of understand what news are coming out, how the shareholder base is communicating to each other, how the CEO is communicating, not only in earnings calls, but also in between.

而且我个人觉得，不要对负面消息反应过度，相信这个过程，同时也要认识到，虽然我们一遍又一遍地看这些公司，但我们是在为长期建一个投资组合。

And I think personally, not reacting too much to negative news, trusting in the process, and also acknowledging that while we look at those companies again and again, we're building a portfolio for the long term.

对吧？

Right?

所以，一年之内有这么高的换手率也说明我们可能应该更经常地拉远视角，看看这些公司到底发生了什么变化，尤其是长期逻辑有没有变。

So having so much turnover in just one year also shows that we probably should sort of zoom out more often and look at what actually is changing within these companies and especially for the long term thesis.

我觉得我们也应该更频繁地做这类节目。

And I probably also feel that we should do more of these episodes more often.

不一定非要是我们赚得最多或亏得最多的那些票，而是重新审视之前的投资，聊聊我们的思路是怎么演变的。

Not necessarily talking about our biggest winners or biggest losers, but just revisiting investments and discussing how our thinking evolves.

因为我们在Mastermind社区里每天都在做这件事，所以很容易让人觉得我们一直在做，但其实播客上还没做过。

Since we do that every day in the Mastermind Community, it can easily feel like we are already constantly doing it, but we're not doing it on the podcast.

我觉得这对听众来说是一回事，对我们俩包括Kyle来说也是另一回事。

And I feel like that's a different thing for the people who listen, but also for, you know, the two of us including Kyle.

我确实觉得我们应该多分享一些关于投资反思的内容。

I definitely think we should have more of these reflections on our investments.

我其实正在准备一集关于Uber的更新节目，幸好今天没提到它。

I'm actually working on an updated episode for Uber, which we fortunately didn't mention today.