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欢迎回到《投资者播客》,每周肖恩、凯尔和我一起探讨、分析并评估上市公司,讨论它们是否值得进入我们的共同投资组合。
Welcome back to "The Investor's Podcast," where each week, Shawn, Kyle, and I explore, analyze, and also value publicly traded companies and debate whether they deserve a spot in our shared portfolio.
今天的节目是第855期,我们实际上在重新审视一家我们一直惦记的公司,那就是Shopify。
And today's episode is 855, and we're actually revisiting a company that we always had in the back of our minds, and that company is Shopify.
为了提供背景,肖恩,你在去年五月推荐了Shopify,我想可以这么说,你非常喜欢这家公司,事实上,我们俩都很喜欢。
So for context, Shawn, you pitched Shopify in May of last year, and I think it's safe to say that you very much like the company, and in fact, both of us did.
所以你把Shopify看作是反抗亚马逊帝国的叛军。
So you saw Shopify as basically the rebels fighting Amazon's empire.
你当时就是这么说的,我们非常喜欢这个想法。
That's how you put it back then, and we very much liked that idea.
但当时股价相当高,在你的模型里,你算出的内在价值每股目标价大约是53美元,而当时市场价格大约是每股80美元。
But the stock was quite expensive, and in your model, you came up with an intrinsic value share target of about $53 against the market price back then of about $80 per share.
讽刺的是,作为推荐人,你建议我们暂缓行动,除非股价跌到每股60美元以下。
And ironically, as the guy pitching it, you recommended that we hold off unless the stock would fall south of $60 per share.
天哪,别提了,丹尼尔。
Gosh, don't remind me, Daniel.
这有点让人心疼。
It's a bit painful.
嗯,我觉得可以肯定地说,它从来没跌到过60美元。
Well, I think it's safe to say that it never did touch $60 per share.
而且在我们录制这期节目的时候,Shopify的股价实际上已经涨到160美元以上了,市值高达2000亿美元。
And as we record this one, Shopify actually trades north of $160 per share with a massive $200 billion market cap.
我觉得可以肯定地说,我们报道了这么多公司,而且大多数都是好公司,我们选择的公司肯定存在选择偏差,所以这种情况时不时会发生。
And I think it's safe to say that we cover so many companies, and mostly good ones, there's certainly a selection bias in the companies that we choose, that this happens from time to time.
但我们也经常被问到,感觉怎么样?
But we also often get asked, how does it feel?
错过这样一家优秀的公司,感觉如何?
How does it feel to miss out on one of these fantastic companies?
那么,肖恩,你感觉怎么样?
So, Shawn, how does it feel?
确实有点怕错过,但作为价值投资者,这很正常。
There's definitely been some FOMO, but that's par for the course as a value investor.
这不会是最后一次发生这种事,我们今天想花点时间反思一下,是不是分析上犯了错,或者我们对Shopify有什么误解,又或者只是一个非常不可能的多头行情真的发生了,再或者就是市场先生完全在非理性行事。
This won't be the last time this happens, and we're going to try to spend some time today just reflecting on whether an analytical mistake was made, and we misunderstood something about Shopify, or if just a really unlikely bull case played out in reality, or maybe Mr. Market is acting just completely irrationally.
那样的话,我会感觉好受一点。
That would make me feel a little bit better.
那会是一个更让人安心的说法。
That'd be a more comforting narrative.
但我觉得都有可能。
But I would say it's all possible.
自2014年以来,我们的节目下载量超过2亿次,采访了全球最优秀的投资者,深入研究了价值投资的原则,并发现了许多引人注目的投资机会。
Since 2014, with more than 200 million downloads, we have interviewed the world's best investors, studied deeply the principles of value investing, and uncovered many compelling investment opportunities.
我们专注于理解企业和内在价值,据此进行投资,并与你分享我们学到的一切。
We focus on understanding businesses and intrinsic value, investing accordingly, and sharing everything we learn with you.
本节目不构成投资建议。
This show is not investment advice.
这个节目仅供信息和娱乐用途。
It's intended for informational and entertainment purposes only.
主持人和嘉宾表达的所有观点都仅代表他们个人,而且他们可能持有讨论中提到的证券。
All opinions expressed by hosts and guests are solely their own, and they may have investments in the securities discussed.
现在,有请主持人肖恩·奥马利和丹尼尔·曼卡。
Now, for your hosts, Shawn O'Malley and Daniel Manka.
投资中最难的事情之一,就是冷静地回顾做决策时手头的信息,然后问自己是否真的犯了错,比如漏掉了什么重要的东西,或者对公司估值过低,这大概就是这里的情况。
One of the hardest things in investing is to just soberly look back at the information you had available at the time of a decision, and then ask whether you actually made a mistake, like missing something important or valuing the company too low, which arguably has been the case here.
正如你所说,因为股票总是根据新信息定价,所以也有可能当我们考虑牛市情形时,现实只是落到了一个不太可能发生但确实发生了的极端结果上。
As you said, since stocks are always being priced on new information, it's also possible that when we factor in a bull case, reality simply landed on an outlier outcome that was not the most likely to occur but did nevertheless.
而且我们其实对可能的结果范围考虑得挺周全的,现实只是落在了那些不太可能的结果之一上。
And we actually thought about the range of outcomes pretty well, and reality just landed on one of those less likely outcomes.
这种情况我们经常遇到。
And that happens to us all the time.
我们看了大约100家公司,我敢说至少有10家就是这种情况。
We looked at about 100 companies, and I would say there's easily 10 of those that worked out that way.
第一个问题很难判断,因为事后偏见很容易悄悄溜进来,改变你当时对公司的看法。
And the first is pretty hard to judge without hindsight bias sort of creeping in and changing how you back then thought about the company.
第二个问题也很难证明,因为现实只有一个版本,一旦事情真的发生了,就没有办法回去衡量它当时发生的可能性有多大。
And the second is kind of hard to prove because there's only one version of reality, and once something has actually happened, there is no way to go back and then measure how likely it really was.
听起来有点抽象,但我觉得用体育来打个比方,可能更容易理解。
Sounds a little abstract, but I think putting it through the lens of sports is maybe a helpful way to think about it.
如果你最喜欢的球队在比赛后期落后,从数学上讲,你可以合理估计他们翻盘获胜的概率,比如说10%,这取决于剩余时间和落后多少分。
If your favorite team is trailing late into the game, it would be mathematically reasonable to estimate, let's say, a 10% chance of them coming back to win, depending on how much time there is left and how far behind they are.
你会看到一些博彩市场之类的,确实会尝试给这类事情标出一个可能性的百分比。
And you see some of the betting markets and stuff try and actually put a percentage of likelihood on things like that.
所以,如果你决定赌他们会输,也许是为了做个情感对冲,这样至少能赚点钱来弥补球队输球的痛苦,那么十次里有九次,这假设上都是正确的决定。
So if you decided to bet that they would lose, maybe as an emotional hedge so that at least you make some money to offset the pain of your team losing, nine out of 10 times, that would have hypothetically been the right decision.
我得说,我不参与体育博彩,但我确实用梦幻足球来对冲我最喜欢的球队表现不佳的痛苦。
And I'll just say, I don't do sports gambling, but I do use fantasy football to hedge the pain of my favorite team not being very good.
所以,如果他们最终赢了,问题是你该怎么看待这件事?
So anyways, if they do end up winning, the question is, what are you to make of that?
所以首先,如果你像我一样,你可能会太高兴了,根本不在乎输掉赌注,因为你最喜欢的球队赢了。
And so for starters, you're probably so happy, if you're like me, that you don't care about having lost a bet because your favorite team won.
但问题是,你错了吗?
But the question is, were you wrong?
我觉得这真的没有一个非黑即白的答案,因为在那个时刻,你的球队逆转的可能性微乎其微。
And I don't think it's really something you can have a black or white answer to because at that moment in time, it was overwhelmingly unlikely for your team to come back.
所以下注反映那些赔率是合理的。
So making a bet that reflected those odds was a reasonable thing to do.
但当然,10%的情况下,即使是非常合理的赌注也可能最终是错的。
But of course, 10% of the time, a very logical bet like that can still work out to be wrong.
我们在体育和市场中经常看到这种情况。
And we see that all the time in sports and in markets, too.
而投资更难,因为它不像体育比赛那样有明确的结束。
And investing is even harder because there's no finite end to it as with a sports game.
你不能像说“我客观上看对了哪支球队会赢”那样,直接说“我客观上看对了这只股票”。
You can't just declare, "I objectively was right about this stock" in the same way that you could say, "I was objectively right about which team would win a game."
而且投资更像是一个持续的过程,这让概率估算变得非常非常困难,甚至几乎不可能。
And investing is more of this continuous process, which makes the probabilities much, much harder, if not impossible, to estimate.
这可能会造成一种错觉,让你觉得“对,这笔投资还没见效”,但技术上它仍然有可能成功,于是你就一直抓着这个想法不放。
And it can create this false illusion where you think, "Yeah, the bet hasn't worked out yet," but it could still technically, and you sort of cling to that.
我得承认,世界杯期间我犯了一个现在可能被称为“情境意识”的错误。
I got to admit, during the World Cup, I made the, now probably called situational awareness mistake.
我确实赌了钱,虽然我通常不这么做,但我确实赌了德国队赢。
I did bet money, which I usually don't do, but I did bet money on Germany winning.
结果不仅我们输了,我也因为没赢而输了钱。
And not only did we lose, I also lost my money because we didn't win.
所以基本上,我没有对冲,反而在亏损的赌注上加倍下注。
So I was basically, instead of hedging, I was doubling down on the losing bet.
所以,是的,我在体育博彩上没什么好经历,所以以后可能就不碰了。
So, yeah, I don't have the best experience with sport betting, so probably I just don't do it in the future.
但你提到的这一点,我觉得触及了让投资变得非常困难的一些情感偏见的本质,我们总是试图去解决这些问题,对吧?
But what you're touching on here, I think, gets to the heart of a handful of emotional biases that make investing really difficult, and we always try to tackle those, right?
除非公司破产,而你押注的是股价上涨,否则你几乎永远没有机会客观地宣布最终结果。
Unless a company goes bankrupt and you were betting on the stock going up, you almost never get the chance to objectively declare a final outcome.
所以你可以无限期地坚持一个亏损的决定,希望它最终能成功。
So you can cling to a losing decision indefinitely, hoping that it will eventually work out.
但显然,这不是我们两个人,可能也不是大多数听众,会认为的真正投资,因为真正的投资意味着你买入时是基于对内在价值的估算,也就是股票实际值多少钱,并且有一个时间表来验证这个论点。
But obviously, that's not what the two of us, and probably most of our listeners, would consider real investing, because real investing would mean that you buy with an estimate of intrinsic value, what a stock is actually worth, and a timeline also for that thesis to play out.
所以这个游戏有一个终点,你可以真正评估你的思考。
So the game has an endpoint, and you can actually grade your thinking.
比如,我过去谈到过PayPal,我确切地写下了论点,以及我想在某个季度看到什么来验证它是否有效。
For example, I talked about PayPal in the past and I wrote down the thesis exactly, and also what I wanted to see in a certain quarter to see if it works out.
结果没有成功,但至少我们有了时间表的终点,知道什么时候卖出这家公司。
It did not, but then at least we had an end to the timeline and knew when to sell the company.
所以不存在一种现实,你能完美地评估每项投资的内在价值而从不亏钱,因为你的估值中总是包含了一系列可能不顺利的情况,然后由你作为投资者来决定你是否喜欢面前这些赔率。
So there's no reality where you can underwrite every investment's intrinsic value perfectly without ever losing money, because baked into your valuation is always a range of possibilities where things don't work out, and then it's up to you as the investor to decide whether you like the odds of that before you.
这就是为什么他们说,作为投资者,如果你能有一个长期的投注平均,让你比一半的投注稍微好一点,也就是你押注的赌注中有一半以上最终是对的,那对你的复利之旅来说就相当不错了。
And that's why they say that as an investor, if you can have a long-term betting average where you get a slightly better average than, saying, half of the bets you bet on actually turning all right, that's pretty well for you and your compounding journey.
但同样重要的是,你得能察觉到你的投资逻辑已经变了,也就是说现实已经偏离你最初的预期太远了,这时候就得及时止损,别死扛着一直拿到归零,那可是破坏复利的最佳方式,查理·芒格早就告诉过我们这一点。
But then, also importantly, you also have to recognize when your thesis has changed, meaning reality has drifted too far away from your original expectations, and you have to cut your losses so you don't get stuck holding something all the way to zero, which is the best way to disrupt your compounding, as Charlie Munger already told us.
说到这个,我们最喜欢举的例子之一就是露露乐蒙,我在播客里聊过很多次这只股票,也大力推荐过。
So one of our favorite examples of this was with Lululemon, and I talked about the stock a lot and pitched it on the podcast.
我跟所有愿意听的人说,我对投资它有多兴奋。
And to anyone who would listen, I would tell them how excited I was about investing in it.
但跟所有人一样,我在投资上犯错的时候也不少。
And like anyone, I'm wrong in investing plenty of the time.
所以这种事经常发生,就是投资逻辑的走向跟预期完全不一样。
So these things happen where the thesis just works out differently than expected.
露露乐蒙最后的情况是,它在北美市场份额的流失速度远超我的想象,而且我也没想到CEO会被解雇,换成两位临时联席CEO。
And what ended up happening with Lululemon was that they lost market share in North America far faster than I thought, and I also didn't expect the CEO to be fired and replaced with co-interim CEOs.
这两件事都让我最初的投资逻辑发生了重大变化,这时候我面临两个选择:要么保持纪律,承认逻辑已经变了,该走就走;要么继续找理由,说服自己逻辑还没变到需要卖出的地步。
So both of those things represented pretty material changes to my original thesis, where I could either try and be disciplined and recognize that the thesis had changed and it was time to move on, or I could just keep rationalizing why the thesis hadn't changed enough to justify selling.
而在这个案例里,至少到目前为止,如果选择后者,那就意味着要眼睁睁看着股价跌得更低。
And in this case, at least so far, that would've meant riding the stock even lower.
所以我们当时决定退出那个投资,我挺高兴的。
And so I am quite happy that we decided to get out of that investment.
但我得说,我们得适可而止,别再老提我们最大的亏损了。
But I got to say, at some point, we got to stop bringing up our biggest losers.
我们这么频繁地提,现在大家都以为我们只有这些亏损案例了。
We're doing it so routinely that by now people think we only have those.
我觉得这正好为我们今天讨论Shopify做了铺垫。与其说是我们犯了买入的错误,比如像PayPal、Lululemon那样买了没涨的,不如说Shopify是我们错过的机会。
And I would say that's quite a prelude to our Shopify discussion today, where rather than a mistake of commission, buying something that didn't work out, like PayPal, like Lululemon, Shopify was arguably a mistake of omission.
我们当时没买,可能本不该错过。
So we passed on it when perhaps we shouldn't have.
所以我们想聊聊这个,但也要看看从今天的价格来看,这只股票未来会怎样,因为最终我们得在今天做决定,不能光回头看过去。
And so we want to talk about that, but also what that means for the stock looking forward from today's prices, because in the end, we have to make a decision today and can't just look back in the past.
我其实觉得,Shopify可能是目前最有趣的公司之一,尤其是在AI真正开始影响实体经济这方面。
So I actually think Shopify might be one of the most interesting companies out there right now when it comes to AI actually showing up in the real economy.
也许Meta在AI上也有巨大优势,但除了Meta,大多数其他公司可能看起来更受威胁,而Shopify绝对不属于那类。
There's maybe Meta that also has a huge advantage betting on AI, but apart from Meta, most other companies probably seem like they're more threatened, and Shopify definitely does not belong to those.
所以,当我们忙着报道其他公司的时候,Shopify已经成了定义AI代理如何在线购物的标杆。
So while we were away covering their businesses, Shopify became the company setting the standard for how AI agents buy things on the internet.
用AI代理购物,也就是现在大家说的代理式商务,我在聊Meta的那期节目里讲了很多,而Shopify是理解AI如何改变未来购物方式的关键一环,如果这真的是我们未来的方向的话。
And shopping with AI agents, or what people nowadays call agentic commerce, is something that I talked a lot about in my episode on Meta, and Shopify is a pretty important piece of the puzzle for understanding how AI may shape the future of shopping if that is actually where we're supposed to go.
与此同时,它的业务增长速度已经快到了疫情以来从未见过的水平,而且估值问题不仅没有变简单,反而变得更棘手,也更有意思了。
And at the same time, the business has accelerated to growth rates it hasn't seen since the pandemic, and the valuation question has, if anything, only gotten harder and a lot more interesting too, I think.
嗯,我觉得你说得对。
Well, I think that's right.
我们待会儿会详细聊估值,但为了照顾刚接触Shopify的投资者,我先花一分钟让大家对齐一下基本信息。
And we'll get more to the valuation, but for anyone new to Shopify as an investor, I'll just take a minute here to get us all on the same page.
Shopify是全球领先的电商平台,它的软件让任何人都能开店——不管你是第一次创业、在厨房餐桌上起步的新手,还是像Skims、Supreme这样的品牌,甚至现在连通用汽车和星巴克,他们的商品商店都是通过Shopify运营的。
And so Shopify is the world's leading commerce platform, and basically it is the software that lets anyone, whether you're a first-time founder working from your kitchen table or you're a brand like Skims, Supreme, and actually even now General Motors and Starbucks all have their merchandise stores run through Shopify.
有了Shopify,任何人都可以搭建虚拟店面、处理支付、管理库存、搞定物流和税务,还能在线销售、线下销售、在社交媒体上卖货,现在甚至可以在AI聊天机器人里卖东西,所有这些都在一个平台上搞定。
And so with Shopify, anyone can build their virtual storefront, process payments, manage inventory, handle shipping and taxes, sell online, in person, on social media, and now even inside of AI chatbots, all from one platform.
他们为175个国家的数百万家企业提供支持,美国超过14%的电商交易都是通过Shopify商家完成的。
And so they power millions of businesses across 175 countries, and over 14% of all e-commerce in the United States flows through Shopify merchants.
这就是我们说的量级,而且除了亚马逊,Shopify在美国电商市场的份额比谁都高。
That's the order of magnitude we're talking about here, and that's more of US e-commerce market share than anyone except Amazon.
太厉害了。
That's incredible.
感觉亚马逊好像一直都在,而Shopify也就是十年前、十五年前才冒出来的。
It feels like Amazon has been there for basically eternity, and Shopify only came up 10, 15 years ago.
至少我是那时候才注意到它的。
At least that's when it came onto my map.
现在它居然占了美国电商的14%,真是非常惊人。
Now they're supposed to be there for 14% of e-commerce in the US, which is just absolutely tremendous.
不过你再跟我说说,他们到底是怎么靠这个赚钱的?
But do tell me again, how exactly do they make money off that?
我猜应该有很多机会可以抽成吧。
I would assume there are quite a lot of opportunities to have a certain take rate.
对,主要有两块业务,一块叫订阅解决方案,这个比较简单直接。
Yeah, so there are two engines, and one is called subscription solutions, and that's pretty straightforward.
使用Shopify需要支付软件费用,商家每月最低可能只需39美元,而企业级客户通过Shopify Plus这个产品,每月可能要支付数千美元。
There's a software fee for using Shopify, where merchants pay anywhere from as low as maybe $39 a month to, for enterprise clients, thousands of dollars a month through a product called Shopify Plus.
所以订阅业务虽然规模较小,但却是公司非常稳定的引擎,因为你大概知道每个月都会有这些经常性现金流进账。
And so the subscription business is the smaller but very much the steadier engine powering the company, because you kind of know every month you're going to get these recurring cash flows.
而更大的引擎是他们所谓的商家解决方案,Shopify会从平台上实际发生的交易中抽取一小部分。
And so the bigger engine is what they call merchant solutions, where Shopify takes a small cut of the actual commerce flowing through the platform.
这首先可能包括支付处理,但也包括像通过Shopify Capital提供贷款、提供折扣运费标签、促进货币兑换、提供广告工具等等这些服务。
So that might be payment processing above all, but Also things like lending through Shopify Capital or offering discounted shipping labels, facilitating currency conversion, providing advertising tools, those kind of things.
这其实让我想起Intuit QuickBooks,但Shopify更专注于电商企业,而Intuit则适用于任何类型的企业。
And it actually reminds me a lot of Intuit QuickBooks, but just more focused on e-commerce businesses specifically, whereas any business can use Intuit.
比如,我自己的有限责任公司就是用Intuit记账的,而且Intuit也是我们内在价值投资组合中的一只股票。
And for example, I run my LLCs book through Intuit, and Intuit is also a holding in our intrinsic value portfolio.
所以我才会毫不掩饰地推荐它。
That's why I shamelessly plug them.
而且因为他们能看到我的会计和记账数据,所以如果我有需要额外融资的话,他们很容易就能评估出适合我的信用额度。
And because they can see my accounting and bookkeeping, they can easily underwrite what is an appropriate line of credit for me if I ever needed to tap extra financing.
对我来说,这很好地说明了Shopify和Intuit作为金融科技平台能做什么。
And to me, that's a really basic illustration of what both Shopify and Intuit can do as these fintech platforms.
这部分业务最重要的指标就是我之前提到的“抽成率”,简单来说,就是Shopify商家每卖出一美元的商品,Shopify能从中留下多少美分,用于帮助处理交易的各种环节,从管理网站到协助物流等。
And the most important metric for this part of the business is what I mentioned earlier, which is called the take rate, where basically, it tells you for every dollar of merchandise that Shopify's merchants sell, the take rate is how many cents Shopify actually keeps for helping facilitate the transaction in different ways, from managing the website to even helping with your logistics.
所以你刚才提到的所有业务单元,那些把业务垂直整合到商家运营中的部分,都是提高抽成率的手段,因为你对于商家来说变得越来越重要。
So all the business units that you basically just talked about, that sort of vertically integrate the business into what a merchant then does, is a way to have a lever to take up the take rate because you get more and more important for the merchant.
目前Shopify的这个数字大约是每美元抽三美分,其中约0.8美分来自订阅,另外2.2美分来自商家解决方案的平均值。
So for Shopify, that number is currently roughly three cents on the dollar, and about 0.8 cents of that is coming from subscriptions, and then 2.2 cents from merchant solutions on average.
所以看涨的主要理由之一就是,随着Shopify为更多商家客户提供更多服务,这个抽成率会逐渐上升。
So a big part of the bull case was that this take rate would slowly creep up over time as Shopify attaches more services to more of their merchant customers.
因为再说一次,相对于商家,你拥有这种杠杆。
Because again, it's leverage that you have compared to the merchant.
我想回到我们上次讨论过的一句话,因为我觉得它能让我们了解Shopify内部如何看待自己。
And I want to go back to a quote that we talked about last time because I think it gives some insight into how Shopify internally at least perceives itself.
用Shopify CEO托比·吕特克的话说:“亚马逊想建立帝国,而我们想武装反抗者。”
And in the words of Shopify's CEO, Tobi Lütke, he said, "Amazon is trying to build an empire, and we are trying to arm the rebels."
基本上,这就是你对Shopify在做什么的一个整体印象。
That's basically where you have this picture of what Shopify is doing.
所以这里的想法是,电子商务有两种对立的愿景,亚马逊把商家拉进它的标准化市场,而Shopify则相反,给商家独立性。
So the idea here is that there are two opposing visions for e-commerce, with Amazon pulling in merchants onto its standardized marketplace, and Shopify, on the other hand, giving them independence.
我觉得这个框架很有道理,尤其是在疫情期间和之后不久,因为那时候有很多电商公司,还有很多商家开始转向线上销售。
And I think that framing made a lot of sense, especially during COVID and shortly thereafter, because you had all of these e-commerce companies and just merchants going into e-commerce selling online.
但在过去一年里,人工智能的进步已经给亚马逊和Shopify现在的竞争方式带来了实质性的变化,也改变了市场对它们未来竞争格局的看法。
But in the last year alone, advances in AI have made some real changes to how Amazon and Shopify compete today, and also how the market thinks about how they will compete in the future.
说得好,我们来看看过去一年半里,随着股价翻倍,这家公司实际做了什么。
It's a great point, and let's get to what the business has actually done over the last year and a half as its stock has doubled.
当我们上次报道Shopify时,收入年增长率大约是26%,当时最大的问题是这种增长能否持续。
And so when we covered Shopify, revenue was growing at about 26% a year, and the big question was whether that growth could last.
结果它不仅没有放缓,反而加速了,而且加速了很多。
And while it definitely did not slow down, it sped up and actually by a lot.
2025年,商品交易总额,也就是Shopify上所有商品的总价值,达到了3780亿美元,增长了29%。
For 2025, gross merchandise volume, the total value of everything sold across Shopify, hit $378 billion, up 29%.
然后收入达到了115亿美元,增长了30%。
And then the revenue across $11.5 billion, which was up 30%.
这是Shopify自疫情以来最快的年度增长率,自由现金流也达到了20亿美元。
That's Shopify's fastest annual growth rate since the pandemic, and then free cash flow hit $2 billion.
我觉得可以说2025年对Shopify来说是相当不错的一年,但我听说2026年只会更好。
I think it's safe to say that 2025 has been a pretty good year for Shopify, but I heard 2026 is only supposed to be getting better.
嗯,确实如此。
Well, somehow, yes.
第一季度收入增长了34%,第二季度公司直接把新闻稿标题定为“Shopify大丰收”。
Q1 revenues grew 34%, and Q2, the company literally titled its press release as "Shopify Delivers Big."
他们确实做到了。
And they did.
他们一个季度的商品交易总额就达到了1160亿美元,增长了32%。
They delivered $116 billion of gross merchandise value in a single quarter, and that was up 32%.
毛利润增长了近三分之一,营业收入增长了三分之二,自由现金流利润率也相当可观。
You had gross profit up by almost a third, operating income up by two thirds, and then a pretty healthy free cash flow margin.
所以管理层称这是一个非常强劲的季度。
And so management called it a monster quarter.
但现在他们已经连续五个季度实现商品交易总额增长超过30%,我觉得这已经是一个了不起的年份,甚至更多。
But now that they've hit five quarters in a row of 30% plus gross merchandise value growth, I would say it's been a monster year and more.
我觉得考虑到Shopify的规模,这真的很了不起,对吧?
I think it's quite remarkable when you look at the scale of Shopify, right?
他们在2025年第四季度的收入比2020年全年还要多。
They did more revenue in the fourth quarter of 2025 than they did in the entire year of 2020.
这中间只隔了五年,对吧?
That's only five years apart, right?
所以一个季度的收入就超过了整个疫情繁荣年。当时关注市场的人都知道,尤其是电商公司和支付公司,在2020年疫情爆发时都表现很好。
So one quarter was bigger than the whole pandemic boom year, which anybody who looked at the markets back then, we know that especially e-commerce companies and also payment companies, they had a good year in 2020 when the pandemic hit.
更棒的是,这种增长是全面的。
And even better is that this is coming across the board.
所以不仅仅是某一个地区在增长。
So it's not only one region growing.
北美增长了28%。
North America grew 28%.
欧洲实际上增长更快,达到了34%,这还不算汇率波动的影响,而线下销售增长了大约32%。
Europe actually outpaced that by growing 34%, excluding currency swings, and in-person sales grew about 32%.
然后是B2B,也就是企业之间的批发交易,这在几年前在Shopify上几乎不存在,但在第二季度增长了76%,而前一年已经翻了一番。
And then B2B, which is wholesale commerce between businesses, which barely existed on Shopify just a few years ago, that grew 76% in Q2 after already doubling the year before.
明确一下,B2B增长76%简直太疯狂了。
Just to be absolutely clear, 76% growth in B2B is absolutely wild.
在我们覆盖的企业中,没有多少能实现这样的数字,尤其是在Shopify这样的规模下。
There are not that many businesses that we cover that can pull off those numbers, especially at the scale of Shopify.
既然我们现在在聊数据,这里还有一个惊人的数字,因为根据公司首席财务官的说法,自2025年初以来,Shopify的商家已经占据了美国电子商务增量支出的近一半。
And since we're dropping off stats right now, here's another incredible one, because according to the company's CFO, since the start of 2025, Shopify merchants have captured nearly half of all incremental e-commerce dollars in the United States.
所以显然,我们说的不是电子商务总市场份额的一半,而是增量增长的一半,这确实很了不起,对吧?
So we're not talking about half of all e-commerce market share, obviously, in total, but half of all incremental growth, and that's really something, right?
过去几年有很多增长,尤其是在电子商务领域,而其中一半都流向了Shopify。
There's a whole lot of growth in the last couple of years, especially in e-commerce, and half of that is going to Shopify.
所以过去一年美国电商每新增一美元支出,大约有50美分是经过Shopify的商店完成的。
So for every new dollar of US e-commerce spending in the last year, roughly 50 cents has gone through Shopify's store.
所以当我们把这一点和我们之前对Shopify的预期对照起来看,天哪,我们当时的看法确实太悲观了。
So when you match that up with what we thought would happen for Shopify, gosh, we did look incredibly bearish.
这个数字实在太惊人了,我到现在还是有点难以接受。
It's just such an outlandish number that I still have trouble wrapping my head around it.
但真正卓越的公司往往就是这样,无论是谷歌、亚马逊还是苹果。
But it does tend to be the case with truly exceptional companies, whether it be Google or Amazon or Apple.
多年来,这些公司多次让最乐观的投资者都感到意外,甚至显得他们的预期太保守了。
There have been many times over the years where those companies have surprised even the biggest bulls and made them look modest.
而在表面之下,推动Shopify飞轮运转的核心动力似乎确实在加速。
And under the hood, the core dynamics propelling Shopify's flywheel do seem to be speeding up.
首先,企业客户向Shopify的迁移进展符合预期,而我最初投资逻辑的核心正是围绕创新者困境这一概念——Shopify最初是面向小商家的廉价工具,然后逐步向高端市场进军,解锁越来越大宗的交易。
And so firstly, the march of enterprise customers to Shopify has worked as well as hoped, and the heart of my original thesis was around this kind of idea of the innovator's dilemma with Shopify starting as this cheap tool for tiny merchants and then moving upmarket from there to unlock bigger and bigger deals.
只要看看过去几个季度签约Shopify的公司,就能大致了解这一进展如何。
And if you just look at the companies from the past few quarters who have signed on to Shopify, you get a pretty good idea of how that's gone.
我们说的是通用汽车、星巴克、欧莱雅、雅诗兰黛、蔻驰、迈克尔·科尔斯、Keurig、Dr. Pepper、Sonos、Amer Sports(旗下拥有Wilson和Salomon)、Guess、Avon、Claire's和加拿大鹅。
We're talking General Motors, Starbucks, L'Oreal, Estée Lauder, Coach, Michael Kors, Keurig, Dr. Pepper, Sonos, Amer Sports, which owns Wilson and Salomon, Guess, Avon, Claire's, and Canada Goose.
对于大型企业来说,更换电商平台可不是闹着玩的。
And so switching e-commerce platforms as a large enterprise is really no joke.
所以这证明了Shopify能够说服商家,让他们相信这是他们最后一次迁移,Shopify可能是他们永远的家,这就足以让他们愿意经历更换平台的所有麻烦。
So it's a testament to Shopify being able to pitch merchants on this being their final migration, Shopify being perhaps their forever home, and that being enough to justify going through all the trouble of switching platforms.
这个说法挺有说服力的。
That is a pretty good pitch.
内部想想,所有员工,对吧?
Internally, when you think about all the employees, right?
如果你告诉他们每六个月就得换一次供应商,我想他们不会喜欢这个消息。
If you tell them that you have to switch those providers every six months, I think they wouldn't like that message too much.
不,那真是太麻烦了。
No, it's just a huge hassle.
对,那我们来看看Shopify飞轮的第二部分是如何运作的,这可以从他们的客户留存率和客户群中看出来。
But yeah, let's look at the second piece of Shopify's flywheel coming to life, and we can see that in their customer retention and cohorts.
所以,在Shopify上年销售额达到100万美元的商家,留存率是92%,而达到1000万美元的,留存率是97%。
And so merchants who reach $1 million in annual sales on Shopify have a 92% retention rate, and then at $10 million, it's 97%.
再看看他们的客户群数据,从2015年第一季度算起,也就是11年前,那批客户现在的季度收入是当初的3.3倍。
And then if we look at their cohort data going back to the first quarter of 2015, so 11 years ago, that cohort of customers is now doing 3.3 times the quarterly revenue it did back then.
所以,客户在Shopify上的花费是随时间增长的。
So customers are spending more money with Shopify over time.
这些老客户不断花更多钱,然后新客户群进来,规模越来越大,这些层次层层叠加。
And so these old customers just keep spending more, and then new cohorts come in and get bigger and bigger, and those layers stack on each other.
这正是这家公司作为复利机器取得惊人成功的重要原因。
And that's a huge part of why the company has had this incredible success as a compounder.
我不想拿他们比较,但如果你看看Wix的客户群数据,其实也挺强的。
I wouldn't want to compare them, but if you look at the cohort data for Wix, it also looks quite strong.
但显然,如果你用Shopify,尤其是看留存率,锁定效应要强得多,而且因为它整合了各种垂直领域,你在上面作为商家花的钱,效果更强大。
But obviously, you have a much larger, especially if you look at the retention rates, lock-in if you use Shopify, and it's way more powerful because of all the verticals that it's integrated in with your spending money as a merchant on Shopify.
特别是2015年那批客户的数据,真的有点不可思议。
And especially if you look at that 2015 cohort stat, it's kind of incredible.
是11年前的三倍多,对吧?
Over three times is what they were doing 11 years ago, right?
我觉得我们可能有点过度吹捧Shopify了,但数据确实说明了一切。
I would say that we're over-hyping Shopify, but I think the numbers speak for themself.
我要说的第三点是,最能体现他们飞轮效应的是支付业务。
And the third point that I would make is that to best illustrate their flywheel working would be on the payments front.
现在Shopify Payments处理了平台上所有商品交易总额的68%,也就是通过他们客户完成的交易,这个比例一年内上升了四个百分点,而且现在已经覆盖了40个国家。
And so Shopify's payments now process 68% of all of the gross merchandise value that goes through their platform, goes through their customers, and that's up four percentage points in a year, and it's also live in 40 countries now.
还有Shop Pay,这是他们的一键结账功能,累计交易额已经超过4000亿美元,现在处理了Shopify在美国一半以上的支付量。
And with Shop Pay, this is their one-click customer checkout, that crossed $400 billion in lifetime volume and now handles more than half of Shopify's US payment volume.
所以我们一直在用“不可思议”这个词,确实如此。
So that's really, we keep using that word incredible, and it really is.
另外,我们在最初那期节目里还提到过,他们的抽成比例会随着时间慢慢上升,现在这个趋势也真的出现了。
And the other thing we talked about in our original episode was this idea of their take rate creeping up over time, and we've seen that unfold too.
具体来说,在商家解决方案这块,抽成比例从去年初的约2.2%上升到了一年后的2.4%。
Namely, with the merchant solutions, the take rate went from about 2.2% early last year to 2.4% a year later.
听起来变化很小,但在每年超过4000亿美元的销售额上,每提高0.01个百分点,就大约能带来4000万美元的收入。
And it sounds like a really tiny change, but on more than $400 billion of sales a year, every hundredth of a percentage point is worth roughly $40 million in revenue.
我们快速休息一下,听听今天赞助商的介绍。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
在我职业生涯早期,我一直在还学生贷款,感觉永远都还不完。
Early in my career, I was chipping away at student loans, and it felt like it would never end.
每次还款后查看余额,几乎没怎么动。
I'd make a payment, check the balance, and it barely moved.
最终改变我心态的是看到了一个真正的终点,一个我能在日历上圈出来的日期。
What finally changed my mindset was seeing a real finish line, a date I could actually circle on the calendar.
这就是Monarch的债务清偿模拟器能给你的。
That's what Monarch's debt paydown simulator gives you.
它使用你真实的余额和还款记录,显示你确切的无债日期。
It uses your real balances and payments to show your exact debt-free date.
然后你可以并排运行不同的方案,比如每月多还100美元,立刻就能看到你能提前多久还清。
Then you can run different scenarios side by side, like adding an extra $100 a month, and instantly see how much sooner you'd be done.
看着那个时间线缩短,真的很有动力,而且你是掌控计划的人。
Watching that timeline shrink is really motivating, and you're the one in control of the plan.
另外,在手机或电脑上快速查看一下,就能确切知道你的钱在哪里。
Plus, a quick check-in on your phone or laptop tells you exactly where your money stands.
管理财务非常重要,我相信Monarch能帮你做到这一点。
It's so important to manage your finances, and I believe Monarch can help you in doing so.
用Monarch书写你自己的财富故事。
Write your own money story with Monarch.
在monarch.com使用代码WSB,你的Monarch Core第一年只需50美元,半价优惠。
Use code WSB at monarch.com to get your first year of Monarch Core half off at just $50.
在monarch.com使用代码WSB,第一年立减50%。
That's 50% off your first year at monarch.com with code WSB.
对在线交易感兴趣,但还没迈出第一步?
Curious about online trading but haven't taken the first step yet?
你并不孤单,Plus500 Futures是一个很好的起点。
You're not alone, and Plus500 Futures is a great place to start.
期货市场变化很快,通过Plus500,你可以交易石油、黄金、标普500、比特币等热门资产。
The futures markets are moving fast, and with Plus500, you can explore popular assets like oil, gold, S&P 500, Bitcoin, and more.
从加密货币到大宗商品,总有新的机会出现。
From crypto to commodities, there's always something happening.
这个平台操作非常简单,你可以随时随地用手机交易。
The platform is super easy to use, so you can trade on the go right from your phone.
只需100美元就能开始,马上参与其中。
You can get started with just $100 and jump into the action.
看到感兴趣的了?
See something interesting?
账户开通后,只需几次点击就能完成交易。
Once your account is open, you can trade it in just a couple of clicks.
如果你还没准备好,可以用免费模拟账户练习一下。
And if you're not quite ready yet, you can practice with a free demo account.
没有风险,也没有压力。
No risk, no pressure.
凭借20年的经验,Plus500让交易变得比以往任何时候都更容易。
With 20 years of experience, Plus500 makes trading more accessible than ever.
去plus500.com看看吧。
Check it out at plus500.com.
期货交易涉及亏损风险,并非适合所有人。
Trading in futures involves risks of loss and is not suitable for everyone.
并非所有申请者都能通过审核。
Not all applicants will qualify.
Plus500,交易更上一层楼。
Plus500, it's trading with a plus.
每周我们都会在节目中分析一些公司,并问同一个问题:管理层真的在高效运营这家公司吗?
Every week we analyze companies on this show and ask the same question: Is management actually running this business efficiently?
对于目前大多数公司来说,诚实的答案是:那些领先的公司,正是那些把AI应用到日常工作中的公司。
Here's the honest answer for most companies right now, the ones pulling ahead are the ones putting AI to work on the everyday stuff.
这正是NetSuite Next的用武之地。
That's exactly what NetSuite Next was built for.
NetSuite Next 在你最需要的时候提供关键信息。
NetSuite Next surfaces insights exactly when you need them.
它让智能代理处理日常任务和问题,而且你可以用日常语言提出复杂问题,就像跟一位知识渊博的同事聊天一样。
It puts agents to work on routine tasks and problems, and it lets you ask complex questions in plain language, like talking to a knowledgeable colleague.
但技术只是故事的一部分。
But technology is only part of the story.
AI 也在改变人们和团队协作的方式,而这种转变已经在进行中。
AI is also reshaping how people and teams work together, and that shift is already underway.
今天你就能拿到专家编写的商业指南。
Expert-created business guide in your hands today.
这本指南叫《为智能体时代做好准备:AI 如何改变日常工作》。
It's called "Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work."
现在你可以免费获取。
And right now it's yours absolutely free.
在书中,你会发现 AI 如何重塑整个组织的工作方式,以及如何让你的业务从中受益。
Inside, you'll discover how AI could reshape work across your entire organization and how to position your business to prosper from it.
我自己在用这个,你也应该试试。
I use this, and you should too.
如果你的年收入至少达到七位数,就去 netsuite.com/tip 免费领取我们的商业指南《为智能体时代做好准备:AI 如何改变日常工作》。
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这份指南在 netsuite.com/tip 免费提供给你。
The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/tip.
netsuite.com/tip。
netsuite.com/tip.
好了,我们回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
光看他们处理的交易量,他们自己的支付系统就非常厉害。
Just looking at how much volume they process, their own payment system is incredible.
如果你看看很多支付公司,会发现市场竞争越来越激烈,然后你看到像 Shopify 这样主要做电商的公司,通过自己的支付系统赚了那么多钱,这个数据真是惊人。
If you look at a lot of payment companies and you see how much more competitive the market gets, and then you see a player that's generally in e-commerce, like Shopify, generates so much money through their payment system itself, it's an incredible stat.
又提到这个词了,但到目前为止,我觉得可以这样总结。
There's this word again, but so far I think we can summarize it that way.
听起来我们当初对这项业务的乐观态度方向是对的,但也许我们没有完全预料到事情会发展得这么好,至少在短期内是这样。
It sounds like we were, let's say, directionally right to be so optimistic about the business, but maybe we didn't fully appreciate just how well things could or would work out and go for them, at least in the short term.
我觉得我学到的教训是,如果你要像Shopify那样给出令人惊艳的数字,你必须有很强的信念。
And I think a takeaway for me is that if you're going to underwrite numbers that just jump off the page like Shopify has achieved, you have to have a ton of conviction.
否则,你就有可能会严重偏离实际,如果你为一家公司支付过高价格,那真是很可怕的事情。
And otherwise, you just risk being massively off, and that's a quite scary thing if you overpay for a company.
但也许我们现在可以看看资产负债表和资本回报的变化。
But perhaps we can now look at the balance sheet and the capital returns that have evolved.
我们最初报道Shopify时,它还有未偿还的可转换债券,而且每年都在稀释股东权益。
When we first covered Shopify, it still had convertible notes outstanding, and obviously also a history of diluting shareholders every single year.
从那以后,现在看资产负债表,他们几乎用现金还清了所有可转换债券。
And since then, when I look at the balance sheet now, they repaid the convertibles almost entirely in cash.
我记得到2025年底,他们有大约60亿美元的现金和投资,零债务。
I think it ended in 2025 with about $6 billion of cash and investments and zero debt.
然后今年二月,董事会批准了Shopify有史以来第一个股票回购计划,规模为20亿美元。
And then in February of this year, the board authorized Shopify's first-ever share repurchase program with $2 billion of capital.
然后在六月份又增加了30亿美元,到现在总共是50亿美元,其中大约19亿,差不多20亿,已经在2026年上半年执行了。
Then added another $3 billion in June, and so it's $5 billion in total by now, and about $1.9 billion, so almost two, was already executed in the first half of 2026.
所以他们回购的股票数量可不少,但显然,你得告诉我,你觉得现在的估值怎么样?
So it's not a modest amount of stock that they are buying back, but obviously, you got to tell me, what do you think about it in terms of the valuation today?
对于一家以前每年都大幅稀释股东的公司来说,这是一个巨大的转变。
It's a big shift for a company that used to dilute shareholders pretty massively every single year.
那曾经是我们对Shopify最大的担忧之一,而且我预计未来股票数量会继续下降,或者至少会保持稳定,因为他们现在已经开了回购的先例。
That was one of our biggest concerns with Shopify, and I expect the share count will continue to decline going forward, or at least probably be flat now that they've set this precedent with buybacks.
会有很大的压力要求他们继续确保回购足够多的股票,以防止股票薪酬导致股票数量增加。
There'll be a lot of pressure to continue to ensure that they're buying back enough to make sure that stock-based comp isn't creating increases in the share count.
然后争论点总是,嘿,如果你增长这么快,业务一切顺利,为什么不把现金投入到业务再投资中,而是以100倍市盈率回购股票呢?
And then the debate is always that, hey, if you're growing so fast and everything's working so well with the business, why would you not put the cash toward reinvesting into the business rather than purchasing shares at 100 times earnings, right?
所以基本上,你就是在把钱投回那些可能有助于证明那个荒谬的100倍市盈率合理的项目上。
And so basically you'd be pouring money back into projects that might actually help to justify that sort of ridiculous 100 times earnings multiple.
所以,确实,这是Shopify上市以来第一次,它的回购大致抵消了股票薪酬。
So for the first time in its public life, it is true that Shopify's buybacks are roughly offsetting stock-based compensation.
所以即使50亿美元,相对于一个2000亿美元的公司来说,也不算多。
So even $5 billion is modest next to a $200 billion company.
但从象征意义上讲,这家公司正在从烧钱的颠覆者阶段,过渡到自我造血的复利阶段,对吧?
But symbolically, this is a company that is crossing from the cash-burning disruptor phase of its life into the self-funding compounder phase, right?
我们最近在优步身上也看到了同样的情况,这通常标志着市场对待这只股票的方式会发生永久性的改变。
And we watched the same thing happen at Uber recently, and usually it marks a permanent change in how the market treats the stock.
所以即使我不太喜欢在100倍市盈率时回购股票,但至少对我来说,这是个好迹象,说明他们现在更谨慎地考虑稀释股东的问题了。
So even if I don't necessarily like the idea of putting money into buybacks at 100 times earnings, at least it's a good sign for me that they are more careful now thinking about diluting shareholders.
当然,我们还得重申,他们现在花的这些钱,本来可以用在业务上,或者作为股息分给股东。
Even if, of course, we have to repeat that the money they are spending right now, well, that's money that otherwise would have paid either into the business or maybe as a dividend to, for example, paying out shareholders.
所以,这就是我们对如果你以100倍市盈率交易,你会怎么处理这50亿美元的看法。
So that's I think our opinion on what do you do with $5 billion if you trade it 100 times earnings.
现在,我们来谈谈我们最初那期节目里提到的估值问题。
Now, let's talk a bit about the valuation in our original episode.
我觉得你的假设一点也不保守,至少我是这么认为的。
So I didn't think your assumptions came off as modest by any means, I would say at least.
这就是我当时第一次推荐这只股票时的感受。
That's what I felt back then when you pitched the stock for the first time.
但你当时很明确地说,这只股票的价格已经完美定价了。
But you were pretty clear that the stock was priced for perfection.
所以这其实是你当时在原始节目中说的话。
So this is actually what you said back then in the original episode.
我甚至不能凭良心把数字放进我的模型里,让它得出当前的股价。
I can't even in good conscience put numbers into my model that spit out the current share price.
这感觉太乐观了,如果我对电子商务有更深入的了解,也许就不会有这种感觉了。
It just feels too optimistic, and maybe it wouldn't feel that way if I had a deeper understanding of e-commerce.
所以,尽管我是推荐Shopify的人,但我建议我们暂时不要买它,这有点讽刺。
So I am recommending we hold off on Shopify, ironically, as the person who's pitching it.
但如果价格能降到每股60美元以下……
But if we get a price south of maybe $60 per share...
显然,事后看来我太保守了,但我觉得除了简单地说我对或错之外,还有几个不同的点需要考虑。
Obviously, I was too conservative in hindsight, but I think there are a few different points to consider here beyond simply saying I was wrong or right.
如果要说我们是不是误解或者低估了这家公司的质量,我基本上会说没有。比如说,我们之前讨论过创新者困境会推动Shopify向高端市场和企业级客户发展,这一点确实发生了。
If we're talking about whether we misunderstood or underappreciated the quality of the business, I would mostly say no. And so, for example, we talked about the innovator's dilemma dynamic that would carry Shopify upmarket and enterprise, and that very much has happened.
而且实际上,这发生得比我们预想的还要快,规模也更大。
And it's actually happened even faster and in a bigger way than we thought.
我们还说过Shopify的抽成比例会随时间上升,到目前为止确实如此。
And we also said Shopify's take rate would creep up over time, and so far it has.
我们还说过,护城河主要在于转换成本加上应用商店的网络效应,而他们的留存数据,我觉得最能说明问题。
And we said the moat was focused on switching costs plus a network effect with their app store, and their retention figures, I think, shows all best.
我们提到过,他们的留存率在92%到97%之间,具体取决于客户类型。
We mentioned that they are having 92% to 97% retention, depending on the customer.
所以在这方面,情况看起来相当不错。
So on that front, things look pretty good.
我觉得一般来说,要弄清楚如果一切顺利的话,某样东西可能值多少钱,真的非常难。
I think generally it's just incredibly difficult to figure out what something might be worth if everything works out perfectly.
所以通常你有两个引擎:盈利增长和股价实际大幅上涨,然后市场对此兴奋,进一步推高市盈率,最终导致价格大幅跳升,尤其是在短时间内。
So usually you have this twin engine of earnings growth and them going up meaningfully actually, and then the market getting excited about that, pushing up the multiple too, and then you end up these massive price jumps, especially in a short amount of time.
我们常说伟大的公司会给你带来惊喜,Shopify 确实做到了。
And we often say that great companies surprise you to the upside, and Shopify certainly did that.
但如果你想留出安全边际,你就没法把这种惊喜算进去,对吧?
But you can't model that when you also want to have a margin of safety, right?
所以我在模型最后通常不太愿意直接打个20%的折扣作为安全边际。
Which is why I'm generally quite hesitant to just put a flat 20% margin of safety discount at the end of my model.
但即便如此,你在假设上还是得保守一些。
But even then, you have to still be conservative in your assumptions.
实际上,如果你不用这种一刀切的折扣,那就得更保守。
And actually, even more so if you don't use these flat out discounts.
另外,在我做的任何投资决策复盘里,我都会问自己:我们的数字是不是搞错了?
And another thing I would like to ask myself for any investment decision audit that I do is, were we wrong about the numbers?
在这方面,我觉得你可以更清楚地指出我们当初的模型,然后说,是的,我们确实错了,对吧?
And on that end of things, I think you can more clearly point to what we had modeled and say, yes, we were, right?
我当时以为 Shopify 正在转型为一家更成熟的公司,那意味着增长会放缓。
I thought Shopify was transforming into a more mature company, and that would mean that growth would decelerate.
但相反,就像我们说的,增长实际上加速了。
And instead, as we talked about, growth has actually accelerated.
所以即使只看2026年,我实际上低估了他们的收入,最终可能会差大约20亿美元。
So even just looking out to 2026, I actually ended up underestimating their revenues by what will probably shake out to be about $2 billion.
在这么短的时间内偏差这么大,真是让人谦卑。
And being so far off in such a short period is, it's humbling.
但我想我们俩都同意,过去一年左右我们对电商的理解有了很大的提升。
But I think we'd also both agree that our understanding of e-commerce has improved really dramatically over the last year or so.
我们现在覆盖了这么多这个领域的公司,从Coupang到Sea Limited、Mercado Libre和亚马逊,如果之前做了那些研究,我可能对Shopify增长的可持续性更有信心。
We've covered so many companies in the space now from Coupang to Sea Limited, Mercado Libre, and Amazon, that I probably would've been more confident in Shopify's growth being sustainable if I had done that other prior research.
但因为没做,我默认选择保守,我仍然认为这是合理的做法,用来对冲自己的无知,因为你并不总是知道自己不知道什么。
But because I hadn't, I defaulted to conservatism and I still think that's the reasonable thing to do to hedge against your own ignorance when you don't always know what you don't know.
而且我们本来也不喜欢过分依赖模型。
And we don't like to put too much weight on our models anyways.
我觉得一般的想法或智慧是,如果你需要一个复杂的模型来精确算出股票的价值,那这个机会可能就不太好。
And I think the general idea or the wisdom is that if you need a complex model and you need it to figure out exactly what the stock's worth, probably the opportunity's just not that great.
而且如果你做了模型,结果发现这家公司被严重高估了,那么大多数时候你投资这家公司赚不到什么钱或者回报不好的可能性就更高了。
And if you do your model and it actually means this company is highly overvalued, there's an even higher likelihood that most of the time you will not earn a lot of money or good return investing in that company.
我得说,我越研究电商公司或玩家,就越意识到这个市场的机会有多大,但同时也意识到竞争有多激烈,而且不同地区、甚至不同客户群体之间的市场差异有多大,对吧?
And I got to say, the more e-commerce companies or players I looked into, the more I've also realized how big the opportunity is, but also how competitive and how much the markets differ from region to region, and even between different customer groups, right?
有些玩家在同一个地区运营。
There are certain players operating in the same geography.
比如你看Shopee和Mercado Libre,它们虽然在同一地区,但我觉得它们面向的客户群体是不同的,对吧?
You look at Shopee and Mercado Libre, for example, but they do, I would say, speak to a different sort of customer, right?
然后你总是要搞清楚,它们之间的动态关系是怎样的。
And then you always have to figure out, okay, what's the dynamic between the two of them?
Shopee会往高端市场走吗?
Will Shopee go up market?
Mercado会试图守住低端市场吗?
Will Mercado try to defend the down market?
这个领域相当复杂,如果我们回头看一年前的节目,觉得现在对行业和公司的理解比那时深多了,我也觉得这是个好迹象,对吧?
It's a pretty complex space and if we look back at an episode from a year ago and feel like we have a much better understanding of the industry and the company now, I also take that as a good sign, right?
我更感兴趣的是反思我们长期以来的决策过程,以及当我们觉得自己作为投资者有所成长、对行业和公司了解更深时,我认为我们其实已经尽到了职责。
I'm more interested in reflecting on our decision-making process over time and when we think we have evolved as investors and we know the industry and the company better, I think we've made our job actually.
如果我们给自己一点肯定的话,2025年5月市场要求我们为Shopify支付超过100倍的滚动营业利润。
If we give ourselves some credit, the market was asking us to pay more than 100 times trailing operating profits for Shopify in May of 2025.
我们说这个价格已经包含了最好的情况,没有安全边际我们不会支付。
And we said that price embedded a best case future and we wouldn't pay it without a margin of safety.
我觉得这挺合理的,对吧?
And I think that was pretty reasonable, right?
我也有自己的偏见,但我觉得这个判断站得住脚,而且就像我们提到的,最好的情况恰好出现了。
I have my own biases, but I think that stands up and as we mentioned, it just so happened that the best case showed up.
实际上,发生的情况比我最好的模型里想象的还要好。
Actually, what happened was better than anything I imagined in my best case model.
所以如果你拒绝为完美支付,而公司真的做到了完美,那你看起来确实会像是错了。
And so if you refuse to pay for perfection and then the company delivers it, yeah, you're going to look wrong.
但从流程和作为投资者的生存角度来看,为了避免灾难性的损失,如果你买下每一个定价为完美的股票,你不可能长久存活。
But as a matter of process and survival as an investor and avoiding catastrophic wipeouts, you can't expect to last long if you buy every stock that's priced for perfection.
到现在我们已经覆盖了超过100家公司,回头看,我很庆幸我们很少为某个东西支付过高的价格,因为最理想的情况确实发生了。
When I look at the more than 100 companies by now that we have yet covered, I'm actually glad that we rarely overpay for something because the absolute best case scenario happened.
如果我们只是相信管理层,或者只看后视镜,那我们也应该买Trade Desk或者类似的公司,对吧?
And if we just trust management and the look in the rearview mirror, we should have also bought Trade Desk or companies like that, right?
而那只股票在过去两年里跌了91%。
And that stock lost 91% over the last two years.
所以我很庆幸我们没有这么做。
So I'm kind of glad we didn't do that.
那可能是我们最明智的决定。
That's maybe our best decision.
Trade Desk的股价和盈利图表在很长一段时间里都是持续上涨的,但就在我们发布那期节目后的第二天,它突然就崩盘了。
The Trade Desk stock chart and the earnings chart for such a long time was just up and to the right and then all of a sudden it basically fell off a cliff literally the day after we published our episode.
而且在过去12个月里,它似乎又经历了好几次暴跌。
And it's fallen off multiple cliffs in the last 12 months it seems.
所以你说得对,对于像Shopify这样的公司,我们应该认可他们的历史业绩,但也不能像Trade Desk那样给予过高的信任。
And so to your point, there's something to be said for giving a company credit for their track record, as in Shopify's case, but maybe not too much credit as in the Trade Desk case.
所以我不知道,这真的是一条很难平衡的线。
And so I don't know, that's just a really fine line to balance.
确实,而且我觉得我们可能已经非常彻底地做了复盘,就像我们之前说的,投资是一场永无止境的游戏。
It is, and I actually think that we've probably been through and thorough in doing our postmortem here and as we said earlier, investing is a game that never ends.
所以投资Shopify的机会并没有完全消失,这也是我们今天聚在一起讨论这个机会的原因。
So it's not like the chance to invest in Shopify has completely disappeared, which is why we're meeting today, discussing the opportunity.
说到这个,自从去年我报道了一些支付和电商公司以来,我一直是代理商务的看多者。
And on that note, I've been a bull on agentic commerce since covering some payment and e-commerce companies last year.
然后我得说,很长一段时间都没什么动静,我甚至觉得自己可能在那方面过于乐观了。
And then I got to say, nothing happened for quite a while and I thought maybe I've been too optimistic on that front.
但现在Meta推出了Muse,我觉得这又把代理商务重新带回了更多人的视野。
But now we have Meta coming out with Muse and I would say it has put agentic commerce on the radar of many more people again.
所以也许先简单解释一下代理购物到底是什么。
So maybe just as a quick explanation of what agentic shopping actually is.
现在,当你在网上买东西时,所有的工作都是你自己做的。
Today, when you buy something online, you do the work.
所以你要搜索、比较标签页,最后如果决定了买什么,还要填结算表单。
So you search, compare tabs, and you fill in in the end if you have made your decision on what to buy, the checkout form.
在智能体商务中,理念是你有一个AI助手,可能是Muse,可能是ChatGPT,可能是Gemini,也可能是Copilot。
In agentic commerce, the idea is that you have an AI assistant, and that could be Muse, it could be ChatGPT, it could be Gemini, it could be Copilot.
不管你用哪个,我猜大多数都会在某个时候推出自己的智能体。
Whatever you use, I assume most of them will come out with an agent at some time.
它们会替你完成这些工作。
They will do the work for you.
你告诉它:“帮我找一款适合轿车后排坐三个人的最佳儿童座椅。”
So you tell it, "Find me the best car seat that fits three people across a sedan."
然后它不会给你十个蓝色链接让你自己去搜,而是理解实际限制条件,跨产品搜索,然后还能在对话中直接完成购买。
And then instead of giving you 10 blue links for you to search It understands the actual constraints, and it searches across products, and then it can increasingly complete the purchase right then and there in the conversation.
Shopify的首席财务官在这里做了一个很有用的区分。
And Shopify's CFO makes a useful distinction here.
他说:“现在大多数情况更像是大语言模型驱动的发现。”
So he says, "Most of what's happening today is more like LLM-driven discovery."
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所以,人们开始在聊天机器人里开始他们的购物研究,而不是在谷歌上。
So, people starting their shopping research inside the chatbot instead of, for example, Google.
但完整的愿景——你给代理一个预算,然后它主动帮你买东西——现在因为Meta的Muse看起来更接近了,但还没有完全实现,我们也不知道至少在不久的将来会不会实现。
But the full vision, where you give the agent basically a budget and then it proactively buys things for you, that seems closer now due to Meta's Muse, but it's not yet fully there, and we don't know whether that will be the case in at least the near future.
要让代理做得好,能够基本上代表你做决定,它需要大量的背景信息,大量关于你生活的信息。
For an agent to do this well and be able to make decisions basically on your behalf, it needs a ton of context, a ton of information about your life.
我们昨天正好和Muse聊到这个,看起来很多人愿意注册Muse,他们只是假设把数据交给Meta,而且他们对此感到放心。
And we were just talking about that with Muse yesterday, where it seems like a lot of people are willing to sign up for Muse, and they just assume that they're handing over their data to Meta, and they're comfortable with that.
但实际上,情况并非完全如此。
And actually, it turns out not exactly to be the case.
Meta正试图建立一种屏障,或者把Muse收集的数据分流出去。
Meta is trying to create a kind of a barrier, or siphon off the data that Muse is collecting.
但重点是,要让代理能很好地代表你行事,它真的需要知道你生活中的所有相关变量,它必须成为你的私人购物助手,你的私人助理。
But the point being, for an agent to be able to act well on your behalf, it really needs to know all of the relevant variables in your life, and it has to become your personal shopper, your personal assistant.
它不只是每周帮你买杂货的机器人。
It's not just some robot that buys your groceries every week.
所以,关于怎么思考这个问题,我很大程度上借鉴了一个人,在我看来,他是卖方最好的电商分析师之一,就是MoffettNathanson的Michael Morton,Ben Thompson六月份也在Stratechery上采访过他,我们在节目笔记里放了链接。
And so I take a lot of inspiration on how to think about this from, in my opinion, one of the best e-commerce analysts on the sell side, and that's Michael Morton at MoffettNathanson, who Ben Thompson also interviewed on Stratechery in June, and we've linked to that in the show notes.
但Morton对全自动食品储藏室以及这些东西自动送到你家的想法非常怀疑。
But Morton is really skeptical of the idea of having a fully automated pantry and these things automatically being delivered to you.
而他最喜欢的证据,说来也怪,是送奶工。
And his favorite piece of evidence is, of all things, the milkman.
即使在1960年代初,送奶服务无处不在、毫无摩擦,需求也几乎可以预测到极致,但美国牛奶消费中只有30%是通过配送完成的。
So even in the early 1960s, when milk delivery was ubiquitous, frictionless, and demand was probably as predictable as it could get, only 30% of US milk consumption came via delivery.
然后从那时起,这个比例就逐渐降到了零。
And then from there, it went to zero over time.
我有点好奇我们是怎么从AI代理聊到60年代的送奶工的。
I kind of asked myself how we went from AI agents to the milkman of the '60s.
但我认为亚马逊的Subscribe & Save也是一个很好的例子,因为根据他的计算,那可能只占亚马逊总GMV的1%到3%。
But I think a good example has also been Amazon Subscribe & Save, because by his math, that captures maybe 1 to 3% of Amazon's total GMV.
这大概就说明了问题:普通家庭每年购买250到300种不同的商品,除非一个代理能解决几乎所有这些问题,否则它实际上什么也没解决。
And that kind of gives you the point of the average household buys 250 to 300 different items a year, and unless an agent solves for pretty much all of them, it hasn't really solved anything.
所以消费者其实从来就不想要东西自动送上门。
So consumers have never actually wanted stuff just showing up.
至少这是他的观点。
That's his argument, at least.
你之前跟我说过,你试过很多亚马逊的“订阅并省”服务,结果就是东西越积越多,最后都取消了,因为大多数产品的需求没法按周或按月精确预测。
And you were telling me before the call about all the different Amazon Subscribe & Save's that you've done that just led to you accumulating more stuff than you ever wanted and then canceling eventually, because for most products, your demand can't be perfectly estimated on a weekly or monthly schedule.
我经常跟你说,我基本上每天吃的东西都差不多。
And I often tell you, I basically eat pretty much the same stuff every day.
但连我也做不到那样。
And even I couldn't do that.
就算是我,每周买同样的东西,最后通常也得扔掉一些,因为已经不新鲜了。
Even for me, I totally see that when I buy the same stuff every week, usually you have to throw something away because it's not good anymore.
而AI购物真正发挥作用的地方,是在那些需要深思熟虑的产品发现上。
And where AI shopping really does work is with these high-consideration product discoveries.
比如帮你找到,怎么说呢,一款最适合冲浪的新手表,或者三周后去旅行要用的新飞钓竿。
So maybe helping you find, I don't know, the best option for a new watch for surfing, or maybe a new fly fishing rod for a trip in three weeks.
而这正是Shopify商家真正在卖的东西。
And that's exactly the kind of stuff that Shopify merchants actually sell.
所以是那种具体的、需要深思熟虑的产品。
So it's specific, high-consideration products.
嗯,我知道我们在蒙大拿州飞钓时都玩得很开心。
Well, I know we both had so much fun fly fishing in Montana.
那很好。
That's good.
这是个很好的例子。
It's a great example to use.
也许我会给自己买一根飞钓竿。
Maybe I will get myself a fly fishing rod.
但不管我们有没有意识到,我觉得Shopify早就看到了这一点,而且他们至少已经为此准备了两年。
But whether we appreciated it or not, I think Shopify has seen this for some time, and they've been building for it for at least two years.
然后在过去大约九个月里,他们推出了很多我称之为AI购物基础管道的东西。
And then over about the last nine months, they rolled out a lot of what I'll call maybe the basic plumbing for AI shopping.
所以我觉得这里面有三点值得了解,我会尽量少用专业术语来讲。
And so I think there are three pieces to this that are worth knowing, and I'll try to keep the jargon to a minimum as we go through it.
第一点是“Catalog”,大写C。基本上就是一个巨大的、实时更新的列表,包含来自数百万Shopify商家的超过十亿件商品。
And so the first is Catalog with a capital C. And so it's basically one giant, always up-to-date list of more than a billion products from millions of Shopify merchants.
每个价格、每个尺码、库存情况,所有这些信息都以AI模型可以直接读取的格式呈现。
Every price, every size, what's in stock, all of that information in a format that AI models can directly read.
换句话说,这让每个Shopify店铺都变得非常容易被AI助手理解。
So in other words, it makes every Shopify store very easy for AI assistants to understand.
Shopify的CEO对此有一句非常精彩的话。
And so Shopify CEO has a really great line about this.
他说:“其他人都得从网上抓取产品数据,”基本上就是派机器人去读网页,而Shopify本身就是数据的源头。
"Everyone else," he says, "has to scrape the internet for product data," basically sending bots to read webpages, while Shopify is the source of that data.
这一点越来越重要,因为基于Catalog的AI搜索转化为购买的比例,是依赖抓取网页的两倍。
And so that matters more and more because AI searches powered by Catalog turn into purchases twice as often as ones that rely on scraped webpages.
而且Shopify还在添加购物者真正关心的细节,对吧?
And Shopify is also adding the kind of detail that shoppers really care about in shopping, right?
这条裙子参加婚礼够正式吗?
Is this dress formal enough for a wedding?
面料透气吗?
Does the fabric breathe?
这双运动鞋适合长跑吗?
Are these sneakers good for a long run?
AI助手需要这些背景信息,Shopify正在努力满足这一点,而这些细节光靠浏览网页是得不到的。
An AI assistant needs that context, and Shopify is working to accommodate that, and it can't get that kind of insight by skimming a webpage.
而这正是Agentic Commerce需要解决的核心问题。
And that is really the problem that Agentic Commerce needs to solve.
现在你在ChatGPT里购物,其实就是在浏览Shopify的商品目录。
And when you shop inside of ChatGPT today, what you're basically doing is you're browsing Shopify's catalog.
我觉得那些问题对你来说挺有切身体会的,毕竟你最近四五周就参加了三场婚礼。
I feel like those questions were personal to you, having visited- ... three weddings in the last, what is it, four or five weeks.
不过这也是你最近几周经常提到的点,我觉得说得很好。
But that's a point that you brought up in the last couple of weeks quite often, and I think it's a good one.
想想看,每次有人购物时,AI要浏览网页需要多少计算能力,对吧?
Just think about how much computing power it takes for an AI to comb through webpages every time someone shops, right?
而目录直接提供干净的产品数据,这正好说明了AI长期来看是如何让Shopify占优势的。
Catalog hands it clean product data instead, which is a great example of AI tilting things in Shopify's favor in the long term.
接下来的术语可能有点技术性,但第二部分叫做“通用商务协议”,简称UCP。
And the jargon is maybe going to get a bit technical here, but the second piece is called the Universal Commerce Protocol, or just UCP.
怎么理解呢,Daniel,我们不是技术人员,所以我会尽力解释,我相信评论区会有人说我们没说到点子上,但我就这么讲了。
And the way to think of this, and Daniel, we're not technical people, so I'm going to do my best to explain it, and I'm sure somebody in the comments will tell me that we didn't quite hit the nail, but here it goes.
我的理解是,它就像一种通用语言,让任何AI助手都能在任何商店购物。
The way to think of it is sort of like a common language, as I understand it, that lets any AI assistant shop at any store.
实际上,Shopify和谷歌合作,在1月份把它作为开放标准一起推出了。
And so actually, Shopify and Google worked on this and launched it together in January as an open standard.
基本上,它涵盖了整个购物流程,从找产品、加购物车、结账,甚至处理退货。
And basically, it covers the whole shopping trip, from finding a product, to putting it in the cart, to checking out, and even working on returns.
而且它兼容任何支付提供商,所以每家商店都能保留自己的结账、订阅、折扣等等,这样就能实现代理商务,而不会让ChatGPT或Claude抢走零售商和商家的客户关系。
And so it works with any payment provider, so each store keeps its own checkout, subscriptions, discounts, all of it, and basically allows Agentic Commerce to happen without ChatGPT or Claude stealing the customer relationship from retailers and merchants.
所以整个行业很快就跟进了,对吧?
And so the industry has gotten behind it quite fast, right?
亚马逊、Meta、微软、Salesforce和Stripe都加入了管理UCP这个协议的组织。
You had Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, Salesforce, and Stripe all join the group that oversees the UCP, this protocol.
然后像Target、Etsy和Wayfair这些零售商也选择了加入。
And then retailers like Target and Etsy and Wayfair have opted into it, too.
这可能是唯一一个亚马逊没有立刻反对的AI相关的东西,但我也觉得这不算什么大承诺,对吧?
That might be the only thing regarding AI that Amazon didn't immediately block, but I also assume it's less of a commitment, right?
我觉得这听起来没那么乐观,因为它是一个开放标准,对吧?
I don't think it's as bullish as it sounds because it's an open standard, right?
所以加入只是意味着同意AI代理购物时的技术规则,并不代表这些公司,比如,要为使用这个协议向Shopify或Google支付任何费用。
So signing on just means agreeing to the technical rules for how AI agents will shop, and it does not mean that those companies, for example, owe Shopify or Google any kind of toll for using that protocol.
不然的话,我敢肯定他们不会加入。
Otherwise, I'm very certain they wouldn't have joined.
当然,亚马逊希望自己的购物代理能流行起来,那就意味着这些代理需要在亚马逊之外也能工作。
And of course, Amazon wants its own shopping agents to catch on, which means those agents need to be able to work outside of Amazon.
所以,一个所有大型科技公司都认同的通用标准,不管是谁制定的,在这里是他们的主要竞争对手之一Shopify,都有助于实现这一点。
And so a common standard that all the big tech companies are aligned on, that helps with that, no matter who wrote it, in this case, one of their chief rivals, Shopify.
这听起来可能有点矛盾,因为正如你提到的,亚马逊刚刚把Muse从它的网站上屏蔽了。
And so that might sound contradictory because Amazon just blocked Muse from its site, as you're kind of alluding to there.
但亚马逊是想鱼和熊掌兼得。
But Amazon is trying to have its cake and eat it, too.
我觉得它希望自己的智能体能在其他任何地方购物,同时把其他公司的智能体挡在亚马逊之外。
I think it wants its own agents to shop everywhere else while keeping other companies' agents out of Amazon.
也许他们现在能做到,但我认为这不可持续。
And maybe they can do that for now, but I don't think it's sustainable.
但对Shopify来说,特别之处在于,现在任何开发者都可以用UCP构建,并接入Shopify的商品目录,无需批准就能接触到Shopify的所有商家。
But what is special for Shopify is that now any developer can build using the UCP and plug into Shopify's catalog, giving them access to all of Shopify's merchants with no approval needed.
所以,任何人构建的每一个新AI购物应用,基本上都会自动成为Shopify商家销售商品的一个新店面。
So every new AI shopping app anyone builds becomes basically another storefront for Shopify merchants to sell through by default.
这给Shopify带来了巨大的信誉,连亚马逊都决定不能忽视一个由Shopify和谷歌共同制定的标准。
And it gives Shopify a ton of credibility that even Amazon decided it couldn't afford to ignore a standard that Shopify and Google had both written.
亚马逊在这场讨论中真的很有意思。
Amazon is so interesting in this entire debate.
我觉得回到送牛奶的例子,日常购物的消费者可能不会通过Muse下单,因为我们看到过订阅和保存的运作方式。
I think going back to the milk delivery example, everyday buyers might not go through Muse because of what we've seen with the Subscribe and Save dynamic.
不过,亚马逊可能确实有办法阻止外部代理,而且不会造成太大影响,甚至长期来看也是这样。
Amazon might actually have a good shot, though, of blocking outside agents without a major impact, even in the long term.
至少我是这么认为的,因为你可以在亚马逊上继续像现在这样购买你的日常用品,然后通过代理去购买那些需要慎重考虑的高价值商品。
At least that's why I'm saying, because you can keep buying your monthly routine on Amazon just as you're doing today, and then shop for these high consideration assets or products through an agent.
即使那样,你最终可能还是会回到亚马逊,但更重要的是,亚马逊仍然可以为你将要购买的大部分商品展示广告。
And you might still end up on Amazon even then, but more importantly, Amazon can still show you ads for the majority of products that you are going to buy.
这样一来,它只是失去了那些高价值商品的销售机会,而这些商品,我不知道你怎么想,我通常不会在亚马逊上买那些特别的东西。
Then it's only losing them for these high consideration assets or products, which usually, I don't know about you, I don't often buy that special stuff on Amazon.
大多数情况下,这些购买发生在亚马逊生态系统之外。
Mostly, it's somewhere outside of the Amazon ecosystem.
对我来说,理解这个协议最重要的一点是,它让商家可以继续使用他们想要的任何支付处理服务。
For me, the most important thing to understand about this protocol is that it lets merchants keep using whatever payment processor they want.
顺便说一下背景,早期大家担心谷歌最终会进军Shopify的支付业务,所以Shopify联合制定了这个标准,就是为了防止这种情况发生。
And just for context, the early fear was that Google would eventually come for Shopify's payments business, and so Shopify co-wrote this standard precisely so that wouldn't happen.
而且就算他们没这么做,谷歌为什么要为了每笔交易那点支付处理的小钱操心呢?它有那么庞大、那么巨大的广告业务要保护。
And even if they hadn't done that, why should Google care about pennies on a transaction for payment processing when it has this massive, gigantic advertising business to protect?
这才是它的核心重点。
That is its core focus.
这也是我脑子里最大的疑问。
And that is also the biggest question, at least in my head.
谷歌、亚马逊这些公司的广告业务会变成什么样?
What will happen to the advertising businesses of Google, Amazon, and co., those type of companies?
我觉得Meta可能是唯一比较安全的,因为人们在找娱乐内容的时候会看到广告。
And I think Meta is probably the only one that's pretty safe because they play ads when people are looking for entertainment.
他们完全不参与购买过程。
They're not anywhere in the buying process.
不管你有没有用代理,或者直接购物,人们还是会去Instagram找娱乐。
And if you have agents, or you just shop without them, people will still go to Instagram for entertainment.
但我觉得亚马逊和谷歌其实面临着一个威胁,这个威胁大概一年前还没人能想象到,这些公司可能会失去他们业务的核心,而对他们两家来说,现在核心就是广告业务。
But Amazon and Google, I think they actually face a threat here that probably just a year ago, nobody would've imagined that it's possible that those companies might lose the core of their business, which for both of them by now is their advertising business.
我个人相信他们能想出解决办法,但这个威胁绝对不容小觑。
And I personally believe they will be able to figure it out, but it's certainly a threat that is not to be underestimated.
我也这么认为。
I think so, too.
有意思的是,Shopify声称自己是目前唯一一个让商家能直接在ChatGPT、Copilot和谷歌里销售的平台,而且所有这些都能通过Shopify在一个地方管理。
And so it's interesting that Shopify claims that it's currently the only platform that lets merchants sell directly within ChatGPT, Copilot, and Google, and then you can manage that all from one place, of course, through Shopify.
所以我觉得关键点在于,聊天机器人并没有把Shopify从结账流程中踢出去,我们之前提到过,商家解决方案业务是Shopify增长的最大引擎,而支付处理又是这个引擎中推动收入的最大部分。
So I think the key point is that the chatbots don't cut Shopify out of the checkout process, where we talked about merchant solutions business as the biggest engine of growth for Shopify, and then payment processing is the biggest part of that engine in terms of driving revenue.
所以支付处理这个角度对Shopify来说真的很重要,基本上,聊天机器人负责和购物者对话。
So the payment processing angle is really important for Shopify, and basically, the chatbot handles the conversation with the shopper.
但Shopify仍然在幕后处理一切。
But Shopify still runs everything behind the scenes.
它处理订单,通过Shopify Payments收款,然后帮忙安排发货。
It processes the order, it takes the payment through Shopify Payments, and then it helps get it shipped.
我们快速休息一下,听听今天赞助商的介绍。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
不用我说你也知道,房租和房贷越来越贵了。
You don't need me to tell you that rent and mortgages are only getting more expensive.
所以Bilt推出了三款信用卡,专门为房租、房贷以及其他日常消费提供最丰厚的积分奖励。
That's why Bilt created three credit cards designed to offer the richest rewards on rent, mortgage, and everything else you spend on.
无论你是租房还是自有住房,每次支付住房相关费用都能获得高达1.25倍的积分,而且没有交易手续费,不管你在哪里住。
Whether you rent or own, you can earn up to 1.25x points on every housing payment without the transaction fee, no matter where you live.
积分可以兑换机票、酒店、Lyft打车服务、未来的住房付款,还有更多。
Points can be redeemed for flights, hotels, Lyft rides, a future housing payment, and much more.
把你生活中最不可避免的一笔开销,变成最划算的一笔。
Turn one of the most unavoidable payments in your life into the most rewarding.
找到适合你的卡,去joinbilt.com/tip申请吧。
Find the card that's right for you and apply at joinbilt.com/tip.
网址是J-O-I-N-B-I-L-T.com/tip。
That's J-O-I-N-B-I-L-T.com/tip.
用我们的链接,这样他们就知道是你推荐来的。
Use our link so they know we sent you.
适用条款。
Terms apply.
需经批准并符合资格要求。
Subject to approval and eligibility.
Bilt卡由Column发行,Column是FDIC成员,并依据万事达卡国际公司的许可发行。
Bilt cards are issued by Column in a member FDIC pursuant to license from Mastercard International Incorporated.
对在线交易感兴趣,但还没迈出第一步?
Curious about online trading but haven't taken the first step yet?
你不是一个人。
You're not alone.
而Plus500期货是一个很好的起点。
And Plus500 Futures is a great place to start.
期货市场瞬息万变,通过Plus500,你可以探索石油、黄金、标普500、比特币等热门资产。
The futures markets are moving fast, and with Plus500 you can explore popular assets like oil, gold, S&P 500, Bitcoin, and more.
从加密货币到大宗商品,总有什么在发生。
From crypto to commodities, there's always something happening.
这个平台超级好用,你可以直接在手机上随时交易。
The platform is super easy to use, so you can trade on the go right from your phone.
你只需要100美元就能开始,马上参与进来。
You can get started with just $100 and jump into the action.
看到感兴趣的东西了吗?
See something interesting?
账户开通后,只需点击几下就能交易。
Once your account is open, you can trade it in just a couple of clicks.
如果你还没准备好,可以用免费模拟账户练习一下。
And if you're not quite ready yet, you can practice with a free demo account.
没有风险,也没有压力。
No risk, no pressure.
凭借20年的经验,Plus500让交易比以往任何时候都更容易上手。
With 20 years of experience, Plus500 makes trading more accessible than ever.
去plus500.com看看吧。
Check it out at plus500.com.
期货交易涉及亏损风险,并非适合所有人。
Trading in futures involves risks of loss and is not suitable for everyone.
并非所有申请者都能通过审核。
Not all applicants will qualify.
Plus500,让交易更上一层楼。
Plus500, it's trading with a plus.
每周我们都会在节目中分析一些公司,并问同一个问题:管理层真的在高效运营这家公司吗?
Every week, we analyze companies on this show and ask the same question: Is management actually running this business efficiently?
对于目前大多数公司来说,诚实的答案是这样的。
Here's the honest answer for most companies right now.
那些领先的公司,正是那些把人工智能应用到日常事务中的公司。
The ones pulling ahead are the ones putting AI to work on the everyday stuff.
这正是NetSuite Next的用武之地。
That's exactly what NetSuite Next was built for.
NetSuite Next 会在你最需要的时候给你提供关键信息。
NetSuite Next surfaces insights exactly when you need them.
它能让智能代理处理日常任务和问题,你还可以用日常语言问复杂问题,就像跟一个懂行的同事聊天一样。
It puts agents to work on routine tasks and problems, and it lets you ask complex questions in plain language, like talking to a knowledgeable colleague.
但技术只是其中的一部分。
But technology is only part of the story.
AI 也在改变人们和团队协作的方式,这种变化已经开始了。
AI is also reshaping how people and teams work together, and that shift is already underway.
今天你就能拿到专家编写的商业指南。
Expert-created business guide in your hands today.
这本指南叫《为智能体时代做好准备:AI 如何改变日常工作》,现在你可以免费获取。
It's called "Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work," and right now it's yours absolutely free.
里面会告诉你 AI 如何重塑整个组织的工作方式,以及如何让你的企业从中受益。
Inside, you'll discover how AI could reshape work across your entire organization, and how to position your business to prosper from it.
我自己在用,你也应该试试。
I use this, and you should too.
如果你的收入至少达到七位数,就去 netsuite.com/tip 免费获取我们的商业指南《为智能体时代做好准备:AI 如何改变日常工作》。
If your revenues are at least in the seven figures, get our free business guide, "Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work" at netsuite.com/tip.
这份指南在 netsuite.com/tip 上免费提供。
The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/tip.
netsuite.com/tip。
netsuite.com/tip.
好了,回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
我真没想到你会对支付业务这么兴奋。
I would've never thought that I see you as excited about a payments business.
但不得不说,这让我想起了美客多,电商加支付的飞轮效应非常强大。
But I got to say, it kind of reminds me of Mercado Libre, where the flywheel of having the e-commerce plus the payments is incredibly powerful.
而且显然,对 Shopify 来说最重要的是,你保住了抽成率。
And obviously, and that's the most important thing to Shopify, you're keeping the take rate.
所以在这种情况下,比如 ChatGPT 只是门面,可以这么说。
So in this case, for example, ChatGPT is only the shop window, so to say.
我觉得没错。
I think that's right.
所以只要通过ChatGPT卖出的每一美元,和通过商家自己网站卖出的每一美元,给Shopify带来的收入是一样的,那Shopify在智能体商业时代就会过得很好,甚至可能更兴旺,因为我们的智能体可能会推动整体消费增长。
And so long as a dollar sold through ChatGPT pays Shopify the same as a dollar that goes through the merchant's own website, then Shopify is going to do just fine in the age of agentic commerce and maybe even thrive, as perhaps our agents will drive more consumption, generally.
随便花20美元买点东西会变得非常顺畅,几乎没有摩擦。
Become so much more frictionless to just spend $20 on something arbitrary.
而且你看看Shopify的数据,智能体已经变得越来越重要了。
And when you look at especially Shopify's data, it looks like agents are becoming already more and more important.
具体数字来看,从2025年1月起,归因于AI搜索的Shopify店铺订单增长了大约15倍。
So putting some numbers on it, orders to Shopify stores attributed to AI search are roughly 15X since January of 2025.
仅第二季度,AI带来的流量和归因于AI的订单都同比增长了三倍,而且AI引荐的访问中有一半直接落在产品页面上。
And in Q2 alone, both AI-driven traffic and AI-attributed orders tripled year over year, and half of AI referred sessions land directly on a product page.
这基本上是传统搜索转化率的两倍半。
So that's basically where you have two and a half times the rate of traditional search.
所以很多人跳过了大量浏览环节。
So people are skipping a lot of the browsing.
然后在一次高盛会议上,我记得是九月份,CFO说通过那些AI渠道来的顾客,转化率大概能高出80%。
And then at a Goldman Sachs conference in, I think it was September, the CFO said that shoppers convert roughly 80% better if they come through those AI rails, basically.
而且通过AI渠道来的新买家,比例几乎是其他渠道的两倍。
And then new buyers arrive from AI channels at nearly twice the rate of other channels.
所以某种程度上,我觉得这些数字挺多的,听起来好像进展比实际情况要快一些。
So to some extent, I feel like those are a lot of numbers and they make it sound like it's maybe a bit further than it actually is.
但如果你看整体数字,比如有75%的AI归因购买来自前100大产品类别之外,这真的很疯狂,你想想看。
But then if you look at the total numbers, for example, you have this crazy 75% of AI-attributed purchases coming from outside of the top 100 product categories, and that's insane if you think about it.
嗯,这个数据确实很重要,你能再解释一下这意味着什么吗?这样我们都能更好地理解。
Well, it's a really important stat, so maybe you can just explain more of what that means so we can all appreciate it.
好的,当然。
Yeah, sure.
一般来说,传统搜索是按热度排名的,对吧?
Generally, traditional search ranks things by popularity, right?
所以这对那些有大笔SEO预算的大品牌有利,他们能确保自己的页面在谷歌的任何相关搜索中都能排到前面。
So that favors big brands with big SEO budgets who can ensure that their pages land near the top for any relevant search on Google.
因为你知道我也知道,在谷歌上找东西,你绝对不会翻到第三页。
Because as you and I know, you would never go to page three if you want to find anything on Google.
要么就在第一页靠前的位置,要么你根本看不到它。
Either it's on page one and pretty up the top, or you just never see it.
但AI代理是根据具体的意图来匹配的。
But AI agents, they match on specific intent.
比如在财报电话会议上,Shopify的管理层讲了一个故事:有位家长想给10岁的孩子找一款无屏幕手机,结果被引导到了一个叫Tin Can Phone的小型Shopify商家,那正是他们想要的。
So on an earnings call, for example, Shopify's management told, there was a story about a parent searching for a screenless phone for their 10-year-old kid, and they were being led to a small Shopify merchant called Tin Can Phone, and it's pretty much exactly what they wanted.
但如果他们用谷歌搜索,根本找不到这个商家。
And yet, if they would've searched through Google, they would've never found it.
所以从某种程度上说,AI发现机制更有利于那些小众的、专门化的长尾商家。
So in some ways, AI discovery favors these long tail of small, specialized merchants.
你猜怎么着?
And guess what?
那正是Shopify的客户群体。
That's exactly what Shopify's customer base is.
完全正确。
That's exactly right.
而且关于这一点,MoffettNathanson发布了一些数据,衡量AI平台给网店带来多少流量,并与谷歌搜索做了对比。
And to that point, MoffettNathanson has released some data measuring how much traffic AI platforms send to online stores and compared that with Google Search.
为了说明背景,他们提到的只是那种泛泛的品牌。
And for context, they refer to just kind of the generic brand.
Brand.com指的是一个公司及其自己的网站。
Brand.com is a company and their own website.
所以听到这个的时候,你可以想象任何在Shopify上运营的独立店铺。
So think of any independent store running on Shopify when you hear that.
但在常规的谷歌搜索中,这些brand.com、这些类似Shopify的网站的流量增长速度,大约是亚马逊、Wayfair、Chewy和Etsy这些大型市场平台的两倍。
But in regular Google search, traffic to those brand.com, those Shopify-type sites grew about two times faster than traffic to big marketplaces like Amazon, Wayfair, Chewy, and Etsy.
这又是一个听起来很惊人的数据。
Which is another one of those stats that sound incredible.
但公平地说,这也是意料之中的,对吧?
But to be completely fair, it is what you would expect, right?
最好的Shopify品牌应该比亚马逊增长得更快。
The best Shopify brands should be outgrowing Amazon.
嗯,大多数情况下,这只是规模的问题。
Well, for the most part, it's just a matter of scale.
但是当他们汇总来自AI平台的流量时,这些品牌官网的流量增长速度基本上是传统市场平台的四到八倍。
But when they aggregated the traffic coming from AI platforms, this brand.com was basically outpacing the legacy marketplaces by four to eight times.
所以莫顿说,他在这个漏斗里看到的品牌官网比以往任何时候都多,现在这些也反映在了实际数据中。
And so Morton has said he's seeing more brand.com sites in this funnel than ever before, and now it's showing up in the measured data.
正是这些数据让他今年坚定了上调股票评级的信心。
And that data is what drove his conviction to upgrade the stock this year.
他还说,引用原话:“GMV的增长会比大多数人预期的更高、更持久。”
And he said, quote, "GMV is going to grow higher for longer than most people think."
确实,肯定比我们去年预期的要持久。
Well, definitely for longer than we thought last year.
我觉得换句话说,简单来说,AI聊天机器人正在为小型在线商店带来更多流量,而不是更少。
I think in other words, if you just want to put it more simply, AI chatbots are driving more traffic to small online stores and not less.
这挺有意思的,因为我觉得在90年代,很多人以为互联网会让零售商遍地开花,上架产品的门槛会被消除,这样一来,大零售商的权力就会被削弱。
Which is kind of interesting, because I think in the '90s, many folks thought the internet would lead to a proliferation in retailers, and then the barriers to listing products would be erased, and that would basically take power away from the largest retailers.
但后来我们都知道实际发生了什么。
But then we all know what really happened.
就是亚马逊进来了,利用互联网把成千上万的第三方零售商整合到自己的平台上。
It was Amazon coming in, using the internet to consolidate thousands of third-party retailers on their platform.
但你引用的数据表明,也许现在,AI聊天机器人可能不是在给沃尔玛、亚马逊这些巨头更多权力,而是在帮助独立品牌,借用托比的话说,就是在给反抗军武装。
But the data you cited suggests that maybe now, rather than handing even more power to Walmart and Amazon or those sort of huge retailers, AI chatbots may actually be helping independent brands, sort of arming the rebels, to borrow Tobi's line here.
而且,如果我没记错的话,这里还有一个重要的二阶效应,比如我们看看Etsy。
And there's an important second-order effect here too, if I'm not mistaken, where if we look, for example, at Etsy.
这家公司超过100%的营业利润都来自我们之前提到的站内广告,同时向卖家收取大约25%的综合费率。
The company earns over 100% of its operating profit from these on-site ads that we mentioned earlier, while charging sellers an all-in take rate of around 25%.
所以,就像我们说的,在代理商务的世界里,这种商业模式是撑不住的,因为代理是替人购物的,它们不会像你我那样被广告影响,尽管我们可能觉得自己不会受影响。
So, as we talked about, in a world of agentic commerce, that business model won't last because agents are doing the shopping on behalf of people, and they're not swayed by advertising in the same way that maybe you and I are, even though we like to think that we probably aren't.
而且这一点越被证实,一个成功的Etsy卖家可能就会开始问:"那我为什么要付25%的费用来被找到呢?我自己开个Shopify店铺,现在被谷歌AI搜索或ChatGPT推荐的机会比以往任何时候都大,而且成本只是那的一小部分。"
And the more that proves to be true, a successful Etsy seller might start asking, "Well, why am I paying 25% to be found when a Shopify store of my own now has a better chance than ever being recommended by Google's AI search or ChatGPT at basically a fraction of the cost?"
不过反过来想,就像我们之前说的,要抓取整个互联网需要大量的计算资源。
The counterpoint would be that it takes significantly more compute to scrape the internet, as we talked about earlier.
所以理论上,智能代理应该更倾向于像亚马逊这样索引完善的平台,这样它们能更轻松地找到想要的东西。
So agents should, in theory, favor well-indexed platforms like Amazon, where they can find what they're looking for with much less effort.
所以,品牌官网在AI推荐上表现优于亚马逊,这确实证明了Shopify在Shopify Catalog上所做工作的重要性。
So the fact that brand.com is outperforming Amazon on AI referrals is really a testament to the importance of what Shopify has built in Shopify Catalog.
说到底,我觉得像亚马逊这样能实际发货的市场平台,对商家还是会有很大的控制力,因为AI可能会改变我们购物的方式,但它改变不了的事实是,你需要庞大的物流网络才能真正把东西送到你家门口。
Ultimately, I think marketplaces that physically fulfill, like Amazon, for example, will maintain lots of leverage over their merchants because AI might revolutionize how we shop, but it can't really change the reality that you need a massive logistics footprint to actually bring things to your door.
而真正被挤压的是那些纯粹做发现和导购的中间商,就像我们刚才提到的Etsy的例子。
Whereas pure discovery middlemen are the ones actually getting squeezed, going back to the Etsy example.
而且,从Etsy流失的商家,最终很可能会流向Shopify。
And the idea is that merchants defecting from Etsy will most likely eventually find their way to Shopify.
如果我们再往后退一步看,实际上只有大约20%的零售交易是在线上完成的。
And if we really step all the way back, only about 20% of retail commerce happens online.
如果你在90年代告诉别人,到2026年,所有零售购物中有20%会在线上进行,我想大家都会非常震惊。
And if you told somebody in the '90s that that would be the case in 2026, that 20% of all retail shopping would be online, I think people would've been really shocked by that.
而且不管怎样,Shopify的管理层一直认为,消除购买过程中的摩擦,给每个人一个相当于口袋里的私人购物助手,会推动更多零售支出转移到线上,这个观点我认同。
And anyways, Shopify management has argued to this point, and I buy it, that stripping out the friction from buying and giving everyone what amounts to a personal shopper in their pocket will push more retail spending online.
所以我们将会看到,线上零售在整体零售中的占比会更高。
So we'll see a higher percentage of all retail commerce occurring online.
如果这个观点哪怕只有部分正确,那么整个蛋糕对亚马逊和Shopify来说都会变得更大。
And if that's even partly right, then the whole pie gets bigger for both Amazon and Shopify.
所以我们又一次看到了这个模式:上市公司的CEO声称AI实际上对他们的业务有利。
So once again, we've come across the pattern here where a CEO of a publicly traded company claims that AI is actually good for their business.
看起来每个人都是这么说的,但在这个案例中,我确实觉得Shopify的逻辑相当扎实。
It seems like everyone does that, but actually in this case, I do think the logic for Shopify is pretty solid.
对,我觉得这里说得更准确。
Yeah, I think it's more accurate here.
所以也许回到我们最初的那期节目,我认为我们最大的结构性担忧是亚马逊的Buy with Prime计划,它针对第三方网站,有点像是一个警告信号——卖家不再需要选择Shopify生态系统,而是可以通过亚马逊为顾客提供配送服务,即使他们不在亚马逊市场上销售。
So maybe just to go back to our original episode, I think our biggest structural worry was Amazon and their Buy with Prime initiative for third-party websites sort of being a warning shot where instead of opting into the Shopify ecosystem, sellers could now offer their customers deliveries via Amazon, even when they're not selling on the Amazon Marketplace.
那对Shopify来说是个相当大的打击,而且这其实是我们当时怎么说的。
And that was a pretty big stab onto Shopify's toes, and this is actually how we put it back then.
“让我担心的是,亚马逊可能还有几张王牌,如果情况真的恶化,他们可能会拿出来进一步打击Shopify。”
"What scares me is that Amazon might have some aces up its sleeve that it could pull out to damage Shopify further if push really came to shove."
那么现在,一年半过去了,既然亚马逊已经签署了Shopify基本上参与制定的协议,这个担忧还成立吗?还是你的看法有所改变?
So now, a year and a half later, now that Amazon has signed on the protocol Shopify basically co-wrote, does that fear still hold up or did your opinion change on that?
我觉得,尽管Buy with Prime的推动对Shopify来说看起来相当不利,尤其是在智能体商务时代到来之前,但似乎AI时代已经打乱了旧的战线。
I feel like for as bearish as this Buy with Prime push seemed to be for Shopify, especially in a pre-agentic commerce world, it does seem like the AI era has just scrambled the old battle lines.
所以,在一个购物从Claude或Muse开始,而不是直接在amazon.com或亚马逊应用上开始的世界里,即使是亚马逊也有兴趣让更开放的轨道存在。
And so in a world where shopping starts inside of Claude or Muse rather than directly on amazon.com or in the Amazon app, even Amazon has an interest in more open rails existing.
而大家最终都落脚的轨道,还是Shopify和谷歌一起搭建的那些。
And so the rails everyone is ending up on are, again, the ones built by Shopify alongside Google.
如果你要站在看空Shopify的人的立场上,你会怎么看?
And if you would have to step into the shoes of a Shopify bear, then how would you look at it?
所以,如果我要持怀疑态度,我会说,标准组织加入成本很低,而且最终,亚马逊仍然拥有地球上最大的封闭商务生态系统。
So maybe if I were going to be skeptical, I would say that the standards bodies are cheap to join, and ultimately, Amazon still owns the largest closed commerce ecosystem on Earth.
所以他们还是会遵循那些激励。
So they're going to follow those incentives.
而且我们也看到了,亚马逊封杀了Muse,今年早些时候还向OpenAI投了500亿美元。
And as we've seen, Amazon blocked Muse, and they completed a $50 billion investment in OpenAI earlier this year.
巧合的是——我完全是在猜测——就在那个消息公布几周后,OpenAI就搁置了那个即时结账实验,而Shopify的商家从2025年秋天起就一直在接入这个功能。
And coincidentally, and I'm completely speculating here, but within a few weeks of that announcement, we did see OpenAI shelve its instant checkout experiment that Shopify merchants had been plugging into since the fall of 2025.
所以亚马逊铁了心要尽可能维持现状,但谁知道他们能撑多久呢?
And so Amazon is hellbent on maintaining the status quo for as long as possible and Who's to say how long they'll be able to do that for?
另外,这一切变化实在太快了。
And then the other thing is this is all just changing so fast.
确实。
Absolutely.
而且我其实希望ChatGPT的结账功能不是这笔投资的唯一原因,因为花500亿就为了这个,我觉得……这代价也太高了。
And I actually hope that the checkout process of ChatGPT was not the only reason for the investment, because 50 billion for that seems like- ... quite a hefty price tag, I would say.
但如果现在要我问你,你最终怎么看?
But if I would have to ask you now, where do you net out?
你会怎么总结?
Where would that be?
就在大约一年前,亚马逊和Shopify之间似乎还是一种对立关系,对吧?
In just a year or so, it seemed like there was a dichotomy between Amazon and Shopify, right?
从长远来看,似乎总有一方要赢,另一方就得输。
Long term, one, it seemed like, would have to win at the expense of the other.
但现在这种感觉越来越不准确了。
But that really feels like a less accurate depiction of reality.
随着AI的进步和越来越深入地融入我们的生活,我觉得现在更准确的说法是,电商这块蛋糕会变大,而且可能会大很多,这对两家都有好处。
As AI improves and becomes more embedded in our lives, I think the more accurate way to think about it now is the e-commerce pie will grow, and probably grow by a lot, and that's good for both of them.
不过目前我们还不知道大语言模型和智能体会如何具体改变我们的购物方式,所以这还有待观察。
And yet we don't know at this point how LLMs and agents will change the way we shop exactly, so that remains to be seen.
至于这会不会偏向某一方,也是有可能的。
And whether that will favor one or the other is possible.
有可能两家都赢,也有可能两家都被某个现在还不存在的竞争对手抢走地盘。
It's possible that both will win, or it's possible that both will lose ground to some competitor that doesn't even exist today.
我觉得对我来说,这里更大的问题之一是,AI最终会成为导流渠道还是分销商。
I think to me, one of the bigger questions here is whether AI will end up being a referral channel or a distributor.
所以,分销商基本上就是插在你这个在线商家和你的客户之间,可能会把几十年的客户关系拱手让给别人。
So a distributor basically wedges itself between you as an online merchant and your customer, potentially handing decades-old customer relationships to someone else.
但如果它最终只是一个推荐渠道,那基本上就是谷歌搜索的升级版,让商家保留客户关系、结账流程和数据,因此也保留了大部分主动权。
But then if it actually ends up being a referral channel, on the other hand, it's basically just a better version of Google Search that allows the merchant to keep the relationship and the checkout and the data, and therefore, also most of the takeaway leverage.
那你觉得呢?
Well, you tell me.
就我所见,AI聊天机器人看起来更像是一个新的推荐渠道,而不是分销商,对吧?
From what I've seen, AI chatbots look more like a new referral channel than a distributor, right?
要让Anthropic、OpenAI或Meta成为拥有客户的中间商,他们真的得掌控整个购物体验,而且我们都得习惯让智能体替我们买所有东西。
For Anthropic, OpenAI, or Meta to become the middleman that owns the customer, they would really have to control the whole shopping experience, and we'd all have to get comfortable letting agents buy everything for us.
我们之前也聊过,这确实是智能体电商爱好者们要面对的大挑战。
And we've talked about that being really the big challenge for Agentic Commerce bros to solve.
这总是很有趣,因为你比我买的东西多得多。
Well, it's always funny because you order so much more stuff than I do.
你跟我说你每天从亚马逊收五个包裹,而我可能一年才在亚马逊上买五次东西。
You're telling me about five packages a day from Amazon, and I order maybe five times a year on Amazon.
不过,我完全能想象让一个智能代理帮我买东西,而你可能是我们俩中更持怀疑态度的人。
Yet, I can absolutely imagine an agent ordering stuff for me, and you're the more skeptical person, I think, from the two of us.
我也不知道,也许我应该听你的,毕竟你网购经验更丰富,但我不确定。
And I don't know, perhaps I should listen to you as the more experienced online shopper, but I don't know.
就像你说的,我觉得OpenAI搁置了即时结账功能,现在把顾客引导到商家自己的网站去完成购买。
Like you said, I think OpenAI shelved instant checkout and now sends shoppers to the merchant's own site to finish the purchase.
所以也许可以说,OpenAI和Anthropic对市场的那个部分并不真正感兴趣。
So maybe you could say that OpenAI and also Anthropic, they're not really interested in that part of the market.
他们也在进军企业领域。
They're also moving into the enterprise field.
所以你可能读到过这样的说法:ChatGPT更需要亚马逊,而不是亚马逊更需要ChatGPT。
So you might have read that as ChatGPT needs Amazon more than Amazon needs ChatGPT.
而且,谷歌和Meta多年前就发现,如果你只是全球最大的推荐引擎,那能有多赚钱。
And anyways, Google and Meta figured out years ago how wildly lucrative it can be if you're just the world's biggest referral engine.
对他们两家来说,这确实效果很好。
It worked pretty well for the two of them.
不过,现在大家谈论Muse的方式,而且很遗憾,我还没能测试它,因为它还没在欧洲上线。
That said, the way people currently talk about Muse, and again, unfortunately, I couldn't yet test it because it's not yet out in Europe.
在我看来,它更像是一个分销渠道,而不是推荐渠道。
To me, it looks more like the distributor and not a referral channel.
所以我不太确定。
So I don't know.
也许这就是为什么Shopify的股价在Muse最初发布后从大约155美元跌到大约130美元,然后亚马逊又阻止了Muse在其网站上购物。
Perhaps that's why Shopify's shares slid from around 155 bucks to about 130 bucks after Muse was initially announced, and then Amazon blocked Muse from shopping on its site.
而就在第二天,Shopify基本上宣布了,我引用一下,“与Muse深度合作,在所有Shopify商店中通过Shop Pay实现代理结账。”
While just the next day, Shopify basically announced, and I quote this, "Partnering deeply with Muse to enable agentic checkout with Shop Pay on all Shopify stores."
然后市场对此反应相当积极。
And then the stock took that as a pretty good sign.
我想接下来两天股价上涨了14%。
I think it rose 14% over the next two days.
所以我不太确定。
So I don't know.
我觉得市场好像也不太清楚该怎么应对这个,就像我们俩一样。
It seems to me like the market doesn't exactly know what to do with this either, kind of like the two of us.
我想说,这期节目之后,我们48小时内都不提“代理”或“代理式”这些词了。
I'm going to say that we take a 48-hour hiatus from saying the words agents or agentic after this episode.
不过,玩笑归玩笑,其实,跟听众们说一声,昨天我和丹尼尔通了个电话,我手机上下载了Muse,也稍微玩了一下。
But yeah, jokes aside, I actually, for the listeners, Daniel and I were on a call yesterday, and I do have Muse downloaded on my phone and have played around with it a bit.
我基本上是把我的iPhone投屏到电脑上,然后跟丹尼尔共享屏幕,这样他就能看到我在Muse应用里的操作。
And I basically mirrored my iPhone onto my computer for the call and then screen shared my screen with Daniel, and so he could see me going through the Muse app.
所以他对这个也有点了解。
So he's got a little bit of exposure to it.
回到Shopify的话题,看起来代理式销售的经济效益跟Shopify商家任何其他在线交易完全一样,因为每次在Shopify商店通过Muse购买都会走Shop Pay。
And so just to go back to Shopify, apparently, it seems agentic sales will carry the exact same economics of really any other online store transaction from a Shopify merchant, because every Muse purchase on a Shopify store is going to run through Shop Pay.
所以九月份的时候,你找不到比Shopify和亚马逊之间更鲜明的对比了。
So in September, you couldn't have asked for a clearer contrast between Shopify and Amazon.
确实,这是第一次有热门AI代理找上亚马逊的门,结果被拒之门外,而Shopify却全力押注,把旗下所有商店都跟Muse紧密绑定。
Really, the first time a popular AI agent showed up at Amazon's door, Amazon turned them away, while Shopify has just doubled down on it and opened every one of its stores to really be tied in with Muse.
就像你说的,我们现在真的还太早,事情变化太快了,几乎很难说未来会怎么发展。
And as you said, we're basically just so early, and things are changing so fast that it almost seems impossible to say how things will play out.
而且说实话,我们连亚马逊和Shopify自己是怎么想的都不知道。
And actually, we don't even know how Amazon and Shopify actually think about it.
如果他们心里有数,知道五年后应该是什么样子,我完全可以想象,比如亚马逊会慢慢改变对agent的看法或者处理方式。
If they have a vision for how this is supposed to look in five years' time, I could very well imagine that, for example, Amazon is changing how they think or approach agents over time.
可能也取决于他们自己的agent能有多成功,尤其是在亚马逊生态系统之外。
Maybe also dependent on how successful their own agents will become, especially outside of the Amazon ecosystem.
但就在Shopify交易两天后,马克·扎克伯格说Meta计划通过从Muse完成的交易中抽取一小笔费用来赚钱。
But just two days after the Shopify deal, Mark Zuckerberg said that Meta plans to make money from Muse by taking a small fee on the transactions that it completes.
他没说费用会是多少,也没说谁来付,Shopify声称自己的分成未来不会变,但那个费用总得有人出。
So he didn't say how big the fee will be or who pays it, and Shopify claims its own cut will not change in the future, but that fee has to come from somewhere.
这点我们很清楚。
We know that.
而Meta是第一个公开表示想对交易本身收费的主要AI平台,这再次说明,他们更倾向于我们之前讨论的那种分销商模式,而不是仅仅做一个推荐渠道。
And Meta is the first major AI platform to say out loud that it wants to basically take a toll on the transaction itself, which, again, would be a big step toward that distributor framework we talked about earlier, as opposed to just being a referral channel.
为了继续推进我们的讨论,也许我们该再深入探讨一个看跌的观点。
So to keep us moving along here, maybe there's one other bear case point we should linger on.
你经常从科技投资者那里听到这样的说法:在AI编写软件的世界里,商家会自己用AI生成代码来搭建类似Shopify的平台,然后不再向Shopify这个中间商支付费用。
And you hear it a lot from folks that invest in tech, and it's something along the lines of, in a world where AI writes the software, merchants will just vibe code their own Shopify and then stop paying tolls to Shopify as a middleman.
我们在节目中报道过的许多软件公司都曾面临这种情况,所谓的SaaS末日论,即担心AI会取代它们,导致Adobe、CoStar和Intuit等公司的股票被抛售。
And so We've heard that so many times about software companies we've covered on this show that have been caught up in the so-called SaaS apocalypse, the sell-off from these stocks on fears that AI will replace them with companies like Adobe, CoStar, and Intuit.
但我认为市场对这个想法有点过度反应了。
But I just think that the market has taken things one step too far with that idea.
对,放下你的显示器和Excel表格,去外面走走,接触一下现实,和真正的商家聊聊,你会发现没有人真的想用AI生成代码来替代Shopify提供的核心服务。
Yeah, just step out from behind the monitors and the Excel sheets, go touch some grass, maybe go talk to some real merchants, and I think you'll find that no one is actually trying to vibe code essential functions like the services that Shopify provides.
相比这样做的风险和挑战,节省的成本简直微不足道。
The savings are just so negligible compared to the risks and challenges of doing so.
我不知道。
I don't know.
也许这个观点以后会被证明是错的,但这是我最为怀疑的一点,而且我认为单干真的省不了钱,因为你失去了Shopify的规模优势。
Maybe that won't age well, but that's the thing I'm most skeptical about, and I just don't think going it alone would even really save money because you're missing out on Shopify's scale.
比如Shopify,它跟Stripe谈的费率比任何单个商家自己谈的都要好。
So Shopify, for example, has a better fee structure with Stripe than any individual merchant could ever negotiate.
所以你要是自己单干,去随便写个代码,就享受不到这个优势了。
And so you lose that when you go off on your own to vibe code something.
而且Shopify的商家可以一键接入Meta的广告追踪工具,这个整合现在能存在,是因为Shopify的CEO和马克·扎克伯格亲自谈成的合作。
And Shopify merchants get a one-click connection to Meta's ad tracking tools, and that's an integration that exists now because literally the CEO of Shopify and Mark Zuckerberg personally worked on that deal together.
我完全能理解,Shopify提供的价值很大程度上在软件之外,所以不太可能被随便写个代码就替代掉。
I could definitely see how Shopify offers enough value, basically outside of the software to not be vibe coded away by anyone.
就像你说的,物流、广告,还有那些幕后的工作,都得靠这样的平台来做。
As you said, it's between logistics, the advertising, and all that basically behind the curtain work that has to be done by such a platform.
几乎不可能想象有人能靠随便写代码搞定这些,虽然长远来看可能会限制他们的定价能力,但比起Shopify,我更担心的是其他公司。
It's almost impossible to imagine that anyone could vibe code any of this, and it might limit their pricing power way down the line, but they are definitely businesses I'm a lot more concerned about than Shopify.
说实话,每次讨论投资时,如果不用再纠结AI的问题,我反而挺高兴的。
And honestly, I'm kind of glad whenever I don't have to make a call about AI anymore when we talk about an investment.
我觉得现在有个被低估的能力,就是承认有些事情现在无法预知,所以它们不是我们通常该找的那种低难度目标,至少我们在投资时应该尽量找这样的目标。
And I think it has become an underrated skill to also accept that some things are unknowable today and therefore not the one-foot hurdles that we usually should look for, at least we try to look for in those investments.
而且就像你之前提到的,我们也不该忘记,算力和大语言模型在现实世界中是有限制的。
And as you mentioned before, we also shouldn't forget that there are real-world constraints on compute and LLMs.
这也不是什么神奇的技术,虽然有时候感觉像。
And this isn't some magic technology, even though it sometimes feels like that.
它不会一夜之间就让所有软件平台都过时。
It just renders every software platform obsolete overnight.
我们一直在聊迈克尔·莫顿,还引用他的话,因为我觉得他对Shopify的看法非常清晰。
We keep on talking about Michael Morton and quoting him because I think he's very clear about Shopify.
基本上,他认为即使有无限的资源、一支工程师大军,还有Anthropic给的空白支票,你也没法重建一个比直接付费使用Shopify更便宜的东西,还能享受随之而来的所有好处,比如拿到Stripe的批量折扣。
And so basically, he has argued that even with unlimited resources, an army of engineers, and a blank check from Anthropic, you could not rebuild it to be cheaper than just paying to use Shopify and enjoying all the benefits that come with that, to the point of getting volume discounts with Stripe.
我觉得这在更广泛的软件讨论中也是成立的。
And this is true, I think, in the broader software debate, too.
现实很无聊,东西就是会坏。
The boring reality is that stuff just breaks.
如果你是一个在TikTok、Etsy、亚马逊还有自己网站上卖货的商家,然后你用了vibe coding搞了一套替代Shopify的方案,结果在黑色星期五出了故障,那你就只能靠自己了,生意就毁了,你为了省几毛钱把自己坑了。
If you're a merchant who's selling on TikTok and Etsy and Amazon, and also your own website, and then you've vibe coded this alternative stack to Shopify, and you run into a glitch on Black Friday, well, you're on your own and your business is on fire, and you shot yourself in the foot just to save a few pennies.
我都有点不好意思了,但最后我还是得再聊一次AI。
I almost feel bad about it, but I got to get back to AI one last time.
那你怎么看AI故事的另一半,就是AI来运营商家业务这个想法?
So what's your take on the other half of the AI story, where the idea is basically that AI runs the merchant's business?
这应该就是Shopify的Sidekick产品,如果你愿意这么叫的话,它就像是内置在Shopify里的一个AI业务伙伴。
So this is Shopify's, I think, Sidekick product, if you want to call it that way, which is meant to be like an AI business partner built right into Shopify.
它了解你的产品、你的客户、你所有的交易记录,而且还能在你的店铺里实际操作。
So it knows your products, it knows your customers, your entire transaction history, and it can also actually build within your store.
它能编辑你的产品图片,分析你的数据,还能创建定制应用。
So it edits your product photos, it analyzes your data, and it creates custom apps.
我觉得听起来挺不错的,而且使用量似乎也很高。
I think it sounds pretty good, and usage seems to be pretty strong.
我觉得每天活跃使用Sidekick的商家数量同比增长了3.5倍。
I think daily active merchants using Sidekick is up three and a half times year over year.
每日会话量增长了近5倍,而且仅今年第二季度就有近3400万次对话。
Daily sessions is up almost five times, and we have nearly 34 million conversations just in Q2 of this year.
而且仅仅一年内,商家就通过它创建了36000个定制应用。
And then you have 36,000 custom apps built by merchants through it in just a single year.
这基本上是上一季度的三倍。
So that's basically triple to the prior quarter.
所以,数字看起来确实惊人,但你觉得长期来看怎么样?
So again, the numbers look insane, but what's your take on it in the long term?
这简直太疯狂了。
It's just nuts.
对于那些四处观望、想知道ChatGPT发布四年后AI到底会如何影响整个经济生产力的人来说,我觉得这就是一个绝佳的例子。
For anyone looking around wondering how AI will actually impact productivity across the economy four years after the release of ChatGPT, I think that's a heck of an example.
我还读到,在Sidekick的帮助下,由Shopify支持的新店铺中,有近10%在注册当天就完成了首笔销售。
And I've also read that with the help of Sidekick, nearly 10% of new shops powered by Shopify now make their first sale within a single day of signing up.
而这个比例在短短三年内就增长了43%。
And so that share is up 43% in just three years.
而且教皇当选时,教皇T恤在一个小时内就上架开卖了。
And when the Pope was elected, Da Pope T-shirts were on sale within an hour.
所以Shopify把这叫做文化速度下的商业。
And so Shopify calls it commerce at the speed of culture.
而且每次创业变得更容易,Shopify的商家漏斗就越来越宽,然后我们就有了这些按需供应的Da Pope T恤。
And every time it gets easier to start, Shopify's funnel of merchants just gets wider and wider, and then we get these Da Pope T-shirts available on demand.
作为一个密切关注这家公司的人,我希望你买了一件那样的T恤。
As someone who follows the company quite closely, I hope you got one of those T-shirts.
我觉得你没买,不然我肯定看到了,但说真的,挺可惜的。
I don't think you did, because otherwise I would have seen it, but it's a shame, I got to say that.
我可能比你感受更复杂一些,因为Shopify的总裁称他们可能是全球最拥抱AI的公司,意思是他们内部全面采用了AI。
And I probably feel a bit more mixed about it than you, but just because Shopify's president has called them probably the most AI-pilled company in the world, meaning they've gone all in using AI internally.
每当这样做,尤其是在这种时候,还拿出这么亮眼的数据,在我看来,即使他们运作得不错,也可能稍微有点过度宣传。
And whenever you do that, especially at these times, and you come out with these incredible numbers, to me, it seems like even if they're working quite well, they might oversell it just slightly.
不过,得承认,他们的员工人数两年基本没变,而那时收入增长超过60%。
To their credit, though, headcount has been roughly flat for two years, while revenue was growing at 60-plus percent then.
我不能说这全靠AI,但正是这种模式让运营费用从2024年第二季度的42%降到了上季度的34%。
I can't say whether that's all thanks to AI, but that formula is how operating expenses have been able to fall from 42% in Q2 of 2024 to 34% last quarter.
所以这影响非常大。
So that's a major, major impact.
确实如此,而且我觉得正因为这样,说AI已经在收入和利润率上产生了巨大影响是有道理的,可能比我们看过的任何其他公司都要明显。
And that's the case, and I think it's fair because of that, that you can make a case that AI is already showing up in a big way for revenues and margins, probably more than with any other company we've yet looked at.
也许他们确实是全球最痴迷AI的公司。
Maybe they are the most AI-pilled company in the world.
有可能。
They might be.
我明白你的意思,Airbnb的布莱恩·切斯基也经常谈到这个观点,就是AI会在内部帮助提升利润率。
I do see the point, and Brian Chesky at Airbnb has talked about this a lot, of the idea that AI will help margins internally.
但显然,这不是没有代价的。
But obviously, that doesn't come for free.
我敢肯定Shopify在AI计算上的开销简直高得离谱。
I'm sure Shopify's AI compute bills are just completely crazy.
之前我们听说Uber的时候,他们对公司在AI计算上的花费感到非常震惊,因为他们把这些工具交给了员工使用。
We heard about with Uber a while back that they had been pretty shocked by how much the company was spending On AI compute by handing over these kind of tools to their employees.
所以Shopify的CEO其实也承认了,由于Sidekick的大量使用,AI计算成本上升,给毛利率带来了一些压力。
And so Shopify's CEO has actually acknowledged that rising AI compute costs from all that Sidekick usage are putting some pressure on gross margins.
这也让我想起Adobe管理层因为免费提供计算密集型的AI创意工具而惹恼了投资者,他们的希望是用户会先对这些工具上瘾,然后随着时间推移,再逐步将这些AI工具变现。
And that also reminds me of how Adobe's management has gotten in trouble with investors for offering AI creative tools for free that are compute-intensive, and the hope there at least is that users would get hooked on the tools and then over time, they can turn to monetizing those AI tools more.
所以现在这算是一种亏本引流策略,用来获取客户。
So sort of a loss leader right now and where they're functioning for customer acquisition.
我指的是Adobe,但我觉得这个逻辑可能也适用于Shopify。
And so I'm referring to Adobe, but I think that logic probably applies to Shopify as well.
有可能,不过我得说,如果你有Shopify那样的增长,我猜市场给你的信任度会比Adobe过去几年得到的要多一些。
It might be, although I've got to say, if you have the growth of Shopify, I assume that the market will likely give you a bit more credit than Adobe has gotten in the last couple of years.
我觉得我们今天聊了很多内容,要不我们进入估值部分吧,基本上就是18个月前你第一次看这家公司时,我们决定不投资的原因,而它可能是我们在节目里看过的最优质的公司之一。
And I think we covered a lot of ground today and how about we get to the valuation section, basically the part that 18 months ago, when you first looked at the company, was the reason why we did not invest in one of the probably highest quality companies that we looked at here for the show.
那你觉得今天Shopify这家公司值多少钱?
So what do you think today the company Shopify is worth?
是的,你可以想象,我得对我的模型做一些更新。
So yeah, as you can imagine, I had some updates to make to my model.
我们会在下面的节目笔记里附上这个模型的链接,想看的人可以去看看。
And we'll have that model linked to in the show notes below for anyone who wants to see it.
除了上调未来几年的营收预期——这部分我之前确实低估了——最大的变化是把营业利润率从今年的14%提高到未来五年接近20%。
But besides revising higher their revenue over the next few years, where I was really underestimating things, the biggest change was setting their operating margins to increase to nearly 20% in the next five years, up from 14% this year.
利润率的提升能让营业利润的增长速度快于营收,这对股东来说可是件大好事。
So that jump in margins enables operating profits to actually grow faster than revenues, and that would be a wonderful thing for shareholders.
我还调整了模型,以反映Shopify——我们之前聊过——已经从大规模稀释现有股东,转变为通过回购保持股本数量不变。
And I also adjusted my model to reflect that Shopify, we talked about this earlier, has gone from being a massive net diluter of existing shareholders to, thanks to buybacks, being able to keep their share count flat.
当我们考虑双引擎,也就是盈利增长和市盈率时,你现在给这家公司定的市盈率是多少?
And when we think about the twin engine, so earnings growth and the multiple, what's the multiple that you're now putting on the business?
问得好,这次我决定请教一下本·格雷厄姆。
It's a good question, and I decided this time to invoke the knowledge of none other than Ben Graham.
他有一个市盈率矩阵,根据AAA级公司债券的利率——也就是最高质量的公司债券——以及你对公司未来几年盈利增长的预估,得出一个你愿意为这只股票支付的市盈率。
And basically, he has a price-to-earnings matrix where you look at the interest rate on AAA-rated corporate bonds, so the highest quality corporate bonds out there, and then your estimated growth rate for the company's earnings over the next couple of years, and then it spits out a multiple that you should be willing to pay for the stock.
这是个很有用的参考方法。
And it's a helpful heuristic.
如果我们遵循这个非常简单的框架,那么像Shopify这样增长的公司,支付大约35倍的营业利润可能是一个合理的价格,不过我也知道,与市场历史上对Shopify的估值相比,这算是相当保守的了。
And if we follow this very simple framework, then something like 35 times operating earnings is probably a fair price to pay for a company growing like Shopify is, though I recognize that this is pretty conservative compared to how the market has historically valued Shopify.
所以,为了讨论方便,也许我们可以更慷慨一些,因为正如我们今天所发现的,Shopify是一家非常特别的公司。
So for the sake of argument, maybe we'd be more generous because Shopify is such a special company, as we've found out today.
即使按每股营业利润的45倍来计算,我得到的估值数字看起来也不怎么样。
And even at 45 times operating profits per share, though, the valuation number that I get just doesn't look great.
不幸的是,我们遇到了和去年一样的问题,而且在我们第一次看这只股票的时候,你猜怎么着,它的交易价格是营业利润的112倍。
Unfortunately, we have the same problem that we did last year, and at the time we first looked at the stock, it was trading at, guess what, 112 times operating profits.
这个数字简直离谱,说出来都让人觉得不可思议。
It's just an obscene number to even say.
这简直违背了价值投资者的直觉。
It violates the senses of value investors.
而今天,它的交易价格恰好就是营业利润的112倍。
And well, today, it trades at exactly 112 times operating profits.
所以就算我想编,也编不出这样的数字来。
So I couldn't have made that up myself even if I wanted to.
而且就像他们说的,Shopify根本没有通过增长来消化它的高估值。
And as they say, Shopify has not grown into its multiple at all.
股价翻倍是因为盈利差不多翻倍了,而市场从头到尾一直愿意支付同样的溢价。
The stock doubled because the earnings roughly doubled, and the market just kept paying the same premium the whole way.
所以实际上,今天买股票的人跟我们当初放弃的是同一个赌注,只是起点更高了,而且对公司未来的要求同样是完美无缺。
So really, anyone buying shares today is making the same bet that we passed on, just from a higher starting point, and the same need for perfection from the company going forward.
Shopify过去一年确实表现不错,但112倍的经营利润意味着你不仅期望它延续去年的势头,还期望它越来越好。
Shopify definitely delivered over the last year, but 112 times operating earnings means that you do not only expect it to continue the way it has in the last year, you actually expect it to get better and better.
我最近看了Palantir,那也是一家长期以离谱倍数交易的公司,但我至少能算清楚它怎么随着时间消化这个倍数。
I looked at Palantir just recently, which is another company that traded at absurd multiples for a long time, but I could actually do the math and see how it grows into the multiple over time.
但在这里,我觉得我们还得再等几年,等市场终于说:"好吧,咱们得谨慎一点了",然后真正回落到比如35倍到45倍的盈利水平。
Here, I think it will take us another couple of years and a market that finally says, "Okay, well, let's be a bit more cautious here" and actually settle down to, let's say, 35, 45 times earnings.
而且我觉得,如果本·格雷厄姆会建议35倍盈利,我们取45倍,那已经是我们能接受的上限了。
And I think if Ben Graham would suggest 35 times earnings and we go with 45, I think that's as far as we can go.
我不知道本·格雷厄姆会不会为任何公司支付35倍的盈利,但即使Shopify是个很棒的企业,让我付112倍的经营利润,我还是觉得不太舒服。
I think, I don't know if Ben Graham would have paid 35 times earnings for any company, but I don't feel too good, even though Shopify is a fantastic business, about paying 112 times operating earnings.
是的,我当然不想押注Shopify会一直完美运营下去。
Yeah, I certainly wouldn't want to bet on Shopify basically continuing to operate perfectly.
所以我也说不准。
And so I don't know.
也许我们终究没学到什么,因为结论还是老样子。
Maybe we haven't learned anything after all because we're at the same conclusion.
而且说到底,也许我们就是太抠门的价值投资者,不愿意为这家公司出高价,尽管我们现在几乎花了两整期播客来主要讨论它有多好。
And maybe at the end of the day, we're just too stingy of value investors to pay up for this company, despite us now basically devoting two full podcasts to primarily talking about how great it is.
这次我要怪价值投资之父,对,就是本·格雷厄姆。
And this time, I'm going to blame the father of value investing, yeah, Ben Graham.
他就是我的借口。
He's my cop-out.
我无法接受支付他推荐市盈率的近两倍,甚至三倍。
I can't justify paying nearly twice the multiple he would recommend, or really triple the multiple he would recommend.
所以这就是我晚上能睡得着觉的原因——不持有这家公司。
So that's how I'm going to sleep at night by not owning this company.
但这确实是我们需要密切关注的一个公司。
But it really is one that we need to be watching closely.
所以我说这家公司可能大概值每股100美元,肯定会显得我很没眼光。
And so I'm sure I'll look terrible by saying that the company is probably about fairly valued at maybe $100 a share.
他们过去一年内在内在价值上大幅提升,但录制时股价已经到每股160美元了。
So they have increased their intrinsic value dramatically in the last year, but shares are trading at $160 per share at the time of recording.
我希望某个时候能出现足够大的抛售,这样我们就能大量买入股票。
At some point, I'm hoping we'll get a big enough sell-off so we can gobble up a bunch of shares.
如果股价接近100美元,我肯定会考虑建立一个跟踪仓位。
And if it gets close to $100, I would definitely be open to opening a tracking position.
嗯,我觉得我们花了很长时间来反思我们错得有多离谱,我们低估了Shopify,这听起来像是在重蹈覆辙,但说实话,我并不是完全同意我们当初就错了这个说法。
Well, I think we spend such a long time working out how wrong we've been, and that we underestimated Shopify, and this sounds like repeating the same mistake, but if I'm being completely honest, I don't fully agree with the notion that we were wrong anyway in the first place.
这倒不是因为我不愿意承认过去的投资决策是错误。
And it's not because I don't like considering Past investment decisions are a mistake.
我们确实承认过错误。
We definitely did that.
我们有一整期节目专门讲过去一年半里我们犯下的错误。
We had an entire episode devoted simply to the mistakes that we committed in the last year and a half.
但我们不必一直追逐那些已经把最乐观情况计入价格的股票。
But we don't have to chase stocks that price in these best-case scenarios continuously.
我们知道市场是怎么运作的,而且我很有信心,总有一天我们会有机会以对我们俩来说更有吸引力的价格买入Shopify,尤其是在整个市场都在琢磨AI和智能体对电商整体以及长期会有什么影响的时候。
We know how the markets work, and at some point, I'm pretty confident we will get a chance to buy Shopify at a price that seems more attractive to the two of us, and especially at times where the whole market tries to figure out what impact AI and agents will have on e-commerce in general, and in the long run.
而且,我也不确定。
And, I don't know.
这个月Meta和Shopify还是AI的大输家,下个月它们就成了AI的大赢家。
One month Meta and Shopify are the big AI losers, and then the next month, they are the big winners of AI.
所以我很有信心,将来我们会有机会以明显更好的价格买入它们。
So I'm pretty confident we will have the chance to buy them at significantly better prices in the future.
好的。
All right.
那我们就收个尾吧。
Well, let's bring it home.
如果今天你只记住一件事,我希望是:投资中最难的问题不是找到好公司。
If you take nothing else from today, I hope you'll remember this, listeners, that the hardest problem in investing is not finding great companies.
Shopify 从来都不难被认定为一家好公司。
Shopify was never hard to identify as great.
难的是市场通常也知道这一点,而且你往往需要付出一个不容许犯错的价格。
The hard part is that the market usually knows it, too, and you usually have to pay a price that leaves no room for error.
所以在一段时间内,错误可能不会出现,价格持续上涨。
And so over some periods, the error never comes, and the price keeps working.
但我们的工作就是持续在场,保持诚实,并准备好迎接市场先生终于对公司某些行为做出负面反应的那一天。
But our job is just to keep showing up and staying honest and be ready for those days when Mr. Market finally has a bad reaction to something that the company has done.
最后,今天分享的名言来自伟大的霍华德·马克斯,他写道:“领先时代太多,和犯错是无法区分的。”
And to close things out, today's quote comes from the great Howard Marks, who wrote, "Being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong."
所以,在过去一年半里,我们对 Shopify 的谨慎态度可以说和犯错无法区分,而且这种情况可能还会持续,因为这家公司的执行力不亚于世界上任何一家企业。
And so for a year and a half, our caution on Shopify has been indistinguishable from being wrong, I would say, and it may stay that way because this company is executing as well as any business on the planet.
但马克斯也在提醒所有以当前价格买入的人:即使你对公司的判断是对的,但如果太早或价格不合适,那种感觉可能和犯错一模一样,而且会持续很长时间。
But Marks is also warning everyone paying today's price that being right about a company too early or at any price can feel exactly like being wrong for a long, long time.
所以我们宁愿等待,等到我们观察名单上的好公司价格更接近合理水平,也不愿意为完美付出过高的代价。
And so we would rather wait for what we think is something closer to a fair price for a great company on our watchlist than pay for perfection.
好了,我们下次再见。
And with that, we'll see you all again next time.
感谢收听TIP。
Thanks for listening to TIP.
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