混乱的幽灵——格雷厄姆·艾利森

女士们、先生们，本集由我的周末邮件赞助。

Ladies and gentlemen, this episode is brought to you by my weekend email.

正如你们许多人现在所知，每个周末，我都会分享一些我阅读、观看或收听过的有趣链接、文章和资料。

As many of you now know, every weekend, I share some interesting links, articles, and sources that I've been reading, watching, or listening to.

例如，上个周末，我分享了五个链接，包括《台湾的诱惑》、斯坦福大学奥里安娜·斯凯勒·马斯特罗撰写的新一篇外交事务文章，以及一位即将做客播客的嘉宾撰写的遍历经济学文章。

Last weekend, for example, I shared five links, including the Taiwan temptation, a new foreign affairs article by Stanford's Oriana Skylar Mastro, and an article on ergodicity economics by an upcoming podcast guest.

如果你是一位喜欢广泛阅读的Infervor，那么你应该加入我的邮件列表，前往 jspod.com 获取我的周末邮件。

If you're an infervor who enjoys reading widely, then you should join my mailing list and get access to my weekend emails by heading to the jspod.com.

就是 jspod.com。

That's the jspod.com.

就这些。

That's all.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

您正在收听《快乐的斯瓦格曼》播客。

You're listening to the Jolly Swagman podcast.

以下是您的主持人，乔·沃克。

Here's your host, Joe Walker.

女士们、先生们，男孩们、女孩们，流浪汉和流浪汉们，欢迎回到节目。

Ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, Swagmen and Swaggarts, welcome back to the show.

很高兴您能回来。

It's great to have you back.

本期节目将探讨中美关系，嘉宾是该领域的世界顶级权威之一。

This is an episode about China US relations with one of the world's leading authorities on the topic.

这是一期严肃的节目，我想好好铺垫一下。

It's a serious episode, and I want to set it up properly.

所以，请给我大约四分钟来做准备。

So give me about four minutes to do so.

正如李光耀所说，中国是世界历史上最大的玩家，但中国的崛起却如惊雷般突如其来。

To quote Lee Kuan Yew, China is the biggest player in the history of the world, But China's rise has happened like a thunderclap.

正如前捷克总统哈维尔所言，这一切发生得太快，我们甚至还没来得及感到震惊。

To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel, it has happened so quickly we have not yet had time to be astonished.

以购买力平价衡量，中国的经济规模从2004年相当于美国经济的45%，在2014年超越美国，到去年已高出六分之一，预计到2024年将达到美国的135%。

Measured in terms of purchasing power parity, China's economy has grown from being 45% the size of The US economy in 2004 to surpassing it in 2014 to being one sixth larger last year, and it's expected to be 135% its size in 2024.

中国迅猛的崛起创造了人类历史上最伟大的减贫机制。

China's meteoric rise has created the greatest poverty reduction mechanism in human history.

它也使中国与美国陷入冲突，作为崛起中的超级大国与现存霸权国家争夺全球主导权。

It has also set China on a collision course with The United States as the rising superpower and the ruling one fight for global hegemony.

这种类型的竞争在历史上屡见不鲜，因此我们给它起了个名字——修昔底德式竞争，它引出了我的嘉宾提出的‘修昔底德陷阱’这一概念，我稍后会加以解释。

This type of rivalry has occurred often enough in history that we've given it a name, Thucydidean rivalry, and it sets up what my guest coined Thucydides trap, an idea I'll explain momentarily.

我的嘉宾艾利森是哈佛大学道格拉斯·迪隆政府学教授。

My guest, Allison, is the Douglas Dillon professor of government at Harvard University.

他已在哈佛执教五十年。

He's taught at Harvard for five decades.

事实上，他是哈佛肯尼迪学院的创始院长。

In fact, he was the founding dean of Harvard's Kennedy School.

他还曾担任克林顿政府第一任期的国防部副部长。

He was also assistant secretary of defense in the first Clinton administration.

格雷厄姆是全球最杰出的国际关系学者之一。

Graham is one of the most preeminent international relations scholars in the world.

他的第一本书《决策的本质：解释古巴导弹危机》于1971年出版，销量超过五十万册，彻底改变了政治科学中对决策的研究。

His first book, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, published in 1971, sold more than 500,000 copies and revolutionized the study of decision making in political science.

他最新的著作《注定一战：中美能否避免修昔底德陷阱》于2017年出版，并迅速成为国际畅销书。

His latest book, Destined for War, Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap, was published in 2017 and quickly became an international bestseller.

我第一次在2018年读到这本书，它是过去几年里我读过的最重要的著作之一。

I first picked it up in 2018, and it's one of the most important books I've read in the past several years.

修昔底德陷阱指的是当一个崛起大国威胁到取代现有主导国时，所产生的严重结构性压力。

Thucydides Trap refers to the severe structural stress produced when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one.

这一名称是对雅典历史学家修昔底德的致敬。

The name is a nod to the Athenian writer Thucydides.

在他的著作《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》——被公认为人类历史上第一部历史著作——中，修昔底德写道，正是雅典的崛起和斯巴达由此产生的恐惧，使得战争不可避免。

In his book, The History of the Peloponnesian War, regarded as the world's first ever work of history, Thucydides writes that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.

伯罗奔尼撒战争并非修昔底德陷阱最后一次被触发。

The Peloponnesian War was not the last time Thucydides' trap was sprung.

回顾过去五百年，格雷厄姆及其哈佛研究团队发现了16个新兴国家威胁挑战主导强国地位的案例。

Looking back over the past five hundred years, Graham and his research team at Harvard found sixteen cases where a nation threatened to disrupt the position of a dominant power.

这些案例从15世纪末的葡萄牙与西班牙，一直延伸到柏林墙倒塌后英国和法国对德国的挑战。

The cases range from Portugal versus Spain in the late fifteenth century to The United Kingdom and France versus Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

在16个案例中，有12个最终演变为战争。

In 12 of the 16 cases, the result was war.

当然，仅凭这12个爆发战争的案例就断定未来几十年美中爆发战争的概率为75%，是错误的。

Of course, it would be a mistake to conclude on the basis of those 12 war torn cases that the probability of a US China war in the next few decades is 0.75.

对于一次性历史事件，我们只能用可能性（序数变量）来讨论，而不能用概率（基数变量）来衡量。

It only makes sense to speak about one shot historical events in terms of likelihood, an ordinal variable, not probability, a cardinal variable.

要了解为什么这么说，请收听我在第131期节目中与约翰·凯进行的三十分钟对话。

For an explanation of why this is true, have a listen to my thirty minute conversation with John Kay in episode 131.

有鉴于此，我同意格雷厄姆的观点：美中开战的可能性不仅高于大多数人所认知的，而且更可能发生而非不会发生。

With that in mind, I agree with Graham that US China war is not just more likely than most people recognize, but more likely than not.

尽管一场美中战争将带来无比深远且永恒的遗憾，但其发生绝非难以想象。

As utterly and eternally regretted as it would be, a war between The US and China is far from inconceivable.

事实上，这种情况已经发生过。

In fact, it's already happened.

1950年6月25日，金日成在中国和苏联的支持下，对韩国发动了突然入侵。

On the 06/25/1950, Kim Il sung with support from China and The Soviet Union launched a surprise invasion of South Korea.

大约一个月后，麦克阿瑟将军率主要由美军组成的联合国部队前来救援首尔。

About a month later, general MacArthur came to Seoul's rescue, leading a UN force mainly composed of American troops.

他们将朝鲜军队击退至三八线以北，逼近朝鲜与中国边境。

They pushed the North Korean army back beyond the 38th Parallel and towards the border between North Korea and China.

某年十一月的一个早晨，麦克阿瑟惊讶地发现有三十万中国士兵正在进攻美军阵地。

One morning in November, MacArthur was flabbergasted to find 300,000 Chinese soldiers assailing the American lines.

中国军队将麦克阿瑟的部队打回三八线，这条线至今仍是朝韩两国的分界线。

The Chinese beat MacArthur's forces back to the 38th Parallel, which continues to demarcate the two Koreas today.

到1953年战争结束时，近三百万人丧生，其中包括三万六千名美军士兵。

By the time the war ended in 1953, almost three million people had died, including thirty six thousand American troops.

当我跟人们谈论修昔底德陷阱以及美中关系的脆弱状态时，有时会遇到一种奇怪的现象：有人误以为我是在鼓吹或庆祝战争的阴影。

When I talk to people about Thucydides' trap and the powerless state of US China relations, I'm sometimes met with the strange experience of being misinterpreted as somehow inviting or celebrating the specter of war.

恰恰相反。

Au contraire.

从历史角度来看，我们正航行在危险的水域中。

Historically speaking, we're sailing through perilous waters.

客观性，才是防止战争作为结果的第一步。

Objectivity, not is the first step to preventing war as an outcome.

这种结果有可能终结每个人的所有梦想。

An outcome with the potential to end every part of every dream of every person.

那些试图淡化危险的人，充其量是天真的，因为低估风险只会使风险增加。

People who want to gloss over the danger are at best naive because by underestimating the risk, we increase it.

知识和机遇是我们避免迷迷糊糊跌入深渊的全部依靠，而我从未觉得机遇是可靠的。

Knowledge and chance are all that keep us from stumbling bleary eyed into the abyss, and I've never found chance to be reliable.

在进入下一集之前，我想强调最后两点。

Before I throw to the episode, I want to note two final things.

第一，格雷厄姆和我在有限的时间内还有很多没有讨论的内容。

One, there is so much that Graham and I didn't discuss in the limited time that we had.

我认真推荐他的著作《注定一战》。

I seriously recommend his book destined for war.

我不是轻率地说这句话。

I don't say that lightly.

我试着向格雷厄姆提出了一些书中没有讨论的问题。

And I tried to ask Graham some questions you won't find discussed in the book.

第二，格雷厄姆不仅是一位学者，也是一位绅士。

Second, Graham is not just a scholar, but also a gentleman.

他后来给我发邮件，说这是他参加过最富有见地、最深思熟虑、最引人入胜的访谈之一，我感到非常荣幸。

I was honored when he emailed me afterwards to say it was one of the most informed, thoughtful, and engaging interviews he'd ever done.

能够有机会与格雷厄姆对话，对我来说是一种特殊的荣幸，我希望这次对话能为你和这个世界带来一些价值。

It was a special privilege me for me to have this opportunity to speak with Graham, and I hope it provides some service to you and to the world.

那么，不多说了，请欣赏我与伟大的格雷厄姆·艾利森的对话。

So without much further ado, please enjoy my conversation with the great Graham Allison.

格雷厄姆·艾利森，欢迎来到《快乐流浪者》播客。

Graham Allison, welcome to the Jolly Swagman podcast.

谢谢您邀请我。

Thank you for having me.

能与您交谈，我深感荣幸，先生。

It is an honor to speak with you, sir.

我是您作品的粉丝。

I am a fan of your work.

我认为在当前这个时刻，您的工作至关重要，我有很多话题想与您讨论。

I think it is vitally important work in this current moment, and I have many things that I would like to discuss.

但我的第一个问题可能是最棘手的，那就是：在什么情况下，对中国的战争是值得打的？

But my first question is perhaps the trickiest, and that is, in what circumstances would a war against China be worth fighting?

我的天啊。

Well, my god.

这是最困难的问题。

That's the most difficult question.

所以，向教授们提出这样的问题有一个难点，就像我一位同事曾经说过的，我们总是用五十分钟的简短发言来表达观点。

So one of the difficulties with asking a question like that of professors is as one of my colleagues used to say, we speak in fifty minute sound bites.

所以让我试着简洁地讲三点或四点。

So let me try to be succinct three or four points here.

首先，这很大程度上取决于你所说的‘战争’指的是什么。

First, depends a lot on what you mean by a war.

我认为我们大多数人已经忘记了战争真正意味着什么。

And I think most of us have forgotten what really means war.

但如果我们谈论的是美国和中国之间的全面战争，也就是第三次世界大战，而在这场战争中，美国和中国都动用了全部核武库，那么战争结束后，这两个国家可能都会从地图上消失，中国境内的所有中国人和美国境内的所有美国人都将被杀死。

But if what we're we're talking about was a total war between The US and China, that is World War three, and if in that war the US and China each used their full nuclear arsenals, at the end of that war there could be both countries erased from the map and every Chinese in China killed and every American in The US killed.

而且，实际上，还有足够的核弹可以攻击其他一些目标。

And, actually, there's enough other bombs to go around to hit a few other targets.

所以，罗纳德·里根——一位我曾为他工作的强硬反共人士——通过这种逻辑推理，得出了他经常用一句车贴表达的结论：核战争无法取胜，因此绝不能发动。

So Ronald Reagan, a fierce anticommunist for whom I worked, worked his way through this logic and came to the conclusion that he often expressed in a bumper sticker, a nuclear war cannot be won and must therefore never be fought.

因此他得出结论：没有任何事情值得以彻底毁灭美国为代价。

So he concluded there was nothing for which it would have been worth after the fact having destroyed The US entirely.

好的。

Okay.

所以这是第一点。

So that's point one.

痛苦且很难快速在理智上达成某种共识。

Painful and very hard to intellectually come to a certain point quickly.

但这并不意味着人们不会为了某些事情冒核战争的风险，或冒一场可能升级为核战争的小规模战争的风险。

So that doesn't mean that one's not prepared to risk a nuclear war for some things or risk a small war that could escalate to a nuclear war.

在冷战期间，我们确实采取了一些包含战争风险的行动。

And in the cold war, we did take actions that included some risk of a war.

所以我认为，更好的问题是：在什么情况下，应该冒一场可能升级为核战争的战争风险？

So I think the question is better asked under what circumstances should one take a risk of a war that could escalate to a nuclear war?

而在这里，again，这取决于价值观和利益。

And there, again, it depends on the values and the interests.

因此，当美国对澳大利亚、新西兰、日本和韩国有明确的条约承诺时，如果美国不履行这些承诺，联盟体系就会崩溃，然后我们可以推演其后果，人们很可能会得出结论：与其坐视不管，不如开战并承担核战争升级的风险。

So where The US has firm treaty commitments to Australia and New Zealand, to Japan, to South Korea, If The US should not fulfill its commitments, the alliance system would unravel and then we can play out the consequences of that and one could well conclude that it would have been better to fight a war and risk the escalation of a nuclear war.

所以具体来说，第三点：朝鲜战争。

So take specifically third point, Korean War.

我们该不该打朝鲜战争？

Should we have fought the Korean War?

美国和澳大利亚是否应该为阻止南朝鲜被北朝鲜吞并而开战？

Should The US and Australians have fought to keep South Korea from being absorbed by North Korea.

当时我们能够这么做，尽管我们根本没想到中国会参战，但中国确实参战了。

Well at the time we were able to do so against a China that we would even imagine would have entered the war, did enter the war.

结果，丧生的美国人和澳大利亚人比原本要多得多。

As a result, lots more Americans and Australians were killed than would have been otherwise.

但无论如何，当时并没有升级为核战争的风险。

But, nonetheless, there wasn't a risk that it, would escalate to a nuclear war.

尽管有五万名美国人和数千名澳大利亚人阵亡，但南朝鲜却是过去五十年中最伟大的成功故事之一。

And despite the fact that there were 50,000 dead Americans and some thousands of dead Australians, South Korea has been one of the great success stories of the last fifty years.

它已发展成为一个自由、充满活力的民主经济体。

It's emerged as a free, vibrant, democratic economy.

如果你说，好吧，我们再重来一次。

If you said, well, let's do it again.

我们还会再这么做吗？

Would we do that again?

我认为答案是会的。

I think the answer is yes.

那我会再打越南战争吗？

Now would I do Vietnam again?

不会。

No.

所以有很多不必要的战争。

So there's lots of unnecessary wars.

不幸的是，美国最近对这类战争有一种倾向，包括在伊拉克和阿富汗。

Unfortunately, The US has had a inclination for them lately, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.

但我认为有些事情是值得为之战斗的。

But I think there's some things that are worth fighting for.

当然，为了我们自己的自由，这些是值得为之战斗的。

Certainly for our own freedoms, they're worth fighting for.

约翰·肯尼迪有句话，你知道吗？人们说，你是宁愿死也不愿红色，还是宁愿红色也不愿死？

John Kennedy had a saying, you know, people said, well, will you rather be dead than red or red than dead?

他说，等一下。

And he said, wait a minute.

不。

No.

我拒绝这种二元对立。

I refuse that dichotomy.

我希望既有和平又有自由。

I want both peace and freedom.

所以我认为，这正是我们所追求的。

So I think that's what we want.

你说过，你在中国问题上最重要的三位老师是亨利·基辛格、陆克文和李光耀。

You said that the three great teachers that you had on China were Henry Kissinger, Kevin Rudd, and Lee Kuan Yew.

我很想知道，你能总结一下这三位先生各自教给你的关于中国最重要的东西吗？

I'm curious, could you summarize the most important thing that each man has taught you about China?

哦，很好的观点。

Oh, great points.

当我还是研究生时，我的导师是亨利·基辛格。

So my teacher when I was a graduate student was Henry Kissinger.

后来我成了他的教学助理、课程助理和研究助理。

Then I became his teaching assistant and course assistant and research assistant.

他和我计划在周六就某件事通话。

He and I are going to do call on Saturday on something.

所以，如果你曾经为亨利工作过，你就永远在为他工作。

So one of the things if you ever worked for Henry, you've always worked for Henry.

他几周前刚满98岁。

And he just turned 98 a couple of weeks ago.

真是了不起的人物。

So amazing character.

我认为，亨利理解里根的观点：由于我们无法与苏联打核战争，我们必须找到一种方式与他们共存，即使我们之间存在长期的竞争或对抗。

Henry, I think, understood the Reagan proposition that because we couldn't fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, we had to find some way to live with them even while we had a long term competition or rivalry.

他在尼克松政府时期为此而挣扎。

And he struggled with that in the Nixon administration.

笛卡尔是这一理念的早期阶段。

Descartes was a kind of a early stage of that.

遏制战略的演变。

The evolution in the strategy of containment.

亨利甚至说过，在我与他的一次在线访谈中，他一直疑惑，如果苏联真的对美国发动核攻击，他是否会建议我们以彻底摧毁整个苏联作为回应，即使这意味着美国也将被彻底毁灭。

And Henry has even said, there's an online interview that I did with him in which he always wondered that if the Soviet Union had actually attacked The US with nuclear weapons, would he have recommended that we respond by basically destroying the entire Soviet Union if it meant that would mean the entire destruction of The US.

他始终无法在内心给出这个问题的答案。

And he was never able to answer that question in his own mind.

所以即使到现在，他仍在反思这一点。

So even now reflecting on it.

但无论如何，我认为这是从亨利身上得出的一个重要启示。

But in any case, I would say that's a big takeaway from Henry.

至于李光耀，我认为他无疑是最敏锐的中国观察家之一，部分因为他极其聪明，部分因为他有迫切的需要去了解中国——因为新加坡的生存完全取决于中国的意愿或恩惠，同时他也被许多中国领导人视为榜样。

From Lee Kuan Yew, whom I think was unquestionably the most astute China watcher, in part because he was so smart, in part because he had a really urgent need to know since Singapore only survives that China's whim or China's largesse and also because he was a model for many Chinese leaders.

他们总会来找他谈话，因此他与中国领导人的面对面交流时间比任何人都多。

They would come and want to talk to him so he spent more face time with Chinese leaders than anybody.

他的观点是，中国将成为世界历史上最重要的角色，其崛起是正常的，因为它大致遵循了新加坡、韩国、日本等国走向市场的路径，而这将成为二十一世纪的决定性特征。

His proposition was that China was going to be the biggest player in the history of the world that its rise was normal since it was trying to follow more or less in the path of Singapore and South Korea and Japan and others who had made their way to the market and that this was something that was going to become the defining feature of the twenty first century.

争夺主导权将成为二十一世纪的决定性特征，他不断告诉我：这甚至早在本世纪初，格雷厄姆，你该更多关注中国，更多关注中国。我回答说：谢谢您，但中国太大太复杂了。

That the contest for supremacy would be the defining feature of the twenty first century and he kept telling me this is now back even at the beginning of the century Graham you should pay more attention to China, pay more attention to China and I said thank you sir but China is so big and so complicated.

有着如此悠久的历史，我又不会说普通话，而他却说：要更多关注中国。

Have such a long history and I don't speak Mandarin and what he said pay more attention to China.

这是一条明智的建议，他对这一趋势如何发展的基本洞察是正确的。

So that was wise advice and his basic insight about how this was likely to develop was correct.

对于凯文，我认为他一直是我理解中国内部政治复杂性的重要导师，同时也帮助我理解像澳大利亚这样的国家所面临的现实：它们无法在安全上依赖美国（这对它们的生存与福祉至关重要）和经济上依赖中国（这对它们的繁荣至关重要）之间做出选择。

For Kevin, Kevin I think has been a great tutor for me on helping understand more of the complexities of the internal politics of China on the one hand and also the reality of states like Australia in which it is impossible for them to choose between their security relationship which with The US, which is essential for their survival and well-being on the one hand, and their economic relationship with China, which is essential for their prosperity.

所以凯文是最早让我深刻意识到这一点的人之一：别逼我们在中国和美国之间二选一，别幻想能重建一个经济上的铁幕，把站在你这边的国家与中国的阵营隔离开来，因为你根本找不到任何可行的方案——无论是对澳大利亚、日本、新加坡还是德国而言。

So Kevin was one of the first people to make it drive it home to me that you know don't try to make us choose between The US and China and imagining that you're gonna reconstruct some cold war with a iron curtain of economics between the people that are on your side in the rivalry and China because you're going to not find the choices, ones that you can live with whether it's for Australia or Japan or Singapore or Germany.

因此，我认为这有助于你理解，为什么这最终比冷战复杂得多，因为对于苏联来说，幸运的是——我是个老冷战派——他们主动与全球经济脱钩了。

So I think that helps you see why this is ultimately so much more complex than the Cold War because for the Soviet Union, fortunately, I'm an old cold warrior so fortunately they isolated themselves from the global economy.

所以他们基本上只与自己阵营的成员进行贸易，而快速增长的经济体则属于市场经济阵营，这最终增强了我们一方的实力，同时削弱了对方的力量。

So they only traded basically with the members of their block and the growing economies were part of the market world and ultimately that built the strength of our side and hollowed out their side.

他们也大多在技术上处于劣势，仅在少数领域有所突破。

They also were largely, they were mostly technically challenged except in a few areas.

他们的导弹项目不错，炸弹也能用，但无法制造计算机。

So they had a good missile program, they had bombs that worked, but they were not able to make computers.

他们甚至在那个年代还在使用真空管，基本上他们只是在某些领域具备竞争力，但与中国不同，中国是一个全方位的平等竞争对手，而美国、澳大利亚以及其他国家都必须正视这一点——这不再是一个能简单套用冷战模式就能应对的局面。

They still used vacuum tubes back when so basically they were they were a competitor in certain arenas but unlike China, China is a full spectrum peer competitor and coming to grips with that for The US and for Australia and for everyone else again means there is no simple model like the cold war that if we just follow that playbook it's going to work out okay.

这是一个特殊而复杂的新情况。

This is a special new complicated case.

这就像修昔底德曾经教导我们的历史模式。

It's like what we've seen historically that Thucydides taught us about.

因此，这是一个崛起中的大国威胁要取代现有霸权，两者之间有根本的相似性，但这一案例与苏联或其他许多案例之间的差异更为显著，必须被充分重视和考虑。

So it is a rising power threatening to displace a ruling power, so there's a fundamental similarity but the differences between this case and the Soviet Union or many of the other cases are more significant, I mean have to be more significant and have to be taken into account.

为什么购买力平价是衡量一个国家GDP的最佳标准？

Why is purchasing power parity the best yardstick for measuring a country's GDP?

很好的问题，这个问题对你们的一些人来说可能太复杂了，因为一旦涉及购买力平价和市场汇率，情况就会变得复杂。

Great question and this may be too complicated for some of your folks because once they get into PPP and market exchange rates it can become complicated.

我写过一篇相当简单的文章，叫《巨无霸跷跷板》，用它来理解如何衡量经济。

I wrote a fairly simplistic article on this called the Big Mac Seesaw for understanding measuring economies.

相信购买力平价是最好的衡量标准，最主要的原因是，美国中央情报局和国际货币基金组织在多年使用传统方法后，经过反复推敲，最终得出了这一结论。简而言之，使用购买力平价而非市场汇率的理由在于，它关注的是中国人在中国境内、以中国价格能买到什么，而不是将等额人民币按当前汇率兑换成美元后再用美元购买商品。

So the best reason for believing this is the best yardstick is that that is the conclusion that both CIA and the IMF have come to painfully after having used the traditional yardsticks for many years but worked their way through the logic of it and in brief the logic of using PPP rather than market exchange rates is that it focuses on what Chinese can buy in China at China prices as compared to what they would be able to buy if they took that equivalent amount of RMB, exchanged it at the current exchange rates for dollars and then use those dollars to buy something.

以经济学家提出的巨无霸指数为例，我认为这个方法非常出色，能很好地解释这一概念。

So to take the big mac index which was developed by the economist and which is I think brilliant as a way to explain this.

如果我去北京的麦当劳，用相当于波士顿麦当劳一个巨无霸4.5美元的人民币购买一个巨无霸。

If I go to a McDonald's in Beijing and take the RMB equivalent of the $4.50 it cost me for a big mac at McDonald's in Boston.

所以我拿着这些人民币。

So I take those RMB.

我可以买到一个半的巨无霸。

I can buy one and a half Big Macs.

因此，用等值的美元或4.5美元，我能买到更多的汉堡。

So I get more burger for my equivalent of a a of a dollar or a $4.50.

所以如果我按汇率换算成美元并带到那里，我得到的就更少了。

So if I do it at exchange rates and make me translate it into dollars and take those there, I get less.

所以我认为最好的理解方式是，看中国人用他们的货币在当前汇率下能买到什么，比如一辆车、一架飞机、一枚导弹或一个基地。

So I think the best way to think of it is in terms of what the Chinese buy for their currency at the current exchange rates and if they are buying a car or a plane or a missile or a base.

另一种思考方式是，购买一名士兵需要多少钱。

Another way to think of it is how much does it cost to buy a soldier.

因此，在中国，一名士兵的成本大约是美国士兵的五分之一。

So again, in China about one fifth the price of an American soldier.

不过，我认为他们并不如美军那么优秀，也没有经过充分检验，所以要进行比较是一项复杂的工程。

Now, they are not as good I think, not as tested but so it's a complicated effort to try to compare.

尽管如此，如果你上网查阅美国中央情报局的《世界概况》，询问经济体规模，你会发现，根据他们认定的最佳衡量标准，中国的GDP现在比美国大约大20%。

Nonetheless, if you go to the CIA fact book online and ask about size of economies, you'll see that by their judgment of what's the best yardstick, China's GDP is now about 20% larger than that of The US.

为什么中国没有像所有人预期的那样实现自由化？

Why didn't China liberalize like everyone thought it would?

有趣的问题。

Interesting question.

我经常和刘鹤讨论这个问题。

This is one I've talked to Liu He about often.

他是他们负责经济事务的首席人物，曾是肯尼迪学院的学生。

He's their chief economics person who was a former student at the Kennedy School.

所以我认识他已经有二十五年了，他是一位聪明、深思熟虑、严肃的人，他说，正如他们政府所认为的那样，我们认为西方金融市场就像一个赌场，容易引发过度行为，就像我们看到的那样，导致了2008年的重大金融危机，而且这些危机反复出现，如果没有美国美联储和中国政府采取大规模刺激措施并协调应对，本可能演变成大萧条。

So I've known him for twenty five years and he's a brilliant thoughtful serious person and he says as I think their government says is we believe that western financial markets are like a casino and that they invite excesses of the sort that we saw that produced the financial crisis, the great financial crisis of two thousand and eight And they've repeatedly produced these crises in which there would have been a great depression if there hadn't been this extraordinary response both by the US Fed and by the Chinese government in doing their stimuluses and coordinating them.

因此，他们正在逐步涉足这一领域，但他们担心金融市场中总是存在诱惑，让大玩家承担不必要的或不可持续的风险。如果你看看花旗集团、高盛、AIG或其他机构在2008年之前的行为，他们创造了一系列金融工具，使自己面临巨大风险——一旦房地产价格下跌，他们就会濒临破产，若非政府救助，他们早已崩溃。

So they are creeping out in that space but they worry about financial markets in which the temptation always in the financial market is for big players to take on unnecessary levels or unsustainable levels of risk and if you look at what Citigroup or Goldman or AGI or others did before 2008 they had created a bunch of instruments that left them so exposed that if ever there should be a real estate prices should decline they would find themselves bankrupt and they would have been had there not been for the bailout.

因此，我认为中国人对本币完全自由化非常警惕，因为他们担心会受到国际市场的摆布，认为这些市场是‘狂野’的。

So I think the Chinese are very nervous about the full liberalization of their currency because they think they can be jerked around by international markets and they believe those are quote wild.

不过，这是一个复杂的问题，因为在西方开放的金融市场中，我们确实反复见证了过度承担风险导致金融危机，并需要重大应对措施，包括大萧条之后的反应。

Now, it's a complicated subject because it certainly is the case that in western open financial markets we've seen recurring excesses of risk that led to financial crises that required major responses including what we saw after the depression.

因此，他们能否找到一条通往受控市场、更受管理的市场的道路，这是一个值得探讨的问题，就像我们在美国也在思考：在‘大到不能倒’和2008年后实施的沃尔克规则等法律框架下，是否能对金融市场的参与者施加更多风险管理，因为他们的过度行为可能危及整个金融体系。

So, whether they can find their way to a controlled market, a more controlled or more managed market is a good question in the same way that you can see how in The US we are asking how with too big to fail and the other Volker rule laws that were put in after 2008, whether there can be a little bit more management of the risks in the financial markets by the players whose excesses could actually jeopardize the whole financial system.

修昔底德陷阱的理论基础是什么？

What are the theoretical underpinnings of the Thucydides trap?

我认为修昔底德深刻地阐述了这一基本理念，我之所以总是提醒人们，这是修昔底德的观点，而不是我的观点。

I I think the fundamental idea Thucydides wrote about brilliantly and the reason why I always remind people this was Thucydides idea not my idea.

我很幸运地创造了‘修昔底德陷阱’这个术语，但这是为了生动地呈现修昔底德的洞见，我认为他的洞见实际上非常根本，正如你所说，它的理论基础是什么。

I had the good fortune to coin the term Thucydides trap but it was a way of making vivid Thucydides insight and I think his insight is actually fundamental just as you say, what's the underpinning.

这个观点中有一种极其近乎本能的逻辑：当一个崛起的力量切实威胁到取代一个统治力量时，就会产生一种相当可预测的动态——统治力量会认为这种挑战是不合理、不公正、非正常的，崛起力量本应安分守己；于是便出现了我在书中所描述的一种综合征。同样，崛起力量自然会想：等等，这些规则是在我变得更强壮之前制定的。

There's something extremely almost protein about the proposition that when a rising power credibly threatens to displace a ruling power you get a dynamic that is fairly predictable in which the ruling power believes this is unreasonable, unjust, irregular, that the rising power should actually know its place and so you get what I describe in my book as a syndrome and similarly the rising power quite naturally thinks, well now wait a minute, the rules were made before I was bigger and stronger.

因此，规则需要调整，以反映我的实力和利益。你其实可以在各个地方看到这种现象。

So they need to be adjusted to take account of my weight and my interest And you see this actually everywhere.

比如，取任何行业中的老牌企业与一个具有技术颠覆性的新兴竞争者为例，你就能在新闻业看到这种现象：曾经长期垄断的报纸和电视网络，如今被新技术和新入局者颠覆，他们不禁疑惑：这到底发生了什么？

So if you take the established firms in any industry and a disruptive, a technologically disruptive upstart, you can see this in the news business where things that were newspapers and monopoly television networks for many years had been disrupted by technologies and upstarts and they wonder what the hell is going on?

你们为什么这样行事？

Why are you behaving this way?

你们不该做这种事。

You shouldn't be doing things like this.

你也可以在动物界看到这种现象，比如观察一头头狼和一头试图取而代之的年轻狼的崛起。

You can see this in the animal kingdom as you watch an alpha wolf and the emergence of a would be.

你甚至可以在家庭中看到这种现象。

And you can see this actually in families.

如果你有两个年龄相仿的孩子，年长的那个比年幼的高很多，但不知为何，年幼的孩子突然开始猛长，变得比年长的孩子还高，餐桌上的对话就会发生变化，年幼的孩子开始说更多话。

If you see, if you have two children roughly the same age and one, the older one is much taller than the younger one but then for whatever reason the younger one begins to sprout and becomes taller than the older one, the table conversation changes the amount of talk the younger one begins to do.

有时他甚至会建议，也许该重新调整卧室了，因为现在的卧室已经不够我用了。

Even sometimes he suggests that maybe the bedroom should be readjusted because my bedroom is not sufficient for me now.

所以，我认为当一个崛起的力量威胁要取代主导力量时所发生的现象，你可以在历史进程中看到，也能在动物界乃至家庭中的人类行为里直观地感受到它的元素。

So, I think the phenomenon that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, You can see in the course of history but you can see its elements intuitively in basically the animal kingdom and even the human expressions of that in families.

你写这本书时，暗示了第一次世界大战前的德国和英国，是最类似于当今中国和美国的案例。

When you wrote the book, you implied that Germany and Britain pre World War one was the most similar case study to China and The US today.

我很好奇，格雷厄姆，自从那以后，你的这种观点有改变吗？

I'm curious, Graham, has that view changed since the

书出版之后？

book was written?

例如，日本和

For example, Japan and

二战前的美国现在可能更具有参考性。

The United States before World War two might be more applicable now.

嗯，我仍然认为，由德国崛起和英国应对这一崛起所引发的第一次世界大战，是最相似的案例。

Well, I I still find the World War one resulting from the rise of Germany and efforts of Great Britain to cope with it the most analogous case.

当我与中国人士讨论这个问题时，他们最喜欢的例子是美国在与英国的竞争中崛起，以及英国对这一变化的接受。

The Chinese, when I talk to them about this, the case they like the best is the rise of The US in its rivalry with Great Britain and Britain's acceptance of that.

而我提醒他们的案例是冷战期间美国与苏联之间的竞争。

And the case that I remind them of is the case of the Cold War and the rivalry between The US and The Soviet Union.

但我认为，德国案例之所以令人不安，大概有三到四个原因。

But I think the reason why the German case is so haunting, I guess there is three or four reasons.

首先是，一旦德国完成统一，普鲁士成为完整的德意志国家后，其经济增长率便开始超过英国，到1900年其GDP与英国持平，到1914年则高出25%。

The first is that once Germany was reunified given Prussia and now that it had become a full German state, its growth rate began to exceed that of Great Britain so that by 1900 its GDP was equal and by 1914 twenty five percent larger.

因此，德国正处于一个日益强大的轨迹上，而随着实力增强，德国人开始问：为什么别人有殖民地，我们却没有？

So it was on a trajectory in which it was getting stronger and as it got stronger Germans said well why don't everybody else have colonies and we don't?

所以我们也应该拥有殖民地，尽管这些殖民地早在我们有能力竞争之前就被占有了。

So we should have colonies and even though they're all taken but they were taken before we were able to compete.

那我们呢？

So how about some for us?

或者，为什么英国要拥有主宰所有蓝色海域的海军？

Or, why should the British have a navy that dominates all the blue border?

我们更强大、更富裕，所以我们应该拥有海军。

We're bigger and richer, so we should have a navy.

于是他们开始建造海军。

So they began building a navy.

所以，如果你看看我在书中提到的克劳备忘录，那是为了向英国国王解释为什么与德国的竞争成为英国的核心问题。

So if you look at the Crow memoranda that I refer to in the book, written to explain to the king of England why the rivalry with Germany was becoming the central feature for British.

我觉得这令人不安。

I think it's haunting.

其次，这是一个对我们极具价值的警示案例：在这个案例中，英国和德国都不希望开战。

Secondly, this is a valuable warning case for us that in this case neither Great Britain nor Germany wanted war.

双方实际上都明白战争对自己会造成毁灭性后果，但他们陷入了一系列纠缠之中，最终让一件原本微不足道的事件——萨拉热窝大公遇刺——成为点燃战火的导火索，最终酿成一场无人预想的浩劫，而作为文明中心长达半个千年的欧洲，也因此元气大伤，再未恢复。

Both of them actually understood that war could be devastating for themselves but they got themselves into a set of entanglements that then allowed something as otherwise inconsequential as the assassination of an archduke in Sarajevo to become a spark that produced a fire, that produced a conflagration at the end of which nobody would have chosen what they got and actually Europe which had been the cockpit of civilization for half a millennium was basically exhausted and never recovered.

所以我认为，提醒我们一点很重要：你并不需要有意发动战争，战争也可能发生；那些在正常情况下看似微不足道的事件，一旦被卷入因竞争和误判而产生的认知偏差中，往往可能触发一系列负面反应，将人们拖入他们原本并不想抵达的境地。我担心台湾或朝鲜可能成为这样的导火索，因此，如果你用修昔底德的视角来思考，不难发现一些潜在的引爆点——如果双方不能提前足够明智地看待这些问题，并找到方法加以预防的话。

So I think the reminder that you don't have to want war for war to happen and that things that would otherwise seem inconsequential when played into the misperceptions and miscalculations that are characteristic of ethucidity and rivalry can often trigger a spiral of negative reactions that drag people to a place they don't want to be and I worry about Taiwan as a potential trigger or North Korea as a potential trigger so I think it's not difficult if you were thinking about it through Thucydidean lens to find candidates that could become a such a spark if the two parties are not smart enough to think about them before and figure out ways to con to to prevent them.

格雷厄姆，关于第三方在引发修昔底德式对手之间战争中的作用，这一点非常重要，但却被忽视了。

That point, Graham, about the role of third parties in igniting a war between Thucydides and rivals, I think, is really important and overlooked.

我跟很多人谈起你的书时，他们的第一反应都是：我实在无法想象这种事会发生，因为中美之间的战争对双方利益都明显有害。

Most people who I talk to about your book, their first reaction is, I just can't see it happening because war between China and The US is so manifestly against the interests of both.

但你的观点是，这类冲突几乎具有一种悲剧性，因为它们会失控地升级。

But your point is that there's almost this tragic quality to some of these conflicts because they spiral out of control.

正如我在书中提到的，我一直对第一次世界大战非常着迷。

As I mentioned in the book, and then I I mean, I've been fascinated by World War one for a long time.

所以巴特曼·霍尔德威克这位首相非常有意思。

So Bateman hold Bateman Holdwick is very interesting, the chancellor.

他亲身经历了这一切，战后，一位亲戚问他：你们到底干了些什么？

And here he lives through this, and after it, one of his relatives asked him, you know, what did you guys do?

你们当时到底以为自己在做什么？

What did you think you were doing?

你怎么会允许这种事情发生？

How did you like how did you let this happen?

他有一句疯狂的话：‘如果我们当时知道就好了。’

And he has this crazy line, ah, if we only knew.

他本该更明智一些，而我们至少应该足够聪明，能从这样的教训和错误中吸取经验。

So he should have known better than that, and we can at least be smart enough to learn from lessons and mistakes like that.

我的意思是，如果我们愿意的话。

I mean, if we're if we're prepared to.

是的。

Yeah.

乐观地说，中国人并不真的相信无意中的升级。

On an optimistic note, the Chinese don't really believe in inadvertent escalation.

在这方面，他们的思维方式与西方截然不同。

Their thinking is quite different to Western thinking in that sense.

我昨晚在悉尼跟阿里安娜·斯凯拉·马斯特罗聊了聊，她说中国人根本想不通：我们为什么要让一场战争失控？

I I was catching up with Ariana Skyla Mastro in Sydney last night, and she was saying that the Chinese just think, you know, why would we let a war spiral out of control?

这完全在我们的掌控之中。

It's completely within our control.

我曾与中国方面讨论过这个问题，我认为毫无疑问，在他们的世界观或对战争的概念中，尤其是在他们那种马列主义的视角下，存在着必然性和决定论的思想。

I've had this discussion with with Chinese, and I think there's no question that in their in their cosm or in their, you know, their conceptualization of war and especially in their kind of Marxist Leninist light rinse of that, that has these ideas of inevitability and determinism.

这其中确实有一部分因素。

There is no doubt an element of that.

但我认为，对于他们的严肃思想者来说，他们也注意到许多看似并非人为选择而发生的事情。

But I think that it is also the case that for their serious thinkers, they notice lots of things that seem to happen that were not chosen.

所以我曾与两位直接为习近平工作的人交谈过，我问他们，是否认为2008年那场金融危机是有人清楚理解自身行为后主动选择的。

So I've had this conversation with two people who work directly for Xi Jinping and I said, did they think that the great financial crisis of two thousand and eight was chosen by somebody understanding what they were doing.

他们说：当然不是！

They said, Well, of course not!

你知道，如果当时有人清楚可能发生什么，他们本会采取完全不同的应对方式。

You know, if anybody had understood what was likely to happen then, they would have positioned themselves quite differently.

我认为，在某种程度上，中国人的许多思维方式确实受到其历史观念、中国特色，甚至儒家思想的影响。

I think to some extent, I'm sure much of Chinese thinking is shaped by their historical concepts and their Chinese characteristics and even by their Confucianism and to some extent.

尽管凯文即将说服我，也许连某些马列主义成分也是如此，但我一直告诉他，在马萨诸塞州的剑桥，我能找到比在北京更多的真正共产主义者。

Though Kevin is about to persuade me that maybe even some of the Marxist Leninism, although I I keep telling him I can find more real communists in Cambridge, Massachusetts than in Beijing.

但我更钦佩他们最终的务实态度——当我观察他们实际的行为方式时，尽管他们有时会对这些行为给出一些不寻常的解释，但他们显然非常冷酷而现实、务实。

But I I'm more impressed with their ultimate pragmatism in which when I watch the way they actually behave, even though they sometimes give unusual explanations of it, they seem to be very ruthlessly realistic and pragmatic.

我认为在这方面，如果金融市场可能如此不确定，且极易因异常行为或不负责任的行为而被触发的话。

And I think in that regard, if financial markets can be as undetermined and vulnerable to being triggered by unusual behavior or irresponsible behavior.

我认为他们也怀疑，如果美国做出某种鲁莽举动，或者台湾做出某种鲁莽行为，或对他们的某个行动做出他们视为鲁莽的回应，情况也可能如此。

I think that they suspect that that could also be true, you know, if The US were to do something reckless or alternatively, Taiwan to do something reckless or to respond in a way that they would regard as reckless to something, that they did.

是的。

Yeah.

修昔底德陷阱真的算得上是陷阱吗？

Is the Thucydides trap really a trap?

我们已经讨论过，有些战争是必须打的。

We've already spoken about how there are some wars that have to be fought.

例如，美国参战第二次世界大战是正确的。

For example, The United States was right to join World War two.

但更重要的是，除了战争之外，还有更多非常非常不理想的事情。

But more than that, there are more things than war that are really, really undesirable.

例如，失去头号强国的地位以及随之而来的所有影响力丧失。

For example, losing your status as top dog and all of the loss of influence that that entails.

有时，为了防止这种地位的丧失，战争可能是必要的。

And sometimes a war might be necessary to prevent that loss of status.

那么，修昔底德陷阱真的算是一种陷阱吗？

So is the Thucydides trap not so much a trap?

哦，好问题。

Oh, good question.

修昔底德陷阱是一个宏大的概念，而修昔底德式的竞争则是其背后的根本结构。

So there's the Thucydides trap as one big idea, and the Thucydides and rivalry is really the structural underpinning of that.

在修昔底德式的竞争中，这是一种特殊形式的大国竞争。

So in a Thucydian rivalry, so this is a special form of great power competition.

历史上，大国竞争屡见不鲜，但有些大国竞争伴随着双方相对实力的剧烈变化，其中一个国家的崛起基本上将权力的跷跷板向原主导国的不利方向倾斜。

Great power competition is known through history but some great power competitions include rapid change in the relative power of the two parties in which one power's rise is basically shifting the seesaw of power to the disadvantage of the party that was the ruling party.

所以在这种情况下，这可以说是根本性的情势，有时统治国可能会主动出击，趁崛起国尚未强大到足以超越它之前就发动战争。

So in those circumstances, I mean that's the fundamental situation and sometimes there can be an argument for the ruling power fighting the rising power deliberately before the rising power becomes strong enough to overtake it.

或者，崛起国也可能认为自己已经足够强大，是时候采取行动了，你要么退让，要么我就不得不与你开战。

Or similarly, the rising power may think I'm big enough and strong enough that it's time for me to make my move and you should either stand down or if I have to fight you, I'll fight you.

因此，我会说，修昔底德式竞争在某些情况下确实引发了战争，但并非一定源于所谓的‘修昔底德陷阱’这一要素。

So I would say Thucydides rivalries produced war in some instances without having quote been caught in the Thucydides trap component.

‘修昔底德陷阱’这一概念强调的是，在这种竞争中，误判、计算错误、意外事件或第三方挑衅如何将双方推入一场他们本都不愿发生的战争。

The Thucydides trap component emphasizes the ways in which the misperceptions and miscalculations in this rivalry and accidents or incidents or third party provocations trigger the parties into a war that neither would have chosen.

因此，它试图突出这一层面。

So it tries to highlight that component of it.

但你确实敏锐地注意到，修昔底德式竞争关乎实质内容，而不仅仅是谁站在阶梯顶端，还关乎当你变得比我更强大时，是否坚持‘中国统治香港’这样的立场。

But you're certainly right to notice that the lucidity and rivalries are about something and they're about not simply who's at the top of the ladder but whether if if as you get bigger and stronger than I am, you insist that, well, China rules Hong Kong.

所以中国统治香港。

So China rules Hong Kong.

那么接下来，中国就会统治台湾。

Well, then China rules Taiwan.

等等，稍等一下。

Well, wait a minute.

但我之前建议我们保持台湾现状，而回应是：现在你已经让局势变得如此，如果我想阻止你统治台湾，我就不得不承担一个我认为不可接受的风险，因为军事力量的平衡已经发生了变化。

But I was proposing we leave Taiwan the way it was before, to which the answer is, well, you now have made it such that if I wanna prevent you ruling Taiwan, I have to take a risk that I would regard as unacceptable because a balance of military power has shifted.

因此，我认为这一观点是：鉴于各方有着相当合理但相互冲突的利益和价值观，问题不仅仅在于担心意外战争的风险。

So I think the proposition that this the relative strength of the parties given that they have quite understandable contrary interests and values mean that it's about more than worrying about the risk of accidental war.

它还涉及一个根本性问题：究竟谁的规则最终会占上风？如果我们非常珍视我们的自由——而我们确实如此，并且如果我们相信民主政体是保障这些自由的最佳方式，那么我们就必须找到一种方法，让在这场竞争中，我们的团队至少能在足够的‘奥运赛事’中胜出，以维持我们的地位。

It's also the fundamental question of, well, whose rules are going to ultimately obtain and if we care deeply about our freedoms, which we do, and if we believe that democratic forms of government are the best way in which to ensure those, then we have to figure out a way in which in this rivalry ultimately our our our team wins at least enough of the Olympic contests, you know, to hold our own.

这并不意味着我们必须死守过去我们相对更强时所拥有的每一个位置。

That doesn't mean we have to hold on to every position we had when we were relatively stronger.

但我觉得我们必须小心，不要陷入注定失败的事业，或者执着于某些无谓的代价。

But it and I think we have to be careful not to, you know, get stuck with lost causes or lost, you know, some cost.

但我认为，相比过去我们更多是出于施恩，通过核保护伞来庇护其他国家的时期，如今美国更需要澳大利亚、日本、印度——如果印度真能崛起的话——以及韩国。

But I think there's more reason to believe that The US now needs Australia, Japan, India, if ever India could become real, and South Korea than in the earlier period in which we were more, doing a favor for, countries by bringing them under our nuclear umbrella.

乔·亨里克，另一位杰出的哈佛教授指出，中国变得‘更奇怪’了，因为它发展出了一种更接近西方心理的思维方式。

Joe Henrik, another distinguished Harvard professor, points out that China has become weirder in the sense that it's developed a psychology more similar to Western psychology.

中共自1950年左右开始，以类似于天主教会在欧洲所采取的方式改变亲属结构。

The CCP began altering kinship structure in ways similar to what the Catholic church did in Europe beginning in around 1950.

他们首先摧毁宗族，推行双系继承，废除一夫多妻制，随后实施的独生子女政策大幅缩小了家庭规模，使堂表亲变得稀少，再加上城市化、大学和商业组织等自愿性团体的竞争。

They started by destroying the clans requiring bilateral inheritance, ending polygyny, then the one child policy massively shrunk families, made cousins rare, and then add to that urbanization, competing voluntary associations like universities, and business organization.

中国变得越来越‘怪异’，有证据表明，文化上相似的群体更不容易发生战争。

China has become a lot weirder, and there's evidence that culturally similar groups are less likely to go to war.

我想，1900年左右的英国和美国就是一个例子。

I guess Britain and America around 1900 is an example of that.

西方是否应该更努力地让中国变得更‘怪异’？

Should the West be trying harder to make China weirder?

首先，他用‘怪异’这个词来描述其实有点反常，因为他真正想表达的是‘更像我们’、更正常。

So first, I mean, the, it's a slightly perverse argument that he makes by calling it weirder because it seems like and he really means more like us, more normal.

不过我认为美国人本身就很怪，一旦你进入这个语境，通常当这种论点被提出时，人们会说，他们认为问题在于中国是儒家传统、专制、共产主义，还是党领导的体制，哪一部分才是‘怪异’的。

Now I think Americans are weird anyhow, So I like the I once you're once you're in the junk, but normally when this argument is up, people say, well, you know, they think it's about whether China's Confucianism, autocracy, communism, or party led system is what part is, weird.

而在如今的美国，尤其是那些试图动员力量制衡中国的人，他们越能将中国描绘成‘怪异’的——用简单的话说，即在新疆、香港或其专制体制、党领导体制下的行为与其他国家截然不同——就越能强化意识形态或人权议题，从而构建反华联盟。

And in The US now, particularly for people trying to rally, the efforts to counterbalance China, the more they can seem, quote, weird in simple English, the more they seem like they're behaving differently than other states in Xinjiang or in Hong Kong or in their autocratic system or in their party led system, the more you can heat the ideology piece of this or the human rights in order to, build a coalition, to counter China.

这实际上是一个不同的观点。

So that that's actually a different idea.

我认为在这个问题上，这是一个非常庞大而复杂的论点，我并没有完全确定的立场或共识。

I think in this instance, it's a very big and complicated argument, and I think I'd I don't have a totally settled argument, you know, agreement about it.

毫无疑问，中国的历史、文化、儒家思想和特征都显著不同。

I think that the there's no doubt that Chinese history, culture, Confucianism, characteristics are significantly different.

毫无疑问，他们当前的政党领导的威权体制以及认为党应统治一切的观点，与我个人或西方关于个人自由是最高政治价值、政治体制应保护这一价值的信念截然相反。

And there's no question that their current party led autocracy and their views about the fact that the party should rule everything is quite contrary to my convictions or western convictions about individual liberty being the highest political value and the political system protecting that.

这一点毫无疑问是真实的。

There's no doubt that that's true.

另一方面，我认为从根本上说，这是一场地缘政治结构上的竞争。

On the other hand, I would say fundamentally, this is a structural a geopolitical structural rivalry.

如果中国真的和我们一模一样，我认为这种竞争的差异会很小。

And if China were, quote, just like us, I believe the difference in the rivalry would be modest.

因此，与那些认为当前局势源于中国异常性的人相反，我认为中国作为一个大国，看起来不幸地非常正常。

So contrary to those that argue that what's going on now is China's abnormality, I would say China looks to me unfortunately very normal as a great power.

事实上，在我的书中，最受美国读者反感、而我却觉得最精彩的一章，名为《假如中国和我们一样会怎样？》。

And in fact, in my book, the chapter that most Americans don't like, the most and that I actually find the most, delicious is, called What if She's China were just like us?

我设想了一场西奥多·罗斯福与习近平之间的对话。

And I imagine a conversation between Teddy Roosevelt and Xi Jinping.

我认为，西奥多·罗斯福曾带领美国进入他深信不疑的‘美国世纪’，他会说：‘习近平，考虑到你所拥有的相对实力，你看起来似乎相当温和与内敛。'

And I think Teddy Roosevelt, who led the Americans into what he was confident would be an American century, would say about Tashi Xinping, you seem to be pretty mild and reserved, given your relative power.

在美国的情况中，正如你所知，但许多听众可能不了解，西奥多·罗斯福于1898年抵达华盛顿，担任海军部的第二号人物。

So in The US case, as you'll know, but many of your listeners may not, Teddy Roosevelt showed up in Washington in 1898 as the number two person in the department of the navy.

他推动了一项令人憎恶的政策，认为外国人——尤其是西班牙人——占领了古巴，甚至英国和德国也盘踞在我们的半球。

He founded an abomination that there were foreigners, especially Spanish, who were occupying Cuba, but even British and Germans in our hemisphere.

是时候让他们离开了。

It was time for them to leave.

在那之后的十二年里，首先，哈瓦那港发生了一起神秘爆炸，一艘名为‘缅因号’的军舰被炸毁。

And in the dozen years after that, we first there was a mysterious explosion in the Havana Harbor, blew up a ship called the Maine.

我们并不知道是谁干的，但无论如何，我们对西班牙宣战，击败了他们，解放了古巴，夺取了波多黎各作为战利品，还有关岛——这就是美国获得关岛的由来，并且吞并了菲律宾作为第一个殖民地。

We didn't know who had done it, but in any case, we declared war on Spain, defeated them, kicked them out of liberated Cuba, took Puerto Rico as a spoiler of war, and also Guam, which is how The US got Guam, and picked up The Philippines as a first colony.

随后，我们威胁英国和德国，除非它们退出委内瑞拉的领土争端，否则将发动战争。

We then threatened war with first Britain and then Germany unless they backed out of a territorial dispute in Venezuela.

我们策划并支持了在名为哥伦比亚的国家发动政变，创建了一个全新的国家——巴拿马，而第二天，巴拿马就与我们签订了运河合同，使任何船只都能从大西洋通往太平洋。

We, sponsored and, supported a coup in a company country called Columbia, created a whole new country called Panama, which the next day gave us our contract for a canal so that any ships could go from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

他还进一步提出了门罗主义的罗斯福修正案，宣称：在我们半球内，任何行为不端的国家，我们都会派遣海军陆战队去改变其政府。

And he even then enunciated the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine in which it said, any nation in our hemisphere that misbehaves, we will send the marines and change their government.

此后每年，我们都会派海军陆战队去某个地方，推翻某个政府。

And every year thereafter, we send the marines somewhere and changed some government.

所以我认为，以他目前对习近平的看法，会说：还挺温和的。

So I think he would look at Xi Jinping so far and say, pretty mild.

最后一个问题是，我知道你得走了。

Absolute last question because I know you have to go.

如果美国是斯巴达，中国是雅典，那么澳大利亚人现在感觉有点像米洛斯人。

If The US is Sparta and China is Athens, Australians feel a bit like the Melians at the moment.

你一定熟悉修昔底德《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》中的另一段记载——米洛斯对话，雅典人来到米洛斯岛，对他们说：你们和我们一样清楚，在这个世界上，正义只存在于实力相当的双方之间；强者为所欲为，弱者忍气吞声。

And you'll be familiar with the other that other passage in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, the Melian dialogue where the Athenians come to the island of Milos and say, you know as well as we do that right as the world goes is only in question between equals in power while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

目前澳大利亚在对华关系上处于冷冻状态，而中国的做法完全缺乏分寸。

Australia is in the freezer at the moment with regards to China, and China's behavior has been lacking all proportion.

澳大利亚在应对中国时应遵循哪些原则？

What principles should Australia obey in its response to China?

首先，澳大利亚是否处于弱势一方只能被迫接受的境地？

First, is Australia in the median position in which the weaker suffer what they must?

是的。

Yes.

好的。

Okay.

是的。

Yes.

第二。

Two.

如果我理解得没错，澳大利亚40%的出口都流向中国，这约占澳大利亚GDP的10%。

If I understand it, 40% of Australia's exports go to China and that's about 10% of Australia's GDP.

所以中国是您最重要的经济关系。

So China is your most important economic relationship.

所以基本上，尽管目前因为澳大利亚的那七个所谓错误举动，对大约7%的贸易实施了惩罚，但这些只是整体贸易中的一小部分。

So basically, even though there's this current punishment for about 7% of that with the seven whatever they call them, the seven wrong moves that Australia did or whatever, These are about 7%, so they're a small portion of the overall trade.

他们试图惩罚澳大利亚，以促使澳大利亚表现出应有的顺从。

And they're attempting to punish Australia in order to encourage the proper level of deference.

所以我认为，不幸的是，作为一个小国，必须在某种程度上迎合、应对、适应、调整、顺从甚至屈从，才能与一个强大而有力的邻国相处。

So I I think, unfortunately, that as a as a million, it's necessary to try to humor and deal with and adapt to and adjust and defer and grovel to some extent in order to deal with a big powerful strong neighbor.

最后，也是最后一点，幸运的是，澳大利亚人并不完全像米洛斯人。

Finally, and last point, fortunately the Australians are not exactly like the Melians.

米洛斯人实际上对任何人都没那么重要。

The Melians actually didn't really matter that much to anybody.

他们当然对斯巴达人也不重要。

They certainly didn't matter to Sparta.

所以他们和斯巴达人之间并没有防御同盟。

So they didn't have a a, defense treaty with Sparta.

所以没有人会来为这些百万人口发声。

And so nobody was coming to the defense of the millions.

但在澳大利亚的情况下，你们出口的原材料——尤其是铁矿石、煤炭、大豆等——对中国至关重要。

So they whereas in the Australian case, the exports that you provide, the raw materials, especially iron ore and coal and soybeans and others, are absolutely important to China.

因此，这里存在一定程度的相互依赖，这一点需要谨慎处理。

So there's a degree of interdependence there that, again, managed carefully.

我认为，你可以取得成功。

I think you can, you know, be successful.

但归根结底，你生活在一个强大而强势的邻国旁边，你必须找到一种方式去迁就、顺从并应对它，却无法选择忽视它，因为那样做会危及你的经济；任何试图这样做的总理都会面临权力不保的风险。

But I think the bottom line is you're living with a big, powerful, strong neighbor, that, you'll have to find a way to humor and defer to and, cope with, but be unable to choose, to ignore because you would do so at the risks to your economy, and any prime minister who tried to do that would be at risk to his power.

所以我认为这又回到了基文·拉德的观点。

So I think it's back to the Kevin Rudd point.

不要逼我们在中国的经济关系和安全关系之间做选择。

Don't try to make us choose between our economic relationship and our security relationship.

我们不得不生活在这个非常不舒服的中间地带，或许你可以向一些生活在西半球、与美国为邻的人请教，从中汲取一些经验。

We are going to have to live in this very uncomfortable middle ground and I think maybe for some lessons in it, you could talk to some people that live in the Western Hemisphere with The US.

我认为墨西哥人有句很好的话，说离美国这么近，离上帝却那么远。

I think the Mexicans have a have a good line which says so close to The US and so far away from God.

所以也许吧，我得走了，因为如果我不去参加这个早上六点的活动，我老婆会生气的。

So maybe maybe that'll that'll be I've gotta run because if I don't show up at this 06:00 thing, my wife is gonna be angry.

所以谢谢。

So thank you.

谢谢你，格雷厄姆。

Thank you, Graham.

谢谢你的收听。

Thank you for listening.

我希望你和我一样享受了这场对话。

I hope you enjoyed that conversation as much as I did.

请访问我的网站 thejspod.com，获取节目笔记、文字稿、资源，并订阅我的邮件列表。

Head to my website, thejspod.com for show notes, transcripts, resources, and to join my mailing list.

《快乐流浪汉》播客的音频工程师是劳伦斯·莫菲尔德。

The audio engineer for the Jolly Swagman podcast is Lawrence Morefield.