加里·克莱因：做出更好决策的洞见

我可能会从你的抽象中得出错误的结论。

Your abstraction I might draw the wrong lessons from your abstraction.

我不知道这个抽象的来源是什么。

I don't know where it's coming from.

我可以请你解释一下。

And I could ask you to explain it.

语言是沟通的工具，但同时也是误解的根源，因为我们使用的词语充满了各种歧义。

And language is a means for communication, but it's also a means for miscommunication because there's all kinds of ambiguity in the words that we use.

人们使用相同的词语却表达不同的意思，还误以为彼此的意思相同，从而陷入麻烦。

And people use the same words and mean different things, and then believe that they mean the same thing, and can get themselves in trouble that way.

因此，让你解释你的抽象存在这样的局限性。

So that's a limitation of having you explain your abstraction.

克服这种局限性的一种方法是向你询问故事。

A way around that limitation is to ask you about stories.

你是怎么得出这个抽象的？

Where did you come up with this abstraction?

发生了什么？

What happened?

告诉我是什么让你改变了主意。

Tell me what went on that changed your mind.

然后我可以问你关于那个事件的情况。

And then I can ask you about that event.

你当时处于这种情况，发生了一些让你感到惊讶的事情。

So you were in this situation and something happened that surprised you.

发生了什么？

What happened?

你为什么感到惊讶？

And why were you surprised?

你是怎么注意到的？

And how did you notice it?

你是怎么理解这件事的？

And what sense did you make of it?

故事不受语言局限的制约，因为我们现在有了可以驱动的事件描述。

Stories are not hampered by the limitations of language because now we have an incident account that we can drive.

许多组织并没有充分利用故事的力量。

And many organizations don't take advantage of stories.

我们刚刚完成了一个为石油化工集团做的项目，通过故事来挖掘并传递这类专业知识。

And we've just finished a project for a petrochemical group about using stories to try to get at these kinds of of expertise and communicate them.

你能更详细地讲讲故事所起的作用吗？

Can you expand more on what role stories play?

它们只是对想法的压缩吗？

Are they just compressions of ideas?

它们是突出了某些变量或细节，还是忽略了某些变量或细节，或者帮助我们锚定在某个点上？

Are are are they sort of highlighting certain variables or details or omitting certain variables or details or getting us to anchor to something?

故事正在做所有这些事情，而且是以一种非常吸引人的方式进行的。

Stories are doing all of those things, and they're doing it in a in a way that's really engaging.

比如，事情是这样的，我当时根本不知道该怎么办。

Like, here's what happened, and I didn't know what to do about it.

然后你就想知道，我当时是怎么处理的？

And then you wanna know, what did I do about it?

结果怎么样？

How did it end?

而且，当我们做这个项目时，我们研究了几组人，发现当人们讲述故事时，我们会说，好吧。

And and and, I know when when people have, recounted stories in a couple of groups that we studied when we were doing this project, we'd say, okay.

那么这个故事的启示是什么？

So what's the takeaway from the story?

每个人得出的启示都不同。

And everybody had a different takeaway.

这就是故事的丰富性所在——你从故事中学到了什么？

So that's the richness of stories, is what what have you learned from the story?

有什么样的影响？

What's what are the implications?

然后，作为一个小团队，我们互相交流，意识到因为我们有不同的思维模式，所以对故事及其重要性的理解也各不相同。

And then we, as as a small team, just compare notes and realize that because we have different mental models, we have different interpretations of the story and the importance of the story.

什么让一个故事有效？

What makes for an effective story?

故事中必须有一些令人意外的神秘元素，听众会想知道事情最终是如何收场的。

There's gotta be some sort of mystery about something happened that wasn't expected, and and then the the people listening to the story wanna know how it how it, wound up.

第二，讲故事的人应该喜欢讲故事。

Second is the storyteller should be somebody who likes to tell stories.

我遇到过一些不喜欢讲故事的人。

And I've encountered some people who don't like to tell stories.

当我问他们关于故事的事时，他们会说：我想不起任何故事。

And I'll ask them about stories, and they say, I can't remember any stories.

所以，要么他们是在回避问题，要么他们的大脑天生就不擅长回忆故事。

So either they're avoiding the issue or their brain isn't wired to be able to access stories.

或者有些人以为自己在讲故事，其实只是在叙述一件事。

Or some people think they're telling a story when they just give me a narrative.

这件事发生了，那件事也发生了，我们把经过都过了一遍，但根本算不上一个故事。

This happened and that happened, and we go through what happened, but there's no story.

它没有变化。

It doesn't move.

它没有发展。

It doesn't evolve.

没有转变。

There's no transformation.

好的故事能带来洞见。

And the good stories resulted in insight.

这让我想起你提到那个在灰烬中的警察时的情景。

That reminded me when you were saying that about the cop in the ashes.

对吧？

Right?

所以他是在寻找矛盾。

So he's looking for the contradiction.

某种程度上，他心中有一套关于世界如何运作的故事。

So he he's got a story in his mind, in a way about the world works.

我们开车时都会这样。

And we all do when we're driving.

因为我们并没有有意识地注意路况，但却能注意到异常情况。

Because we're not consciously paying attention to the road, but we notice anomalies.

所以我们能察觉到一些出乎意料的事情。

So we notice something that is unexpected.

而在车辆中，这正是提醒我们作为驾驶员要集中注意力的信号。

And in in a vehicle, that that's our cue to pay attention as a driver of a vehicle.

不知为何，经过多年的驾驶，我们被潜移默化地形成了这种反应。

For whatever reason, we get encoded with this after years of driving.

就像是，好吧。

It's like, okay.

现在我进入状态了。

Now I I'm switched on.

也许我的心跳会加快一点，但我会做出反应。

Maybe my heart races a little bit, but, like, I react.

我从恍惚中醒来，身体也恢复了知觉。

I get out of my trance and my body awakens.

就像我处于低功耗模式，然后突然醒了过来。

It's like I'm in low power mode and then I wake up.

但在工作中，我们并不会这样做。

But at work, we don't do this.

我们被惊醒，遇到意外或矛盾时，却...

We we we get woken up and we we have a surprise or a contradiction.

然后我们选择忽视它、找借口解释，或者直接转向下一个任务，而不是从低功耗模式切换到全功率模式——这里到底发生了什么？

And then we ignore it or we explain it away or we move on to the next task instead of going from low power mode to sort of like full power mode, what's going on here?

因为这种意外表明，世界并没有按照我预期的方式运行。

Because the surprise would indicate the world is not working the way that I I thought that it should work.

所以你想要的是，当事情没有按预期发生时，能够激发好奇心的力量。

So what you wanna have is the is a way to harness the power of curiosity when something didn't happen the way it was supposed to.

而我们的自然倾向是忽视它、忽略它，或者找理由把它搪塞过去。

And our natural tendency is to dismiss it, to ignore it, and to explain it away.

你会想，为什么人们不能像科学家那样思考呢？

And you think, well, why can't people think like scientists?

因为科学家很谨慎。

Because scientists are careful.

但研究这一现象的学者发现，科学家也会做同样的事情。

But the researchers who investigated this find that scientists do the same thing.

他们也有所谓的知识盾牌，就像我们所有人一样，使用各种方法来解释掉那些不便的数据和异常。

They have something that's called knowledge shields the way all of us do, that a variety of techniques for explaining away inconvenient data and anomaly.

所以我们有一个关于世界如何运作的故事，然后我们注意到了一个异常。

So so we have a story about how the world works, and then we notice an anomaly.

与其试图将这个异常纳入其中或探索它，我们觉得这样更简单。

And rather than try to fit that anomaly in or explore the anomaly, we we it's easier.

对我们来说，保持我们讲述给自己的故事不变，忽视或 dismiss 异常，这是一种低功耗模式。

It's a low power mode for us just to continue with our story the way that we're we're telling it to ourselves and ignore or dismiss the anomaly.

这就是为什么我们使用这些知识盾牌，科学家也使用知识盾牌。

That's why we we use these knowledge shields and scientists use the knowledge shield.

科学家不希望有任何东西挑战他们的理论。

Scientists don't wanna have anything challenge their theories.

所以当你提出一个数据点，让我钟爱的理论显得有点可疑时。

And so you bring up a data point that's gonna make my pet theory look a little bit sketchy.

我会说：你是怎么收集这些数据的？

And I'm gonna say, Well, how did you collect those data?

或者：我不确定你对数据的解读是否正确。

Or, I'm not really sure that you've interpreted the data correctly.

我会找出各种方式来否定它。

I'm gonna find all kinds of ways of dismissing it.

是的。

Yes.

这会导致固执己见。

It leads to fixation.

因为当我们遇到一种情况时，我们的一大优势就是能迅速理解它。

Because one of our strengths when we encounter a situation is we quickly make sense of it.

我们使用自己积累起来的模式。

We use the patterns that we've built up.

这通常有效，但并不总是有效。

And it usually works, but it doesn't always work.

因此，有些人说我们应该阻止人们做出即时反应，但这很荒谬，因为这不符合我们的思维方式，而且会让我们陷入瘫痪。

And so some people say we should discourage people from coming up with immediate reactions, but that's ridiculous because that's not the way we think and it would cripple us.

所以，你希望我们先快速做出反应，但如果错了，就会出现异常，而我们希望有能力重新审视它。

So instead, you want us to come up with a quick reaction, but if we're wrong, there's gonna be an anomaly, and we wanna be able to revisit it.

我们希望人们意识到，打破固化的办法就是注意到这些异常。

We want people That's the way we break out of fixation is we notice the anomalies.

我们陷入固化并犯下固化错误的方式，就是为这些异常找借口，坚持最初的错误印象，直到为时已晚。

The way we get stuck in fixation and making fixation errors is we explain away the anomalies, on to the original wrong impression until it's far too late.

现在，对于你的决策日志，你可以记录的一件事是：你现在认为这种情况正在发生什么？

Now, for your decision journal, one of the things that you could capture is, what do you think is going on in this situation now?

描述一下正在发生的事情。

Describe what's going on.

随着时间的推移，人们可以记录下与这一信念不一致的信息。

And then as time occurs, maybe people can jot down data that they receive that are inconsistent with that belief.

你可以追踪一下，你是什么时候开始对最初的印象产生怀疑的？

You can sort of track when is it that you first started to lose faith in your initial impression?

你本可以更早地质疑它吗？

Could you have questioned it earlier?

你是否等待了比必要更长的时间？

Did you wait longer than you needed to?

我想稍微换个话题。

I wanna switch gears just a little bit.

你如何看待那些停留在中级技能水平的人，与那些在相同技能上达到精通的人之间的区别？

How do you think about the difference between people that stagnate at say an intermediate skill level and people who reach a mastery of the same skill?

对。

Right.

这就涉及到专长的问题，人们是如何达到更高水平的专长的。

So this gets into the issue of expertise and how do people get to to the higher levels of expertise.

一些关于专业能力的模型认为，人们只是不断积累更多信息，专业能力就是这样建立起来的。

And some models of expertise say that people just acquire more and more information, and that's how expertise builds.

但这种说法行不通，因为这就像拥有未经反思的经验，你并没有形成更丰富的心理模型。

But that doesn't work because that's like having unexamined experiences, you're not coming up with a richer mental model.

我与同事科莉·巴克斯特一起推测，人们在达到一定水平后就会开始停滞，进入平台期。

My speculation, working with a colleague, Collie Baxter, is that people get up to a certain level of performance, and then they start to stagnate, and they start to plateau.

而那些突破瓶颈、迈向更高层次的人，是那些进行‘卸载学习’的人——他们意识到自己过去接受的某些惯例或信念要么是错误的，要么是有限的，并没有像他们想象的那样普遍适用。

And people who break through and move to the next level are the ones who engage in unlearning, who realize there are certain conventions they've brought into or beliefs they hold that are either wrong or are limited and and don't apply as broadly as as they imagine.

你有没有发现一些在现实中特别有效的方法，能让人们比预期更短的时间内掌握这项技能？

Is is there any sort of practical things that you've seen work particularly well in the wild for people developing mastery in, less time, say, than people would expect?

让我们想象两个人刚入职。

So let's imagine two people starting out a job.

我们称他们为员工A和员工B。

We'll say person a and person worker a and worker b.

他们都将在这份工作中工作一年。

They're both gonna be on the job for a year.

而工人A这一年很幸运，一切都很顺利。

And worker a has a lucky year, and everything goes smoothly.

没有任何干扰，也没有任何问题。

And there's no disruptions, no problems.

这真是非常、非常低压力的一年。

It's just a really very, very low stress year.

工人B则经历了一年动荡。

Worker B has had a turbulent year.

各种各样的事情都出了问题。

All kinds of things have gone wrong.

必须做出各种调整。

All kinds of adaptations have been necessary.

出现了错误，需要被发现、诊断并修复。

There were mistakes made that had to be identified, diagnosed, and recovered.

有一件事是，整个这一年都充满了这些经历。

And one thing is like the whole year has been filled with all of this.

第一年之后，你更希望和谁一起工作？

Who is the one that you would like to have working with you after that first year?

我会选择B，因为他们的学习面更丰富、更细致。

Oh, I would choose person B because the surface area of their learning is so much richer and detailed.

没错。

Exactly.

所以，经历动荡一年的第二位员工学到了更多。

So worker the the second worker with a turbulent year has learned much more.

对于经历顺遂一年的员工A，你能做些什么？

What can you do for worker a who's had this smooth year?

你可以把第二位员工经历的那些危机提炼成故事或情景，讲给员工A听，让他们通过间接经验获得成长。

You can take some of these crises that worker that the second worker had and encapsulate them as stories or as scenarios, and you can present them to worker A just to give them vicarious experiences to get them to move forward.

这就是你可以采取的做法。

So that's something that you can do.

我们已经看到一些组织在做类似的事情，而提供这些间接经验正是我们的决策训练方法之一。

And we've seen organizations doing some things like that, and that that's actually one of our decision training methods is to provide those vicarious experiences.

当你把组织看作是试图减少变异或减少错误时，这真的很有意思。

That's really interesting when you you think about organizations as as sort of, like, trying to reduce the variability or reduce errors.

但与此同时，错误却为反思、经验、专业能力和学习创造了空间。

And then at the same time, that errors create surface area for reflection, experience, expertise, and learning.

是的。

Yeah.

但人们往往会把它推向极端，认为你犯的错误越多，学到的就越多，这虽然没错，却进而鼓励人们去犯错。

But where people spoil it is is they then take it one step too far and say, the more errors you you make, the the more you're gonna learn, which which is true, and and say, wanna encourage people to make errors.

他们并不是这个意思。

And they don't mean that.

组织并不希望鼓励人们犯错，尤其是在我所从事的一些行业中，错误可能非常危险。

Organizations don't wanna encourage people to make errors, especially some of the industries that I work in where errors can be very dangerous.

事实上，我不喜欢犯错。

And the fact is, I don't like to make mistakes.

如果我举办了一个效果很差的工作坊，我的第一反应就是再也不想办任何工作坊了。

And if I do something, if I put on a workshop that has gone poorly, my immediate reaction is, I never wanna put another workshop on again.

我的意思是，这实在太痛苦了。

I mean, this is just too painful.

这会让我花上几天时间才能从这种情绪低谷中走出来，静下心来想：如果我当时那样做，就能利用那个问题，结果可能会好很多。

And it takes me a few days to get out of that emotional funk and to think about it and say, you know, if I had done it this way, I could have used that problem, and it could have been much better.

经过这种反复琢磨和反思之后，我的反应却是：我迫不及待想再办一次工作坊，因为现在我想再试一次。

And so by the end of that kind of rumination, that kind of reflection, my reaction is, I can't wait to do another workshop, because now I wanna try that again.

但最初的反应却是因犯错而感到非常沮丧。

So, but the immediate reaction is one of being pretty devastated by a mistake.

所以，如果你告诉我，加里，你要故意犯错，这才是学习的方式，这对我来说很难做到。

And so it's gonna be a hard case if you tell me, Gary, try to make mistakes, that's how you're gonna learn.

这不符合我的情感特质。

It's not in my emotional makeup.

也许这在你身上是出于羞耻感，但在我身上不是这样。

Maybe it's in your shame, but it's not in my emotional makeup.

哦，我不确定我是不是故意犯错，但我确实犯的错远多于统计上的平均值。

Oh, I don't know if I intentionally make them, but I certainly have more than my statistical fair share of them.

什么是认知灵活性理论？

What is cognitive flexibility theory?

认知灵活性理论是指通过防止人们固守于固定模式和常规做法，帮助他们达到专家水平，从而变得更加自然地适应变化。

Cognitive flexibility theory is the notion of trying to help people achieve expertise by preventing them from locking in to routines and standard ways of doing things so that they can become more naturally adaptive.

你可以给他们提供一些常规方法无法应对的替代性经验，迫使他们走出舒适区，培养一种不仅准备好适应变化、而且享受适应变化的心态。

You can give them vicarious experiences that can't be handled by the usual routines just to force them out of their comfort zone and to get them into a mindset of not only being prepared to be adaptive, but enjoying being adaptive.

因为这是我观察到专家的另一个特点。

Because that's another thing that I've noticed about experts.

如果他们一遍又一遍地做同样的工作，就会感到无聊。

If they're doing the same job over and over again, they get bored.

然后一旦发生意外，他们无法再使用熟悉的套路，而普通从业者就会非常沮丧，觉得‘这不该发生’。

And then something happens, and they can't use the same routines, and the journeyman, they get really frustrated like, it's not supposed to happen.

我不确定。

I don't know.

我该找谁？

Who do I call?

而专家们的眼睛会亮起来。

And the experts, their eyes light up.

好的。

Okay.

我们不能再使用那些迄今为止对我们有效的技巧了。

We can't use the techniques that have been successful for us up to now.

我们能做什么？

What can we do?

我们能发明什么？

What can we invent?

因此，眼睛亮起来对我来说是认知灵活性理论的关键——就是要让人进入一种状态，在事情不如预期时感到兴奋，并且不得不即兴发挥。

And so the eyes lighting up is like, for me, a key to cognitive flexibility theory, is to get people into that mode where they're excited when things don't go as planned, and and they're gonna have to improvise.

回到开头，我们已经讨论了很多关于获得更好洞察力的内容。

Coming back to the beginning, we've talked about sort of a a lot about gaining better insights.

让我们谈谈一些可以减少错误的工具。

Let's talk about some of the tools that we can use to reduce errors.

也许我们可以从事前验尸开始。

Maybe we can start with a pre mortem.

那是什么？

What is it?

它为什么有用？

Why is it useful?

我们该如何进行一次？

How do we conduct one?

我只是在上世纪八十年代末，为我当时经营的一家公司发明了这种方法。

I just sort of invented it for when I for a company that my the company I was running back in the late nineteen eighties.

我们大多数项目都很成功，但并非总是如此。

And we mostly had successful projects, but not always.

有时我们的项目会失败。

Sometimes our projects would fail.

然后我们会进行事后回顾。

And then we would do an after action review.

我们会问，哪里出了问题？

We'd say, what went wrong?

然后我们会意识到，哦，如果我们当初换个方式处理，结果可能不会这么糟糕。

And we'd realize, oh, if we've just done this differently, it might not have ended so badly.

我说，为什么我们不在项目启动时总是开个启动会议呢？

And I said, why don't we we always have a kickoff meeting when a project starts.

为什么不把那个事后回顾移到项目开始前，就像一次事前剖析？

Why don't we move that after action review to the front, like a postmortem?

尸检就像在医院里病人去世后所做的那种检查。

A postmortem is something that you do like in a hospital when a patient has died.

医生进行尸检是为了查明病人死亡的原因。

And a physician does a postmortem to find out why did the patient die.

进行尸检并发现真正的死因或死亡原因的好处在于，医生会变得更聪明，现在有了更丰富的心理模型，所以这对医生有帮助。

And the advantage of doing a postmortem and discovering what was the real cause of death or the causes of death is that the physician gets smarter, now has a richer mental model, so it helps the physician.

现在医生可以告诉家属，你的亲人去世的原因是这样的，因为他们真的很想知道，现在你可以通过给出答案来帮助减轻他们的痛苦，他们可以据此应对。

And now the physician can tell the family, Here's why your loved one died, because they really wanna know, and now you can help reduce their pain by giving them an answer, and they can work with that.

每个人都能从尸检中受益，除了病人，因为病人已经死了。

Everybody benefits from a postmortem, except for the patient, because the patient is dead.

所以我们说，与其在项目失败后才进行尸检，不如把它提前到开始阶段。

So we said, instead of doing a postmortem for projects that fail after they fail, let's move it to the beginning.

这就是为什么它被称为‘预检’。

That's why it's called the premortal.

它的运作方式是：如果我们是一个团队，我们会让团队中的每个人都围坐在桌旁，通常我们会在启动会议上进行。

And the way it works is if we're on a team, we take everybody on the team, we're all sitting around at a table, and usually we do it at a kickoff meeting.

这就是我们执行计划的方式。

Here's how we're gonna carry out the plan.

我们已经花了整整一个小时到一个半小时来开启动会。

Now, we've spent an hour, hour and a half just through the kickoff meeting.

我们要做什么？

What are we gonna do?

谁负责什么？

Who's doing what?

角色和职责是什么？

What are the roles and functions?

这些我们都已经明确了。

We've got all that nailed down.

我们还剩下大约二十分钟，有足够的时间来做一次事前死亡分析。

And we've got about twenty minutes left, and we have enough time to do a premortal.

我说，好的。

And I say, okay.

现在我们要进行事前死亡分析。

Now we're gonna do the premortal.

大家放松一下。

Everybody, just relax.

往后靠在椅子上。

Sit back in your chairs.

现在我正看着一个想象中的水晶球。

Now I'm looking in an imaginary crystal ball.

我确实有一个水晶球，但我不会随身带着它。

I actually do have a crystal ball, but I don't carry it around with me all the time.

我正看着一个想象中的水晶球，现在是六个月后。

I'm looking at an imaginal imaginary crystal ball, and it's now six months from now.

哦，这个项目已经彻底失控了。

Oh, and this project has gone off the rails in a major way.

这是一场灾难。

It's been a disaster.

这是一次失败。

It's been a failure.

可能是六个月后。

Could be six months.

也可能是一年后。

Could be a year.

选一个你的时间范围吧。

Pick pick your time frame.

发生的情况是，水晶球显示的是失败。

What happened is the crystal ball is showing failure.

现在水晶球并没有告诉我们失败的原因，只是显示它已经失败了。

Now the crystal ball isn't showing us why it failed, just showing us that it has failed.

这一点是确定的，而水晶球是绝对准确的。

That much is certain, and the crystal ball is infallible.

它从不说谎。

It never lies.

现在，桌边的每个人，你们面前都有一本笔记纸和一支笔，请用接下来的两分钟写下这个项目失败的所有原因。

Now, everybody around the table, you have a pad of paper in front of you and a pen, take the next two minutes and write down all the reasons why this project failed.

然后我会启动计时器，大家就开始像制定计划一样在接下来的两分钟内疯狂书写。

And then I have a timer, and I start the timer, and then everybody's writing like a plan for the next two minutes.

然后我会说：时间到。

And then I say, Time's up.

我通常会用一块白板，或者在Zoom上使用虚拟白板。

I've got usually a whiteboard, or on Zoom, I'll have a virtual whiteboard.

我会说：现在，我要挨个询问大家，如果我是项目经理，我就先来。

And I'll say, Now, I'm gonna go around the room, and I'll start if I'm the project leader.

这是我列表上的第一条。

Here's the top of my list.

这就是我提到的事情。

Here's the thing that I mentioned.

通常，这在会议中从未被提及过。

And usually it's something that never came up during the meeting.

项目经理和引导者可能是不同的人，但在这个案例中，我们假设是同一个人。

The leader and the facilitator could be different people, but in this case, we'll say it's the same person.

我想树立一个好榜样，我不是随便提出一些荒谬的理由，而是提出真实的理由。

I wanna set a good example that I'm not just coming with something that's absurd, but something that's real.

然后我转向下一个人，谢恩，你列表上最重要的是什么？

And then I go to the next person, Shane, what do you have on top of your list?

接下来，戴夫，你列表上有什么是谢恩和我都没提到的？

And then Dave, what do you have on your list that neither Shane nor I have mentioned?

我们围绕房间转一圈，把这些内容记下来，通常我们会再转一圈，有时甚至第三圈，从而列出一份长长的清单，解释这个项目为何失败。

And we go around the room, and I'm writing these down, and usually we go around the room a second time, sometimes a third, and we have a long list of things that would explain why this project failed.

其中大多数都是人们之前未曾想到的事情。

And most of them are things that people hadn't thought about.

现在，我们正在收集房间里每个人集体的智慧和经验教训，看到我们曾经如此自信、甚至过于自信的计划，如今这种过度自信已经减弱了。

And now we sort of are are harvesting the collective wisdom of the people and the scar tissue of the people in that room, And we're seeing all the ways that this plan that we were so confident, so overconfident in, now our overconfidence has been diminished.

有些人担心，也许信心水平降得太低了，因此我们在这个练习中增加了一个最后的环节。

Now, some people have worried that maybe the confidence level got too low, so then we added a last part of the exercise.

看看白板上的所有内容。

Look at everything on the whiteboard.

看看所有这些项目。

Look at all of those items.

现在，请再花两分钟时间，写下每个人自己可以做些什么，来降低这些情况发生的可能性。

Now, let's take another two minutes and write down what each of us, what can I do personally to try to reduce the chance of some of these happening?

然后大家会写下自己能做的事情。

And then people are writing down what they can do.

这是一种降低风险的方式。

And that's a way of trying to reduce the risk.

这就是我们进行事前验尸的方法。

And so that's how we run a premortem.

我们发现，它能揭示出人们未曾考虑到的想法和缺陷。

What we find is it surfaces ideas and flaws that people hadn't considered.

但它同时也营造了一种团队坦诚的文化，人们开始习惯于表达问题，而不是掩盖它们。

But it also creates a culture of candor in the team where people are used, are starting to get used to expressing problems rather than covering them up.

它还建立了一种信任感：我可以提出意见，而不会因此受到批评。

And it creates a sense of trust that I can say something and I'm not gonna get criticized for it.

事前验尸的运作方式是逆转了这类会议通常的氛围。

The way the premortem works is it reverses the usual dynamic of these meetings.

在会议结束时，通常有人会说：‘好了，我们结束了。’

Often at the end of a meeting, somebody will say, All right, we're done.

我们马上就要结束这次会议了。

We're just about done with the meeting.

有人看到什么问题吗？

Does anybody see any problems?

没人愿意指出问题。

Nobody wants to identify a problem.

我们刚刚花了一个半小时来制定和讨论这个计划。

We've just spent the last hour and a half coming up, discussing the plan.

没人愿意承认存在问题。

Nobody wants to admit that there's a problem.

人们甚至根本没在考虑问题。

People aren't even thinking about problems.

他们全都处于急于推进的状态。

They're all in a go mode.

我们开始吧。

Let's get started.

你急着想开始。

Let's You're impatient to start.

而且，你知道，暴露问题可能会带来一些后果。

And there, you know, there could be consequences of exposing problems.

通过事前验尸法，我们逆转了这种局面。

With a premortem, we we reversed that dynamic.

在事前验尸中，展现你聪明的方式是你提出的观点的质量。

The way you show you're smart in a premortem is the quality of the of the items that you generate.

我觉得你点出了一个显而易见却被大多数人忽略的关键点——我们花了相当多时间思考的是，如何通过改变人们所传递的价值信号来召开更有效的会议。

I think you hit on something that is hiding in plain sight that most people miss, and and we've spent quite a bit of time on our ourselves is sort of how do you run more effective meetings by changing what people signal as value?

你可以通过要求每个人提供其他人所不具备的独特见解来实现这一点。

And you can do this by asking people for unique insights into the problem that nobody else in the room has as one way.

而不是每个人都进来复述一遍高管摘要——所有人都读过，但每个人都需要重新表述，因为他们想表明自己做了功课、有资格参会，而且了解问题所在，尽管他们只是在不断重复同样的术语。

Instead of everybody coming in and summarizing the executive summary, which everybody's read, but everybody needs to paraphrase because they wanna signal that they they've done the work and they're they should be in the room and they know what the problem is even though they're just regurgitating the same terms over and over again.

我认为，事前验尸的关键在于，你通过提出对问题有价值且独到的见解，向同事传递了你的专业能力。

I I think it's really a key key factor to the pre mortem that you're you're changing you're signaling expertise to your coworkers through coming up with something valuable and uniquely insightful into the problem.

对。

Right.

所以这有点像一种近乎表演的行为。

So it's sort of like a it's almost theatrical.

我的意思是，这其中确实带有一种表演的性质。

I mean, there there there's a certain, performative quality to this.

我尽量快速地进行这项操作。

And we try to I try to do it quickly.

我只是想让每个人迅速提交自己的想法，以保持现场的活力。

I just wanna get everybody's entry very quickly so that the energy level stays high.

我想让每个人都有贡献，因为通常团队中的资深成员会想一口气列出所有内容，而其他人则只是被动接收。

And I wanna get one from each person because often, like, one of the senior members of the team might wanna give the entire list and then everybody just sort of in a in a receive mode.

我想摆脱这种模式。

And I wanna get out of that mode.

我希望每个人都做好准备。

I want everybody ready.

人们在主持预演复盘时常见的错误有哪些？

What are the common mistakes that people make in running a premortem?

其中一个错误是他们从一开始就 framing 不对。

One of the mistakes is that they just frame it wrong from the beginning.

他们会说，好吧。

They'll say, okay.

我们应该做一个事前验尸。

We should do a premortem.

那么可能会出什么问题？

So what can go wrong?

这并不是关于可能会出什么问题。

It's not an issue of what can go wrong.

我们面对的是一个已经显示计划失败的水晶球。

We're dealing with a crystal ball that has showed that the plan has failed.

我们知道它失败了。

We know that it failed.

我们的任务是解释为什么会失败。

And our job is to explain why.

所以问‘什么可能会出错’显得太过犹豫。

So saying, what can go wrong is too tentative.

这太模糊了。

It's too vague.

我认为，人们最常见的错误就是没有这样来设定问题。

And so that's, I think, maybe the most common mistake that people make, is they don't frame it that way.

另一个错误是让个人讲得太久，而其他人只能干等。

Another mistake is they let individuals talk too long, and and everybody else is waiting.

而这种方式下，我们会以相当快的节奏轮流发言，每个人每次只说一件事。

And and this way, we're we're going around the room at a pretty rapid clip, and everybody just stating one thing at a time.

第三个错误可能是领导者退缩了，说：‘我只是想听听大家的意见。’

And a third mistake might be the leader gets cold feet and says, I just wanna hear what everybody else has.

因此，领导者没有营造出信任与坦诚的文化，反而制造了一个危险的环境，让人们可能惹上麻烦，而领导者自己却躲在后面受到保护。

So instead of creating a culture of trust and candor, the leader is creating a dangerous environment where people can get in trouble, and the leader is is being shielded and protected.

当我们思考减少错误时，人们常提到的一个常见问题是认知偏差。

When we think about reducing errors, one of the the common things that sort of comes up with people is cognitive biases.

我想知道你见过什么，对限制认知偏差有什么看法？

I'm curious as to what you've seen, what you think about, trying to limit cognitive biases.

我们已经谈到了一种，就是固着错误。

We've talked about one, which is fixation error.

我有自己的理论，但我想听听你的观点。

And I have my own theory on this, but I'd like to hear your your views.

好吧，我得小心这一点。

All right, so I have to be careful about this.

在我说之前，先说明一下，我是个异类。

And just caveat what I'm about to say, that I'm an outlier.

关于决策和判断偏差这一整个问题，是一个主要的研究领域。

That the whole issue of decision and judgment biases is a major line of research.

这个启发式与偏见研究群体在他们的研究以及在判断与决策领域中的应用上，已经取得了非常显著的成果。

And the community, the heuristics and biases community has been extremely effective in the research they've done and the applications that they've put this work to in the judgment decision community.

所以我想让听众明白，主流观点认为这些偏差很重要，必须加以考虑。

So I want listeners to understand that the dominant view is that these biases are important and need to be taken into account.

话虽如此，我并不认同。

Having said that, I don't agree.

我不喜欢决策偏见这个概念。

I don't like the idea of decision biases.

根据我对文献的了解，人们在消除偏见方面几乎没有取得任何成功，我认为这是一件好事。

I know my sense from the literature is that there's been little if any, success in debiasing people, and I think that's a good thing.

因为被识别出来的偏见本质上与我们习得的启发式方法有关，是我们经验的一部分。

Because the biases that get identified are essentially related to the heuristics that we've learned and are part of the experience that we have.

只有当其中一种启发式方法失效时，我们才会在事后觉得它们像是偏见。

And they only look like biases in hindsight when one of them doesn't work.

但这是一种启发式方法。

But it's a heuristic.

它不是一种算法。

It's not an algorithm.

所以有时候启发式方法会失效。

So sometimes heuristics don't work.

而研究的方式是，让参与者完成一项任务，在这项任务中，他们习惯使用的启发式方法将不再适用。

And the way the research has been done is you put people, you give them a task where the heuristic that they're used to applying is not gonna apply in this situation.

然后你展示出人们陷入了你设下的陷阱。

And you show that people fall into the trap that you've said to them.

你指出，看吧，他们的启发式方法是有缺陷的，然而许多人、大多数人都中了圈套。

And you say, you see, their heuristics are flawed, and yet people, many people, most people, fall prey to it.

但还没有人对这些启发式的积极面进行过研究。

But nobody has done research on the positive side of these heuristics.

因此我认为，决策偏差研究者自身存在一种偏见，他们只关注了负面效果。

And so I think that's a bias on the part of the decision bias researchers, that they're only looking at the down arrow.

这些启发式方法是如何让我们陷入困境的？

How do these heuristics get us in trouble?

他们没有关注这些启发式方法的优势。

And they're not looking at the strengths of these heuristics.

而提出这些观点的丹尼尔·卡尼曼和阿莫斯·特沃斯基本人也指出，这些启发式方法总体上是有用的，尽管并不完美。

And Danny Kahneman and Thomas Tversky, who developed these ideas, they themselves stated that these heuristics are generally useful, even though they're not perfect.

现在正在形成一种现象，因为设置那些让启发式方法导致错误答案的研究很容易，因此这类研究非常多。

And what's happening is a community is setting up, because it's easy to set up studies where the heuristics get you the wrong answer, and so there's lots of these studies performed.

于是，这种只关注负面效应的信息被汇总起来，而忽略了其积极面。

And so that's the message that gets compiled without looking at the upside.

因此，我写过关于积极启发式的内容，所有那些被批评的主要启发式方法，在产生洞见和做出决策时都极具价值。

So I've written about positive heuristics, that all the major heuristics that get criticized are extremely valuable for coming up with insights and making decisions.

比如可用性偏差，当然，如果我想借助自己的经验来了解如何应对某种情境，这会很有帮助。

So availability bias, of course, that's gonna be helpful if I wanna draw on my experience in order to know how to work in a situation.

它并不完美，但这就是我的经验能带给我的东西。

It's not gonna be perfect, but that's what my experience buys me.

代表性偏差和锚定偏差也是如此。

The same thing for representative bias, anchoring bias.

我会以某个数字为锚点。

I'm gonna anchor on a number.

有时候，如果只是随便给人们一个数字，他们就会以此为锚点，做出愚蠢的决定。

Now sometimes people do foolish things if you just give them a random number, they anchor on that.

所以人们是会做出愚蠢行为的。

So people are capable of foolishness.

但一般来说，我总得有个起点。

But but generally, I've gotta start somewhere.

因此我会借助我的经验来判断这种情况类似什么，然后以它为锚点，再进行调整，因为如果我具备相当的专业知识，我的初步判断通常是准确的。

And so I draw on my experience to see what's this like, and I'll I'll anchor on that, and I'll adjust from that because my initial impression, if a I reasonable amount of expertise, is going to be accurate.

所以那些被批评的启发式方法，如果没有它们，我们会陷入瘫痪。

And so the heuristics that get criticized, we would be crippled without those heuristics.

我设计了一个思想实验：人们担心情绪会蒙蔽我们的理智，妨碍我们做出良好的决策。

And I've created a thought experiment, which is, people worry about emotion clouding our intellect and getting in the way of good decision making.

事实证明，大脑中有一个区域，我忘了它的名称，情绪和决策在这里交汇。

And as it turns out, there's a part of the brain, I forget what the structure is called, where emotion and decision making come together.

有一些人在这个脑区有损伤。

And there are some people who have a lesion in this part of the brain.

这是大约十五年前迪·马西奥所做的研究。

And this is work done by Di Macio fifteen years ago or so.

他研究了那些大脑该区域有损伤的人，他们无法借助情感来做决定。

And he studied people with lesions in that part of the brain where they were unable to draw on their emotions to make decisions.

换句话说，他们完全是理性的。

In other words, they were purely rational.

他们就像史波克先生。

They were like Mr.

史波克。

Spock.

他们的智力并没有受损。

Their intelligence didn't suffer.

他们的智商和受损前一样高，但他们的生活变得悲惨。

Their IQ was as high as it ever was before the illusion, But their lives became miserable.

他们要花四十五分钟才能决定去哪家餐厅。

It would take them forty five minutes to decide what restaurant to go through.

他们离婚了，丢了工作，因为他们无法运用情感，而我们的情感正是利用我们积累的模式和经验的一种方式。

They got divorced, they lost their jobs because they could not use their emotions because our emotions are a way of drawing on the patterns we've built and on our experiences.

所以，这就是我提出的演示和思想实验。

So here's the demonstration, the thought experiment I have.

如果你坚信情绪会模糊我们的思维，干扰我们的决策和判断，那么我们知道这个脑区的位置。

If you are a strong believer in the idea that emotions cloud our thinking and interfere with our decisions and our judgments, we know where this area is.

我们可以进行激光手术，通过聚焦多束激光在该区域制造一个病灶，这样你在做决定时就不再受情绪困扰。

We can do laser surgery to triangulate different laser beams to create a lesion in this area, so you will no longer be troubled by emotions when you make decisions.

我要向所有担心情绪会破坏决策的判断与决策研究者提出挑战：你们愿意接受这种手术吗？

And my challenge is to any of the judgment decision researchers who worry about emotions collabing our decisions, would you have the surgery done?

我至今还没找到愿意尝试的人。

I have yet to find the backer.

我还说过，我可以自己支付手术费用。

And I've said, will pay for the surgery myself.

这将是一个绝佳的实验，一个难得的机会。

Now this would be a great experiment, a great opportunity.

但没有人接受我的这个提议。

Nobody has taken me up on this offer.

你能跟我聊聊团队决策和个人决策之间的区别吗？当董事会或委员会被要求做出决定时，情况是怎样的？

Talk to me a little bit about making decisions in teams of people versus an individual making a decision where boards or committees are are are sort of asked to come to a decision?

团队决策方式的优势和劣势是什么？

What are the pros and cons of a team based approach?

你见过哪些更有效的方法能帮助团队做出决策？

And what have you seen as more effective ways to get teams to make decisions?

团队决策有不同的策略和形式。

Team decision making, teams use different kinds of strategies, and there's different formats.

你可以有一个专制型团队，由领导者直接做决定。

You can have an autocratic team where a leader just makes a decision.

你也可以让团队进行投票。

You can have teams voting.

如果人们担心会有后果，投票可以是匿名的。

You can have the vote be anonymous if people are afraid of repercussions.

比如，我们拿海盗船来举例。

There are situations like, let's take a pirate ship.

在过去的加勒比海时代，当海盗船四处出没时，海盗船是非常民主的。

In the old Caribbean days when you had pirate ships around, pirate ships were extremely democratic.

船上没有人掌权。

There was nobody in charge.

他们投票选出谁来领导他们。

They voted who was gonna lead them.

他们投票决定要攻击哪些目标。

They they voted about what targets they wanted to attack.

一旦投入战斗，就会有一位船长。

Once they were in battle, there was a a captain.

船长的命令必须服从，因为在那种时间紧迫、情况紧急且后果重大的情况下，你需要将决策方式转变为更专制的形式。

And the captain's orders had to be obeyed because under that time pressure, with that kind of urgency and those kinds of stakes, you needed to switch your decision strategy to something more autocratic.

因此，团队做决策并没有一个通用的规则。

So there's no general rule for how a team should make decision.

这取决于具体的情境和背景。

It's gonna depend on the situation and the context.

我可以给你举一个反面例子。

I can give you an example of what not to do.

几年前有一部马特·达蒙主演的电影，叫《火星救援》。

There was a movie with Matt Damon a number of years ago called The Martian.

马特·达蒙是前往火星的团队成员之一，后来发生了意外，他们需要立即撤离。

And Matt Damon is part of a team that went to Mars, and something happened and they needed to depart.

他们召集了所有人，但却找不到马特·达蒙。

And they gathered everybody together, but they couldn't find Matt Damon.

他不在场，而撤离刻不容缓。

He wasn't available, and it was urgent that they depart.

于是他们没等他，直接离开了，以为他受伤或已经遇难。

And so they departed without him, assumed that he had gotten injured or killed.

这就是他没出现的原因。

That's why he wasn't there.

现在他们已经从火星起飞了。

So now they've taken off from Mars.

他们正在远离。

They're heading away.

而马特·达蒙不知怎么回到了空间站，通过无线电联系他们，问：你们在哪？

And Matt Damon somehow finds his way back to the station and radios them and says, where are you?

他们这才意识到他还留在那里。

They realize he's still there.

于是他们决定：要不要回去？

So the decision is, do we go back or not?

太空船上的人员知道，如果回去，将会非常危险。

And the people on the spaceship know that if they go back, it's gonna be risky.

所以他们说，我们来看看能不能达成一致意见，决定该怎么做。

So they said, let's see if we can come to a a consensus about what to do.

我不喜欢共识决策，也不喜欢在这种危险环境下做共识决定。

I don't like the idea of consensus decisions, and I don't like the idea of a consensus decision in this kind of a dangerous environment.

因为当太空船上的人员逐一征求意见时，每个人都承受着巨大的压力，必须附和那个共识——我们应该回去救他。

Because as the people in the spaceship went around, there was enormous pressure on everybody to go along with the with the the the consensus, which was we should go back and rescue him.

而且这件事是公开的，他们返回了，冒着所有人的生命危险去救他。

And it was public, and they went back, and they they risked all of their lives in order to save them.

他们本该让每个人以秘密投票的方式做出决定。

What they should have done is had people vote in a way that was secret.

我看到一些人在野外进行越野滑雪时，不想只在平地上滑，而是想去有山坡的地方。

And I see this with people who are cross country skiing in the back country, and you don't wanna just cross country ski where it's level, you want places where there's hills.

但如果山坡太陡，就有可能发生雪崩。

But if the hills are too great, then you have a risk of an avalanche.

在某个时刻，他们会向前看，说：这可能有风险。

At a certain point, they'll look ahead and say, This could be risky.

我们是继续前进，还是放弃？

Do we wanna continue or not?

这同样是同样的情况。

And it's the same dynamic.

人们承受着巨大的压力，要压抑自己的恐惧，顺从共识，而不是通过匿名投票的方式，意识到有一两个人并不想这么做。

There's a lot of pressure on people to inhibit their fear and go along with the consensus, rather than finding a way to vote anonymously and realizing that one or two of the members don't wanna do it.

投票采用匿名方式很重要。

Having votes that are anonymous is important.

我也不喜欢共识决策，因为这些决策往往倾向于保守，不像《火星救援》中的情况那样。

And I also don't like consensus decisions because those tend to be And in other situations, the consensus is fairly risk averse, unlike with The Martian.

人们希望达成一个所有人都能接受的方案。

And people wanna have something that everybody can agree with.

你因此失去了那些拥有洞见的人发挥作用的机会。

And you've lost your opportunity for somebody who's had an insight.

有人提出了一个新想法并希望付诸实践，但共识却倾向于选择安全、舒适、人人都能接受的方案，而不是大胆创新的做法。

Somebody has a new idea of trying to put that in practice, but the consensus is to try to do the safe thing that's comfortable, that everybody can can live with, rather than to do something that's bold and innovative.

因此，我对共识决策感到担忧。

So I have I have problems with consensus decisions.

我对群体决策也有意见。

I have problems with group decisions.

我认为群体作为一种规则或经验法则，通常会做出糟糕的决策。

I think groups as a rule or like a heuristic make terrible decisions.

决策应该由个人来做。

Individuals should make decisions.

团队应该提供意见，但应该由一个人来做最终决定。

Groups should provide input, but there should be one sort of person making the decision.

但这只是我个人的经历，是我一生中扮演过各种角色后所体会到的。

But that's my personal sort of, experiences that I I've lived through through all of the, different roles that I've had in life.

我同意这一点。

I would agree with that.

我刚才在回答你的问题：团队应该如何做决策？

I was trying to answer your question, how should how should teams make decisions?

不。

No.

但这非常重要。

This is so important, though.

对吧？

Right?

因为并不是每个人，当很多人同意时，他们却无法改变它。

Because not everybody, in in when people a lot of people agree with it, but they can't change it.

所以他们属于一个委员会，委员会在做决定，尽管委员会里的每个人可能都认为，如果由一个人署名做出决定，会更有效，而且这还能增加问责性，信不信由你。

So they're part of a committee, and the committee is making a decision even though everybody on that committee might think it would be more effective if one person, signed their name to the decision, which also would increase the accountability of the process, believe it or not.

因为我发现，群体决策往往在决策正确时，房间里每个人都认为自己对此负责。

Because often, what I found with group decision making is that, when the decision is correct, everybody in the room was responsible for it.

而当决策错误时，房间里每个人都试图说服大家不要这么做。

And when it was wrong, everybody in the room tried to convince them not to do it.

因此，这些情况下根本无法形成任何真正的学习。

And so the the there's no sort of, like, learning that happens from these.

但在现实世界中，许多组织仍然坚持由群体来做决定。

But in in in the real world, a lot of organizations still insist on making decisions as a group.

所以问题其实是，我们如何才能更有效地进行群体决策？

So the question was sort of, like, how do we make more effective decisions as a group?

我认为你刚才已经完美地回答了这个问题。

And and and I think that you answered that beautifully.

第二个问题是，在我们以小组形式做决策时，如何在群体环境中揭示这些洞察？

And the second question is, how do we how do we illuminate the insights in a group setting when we are making a decision as a group?

我们如何找到方法，挖掘出我们可能不知道的独特见解？

How do we find ways to surface unique insights into the problem that we might not know.

你有这方面的经验吗？

Do you have any experience with that?

哦，嗯，事前方法

Oh, well, the premortal method

对。

Right.

在很大程度上实现了这一点。

Accomplish that to a great extent.

我认为事前方法的重要之处在于，它也可以普遍应用于群体和团队环境中，即让每个人在向他人展示之前，先独立、私下地形成自己的想法、解读和评估。

And I think what's important about the premortal method that could also be used generally by and group and team environments, is to have people craft their ideas and their interpretations and their assessments individually and privately before they surface it to other people.

关于头脑风暴的研究，我们都是一起进行头脑风暴。

And the research on like brainstorming, we're all brainstorming together.

研究表明，头脑风暴并不会产生更多或更具创新性的想法。

The research shows that brainstorming does not produce more ideas or more innovative ideas.

我认为团队和群体如果让个人独立生成自己的想法，效果会更好。

And I think teams would be and groups would be better having individuals generate their own concepts.

然后在他们独立且私下完成之后，再与其他人分享。

And then after they've done it independently and privately, sharing it with the others.

这将是一个很好的方式，来揭示那些难以浮现的见解，比如项目可能失败的原因。

And that would be a good way to generate insights that are hard to surface about why the project might fail.

有没有办法把这些见解融入到我们推进项目的方式中呢？

Is there a way to even bring those forward into how we're proceeding with the project?

比如，我们如何将这些见解摆上台面，即使这些见解是在定义问题本身？

Like, how do we get the insights on the table even if those insights are defining the problem?

因为在解决问题之前，你必须先定义问题。

Because before you can solve it, you have to define it.

而我们常常有着非常不同的观点。

And often, we have very different view.

如果把这个当作一个有趣的实验，我建议所有在群体环境中工作的人们都试试这个方法。

If you were to this is a fun experiment, and I suggest everybody who who does this in in group settings do this.

当你需要做决定或参加一个决策会议时，让房间里的每个人在纸上写下他们认为这个决定要解决的问题，然后比较这些问题陈述之间的差异和多样性。

When you go to a decision to make or go to a meeting to make a decision, have everybody in the room write out the problem on a piece of paper that they think they're solving with this decision, and then compare how different and how much variance there is in those problem statements.

通常情况下，现实中发生的情况是：你去参加会议，有人提出了问题，这个说法就在每个人心中形成了最低限度的共识。

And so often, somebody has a more unique what what tends to happen in the real world is you go to a meeting, somebody surfaces what the problem is, it sort of clicks the minimal standard in everybody's mind.

然后，作为一群倾向于行动的人，我们立刻开始解决问题，却忘了回头问问：我们对问题的理解真的正确吗？

And then being all type a individuals, we jump on solving the problem and we forget to sort of go back and say, like, do we have the right insight into the problem?

我们是否准确定义了问题？

Have we defined the problem?

如果你是一个单独的决策者而不是一个群体，那么你可以意识到，这个决策者的责任可能是倾听他人对问题的定义，但最终，他们有责任为整个团队和自己定义问题。

And this is where if you have a sole decision maker instead of a group that you can acknowledge that the responsibility of that decision maker may be to listen to other people's definitions of the problem, but ultimately, they're responsible for defining the problem for the group and for themselves.

好的。

Okay.

我有很多反应，因为你刚才从这个地图中说了很多非常有趣且令人兴奋的内容。

So I have a bunch of reactions because you've said a lot of very interesting exciting things from this map.

首先，我同意你的观点。

So first of all, I agree with you.

最好有一个他们信任的单一领导者。

Better to have a single leader that they trust.

他们不需要认为领导者是无所不能的，但他们知道领导者能够有效利用团队的资源。

They don't have to think that the leader is infallible, but they just know that the leader is going to be effective at at making the most of of the team's resources.

但你希望领导者具备的一个特质是，能够诚恳地询问团队成员，了解他们的想法。

But one of the traits that you want in a leader is somebody who can honestly query the team members and see what what they think.

很多时候，这种询问只是流于形式，收效甚微。

A lot of times that querying is done in a rote way that doesn't accomplish much.

我知道我是领导者，但我不能直接说：‘我们就这样做吧。’

So I know that I'm the leader, but I'm not supposed to say, here's what we're doing.

我应该表现出对其他想法持开放态度。

I'm supposed to have some guise of being open to other ideas.

所以我会说：‘我们挨个说说大家的想法吧。’

So I say, so let's go around the table and see what other people think.

你怎么看？

What do you think?

好的，不错。

Okay, good.

你怎么看？

What do you think?

所以我们只是走个过场，好让我能说：我确实征求了大家的意见，了解了每个人的想法。

So we're just checking the boxes so that I can say, but I went around the table and I learned what people had had in mind.

这不是正确的方式。

That's not the way to do it.

与其只是走形式，不如真正好奇他们是怎么想的。

Instead of just checking the boxes, you wanna be curious about what do they think.

你对这件事有什么看法？

What are your thoughts about this?

你觉得在哪些方面有不同的看法？或者你对当前的情况和我们的目标有什么不同的理解？

In what ways do you think Do you have a different sense of what's going on here or what our goals can be?

让我们把这个记录下来。

And let's capture that.

所以，围绕大家转一圈，不应该只是机械地走个过场。

So that's the way to go around the table, not in a rote fashion.

你开始进入复杂问题和棘手问题的领域了。

You're starting to get into the area of wicked problems and difficult problems.

我目前正在和两位同事，约翰·施密特和肖恩·墨菲，做一个关于复杂问题以及如何应对复杂问题的项目。

And I'm doing a project on that right now with two colleagues, John Schmidt and Sean Murphy, on wicked problems and how to proceed with wicked problems.

我们发现，目标的概念会随着进程的推进而变得更加丰富，并且会发生变化。

And we're finding that the notion of the goals is going to get richer and it's going to change as we proceed, as we go along.

而你需要把这些变化记录下来。

And you want to capture that.

你不应该固守最初的想法，因为几乎可以肯定，我们最初的设想是不够充分的。

You don't want to lock in to original ideas because almost certainly our original ideas are going to be inadequate.

此外，还有一种方式进行项目复盘，可以更好地捕捉到更多洞见。

Now there's also a way to do project reviews that could try to capture more insights.

在许多组织中，如果我们正在做一个项目，我会说，好吧，谢恩，你负责这个项目。

In many organizations, if we're doing a project, well, I'll say, okay, Shane, you're doing this project.

我们每三个月进行一次评审。

Let's have a review every three months.

现在这已经成为一种标准评审。

And now it's a standard review.

你已经投入了哪些资源？

What resources have you expended?

你当初预计会投入哪些资源？

What did you project that you were gonna expend?

你完成了哪些任务？

What tasks did you accomplish?

我们在里程碑图表上进展到哪里了？

Where are we in the milestone chart?

我们会逐一检查所有这些内容。

And we go through all of those things.

但在那次回顾会议上，我也可以问你，Shane，在过去三个月里，有什么让你感到意外的事情吗？

But I can also ask you in that review meeting, Shane, in the last three months since the last meeting, has anything happened that surprised you?

如果我们面对的是一个复杂的情况，一个棘手的问题，这和粉刷房间这种一切都在预料之中的事情是不同的。

If we're dealing with a complex situation, with a wicked problem, that's different from something that's sort of like painting a room where everything is predictable.

所以我会问：在过去三个月里，有什么事情让你感到意外吗？

So I'd say, has anything happened in the last three months that has surprised you?

如果你说：没有，没什么让我感到意外的。

And if you say, No, no, nothing has surprised me.

那你就不必担心。

You don't have to worry.

但恰恰这时你才需要担心，因为我想要知道什么让你感到意外。

That's when you have to worry because I wanna know what surprised you.

这样我们就可以开始去探究它，保持好奇，看看它可能意味着什么，以及我们如何改变对问题、目标或任何重要参数的理解。

And now we can start to examine that and see and be curious about it and see what it might mean and how we can change our notion of the problem or the goals or any of any of the important parameters.

我们稍微换个话题吧。

Wanna switch gears a little bit.

通常，当我们做决定时，会有两个非常相似的选项，它们的效果或我们预期的效果虽然不是完全相等，但相差不大。

Often, when we are making a decision, there's two really similar options that are I wouldn't say equally, but near equal in terms of their effectiveness or our anticipated effectiveness about how they'll solve the problem.

我们往往会花费大量时间、金钱和资源，试图做出一个完美的决定。

And we spend a lot of time, money, and resources trying to make a perfect decision.

你能解释一下‘无差别区间’这个概念吗？

Can you explain the zone of indifference to

对。

Right.

我喜欢‘无差别区间’这个想法。

I love the idea of the zone of indifference.

这种现象的运作方式是：如果我有两个选择，一个是糟糕的选项，一个是绝佳的选项。

And the phenomenon the the way the phenomenon works is if I've got two choices, a terrible option and a wonderful option.

快说，你会选哪一个？

Quick, which one do you pick?

好吧，这并不难决定。

Okay, that's not a hard decision.

当我们把它们拉得更近时，糟糕的选择开始有一些正面特点，而绝佳的选择也出现了一些负面后果。

As we move them closer together, and so now the terrible option has some positive features and the great option has some negative consequences.

我们到达了一个非常难以抉择的点，因为两者的优势和劣势几乎完全平衡。

And we get to this point where it's really hard because the strengths and advantages of one versus the other are almost totally balanced.

这些是人们一生中遇到的最难做出的决定。

These are the hardest decisions people ever wrestle with.

而悖论在于，如果两个选项的优缺点几乎完美平衡，那么选哪一个其实都无所谓。

And the paradox is, if the advantages and disadvantages of the two options are almost perfectly balanced, it doesn't matter which one we pick.

但我们却会花上几天、几周，陷入焦虑，纠结到底该选哪个？

And yet we will spend days, weeks going around in a funk, which one am I gonna choose?

委员会也会花数小时反复讨论。

Committees spend hours going over it.

在我所讨论的内容中，最有价值和最高效的一点就是这个。

And if there's anything that can be valuable and efficient in what I'm discussing, it's this.

当你认为自己处于无差别区间时，要意识到：我正处于无差别区间，我永远无法把它们区分开来。

When you think you're in a zone of indifference, to recognize I'm in a zone of indifference, I'm never gonna be able to tease them apart.

所以我干脆就选一个，把时间花在更有意义的事情上，哪怕这意味着抛硬币决定。

So I'm just gonna pick one and spend my time in more fruitful ways, even if it means flipping a coin.

我非常喜欢这一点，因为我觉得我们确实花了太多时间。

I like that a lot because I think we do spend so much time.

我们常常因为追求完美而陷入瘫痪。

Often, we get paralyzed with perfection.

我有一个叫做‘停、放、否’的启发式方法，用来帮助自己摆脱这种瘫痪状态：那就是停止收集有用的信息。

And I have a heuristic called stop, flop, or no that I use to sort of, like, get myself out of this paralysis, which is you stop gathering useful information.

‘放’意味着第一个错失的机会。

Flop is the first loss opportunity.

你即将失去某个选项或机会，或者你已经清楚该做什么了。

So you're about to lose an option or opportunity, or you know you know what to do.

所以，如果你采用‘停、放、否’的方法，就能摆脱这种瘫痪状态。

And so if you stop, flop, or no, it it can get you out of this paralysis.

所以这个方法对你有效。

And so that works for you.

是的

Yeah.

而且，这听起来像是一个合理的策略。

And, it sounds sounds like a reasonable strategy.

哦，这并不完美。

Oh, it's not perfect.

这又是一个启发式方法。

It's it it's a heuristic again.

但跟我谈谈影子拳击吧。

But, talk to me about shadow box.

这就是影子拳击的工作方式。

So here's how shadow box works.

它主要是一种基于场景的方法。

It's primarily a scenario based approach.

我会创造一个艰难、具有挑战性的场景。

I create a tough, challenging scenario.