TKP Insights: Making (Even) Better Decisions

或者在扑克牌的情况下，也许我应该弃掉这手牌，或者其他类似的情况。

Or in the case of poker, maybe I should fold this hand or whatever it is.

你可以将这个类比应用到任何你情绪化时所做的决定上。

You can make the analogy to basically any decision that you want to make where you're being emotional.

所以，所有这些因素结合起来，帮助我理解了你不可能完全理性，因为你总会经历情绪。

So all of these things kind of came together and helped me understand that you can't ever be purely rational because you're always going to experience emotion.

然而，你能做的是学会——这又回到了更加自我反思、审视你的思维过程。

And yet, what you can do is learn This goes back to the being kind of more self reflective and going through your thought process.

学会更加留心你所经历的情绪。

Learning to be more mindful about the emotions you experience.

告诉自己：好吧，我现在正经历这种情绪。

To say, Okay, I am experiencing this emotion right now.

为什么？

Why?

是什么让我产生了这种情绪？

What made me experience it?

因为有时候情绪实际上对决策至关重要。

Because sometimes emotions are actually incredibly relevant to a decision.

需要摒弃的是那些无关的情绪。

It's the irrelevant emotions that need to get rid of.

心理学研究显示，那些因神经损伤而无法体验某些情绪（如恐惧）的人，往往会做出糟糕的赌博决策，最终破产，因为他们根本不在乎。

There's psychological work that shows that people who can't experience certain emotions like fear because they have neural damage, they actually make really bad gambling decisions and they go broke because they just don't care.

他们完全没有风险规避意识。

They have no risk aversion whatsoever.

但这也不好。

Well, that's also not good.

对吧？

Right?

他们完全缺乏情感。

They're completely not emotional.

但在这种情况下，恐惧是重要的。

But in that particular case, the fear was important.

它对决策至关重要，而他们已经失去了这种情感反馈。

It was integral to the decision and they no longer had that emotional feedback.

因此，你需要学会识别这种情绪，意识到自己正在经历它。

So what you need to learn is to identify the emotion, figure out that you're experiencing it.

因为很多时候你根本没意识到自己生气了，没意识到自己沮丧了，没意识到自己饿了，没意识到这些事情都在发生。

Because a lot of times you don't even realize you don't realize you're angry, you don't realize you're frustrated, you don't realize you're hungry, you don't realize that all these things are going on.

所以首先你要识别它。

So So first you identify it.

然后尝试找出根本原因。

Then you try to identify the root cause.

这是一些完全偶然的事情，还是真正重要的事情？

Is this something that's totally incidental or is this something that's actually integral?

大多数情况下，它都是偶然的。

More often than not, it's incidental.

然后你会说，好吧，现在我需要把它放下。

And then you say, Okay, now I need to dismiss it.

弄清楚这种情况通常如何影响我的决策过程，以及我该如何纠正它？

Figure out how does this normally affect my decision process and how do I correct for that?

我该如何真正将其排除在决策过程之外？

How do I actually take it out of the decision process?

有趣的是，仅仅通过识别并经历这个思考过程，就能让你冷静下来。

And the funny thing is, just the very process of identifying and kind of going through that thought process tends to cool you down.

因为突然之间，你已经与事件的即时性拉开了距离。

Because all of a sudden, you've kind of distanced yourself from the immediacy of the event.

突然间，你开始以一种不同的方式思考它。

All of a sudden, you're actually thinking about it in a different way.

所以当你真正到达那一步时，你已经平静多了。

And so by the time you even get there, you're already calmer.

你已经更加理性了。

You're already more rational.

因此，它在多个方面都起到了帮助作用。

So it helps in more ways than one.

这是来自第89期节目《少一些确定性，多一些探究》的玛丽亚·孔尼科娃。

That's Maria Konnikova from episode 89, Less Certainty, More Inquiry.

请查看节目说明，获取完整节目的链接。

Check out the show notes for a link to the full episode.

接下来，我们将听到帕特里克·科利森的分享，他是领先在线支付公司Stripe的联合创始人兼首席执行官。

Next up, we hear from Patrick Collison, co founder and CEO of the leading online payment processing company Stripe.

如果你在过去几年里在线购买过任何东西，那么很可能这笔交易是由Stripe处理的。

If you've purchased anything online over the past few years, there's a good chance that Stripe facilitated that transaction.

我们这一部分的访谈将从帕特里克对过去五年间自己决策方式最大变化的看法开始。

We'll start this portion of our interview with Patrick's thoughts on the biggest differences in his decision making practices from five years ago up until now.

我认为有四个主要区别。

I think there are four big differences.

第一个是，我更加重视决策的速度：如果你能以一半的精确度做出两倍数量的决策，这通常反而更好。

The first is and I just place more value on decision speed in that if you can make, like, if you can make twice as many decisions at half the kind of half the precision, that's actually often better.

而且考虑到随着投入时间增加，决策质量的提升速率几乎必然趋于平缓，我认为大多数人——当然包括五年前的帕特里克，甚至可能也包括今天的帕特里克——都应该更早地在这条曲线上行动。

And it's and then given the fact that sort of the rate of improvement of decision making with additional time almost necessarily tends to kind of flatten out, I think that most people, certainly, that Patrick of five years ago, and, potentially, even the Patrick of today included, should be sort of earlier should be operating earlier in that curve.

做出更多决策，但信心更低，耗时却显著更短。

Make more decisions with less confidence, but in significantly less time.

对吧？

Right?

并且要意识到，在大多数情况下，你可以及时调整方向，把快速决策视为一种独立的资产和能力。

And just recognize that in most cases, you you you can course correct and and treat fast decisions as a kind of asset and capability in their own right.

令我印象深刻的是，我最敬佩的一些组织往往就是这样做的。

And it's quite striking to me how some of the organizations that I hold in the highest regard tend to do this.

第二点是，不要对所有决策一视同仁。

The second thing is not treating all decisions kind of uniformly.

我认为最明显的分类维度是可逆程度和影响大小。

I think the most obvious kind of axes to break them down on are degree of reversibility and magnitude.

对于那些不可逆且影响重大的决策，你确实需要认真权衡，努力做到正确。

And things with low reversibility and, you know, great impact and magnitude, Those ones you do want to, you know, really deliberate over and and and try to get right.

但我认为，如果没有警惕，你为这类决策设立的机制很容易渗透到其他类别的决策中。

But I think it's very easy sort of absent care to have maybe this mechanism you put in place for those decisions to seep into decision making for the other categories.

而在其他三个象限中，你可以更加灵活、更加从容，同样地，优先考虑速度，因为显然，如果决策很容易逆转，那么从定义上讲，你总能事后纠正。

And really in the other three quadrants, you can afford to be sort of much more flexible and and much more fluid and and, again, really just to prioritize speed because, obviously, if it's very reversible, then, you know, by definition, you can always correct it later.

如果这件事影响不大，那谁在乎呢？

And if it's, you know, of low import, then who cares?

对吧？

Right?

这是第二点，就是要意识到这一点，在做决定之前，试着分类一下：这到底是什么样的决策？

And that's kind of the second one and just being kind of cognizant of that and and before making the decision, trying to categorize, well, what kind of decision is it?

第三点是，我现在会刻意尽量减少做决策的次数，问问自己：我为什么要做这个决定？

The third thing is I now try to fairly deliberately just make fewer decisions in that why am I making the decision?

对于某些类型的决策，确实有一些合理的理由。

And for some kinds of decisions, you know, there are some good reasons for that.

我的意思是，有些决策本就应该由首席执行官来做，他对此负有根本责任。

I mean, there are some decisions the CEO ought to make and is kind of fundamentally on the hook for.

但有些决策，如果必须由我来做，那很可能说明组织或制度上已经出了问题。

But there are some decisions where if I'm making it or if I have to make it, that probably suggests that something else organizationally or institutionally has broken.

我认为，任何人——而不仅仅是我的——做出决策的需求，往往只是一种表象，真正的原因是某种潜在的问题迫使你必须做出决策。

And I think the need for a decision from from anyone, not just for me, is often, like, only a sort of an epiphenomenon, and there's really some other underlying issue that's causing you to have to make in the first place.

因此，要思考这一点，并切实采取更多措施推动他人做决策，把决策权推回给那些真正该负责的领域专家。

And so thinking about that and concretely doing more to push others to make decisions and and sort of pushing them back sort of to people who ought to be the the domain experts.

第四，当我意识到我会以不同于他人的方式做决策时，我不会直接讨论决策本身，而是试图深入探究：我们的模型有什么不同，导致你想做决策A，而我想做决策B？

And then fourth, when I realized that I would make a decision differently to how someone else is making it, not even really discussing the decision itself, but trying to dig into what is the difference in our models such that you wanna make decision a and I wanna make decision b.

我们目前在Stripe花大量时间做的一件事，就是让组织的不同部门写下他们所优化的目标——也就是他们的使命是什么，他们部门长期的关键指标是什么。

And one thing we're currently spending a bunch of time on here at Stripe is having different parts of the organization write down what they're optimizing for essentially, like what their mission is, what the long term key metrics are for for kind of their part of the organization.

他们的客户是谁，无论是内部还是外部的客户。

What who who their customers are, either internally or externally.

像这类持续存在的、根本性的问题，如果大家能就这些长期目标达成一致，那么对某个具体决策的分歧，可能就只是我们在实现这一目标的最有效手段上存在不同，但我们都对期望的最终状态高度一致。

And so things of this kind of persistent on ongoing underlying nature such that, hopefully, once there's agreement on those longer term things, then maybe a difference on on to any particular decision might just be, well, we differ sort of on what the most instrumentally effective way to achieve this outcome is, but we're both really unified on what the desired end state is.

在这种情况下，我认为对工具性有效性产生分歧其实并没那么严重，因为如果你是对的，我们很快就会发现。

And there, I think I think disagreement over sort of instrumental efficacy, you know, well, that that's really that problematic a disagreement because, well, if you're right, then we'll soon learn that.

如果你错了，现实很快就会让你清楚地看到这一点。

If you're wrong, reality will probably sort of make that pretty clear in in short order.

我认为更令人担忧、也更容易在组织中引发持续摩擦的是那些关于你真正追求目标的潜在分歧。

I think the more troubling ones and the ones that tend to cause more kind of persistent friction in an organization are where sort of there is latent disagreement and what you're actually optimizing for.

但这些分歧往往从未被明确揭示出来。

But that's kind of never explicitly surfaced and uncovered.

因此，我想再次强调，在决策过程中，我们应更加重视确保我们拥有正确的基础共识，这样后续出现的分歧往往只是表面性的。

And so now, I guess, again, in decision making, place kind of more importance on making sure that we have the right sort of foundational agreement such that the kind of disagreement that then tend to arise are of the sort of essentially more superficial sort.

而这种共识实际上并不那么重要。

And their agreement is actually less important.

文化的一部分是

Part of culture is

从组织所做的决策中学习。

learning from the decisions the organization makes.

你们在Stripe采取什么措施来确保人们从中学习？你个人又如何确保自己能从自己做出的决策中学习，无论是正面的，还是事后看来本可以做得不同的决策？

What do you do at Stripe to make sure that people are learning and what do you do personally to make sure that you're learning from the decisions that you've made both positive and perhaps ones that you, in retrospect, would have wished you could make differently?

我倾向于说，我不确定自己是否真的相信这一点，但针对这个问题，我想说组织中的决策过程被略微高估了，因为组织并不像投资机构、基金或基金经理那样运作。

I'm inclined to say I don't know if I actually believe this, but I'm inclined to say in response to that question that decision making in organizations is slightly overrated in that organizations are not like investment entities, or funds or or managers.

在组织中，投资本质上是非常二元的。

In that organizations well, with investing, it's fundamentally very binary.

总有一个时刻，你必须决定买或不买、卖或不卖，等等。

There is a moment, at which you either buy or or or don't or sell or don't or whatever.

而在公开市场投资等情况下，可能更偏向于一种连续的过程。

And maybe it's somewhat more continuous in the case of, say, public market investing and so on.

但由于决策时间的限制，我认为你必须将其视为更偏向二元的判断。

But given sort of constraints on just decision making time, I think you have to treat it a bit more binary.

你评估股票，然后做出买或不买的决定。

You assess the stock and you make a buy or or or or not decision.

而在组织中，一切都更加流动和连续。

Whereas in organizations, everything is much more fluid and continuous.

我认为，这更多是关于设计反馈机制。

It's much more about, I think, designing the feedback mechanisms.

你知道吗？

You know?

更像生物的。

More biological.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

而且，你知道的，有一种著名的经济水模型，涉及循环的流体，你可以调整利率、通胀率之类的，但只是为了整体把握这种生物机制的运作方式。

And, you know, there's the famous sort of water model of the economy, you know, with the sort of circulating fluids, and you can vary the interest rate or the inflation rate or whatever, but just kind of try to get a sense for the overall kind of biological apparatus.

我认为组织更像这样。

And I think an organization is much more like that.

所以，我认为需要优化的是激励机制、心态、目标定义、从结果反馈到输入、工作和运营本身的机制，所有这些，而不是单纯的二元决策。

And so the I think the things the things to optimize are the incentive structures and the mindsets and the definitions of the goals and the feedback mechanisms from the outcomes to the inputs and the work and the operations themselves and all of those things unless the the binary decisions.

我当然不想完全忽视决策的重要性，确实有时你需要决定：我们是否要推出这个产品？

And I don't want to kind of completely dismiss, obviously, the importance of decision making and that there are times where you've decided, well, are we going to launch this product or not?

我们是否要启动这个项目？

Are we gonna start this project or not?

我们要不要替换这个系统？

Are we going to replace this system or not?

诸如此类。

And so on.

当然，确实存在一些真正的决策，但我认为这更倾向于——也许对我来说，这并不是合适的分析单位。

So there are, of course, real decisions, but I think it tends to be much more well, I guess maybe it doesn't feel like the right unit of analysis to me.

我认为合适的分析单位是细胞。

I think the right unit of analysis is is that of the cell.

那么，在一个组织中，什么是细胞，什么是器官，它们又是如何相互作用的？

And the question is, well, in an organization, what are the cells and what are the organs and how do they interact?

它们之间的反馈机制是什么？

What are the feedback mechanisms between them?

我们来深入探讨一下这里的反馈机制吧。

Let's geek out a little bit on the feedback mechanisms here.

你努力确保哪些类型的反馈机制得以建立？

What sort of feedback mechanisms do you try to make sure are in place?

在流程的哪个阶段，你们会尝试去确认它们是什么？

What point in the process do you try to acknowledge what they are?

我真的认为，这并不是在回避问题，但我觉得现在回答这个问题还为时过早，因为我的确可以告诉你我今天的想法，以及过去一年我们做出的一些调整之类的。

I really think that and this is not to evade the question, but I really think it's too early to answer that in the sense that, I mean, I I can kinda tell you what I think today and the sort of changes we've made over the last year and things like that.

但Stripe成为千人规模的组织，或者说超过五百人的组织，才刚刚一年多一点。

But, like, Stripe has been a thousand person organization for has been more than 500 person organization for just over a year.

对吧？

Right?

我们在这方面还是新手。

We're we're beginners at this.

三年前，Stripe还不到一百人。

And, you know, three years ago, Stripe was under a 100 people.

如果我妄下断言，或者更糟糕的是，认为我们已经完全搞明白了，那将是极大的傲慢。

And and I think either to, opine as if, or to even more problematically believe that we can have it figured out would be would be real hubris.

所以，我们之前讨论过的一些输入，可能部分解释了我和我的想法的来源，但我目前还不知道正确的答案是什么。

And so kind of an input we've been talking about, think that's maybe some of, you know, where our and my thinking comes from, but but I don't know what the right answers are yet.

我们花了很多时间去仔细研究其他组织，试图找出它们成功的原因并逆向分析其做法。

And and we spend a lot of our time sort of scrutinizing other organizations trying to find out and and kind of reverse engineer what works for them and why.

我认为科技行业的一个有趣之处在于，它是一种纯粹的知识型工作，而我们在如何最优地协调和协作这方面，仍然处于相当早期的阶段。

And I think that part of what's interesting about the tech industry is that it's it's a kind of pure knowledge work that we're still, I think, quite early in sort of figuring out in in terms of how to optimally coordinate it and and collaborate on it.

你可以追溯一条从惠普、英特尔、微软、谷歌、Facebook，一直到WhatsApp的脉络。

In that, you can sort of draw a lineage of HP and Intel and Microsoft and Google and Facebook and so on, WhatsApp.

这些都是一些颇具启发性的例子，至少再次表明我们可能还没有完全搞清楚这些问题。

And there are all these sort of suggestive examples that I think, at least, again, suggest that we may not have it all figured out.

我的意思是，WhatsApp和Instagram团队规模都极其微小，却能运作在如此庞大的规模上，或者说到方式

I mean, the fact that WhatsApp was such a miniscule team and Instagram too, of course, despite operating at such a scale, or the fact that The way

一种新范式。

of a new paradigm.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

Facebook的运作方式与惠普的运作方式截然不同。

And the way kind of Facebook operates is very different to the way, you know, HP operated.

这是第32期节目中帕特里克·科利森的发言，讲述如何赢得认可。

That's Patrick Collison from episode 32, earning your stripes.

请查看节目说明，获取完整节目的链接。

Check out the show notes for a link to the entire episode.

接下来，我们将重温我们与安妮·杜克的对话，她不仅在扑克牌桌上表现出色，还成为了一位专注于认知行为决策科学与决策教育的知名作家。

Next up, we'll revisit our conversation with Annie Duke, who not only killed it in poker, but has since become a celebrated author focused on cognitive behavioral decision science and decision education.

她是《思考如何决策与放手》一书的作者。

She's the author of Thinking in How to Decide and Quit.

在我们采访的这一部分，她正在讨论商业决策和日常生活中最佳的决策实践。

In this portion of our interview, she's discussing best practices for decision making in business and your everyday life.

我认为这其中有两点。

I think there's two pieces to it.

第一点是，你必须让人们对每一次尝试的结果不再感到恐惧。

Piece number one is that you have to really get people to feel like they shouldn't be afraid of the outcome on any given try.

因为单次尝试中，我们没有足够的数据来判断它是否有效。

Because on a single try, we don't have enough data to know whether it's any good.

你只是抛了一次硬币，对吧？

You flipped one coin, right?

就一次。

Like one time.

这能说明什么？

What does that tell you?

你没有一万次抛硬币的数据。

You don't have 10,000 coin flips.

所以你得让人觉得，即使这一次没成功也没关系。

So you have to get people to feel like it's okay if the one try doesn't work out.

我认为作为领导者，你必须在文化上善于传达这一点，然后还要以身作则，真正践行它。

And I think that that's as a leader, you just have to culturally, you really have to be good at communicating that and then you have to live it, you have to act it.

那么你该如何做到这一点呢？

So how do you do that?

好吧，和团队一起推演决策过程，并将你们构建的决策树记录下来。

Well, work the decision process through with the group, and actually memorialize the tree that you create.

那么你该如何做呢？当有多个决策正在考虑中时。

So how do you do that you're you have decisions under consideration.

你需要尽可能清楚地分析，决策A、决策B和决策C各自可能引发哪些情景，然后为这些情景分配概率。

And what you want to do is try to figure out as best as you can, what are the scenarios that you think are going to result from decision A versus decision B versus decision C, and then try to assign probabilities to those scenarios.

不要害怕这样做，因为大多数人不敢赋予概率，因为他们觉得一定有正确答案。

And don't be afraid of it that most people are afraid to sign probabilities, because they think that there's a right answer.

确实，客观上存在一个正确的答案。

And it's true, there is some objectively right answer.

但很可能，你给出的估计值——如果我们能窥见客观现实的话——并不会完全准确。

And it's likely that the guess that you give is not going to be if we could, if we had some mirror into the objective reality, you know, it's probably not going to be perfect.

当我提到我有73%的把握能正确拿到我的食物时。

When I said that I was whatever 73% to get my food back correctly.

我不确定自己是不是恰好就是73%。

I don't know if I was exactly 73%.

但至少我尝试了，这总比完全不尝试要好。

But the fact that I was making a try at it is better than not trying at all.

因为如果你根本不尝试，那就意味着你确信结果一定会是某种特定的方式。

Because if you don't try it all, you're either saying that, well, you're certain it's going to turn out in a certain way.

或者你在说，反正要么发生，要么不发生。

Or you're saying something like, well, it either will or it won't.

事实上，事情是具有概率性的。

I mean, the fact is that it is probabilistic.

你很可能比任何人都更专业，因为你有自己做这类选择的经验。

And you're probably more of an expert than anybody else, because you have your own experience in making these kinds of choices.

你当然可以去查阅各种商业案例，看看有没有数据可以参考，以优化你的判断。

You can certainly go and look at, you know, there's all sorts of business cases, and there's data that you can go look at to try to refine that guess.

而做出判断的意愿会让你变得非常渴望获取信息。

And the desire to make the guess makes you very information hungry.

因此，它实际上让你更开放，因为现在你的目标不再是必须找到正确答案。

So it actually makes you more open minded, because now your goal is not like I have to have the right answer.

我想尽可能接近客观概率。

It's I want to try to get as close as I possibly can to what the objective probability is.

我只能通过获取大量信息或倾听持有不同观点的人，来开始问自己：为什么这个可能是错的？

And I can only do that by getting lots of information or listening to people who have different points of view so that I can start asking myself like, why might this be wrong?

但为什么我可能会在这个问题上出错呢？

But why might I be off on this?

然后不断回头，努力改进并获得反馈。

And going back and just constantly trying to refine and get that feedback.

因此，这会让你变得极度渴求信息，让你认为他人的观点极具帮助。

So it causes you to be really information hungry, it causes you to view other people's perspectives as incredibly helpful.

再次强调，这是一种围绕它的身份转变。

Again, it's that sort of identity shift around it.

那么，如果你能做到这一点，能弄清楚：好吧，这是我对于这个决策可能结果的看法。

And so what if you can do that, if you can sort of get, okay, well, here's here's how what I think the outcomes of this decision might be.

这是我认为这些结果发生的概率。

Here are the probabilities that I think that those might occur with.

在这个过程中，确保你充分吸纳不同意见。

And then in that process, make sure that you're really wrapping in the dissenting voices.

这非常重要。

This is very important.

你可以通过多种方式做到这一点。

And you can do that in a variety of ways.

一种方法是设立红队和蓝队。

One is that you can do you know, you can create red team, blue team.

你可以组建一个团队，专门负责反驳当前的主流观点；如果房间里有人对某个结果的概率判断差异很大，就强迫他们互换立场。

So you just create a team of people who are supposed to argue against, you know, what the prevailing opinion is, if you have people in the room who really disagree on what the probability of a particular outcome is, which will happen, force them to change sides.

我们意见不一致，你认为是30%，我却认为是70%。

And we disagree, you're at 30%, and I'm at 70%.

天啊，我们的差距太大了。

Wow, we're way off.

首先，这很棒。

First of all, cool.

通过这个过程，我们很可能会学到一些东西。

We're probably going to learn something through this process.

这实际上比我们达成一致更令人兴奋。

That's actually much more exciting than us agreeing.

如果我们所有人都同意的话。

If we all agree.

对。

Right.

现在这真的令人兴奋，因为你和我都掌握了充分的信息。

Now, this is really exciting because you and I are pretty well informed.

我们属于同一个团队。

We're on the same team.

我们同属一家公司。

We're in the same company.

我们基本上是在使用相同的信息。

We're kind of working with the same information.

然而，我们对概率的判断确实存在很大分歧。

And yet we really disagree about what the probability is.

这很令人兴奋。

That's exciting.

这对我们的成长有好处。

And that's good for us.

有人有机会更新自己的观点。

Somebody has an opportunity to update their view.

我们可能只是不知道这个人是谁。

We might just not know who that person is

在这一点上。

at this point.

或者我们所有人都可能更新自己的观点，因为我们现在可能会达成一个更居中的看法。

Or we might all update our view because we might all come now to something that's more in between.

是的

Yeah,

对。

right.

但现在让我们换位思考。

But now make us switch sides.

你现在必须为我的立场辩护，即我是70%，而我要为你辩护，即你是30%。

You now have to argue my side that I'm 70%, and I have to argue your side that you're 30%.

在场的人将评判谁在辩论中胜出。

And the people in the room are going to judge who wins the debate.

换句话说，不是谁对，而是谁更能代表对方的立场。

In other words, not who's right, but who's the better arbiter of the other side.

注意，这让我必须构建出你观点的最佳版本。

Notice that makes me construct the best version of your argument.

我的目标是能够比你本人更好地阐述它，因为我想要赢。

My goal is to be able to argue it better than you could because I want to win.

对。

Right.

是的。

Right.

我希望房间里的人来评判我。

I want the people in the room to judge me.

真正美妙的是，我现在开始思考：为什么？

And what's really wonderful then is that now I'm going to start thinking about, well, why?

我们为什么差距这么大？

Why are we so far apart?

他为什么认为是30%？

Why does he think it's 30%?

我很可能也会调整自己的观点。

I'm likely to probably moderate my view.

你也很可能调整自己的观点，而房间里每个人都会因此学到东西，因为他们接触到了我们的思考过程。

You're likely to probably moderate your view, and everybody in the room is now going to learn because they're exposed to what our processes.

这太棒了。

And that's wonderful.

现在，假设房间里的大多数人同意我的观点。

And now, let's say most of the room agreed with me.

而你作为30%的少数派，有机会表达你的声音，你的观点也会被纳入我们刚刚制定的场景计划中。

And you were this outlier at 30%, you get a chance to have your voice heard and your voice is now represented in that scenario plan that we've now created.

所以，这是一种非常好的做法。

So that's a great way to do it.

另一种确保你听到那些持不同意见者‘为什么可能出错’的思路，是进行所谓的‘事前验尸’——即在问题发生前而非发生后检查病患。

Another way you can do it in order to really make sure that you're getting those, you know, why might it go wrong in those dissenting voices is to do what's called a pre mortem, which is examining the patient before it's dead instead of after.

想象一下，我们公司有一个目标：将销售额提升X个百分点。

So imagine, okay, we have this goal as a company, we want to increase sales by X amount.

让我们设想，这就是我们想要实现的目标。

Let's imagine and that's a goal that we want to have.

这是一个两年期的目标。

It's a two year goal.

假设两年后，有一份报纸报道说：我们失败了，没有达成目标。

Let's imagine at the end of two years that there's a newspaper that says we failed, we did not reach our goal.

现在，请房间里的每个人都写下五个我们失败的原因。

Let's all everybody in the room now write down five reasons why we failed.

而在这些场合中，通常会出现团队合作的问题：每个人都想被看作是团队成员，都想显得随和，都想表现得好像我们正在赢，因为我们都很聪明，像啦啦队一样。

And now what happens is that very often in these rooms, you end up with this team player problem, everybody wants to be seen as a team player, everybody wants to be seen as agreeable, everybody wants to be seen as sort of like, we're winning the game, because we're all so smart and like cheerleaders.

但当你进行事前验尸时，你就改变了什么是团队成员的含义，对吧？

When you do a pre mortem, now you've changed what it means to be a team player, right?

真正会得到表扬的人，是那些提出最富有创意的失败原因的人。

Like the people who are going to get pats on the back are the ones who come up with the most creative reasons for failure.

这将帮助你提前预判可能出现问题的地方，让你把这些因素融入你设想的情景中，并调整成功或失败的概率。

And that's going to allow you to now anticipate sort of where things might go wrong, it's going to allow you to wrap that into the scenarios that you think might occur, it's going to allow you to adjust the probabilities of success or failure.

好的，你通过这些练习创建了这些内容。

Okay, so you go through those kinds of exercises you create.

现在，我们决定采用方案A，以下是可能发生的情景，以及我们对概率的初步估计，把这些记录下来。

Now, okay, we're going to go with decision A, here are the scenarios we think might occur, here are stabs at the probabilities, and you memorialize it.

所以，当事情发生时，这些内容就清晰地写在白板上，你拍了照，结果却没成功。

So now, when the thing happens, that's right up there on the whiteboard, you took a picture of it, That didn't work out.

而且旁边还标着百分比，你知道，好吧，我们原以为有33%的概率会发生这种情况，结果很糟糕。

And it's got that percentage by it, you know, okay, well, thought 33% of the time this was going to happen, it was going to be bad.

这使得评估结果变得非常困难。

It makes it very hard to result.

因为你要怎么回去说，我们的流程其实很糟糕呢？

Because you how do you go back and say our process was really bad?

就像，这事儿就在这儿，

It's like, well, here it was,

对吧？

right?

我们其实早就知道它可能会发生。

We kind of knew it was going to happen.

所以我认为，这真正让你能更专注于：究竟是什么流程帮助我们理解了这个决策？

So I think that that really allows you to now focus much more on what's the process for getting us to understand what the decision is.

而且显然，随着未来的发展，你可以回头审视，看看我们是否在那个流程中遗漏了什么。

And obviously, as the future unfolds, as it does, you can go back in and examine and say, you know, did we miss something in that process?

还是说只是那27%？

Or was it just it was the 27%?

你知道，我们的概率对吗？

You know, were our probabilities right?

你可以问这个问题，但你已经把一切都混在一起了。

Like you can ask that, but you've done it all together.

对。

Right.

我非常喜欢这一点。

I like that a lot.

我看到扑克和组织之间的一个区别是，在扑克中，你做出的是非常个人化的决策。

One of the differences that I see between poker and maybe organizations is in poker, you're making very individual decisions.

你是做决策的那个人。

You're the person making the decision.

你对这些结果负有责任和问责。

You're responsible and accountable for those outcomes.

在组织中，这些界限往往会变得模糊，因为有时你需要执行别人的决策。

Those lines in organizations tend to blur in the sense of sometimes you're responsible for implementing somebody else's decision.

有时他们则需要执行你的决策。

Sometimes they're responsible for implementing yours.

有时你们会以团队的形式做出决策，而不是个人单独决定。

And sometimes you come to decisions as a group instead of an individual.

这如何影响你对这个问题的思考？

How does that affect how you think about this?

首先，我认为无论情况如何，做出正确决策的过程可能是相似的，因为当时我虽然在做自己的决定，但也有责任去和我的同僚交流，一起学习、分析这些决策，并讨论我未来可能采取的战略。

Well, first of all, I think that the the process for coming to what the right decision is can be similar regardless, because what I was doing was certainly in the moment I was making my own decisions, but it was my responsibility to go talk to the people who were my peers that I was trying to learn with, and work through and deconstruct those decisions and talk about strategically what I might be doing in the future.

所以从某种意义上说，这其实是个类似的问题，对吧？

So in some sense, that's a similar problem, right?

我必须自己去执行。

I have to go execute on my own.

但我需要与团队互动，以确定我最佳的战略规划。

But I'm interacting with a group in order to try to figure out what my best strategic plan is.

我认为在很大程度上，这实际上是非常相似的。

And I think that that's actually in large sense, very similar.

话虽如此，当然，如果我能和团队一起进行决策练习会很好，但这并不合适，因为这是一人一局的游戏，你需要独立行动。

That being said, obviously, it would be really nice if I could go through a group decision making exercise at the table, but that would be bad because it's one player to a hand and you need to play on your own.

所以，实际上我认为这并没有那么不同。

So, but I actually don't think that it's that dissimilar.

我认为作为领导者，你可以这样看待：是的，这个人必须独立执行。

And I think that you can sort of view as a leader, the same thing that, yes, the person has to go execute on their own.

但作为领导者，我的职责是在他们执行之前，与他们一起梳理清楚流程和战略，这样我们都能达成共识，他们和我都理解他们的推理，他们知道我认同这个过程，他们也明白我知道结果可能不会如预期。

But it's my job as a leader to have worked through what the process is and what the strategy is with that person before they go off and execute, so that we're all bought in and they and I understand what their reasoning is, they know that I've bought into the process, they understand that I know that there's some probability that it doesn't work out.

但我们已经达成一致，当他们去执行时，他们会按照这个计划行动，然后回来和我们讨论，看看未来如何优化。

But we've agreed that as they go and execute, that they're going to, you know, they're going to execute on this plan, and then they're going to come back and we're going to discuss later to see how we might refine in the future.

但他们不会为糟糕的结果负责。

But they're not going to be held responsible for the bad outcome.

他们需要为共同参与整个决策过程负责。

They're going to be held responsible for having worked through the process together.

这实际上和扑克非常相似。

And that's actually very similar actually to poker.

我独自执行，然后我会去找我的团队，说：嘿，我们能不能复盘一下我刚才的对局，以便思考有哪些不同的打法？

So I'm executing on my own, but then I'm going off to my group and saying, Hey, can we deconstruct this session that I played, so that I can start thinking about what are different lines of play?

如果我在特定情况下做出这样的决定，可能会有哪些不同的结果？

And if I make these kinds of decisions in particular situations, what are the different ways that I think that could turn out?

让我们开始从战略角度思考我应该怎么做，这样当我再次独自执行时，我是在执行我所学到的、并真正认同的流程。

And let's start thinking about strategically what I should be doing so that when I go back and execute on my own, I'm sort of executing what I've learned, and what I'm sort of bought into in terms of process.

你会记录决策日志吗？

Do you keep a decision journal?

我其实不会。

I actually don't.

我不是那种会写日志的人。

I'm not a journaler.

我希望自己能这么做，因为我觉得那样会好得多。

And I wish that I were because I think it would be way better.

我更倾向于

I'm much more of

我真想回去读一读你在快速崛起和转变时期的日记，对吧？

I would love to go back and read your journals as you were, like, meteoric rise and change, right?

那些伴随而来的高峰与低谷。

The highs and lows associated with them.

所以我认为人们的学习方式各不相同。

So I think that people learn in different ways.

对我来说，真正学会的方式是通过与他人交谈。

And for me, the way that I really learned was through conversation with others.

我发现，让自己对自己的想法负责的最好方式，就是把这些想法暴露给其他人。

The way that I found that I was best held accountable to my own ideas was to expose those ideas to other people.

并让他们提出质疑。

And have them challenge.

并让他们提出质疑。

And have them challenge.

这仅仅是我的学习方式。

And that's just my learning style.

当我想象一个决策日记时，我所设想的那种决策日记，就是去跟别人聊聊你今天改变了哪些想法，对吧？

When I imagine a decision journal, the kind of decision journal that I imagine would be, you know, go talk to people about what you've changed your mind about today, right?

这整个过程我认为都涉及去跟其他人交流，去找人聊聊，而且因为我独自一人时也有那样一个群体，我独自思考这些问题时，总是想象自己在跟别人对话。

It would all involve, I think, go talk to other people, go find other people to speak to go, you know, and then I also because I had that group when I was on my own, and I was kind of thinking about those things on my own, I was always imagining it as if I were talking to somebody else.

所以对我来说，这种内化的群体对话就成了我自己的日记，而不是把它写下来。

You know, so for me, that internalized conversation of the group became my own journal, you know, as opposed to physically writing it down.

不过这很有趣，因为在写书的过程中，我并不会写很多草稿，因为大部分的草稿其实都在我脑子里完成。

It's interesting, though, because this that, you know, even in the writing process of writing the book, I don't write a whole lot of drafts because most of my drafting is in my head.

我会想，你知道的，在练瑜伽时，我想这可能不太好，因为你应该只专注于自己的垫子上。

I'm like, you know, I'm like, you know, in yoga, and I guess this is bad because you're supposed to only be on your mat.

但在练瑜伽时，我可能会在思考一些想法，或者散步、开车，或者做其他任何事情。

But in yoga, I might be, you know, working through some ideas or, you know, walking around or I'm driving or whatever it might be.

我实际上是在脑子里构思，梳理结构和论点。

I'm actually composing in my head and I'm working through the structure and the arguments.

然后我会想象自己跟别人讨论这些想法，试图完善它们。

And then I'm sort of imagining talking about those with other people and trying to refine them.

然后我确实会去说。

And then I do talk.

好吧，这是我正在思考的内容。

Well, here's what I'm thinking about.

这是我打算在这部分写的东西。

This is what I'm thinking about writing in this section.

我会跟别人交流，听听他们的看法，看看这些想法在他们那里反响如何。

And I'm bouncing it off other people and trying to hear what they have to say and how it's playing with them.

这实际上也是我做主题演讲时的很大一部分内容。

And that's actually a lot of what I do a lot of keynoting.

而这就是它的主要方式：你把想法呈现给观众，观察他们的反应，获得反馈。

And that's a lot of what that is, is you're putting these ideas out to the audience and then sort of seeing how they respond back and getting that feedback.

这让你能够梳理自己的叙事方式，调整表达方式，并判断这些想法是否真实可信。

And that's allowing you to figure out your narratives and the way that you're expressing it and whether you think the ideas have fidelity.

当人们事后来找你时，你面临哪些挑战？

How are you being challenged when the people come up to you afterwards?

所以当我最终把它写下来时，已经经过充分的反思了。

So by the time I ever get it down on paper, it's been really well journaled.

这种反思方式正好契合我思维的特点。

It's just been journaled in this way that my mind happens to work really well.

如果你不知道结果，要判断别人的决策质量，你需要哪些信息？

What information would you require from somebody else to or would you want from somebody else to judge the quality of their decision, not knowing the outcome?

我认为这取决于决策的类型。

Well, I think it depends on what the decision is.

你提到的非常重要的一点是，我需要掌握一些具体细节。

What I think is really important that you bring up is that there is that there are details that I need to have.

我认为，无论你做什么，都必须自己独立思考。

And I think that you have to think for yourself in whatever you're doing.

你可以和一群同样精通你所从事领域的人一起探讨，或者和那些正努力成为该领域专家的人一起梳理，明确你始终需要哪些细节来做出好的决策——因为你自己最清楚这些。

And you can work this through with a group of people who are also experts in whatever you're doing or trying to become experts in what you're doing or what are the details that you always need in order to construct a good decision because you know that for yourself better than I do.

我可以从扑克牌游戏中告诉你，我需要很多细节。

I can tell you from poker, for example, there's all sorts of details that I need.

比如——

Like-

这些细节会出现在扑克游戏中吗？

Would they be in poker?

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Sure.

我需要知道桌边有多少人。

I need to know how many people were at the table.

你玩的是现金局还是锦标赛？

Were you in a cash game or a tournament?

如果你玩的是锦标赛，那是在比赛的哪个阶段？

If you are in a tournament, what point in the tournament are you?

你离盈利线还有多近？

How close are you to the money?

比如说，你已经盈利了吗？

For example, have you already made the money?

这类事情。

These kinds of things.

在现金局中，你最近是赢还是输？

In a cash game, have you been winning or losing recently?

你的筹码量是多少？

What does your stack size look like?

你知道的，你玩的是哪种扑克形式？

Is you know, what's the form of poker that you're playing?

你是处于早期位置、中期位置还是后期位置？

Are you in early position, middle position, late position?

换句话说，你具体坐在桌子的哪个位置？

In other words, where exactly are you sitting at the table?

这手牌之前发生了什么行动？

What was the action prior to the hand?

在我回答你的问题之前，情况是怎样的？

Prior to the point that you have a question for me?

你是加注者吗？

Were you the pre flop razor?

所以这全是术语？

Were you so this is all jargon?

继续说。

Keep going.

太棒了。

This is awesome.

你是加注者吗？

Were you the pre flop razor?

你跟注了吗？

Did you call?

你下注时，你和中间的人之间有多少人？

How many people were in between you when you called?

全部？

All?

你知道，因为我无法做到。

You know, so because I can't.

问题是，如果我不知道一些非常基本的事实，比如你是第一个下注的还是第二个下注的？

The problem is that if I don't know some very simple facts, like were you first to bet or second to bet?

或者你是加注者还是不是加注者？

Or were you the razor or not the razor?

或者你周围的人是怎么玩的？

Or how had the people been playing around you?

比如，和你对战的那个人？

Like, was the person that you were playing against?

还是他们通常更松还是更紧？

Or did they tend to be looser or tighter?

这些问题中的任何一个吗？

Any of those questions?

牌面是什么样子的？

What did the board look like?

如果我连这些基本信息都不知道，那我给你任何建议都毫无意义，因为我的建议不会有丝毫可靠性。

Then there's literally no point in me giving you any advice because I'm not going to give you an advice of any fidelity.

我最近其实和我的朋友利夫·博雷聊了聊，她职业生涯早期是我指导过的人，现在她已经是一位非常非常出色的牌手了。

I was actually talking to a friend of mine, Liv Borey, who very early on in her career, I mentored her and was working with her in terms of she's a very, very good player now.

但很久以前，当她刚开始学习的时候，我一直在指导她。

But way back when when she was first learning, I was working with her.

前几天我又和她聊起了这件事。

And she I was talking to her about it the other day.

我问她：你还记得你刚开始和我一起玩的时候，每次来向我描述一手牌的情景吗？

I said, Do you remember when you first started playing with me and you come and describe a hand to me?

我当时在这点上有点像埃里克的偶像。

And I was a little bit Eric's idolish here.

我当时就想，算了，没什么意义。

And I was like, Well, there's no point.

因为你根本没说清楚，我完全不知道。

Because you're not I have no idea.

你当时在什么位置参与行动？

Like, where were you in the action?

你连翻牌圈发下来的三张牌都说不出来。

Like, you can't tell me all three cards that came down on the flop.

我不知道谁加注了，谁没加注。

I don't know who raised or who didn't.

你描述的手牌是：你先加注，有人跟注，然后他们居然在你前面过牌，但他们又不是盲注。

Like, you just described a hand where you were the pre flop raiser and somebody called and then somehow they checked in front of you, but they weren't in a blind.

这根本说不通。

It doesn't even make any sense.

那我为什么要给你建议？

So why should I give you advice?

这对你没有帮助。

It won't help you.

这很模糊，缺乏信息或背景。

It was vague and lacking information or context.

对。

Right.

所以如果我给他们建议，在这个特定情况下，这些建议也不会有帮助，因为我只是在瞎编，因为我根本不知道你到底在做什么。你可以想象，把这套说法套用到你自己的情况里，但你得搞清楚具体细节。

So that I if I gave them advice, her advice in this particular case, it wouldn't have helped her because I would have just been like making things up because I didn't So have the you can think like you can imagine fitting this to whatever you're doing, figure out what the details you are.

如果你做销售，就得弄清楚你需要知道什么。

If you're in sales, figure out what you need to know.

我的意思是，我能想象你肯定有些关键信息需要掌握，比如我们正处于销售周期中。

Like, I mean, I can imagine that there are certain things you need to know, like we're in the sales cycle.

你处于哪个阶段？

Are you?

财年到了哪个时候？

Where in the fiscal year?

你呢？

Are you?

你知道你和另一家公司那个人的关系如何吗？

And you know, what was your relationship with the person in the other company?

你和另一家公司其他人还有其他关系吗？

Did you have other relationships with people in the other company?

还是说你只接触了一个人，过去事情进展得怎么样？

Or was it just you just had one point person and how had things gone in the past?

你知道吗，在对话中，他们跟你说了他们当时处于什么阶段？

You know, what kind of during the conversations, what were they telling you about where they were?

比如，什么？

Like, what?

他们是怎么描述希望未来继续与你互动的？

How were they describing how they wanted to continue to have interactions with you?

这很模糊吗？

Was it vague?

是我们打算定个日期来完成这件事吗？

Was it we're going to set a date to be able to do this?

你们当时使用了哪些策略？

What are the strategies that you were using?

你们是怎么判断什么时候在和他们互动、什么时候没有互动的？

How did you figure out how to figure out when you were interacting with them and when weren't you?

我的意思是，我这都是编的，但我猜这些销售可能会给你发消息，告诉我这可能是任何人说过最荒谬的话。

You know, mean, I'm making this up, but I assume that these are maybe salespeople can write you and tell me that was the most ridiculous thing that anybody ever said.

但重点是，你应该试着为自己这么做。

But the point is, like, you should try to do that for yourself.

我觉得，理解这种情况很棒。

I think, like, understanding the situation is great.

知道那个人做决定时掌握的信息非常重要。

Knowing what information that the person had at the time making a decision is super important.

你还能想到其他任何事情吗？关于你如何结构化你想要了解的内容，尤其是那些不那么依赖情境、更关注你认为可能的结果范围的问题？

Are there anything else that comes to mind for you in terms of how you might structure, what you would want to know from people that may be less situation dependent, more like what range of outcomes did you think was possible?

或者

Or

所以当你真正和某人一起做决定时，你需要了解背景信息。

So when you're actually working through a decision with someone, you want context for one thing.

因此，我想知道他们在过去其他决定上的经历如何。

So I would want to know how things had gone in the past for them with other decisions.

换句话说，我首先想知道他们在长期来看各种事情的进展如何。

So in other words, what was at first of I want to know how things have been working out for them sort of over the long run.

比如，我给你一个非常简单的例子。

So like, I'll give you a really simple example.

如果有人来找我，抱怨他们在一段关系中遇到的问题，如果我知道他们以往所有其他关系的情况，那就很有帮助。

If someone's coming to me and complaining about a problem that they're having in a relationship, it's good if I know how things went in all other relationships.

所以如果他们告诉我，‘我正在约会的这个人真是个混蛋’，而我知道之前那十个人

So if they're telling me, this person I've been dating is such a jerk, and I know that the last 10 people

都

have all

都是混蛋，这就会改变我对该提供什么建议、或者更重要的是，我们如何共同做出决策的看法，而不是当他们之前的九段恋情都非常美好时的情况。

been jerks, that changes the way that I'm thinking about the what you know, what kind of advice I might be giving them or how we might work together, more importantly, through the decision than if the last nine people that they dated were all amazing.

而现在他们恰好和一个混蛋在一起。

And now they happen to be with a jerk.

你可以看到，这种背景信息有多么重要。

You can see how that really matters that context.

是的，我想知道你在做决定时，有哪些信息影响了你的决策？

Yes, I want to know when you were working through the decision, what information was informing the decision that you were making?

你当时认为可能发生哪些可能性？

What were the possibilities that you thought could happen?

因为也许我不同意你的看法。

Because maybe I disagree with you.

也许你会告诉我，你有70%的把握认为这件事会非常顺利。

Maybe you say to me, I was 70% that this was going to work out really well.

而我会觉得，哦，这个概率似乎太高了。

And I'm like, Oh, that seems high.

所以现在我可以考考你。

So now I can quiz you on it.

那你为什么觉得是70%呢？

Well, why did you think it was 70%?

因为天啊，我觉得这个概率低得多。

Because, gosh, it really feels lower to me.

那我们一起来探讨一下，看看为什么会这样。

So let's explore that together and see why that is.

我想知道，特别是你想用哪些信息来推动这个决定。

I want to know the you know, particularly I want to know the information that you were pulling, mainly in order to drive the decision.

你为什么以这种方式做出这个预测？

Why did you make this prediction in this particular way?

因为我可能掌握了一些你没注意到的信息，现在可以提供给你。

Because maybe I have information that you missed, that I can now provide to you.

也许我可以开始提问你了。

Maybe I can start quizzing you.

那么，你认为有没有什么信息是你本可以引入的，可能会让你做出不同的决定？

Well, do you think that there can you think of any information that you could have brought into it that maybe would have made you make a different decision?

你觉得你本可以找到哪些其他信息呢？

What is it that you do you think you could have found other information?

回过头来看，你是不是倾向于某个结论，因此才选择了你手头的这些信息、细节或者其他什么？

In retrospect, you know, did you go you wanted to go toward a certain conclusion, and so you drew this particular information that you had, or this detail or whatever it might be?

那么，世界上存在的其他所有这些信息呢？

Well, what about all this other stuff that existed out in the world?

比如，你为什么没有考虑这些？

Like, why weren't you considering that?

你有没有问过自己，为什么它可能不成立？

Did you ask yourself why it might not be true?

你有没有向其他人寻求建议？

Did you seek out the advice of other people?

他们是不是通常都同意你的观点？

Did they tend to be people who agreed with you?

你有问过那些不同意你的人吗？

Were you asking people who disagreed with you?

你有没有问过别人，他们为什么觉得你可能是错的？

Did you ask anybody why they thought you might be wrong?

你知道，这些正是如果你真的想成为一个优秀的决策者，就总会问自己的问题。

Like, you know, these are all the kinds of questions that you're always asking yourself if you really want to be a good decision maker.

希望在决策小组中，我所做的部分工作就是向你提出这些问题。

And hopefully, if we're in a decision pod, part of what I'm doing is asking you those questions.

因为我知道，由于你思维的方式，你不太可能自己问这些问题。

Because I know that because of the way that your mind works, you're just less likely to ask them of yourself.

我也是。

So am I.

我也不太可能自己问这些问题。

I'm less likely to ask them of myself.

但当你属于那个群体或部落时，问别人就更容易了。

But it's easier to ask other people when you're part of that group or tribe

因为我们对此达成了共识。

because we have an agreement to it.

我认为这种共识真正酷的地方在于，回到如何在不惹人反感的情况下表达不同意见这个想法上。

And I think that what's really cool about that kind of agreement is that going back to the idea of how do you disagree without being disagreeable?

再次强调，我认为这取决于你如何看待分歧。

Again, it I think it depends on how you view the disagreement.

因为如果我们达成协议，你愿意帮助我做出决策，帮助我构建对世界更准确的认知。

Because if we'd agree if we if we have an agreement that you're going to help help me with my decision making, you're gonna help construct an accurate view of the world.

如果你对我隐瞒信息，那就是在伤害我。

If you withhold information from me, now that's hurting me.

你没有提供与我观点相左的视角，这就违背了我们的协议。

You're violating our agreement by not giving me a perspective that disagrees with me.

如果你有这样的信息，却不去分享可能让我降低原有观点的资料，那也是违背我们的协议。

If you have one, You're violating our agreement by not sharing information that you have that might moderate my opinion downward.

这是来自第37集《通过犯错变得更好》的安妮·杜克。

That's Annie Duke from episode 37, Getting Better by Being Wrong.

查看节目笔记以获取完整 episode 的链接。

Check out the show notes for a link to the entire episode.

最后，我们回顾一下与我的朋友、电子商务巨头 Shopify 的联合创始人兼首席执行官 Tobi Lutke 的对话。

Last, we look back at a conversation with my friend, Tobi Lutke, the co founder and CEO of the e commerce giant Shopify.

Tobi 几周后将再次做客节目，在第 152 期与我进行一场全新的三小时深度对谈。

Tobi is back on the show again in a few weeks with a brand new three hour sit down conversation with me in episode one fifty two.

你即将听到的片段来自第 41 期节目。

The clip you're about to hear is from episode 41.

Tobi 是我节目中遇到过最具思想性与目的性的商业领袖之一，他在决策过程中的深思熟虑，以及如何从自己犯过的错误中学习，为本主题 episode 画上了完美的句号。

Tobi is one of the most thoughtful and intentional business leaders I've ever had on the show and his thoughtful process when it comes to decision making and how he learns from some of the mistakes he's made is a fitting way to end this themed episode.

以下是来自第 41 期节目《信任电池》的 Tobi 讲述他一次决策失误的经历，以及他是如何从过程中吸取教训的。

Here's Tobi discussing one of those times he made a mistake in decision making and how he learned from the process taken from episode 41, The Trust Battery.

我不知道我做过最难的决定是什么。

I don't know what the hardest decision is that I ever made.

但我可以告诉你我表现最差的那一次。

I can tell you the one I did the worst on.

那是我拖延太久才做出的最重要决定，而Shopify的故事与大多数风险投资支持并上市的公司略有不同，因为它最初是从销售滑雪板开始的，那时就已经盈利了。

It was the most important decision which I took too long to make which was so again Shopify's story is a little bit different from most venture backed and then public companies in the way that, you know, it started with snowboard selling, so it was actually profitable there.

然后我停止了销售滑雪板，全身心投入到Shopify的建设中。

And then I stopped selling snowboards to focus completely on building Shopify.

经过多年的努力，Shopify最终也成为了一家盈利的公司。

And then for a lot of work, you know, and many years, eventually Shopify became a profitable company itself.

但我的目标是打造世界上最好的、由20人组成的舒适型生活方式企业。

But it was a my goal was I wanted to build the world's best 20 people lifestyle business.

这真的是我对Shopify的初衷。

That was really my goal with Shopify.

你知道，我只是不喜欢风险投资这个想法。

You know, the way like, I just didn't love the idea of venture capital.

我是欧洲人，所以我倾向于认为公司最终应该以盈利为目的。

I'm I'm European, so I tend to think that companies exist to make money at a certain point.

我觉得用别人的钱去盲目追求增长，似乎完全不对。

Know, like, it just seems like so using other people's money to, you know, just try to grow over everything is like it just seemed wrong to me.

但我有大量证据表明，Shopify 确实是一家增长型公司。

But I had lots of evidence that Shopify really was a growth company.

就像风险投资模式适用于某种特定类型的企业，而且这种模式对这类企业非常合适。

Like, it's like the venture capital model is for a certain kind of business, and it's a really good fit for that kind of business.

我认为我知道 Shopify 就是这样的公司，但我却人为地限制了它的发展。

And I I think I knew that Shopify was one of those companies, and then I kind of artificially constrained it.

所以我没有做出的决定是：我能否以及是否应该将 Shopify 从生活方式型企业转变为增长型企业？

So the decision I didn't make was can I and should I transition Shopify from being a lifestyle business to a growth business?

我之所以最终这样想，是因为在长达一年半的时间里，我就是 Shopify 潜力发挥的瓶颈，我一直拖延着做这个决定。

And reason why I ended up like so I feel now that I was the limit I was the bottleneck on potential for Shopify for like a good year and a half period in which I just dragged my feet making this call.

那次经历让我深受创伤，我再也不想成为任何公司的瓶颈了。

And I I'm so traumatized from that, I never want to be a bottleneck of a company again.

这又是另一件促使我意识到必须关注自身成长的事情。

And this was another one of those things that just pushed me into, like, I need to look after my own personal growth.

我必须走在公司对我的需求之前，等等。

I need to be ahead of where the company needs me to be at and so on.

而且，你知道，我最终以一种非常数据驱动的方式做出了决定。

And, you know, eventually I made the decision in a very sort of data driven way.

我没有立即把钱投资于招聘新人，而是先存了一些钱。

I saved up some money instead of investing it immediately into hiring someone new.

当我存够了五万美元后，我挑出了五个我们之前提出的营销或增长 Shopify 的想法，同时为它们全部提供资金，并说：如果其中有两个成功了，那就说明 Shopify 确实是一家被资源限制的高速增长公司。

And once I had like $50,000 saved, I took five ideas we had that, you know, like of marketing ideas or ideas to how to grow Shopify and just funded all of them at the same time and said if two of them work, are really a growth company that's being held back by its resources.

这五个想法全都成功了。

And they all five worked.

情况变得异常明显了。

It became super bloody obvious.

情况变得极其、极其、极其明显了。

It became very, very, very obvious.

你提到你花太长时间才做出这个决定。

You mentioned you took too long to make the decision.

你如何看待内部决策的速度？

How do you think about speed when it comes to decision making internally?

是的，我经常和人们谈论这一点，最重要的事情。

Yeah, the most important thing I tend to talk with people about this a lot.

我认为人们必须理解的最重要的一点是，一个决定有多难逆转。

I think the most important thing that people have to understand is how undoable is a decision.

嗯。

Mhmm.

如果一个想法完全无法逆转，我希望人们能尽可能快地做出决定。

Like if an idea is fully undoable, I want people to almost, you know, make it as quickly as they can.

问题是，你永远无法撤销已经投入的风险投资。

So the problem is that the, you know, you can never un VC fund yourself.

所以当一个决定是不可逆的时候，就非常值得深入理解。

So when a decision is something that you can't take back, then it's worth really, really understanding.

因此在决策方面，我不认为我能教出什么全新的东西。

So in terms of decision making, I don't think I can teach terribly new things.

最重要的事情是掌握所有背景信息，然后做出决定。

The most important thing is get all the context and then make a decision.

如果你只是这么做，就已经比商业领域绝大多数人做得更好了，因为几乎每个人都是先做决定，再找数据来支持这个决定。

If you just do that, you're already doing a better job than the vast majority of people in business because almost everyone makes a decision and then gets data to support that decision.

所以只要你这么做，就已经领先一步了。

So you're already out ahead if you do that.

而你的决策能力直接取决于你获取信息的质量。

And then your skill in decision making is directly proportional to your quality of information acquisition.

那么，你的决策能力有多强？

So how good are you at making decisions?

比如，你获取信息的能力有多强？

Like how good are you at acquiring information?

你能走多远？

How far can you go?

你拥有多少资源？

How many resources do you have?

你有能力直接访问数据库并提出问题吗？

Do you have ability to go directly to a database and ask a question?

你有能力打电话给合适的人，向他们请教他们的经验吗？

Do you have ability to call the right people up to ask them about their experience?

你已经读过那些书了吗？它们能帮你识别某种情境，让你意识到它和之前遇到过的某种情况相似，从而可以重新阅读以判断你是否在考虑相同的事实。

Did you read the books already which allow you to sort of identify a situation as something that's like something else where you can go and reread it to figure out are you considering the same fact.

这些就是你需要培养的技能。

So those things are the things that you will need to cultivate as a skill.

最后，我从很早就开始做的一件事，非常有用：自从决定将Shopify转变为一家增长型公司以来，每当我需要做出重大决策时，我都会写一个简短的日志，记录下我所做的决定以及我认为最能推动我做出这个决定的关键信息。

And then lastly, one thing I started really early which has been exceptionally useful is when and ever since this decision of turning Shopify into a growth company occurred, I tend to when I have to take, do a major decision, have a small log file, I just put one paragraph in about the decision I made and what information I consider to be the most important one which pushed me into the direction.

然后我每隔半年就回顾一次，问问自己：基于 hindsight（事后之明），我当时对这个决定的判断是否正确？

And then I just sort of revisit that every half year and just say, Was I right about this given benefit of hindsight?

因为最终你会知道自己的决策是否正确。

Because eventually you know if your decision was right.

所以，如果你的工作就是做决策，那就值得像对待其他任何技能一样，认真去提升它。

And so it's it's actually if you if your job is to make decisions, it's worth treating it like any other kind of thing to be to get better at.

而这种方法能让你做到这一点。

And so this this allows you to do it.

你从回头阅读这些记录中学到了什么？

What have you learned from going back and reading that?

不是关于决策的结果，而是关于你用来做出决策的过程。

Not not about outcomes of decisions, but maybe more about the process by which you use to reach a decision.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为卡尼曼称之为后见之明偏见。

I think Kahneman calls it hindsight bias.

对吧？

Right?

就像，没错，我们有一种非常强烈的偏见，会低估做出决策的难度，仅仅因为事后有了更多信息，就把当初艰难的决策当成从一开始就很明显。

Like, yes, we we have a very, very strong bias to underestimate how difficult it was to make a decision and really just treat difficult decisions that were made as if they were obvious all along because you now have all these additional information afterwards.

所以这在一定程度上能让你克服这种偏见，对任何领导他人的人来说都非常非常有帮助。

So it cures you of that to a degree, which is really, really, really helpful for anyone who leads people.

而且我也发现，每次我做出错误的决策时——这种事情总会发生——我发现当时缺失的那条信息其实本来是可以获取到的。

It's also like I've just learned, you know, every single time I got a decision wrong, which just happens, like, I found that the piece of information I was missing was actually totally available to me.

我只是，你知道的，我没有去获取它。

And I just, you know, I I just didn't go get it.

是因为你没拿到，还是因为你没意识到它会是一个相关或重要的信息？

Is it is it because you didn't get it or you didn't realize it was going to be a relevant or salient piece of information?

通常，我没有。

Usually, I didn't.

我只是没把它纳入考虑。

I just didn't put it in.

这就像

It's like

你曾经考虑过，但把它否定了。

You had thought about it and dismissed it.

是的。

Yeah.

比如，你意识到，嘿，这本来是一个会让我改变主意的信息，而那个人早就知道了。

Like, I you realize, like, hey, this was a thing that would have actually made me change my mind, and and that that person knew it already.

所以我没有去问那个人。

And so I didn't I didn't go to ask that person.

所以我没有。

So I didn't

你觉得这是不是潜意识里你在想：我知道这条信息可能会让我改变主意，但我已经下定决心了，不想再费劲去重新考虑？

And do you think subconsciously that's you going like, I know this bit of information might make me change my mind, but I've already made my mind up, and I don't wanna have to do the mental labor of going back and then

这种情况会发生，然后你必须诚实地对自己说：嘿，你知道吗，你希望做出决定是基于最好的想法，还是基于赢、基于得偿所愿之类的？

And that happens, and then you have to be honest with yourself saying, hey, you know, how would you wanna make decisions based on what the best ideas or based on being right in a way or getting your way and so on.

再说一遍，你需要明白，这正是为什么这是一种好习惯，因为它迫使你意识到自己何时犯了错。

Again, you need like, this is why it's a good practice because it it just forces you to recognize when you're making mistakes.

对吧？

Right?

你看到人们一再犯的最常见错误是什么？

What's the most common mistake that you see people make over and over again?

人们根本分不清因果关系，甚至搞不懂相关性与因果性的区别，对吧？

It's it's it's people are terrible at deciphering cause and effect or even correlation versus causation, right?