关于贝森特、黄金与独特交易

这里是宏观交易大厅。

The macro trading floor.

我是阿尔方索·佩克卡蒂洛，Macro Compass的创始人，曾在一家大型欧洲银行担任投资主管。

With me, Alfonso Pekcatiello, founder of the Macro Compass and former head of investments at a large European bank.

我是布伦特·唐纳利，Spectrum Markets的总裁。

And I am Brent Donnelly, president of Spectrum Markets.

我做过投资组合经理、日内交易员，还在美国最大的商业银行和投资银行做过做市商。

I've been a portfolio manager, day trader, and market maker at the biggest commercial and investment banks in The United States.

我也是《AlphaTrader》和《外汇交易的艺术》的作者。

I'm also the author of AlphaTrader and the art of currency trading.

如果你想了解市场动态和未来走势，那你来对播客了。

If you wanna know what's going on in markets and where they're going, you found the right podcast.

大家好。

Hi, everyone.

我是阿尔方索。

Alf speaking.

欢迎回到宏观交易台，还是和布伦特一起。

Welcome back to the macro trading floor as always with Brent.

在开始之前，你们一直给我们发邮件和彭博消息。

And before we start, you know, you guys keep sending us emails and Bloomberg pings.

你们在哪儿？

Where are you?

这周没做播客。

You didn't do the podcast this week.

我就说，没事的，各位。

I'm like, it's okay, guys.

如果没什么事，我们不会拿无聊的东西烦你们。

If nothing is going on, we're not gonna bother you with nothing.

但这周，或者说上周，确实发生了不少有趣的事。

But this week, this week or last week, we should say there has been quite some funny stuff going on.

所以我们来了。

So here we are.

我们回来了。

We're back.

Brent，你想聊点什么？

Brent, what do you wanna talk about?

天哪，其实发生了很多事情。

Man, there there is actually a lot going on.

有意思的是，我觉得宏观新闻和头条的数量以及兴奋程度，相对于实际的市场波动来说，算是相当高的。

It's funny because I feel like the amount of macro news and headlines and excitement is pretty high relative to the amount of actual market volatility.

就是说，叙事层面的波动很大，但很多东西其实没怎么动。

Like, the narrative volatility is really high, but a lot of things aren't moving that much.

当然，这周有Druckenmiller关于赤字的评论文章。

Of course, this week, got the op ed from Druckenmiller about deficits.

我觉得其中最有趣的部分之一，就是关于AI写作和非AI写作的争论，但也许这个播客不太适合聊这个。

I think one of the most interesting parts of that was the whole debate over AI writing versus non AI writing, but maybe this isn't the right podcast for that.

我觉得赤字问题已经是众所周知的了。

I think the deficit issue is very well known.

我的朋友吉姆·比安科曾告诉我，1985年他还在工作的时候。

My friend Jim Bianco told me once in 1985, he was working.

那时候他还年轻，他的老板指着一个头条新闻说，美国首次成为净债务国，净投资头寸为负之类的。

He was a young guy at that time, and his boss pointed to a headline that said, US becomes a net debtor for the first time ever, negative investment, net, you know, net investment position or whatever.

他转头对吉姆说，你知道吗？

He turned to Jim and said, you know what?

美元完蛋了。

The dollar is screwed.

这是美国霸权终结的开始。

This is the end of of US hegemony.

那是1985年的事。

So that was 1985.

你知道，德鲁肯米勒在2010年、2013年也经常谈到这个问题。

You know, Druckenmiller has spoken about this frequently in 2010, 2013.

当然，这其中的逻辑是很充分的。

And, of course, there's a lot of logic to it.

你知道，我们怎么能承受20万亿美元的赤字或债务呢？

You know, how can we sustain 20,000,000,000,000 in deficits or in debt?

你知道，我们怎么能承受30万亿美元的债务呢？

You know, how can we sustain 30,000,000,000,000 in debt?

现在的问题是，我们怎么能承受40万亿美元的债务呢？

Now the question is how can we sustain 40,000,000,000,000 in debt?

从智识层面来看，担心这个问题确实很有道理，但很难真正去担心它。我想，如果你有五十年的投资期限，你可以担心它，也可以把它作为看多黄金或看空债券论点的结构性部分。

It's extremely compelling from the intellectual side to worry about this, but it's very hard to worry about it on the you know, as anyone I guess if you have, like, a fifty year time horizon, you can worry about it, and you can also use it as a structural part of, you know, a bullish gold thesis or a bear's bonds thesis.

但随着你的投资期限缩短，到了我这样的时间框架，担心这些事情根本不可能。

But as you your time horizon gets shorter and as you get to my time horizon, it's just impossible to worry about these things.

我觉得你发的那张图表特别好，我相信埃德·亚尔迪尼也发了类似的，但你的图表比他的更好。

And I think you sent out a really good chart, and I believe Ed Yardini sent something similar, but your chart was better than his.

基本上它展示了三十年期收益率减去名义增长，这很好地说明了收益率现在只是在正常化。

But essentially showing the thirty year yield minus nominal growth, and it makes a pretty good case for the idea that yields are simply normalizing right now.

对，当然，确实有一些期限溢价，还有对日本、英国和美国赤字的担忧，这些担忧都是真实的。

And, yeah, sure, there's a bit of term premium and there's a, you know, there's worries about deficits in Japan and UK and US, and those things are real.

不过，债券市场目前的大部分走势，其实就是一个非常正统的名义增长故事。

However, most of what's going on in the bond market is just a very orthodox nominal growth story.

这是不是从你的图表中得出的一个合理结论？

Is that a fair takeaway from your chart?

我觉得是的。

I would say yes.

我觉得这么说有点过于简单了，因为名义增长是6.5%，就认为30年期国债收益率也应该是6.5%。

I would say very simplistic to say because nominal growth is six and a half percent, then thirty year treasuries should be six and a half percent.

这种看法太简单化了。

That's a very simplistic way of looking at things.

不过方向是对的。

It is directionally correct though.

我最喜欢做的是思考你的央行落后于曲线多少，因为这实际上决定了投资者愿意在长期端支付多少期限溢价。

The thing that I like the most doing here is to think in how much is your central bank behind the curve, because that effectively determines how much term premium investors are gonna wanna pay at the long end.

所以，布伦特，我的想法是这样的：我一直在研究一个小指标，用来给一个国家的货币和财政可信度打分。

So the way I think about it, Brent, is I've been working for a while on this little index that tries to score your country for monetary and fiscal credibility.

实际上，你要看的是六个月的年度化核心通胀率，然后和通胀目标比较，不管哪个国家，如果通胀高于目标，可能除了一两个国家之外，其他都是这样，但通胀高于目标也没关系，这种情况是可能发生的。

And effectively what you do is you look at the six month annualized core inflation, and then you compare it with target and then whatever country you score, it's running above target, maybe barring one or two, but then that's fine that inflation is above target, it can happen.

然后，你的央行应该向市场发出信号，表明他们想要收紧货币政策。

Then you should have your central bank signaling to the market that they want to tighten.

对吧？

Right?

而且他们想要大力收紧来抵消这种通胀。

And they want to tighten heavy to offset that.

这样你就能在指数中重新获得一些可信度。

And then you can regain some of the credibility in index.

如果你给G20国家打分，基本上只有巴西在告诉市场，你看，我们远远领先于曲线。

And if you score like the g 20 countries, only Brazil is there basically telling the market, look, you know, we are way ahead of the curve here.

其他国家都落后，只是程度不同。

Everyone else is behind who more, who less.

而美国和日本实际上在最低可信度的MFC评分中领先，这对我来说是有道理的。

And you have The US and Japan actually leading the pack on the least credible MFC scores, which does make sense to me.

你多次提到，美联储已经差不多五年没有达到核心通胀目标了。

You say multiple times, the Fed hasn't hit the core inflation target for what, like five years now.

所以我觉得他们并不是特别可信。

So I wouldn't say they're particularly credible.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，日本也不是。

I mean, and Japan is not.

我觉得特别有意思的是，当你把这个指数放在纵轴上，与曲线的斜率、收益率水平、以及我们的汇率条件做散点图时，你会发现，如果对赤字进行惩罚，它们之间的关系非常紧密。

What I found super interesting is when you scatter plot this index on the y axis versus the slope of the curve, the level of yields, currency in our terms, you find very interestingly tight relationship, if you penalize the score for deficits.

如果你不可信，而且你还有基本赤字，抱歉，你会比之前更不可信。

If you're non credible and then you're doing primary deficits, sorry, you're even less credible than before.

对吧？

Right?

所以基本上你构建一个带惩罚的指数，然后看曲线的斜率，除了美国之外，很多国家都拟合得很好。

So you you basically make up an index with a penalty and then you look at the slope of the curve and it it tracks very well a bunch of countries barring The US.

基本上，这个指数算出来的R平方是0.8。

I mean, basically, index says the R square is point eight.

看起来很不错。

Looks great.

但请把美国排除在外，因为你知道，他们的收益率曲线太平了，低了50到100个基点。

But please exclude The US because, you know, these guys have a yield curve too flat by 50 to 100 basis points.

他们就像在说，抱歉，模型再算一遍。

They're like, sorry, model come again.

对。

Yeah.

长期收益率低了50到75个基点，而且收益率太低。

Fifty, seventy five basis point long and yields too low.

在这种环境下，贝森特却说，哦，不，不，实际上收益率太高了。

And in this environment, you have Bessent that says, oh, no, no, they're actually too high.

我们应该通过回购来进一步压低它。

We should do buybacks to limit it further.

而日本因为货币政策和财政政策搭配不当，一直被市场打压。

And Japan gets harassed by the market for their bad mix of monetary policy and fiscal policy.

对吧？

Right?

我是说，日元已经承受了差不多四年的压力了。

I mean, the yen has been under attack for, what is it, like four years now.

而且日本长期国债收益率在飙升，美国却安然无恙。

And the yield curve is exploding in the long end in Japan and The US gets a free pass.

通常来说，这是结构性的豁免。

Normally structural free pass.

然后贝森特说，不，不，我想要更大的豁免。

And then Bessent says, no, no, I want even a bigger free pass.

然后市场就说，好吧，那就不再给你豁免了。

And then the market goes like, okay, then no free pass anymore.

好的。

Okay.

我们要不要聊聊这个？

Should we talk about that?

所以这真的是一个非常非常有意思的发展。

So that has been a very, very interesting development.

对。

Yeah.

而且我觉得，贝森特那天最有趣的事情就是黄金和比特币的反应。

And one, I guess the most interesting thing from the Bessent day is the reaction in gold and in Bitcoin.

我们其实从六月开始就聊过好几次黄金的走势，你知道，期权市场开始有人买看跌期权。

And we had been speaking a few times really since June about the setup in gold with, you know, put the options market went bid for puts.

它就在4000左右来回磨。

It was just grinding around 4,000.

我做了几次多头，但后来没耐心了。

I went long a couple of times, but I lost patience.

贝森特那件事之后，我确实做多了比特币，一部分是其他原因，但那个也是原因之一。

And I did manage to go long Bitcoin after the the Bessent thing and more on some other reasons, but also on that reason.

让我觉得特别有意思的是，比特币和黄金对贝森特那件事的反应。

And what's really interesting to me about the the reaction in Bitcoin and gold is the, you know, Bessent's thing.

对。

Okay.

这事真的有那么重要吗？

Does it really matter that much?

你知道，金额其实很小，但可能是个重要信号。

You know, the amounts are tiny, but it's an important signal potentially.

但真的是这样吗？

But is it really?

因为他做的和耶伦一模一样，尽管他之前还严厉批评过耶伦。

Because he's just doing exactly what Yellen did even though he was a harsh critic of Yellen.

你知道，政治里人人都是伪君子，两党都一样。

You know, everyone's a hypocrite in politics, both sides of the aisle.

事情就是这样。

That's just the way it works.

总之，黄金和比特币的反应波动了好几个标准差，而收益率那边几乎没什么动静。

Anyways, so the reactions in gold and Bitcoin were, like, multiple standard deviations, and the reaction in yields was, like, basically nothing.

对吧？

Right?

所以这是个非常有意思的情况，我觉得它凸显了起始条件对事情有多重要。

So it's a super interesting situation where I think what it highlights is starting conditions being so important for things.

比如另一个例子，这周加元因为关税消息跌了不少。

Like, another example is the Canadian dollar sold off a decent amount this week on the tariff spot.

但话说回来，金额其实很小。

But, again, the amounts are tiny.

你知道，之前其他关税公告时，美元兑加元反而下跌了，也就是说加元过去是升值的。

You know, the other tariff announcements, dollar CAD actually went down, so the Canadian dollar appreciated in the past.

但同样，起始条件是美元兑加元已经连续跌了好几周。

But, again, the starting conditions were dollar CAD had been selling off for weeks and weeks.

它已经超卖了，所以当初始条件非常成熟时，消息一出，反弹就容易得多。

It was oversold, and so it's so much easier for things to rally on news when the initial conditions are very ripe.

所以当时比特币和黄金的条件非常成熟，然后出现了一些消息，虽然也算是比较大的新闻，但更重要的是大家都睡着了，消息来得毫无预兆。

And so we had extremely ripe conditions for Bitcoin and for gold, and then some news which of course was like kind of biggish news, but the more important thing is everyone was asleep and the news came out of nowhere.

所以我想现在的问题是，这些资产接下来会怎么走，因为贬值交易又强势回归了，但你觉得这是不是有点反应过度，还是说这本来就是迟早要发生的走势，只是终于等到了理由？

And so I guess the question now is where do we go from here on those things because the debasement trade has come back with a vengeance, but do you think it's maybe a bit of an overreaction or simply like, you know, a move that was gonna happen anyway and then finally it got its reason to happen?

还是说你觉得这是黄金再创新高、比特币重回12万的开始？

Or do you think this is the start of like gold back to new all time highs and Bitcoin back to a 120,000?

我的基本假设是，你分享过我做过的那张宏观研究图表，黄金看涨看跌期权偏斜在五年后再次转为负值，所以夏天的时候人们并没有过度追捧黄金看涨期权或看跌期权。

My basic assumption is the the one where I think you shared the chart that I once did for for macro research where the gold, call to put skew had become, negative again after five years, so people were not overbidding gold calls or gold put somewhere in summer.

基本上，所有海湾国家以及波兰、菲律宾和泰国的央行都在出售黄金储备来为经济提供资金。

Basically, all the Gulf States and the central banks in Poland and Philippines and Thailand were basically selling their gold holdings to fund their economies.

所以这对黄金形成了很大的下行压力，甚至期权市场对黄金看涨期权都没有任何溢价了。

And so this was having a big pressure down on gold and even the option market had gone no premium for gold calls at all.

所以我觉得，持有黄金上行的恐惧和回撤程度，基本上已经让持仓完全消失了。

And so I think the level of, yeah, well, drawdown and fear basically in holding gold upside that evaporated positioning altogether.

所以对于黄金或白银这种波动性大的资产来说，不需要太多就能引发20%的反弹，而它们也确实做到了。

So it doesn't take much, right, for a volatile asset like gold or silver to stage a 20% rally, which they did.

而且从现在往后看，有意思的是，布伦特，你可以说贝森特基本上就是在做山叶（Kata Yamaha）长期以来一直在做的事情。

And now going forward, it's interesting because you can make an argument, Brent, that would Bessent is basically what Kata Yamaha has been doing for a whole a long time.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

就是说说而已，随便聊聊，告诉人们，看，我的回购规模现在翻倍了，顺便说一下，哪怕是在采访里。

Just talk, blah, blah, tell people, look, this is my buyback size is now double, by the way, even for the interview.

哦，而且下一次回购操作是在九月。

Oh, and the next buyback operation is in September.

我们会看看我们会做多少回购。

We'll see how much buybacks we will do.

典型的威胁，有人说会是40亿。

The typical threat of who says it's going to be 4,000,000,000.

也许我们在那次回购中会做80亿，就是为了给你个信号。

Maybe we do 8,000,000,000 at that buyback just to signal to you.

对。

Right.

然后我看到有人指着这些名义数字说它们太低了。

And then I've seen people point at these notional numbers and say they're low.

各位，我觉得这个思路不对。

Guys, I think that's the wrong framework.

而且，在三十年期债券上购买十亿美元，与在五年期债券上购买十亿美元，对市场的影响截然不同，因为DV01，或者说你从市场上拿走的每基点风险对应的盈亏，在三十年期和五年期上差别非常大。

And a 1,000,000,000 purchase in thirty year bonds is vastly different for the market and a 1,000,000,000 purchase in five year bonds, vastly different because the DV01 or basically the P and L of risk per basis point you're taking away from the market at 30 or five year is very, very different.

所以，贝森特所做的久期吸收实际上是非常非常大的。

So the duration absorption basically that Bessent is doing is very, very large.

二十亿美元的话，规模很小。

At 2,000,000,000 is small.

四十亿美元的话，根据我的分析，规模还是偏小。

At 4,000,000,000, my analysis said it's still smallish.

八十亿美元的话，就相当于一次相当可观的“扭转操作”式事件了。

At 8,000,000,000 is a pretty reasonable Operation Twist like event.

如果你经历过2000年，那是什么时候来着？

And if you have been around in 2000 and what was it?

天哪，太久以前了。

Man, Too long ago.

12年、13年，差不多那时候，他们搞了那个“扭曲操作”。

12/13, something like this when they did the Operation Twist.

我记得是2012年。

I think it was 2012.

那件事还挺轰动的。

And that was quite a thing.

所以在2011年，收益率曲线的长端失去了锚定，因为美联储说我们处于零利率。

So in 2011, the long end of the yield curve became unanchored because the Fed says we're at zero.

我们不在乎。

We don't care.

我们正在从衰退中复苏。

We are recovering from a recession.

如果你还记得的话，当时美国也尝试过一些财政措施来恢复经济增长。

There was some attempt at doing fiscal in The US, if you remember, to restore some economic growth.

通胀率一度达到了年化4%。

Inflation temporarily went to 4% annualised.

市场当时就懵了，这什么情况？

And so the market was like, what is this?

利率为零，通胀4%，还有财政刺激。

Rates at zero, inflation at four, fiscal on top.

赶紧冲啊。

Let's go.

我记得2011年底那会儿，黄金和白银大涨了一波，收益率曲线的长端也变陡了。

I think I remember gold and silver had a massive rally in the last part of 2011, the longer yield the longer part of the yield curve steepened.

然后他们推出了“扭曲操作”，说白了就是买回大量长期债券，同时发行短期债券来融资。

And then they came in with this operation twist, which is nothing else than basically buying back a bunch of long end bonds and funding it via issuing short term bonds.

对。

Right.

这和贝森特的想法比较相似。

It's relatively similar to what Bessent has in mind.

而且那确实产生了很大的影响。

And that did have a large impact.

所以现在的问题是，布伦特，片山只是随便说说，还是真的会有所行动？

So now question is, Brent, is it just Katayama way just blubbering about something and it will do nothing?

因为如果他什么都不做，那黄金和比特币继续上涨的动力就会减弱，我觉得。

Because if he does nothing, then the impulse for gold and bitcoin to keep rallying is weaker, I would say.

对。

Right.

如果他真的做了，那我觉得黄金会在两周内创下历史新高。

If it does, yeah, then then we're going gold new all time highs in in two weeks, I think if he does.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

所以，你知道吗，这挺有意思的，你刚才说话的时候，我脑子里冒出了大概五十个不同的想法。

So, you know, it's interesting, man, when you were talking, I had like 50 separate ideas there.

第一个就是，对于短线交易者，甚至波动率交易者来说，通常你不会去关注回购，因为谁在乎呢？

So the first one is that for short term traders and even for vol traders, I would say normally you would not be watching the buybacks because who cares?

它们都是按计划进行的。

They're they're on a schedule.

但第一次回购，我在这里没时间仔细核实，但我很确定是在九号进行，结果在十号公布，不过你可以去财政部网站上查一下。

But the first buyback, which I didn't have time to double check here, but I'm pretty sure it's the happens on the ninth and the results come on the tenth, but you can check on the treasury's website.

但就像阿尔夫说的，这里面有隐含的威胁，或者说暗示，就是他们可能会做得更多。

But like Alf said, there is this implicit threat or implicit, like, nudge, nudge, wink, wink that maybe they're gonna do more.

所以大家都会关注这个。

So people are gonna be watching that.

你知道，通常我们关注的东西都一样，非农就业、零售销售等等，但时不时会有一些随机的事情进入视野，比如2010年的分笔数据或者促销操作之类的。

It's you know, use usually, we watch the same things, payrolls, retail sales, etcetera, but every now and then some random thing like the tick data or the promo operations in 2010 or whatever comes onto the radar.

所以如果你是交易员，要留意回购公告，因为如果规模不够大，可能会有点令人失望。

So if you're a trader, watch out for the buyback announcement because if it's not bigger, it'll be the a little bit disappointing.

如果规模更大，那显然就是重磅消息了。

And if it is bigger, obviously, that's huge.

听到那个消息，你就应该买黄金和比特币。

You should be buying gold and Bitcoin on that on that news.

另外我想说的是，2008年的时候，汉克·保尔森去国会作证，当时房利美和房地美摇摇欲坠。

The other thing I wanted to say is in '20 in 2008, Hank Paulson went in front of congress, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Freddie Mac were were wobbling.

他说，如果你手里有把火箭筒，而且大家都知道你有，那你就不用把它拿出来。

And he said, if you've got a bazooka and people know you've got it, you don't have to take it out.

结果两个月后，他们还是不得不救助房利美和房地美。

And two months later, they had to bail out Fannie and Freddie.

那件事我记得特别清楚，因为他宣布的时候，我们买了很多Cross Yan，因为那是看涨的，而且那是我在雷曼兄弟最风光的一天。

So I remember that whole thing so well because when he announced that we bought so much Cross Yan because it was bullish, and it was actually my best day ever at Lehman Brothers.

那天所有东西都涨了，因为大家觉得，好吧。

And with so everything rallied on that day because it was like, okay.

后盾来了。

The backstop is here.

结果两个月后，他们就破产了。

And then two months later, they were bankrupt.

当然，我不是说现在的情况跟2008年一样，但我想说的是，当你宣布这种事情的时候，最关键的一点就是可信度。

Now, obviously, I'm not saying anything about this being, like, 2008, but I am saying when you announce something like that, an absolute critical or crucial part of it is credibility.

我觉得这跟政治无关。

And I don't think that's a political statement.

我觉得说贝森特现在的可信度已经跌到谷底，这算是一个很客观的评价。

I think this is a pretty objective statement to say that Bessent's credibility is at the absolute lows right now.

大概三个月前，我记得我写过一篇文章，对贝森特的做法稍微批评了一下。

So about three months ago, I remember writing something that was just, like, moderately critical of something that Bessent was doing.

我都忘了具体是什么事了。

I can't remember what even what it was.

但我记得当时觉得，批评财政部长有点冒险。

But I remember feeling this is a little bit edgy criticizing the treasury secretary.

就是觉得，我得小心点。

Like, I better be careful.

而且，我也不想，你知道，在现在的政府下总是有报复的恐惧，如果你说了一些关于美国政府的负面话，你知道，可能会有某种报复。

Also, I don't wanna get you know, there's always fear of retribution in the current regime that if you say something negative about the US administration, you know, you might there might be some kind of retaliation.

但，这也让人觉得有点冒险，因为你知道，这并不那么主流。

But, also, it just felt edgy because that's you know, it wasn't, like, so mainstream.

现在，我的意思是，上推特，看《华尔街日报》，全世界每个人都在批评贝森特。

Now, I mean, go on Twitter, go on the Wall Street Journal, every single person in the world is criticizing Bessent.

人们都在翻他在Key Square的业绩记录，展示他怎么没赚到钱，诸如此类的事情都变得非常主流，这如果你试图基于信誉来操作，就会造成问题。

People are wheeling at his track record at Key Square and showing how he didn't make money and all that kind of stuff is all so super mainstream that that creates a problem if you're trying to do an operation based on credibility.

比如，如果你在01:56卖出美元兑日元，而人们在推特上嘲笑你，而且你，你知道，你的前老板在公开场合批评你，让你难堪，然后美元兑日元到了01:59:50，你知道，然后你几周后回来说，好吧，我们打算在债券市场尝试同样的事情。

Like, if you're selling dollar yen at 01:56 and people are laughing at you on Twitter and and your, you know, old boss is criticizing you in public and making you look bad, and then dollar yen's at 01:59 fifty, you know, and then you come in a couple of weeks later and say, well, we're gonna try the same thing in the bond market.

到了某个时候，市场就只是耸耸肩，不在乎了。

At some point, the market just kind of shrugs it off and doesn't care.

所以最终，我想也许你说得对，金额必须足够重要，而且行动必须重复，才能重新建立信誉，因为这里没有多少信誉。

So ultimately, I guess maybe to your point, the amounts have to matter enough and the action has to be repeated to reestablish credibility because there is not a lot of credibility here.

尽管如此，自从他宣布以来，收益率已经下降了。

All that said, yields are lower since he announced it.

所以，也许笑话的是别人。

So, you know, maybe the joke's on everyone else.

你看，这让我想到的另一件事是投资组合的构建，因为你可以做所有这些假设。

Look, the other thing that this makes me think about is portfolio construction here, because you can make all these assumptions.

但归根结底，只要一个火热的通胀数据，再加上市场对美国政策制定可信度的这种紧张情绪——这种可信度一直受到质疑——就足以引发问题。

But at the end of the day, it takes one hot inflation print just by mere coincidence with this type of skittish behaviour about, you know, the credibility of US policymaking, which was always challenged.

但现在贝森特似乎唤醒了一个沉睡的巨人，那就是债券市场的长端。

But now Bessent seems to have like waken up a sleeping giant, which is the long end of the bond market.

想象一下，如果下一次核心PCE数据不是20个基点，而是30个基点。

Imagine there is the next core PC print is not 20 bips, but it's 30 bips.

就类似这种情况，布伦特。

Just something like this, Brent.

你觉得债券市场会发生什么？

What do you think happens in the bond market?

天哪。

Oh, my.

说实话，我觉得他们会疯掉的。

I think they go banana, to be honest.

他们会想，好吧，首先，我们要大量抛售长期国债。

They're like, okay, first, we're going to sell the long and heavy.

然后基本上会要求美联储现在立刻加息。

Then we're going to basically ask the Fed to hike now and fast.

如果美联储不这么做，而且显然美联储主席不再提前透露他的行动了。

And if the Fed doesn't the Fed doesn't apparently watch doesn't tell you anymore what he's doing.

对。

Right.

所以你基本上不能指望他会采取什么措施来支撑市场、重建信誉。

So you basically can't even assume that he's going to do something to backstop this and reestablish credibility.

这真的让人思考，风险到底在哪里？

It really makes you think like, is the risk here?

如果我管理一个投资组合，哪里会不对称地对我造成不利影响？

If I'm running a portfolio, where is that asymmetrically can go against me?

而且你得从长期债券的衍生品角度来想，因为在我看来，只需要一个强劲的数据点，甚至不需要那个，就像你之前说的，市场会说，哦，好吧，我们下次回购时去测试一下，结果你只拿出40亿美元。

And you have to think in derivatives of the long end because it just takes one strong data point in my opinion, or even not even that, that what you were saying before is just the market says, oh yeah, okay, let's go and test this at the next buyback you show up only with 4,000,000,000.

哦，40亿美元。

Oh, 4,000,000,000.

好吧，我们能应付。

Okay, we can take that.

那我们就去卖一堆债券吧。

So let's go and sell a bunch of bonds.

可能你无法预测它会从哪里来，但我敢说，这绝对是宏观经济失衡的一个释放阀，这个阀门已经沉寂了一段时间，现在肯定不再沉寂了。

Could be you can't predict where it comes from, but it is definitely a release valve I would say for macro imbalances that has been dormant for a while and now it's definitely not dormant anymore.

对，我觉得干预意味着美元是释放阀，然后如果收益率作为市场利率在变动，那么市场，你知道，收益率就成了释放阀。

Right and I guess the the intervention means the dollar's the release valve, and then if there's if the yield is moving as a market rate, then the market, you know, then the yield becomes the release valve.

而且我觉得问题还在于，如果沃勒说长期收益率上升是在替我们收紧，然后他们不加息，那么长期收益率上升就被央行认可了。

And I guess the question also is if worse is gonna say higher long end yields are doing the tightening for us and then they don't hike, then higher long end yields are being endorsed by the central bank.

与此同时，财政部试图降低或压低后端收益率，这就变成了一场闹剧或者一团糟，如果政府两个部门，你知道，按相反的原则运作的话。

At the same time as the treasury is trying to reduce lower or or reduce back end yields, it becomes a bit of a goat rodeo or a shit sandwich if you have two parts of the government, you know, operating with opposite principles.

但是，我觉得我们不能断定沃勒就会放任长期收益率不管。

But, I mean, I don't think we can conclude that worse is just gonna let the long end go.

不过，你知道，他到底能控制多少呢？

Although, you know, how much control does he have?

我觉得他能控制的方式就是加息，而且我确信那样能稳住长期收益率。

I guess the amount of control he has is that he can hike, and I'm sure that would settle the long end.

但这也不是百分之百确定的。

But that's also not guaranteed.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得，那是你会假设的情况。

Like, that's I think what you would assume.

我不知道。

I don't know.

这肯定是我会假设的，但也不是确定的。

It's definitely what I would assume, but it's not guaranteed.

有可能，你知道，如果他们加息，整个收益率曲线也会整体上移，对吧？

It's possible that, you know, that the whole curve just goes higher as well if they hike, right?

但并不能保证它会跟着上移。

It's not guaranteed that it comes along in.

这取决于他们怎么加息以及何时加息。

It's a function about how they hike and when they hike.

怎么加息，我的意思不是加息50个基点，而是他们加息并给出非常强硬的鹰派前瞻指引吗？

How they hike, I mean, not 50 basis point hike, but do they hike and they give a very strong hawkish forward guidance?

嗯，现在你甚至不能这么说。

Well, you can't even say that anymore.

我是说，显然，罗氏不想给任何人任何前瞻指引。

I mean, apparently, Roche doesn't want to give any forward guidance to anyone.

那又怎样？

So what?

它会加息，然后说，是的，然后就是一堆废话。

It's going to hike and it's going to say, yeah, and then word salad.

对，那样的话，抱歉，但长期端也不会喜欢这种情况，我觉得，Brent。

Yeah, in that case, sorry, but the long end isn't going to like it either, I believe, Brent.

没错。

Right.

因为问题在于美联储已经落后于曲线了。

Because the function is the Fed is behind the curve.

这是市场已经意识到的事情。

That's something the market appreciates.

他们早就知道了。

They know that already.

现在，假设你加息是为了修复这个问题。

Now, let's say you hike in order to repair this.

如果你在加息，那很可能已经太晚了。

If you're hiking, it's probably because it's too late anyway.

所以市场不会因为你加息就给你好脸色，觉得你是个正统的好人。

So the market isn't just going to give you the benefit of the, oh, they hiked, they're such a nice guy, an orthodox guy.

不不不。

No, no, no.

在我看来，他们加息只是最低限度的动作。

They hike, it's the bare minimum, in my opinion.

然后你得站出来说，听着，我们准备多次加息，直到我们控制住局面。

And then you have to go in and say, look, we are prepared to hike multiple times until we get control of what's going on.

所以基本上我们在说的是，美国要实施我所说的新兴市场疗法。

So basically we're talking about The US imposing what I call the emerging market medicine.

也就是说，市场不喜欢你的那套政策。

That is, the market doesn't like your set of policies.

释放压力的阀门就是货币和债券市场。

The release valve are the currency and the bond market.

我们在新兴市场一次又一次地看到这种情况。

We have seen it over and over in emerging markets.

作为政策制定者，你有两个选择。

And as a policymaker, you have two choices.

其实很多时候，这两件事都得做。

Often you have to do them both, actually.

你得走在市场前面，像巴西那样，基本上就是非常激进的加息周期。

You have to put yourself ahead of the curve Brazil way, basically very aggressive tightening cycle.

第二呢，你得削减基本赤字支出。

And the second is you have to cut your primary deficit spending.

现在，让我试着详细说说，离中期选举还有两个月。

Now, let me try to elaborate this two months to go to midterms.

你能真的相信美国会削减基本赤字支出吗？

Can you credibly see The United States cutting its primary deficit spending?

答案是不能。

The answer is no.

在解决这个结构性问题方面，情况更糟了。

The ball is on worse court in terms of fixing this structure.

我的意思是，我不是说用回购之类的办法来修补一下，而是要从结构上彻底解决。

I mean, I'm not like patching it with some buyback attempt, just fixing it structurally.

而且最糟糕的是，他连前瞻指引都不给。

And the worst doesn't even give forward guidance.

所以即使他加息一次，我也不确定那是否足够。

So even if he hikes once, I'm not sure that that's going to be enough.

所以对我来说，唯一的出路很简单。

So for me, the only way out of this is very simple.

就是数据会帮他们解围。

It's the data will bail them out.

最后，Brent，你爱怎么生气就怎么生气。

At the end, Brent, you can get upset as much as you want.

但如果核心PC持续上涨20个基点，那我很抱歉，到时候美联储的政策其实是相对合适的，因为通胀开始缓慢但确定地向2.5%靠拢。

But if core PC keeps printing 20 bps, I mean, I'm sorry, the Fed policy is relatively appropriate at that point because inflation starts converging slowly but surely towards the two and a half percent line.

对吧？

Right?

然后，我觉得就没有那么多理由生气了。

And then there is less reason to be upset, I would say.

所以他们可以被数据救出来。

So they can get bailed out by the data.

这是有可能的。

That's possible.

其次，就像你说的，贝森特声称他手里有那个大杀器，但他得让市场相信那玩意儿真的存在。

And the second is, as you say, the bazooka that Bessent credibly says he has, then he has to make the market believe that it's there.

而且我不确定告诉市场，看，我可能会做40亿，或者我会做40亿，这样够不够。

And I'm not sure that telling the market, look, I might do 4,000,000,000 or I will do 4,000,000,000 is enough.

也许如果我们真得走那条路，就会有点像日元的情况。

Perhaps if we have to go down that route, it will be a bit like the JPY.

他们到目前为止已经花了很多钱试图捍卫日元，而且我们还在1.60的水平，顺便说一下。

They had to spend a lot of money so far to try and defend the JPY, and we are still at $1.60, by the way.

所以你知道吧？

So you know?

但是，你知道，我觉得这个结果挺无聊的，但我也觉得还有另一种情况，就是我们继续在那儿磨来磨去。

But, you know, I think this is really boring as a as an outcome, but I think there's also another case where we just keep on grinding around.

对吧？

Right?

就是说，软着陆还在继续。

Like, we the soft landing continues.

名义增长率就维持在这个水平。

Nominal growth stays around here.

你看2023年8月的十年期收益率，跟现在一模一样。

If you look at where were ten year yields in in August 2023, they were exactly where they are here.

所以三十年期的稍微高一点，但总体来说，过去三年收益率基本没变。

So the thirty year's a little higher, but generally, like, yields are kind of unchanged in the last three years.

所以我也说不准。

So I don't know.

我觉得这挺矛盾的，结构性故事很清晰。

I feel like it's a very tricky conflict between the structural story is pretty clear.

对吧？

Right?

自2017年以来，赤字越来越大。

Bigger deficits since 2017.

TCGA法案让人意识到，你可以在经济周期顶峰时大规模赤字，然后继续火上浇油。

The TCGA unlocked the idea that you can run massive deficits at the peak of the cycle and just keep on pouring gasoline on the fire.

所以财政政策就和经济基本面脱节了。

And so fiscal policy decoupled from the real economy.

而且，你知道，我们已经这样做了九年，收益率虽然正常化了，但考虑到赤字和其他因素，它们并没有真的高得离谱。

And, you know, we've been doing that now for nine years and yields normalized, but they're not really like going that crazy high considering, you know, what deficits and all that are doing.

所以存在所有这些非线性的可能性。

So there's all these nonlinear possibilities.

比如，长期收益率因为赤字和高名义增长而失控。

There's, you know, the long end breaks because of deficits and high nominal growth.

或者数据帮了美联储的忙，通胀回到2%。

There's the data bails out the Fed and inflation goes back to 2%.

但还有一种奇怪的稳定状态，我们似乎已经处于这种状态好几年了，就是名义增长6%，通胀3%，十年期收益率在4.5%左右，然后继续狂欢。

But then there's also this weird steady state, which we seem to be in for years, which is, 6% nominal, 3% inflation, and tens around four and a half and party on.

我不知道。

I don't know.

所以这就像是，没什么能阻止这列火车，我觉得这其实一直是你核心的观点，就是事情没那么糟，而且媒体时不时就会炒作债务问题之类的，但就像我在节目开头说的，20万亿、30万亿、40万亿，很难区分这三个数字之间到底有什么差别，尤其是当消费者和企业债务几乎为零，而所有债务都转移到了主权资产负债表上。

So like that's kind of like the nothing stops this train, and I feel like that's actually been a core view that you've had is just like things aren't that bad, and every now and then the media heats up about this debt stuff and all that, but like I sort of said at the top of the show, 20,000,000,000,000, 30,000,000,000,000, and 40,000,000,000,000, it's very difficult to separate what what is the difference between those three numbers, especially when consumer and business debt is basically almost zero and it's all been moved to the sovereign balance sheet.

这可怕吗？

Is that scary?

我不知道。

I don't know.

我是说，感觉上应该是可怕的，但我觉得有时候在我的时间范围内，最好忽略那些结构性的东西，更关注周期性的，以及接下来几个月会发生什么，否则你总是会被卷入那种……是的。

I mean, it feels like it should be, but I think sometimes it's better to ignore all the structural stuff on my time horizon and focus more on cyclical and and, like, what's going on in the next few months because otherwise, you can always get sucked into Yeah.

债券要崩盘了，美元要崩盘了，黄金要涨到天上去了。

Bonds are going to collapse, the dollar's gonna collapse, and gold is gonna go to infinity.

这些可能长期来看也不是坏交易，但我觉得有时候太容易陷入那种悲观、阴郁、赤字叙事的陷阱，因为它听起来太有道理了。

And those are not bad long term trades probably, but I feel like sometimes it's too easy to get sucked into the doom dooming doom and gloom deficit narrative when because it just makes so much sense.

对吧？

Right?

比如说，你怎么能一直增加债务，一直花更多的钱，却永远不用还债呢？

Like, how can you just keep increasing that and keep spending more money and never have to pay the piper?

但事实上，1985年就有人这么说了。

But literally people were saying that in 1985.

所以我只是想保持开放的心态，认为赤字确实很重要。

So I'm I'm just trying to keep an open mind to the idea that deficits do matter.

所以，我不是说赤字不重要。

So, like, I'm not saying deficits don't matter.

我认为赤字是我们目前经历供应冲击、通胀比预期更高的一个重要原因。

I think deficits are a big part of what why we have these supply shocks currently, why we have more inflation than we would have otherwise.

但我觉得很多时候，赤字的影响并不像人们想的那样。

And but I think a lot of times deficits don't matter in the way that people think they do.

赤字通常利好股市，等等。

Deficits are usually bullish equities, etcetera.

所以我觉得，在头条新闻都在喊40万亿的世界里，更重要的是保持一种细致入微的看法。

So I think it's more like trying to maintain some kind of nuanced view in a world where all the headlines are just screaming 40,000,000,000,000.

四万亿。

40,000,000,000,000.

关于这个，我简单说几句。

So a few words on that.

首先，你刚才提到一个很有意思的点，就是负债和债务从私人部门资产负债表转移到公共部门资产负债表，这可能会让人担心。

First, you said something very interesting, which is it might be scary that liabilities and debt is moving from the private sector balance sheet to the public sector balance sheet.

我觉得这其实是好事。

I think it's great.

我觉得这让我们的系统更加稳定。

I think it makes our system much more stable.

我们来看看1990年以来所有发达市场的危机，或者你想往前推也可以。

Let's take a look at all the developed market crisis since 1990, or you can go back earlier if you want.

这些危机都源于私人部门杠杆过高，而不是公共部门杠杆。

They all come from excess private sector leverage, not public sector leverage.

比如2008年的危机，那是什么情况？

So the two thousand and eight crisis, what was that?

那是住房杠杆，对吧？

There was housing leverage, right?

所以那是私人部门的杠杆。

So it's private sector leverage.

亚洲四小虎危机，那是什么？

The Asian tiger crisis, what was that?

又是私人部门，亚洲企业、泰国企业、韩国企业，还有欧元区危机，那也是爱尔兰、西班牙和荷兰的房地产危机，同样是住房市场、私人部门、资产负债表的问题。

Again, there was the private sector, Asian corporates, Thai corporates, Korean corporates, the eurozone crisis, which was also real estate crisis in Ireland and Spain and in The Netherlands after again, housing market, private sector, balance sheet.

所以我并不是说这不重要，因为如果你借的不是本国货币，而是外币，那你就欠着外国投资者，而且不是用本国货币还。

So I'm not saying it doesn't matter because if you borrow not in your currency, if you borrow in foreign currency, then you're liable, let's say, to foreign investors in not in your currency.

这当然让所有新兴市场在危机中的情况浮现在脑海里，比如俄罗斯，还有阿根廷。

That makes, of course, all the emerging markets over in that crisis come back to mind Russia, whatever, Argentina.

但如果你借的是本国货币，布伦特，那么从宏观角度看，这个问题对我来说就像是一个分布，我们通常处于可控风险参数的范围内。

But if you borrow in your own currency, Brent, then from a macro perspective, this problem for me is like a distribution where we're often at the at the body of the controllable risk parameters.

唯一能让它失控的就是通货膨胀，因为过度赤字支出以本国货币进行，带来的尾部风险就是通胀。

And the only thing that makes it go banana is inflation because the result of excessive deficit spending in your own currency brings a tail risk that is inflation.

这就是你的风险。

That's your risk.

对。

Right.

然后我们看看现在的情况。

And then we look at what's happening now.

美国是不是在过度借自己国家的货币？

Is The US excessively borrowing in their own currency?

是的。

Yeah.

美国是不是在过度印钞，赤字超出经济周期？

Is The US excessively printing deficits versus the cycle?

对。

Yes.

你能说核心通胀失控了吗？

Can you say that core inflation is going out of control?