价值的计算

这是霍华德·马克斯的备忘录。价值的计算。7月28日，我乘坐一架没有Wi-Fi的飞机飞往南美，无法收发邮件或娱乐。除了开始写备忘录，我还能做什么？有趣的是，我在那次飞行中写下的内容，后来成了我落地后回答客户众多问题的答案，因此写下这些内容对我大有裨益。

This is the memo by Howard Marks. The calculus of value. On July 28, I flew to South America on a plane without Wi Fi, leaving me without email or entertainment. What was I to do but start in on a memo? Interestingly, the things I wrote during that flight turned out to be the answers to many of the questions I received from clients after I landed, so writing what follows served me well.

我希望它对你同样有用。1月2日是我那篇让我的写作声名鹊起的备忘录《bubble.com》发表二十五周年纪念日，我通过发布另一篇题为《泡沫观察》的备忘录来纪念这一时刻。虽然标题可能引起了读者的担忧，但我的主要结论是，当时美国股市估值偏高并不一定意味着泡沫的存在，主要是因为我并未发现与泡沫相关的极端投资者心理。用我的话来说，证券价格虽高，但并未疯狂。由于此后七个月发生了许多变化，现在是时候对资产价值进行更新了。

I hope it'll do the same for you. January 2 was the twenty fifth anniversary of my memo bubble.com, the one that put my writing on the map, and I marked the occasion by publishing another memo called On Bubble Watch. While the title may have raised concern for readers, my main conclusion was that the elevated US stock market valuations at the time didn't necessarily signal the existence of a bubble, mainly because I didn't detect the extreme investor psychology I associate with bubbles. Security prices were lofty, but not nutty, is how I put it. Because a lot has taken place in the seven months since then, it's time for an update on asset values.

在开始之前，请注意我谈论的是一般性投资。我的具体参考对象是美国公开上市的公司证券、股票和债券，因为它们定期按市价计价，且是我最关注的资产类别。但由于投资者对某一类资产的行为及其导致的价格变动会影响其他资产和其他市场，并且这些行为很大程度上源于具有高度传染性的投资者心理，我认为我的评论可能也适用于其他资产类别，包括私募资产和公开资产，甚至可能适用于美国以外的市场。我将首先阐述我认为投资价值的来源及其评估方式。我不记得以前曾以这种形式做过这样的阐述。

Before I start, please note that I'm talking about investing in general. My specific reference will be to public US corporate securities, stocks and bonds, since they mark to market regularly and are the assets that most enter my consciousness. But since investors' actions toward one group of assets and the resulting price movements influence other assets and other markets, and since they ensue largely from investor psychology, which is highly contagious, I think my comments are probably applicable to other asset classes, to private assets as well as public ones, and possibly to markets outside The US. I'll start by laying out where I think investment value comes from and how it should be assessed. I don't think I've ever done this before in this form.

这是个很大的话题，但我会尽量简明扼要。价值。投资资产，如股票、债券、公司和建筑物等，都有一个价值，有时被称为其内在价值，即资产在某一时间点的价值。这个价值是主观的。据我所知，它无法在任何地方明确找到，即使是人工智能也无法做到，而且关于它的意见也会有所不同。

It's a big topic, but I'll try to cover it briefly. Value. Investment assets, things such as stocks, bonds, companies, and buildings, have a value, which is sometimes referred to as their intrinsic value, what the asset is worth at a point in time. This value is subjective. It can't definitively be found anywhere, not even by AI, as far as I know, and opinions will differ as to what it is.

在我的术语中，资产的价值来源于其基本面。例如，一家公司的基本面包含许多方面。这些包括其当前收益、未来的盈利能力、未来收益的稳定性或可变性、其组成部分资产的市场价值、管理层的技能、开发新产品的潜力、竞争格局、资产负债表的强度，以及将影响公司未来的无数其他因素。最终，资产基本面的总和构成了其盈利能力，而盈利能力又是其价值的来源。一家公司可能拥有土地、建筑物、机械设备、车辆和自然资源，如矿藏或森林，甚至拥有可以从河水或阳光中获取电力的设施，尽管它显然并不拥有河水或阳光本身。

In my parlance, the value of an asset is derived from its fundamentals. The fundamentals of a company, for example, encompass a great many things. These include its current earnings, its earning power in the future, the steadiness or variability of its future earnings, the market value of its component assets, the skill of management, its potential to develop new products, the competitive landscape, the strength of its balance sheet, and the myriad additional factors that will influence the company's future. Ultimately, the totality of an asset's fundamentals constitute its earning power, which in turn is the source of its value. A company may own land, buildings, machinery, vehicles, and natural resources, such as mineral deposits or forests, and even facilities that allow it to derive electricity from river water or sunshine, which it obviously doesn't own.

这些是有形资产，通常有市场可交易并实现价格。但公司也可能拥有无形资产，如专利、商业秘密、技术诀窍、研究能力、声誉和形象、人才、管理技能和文化。其中一些可能是可转让和可出售的，但另一些则不是。刚才提到的所有资产各自都有盈利能力，而它们的组合则创造了公司的整体盈利能力。一家公司的盈利能力几乎总是超过其各个资产单独考虑时的盈利能力之和。

These are tangible assets, and there's often a market for them and a realizable price. But a company may also have assets that are intangible, such as patents, trade secrets, know how, research capability, reputation and image, human talent, management skill and culture. Some of these may be transferable and saleable, but others are not. All the assets just mentioned have earning power individually, and in combination they create a company's overall earning power. A company's earning power almost always exceeds the sum of the earning power of each of its individual assets taken in isolation.

将各个资产组合起来以最大化公司的整体盈利能力是管理层的首要任务。成功时，结果是协同效应，即通过巧妙组合事物所获得的收益。但并非所有资产都具有我所定义的盈利能力，因此并非所有资产都具有可计算的投资价值。我将盈利能力描述为通过拥有和运营资产所能获得的金钱。也就是说，我排除了仅通过持有资产并最终出售它可能获得的收益。

Combining individual assets to maximize a company's overall earning power is the top job of management. When successful, the result is synergy, the benefit gained from skillfully combining things. But not all assets have earning power, as I define it, and thus not all have calculable investment value. I describe earning power as the money you can make by owning and operating an asset. That is, I omit from earnings the possible gains from simply holding an asset and ultimately selling it.

一枚钻戒、一幅画作或一辆经典汽车，除非出租或收费供人观赏，否则无法为所有者创造收益。因此，其经济价值完全依赖于以更高价格转售获利的可能性。而购买者很可能也是寄望于未来能以更高价转手他人，尽管在此期间它不会产生任何收益。我认为那些无法产生经营现金流或未来具备此潜力的资产，本质上不具备盈利能力，这使得它们无法被客观、分析性或本质性地估值。可参阅我2010年关于黄金的备忘录《闪光的不都是金子》。

A diamond ring, painting, or classic car doesn't produce earnings for its owner, short of renting it out or charging people to look at it. For this reason, its economic potential comes exclusively from the possibility of selling it at a profit. And the person who buys it is likely to be doing so in the hope of selling it to someone else at a still higher price, despite the fact that it won't produce earnings in the interim. I think of assets that don't produce operating cash flow or have the potential to do so in the future as not having earning power, and that makes them impossible to value objectively, analytically, or intrinsically. See my 2010 memo about gold, All That Glitters.

部分盈利能力是即时的，能当下产生收益。这体现在本年度的财务报表中——当前资产在现有配置和条件下所产生的收益。另一些盈利能力则以潜力形式存在，例如未来开采现有自然资源将获得的收益，或公司员工基于知识产权开发新产品将创造的收入。

Some earning power is current and produces income today. The result can be seen in this year's financial statements. The income that today's assets are producing in their current configuration and under today's conditions. Other earning power exists in the form of potential. For example, the income that will be earned when today's holdings of natural resources are exploited in the future, or the income that will be generated from new products developed by the company's employees from its intellectual property.

最终结果取决于未来环境演变，而环境又受公司管理层、竞争对手、客户、政府乃至投资者决策的影响。资产或有形或无形，其盈利能力既可当下产生收益，也可能在未来产生高于或低于当前的收益。资产的当前收益与未来盈利潜力共同构成其核心基本面。有些投资者强调以合理价格购买当下盈利能力，另一些则愿意押注他们眼中的盈利增长潜力。无论如何，我认为审慎投资必须基于对资产当前及未来盈利能力的判断。

The result will be dependent on the environment that unfolds, which in turn will be influenced by decisions made by company management, competitors, customers, governments, and even investors. Assets can be tangible or intangible, and an asset's earning power can produce earnings today, and also in the future, in amounts that might be higher or lower than today. Together, an asset's current earnings, plus its power to produce earnings in the future, constitute its key fundamentals. Some investors emphasize paying a reasonable price for today's earning power, and others are willing to bet on what they see as potential growth in earning power. Regardless, I think prudent investing has to be based on judgments regarding an asset's present and future earning power.

投资者以此方式确定资产内在价值后，便有了确立合理价格的基础，从而获得未来良好回报。价格虽看似抽象缥缈，实则具体——它是你为获取某物支付的金额。归根结底，优秀的投资在于恰当评估价值，并以合理价格买入。

Once an investor has determined an asset's intrinsic value in this way, he will have a basis for establishing a right price that will allow for good returns in the future. Price. While value can seem theoretical and ephemeral, price is concrete. It's the amount you pay to obtain something. Ultimately, as just mentioned, doing a good job of investing comes down to estimating value appropriately and purchasing that value at a reasonable price.

如前所述，构成资产基本面的要素众多，但最终都可归结为盈利能力——价值正源于此。1960年代末，我在芝加哥大学商学院学到：资产的合理价格是其未来现金流或收益的折现现值。或许有人质疑：那前文列举的厂房设备、知识产权、管理层乃至企业声誉呢？

As previously mentioned, there are a great many things that combine to make up an asset's fundamentals. Ultimately, they can be boiled down to its earning power, and it's from earnings that value is derived. In the late nineteen sixties, I was taught at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business that the right price for an asset is the discounted present value of its future cash flows or earnings. You might object. What about all the other things listed above, such as the company's plant and equipment, intellectual property and management, and even its reputation?

这些难道没有价值吗？它们的价值全在于能否增强公司盈利能力，因此已被纳入收益计算。证券分析师工作的核心正是制定盈利预测，再将预测转化为公允价格。在芝加哥大学，折现过程纯属数学运算——用未来每年收益除以（1+r）的n次方（r为适当折现率，n为收益年份），再逐年加总。但现实中，价格由另一种折现过程决定：人们基于主观判断评估资产及其盈利能力的价值。因此，资产价格本质上是投资者对其基础价值达成的共识。

Don't they have value? The value of all of these things is derived from their ability to contribute to the company's earning power, and thus it's captured in the earnings calculation. The key part of a security analyst's job consists of arriving at earnings projections. Then those projections have to be converted into a fair price. At the University of Chicago, the discounting process was purely mathematical.

价值投资之父本杰明·格雷厄姆（沃伦·巴菲特在哥伦比亚大学的导师）认为，市场价格每日由投资者通过买卖报价投票决定。有人看好公司扎实的产品线和得力管理层，也有人视其为迂腐过时。

You divide the earnings for each year in the future by one plus r to the nth power, where r is the appropriate discount rate, and n is the number of years out into the future the earnings are, and then you total up the yearly results. But in the real world, price is set by a different discounting process, which consists mostly of people applying their subjective opinions and attitudes about what the asset and its earning power are worth. So that's what an asset's price is, the consensus view of investors regarding its underlying fundamental value. According to Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, and Warren Buffett's teacher at Columbia, market prices are set each day by investors who cast their votes by offering to buy or sell. Some investors think a company has a solid product line and competent management, and others consider it stodgy and outmoded.

一些投资者认为某家公司充满魅力且前景光明，而另一些人则视其为高风险投机对象。这些态度最终转化为资产价格。这就是拉锯战的由来。正如我每日观察各类资产所见，乐观者与悲观者持续角力。市场以52美元的价格抛售通用汽车股票。

Some investors find another company sexy and right for the future, and others think it's a risky high flyer. These attitudes are converted into asset prices. This is where the tug of war comes in. As I see it every day with regard to every asset, the optimists do battle with the pessimists. The market throws out GM at $52.

乐观者认为其价值58美元，故而乐意以52美元买入；悲观者则认为仅值46美元，因此愿意以52美元向买家抛售，交易由此达成。但有时某一方会占据上风。若认为价值58美元者多于46美元者，则52美元价位的买盘将超过卖盘，价格遂攀升至53美元乃至54美元，以此类推。

The optimists think it's worth $58, so they're happy to buy at $52. Since the pessimists think it's only worth $46, they're willing to accommodate the buyers by selling at $52, and a trade takes place. But sometimes, one side or the other predominates. If the people who think it's worth $58 outnumber the ones who think it's worth $46, more people will want to buy at $52 than want to sell there. So the price will rise to $53 and maybe $54 and so forth.

正如意见失衡能推动通用汽车股价波动，同样能牵动整个市场。有时市场投资者的整体情绪呈积极态势——表现为乐观轻信、错失恐惧（FOMO）及风险偏好；有时则消极阴郁——充斥着悲观怀疑、损失恐惧与过度避险。现实世界在'尚可'与'欠佳'间浮动，而投资者心理却能在'完美无缺'与'绝望透顶'间极端摇摆。当乐观情绪主导时，价格被推高甚至超越实际价值。

Just as an imbalance of opinion in one direction or the other can move the price of GM, it can also move a whole market. Sometimes the overall mood of investors in a market is positive, meaning they're characterized by optimism, credulousness, fear of missing out, FOMO, and risk tolerance. And sometimes the mood is negative and marked by pessimism, skepticism, fear of loss, and excessive risk aversion. Whereas in real life things fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot, in the minds of investors, things can go from flawless to hopeless and bad. When the majority of investors are optimistic, they cause price to rise and potentially exceed value.

当悲观主义盛行时，价格被压低甚至跌破价值。因此，投资者心理倾向若取代有效市场假说所依托的理性客观，就会催生该假说认为不可能存在的廉价筹码或溢价泡沫——这正是投资者需要警惕的。资产价格本身毫无意义：若不了解决定市场价值的品牌、车型、车龄、里程和车况，你无从判断4万美元的汽车是否值得购买。

And when the pessimists reign, they cause price to decline and potentially fall short of value. Thus, a preponderance of investor psychology on one side or the other, in lieu of the rationality and objectivity on which the efficient market hypothesis is predicated, can create the bargains or over pricings the hypothesis says can't exist. Investors should be on the lookout for them. The price of an asset means nothing in isolation. You can't tell whether a car is a good buy at $40,000 unless you know about the things that determine its market value, its make, model, age, mileage, and condition.

投资亦是如此。关键在于资产价格与其价值之间的关系。投资者将这种关系称为资产的估值。若以合理价格购入资产，其当前收益能为持有者在持有期间提供良好的购买价格回报率；而盈利能力的提升不仅能增加当前产生的回报，还能提升资产价值，进而提高其出售价格。因此，投资者能否获得可观的投资回报，很大程度上取决于其是否准确评估了投资的基本面，并为这些基本面支付了合适的价格。

It's the same in investing. What matters is the relationship between an asset's price and its value. Investors call that relationship the asset's valuation. If an asset is bought for the right price its current earnings can give the buyer a good return on his purchase price while he owns it, and increases in earning power can add to the current return it throws off and increase its value, and thus the price at which it can be sold. Thus, an investor's ability to earn an attractive return on an investment will largely depend on whether he accurately appraised the investment's fundamentals and paid an appropriate price for those fundamentals.

长期来看，投资成功与否主要取决于买家对资产盈利能力的判断是否正确。然而，资产的当前盈利能力及对其未来盈利能力的预期，通常不会逐月甚至逐年发生显著变化。因此，短期投资表现很可能主要源自投资者愿意为该资产支付的价格变化。这使得价格成为那些主要关注短期收益者的首要考量因素。价值应被视为对价格施加的磁吸力。

In the long term, the success of an investment will hinge primarily on whether the buyer was right about the asset's earning power. However, an asset's current earning power and opinions regarding its future earning power usually don't change much from month to month or even year to year. Thus, short term investment performance is likely to stem mostly from changes in the price investors are willing to pay for the asset. That makes price the dominant consideration for anyone whose principal concern is the short run. Value should be thought of as exerting a magnetic influence on price.

若价格高于价值，未来价格走势更可能是下行而非上行；反之若价格低于价值，则未来更可能上行而非下行。但短期内，价格相对于价值几乎可朝任何方向波动。这是因为特定时间点的资产价格主要由投资者心理决定，而心理因素可能非理性且难以预测。因此，尽管价格与内在价值的当前关系理应朝预期方向发展，但最多只能指望其在长期中实现这一点。

If price is above value, future price movements are more likely to be downward than upward. And if price is below value, future price movements are more likely to be upward than downward. However, in the short run, price can move in just about any direction relative to value. This is so because an asset's price at any given point in time is mostly determined by investor psychology, which can be irrational and unpredictable. Thus, while the current relationship of price to underlying value should move in the expected direction, it can only be counted on to do so in the long run at best.

‘更有可能’是前文的关键短语。被低估的资产可能长期保持廉价甚至更便宜，正如被高估的资产可能变得更加高估，继而极度高估，直至疯狂高估。正是价格能走向疯狂极端的能力导致了泡沫与崩盘。若价格一旦超过价值就停止上涨，我们就不会有延长的牛市、泡沫及随后的崩盘，反之亦然。那些重注押注价格将向价值方向收敛的人，若缺乏足够的持久力，可能会被市场淘汰。

More likely to be is the key phrase in the previous paragraph. An undervalued asset can remain cheap or even get cheaper for a long time, just as an overvalued asset can become more overvalued, and then extremely overvalued, and then crazily overvalued. It's the ability of price to go to crazy extremes that causes bubbles and crashes. If price always stopped going up when it began to exceed value, we wouldn't have extended bull markets and bubbles and the ensuing crashes, and vice versa. People who bet heavily that price will move in the direction of value, which we call converging, can be carried out if they don't have sufficient staying power.

因此约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯曾说：市场保持非理性的时间可能比你保持偿付能力的时间更长。理性上期待价格向价值靠拢而非进一步偏离是合理的，甚至押注于此也无可厚非，但重仓押注其短期内发生则不明智且危险。正如本杰明·格雷厄姆所言：短期看，市场像投票机，反映资产受欢迎程度；长期看，它却是称重机，衡量资产真实价值。故而我们可以用近乎数学的价值计算来思考——尽管执行者未必理性。价值是投资所得，价格则是支付成本。

That's why John Maynard Keynes said, the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. It's intellectually sound to expect price to move toward value rather than diverge further from it, and even to bet that it will happen, but it's unwise and potentially dangerous to bet heavily that it'll happen soon. As Benjamin Graham said, in the short run, the market functions like a voting machine, reflecting assets' popularity, But in the long run, it's a weighing machine, assessing assets' value. Thus, we can think in terms of a calculus of value that I find entirely logical and almost mathematical, except for the fact that it's applied by people who aren't. Value is what you get when you make an investment, and price is what you pay for it.

优质投资的标准在于价格与最终显现的价值匹配。由于投资者心理的波动性，资产价格变动远甚于基本面价值。因此多数价格波动反映的是投资者心理变化，而非内在价值改变。鉴于心理在定价中的关键作用，投资者欲判断价格与价值关系，除量化指标外更需洞察市场情绪。价格与价值的关系将显著影响投资表现——高估值预示低回报，反之亦然。

A good investment is one in which the price is right for what the value turns out to be. Due to the volatile nature of investor psychology, asset prices fluctuate much more than fundamental value. Thus, most price changes reflect changes in investor psychology rather than changes in fundamental value. Because of the key role psychology plays in setting asset prices, in order to have a sense for where price stands relative to value, investors should try to gauge prevailing psychology, not just quantitative valuation parameters. The relationship of price to value should be expected to strongly influence investment performance, with high valuations presaging low subsequent returns, and vice versa.

但除非从长期视角出发，切勿指望这种关系如期发挥作用。当资产价格公允时（无论以何标准衡量），投资者可预期获得与该风险相匹配的合理回报。而主动投资者费心研究公司与市场，选择性配置资产，客户支付管理费正是希望获得超额风险调整收益。投资理论认为，被动投资即可获得公平回报并省去主动管理费，但主动投资者追求更高收益。

But that relationship must not be counted on to have the expected impact in anything but a long term sense. When the price of an asset is fair, however that's assessed, it's reasonable for an investor to expect to earn a return that is likewise fair for the risk born, relative to the risk adjusted returns on other assets. But so called active investors go to the trouble of studying companies and markets, buying some assets but not others, and overweighting some and underweighting others, and clients employ active investment managers and pay them fees in the hope of earning returns that are more than fair for the risk born, and thus better than the risk adjusted returns enjoyed by other investors. According to investment theory, investors can dependably earn a fair or average return by investing passively, and thereby avoid paying active management fees. But active investors want more.

何种条件能带来主动投资者渴求的超额风险调整收益？1) 市场共识未充分认知资产当前价值；2) 市场价格低于资产当前价值；3) 资产价值增长超预期（通常因盈利能力的未预见提升）；4) 资产受投资者追捧导致与价值无关的价格上涨。

What conditions might give rise to the superior risk adjusted returns active investors crave? The consensus of investors doesn't fully comprehend the asset's current value. The market price is too low for the current value of the asset. The asset's value increases more than investors anticipated, usually because of an unforeseen increase in its earning power. The asset becomes more popular with investors, resulting in an increase in its price that is unrelated to changes in value.

或许还有其他可能，但上述清单已相当完备。当然，与所述相反的发展会导致低劣（甚至负）风险调整收益。若缺乏前述任一条件，则无理由期待超额回报；即便条件具备，投资者仍需卓越洞察力方能实现优异表现。简言之，回报源于：a)价值变化；b)价格与价值关系变化。获得超额回报者正是那些更早预判这些变化的人。投资者如何看待价格与价值？金融节目或市场报道中，绝大多数内容都关乎价格或价价关系。

There may be additional possibilities, but I think the just mentioned list is pretty exhaustive, and of course developments in the opposite direction from those just described can result in risk adjusted returns that are inferior, including returns that are negative. In the absence of one or more of the conditions just mentioned, there's no reason to expect an investment to provide superior returns, And even if these things are present, investors shouldn't expect to achieve superior results unless they possess the superior insight needed to detect them. In a nutshell, it's helpful to think of returns as stemming from a, changes in value, and b) changes in the relationship between price and value, and the people who earn superior returns are the ones who anticipate those changes better than others. How do investors think about price and value? When you watch financial TV shows or read about the market in newspapers or investment publications, most of what you come across relates to price, or to the relationship between price and value.

观众并非去了解公司优劣或2045年的盈利能力——他们只想获知股价短期涨跌。即，他们想知道短期回报是否高于风险补偿，能否优于其他资产的风险调整收益。而这本质上仍是价格与价值的关系问题。那么，当前这种关系处于何种状态？

The audience doesn't go there to find out how good the company is or what its earning power will be in 2045. They go there to be told whether stock prices will go up or down in the short run. That is, if they know to ask whether the short term return will be more or less than fair for the risk, and superior or inferior to the risk adjusted returns on other assets. And, of course, that's mostly about price to value. So where does that relationship stand today?

如同许多由大量定性定量成分构成的事物一样，企业的属性无法通过算法简单加总或简化为单一数字。评估它们需要判断力，举例来说，若一家公司的价值是多维且难以量化的，显然很难判断其在某一时点的价格是否公允。股票投资者主要通过——往往几乎完全依赖——市盈率（PE比率，即公司股价与每股普通股收益之比）来应对这一挑战。计算单只股票的市盈率或股市/指数的平均市盈率很容易，从而能比较当前市盈率与其他股票或历史时点的差异。偏离这些市盈率常规的现象会基于区分该公司与其他公司的基本面因素（超越当前盈利的层面），或区分当下与过去时期的特征来审视，投资者据此得出资产是否被高估、公允或低估的结论。

Like many things that are made up of a large number of ingredients, both qualitative and quantitative, a company's attributes can't be summed up through an algorithm or reduced to a single number. Evaluating them requires judgment, and if the value of a company, for example, is multivariate and confusingly unquantifiable, it obviously can be very hard to assess the fairness of its price at a point in time. Equity investors deal with this challenge by looking primarily, often almost exclusively, at a stock's PE ratio, or the ratio of a company's share price to the amount of earnings attributable to each share of its common stock. It's easy to calculate the PE ratio for one stock or the average for a stock market or index, and thus to know how the current PE ratio compares to PE ratios on other stocks, or at other points in time. Deviations from those PE norms are examined in light of the factors that distinguish the company from other companies, based on aspects of fundamentals beyond the current earnings, or that distinguish today from past times, and investors reach conclusions as to whether the asset is overpriced, fairly priced or underpriced, given those considerations.

当然，仅凭市盈率等单一指标做投资决策是对决策过程的极大简化，因而可能引发误判。更新动态：现在我们可以聚焦当下具体情境。2025年初我们处于什么位置？标普500指数是美股市场最受关注的风向标。

Of course, basing an investment decision on a single metric, such as a stock's PE ratio, represents a vast oversimplification of the decision, and thus introduces the possibility of error. Getting up to date. Now we can start getting current and concrete. Where were we when 2025 began? The S and P 500 stock index is the most watched barometer of The US stock market.

去年末，其前瞻市盈率（股价与未来一年预估盈利之比）约为23倍，显著高于历史均值。当时摩根大通发布图表显示：若在1987-2014年间（唯一有前瞻市盈率及十年回报数据的时期）以23倍次年每股盈利买入标普500指数，后续十年年均回报率每次都在+2%至-2%之间。这段市盈率历史若具参考价值，对标普500预示前景相当黯淡。我在1月备忘录中总结认为这令人不安但尚不构成威胁，主要因我认为伴随或催生多数泡沫的暂时性狂热尚未出现。那是当时的情况。

Toward the end of last year, its forward looking PE ratio, the ratio of its price to its estimated earnings over the coming year, was around 23, significantly above its historical average. At the time, JPMorgan published a graph showing that if you bought the S and P 500 index at 23 times the coming year's earnings per share in the period 1987 to 2014, the only period for which there's data on forward looking PE ratios ratios and resulting ten year returns, your average annual return over the subsequent ten years was between plus 2% and minus 2% every time. To the extent this PE ratio history is relevant, it bodes pretty poorly for the S and P 500. I concluded in my January memo that this was troublesome but not threatening, again mostly because the temporary mania or irrational exuberance that I believe accompanies or gives rise to most bubbles wasn't present. That was then.

此后发生了什么？今年一季度美股市场跌幅达10%，以科技股为主的纳斯达克综合指数领跌。这主要源于平淡的经济与企业表现、温和但仍高于预期的通胀、可能还包括对估值水平及美国能否保持全球首选投资目的地地位的担忧。随后4月2日，特朗普总统宣布的进口商品关税幅度远超预期。投资者立即判定这些关税可能导致通胀加速、经济增长放缓，并削弱全球对美国的好感度。

What has happened since? The US stock markets saw declines of up to 10% in the first quarter of this year, with the tech heavy Nasdaq Composite falling the most. This was primarily the result of unspectacular economic and corporate performance, moderate but still higher than desired inflation, and possibly worries about valuation levels, and whether The US would retain its position as the world's investment destination of choice. Then on April 2, President Trump announced tariffs on imported goods that were much higher and much more sweeping than had been anticipated. Investors promptly concluded the tariffs were likely to cause inflation to accelerate, economic growth to slow, and The US to be viewed less favorably by nations and investors around the world.

结果标普500指数暴跌，较2024年高位下跌15%。简言之，投资者认定基本面前景恶化，并据此下调股价。债券投资者也作出反应，将十年期基准国债收益率推高至4.5%（关税宣布前刚超4%）。收益率上升意味着债券价格下跌，债券投资者明确要求更高的风险补偿。但自4月8日低点以来，标普500已反弹29%，年内累计上涨9%。

The result was a sharp drop in the S and P 500, taking it to a level 15% lower than where it was at the 2024. In short, investors determined the fundamental outlook had been impaired, and they took down stock prices in line with those poorer fundamentals. Bond investors reacted as well, demanding a yield on the benchmark ten year treasury note that got as high as four and a half percent, up from just over 4% immediately before the tariff announcement. Higher bond yields mean lower bond prices, and bond investors made clear that they thought the risks were higher, and thus increased risk compensation was in order. But from the S and P five hundred's low point on April 8, it has risen by 29% through yesterday, putting it up by 9% for the year to date.

这波反弹很大程度上源于利空缓解：贸易谈判期限延长/关税低于4月宣布水平，且关税引发的通胀尚未显现。简言之，迄今关税形势比最初担忧的要好。投资者也可能受到盈利增长预期的鼓舞：通过优待企业的税改支出法案、多国作为贸易协议部分承诺的在美投资、乃至人工智能提升企业盈利的潜力。当前价值评估能得出什么结论？

Much of this seems to have been a relief rally, with trade deal deadlines being extended and or tariffs being established below April's announced levels, and with inflation from tariffs not yet having materialized. In short, the tariff picture thus far is less bad than was feared at the time of the original announcements. It's also possible that investors are encouraged by expectations of rising earnings. The tax and spending bill that was passed with its favorable treatment of corporations, the pledges to invest in The US that a number of foreign countries have made as part of trade deals, and even the potential of artificial intelligence to add to companies' earning power. What can we say about the price to value calculus today?

标普500在2024年及关税宣布前均处于高估值。企业经济前景及多年盈利潜力总体可能不及关税前，但未如最初担忧的糟糕。通胀上行仍是隐忧，其威胁降低了投资者期盼的早期刺激性降息可能性。政府寻求的贸易关税协议正在艰难达成，但美国在全球眼中似乎成为更不可靠的盟友，部分投资者可能决定降低对美国资产的配置权重。

The S and P 500 was highly valued at the 2024, and also just before the tariff announcement. The economic possibilities and likely multiyear earning power for companies are probably less positive on balance than they were before the tariff announcement, albeit not as bad as initially feared. Rising inflation is still a concern. The threat of higher inflation has reduced the likelihood of the early stimulative interest rate cuts investors had hoped for. The trade and tariff agreements the administration sought are being extracted, but The US seems to be viewed around the world as a less dependable ally and partner, and some investors may conclude they should be less heavily weighted toward US assets.

实施这一观点可能导致净卖出和/或减少对这些资产的未来需求。美国的财政赤字和国债未见改善迹象，全球对其担忧似乎正在加剧。尽管如此，尽管整体前景可能减弱，美国股价仍在上涨。虽然预期收益会增加，但股价上涨更多。因此，无论今年年初情况如何，如今美国股票的价值主张似乎比年底时吸引力降低，而即便那时，情况也并不乐观。

Implementation of this view could cause net selling and or reduce the future demand for these assets. The US fiscal deficits and national debt show no sign of improvement, and worldwide concern over them seems to be increasing. Nevertheless, with the outlook possibly diminished on balance, US stock prices are up. While earnings are expected to rise, stock prices are up more. Thus, regardless of where it stood as this year began, the value proposition in US stocks seems to be less appealing today than it was at year end, and even then, it wasn't great.

投资者行为及其导致的价格与价值关系的指标是什么？标普500指数的高市盈率是估值乐观论点的核心支撑。据《金融时报》7月25日报道，根据彭博数据，标普500成分股当前估值超过公司销售额的3.3倍，创历史新高。同一篇文章指出，巴克莱股票狂热指标（综合衍生品资金流、波动率和情绪）已飙升至正常水平的两倍，进入与资产泡沫相关的领域。沃伦·巴菲特最青睐的指标——美国股票总市值与GDP之比——同样处于历史最高位。

What are the indicators of investor behavior and the resulting price to value relationship? The elevated PE ratio on the S and P 500 is the tent pole of the argument that valuations are optimistic. According to the Financial Times, July 25, stocks in the S and P 500 are now valued at more than 3.3 times their company's sales, according to Bloomberg, an all time high. From the same Feet article, a Barclays equity euphoria indicator, a composite of derivative flows, volatility and sentiment, has surged to twice its normal level, into territory associated with asset bubbles. Warren Buffett's favorite indicator, the ratio of the aggregate market capitalization of US stocks to US GDP, is also at an all time high.

特别值得注意的是，美国市值增长受到两方面抑制：当今企业倾向于延迟上市，以及许多公司通过收购私有化。因此，这一高企指标可能比表面显示的更令人担忧。当前十年期美国国债收益率与标普500股息收益率的关系显示，后者从历史角度看显得昂贵。所谓的模因股（被网络散户投资者青睐、未必考虑前述价值主张的股票）近期备受关注——许多股票初看价格低廉，但不禁让人怀疑买家是否真正理解公司基本面（部分显得岌岌可危）。收益率利差方面...

It's especially worth noting that The US market cap has been restrained by companies' tendency to wait longer these days before going public, and by the fact that many companies have been taken private in buyouts. Thus, this elevated indicator could be even more troubling than it appears. The current relationship between the yield on the ten year US Treasury note and dividend yield on the S and P 500 shows the latter to be expensive in historical terms. So called meme stocks, stocks favored by online retail investors who don't necessarily think in terms of the value proposition just described, have attracted heightened attention lately many sport prices that seem low at first glance, but you have to wonder whether their buyers fully understand the company's fundamentals, some of which appear precarious. Yield spreads.

投资者为放弃国债安全性转投高收益公司债所要求的额外收益率正逼近历史低点，且比我三月份撰写《给我信用》备忘录时更为吝啬。这也暗示投资者风险偏好水平升高，成为市场高企的另一征兆。关于标普500估值的题外话：其在2023至2024年惊人58%的两年总回报中，超半数归功于所谓

The amount of incremental yield investors demand if they're going to give up the safety of Treasury securities and buy corporate debt for its higher yields are approaching all time lows and are less generous than they were when I wrote the memo Gimme Credit in March. This too implies an elevated level of risk tolerance on the part of investors, and thus is another sign of a lofty market. An aside regarding the valuation of the S and P five hundred. A bit over half of its jaw dropping fifty eight percent two year total return in 2023 to '24 was attributable to the spectacular performance of just seven stocks, those of the so called magnificent seven. Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, parent company of Google, Amazon, Meta Platforms, parent company of Facebook, Nvidia, and Tesla.

这些是伟大的公司，有些甚至是有史以来最优秀的企业。这七只股票现已占据500只成分股总市值的三分之一，令人震惊。请记住，我并非自称股票（尤其是科技股）专家。由于这些公司的卓越性，其股票估值高昂，普遍观点认为其高估值导致标普500平均市盈率异常偏高。实际上它们的平均市盈率约33倍——虽高于平均水平，但考虑到我认为这些公司拥有卓越产品、重大市场份额、高增量利润率及强大竞争护城河，这一估值并非不合理。

These are great companies some are the best companies ever, and these seven stocks have grown to represent a startling one third of the total market value of the 500 stock index. Please bear in mind that I don't claim to be an expert on stocks in general, or tech stocks in particular. Because of these companies' greatness, their stocks are highly valued, and there's a popular perception that their elevated valuations are responsible for the S and P five hundred's unusually high average PE ratio. The fact is their PE ratios average out to roughly 33. This is certainly an above average figure, but I don't find it unreasonable when viewed against what I believe to be the company's exceptional products, significant market shares, high incremental profit margins, and strong competitive moats.

1969年我刚加入第一国民花旗银行时，许多

A lot of the nifty 50 stocks First National Citibank owned when I got there in 1969 were selling at PE ratios between sixty and ninety. Now that's high. Rather, I think it's the average PE ratio of 22 on the 493 non magnificent companies in the index, well above the mid teens average historical PE for the S and P 500, that renders the index's overall valuation so high and possibly worrisome. Why are asset prices so strong in the face of what I view as net negative developments? How can the S and P 500 have risen 14% in the four plus months since April 1, the day before the tariffs were announced, given that most observers believe the tariffs will add to inflation, weigh on economic growth, and reduce the perception of The US as the premier investment destination.

我的解释是：投资者本质上是乐观主义者。若非乐观，怎会寄望通过将资金托付他人来获取未来回报？股票投资者尤其如此，我认为他们的乐观精神根深蒂固。当处于乐观情绪时，投资者总能积极解读模棱两可的事态发展，同时选择性忽视负面因素。

Here's my explanation. Investors are, by nature, optimistic. You must be an optimist to hand over your money to someone else in the hope of getting more back later. This is especially true of equity investors, and I think their optimism dies hard. When they're in an optimistic mood, investors have the ability to interpret ambiguous developments positively and overlook negatives.

上一次持续的市场调整结束于2009年初，这意味着风险承担已有超过十六年未受到严厉惩罚，而逢低买入策略屡试不爽。这意味着35岁左右的投资者，无论是专业人士还是业余爱好者，都未曾经历过漫长的熊市。年长的投资者虽经历过一次或多次，但经过如此长时间的间隔，有些人可能已被麻痹，产生了虚假的安全感。尽管美国可能仍拥有全球最佳的投资基本面，但部分投资者或许未能意识到其优势可能已略有减弱。各种合理化解释常常涌现，以维持牛市的延续。

The last sustained market correction ended in early two thousand nine, meaning it's been over sixteen years since risk bearing was seriously punished, and buying the dips wasn't rewarded. That means no one 35 or so, professional and amateur investors alike, has ever experienced a prolonged bear market. Older investors have experienced one or more, but with the passage of such a long time, some may have been lulled into a false sense of security. Although The US probably continues to offer the best investment fundamentals in the world, some investors may not appreciate the possibility that it's a little less best. Rationalizations often emerge to keep bull markets going.

近期流行的一个说法是TACO（特朗普总是临阵退缩）。这暗示着他最严厉的威胁及由此引发的投资者最糟糕的恐惧不会成为现实。鉴于市场长期向好，如今的投资者似乎更多是受错失恐惧症（FOMO）驱动，而非担忧市场处于高位可能导致回报不佳甚至亏损的风险。当然，最终决定当前资产价格的投资共识可能比我更看好基本面前景。那么这一系列计算的底线结论是什么？

One these days is TACO, which stands for Trump always chickens out. The suggestion is that his strongest threats and some of investors' worst resulting fears won't be realized. Given the long stain of good years in the markets, it seems today's investors are motivated more by FOMO than by concern about the chance the market is high and likely to produce poor returns or even losses. Finally, of course, the consensus of investors responsible for today's asset prices probably view the fundamental outlook as more positive than I do. What's the bottom line of the calculus?

在我看来，整体基本面似乎比七个月前有所恶化，但与此同时，资产价格相对于收益处于高位，较2024年更高，且相对于历史估值也偏高。多数牛市建立在运转良好的经济基础上叠加一系列积极因素。如今我看到以下要素：近期市场、高端房地产和加密货币上涨带来的积极心理和财富效应；多数投资者认为除美国市场外别无选择；以及围绕当下新宠——人工智能的狂热。

Fundamentals appear to me to be less good overall than they were seven months ago, but at the same time, asset prices are high relative to earnings, higher than they were at the 2024, and at high valuations relative to history. Most bull markets are built through the addition of a constellation of positives on top of a well functioning economy. Today, I see elements that include the following. The positive psychology and wealth effect resulting from recent gains in markets, high end real estate, and crypto. The belief that for most investors, there really is no alternative to The US markets and the excitement surrounding today's new new thing, AI.

正是这类因素能够激发投资者的想象力并助推牛市，而当前它们显然正在发挥作用。去年我读到约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒1859年的精辟论述：只了解己方观点者对议题知之甚少。换言之，若不熟悉反对你立场的论据，便无法真正评估其有效性。因此，若不对议题的反方观点予以阐述，我便无法负责任地推进自己的见解。

These are the kinds of things that have the ability to fire investor imaginations and contribute to bull markets, and they certainly seem to be doing so now. I came across a great quote last year from John Stuart Mill, 1859. He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. In other words, if you're not conversant with the arguments of those who oppose your position, you really can't assess its validity. Thus, I can't responsibly advance my view without giving the other side of the issue.

在每一个强劲上涨的市场中，都必须有一个理由来解释估值扩张的现象，即牛市论调。如果不存在这样的理由，资产价格就不可能达到当前水平。这个理由通常是某种形式的‘这次不一样’的变体。以下是当今市场的逻辑：市盈率本质上是将贴现现金流计算应用于一系列收益后的结果，正如刚才所述。

In every strongly rising market, there has to be a justification for the extended valuations, the bull case. If it didn't exist, asset prices couldn't be where they are. It's usually some variation on it's different this time. Here's how it goes today. A PE ratio is basically the result of applying a discounted cash flow calculation to a stream of earnings, as just described.

进行此类计算并赋予估值的主要输入参数包括对收益增长率、持久性及投资资本回报率的假设。与过去相比，当今标普500指数中越来越多的公司具有以下特征：a) 增长更快，b) 周期性更弱，c) 增长所需的增量资本更少，从而能产生更多自由现金流，d) 拥有更强大的竞争地位或护城河。因此，它们理应获得高于平均水平的市盈率。这一解释完全合理，它列举了确实可能不同的因素。正如约翰·坦普尔顿爵士——我所知最早提出‘这次不一样’陷阱的人——所言，20%的情况下，事情确实会不同。

The main inputs for performing such a calculation and assigning a valuation are assumptions regarding the earnings growth rate, durability and return on invested capital. Compared to the past, today's S and P 500 is increasingly made up of companies that a) grow faster, b) are less cyclical, c) require less incremental capital to grow, enabling them to generate more free cash flow, and d) have much stronger competitive positions, or moats. Thus, they deserve above average PE ratios. This explanation makes complete sense. It cites factors that really might be different, and per Sir John Templeton, the first person that I know who talked about the trap of it's different this time, 20% of the time, things really are.

如今，我敢打赌这个比例超过了20%。所以一方面，‘这次不一样’是牛市反复出现的陈词滥调，总需谨慎审视；另一方面，未能识别真正不同的时刻，正是阻碍普通投资者迈向卓越的障碍。我只是不知道这两种担忧中哪一种在当下更具现实意义。但投资者应牢记三点。

Today, I'd bet it's more than 20%. So on one hand, it's different this time is a recurring bull market cliche that always bears scrutiny. And on the other hand, failing to recognize when things actually are different is something that stands between the average investor and superiority. I just have no idea which of those two concerns is more valid today. But investors should bear three things in mind.

人工智能及相关发展极有可能改变世界，某些真正具备上述特质并展现出我在《泡沫观察》中所描述韧性的公司或许会与众不同，但多数新兴事物中，投资者往往错误地将过多公司视为潜在赢家。高估现象永远无法被证实，且当前条件并不意味着短期内会出现调整。但综合来看，这些迹象表明股市已从高位进入令人担忧的状态。该如何应对？我将战术行动分为从激进到防御的频谱，当估值过高时，我会考虑转向更防御性的策略。

The enormous likelihood that AI and related developments will change the world, the possibility that it is different for some companies, those that truly embody the factors just listed and will demonstrate the persistence I described in On Bubble Watch, but also the fact that in most new new things, investors tend to treat far too many companies, and often the wrong ones, as likely to succeed. The existence of overvaluation can never be proved, and there's no reason to think the conditions just discussed imply there will be a correction anytime soon. But taken together, they tell me the stock market has moved from elevated to worrisome. What should you do about it? I consider tactical actions in terms of the spectrum that runs from aggressiveness to defensiveness, and when valuations are high, I consider becoming more defensive.

在我和妻子南希爱看的军事剧中，五角大楼常从防御准备状态DEFCON五级开始预警，随着危机升级直至预示核攻击的DEFCON一级。类似地，面对高估值市场与投资者乐观情绪，我建议逐步实施以下投资警戒等级（Investcon）：六级停止买入，五级减持激进头寸增持防御资产，四级清空剩余激进持仓。

In the action shows my wife Nancy and I like to watch, the Pentagon sometimes announces a defense readiness condition starting at DEFCON five and escalating as the danger grows to DEFCON one, which indicates a nuclear attack is underway or imminent. In a similar vein, I think of progressively applying the following investment readiness conditions, or Investcons, in the face of above average market valuations and optimistic investor behavior. Six, stop buying. Five, reduce aggressive holdings and increase defensive holdings. Four, sell off the remaining aggressive holdings.

三级开始削减防御持仓，二级清仓所有头寸，一级转为做空。但在我看来，要合理达到实施三级至一级所需的确定性几乎不可能。因为高估绝不意味着必然很快下跌，采取这些极端措施很少是明智之举。

Three, trim defensive holdings as well. Two, eliminate all holdings. One, go short. In my view, it's essentially impossible to reasonably reach the degree of certainty needed to implement InvestCon three, two, or one. Because overvaluation is never synonymous with sure to go down soon, it's rarely wise to go to those extremes.

我虽从未执行过，但认为现在适合启动五级警戒。若减持历史估值过高的资产，转投更安全的标的，即使市场继续攀升，损失也相对有限——至少不至于夜不能寐。需特别说明，信贷投资通常比股票更安全，非常适合作为当前环境下的防御性配置。尽管当前收益率利差狭窄，信贷预期回报相较历史无风险资产并不丰厚（详见《给我信用》）。

I know I never have, but I have no problem thinking it's time for InvestCon five. And if you lighten up on things that appear historically expensive, and switch into things that appear safer, there may be relatively little to lose from the market continuing to grind higher for a while, or anyway, not enough to lose sleep over. I hasten to note, of course, that credit investments are generally more secure than stocks, and thus well suited to serve as defensive holdings in the climate I describe. The narrow yield spreads mean today's prospective returns on credit aren't generous relative to those on risk free assets in the context of history. See Gimme Credit for the details.

但绝对回报依然可观，与股票历史回报相当，且有发行人支付利息和返还本金的合同保障——这是股票不具备的。2025年8月13日。感谢收听霍华德·马克斯的《备忘录》。订阅可收听更多节目。本播客观点仅代表作者发表时的立场，可能随时变更。

But the returns are significant in absolute terms, competitive with the historical returns on equities, and supported by the issuer's contractual promise to pay interest and return principal, something that can't be said for stocks. 08/13/2025. Thank you for listening to The Memo by Howard Marks. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts. This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated, and such views are subject to change without notice.

橡树资本无义务更新本文信息。过往业绩不代表未来表现，且任何盈利可能都伴随损失风险。本播客仅用于教育目的，不构成投资建议或证券销售要约。

Oaktree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oaktree makes no representation, and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.

本文部分经济趋势与表现信息源自第三方独立来源。橡树资本管理公司认为信息来源可靠，但无法保证其准确性，亦未独立验证该信息的完整性及其依据的假设。

Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources. Oaktree Capital Management, L. P. Believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable. However, it cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based.

本播客及其所含信息未经橡树资本事先书面同意，不得以任何形式全部或部分复制、转载、重新发布或张贴。Audiation。

This podcast, including the information contained herein, may not be copied, reproduced, republished, or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Oaktree. Audiation.