安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金谈1929年对2025年的启示

本播客由菲拉格慕为您呈现。

This podcast is brought to you by Ferragamo.

每逢佳节，我们欢聚一堂，开怀大笑，重新发现这个时节如此特别的原因。

Every holiday season, we gather, laugh, and rediscover what makes this time of year so special.

宾客到访时地板上的脚步声，圣诞树闪烁的光芒，盛装打扮的喜悦。

The sounds of shoes on the floor as guests arrive, the sparkle of the tree, the joy of dressing up.

让菲拉格慕成为您节日故事的一部分。

Let Ferragamo be a part of your holiday story.

从立体剪裁的皮革手袋、经典Vara鞋，到永恒的Tramezza系列与奢华丝绸制品，每件作品都经匠心打造，值得年复一年珍藏。

From the sculpted leather hug handbag and iconic Vara shoe to the timeless tramezza and sumptuous silks, each piece is crafted to be cherished season after season.

访问ferragamo.com，挑选完美节日礼物。

Visit ferragamo.com for the perfect holiday gift.

这里是《纽约客》广播时间，由WNYC Studios与《纽约客》联合制作。

This is the New Yorker Radio Hour, a coproduction of WNYC Studios and the New Yorker.

欢迎收听《纽约客》广播时间。

Welcome to the New Yorker Radio Hour.

我是大卫·雷姆尼克。

I'm David Remnick.

我和你们一样听到了关于经济的种种传闻。

I'm hearing the same murmurings about the economy that you are.

诸如'回调'、'泡沫'、'崩盘'、'买入黄金'、'降低风险敞口'，或者更直白的'套现'这类流行语。

Catchphrases like correction, bubble, crash, buy gold, reduce your exposure, or more bluntly cash out.

自年初特朗普启动关税政策以来，即便处于历史高位，市场也一直处于动荡之中。

Since the beginning of the year when Donald Trump began his tariff rollout, the markets, even at record heights, have been in turmoil.

如果特朗普当初真的实施了他那些最不可预测且惩罚性的关税政策，我们可能已经面临真正的灾难——一场严重的经济衰退。

And if Trump had gone through with all his most unpredictable and punitive tariffs, we might have faced real disaster, a major recession.

但他并没有完全这么做。

But he didn't, not quite.

而市场也在这一年中逐渐稳定下来。

And the market stabilized over the year.

事实上，最近市场还在飙升。

In fact, they've been surging lately.

这让一些人开始担心可能还有更大的威胁。

That has some people worried about a threat that could be bigger still.

他们担心经济及其增长过于依赖人工智能领域——尽管前景诱人但充满未知——我们可能很快会遇到大麻烦。

They worry that the economy and its expansion is so dependent on the realm of artificial intelligence, with all its fantastical prospects and unknowns, that we might be in trouble and very soon.

就在前几天，山姆·奥特曼似乎暗示像OpenAI这样的公司可能需要政府救助，这引发了轩然大波。

Just the other day, Sam Altman seemed to suggest that companies like OpenAI might need a government bailout, and that caused a furor.

奥特曼很快就收回了这一说法。

Altman quickly walked that statement back.

某种程度上，当某件事发展到足够庞大的规模时，无论表面如何，联邦政府最终都会成为最后兜底者——就像我们在各种情况下看到的那样。

In some level like, at some level, when something gets sufficiently huge, whether or not they are on paper, the federal government is kind of the insurer of last resort as we've seen in various Right.

金融危机和保险公司把事情搞砸的情况。

Financial crises and insurance companies screwing things up.

所以考虑到我预期AI将带来的经济影响规模，我认为政府最终确实会成为最后的保障者。

So I guess, given the magnitude of what I expect AI economic impact to look like, sort of, I do think the government ends up as, like, the insurer of last resort.

我对这方面不是专家，但安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金绝对是。

I'm no expert on what's happening here, but Andrew Ross Sorkin certainly is.

如果你关注金融，就会知道索金是CNBC《财经论谈》的联合主持人。

If you follow finance, you know Sorkin is the co anchor of Squawk Box on CNBC.

他还创办了《纽约时报》的商业网站DealBook。

He also founded the New York Times business site DealBook.

罗斯·索金的上本书是《大而不倒》，讲述了2008年金融危机。随后他又推出了一本经过深入研究、极具可读性的著作，讲述史上最严重的股灾。

Ross Sorkin's last book was Too Big to Fail, an account of the two thousand and eight financial crash, And he's followed it with a deeply researched and terrifically readable book about the biggest crash of all time.

这本书名为《1929》。

It's called 1929.

安德鲁，就在特朗普的关税政策生效后，他私下承认自己的经济计划可能导致衰退，但他真正想避免的是大萧条。

Andrew, just after Donald Trump's tariff policy went into effect, he privately admitted that his economic plan could bring about a recession privately, but what he really wanted to do was avoid a depression.

嗯。

Mhmm.

谈谈大萧条如何不仅定义了三十年代，还塑造了延续至今的美国政治格局。

Talk about how the Great Depression not only defined the thirties but shaped American politics for generations even today.

你看，

Well, look.

我们遭遇了股灾

We had a crash

1929年的崩盘可以说是第一块多米诺骨牌，随后一系列灾难性政策选择导致1932年失业率达25%，到1933年有9000家银行倒闭。

in 1929 that was ultimately the first domino, if you will, and then in a series of horrible policy choices that led to 25% unemployment in 1932, 9,000 banks going out of business by 1933.

但这实际上改变了人们对投资的根本认知。

But really a shift in terms of how people even thought about investing.

有些投资者留下了跨代创伤，从此再未涉足股市。

Some some investors were generationally scarred, never even touched the stock market ever again.

顺便说一句，20世纪20年代确实改变了我们现在的生活方式。

By the way, the 1920s is really what changed the way we live now.

我们今天所经历的这一切，常常感觉像一个泡沫和这种狂热的时刻，与那时太相似了。

What we're living through today, which oftentimes feels like a bubble and this euphoric moment, is so similar Yeah.

因为20年代有汽车、有电信、有收音机。

To the twenties because, you know, we had automobiles, we had telecommunications, we had radio.

人们认为RCA就是当时的英伟达。

People thought RCA was the NVIDIA of its time.

那么我们是在梦游般走向灾难吗？

So are we sleepwalking into disaster?

我读过你关于大萧条的精彩叙述，那些善意、聪明的权势巨头们，那些真正拥有数百万美元的富豪们。

I I read this this extraordinary narrative of yours about the depression and all these kind of well meaning, intelligent status giants, wealthy people who had actual millions of dollars.

数百万。

Millions.

以百万计。

By millions.

有些人甚至拥有数十亿。

There were some with billions.

是的。

Yep.

他们都认为自己做得对，或者可以把灾难往后推。

And and they all thought they were doing the right thing or that they could shove the disaster down the road.

嗯。

Mhmm.

正如海明威告诉我们的那样，灾难总是先一点点渗透，然后突然全面降临。

And then, as Hemingway tells us, little by little, then all at once, the disaster comes.

准确地说是在我的生日，10月29日。

On my birthday, should say, October 29.

我认为我们不可避免地正走向某种调整，甚至更糟的局面。

I think we are invariably headed towards some kind of correction, if not worse.

看看我们当前的经济状况——考虑到人工智能领域正在进行的各种不计后果的疯狂投资，我得补充说，那些令人震惊的估值水平——真相终将水落石出。

And if you look at where our economy is today, given all the spending that's going on in artificial intelligence, somewhat indiscriminately, I would add, at valuations that are shocking, the rubber will meet the road at some point.

因为历史总是重演？还是这次情况会有所不同？

Because it always does or because now uniquely it's gonna hit the road?

因为历史总是重演，尤其当多种因素同时汇聚时更是如此。

Because it always does, but it always does when you have a confluence of things happening at the same time.

人们正对这项将改变世界的技术表现出惊人的狂热。

You have this remarkable euphoria around a technology that's going to change the world.

毫无疑问，它很可能会改变世界。

Invariably, it likely will.

人工智能。

AI.

人工智能。

AI.

但这项技术改变世界的经济效应未必会同时显现。

But the economics of that technology changing the world may not all happen at one time.

因此你会看到一段惊人的投资热潮期，但另一端却未必能产生相应的收入和利润来支撑整个体系。

And so you have a remarkable period of spending, but not necessarily the revenue and profits on the other end to make it all work.

更重要的是，你在系统中拥有惊人的杠杆力量。

And then more importantly, you have a remarkable amount of leverage in the system.

每一次金融危机，如果我从报道1929年和2008年的事件中学到了什么，那就是杠杆作用。

Every financial crisis, if I've learned anything from covering 1929, covering 2008, it is leverage.

正是人们的借贷推动了这一切的发生。

It is people borrowing to make all of this happen.

而现在，我们正开始见证一个为支撑AI经济而大规模借贷的非凡时期。

And right now, we are beginning to see a remarkable period of borrowing to make the economics of AI work.

详细说明正在发生的具体情况和规模。

Map out the specifics and the scale of what's been going on.

为什么股市会超过45000点？

Why is the stock market over 45,000?

当前进行的杠杆操作规模有多大？

What's the scale of the leveraging that's going on?

我们为何处于如此危险的境地？

Why are we in such peril?

是谁在进行借贷？

Who's doing the borrowing?

一些大型科技公司，无论是谷歌、Meta还是亚马逊，他们现在都在投资英伟达芯片和其他数据中心。

Some of the big tech companies, whether it's Google or Meta or Amazon, they're all investing right now in NVIDIA chips and other data centers.

他们拥有真实的现金，并且正在赚取实际的利润。

And they have real cash and they're making real money.

顺便说一句，在某些情况下，比如Meta，他们现在几乎将所有收入都花在了这些数据中心上。

By the way, they're now spending virtual in some cases, in Meta's case, almost all the money that they're bringing in on these data centers.

嗯。

Mhmm.

但越来越明显的是，围绕这一趋势正涌现出一大批企业。

But in increasingly, what's happening is there's a whole subset of companies that are emerging around this.

比如房地产公司，还有能源公司——为这些数据中心供电的能源需求，非常庞大。

So real estate companies, energy companies by the way, energy to power these data centers, huge.

他们是怎么做到的？

How are they doing that?

他们正在申请巨额贷款来满足能源需求，以实现这一切。

They're taking out extraordinary loans to build out the energy requirements to make all of this happen.

对。

Right.

很多杠杆作用体现在房地产公司、建筑公司和能源公司身上，可以说它们正在建设未来。

A lot of where the leverage lies is in all of the the real estate companies, construction companies, energy companies that are building the future, if you will.

问题在于，本应为此买单的人可能无力支付。

The question is the people who are supposed to be paying for it may not be able to.

比如OpenAI刚刚向英伟达承诺了1000亿美元的投资。

So OpenAI, you know, just made a $100,000,000,000 commitment to NVIDIA.

但它根本拿不出1000亿美元。

It doesn't have a $100,000,000,000 to commit.

那么这里发生了什么？

So what's happened here?

英伟达说，你知道吗？

NVIDIA said, you know what?

我们会为你提供资金。

We'll finance you.

实际上，就是把钱给OpenAI，而OpenAI最终会把这笔钱转给NVIDIA。

So effectively, is giving OpenAI the money that OpenAI is going to give back to NVIDIA.

但你是说这是个骗局吗？

But are you suggesting that's a scam?

你是说杠杆运作和还款的时间点会导致这些混乱、可能的萧条，或者乐观地说，是调整吗？

Are you suggesting that the timing of the way leverage works and being paid back is such that it causes these disruptions, depressions possibly, or corrections more optimistically?

如果情况变得非常糟糕，正是杠杆作用抽走了系统中的信心，因为这不仅仅是系统内的调整。

If you get to a terrible moment, it's the leverage which sucks the confidence out of the system because it's not just that there's a correction in the system.

意思是，不仅仅是其中一些股票下跌了20%或30%。

Meaning, it's not just that some of these stocks fall by 20 or 30%.

而是如果你使用了杠杆，你欠的金额是这些损失的三四倍。

It's that if you're leveraged, you owe three and four times that.

而且你无法翻身。

And you can't come back.

而且你无法翻身。

And you can't come back.

我们现在就是处于这种境地吗？

Is that where we are?

我认为我们现在很可能就是处于这种境地。

I think that's where we are probably right now.

我心中的疑问是，我不确定我们今天是否完全清楚所有杠杆的位置。

The question that I have in my mind is I'm not sure we fully know where all the leverage is today.

我不明白那是什么意思。

I don't know what that means.

从历史上看，公司和个人的贷款主要来自银行。

So historically, companies and even individuals took loans largely from banks.

他们披露了这些贷款的情况。

They disclosed what those loans looked like.

美联储了解这些贷款的详情。

The Federal Reserve knew what those loans looked like.

如今，大部分贷款已不再来自银行。

Today, most loans are not coming from the banks anymore.

它们来自所谓的影子银行系统。

They're coming from what's called the shadow banking system.

它们来自所谓的私人信贷基金。

They're coming from what's called private credit funds.

解释一下这两者。

Explain both of those things.

好的。

Okay.

传统上，你去银行，我们把钱存进去，然后银行会把这些钱贷给想购买英伟达芯片的公司。

So historically, you go to the bank, we give them our cash, and then they would take that cash, and they would loan it out to a a company that wants to go buy NVIDIA chips.

在私人信贷业务中，假设大卫·雷米克决定成立一个私人信贷基金。

In the private credit business, let's say, David Remick decides he's starting a private credit fund.

没错。

Right.

他会去——你们要去拜访一些养老基金，然后说：给我十亿美元，为期十年。

He's going to you're going to go around to some pension funds and say, give me a billion dollars for the next ten years.

你们给我十亿美元用十年，我会还你们十亿美元再加利息。

You give me the billion dollars for ten years, I'll give you back your billion dollars plus plus.

可以说，你们会拿着这十亿美元再贷给别人，他们就会用这笔钱去买芯片。

Arguably, you would then take that billion dollars and then loan it out to somebody and they would go buy the chips.

这其中没有任何信息披露。

There's no disclosure around it.

我们不了解这些基金的情况。

We don't know about these funds.

我们不知道这些基金里有什么。

We don't know what's in them.

我们不知道它们在任何时点是如何被估值或持有的。

We don't know how they're being valued or carried at any given moment.

而事实是，这个私人信贷宇宙与银行系统相连，因为许多银行都在帮它们加杠杆。

And the truth is that this private credit universe is connected back to the banks because so many of the banks help lever them up.

如果人们无法偿还贷款，就可能引发真正的信贷紧缩。

If people can't pay their loan back, you could have a real credit crunch.

我敢打赌，正在听这个节目的听众中有很大比例的人都在想：

I would bet some huge proportion of the people listening to this are out in the world.

我只知道我有401k养老金账户。

Think all I know is I've got a four zero one k.

对吧。

Right.

市场指数达到了45,000点或什么的，这很棒。

And the market's at 45,000 or whatever it is, which is great.

它一直在上涨、上涨、再上涨，所以不用担心。

It keeps going up and up and up, so no worries.

然后安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金跑来告诉我最好担心一下，但我实在想不明白。

And along comes Andrew Ross Sorkin telling me, you better worry, but I don't know how to wrap my head around it.

好吧，问题就在这里。

Well, so here's the problem.

我试图理解这件事。

And I I try to wrap my head around this.

如果你回顾过去一百年，事实是当职业乐观主义者比职业怀疑论者要有利可图得多。

If you look over the past hundred years, the truth is that it has been much more profitable to be a professional optimist than a professional skeptic.

我们是长期投资者。

We're in it for the long run.

嗯，你看。

Well, look.

查尔斯·美林——他在1928年创立了美林证券——当时就告诉人们要退出市场。

Charles Merrill, who founded Merrill Lynch back in 1928, told people to get out of the market.

你可能会觉得这个建议很英明，但事实是从1928年到1929年9月，股市上涨了90%。

Now you might think that was a brilliant thought, except for the fact that from the 1928 to September 1929, the stock market went up 90%.

关键不仅在于预知会有某种调整或崩盘。

You it's not just knowing that there's going to be, you know, a correction of some sort or a crash.

更重要的是把握时机，知道何时上车、下车以及再次上车。

It's getting the timing right and knowing when to get on, off, and on the train again.

你讲述的故事关于

Your story about

大萧条的核心在于一次失败的银行合并，这确实加速了崩盘。

the Great Depression centers on a single bank merger that went wrong, and that really helped to fuel the crash.

嗯。

Mhmm.

现在我们一直在讨论英伟达。

Right now, we're talking about NVIDIA all the time.

一直在讨论。

All the time.

我们的经济命运有多少取决于英伟达未来的叙事？

How much of our economic fate is in the hands of the narrative of NVIDIA's destiny?

哦，我认为影响巨大。

Oh, think hugely so.

哈佛经济学家杰森·弗曼说过，如果剔除所有数据中心的支出——实质上是流向英伟达的资金——嗯。

Jason Furman, who's an economist at Harvard, said if you were to eliminate all of the spending on data centers, effectively all the money that's going to NVIDIA Mhmm.

可以说，美国的经济增长率将只有约0.1%。

If you will, The United States would have a growth rate of about point 1%.

基本等于零增长。

Call it flat.

是啊。

Yeah.

这正说明了我们的未来在某种程度上有多依赖它。

That's just a demonstration of how much our future, to some degree, is dependent on it.

此外，或许这个AI泡沫或增长率掩盖了我们经济中的其他一些问题。

And also how much perhaps this AI bubble or or growth rate is masking or papering over some of the other problems in our economy.

有观点认为AI将会像收音机那样普及，对吧。

There's an argument to be made that AI is gonna be here just like radio was Right.

在二十年代末。

In the late twenties.

顺便说，我们现在就相当于处在收音机时代。

By the way, here we are on the equivalent of radio right now.

你看看互联网，九十年代末也是这样。

You look at similarly the Internet, late nineties.

当互联网泡沫破裂时，并不是说互联网本身出了问题。

It wasn't that when when when the when the .com bubble burst, it wasn't that the Internet was broken.

只是经济模式失衡了，而现在我们拥有了一个主要基于互联网的繁荣世界。

It was just that the economics got out of whack, and now we have, you know, a robust world that's based largely on the Internet.

是的。

Yeah.

我猜想AI领域也会发生类似的情况。

And I imagine something similar is gonna happen in the world of AI.

你对AI持乐观态度吗？

Are you are you bullish on AI?

比如有些人提到麦肯锡。

Some people say that McKinsey, for example.

麦肯锡称近80%的公司发现AI对其利润没有显著影响。

McKinsey said nearly 80% of companies found it had no significant impact on their bottom line.

我认为目前而言，它还没有产生人们所谈论的那种变革性影响。

I think currently, in this moment, it hasn't had the sort of transformative effect that people are talking about.

你觉得随着时间的推移会有这种影响吗？

Do I think over time it will?

是的。

Yes.

确实如此。

I do.

我是从我们目前的讨论中得出这个结论的。

I'm gleaning this conclusion from what we're talking about so far.

第一，我们处于泡沫中，但尽管如此，你应该留在市场里。

A, we're in a bubble, but nevertheless, you should stay in the market.

第二，你重仓AI是因为你认为这最终会表现良好。

And b, you're heavily invested in AI because you think that's gonna turn out just fine.

首先，我没有投资任何这些东西，因为事实上，作为在《纽约时报》和CNBC工作的记者，我不被允许购买个股。

Well, first of all, I'm not invested in any of these things because the truth is, as a journalist who works at The New York Times and CNBC, I am not allowed to buy individual stocks.

所以你只投资基金之类的？

So you're staying a fund or something?

我只持有共同基金。是的。

All I own is is mutual Yeah.

基金。嗯。

Funds Mhmm.

诸如此类，完全透明地说，因为我想保持独立立场。

And the like, just to be a 100% clear because I wanna be an independent actor.

那么我认为每个人都需要仔细考虑，你懂的，何时以及是否需要现金。

Then I think that everybody needs to think through, you know, when and if you need cash.

如果你需要现金，并且认为未来几年内会需要，你肯定希望能有一些

And if you need cash and you think in the next couple years you're gonna need cash, you would like to think that you have some

渠道。

Access.

能有一些获取现金的渠道。

Have some access to that.

我我我不喜欢给出，你懂的，财务建议，但事实就是如此。

I I I don't like to give, you know, financial advice, but that's the truth.

嗯。

Mhmm.

如果你现在有三十年的时间，而且不需要这笔钱，我愿意相信三十年后的世界会比今天更好。

If you have thirty years from now and you don't need the money, I'd like to believe that thirty years will be better thirty years from now than today.

顺便说一句，如果我不这么认为，活着就没意思了。

And by the way, if I were if I didn't think that, it wouldn't be fun to be alive.

不。

No.

不。

No.

确实不会。

It wouldn't.

但当你审视你所描述的债务、人工智能、金融政策等状况时——我们甚至还没谈到关税问题——这个泡沫到底有多大？

But when you look at the situation that you lay out in terms of debt, in terms of AI, in terms of financial policy, we haven't even gotten to tariffs yet, how big is the bubble?

它到底有多接近爆发的临界点，爆发时会是什么样子？

Is it how how ready is it to burst, and how would that look?

嗯，我心中的疑问是，这种情况可能会持续很多很多年才会爆发。

Well, the question in my mind is this could continue on for many, many years before it bursts.

它不一定要在明天就爆发。

It doesn't have to burst tomorrow.

事实上，我认为很可能在未来一段时间内还会经历多轮持续增长。

In fact, I would argue that it's likely that there's gonna be a whole number of iterations of continued growth for some period of time.

我是说，目前这些大型语言模型公司几乎是在不计成本地投入。

I mean, right now, these big large language model companies are investing almost religiously at this point.

如果你真要他们算笔经济账，大多数要么根本算不清，要么在用非常激进的预测数据，本质上都是在说这是个权衡取舍的问题。

I mean, if you really ask them to sort of pencil out the math, most of them truly can't do it or are using very aggressive projections and effectively say, look, it's a trade off.

一个选择是我们投资不足导致落后于人。

There's one alternative is that we don't invest enough and we don't wanna be behind.

另一个选择可能是投资过度，但有些人认为这才是更优解。

And the other is maybe we've invest we'll invest too much, but some prefer to think that that's the better path.

我是说，最让你困扰的是什么？

I mean What troubles you the most?

我们正试图通过关税支撑那些在经济规律本不该存活的产业和经济部门。

We're trying to prop up industries and parts of our economy through tariffs that economically naturally shouldn't be propped up.

但问题是，如果不这样做又能怎么办？

However, there's some real questions about what you would do otherwise.

比如说，如果美国没有汽车关税，我们现在可能根本不会有汽车工业。

If if we didn't have tariffs on cars, for example, in America, we probably wouldn't have a car industry right now.

中国汽车工业如此领先。

That the Chinese car industry is so superior.

比亚迪汽车，中国的电动汽车，是行业标杆。

BYD cars, which are EVs, electric vehicles in China, are the gold standard.

它们比我们的车更好。

They are better than our cars.

它们比我们的车更便宜。

They are cheaper than our cars.

我认为如果大多数美国人有机会坐进这些车的后排，他们会说

And I think if most Americans had an opportunity to sit in the back of one of those cars, they would say

就像你一样。

As you have.

这是怎么回事？

What is going on here?

顺便说一句，包括特斯拉的埃隆·马斯克在内的人都会告诉你这些车非常出色。

People including, by the way, Elon Musk who makes Teslas would tell you that those are remarkable cars.

他提出论点：如果没有关税，我们将面临严重问题。

He's made the argument that without without tariffs, we would have a real problem.

你可能会说，我们想要保留汽车工业。

You may say, we wanna have an automobile industry.

但我们已经决定要支持某些产业，而放弃其他产业。

But we've decided there are certain industries we wanna support and other industries that we don't.

从长远来看，我们的做法存在一个真正的问号。

There's a real question mark just long term about what what we're doing.

我们显然也在向服务型经济转型。

We're also obviously moving to a services economy.

顺便说一句，这又回到了AI话题——我们的服务经济越发达，AI可能带来的威胁就越显著，我们究竟面临着什么？

And by the way, the more we this goes back to AI, the greater we have a services economy and the greater you think that that can potentially be under threat from AI, what do we have?

我正在与CNBC和《纽约时报》的财经记者安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金交谈。

I'm speaking with financial journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin of CNBC and The New York Times.

我们稍后继续。

We'll continue in just a moment.

这里是《纽约客》广播时间。

This is the New Yorker Radio Hour.

本节目由菲拉格慕赞助播出。

This podcast is brought to you by Ferragamo.

每逢佳节，我们欢聚一堂，开怀大笑，重新发现这个时节如此特别的缘由。

Every holiday season, we gather, laugh, and rediscover what makes this time of year so special.

亲友到访时鞋履踏地的声响，圣诞树的装饰过程，盛装打扮的喜悦。

The sound of shoes on the floor as family and friends arrive, the decoration of the tree, the joy of dressing up.

菲拉格慕2025假日系列颂扬这些仪式的美好——那些恍若永恒却历久弥新的时刻。

At Ferragamo, holiday twenty twenty five celebrates the beauty of these rituals, moments that feel timeless, yet always new.

从标志性Vera鞋到经久不衰的Tramezza系列，再到流光溢彩的丝绸制品，每件作品都经过精心雕琢，值得世代珍藏。

From sculpted leather hug handbags in the iconic Vera shoe, to the enduring tramezza and luminous silks, each piece is crafted to be cherished season after season.

这个假日季，菲拉格慕呈现一种新型怀旧情怀，让每个瞬间都成为值得铭记的场景。

This holiday season, Ferragamo presents a new kind of nostalgia where every moment becomes a scene worth remembering.

访问ferragamo.com选购完美节日礼物。

Visit ferragamo.com for the perfect holiday gift.

这里是《纽约客》广播时间，我是大卫·雷姆尼克。

This is the New Yorker Radio Hour, and I'm David Remnick.

今天与我对话的是安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金，我们这个时代金融领域最重要的观察家之一。

And I've been speaking today with Andrew Ross Sorkin, one of the leading observers of finance in our time.

索尔金从事商业报道已超过三十年，早在他大学毕业前就开始了。

Sorkin has been covering business for more than thirty years, since before he'd even graduated from college.

他已具备足够影响力，能够公开批评他认为对经济有害的企业行为。

He's gained the clout to call out corporate practices that he thinks are harmful to the economy.

比如所谓的'税收倒置并购'。

For example, what were called inversion mergers.

在他发声后，联邦政府采取了行动使其更难实施。

And after he did so, the federal government took action to make them more difficult.

索尔金毕生都在报道当下经济动态，但他的新书却关于1929年导致大萧条的华尔街崩盘。

Sorkin has spent his life covering the economy in the here and in the now, but his new book is about the nineteen twenty nine Wall Street crash that led to the Great Depression.

然而，与我们这个时代的某些相似之处却不容忽视。

And yet, some of the parallels to our own time are unmistakable.

我有时在电视上看你，在《纽约时报》读你，试着想象每天每年有多少金融商业精英从你面前经过——你认识所有人，你去达沃斯，久而久之这些人都对你敞开心扉。

I sometimes I watch you on television, read you in the New York Times, and I try to imagine the sheer number of financial and business elites that stream in front of you on a given day and in a given year, and you you know everybody, you go to Davos, you you these people are, over time, comfortable with you.

我想了解他们在非正式场合谈论什么

I wanna get a sense of what they are talking about not on the record

没错。

Right.

当他们思考特朗普的关税政策时。

When they think about Donald Trump's tariff policy.

显然，并不是每个人都持相同看法。

Now, obviously, not everybody thinks the same thing.

或许奥弗顿窗口正在移动。

Maybe the the Overton window is shifting.

我认为总的来说，他们一开始就说这是个糟糕透顶的主意。

I think in general, they started by saying this is a terrible, terrible idea.

我是说，我认识一些人私下谈论过，比如把某些产品从美国运出，再转运到其他地方，最后又运回美国。

I mean, I know people who are who talk privately about, you know, shipping certain products from The United States, out of The United States to other places, and back into The United States.

人们这样来回倒腾货物，唯一合理的解释就是通过这种疯狂操作来降低关税费用。

I mean, people are moving stuff around for reasons that make no sense except that, you know, you can lower your tariff fee by doing sort of crazy things.

没错。

Right.

那么奥弗顿窗口是怎么移动的呢？

So how did the Overton window shift?

有种感觉是，无论最高法院如何裁决，关税政策都将长期存在——世界正朝着瓦解全球化的方向发展。如果其他国家也开始分裂（顺便说句，我们可能是分裂的推手之一），那么未来一二十年内关税壁垒很可能会持续存在。

There's a sense, irrespective of what you think the Supreme Court is gonna do, that tariffs are now here to stay, that the world is moving in this direction of breaking globalization, and that if the rest of the world is splintering, and by the way, we may be leading some of that splintering, that the next decade or two decades likely mean the tariffs are going to be here.

我觉得有些人已经开始接受这个命运了。

And I think some of them are starting to accept that as a as a fate.

然后——这可能涉及到奥弗顿窗口理论的部分——他们开始

And then, and this maybe goes to the the Overton window portion of it, they start

转而支持这种做法

to get supportive of it

或者至少在他们试图理解时，会努力合理化这个政策，试图证明它可能带来某些好处。

or at least when they're as they're trying to get their head around it, they're trying to rationalize why this could somehow be a good thing.

他们开始对自己说，好吧，也许我们真的要建立自己的汽车工业，这将增强韧性，或许我们还能打造一个更好的制药业。

They start to say to themselves, okay, maybe we're actually going to create our own automobile industry and that will create resilience and maybe we're going to create a a better pharmaceutical industry.

我的意思是，我并不是说这些就是正确的道路。

I mean, I'm not arguing these are these are the right paths.

我只是想指出，我认为一些历史上反对这些事情的人，似乎随着时间的推移对他们逐渐有所软化。

I'm just suggesting that I think some of these people who historically were against these things seem to almost be softening over time a little bit around them.

我认为不可否认的是，唐纳德·特朗普之所以能上台，原因之一——可能具有讽刺意味——是他察觉到了严重的收入不平等问题。嗯。

I think it's inarguable that one of the reasons that Donald Trump, ironically maybe, came to office is that he sensed radical income inequality Mhmm.

而且他掌握了一套能利用这种情绪的言辞。

And he had a vocabulary to play on it.

无论你对其真诚度作何评价。嗯。

No matter what you think of the sincerity of it Mhmm.

他比那些民主党人更懂得如何与之对话——顺带一提，民主党人自己也有亿万富翁金主。

He knew how to speak to it better than the Democrats who had their own billionaire donors, by the way.

这种支持正在瓦解吗？

Is that cracking up?

那种在劳动人民中——正如前几天选举所显示的——对特朗普能帮助劳动人民的信任正在消退的感觉？

That that that sense, among working people, as evidenced by the the election the other day, that maybe that support, that faith in Donald Trump to help working people is fading?

嗯，我认为一些民调显示人们对经济现状存在真实的焦虑。

Well, I think some of the polls would suggest that there's real anxiety about what's happening in the economy.

所以我认为总统在竞选时承诺要解决的许多经济问题至今仍未得到解决。

And so I think a lot of parts of the economy that the president during his campaign said that he was going to fix has gone unfixed.

嗯。

Mhmm.

所以问题在于，你知道，我们在中期选举中会处于什么位置，2028年又会如何？

And so the question is, you know, where are we gonna be in the midterms and where we'll be in 2028?

我不一定非要这样看，你知道，选举日发生的事情，对自己说这都是对特朗普主义的否定，因为我认为你看看某些州的情况——

I don't necessarily look at this you know, what what took place on election day and say to myself that this was all a repudiation of Trumpism because I think you look at some of those states and

证据有限。

It's limited evidence.

目前证据有限。

It's limited evidence at this point.

我不太确定对Mamdani的投票（比如Mamdani的例子）是否意味着对特朗普的否定，而不是如果投票给Cuomo的情况。

It's not clear to me that the vote for Mamdani Mamdani, for example, was a repudiation of Trump as opposed to if you had voted for Cuomo.

你看到美国许多最富有的人频繁出现在你的电视节目中。

You see a lot of the some of the wealthiest people in America troop through your television studio.

你报道他们。

You report on them.

他们真的关心激进的收入不平等吗？这种不平等甚至比你写过的二十世纪二三十年代的情况还要严重得多？

Do they care much about radical income inequality, which is which is just hugely different than even the period that you were writing about in '9 in the nineteen twenties and thirties?

他们关心这个吗？

Do they care about it?

这是个好问题。

That's a great question.

我认为他们告诉自己他们关心这个问题。

I think that they tell themselves that they care about it.

我最终不确定他们在如何消除不平等这个问题上考虑得有多深入。

I don't know ultimately how thoughtful they are being about how to end inequality.

我认为他们相信以大写C开头的资本主义就是答案。

And I think that they believe that capitalism with a capital c is the answer.

但资本主义和大资本家不是有点不同吗？

But wasn't capitalism and big capitalists a little different?

对此不要过于天真。

Not to be naive about this.

但我读过你的书，没人会为婚礼租下整座威尼斯城。

But I read your book, and nobody rented out the city of Venice for their wedding.

没错。

Right.

无论多么离谱，炫耀性消费的规模都远比现在要小。

The the the conspicuous consumption was infinitely more modest no matter how outlandish.

确实存在过像了不起的盖茨比那样的人物，但这种生活方式的空中楼阁视角远不及今天这般夸张。

Grad the Great Gatsby existed in in in in reality for certain, but this business of the skybox view of life, it was not nearly what it is today.

哦，你觉得那个阶层的人有谁意识到这可能会以某种方式迎来可怕的结局吗？

Oh, I think anybody in that class have any sense that this could come to a terrible end one way or another?

我想他们考虑过这个问题，然后试图不去想它。

I think they think about it and then try not to think about it.

这个嘛...是的。

That I'm being Yeah.

我尽可能对你坦诚相待。

As straight with you as I possibly can.

因为那些甜美的诱惑实在太令人沉醉了。

Because the because the sweet meats are too delicious.

因为他们最终认为消除不平等也意味着他们富裕生活的终结。

Because they ultimately believe that ending inequality is also is an end to to their, potentially, to their an end to their affluence.

尽管大家都在谈论如何把蛋糕做大。

For all the talk about, you know, increasing the size of the pie Yeah.

我想他们也意识到蛋糕可能只有这么大，问题在于谁分到哪一块。

I think they also recognize that there might only be one size of the pie, and who's taking which piece is the question.

但他们没有察觉到怨恨，更不用说仇恨了。

But they don't sense the resentment, much less hatred.

噢，我认为他们...噢，我觉得他们显然明白这种怨恨和仇恨。

Oh, I think that they oh, I think that they they clearly get the resentment and the hatred.

顺便说一句，这些人大多在这方面感到非常孤独。

By the way, most of these people feel very alone in that way.

我看到你从房间角落擦去一滴眼泪。

I see you wiping a tear away from the corner of your room.

没有。

No.

我没有。

I'm not.

我只是...我只是想说，当你想到这些顶层人士时，我认为他们其实很清楚这种怨恨，但我...

I'm just I'm just suggesting that I think of when when you when you think about these these people at the very top, I actually think they're very cognizant of the resentment, but I don't

你觉得他们真的知道吗？

think Are they?

我们可是有美国总统在场呢。

We had the president of The United States Yeah.

刚度过了一个美妙的盖茨比之夜。

Just had a great Gatsby night.

没错。

Right.

这简直就像是在那些他至少假装要捍卫的人脸上抹黑。

It's almost like rubbing it in the face of the people that he at least pretends to be the champion of.

似乎所有人都缺乏自知之明。

There seems to be a lack of self knowledge all around.

某些人已经摆明态度——他们根本不在乎。

Certain certain people have taken a position that they just don't care.

在完成这本书并为之付出如此长久努力后，你心中是否建立起某种关联？

Is there any relationship in your mind after doing this book and working on it for so hard and for so long?

你认为赫伯特·胡佛式的人物与当今任何人——无论是唐纳德·特朗普还是其他人——存在关联吗？

Is there any relationship between a Herbert Hoover figure and anyone now, whether it's Donald Trump or what have you?

嗯，你看。

Well, look.

说来奇怪，赫伯特·胡佛身上确实有些特朗普主义的影子。

Herbert Hoover, oddly, there were sort of Trumpisms about them.

赫伯特·胡佛在1930年实施了关税政策。

Herbert Hoover implemented tariffs in 1930.

嗯。

Mhmm.

《斯姆特-霍利关税法》。

Smooth Hawley tariffs.

他为什么要那么做？

Why did he do that?

因为在1928年竞选总统时，他迫切需要争取农民的选票。

He did that because in 1928, when he was running for president, he was desperate to get farmers to vote for him.

这实际上与特朗普的做法非常相似。

It's actually very similar to what Trump was doing.

你书中一个银行家角色称这种做法愚蠢至极。

And one of your banker characters refers to it as asinine.

愚蠢至极。

As asinine.

他们认为这是个糟糕的主意。

They thought it was a terrible idea.

但1928年他为了争取农民选票时声称要实施关税政策。

But here he was in '28 trying to get the farmers to vote for him, and he says, I'm gonna put tariffs in place.

到了1930年，他认为需要兑现这个承诺。

We get to 1930, and he thinks, I need to make good on the pledge.

最让我着迷的是胡佛与罗斯福之间的权力交接过程。

One of the things that I'm fascinated by is the transition of power between Hoover and Roosevelt.

胡佛在败选后拼命想要拯救银行业。

Hoover desperately, after he lost the election, wanted to rescue the banks.

他想对银行进行纾困。

He wanted to bail out the banks.

他甚至暗中试图与罗斯福沟通，希望对方在就职前协助完成此事。

And he was secretly actually trying to talk to Roosevelt to get him to help him do this before he became the president.

当然，罗斯福不愿与他有任何瓜葛，因为他想彻底划清界限，不愿与这些事情扯上关系。

And, of course, Roosevelt wouldn't have nothing to do with him because he wanted to start with a clean slate and didn't wanna be connected to these things.

我经常思考这个问题，因为回顾2008年的危机，当时从布什到奥巴马的权力交接至关重要。

And I think about that a lot because if you go back and think about the crisis in 2008, there was the transition from Bush to Obama, and it was critical.

事实上，他们能相互沟通并真诚地试图帮助对方，这一点极其重要。

It was actually super important that they were talking to each other and, frankly, trying to help each other.

在这个两极分化的当今世界里，我始终在思考——

And I I continue to wonder in this polarized world that we live in today Oh,

那是有可能的。

that's possible.

如果我们真的再次面临危机并处于权力过渡期，情况会像2008年奥巴马与布什那样，还是会像拜登与特朗普这样？

If in fact we ever get to a crisis and we are in a transition, is it gonna look like 2008, Obama and Bush, or is it gonna look like Biden and Trump?

当前华盛顿政府中负责的当权者是谁？

Who are the responsible people in charge in Washington today in the administration?

你信任谁（如果有的话）？

Who do you have faith in, if any?