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让·李是WhatsApp的第19号员工。
Jean Lee was NGR number 19 at WhatsApp.
她加入时,美国几乎没人听说过WhatsApp,她见证了它成长为四亿五千万用户,并在Facebook以190亿美元收购该公司时,正戴着降噪耳机坐在自己的办公桌前。在今天的对话中,我们将讨论:WhatsApp如何仅凭30名工程师原生开发了八个不同平台;创始人为何多年来拒绝了几乎每一个功能请求;WhatsApp团队如何在没有代码审查、没有每日站会、没有冲刺规划的情况下运作,还有更多内容。
She joined when hardly anyone in The US had heard of it, saw it grow to four fifty million users, and was sitting at her desk with noise cancelling headphones on when news broke that Facebook bought them for $19,000,000,000 In today's conversation we discuss: How WhatsApp built natively eight different platforms with a team of 30 engineers Why the founders said no to almost every feature request for years How WhatsApp's team operated with no code reviews, no stand ups, no sprint planning, and many more.
如果你想了解一个几乎没有任何流程的小团队是如何打造出历史上最成功的产品之一,以及当今的AI原生初创公司还能从他们身上学到什么,这一集就是为你准备的。
If you want to understand how a tiny team with almost no process built one of the most successful products in history and what today's AI native startups can still learn from them, this episode is for you.
本集由Statsig赞助播出,Statsig是一个集功能开关、分析和实验于一体的统一平台。
This episode was presented by Statsig, the unified platform for flags, analytics experiments and more.
请查看节目说明,了解更多关于Statsig以及我们其他资深赞助商Sonar和WorkOS的信息。
Check out the show notes to learn more about them and our other seasoned sponsors Sonar and WorkOS.
让,欢迎来到播客。
Jean, welcome to the podcast.
见到你真是太棒了。
It is amazing to meet you.
你作为WhatsApp的早期工程师,有着非常精彩的故事。
You have quite the story or early engineer at WhatsApp.
但在我们聊WhatsApp之前,你是怎么进入科技行业的呢?
But before we get into WhatsApp, how did you get into tech?
我一直是个小城镇女孩。
I've always been a small town girl.
我爸爸是个元老级的文艺青年。
My dad was an OG hipster.
他特别喜欢酿啤酒。
He was really into brewing beer.
所以他决定去攻读啤酒方向的博士学位。
So he decided to get a PhD in beer.
在啤酒领域?
In beer.
是的。
Yeah.
在酿造方面。
In brewing.
在酿造方面。
In brewing.
在酿造方面。
In brewing.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我在1999年搬到了旧金山,那时我才真正接触到各种科技岗位。
So I moved to San Francisco in 1999 and that's when I got really exposed to all the different tech roles.
比如,小时候我根本没想过工程会是一个职业。
Like, growing up, I didn't really even think about engineering as a job.
当然,我用过电脑,觉得能用雅虎在线搜索东西真的很酷。
Of course, I used computers, and I thought it was really cool to be able to use Yahoo and search things online.
但除此之外,我第一次接触硅谷和科技,是通过在这里生活。
But beyond that, my first exposure to Silicon Valley and tech came from living here.
我认识了很多在科技行业工作的人。
I got to meet a lot of people who work in tech.
我十几岁的时候稍微接触过编程,但并不太认真。
I dabbled around with coding when I was a teenager, but not too seriously.
但我确实觉得,只要写几行代码,它就能一遍又一遍地为你做事,这太酷了。
But I did think it was really cool that you can just write a few lines, and it will just do things for you over and over and over.
这简直像魔法一样。
It was almost magical.
我特别喜欢那种创造出能真正运行的东西的感觉,调试并修复问题,然后它又能重新运行。
I I love the feeling of creating something that that actually runs and debugging something and fixing it and it runs again.
那真的让人非常开心。
That that was really joyous.
但我直到上大学后才真正深入编程。
And I didn't really get into like, super into coding until I went to college.
但我决定从事编程的一个原因是,我跟不同的人聊过。
But one of the reasons why I decided I wanted to go into coding was I talked to different people.
所以我曾想过,也许我想当设计师,也许想当建筑师,也许想当工程师。
So I thought maybe I wanna be a designer, maybe I wanna be an architect, maybe I wanna be an engineer.
我还与一些在业界工作的成年人交谈过。
And I talked to different adults who work in industry.
在与许多成年人交谈后,我意识到,科技行业的人是唯一真正热爱自己工作的人。
After talking to a lot of adults, I realized people who are in tech were the only ones who were really excited about their jobs.
在硅谷,当你问人们‘谈谈你的工作吧’时,他们往往对未来充满希望,并为自己所创造的东西感到自豪,这与我接触的许多其他成年人形成鲜明对比。
So in Silicon Valley, when you ask people like, tell me about your work, people are often very hopeful for the future and very proud of what they're building compared to many other adults that I spoke with.
他们并不那么鼓舞人心,反而会说:‘别去当建筑师。’
They were not so encouraged, and they're like, oh, don't become an architect.
别去当设计师。
Don't become a designer.
这在我早期的职业选择中是一个重要的影响因素。
So that that was one of the influences for me early on.
我在南加州大学主修计算机科学,我的第一次实际编程实习是在一家小公司。
I studied computer science at USC, and one of my first internships, actual like coding internships, was at a small company.
这是一家由南加州大学的一名新毕业生创办的三人初创公司。
It was a three person startup started by one of the new grads from USC.
你可能会明白,那是一个视频分享网站,但并不是像YouTube那样的。
And you'll probably understand, it was a video sharing website, but it was not like YouTube.
但在YouTube占据主导地位之前,曾经有过很多版本的YouTube。
But there were so many versions of YouTube back in the days before what YouTube was dominant.
对吧?
Right?
所以你可能还记得几十个这样的视频分享平台。
So you probably remember dozens of these video sharing platforms.
到处都是。
Were everywhere.
选项太多的一个问题是,你必须访问12个不同的网站来寻找新内容。
And one of the issues of having so many options is that you have to be visiting 12 different sites to search for new things.
所以我们做了一个网站,可以聚合来自不同来源的各种视频,这其实挺讽刺的,因为最近我看到很多AI平台,你可以直接在不同模型之间切换,和那个非常相似。
So we had a website where you can aggregate all the different types of videos from different sources, which is actually kind of funny because lately I've been seeing a lot of AI platforms where you can just switch between the models, very similar to that.
是的。
Yeah.
你是怎么进入IBM的?
How did you get into IBM?
我非常喜欢在一家只有三个人的小初创公司工作,因为我能和工程师们一起工作。
I really loved working for a small three person startup because I got to work with engineers.
我们在中国有海外工程师,所以我有机会和他们合作。
We had engineers overseas in China, so I got to work with them.
我也自己写了一点代码,但主要是撰写设计文档、功能列表,而且很多决策都是我做的。
I got to also do a little bit of coding myself, but I was coming up with the design docs like the the features list, and I was calling a lot of the shots.
我还能直接看到我的代码对网站产生的即时影响。
And I could also directly see the impact of my code immediately on the website.
我觉得这种掌控感、快速响应和可见性非常令人兴奋,因为我能立刻看到自己工作的成果。
And I thought that type of ownership and speed and the visibility was really exciting that I get to see the the impact of my work immediately.
但我希望当时能有更多的指导,因为我们都是刚毕业的新人,在大学里感觉我们只是在盲目尝试,看哪些能行得通。
But one thing I wish I had was a little bit more mentorship because we were all new grads and in college, I felt like we were just shooting things to see which sticks.
我觉得,对于我毕业后的第一份工作,我希望能有更多的指导和培训。
And I thought maybe for my first job out of school, I would like a little bit more mentorship and training.
于是我开始关注更大的公司、更传统的企业,那时我就这样加入了IBM。
And I started looking at more bigger companies, more traditional companies, and that's how I ended up at the time.
它确实是美国最大的公司。
It was literally the biggest company in The US.
你是什么时候决定要离开或尝试其他东西的?
At what point did you decide that you wanted to leave or try out something else?
是你主动做出的决定,还是有什么意外情况发生?
Did you even decide or something just came up?
我之所以想加入一个更有结构的传统公司,是因为我想获得更多的指导和培训。
One of the reasons why I wanted to go to a more traditional company with more structure was so that I could get more mentorship and training.
IBM在这方面非常出色。
And IBM was excellent for that.
那里有这么多资深员工。
There were so many veterans.
他们拥有丰富的经验,并且愿意与我分享,因为他们比我早了二三十年。
They had so much experience, and they were willing to share with me because they were twenty, thirty years ahead of me.
对吧?
Right?
但我真的很怀念小团队的氛围。
But one thing I really missed was the small team environment.
公司实在太大了。
It was just so big.
有很多会议,很多流程,我怀念能看到自己工作的成果。
There was a lot of meetings, a lot of process, and I I missed seeing the impact of my work.
我很难理解自己的工作是如何为公司整体做贡献的。
I couldn't quite understand how my work was contributing to the overall company.
于是我决定休息一段时间,去探索一下,放松一下。
So then I decided to take some time off and explore and have some fun.
是的。
Yeah.
这大概是什么时候的事?
And around what time was this?
那是哪一年?
What year was this?
我2007年开始工作,2009年离开,现在回想起来,我当时真的很勇敢,因为那正是经济低迷时期。
So I started working 2007 and I left by 2009, which was actually in retrospect, I was really brave because it was in the midst of economic downturn.
当时我的想法是,我才22或23岁,就算休一年假,我依然能追得上来,而我也确实做到了。
My thought process at the time was I was only 22 or three and I figured even if I take a year off, I can still catch up, which I did.
那之后发生了什么?
And what happened from there?
你后来是怎么加入WhatsApp的?
How did you eventually get to WhatsApp?
那是好几年以后了。
That was years later.
对吧?
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我休息了一段时间,去尝试了各种不同的课程。
So I took some time off to try out different, like, classes.
我上了很多课。
I took a lot of classes.
我做了一些现在被称为零工的工作,但那时我干过各种各样的活。
I did a little bit of now nowadays, we call it the gig work, but I did all kinds of work.
只要能维持生计,我就去做,同时上这些课、探索,真正弄清楚自己想要什么样的工作环境或职业方向。
So whatever I needed to, you know, make a living while taking all these classes and exploring and really finding out what like, what kind of environment or what kind of career do I envision for myself?
在休完这段假后,我决定重返硅谷,但这次我想加入一家初创公司。
And after I took those time off, I decided that I wanna go back to Silicon Valley, but this time, I do want to work for a startup.
但我想找一些更有经验的人,不是刚毕业的新人,也不是只有三个人的初创团队,而是一家稍微稳定一点的初创公司,这样我既能获得工作的自主权和影响力,也能得到一些指导,毕竟我当时才二十多岁。
But maybe with people who are a little bit more experienced, maybe not new grads, and maybe not a three person startup, but a little bit more stable startup where I can possibly get both the autonomy and the impact of the work, but also a little bit more mentoring because I was still in my twenties.
好的。
Okay.
那你是怎么找到这家公司的,当然,它就是WhatsApp?
So how did you find this startup, which of course happened to be WhatsApp?
2012年。
In 2012.
那时WhatsApp还处于早期阶段。
WhatsApp was still early.
他们2009年成立,当时已经有大量用户,但主要集中在欧洲和印度。
They started in 2009 and they did still have a lot of users, but they're mostly in Europe and in India.
在美国,他们并不太出名。
They were not very known in America.
那你那时候用WhatsApp吗?
Were you a WhatsApp user back then?
我没用,但我的妻子和她的朋友们用,或者那时候是我的女朋友。
I was not, but my my wife and her friends were or or back then my, you know, my my girlfriend.
但我的一些朋友偶尔也会用。
But so some of my friends were using it on and off.
当时它在欧洲已经开始流行了。
It was kind of starting to be big in Europe.
那时还没有那么庞大。
It wasn't as massive just yet.
没错。
Exactly.
我很幸运,因为在搬来这里之前,我曾在纽约住过一段时间,而纽约的很多人当时都在使用它,因为那里是个国际枢纽。
I was lucky because I I actually lived in New York for a little before moving here, and a lot of people in New York were using it because it's an international hub.
所以我过去确实用过这个产品,而且我在领英上看到了这份职位招聘信息。
So I I had used the prod product in the past, and I saw the job posting on LinkedIn.
然后你就申请了?
And then you applied?
面试怎么样?
What was the interview like?
我觉得我们直到很晚很晚,直到开始招聘实习生和应届毕业生时,才进行过代码测试。
I don't think we did any leak code until way way later, until when we started hiring interns and new grads.
大部分面试都是围绕系统设计展开的。
Most of the interviews were talking about I I guess you can call it system design interviews.
我们会讨论‘你会如何设计这个?’
We we would talk about how would you design this?
你会如何设计那个?
How would you design that?
比如,谈谈你过去开发这个产品的经验。
Like, tell me about your past experience building this product.
我记得我和简聊过不同的即时通讯应用。
And I recall talking to Jan about different messaging apps.
作为韩国人,我跟他讲了很多关于KakaoTalk以及它是如何运作的。
And being Korean, I told him a lot about KakaoTalk and how it worked.
是的,那就是我的面试。
Yeah, that was my interview.
就这样,你就拿到了offer,我猜这是家初创公司,对吧?事情进展很快,我猜offer来得很快,然后你得马上做决定,对吧?
Just like that, you you got an offer, I guess it's startup, right, things move fast, like, I assume it must have been quick turnaround offer and then you have to decide, right?
你是怎么决定加入这家相对不为人知的初创公司的?它在开发一些你觉得挺酷的即时通讯产品,但关于它却没什么信息。
How did you decide that you're gonna join this relatively unknown startup that is building some cool messaging that you kind of thought was cool but there wasn't much information about that.
事实上,当时他们的Glassdoor评分我记得只有一颗星。
In fact, their Glassdoor rating at the time, I remember, had a one star.
只有一条评价,一颗星,有人写说不喜欢在这里工作,或者也不知道那是不是真正的员工,但那就是你的Glassdoor评分。
It had one review, one star, someone saying, I don't like working here or who knows if that was even a real employee, but that was your Glassdoor.
哦,这太有趣了。
Oh, that's so interesting.
我不记得查过。
I don't remember looking up.
我肯定查过Glassdoor,但我真的很幸运,因为我其实还有另一家公司的offer,但他们那边有点慢。
I must have looked up Glassdoor, but like I was really lucky because I actually had another offer from a different company, but they were a little bit sore.
有一家公司花了好几个星期才给让发offer信。
One company was taking weeks to get Jean an offer letter.
另一位创始人第二天就亲自敲定了协议。
Another founder closed the deal in person the very next day.
速度很重要,这不仅体现在招聘上。
Speed matters and not just in hiring.
这自然引出了我们经验丰富的赞助商WorkOS。
This leads us nicely to our seasoned sponsor, WorkOS.
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而一旦发生这种情况,需求就会发生变化。
And in the moment that happens, the requirements change.
客户在部署之前,希望拥有单点登录、SCIM、审计日志和细粒度权限。
Customers want SSO, SCIM, audit logs and granular permissions before they'll deploy.
自己构建这些基础设施需要数月时间。
Building that infrastructure yourself takes months.
WorkOS为您提供API,让您在几天内即可上线。
WorkOS gives you APIs to ship it in days.
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避免重新构建,持续交付。
Skip the rebuild, keep shipping.
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现在让我们回到让和另一家公司为何无法像 WhatsApp 那样迅速给她书面offer的问题上。
And now let's get back to Jean and how that other company could not get her written offer as quickly as WhatsApp did.
那不是一家初创公司,他们说:‘嘿,我已经口头通知你了,很快就会给你书面offer。’
It was not a startup and they said oh hey like you have my verbal offer I am going to give you a written offer soon.
但后来拖了很久,与此同时,简在面试几天后给我打了电话,说:‘今天或明天就来办公室吧。’
But then it took them a while and meanwhile, Jan called me few days later after the interview and he said, come into the office right like today or tomorrow.
是的。
Yeah.
然后他问我:‘要怎样你才会现在就接受这个offer?’
And then he asked me, what would it take for you to take the offer right now?
太棒了。
Love it.
你当时怎么说的?
What did you say?
我的意思是,我也没指望那么多。
I mean, I wasn't looking for that much.
我的意思是,我当时才二十多岁。
I mean, I was in my twenties.
所以我只是告诉他们,我想要的几样东西,然后说,好,我接受这个offer。
So I just told them, oh, like, few things I would like to have and sure, I'll take the offer.
我第二天就签了offer。
And I signed the offer the following day.
我确实收到了另一家公司的回音。
And I did actually hear back from the other company.
我刚去WhatsApp上班的第一天,他们给我打了电话,我说,哦,我刚加入一家新公司。
On the first day I started WhatsApp, they called me and I was like, oh, I just started a new company.
对。
Right.
就这样。
That's it.
对于初创公司,你要行动迅速,否则就别惊讶。
With startups, you move faster or otherwise don't be surprised.
所以你是工程师,还是WhatsApp的第19号员工?
So you were engineer or you were employee number 19 at WhatsApp.
对吧?
Right?
我是第19号工程师。
I was engineer number 19.
WhatsApp的第19号工程师。
Engineer number 19 at at at WhatsApp.
你之前告诉我一件很有趣的事,说你虽然是那时候已经二十多岁了,但仍然是最年轻的。
And you told me something really interesting that you were the youngest person even though you were like by this time at your mid mid twenties or or so.
我确实想过这个问题。
I thought about that.
我记得当时大概有四个人不到三十岁。
So I recall there were about four of us under the age of 30.
所以我不是那个年轻的新员工,但有两个刚毕业的人。
So I was not the young guest, but there were two people who were new grads.
然后我和另外一个人都是二十多岁快三十了。
And then myself and one other person who were in our late twenties.
但当时有大约十五个人年龄超过三十岁。
But there are like 15 or so people above 30
刚开始的时候。
at the start
这简直闻所未闻。
of, which is kind of unheard.
你认为为什么会这样?
Why do you think this was?
这太有意思了。
This is so interesting.
确实如此。
That is true.
现在这还罕见吗?
Is it still rare nowadays?
好问题。
Good question.
我觉得现在可能没那么罕见了。
I think these days it might not be as rare, by the way.
我也这么认为,因为我读过一些投资者的统计数据,他们发现,在评估初创公司成功率时,年长的创始人往往表现更好。
I think so because I think I read some kind of statistics from investors that actually when they look at the success rates of startups, they found that older founders tend to do better.
是的。
Yeah.
还有WhatsApp,你知道的,Jan和Brian,他们是在三十多岁的时候才创办的,之前已经在雅虎和其他公司工作了十多年。
And and then WhatsApp, guess, you know, like, Jan and Brian, they they started this at, like, mid thirties or so after they spent, like, more than a decade working at Yahoo and other places.
没错。
Exactly.
对。
Yep.
所以,我猜他们一定能够利用自己的人脉来招聘之类的人。
So, I guess they must have been able to hire, like, their network and whatnot.
是的。
Yeah.
前十几位工程师中,很多人来自雅虎。
The first 10 or so engineers, a lot of them came from Yahoo.
有些人来自欧洲。
Some came from Europe.
你提到了简联系你的那个故事。
You mentioned the story when Jan reached out to you.
简以前经常这么做。
Jan used to do that.
他会直接查找这个领域的专家,然后联系他们,我们在欧洲有很多外包人员。
He would just look up who is the expert in this field and reach out to people and we had a lot of contractors in Europe.
然后我们还有一些人,主要是通过个人关系,比如来自斯坦福,因为布赖恩上过斯坦福。
And then we had some, like, mostly from personal connection like from Stanford because Brian went to Stanford.
后来我们还通过红杉资本获得了些推荐,因为他们投资了WhatsApp。
And then we had some referrals from Sequoia because they invested in WhatsApp.
这太有趣了,因为咱们建立联系的方式其实是我们都认识Jan,我的意思是,你和他共事过,而我六个多月前,也就是你加入WhatsApp之前,也收到过他发来的一封邮件,他说:嘿,我和我兄弟当时一起开发了一个Windows Phone应用,叫Cocktail Flow,那是个非常漂亮的Windows Phone应用,上面还标注着‘职业机会’。
This is fascinating because the way we connected actually is is both of us know Jan, I mean, you've worked with him but I I had an email in my inbox from him, I think six months before you joined WhatsApp where I got a message from him saying, hey, I built a Windows Phone app at the time together with my brother, called Cocktail Flow and it was a beautiful Windows Phone app and it was labelled Career Opportunity.
所以你的意思是,存在另一种可能性:如果我当时回复说‘我很感兴趣’,回头想想,如果创始人主动联系你,你至少应该和他们聊一聊,别犯我当时的错误——直接回一句‘抱歉,我太忙了’。
So, what you're saying is there's a alternative timeline where if I said like, yes, I'm interested, which in hindsight, if a founder reaches out, you probably should at least talk to them, don't make the mistake that I did, which is just saying like, I'm sorry, I'm busy.
我本可能成为来自欧洲的外包人员,听起来这确实是一种策略,而且是个聪明的策略。
I might have been a contractor from Europe, so like, sounds like that that was a strategy and that was a smart strategy.
是的。
Yeah.
我们在欧洲有很多外包人员,他们都是经验非常丰富的人。
We had many contractors in Europe and they were all very experienced people.
他们基本上都能自我管理。
They were basically managing themselves.
我们全球各地都有人和我们合作。
We had people all over the world working with us.
WhatsApp 的技术栈是什么样的?
What was a tech stack like at WhatsApp?
在 Jean 带我们了解创业史上最具特色的技术栈之前,我们先聊聊八个平台和寥寥数名工程师。
Before Jean walks us through one of the most unusual tech stacks in startup history, we're talking about eight platforms and a handful of engineers.
让我们谈谈如何在高级赞助商 Sonar 的帮助下保持代码库的健康。
Let's talk about keeping your codebase healthy with our senior sponsor Sonar.
Sonar 是 SonarQube 的开发者,它能帮助你自动化代码审查,验证整个技术栈中代码的质量与安全性,确保无论你有一个平台还是八个平台,都不会有漏洞进入生产环境。
Sonar, the makers of SonarQube, helps you automate code review and verify the quality and security of your code across your entire stack so bugs don't make it to production whether you've got one platform or eight.
随着代理在开发流程中扮演越来越重要的角色,Sonar 推出了以代理为中心的开发周期框架,这是一种专为人工智能生成代码的独特规模与速度设计的新软件开发方法论。
As agents take over the development process, Sonar has introduced the agent centric development cycle framework a new software development methodology designed for the unique scale and speed of AI generated code.
这是一种迈向更明确的四阶段循环的转变,为代理提供真正需要的约束机制。
It's a move towards a more intentional four stage loop that gives agents the guardrails they actually need.
四个阶段分别是:先引导,代理需要理解它们被要求创作的环境,以确保输出符合开发者和组织的需求。
The four phases being: Guide First, agents need to understand the canvas on which they are being asked to create so that the output fits with what the developer and organization require.
生成,基于大语言模型的工具会生成它认为能在正确上下文中实现预期结果的代码。
Generate The LLM based tool generates the code it believes will achieve the desired outcome within the right context.
验证。
Verify.
接下来,代理被明确要求检查其工作,以确保它真正实现了预期的结果,并且可靠、可维护且安全。
Next, the agent is deliberately required to check its work, ensuring that it actually achieves the desired outcomes and is reliable, maintainable and secure.
解决。
Solve.
最后,任何发现的问题都会交给代码修复代理进行修复。
Finally, any issues identified are provided to a code repair agent to fix.
为了支持这一流程,Sonar 显著增强了其产品功能,推出了如 Sonar 上下文增强、SonarQube 代理分析、SonarQube 架构和 SonarQube 修复代理等功能。
To power this, Sonar has significantly strengthened its offering, introducing products and capabilities like Sonar context augmentation, SonarQube agentic analysis, SonarQube architecture, and SonarQube remediation agent.
前往 sonarsource.com/pragmatic 了解 Sonar 的最新动态,以及它如何帮助组织拥抱代理时代。
Head to sonarsource.com/pragmatic to learn more about the latest with Sonar and how it's empowering organizations to embrace the agentic era.
好了,现在让我们回到 Jean,聊聊 WhatsApp 所使用的各种技术栈。
And with this, let's get back to Jean and all the different tech stacks that WhatsApp had.
我们实际上非常独特。
We were actually pretty unique.
我不认为任何初创公司真的会这么做,但我们有七个不同的技术栈。
I don't think any startup ever really does this, but we had seven different stacks.
我其实去查了一下,因为很难把它们全部数清楚。
We had I actually looked it up because it's hard count them all.
我们当然有,每个人都有iPhone和Android。
We had of course, everybody has iPhone and Android.
但我们还有黑莓和Windows Phone,这也很常见。
But we also had BlackBerry and Windows Phone, which is also pretty common.
但我们还有诺基亚S40和S60。
But we also had Nokia s 40, s 60.
我们曾经用过一个叫KaiOS的东西,但时间不长,还有网页客户端。
We had a thing called KaiOS for a while, but not for a long time, and we had the web client.
所以实际上是八个。
So it's actually eight.
所以你当然知道,iOS当时是用Objective C,Android早期是Java,而黑莓、诺基亚这些平台,我记得诺基亚用的是Symbian C++,每个平台都有自己的不同语言。
So so you have, of course, you know, we know that iOS is Objective C, Android was Java back in the day, and all of these like the BlackBerry, the Nokia, they all had, I think it's Nokia with Symbian C plus plus they all had like their own different language.
我们还没聊到后端,对吧?
And then we've not talked about the backend, right?
后端用的是Erlang。
And the backend was Erlang.
Erlang。
Erlang.
你能给我们讲讲Erlang吗?
Can you tell us about Erlang?
因为这确实是最奇特的技术栈之一。
Because this that is one of the most exotic tech stack.
我以前听说Erlang在电信领域,比如爱立信,欧洲的电信公司用得比较多,但说到初创公司,我不确定是否还听过其他人在用Erlang。
I've heard Erlang in telecommunications context at Ericsson, again, in Europe, it is popular with the telcos, but startup wise, I'm not sure I heard anyone else use Erlang.
你可能是对的。
You you might be right.
他们确实举办过Erlang大会。
They do have a Erlang conference.
我觉得它叫 Erlang Factory。
I think it's called Erlang Factory.
我们的一位工程师 Rick Reed 做了一场非常精彩的演讲,如果你有兴趣了解更多的话。
There's a really great talk by one of our engineers, Rick Reed, if you're interested in learning more about it.
我们会把链接放到节目笔记里。
We'll we'll link it in the show notes
我相当确定它还在 YouTube 上。
I'm I'm pretty sure it's still on YouTube.
我最近没去查过。
I haven't looked up recently.
但他做了一场非常精彩的演讲,讲述了他们为什么选择使用 Erlang,而这正是完美的选择。
But he gave a really great talk about why they started working with Erlang and it was the perfect choice.
他把它形容为在飞机飞行时持续不断地维护引擎,24/7 不停歇。
And he describes it as trying to maintain the engine of an airplane while it's flying twenty four seven.
因为你可以想象,WhatsApp 是全球性的服务,我们根本无法停机。
Because if you imagine, like, WhatsApp is so international, we can't take a break.
对吧?
Right?
我们必须持续运行,而且总是很忙。
We have to continuously keep running and it's always busy.
世界上某个地方现在是早上8点。
If someone's it's 8AM somewhere in the world.
对吧?
Right?
Erlang 是一种非常稳健的语言,特别擅长并发处理。
And Erlang was a really robust language that was really good at concurrency.
他们偶然发现了它,因为当时他们在使用另一个工具,而这个工具恰好使用了 Erlang,于是决定这正是完美的语言。
They stumbled upon it because they were using this other tool that happened to use Erlang and decided this is the perfect language.
我认为 WhatsApp 的核心工程挑战是什么?
And I guess at the core of WhatsApp, what was the core engineering challenge?
是像海量消息不断涌入,需要被分发到不同平台这样的问题吗?
Was it like so many messages being kind of coming in, needing to be seeded out and sent to different, you know, platforms?
是的。
Yeah.
那确实是主要挑战之一,比如在新年或圣诞节期间。
That was one of the main challenges, like, for example, for New Year's or Christmas.
因为每个人都在同一时刻说新年快乐,这每年都是我们最大的挑战,我们会庆祝——嘿,我们在新年之后没有宕机。
Because everyone's saying Happy New Year at the exact same moment, that was always our big biggest challenges every year and we would celebrate, hey, we didn't we didn't go down after New Year's.
关于七个不同的移动平台,有趣的是,之前和之后的普遍看法都是:如果你想支持所有这些平台,别傻了,做跨平台吧,要么自己构建一个跨平台层,要么用各种框架。为什么WhatsApp没有这么做?
The interesting thing about the seven different mobile platforms specifically is the conventional wisdom before and after has been like, if you want to support all those platforms, don't be silly, do cross platform, either build your own layer that is cross platform or use, you know, there's all sorts of frameworks, Why did WhatsApp not do this?
你还记得当时讨论过为什么雇用七支团队吗?包括一些很难招聘的人才,比如为诺基亚和塞班系统工作的团队,你还提到了欧洲的外包人员,听起来简直是一场噩梦。
Do you remember the discussions of like why why hire seven including some really hard to hire people like for Nokia and Symbian and you mentioned the contractors in Europe, I mean, sounds a bit of a nightmare.
为什么?
Why?
所以,简总是说:我希望一位住在偏远乡村的奶奶也能用上我们的应用。
So, Jan used to always say, I want a grandma in a remote countryside to be able to use our app.
那这意味着什么?
So what does that mean?
他们可能没有最新的iPhone,也没有内存最大、最闪亮的手机,对吧?
They may not have the newest iPhone, the shiniest phone with the biggest memory, right?
在乡下,奶奶用这款应用时,你需要应用轻量、能在任何设备上运行,并且界面简单。
In the countryside where a grandma is using it, you need the app to be lightweight, you need it to work on any kind of device, and you need the app to be simple.
所以这些就是我们的目标和优先级,也正是这些考量促使我们决定开发七个不同的平台。
So those were our goals and priorities and that's the thought process that went into our decision to build seven different platforms.
那么在WhatsApp内部,你们是怎么把事情推进的?
And then inside WhatsApp, how did you get things done?
你还记得项目是怎么完成的吗?当时的项目概念是什么样的?工程师们遵循了哪些流程?尤其是后来你去了Meta,和一般初创公司相比,情况有什么不同?
Do you remember, like, how a project got done or what was the concept of projects and kind of what engineering processes people might have followed, especially, you know, later you worked at Meta compared to, like, how, you know, like more kind of, you know, standard startups work.
因为我感觉WhatsApp根本不是一家普通的初创公司,对吧?
Because I have a feeling WhatsApp was not exactly a standard startup, was it?
不是。
Not really.
即使是和Meta其他部门相比,尤其是在我待的那段时间,我们也非常务实,比如很少写文档。
Even Meta compared to other big tech, especially when I was at Meta, pretty scrappy, like not so much on writing documents, for example.
快速迭代、打破常规的口号在一定程度上让他们的流程更加精简,至少在我任职期间是这样。
The move fast and break things motto kind of allowed them to be a little bit more lean in terms of their process, at least while I was there.
但WhatsApp才是真正极致精简的公司。
But WhatsApp was like the ultimate lean company.
当我们被收购时,只有二十多名工程师,不到30人就服务了4.5亿月活跃用户。
By the time we were acquired, we only had 20 something engineers, so under 30 people serving 450,000,000 monthly active users.
所以我们没有代码审查。
So we didn't have code reviews.
我第一次提交代码时才被审查过。
The only time I got my code reviewed was the first time I made a commit.
Brian在我提交前要求看一下,他问了我一堆问题,我得认真思考,就像一场编程面试。
Brian asked to take a look at it before I committed it, and he asked me a bunch of questions, which I had to think through a lot, like a kinda like a coding interview.
但就只有那一次。
But that that was it.
第一次之后,我们就真的没有正式的代码审查了。
After the first time, we didn't really have a formal code review.
但我的意思是,人们会阅读 Git 提交记录,因为只有三十名工程师,所以你可以阅读别人的代码,他们还会在 WhatsApp 群组里讨论。
But, I mean, people read the git commits because there's only 30 engineers so you can read other people's code and they would discuss it on the WhatsApp groups.
所以每个人都被信任,所有工程师直接将代码推送到生产环境,无需经理审核,大家相信如果他们有疑问,自然会主动询问。
So everyone was trusted, all engineers that they just pushed their code to, they merged it into production, pushed it to production without a manager review and it was trusted that, you know, they would ask if they were unsure or something like that.
没错。
Exactly.
明白了。
Okay.
而且它确实有效。
And it worked.
它确实有效。
It worked.
那发布流程呢?
What about the release process?
如果你告诉我有四亿五千万用户,我第一反应就是:你们有没有做灰度发布?
Like, if if if you tell me four fifty million people, the first thing I'm gonna say is like, okay, did you do canarying?
你们用了功能开关吗?
Did you do feature flagging?
你们做过实验吗?
Did you do experiments?
你们有什么样的安全措施吗?
Did you do you know, what kind of safety nets did you have?
对吧?
Right?
我们没怎么用那些,但我们非常重视内部使用。
We didn't do much of that, but we were really big on dogfooding.
每次要发布时,我们都会自己内部先用起来。
So every time we were about to do a release, we would all internally use it ourselves.
Jan,我想他现在可能还在领英上这么说。
Jan, I think he might still say it on his LinkedIn.
如果你搜索Jan,他会说自己是质量工程师。
If you look up Jan, he said just quality engineer.
他的头衔是首席QA官,当时他给我发消息,因为我根本不知道谁是CEO。
His title, when he messaged me because I didn't know who was CEO, it said chief QA officer.
QA官。
QA officer.
我不知道那是什么意思,还以为是外面人开的奇怪玩笑。
I didn't know what that meant, I thought it was some sort of weird joke from the outside.
现在我明白了。
So now it makes sense.
所以他到处走动,确保一切正常运行。
So he he he was going around, he was making sure that it it worked.
他会尽可能地尝试破坏系统。
He would try to break things as much as he can.
如果他发现了bug,就会拼命地去进一步破坏它,然后来找你说:嘿,我发现了这个bug。
And then if he finds a bug, he will, like, really try to break it and then he'll come to you and say, hey, I found this bug.
你还说,Jan经常说‘不’。
And you also said that Jan said no a lot.
我记得他几乎每次都拒绝,99%的时间都是说不,当时作为一名年轻工程师,我非常困惑,因为那时候你看其他所有应用,都有十几种不同的聊天应用。
He did say no almost as I recall 99% of the time he would say no, which I thought as a again, as a young engineer, I was very confused because when you look at all these other apps, there were like dozen different messaging apps at the time.
比如微信,以功能繁多而闻名。
Like WeChat is notorious for having everything.
对吧?
Right?
它们有太多功能了。
They have so many features.
我特别困惑,为什么我们不开发所有这些功能呢?
And I was so confused, like, why don't we build all these features?
这些是最新的、最酷的功能,我们本该有的,因为在我加入时,我们还没有群组功能。
These are the newest, coolest things that we should have because at the time when I joined, we didn't have groups.
我加入后不久,我们就推出了群组功能。
We launched groups shortly after I joined.
我们也没有语音通话和视频通话。
We didn't have voice calls, video calls.
我们当时根本没有那些所谓的‘不行’的故事,你知道的。
We didn't have any of the no stories, you know.
在我眼里,所有那些酷炫的功能都缺失了,但这是有意为之,因为我们真的希望优先保证——哪怕是一个偏远小镇的奶奶,也能随时顺利使用我们的应用。
All the cool features were missing in my mind, but that was by design because we really wanted to prioritize, again, the quality of a grandma in a remote town being able to use our app at any given time.
WhatsApp 多年来一直克制功能的添加,直到他们对质量绝对有把握。
WhatsApp held back features for years until they were absolutely sure about quality.
他们在推出视频通话功能之前,已经长期投入研发。
They worked on video calling long before they shipped it.
这让我们很自然地引出我们的赞助商——Statsig。
This leads us nicely to our presenting sponsor, Statsig.
今天,你不必在速度和信心之间做取舍。
Today, you don't have to choose between speed and confidence.
Statsig 让你可以将功能置于开关之后,用真实用户进行实验,只有当数据表明你已准备好时,才全面上线。
Statsig lets you shift features behind flags, experiment with real users, and only roll out broadly when data shows that you're ready.
以下是它在实际中的运作方式。
Here's what it looks like in practice.
你通过功能开关发布一个变更,最初只向1%或10%的用户逐步推送。
You ship a change behind a feature gate and you roll out gradually say to 1% or 10% of users at first.
你观察会发生什么。
You watch what happens.
不仅仅是是否崩溃,而是它对你们关心的指标产生了什么影响?
Not just did it crash, but what did it do to the metrics you care about?
转化率、留存率、错误率、延迟。
Conversion, retention, error rates, latency.
如果发现异常,你可以迅速关闭它。
If something looks off, you turn it off quickly.
如果趋势良好,你就继续推进。
If it's trending the right way, you keep rolling it forward.
关键在于,测量已经融入了工作流程中。
And the key is how the measurement is part of the workflow.
你不需要在三个工具之间来回切换,事后才试图匹配用户分组和仪表盘。
You're not switching between three tools and trying to match up segments and dashboards after the fact.
功能开关、实验和分析都集中在一个地方,使用相同的底层用户分配和数据。
Feature flags, experiments and analytics are in one place using the same underlying user assignments and data.
这就是像Notion、Brex和Atlassian这样的公司团队使用Statsig的原因。
This is why teams at companies like Notion, Brex and Atlassian use Statsig.
Statsig提供慷慨的免费套餐供新手起步,团队的专业定价从每月150美元起。
Statsig has a generous free tier to get started and pro pricing for teams starts at $150 per month.
要了解更多信息并获取三十天的企业版试用,请访问 statsig.com/pragmatic。
To learn more and get a thirty day enterprise trial, go to statsig.com/pragmatic.
好了,让我们回到Jean和WhatsApp团队如何在几乎没有任何正式流程的情况下交付高质量代码的话题。
With this, let's get back to how Jean and the WhatsApp team ship quality code with close to zero formal processes.
听起来WhatsApp的流程非常非常少。
It sounds like WhatsApp had very very little process.
这非常有趣,因为当我还在Skype工作时,你加入WhatsApp的同时,我也在2013年加入了Skype,而你是在2012年加入WhatsApp的。
This was very very interesting because when I worked at Skype, at the same time as you joined WhatsApp and I also joined in 2013, I joined Skype and you joined WhatsApp in 2012.
Skype非常自豪地让每个人都参加了Scrum培训。
Skype was very proud that they sent everyone to Scrum training.
我是一名Scrum主管,其他人也是Scrum主管。
I was a Scrum master, other people were Scrum masters.
所以我们这边有全套的Scrum、顾问和各种流程,而WhatsApp却用小得多的团队,没有Scrum,没有TDD,就这样打败了我们,这就是Skype。
So, here we were with all the Scrum, all the consultants, all the everything and WhatsApp Al competed us with like a lot smaller team and no Scrum, no TDD, no Okay, that's Skype.
一千名工程师。
1,000 engineers.
哇。
Wow.
这么多人啊。
That's a lot of people.
是的。
Yep.
我的意思是,当你有一千人的时候,你确实需要这些流程。
I mean, when you have a thousand people, you kinda need these.
对。
Yeah.
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而且公平地说,Scrum 这套方法在一定程度上解决了一个问题:我们当时有超过一百个团队,每个人都在做不同的事情,而通过这种组织方式,我们有了一个优先级列表,明确了哪些团队最重要,这些团队因此获得了全部支持。
And and in all fairness, like, example, one thing that this whole Scrum thing solved for a little bit is we had more more than 100 teams and everyone was working on different things and because of all this organization, we we had a prioritized list of which teams are the most important and those got all the support.
所以我想,其中一个教训是,当你规模变大时,想要快速推进会变得极其困难,而一个小团队反而能超越你。
So I I guess, one lesson might be that when you're just big, it's just so much harder to move fast and a small team can outcompete you.
是的。
Yeah.
仅仅是和所有人沟通,就要花上很长的时间。
It just takes a long time even just to communicate with everyone.
在 WhatsApp 内部,看到这种巨大的增长,你感觉如何?
Being inside of WhatsApp, how did it feel to see this massive growth?
不是指你的团队规模,而是产品的使用量、用户、媒体和反馈这些方面。
Not in your team size, but but in the product usage, the, you know, the people, the media, the feedback.
我们几乎没有媒体报道。
We didn't have much media.
根本没人知道 WhatsApp。
Like nobody knew about WhatsApp.
你之前跟我提到过办公室里有倒计时显示屏,这很有趣。
One interesting thing you told me about the office is you have countdown displays.
你能跟我讲讲这些吗?
Can you tell me about them?
这些倒计时屏是什么东西?
What were these?
它们显示的是什么内容?
What did it display?
是的。
Yeah.
你问了我很多关于指标的问题,但说实话,我们其实不太关注媒体、Skype的使用数据或者其他即时通讯应用的使用数据。
So you you asked me a lot about metrics and I think the really the only metrics we track, like, didn't really pay too much attention to media or Skype's usage numbers or other messaging apps usage numbers.
但我们唯一进行倒计时的指标是自上次服务中断以来的天数,比如已经连续多少天没有宕机了。
But the one metric we counted down was number of days, like x number of days since the last outage.
哇。
Wow.
没有压力。
No pressure.
不过,随着时间推移,这些数字开始上升。
Well, the numbers started to go up over time.
也许正是因为它们醒目地展示在那里,才起到了作用。
Maybe that helped to have it visibly there.
一旦发生中断,你还记得之后发生了什么吗?
And when an outage happened, do you remember what happened after?
因为现在在科技行业,出了故障后都讲究无责复盘:一旦发生中断,我们首先先解决它,然后聚在一起,写一份文档,尽量不去追究是谁的代码导致了问题,而是深入分析系统为什么会这样等等。
Because these days in the tech industry, it's all about blameless postmortems, if an outage happens, you know, we first mitigate it, then we get together, then we write a document where we try really hard to not say who push caused this, but we come up with why the system is like this and so on.
你们当时是怎么处理中断事件的?又是如何跟进,确保它们不会再发生的?
How did you go about, like, dealing with outages and also following up and ensuring that they don't they won't happen again?
我知道他们会在服务器群聊里讨论这些事,但我没在服务器群聊里,所以我不太能确定。
So they, I know they did these discussions in the server group chats, but I wasn't in the server group chat, so I can't really say for sure.
当然,我们肯定没有留下任何文档。
I mean, for sure we did not have documentations.
听起来很多事情都相当简单。
It sounds like a lot of things were pretty simple.
你和人们交流,如果有问题,就去解决它。
You talk with people, if you have a problem, you try to fix it.
不要无端地过度文档化,这样似乎就能顺利运行。
Don't over document things for no reason and it seems to just work.
然后关键的一点是,比如如果你公布自上次中断以来的天数,人们就会明白:好吧,我应该尽我所能避免中断。
And then have the key thing like if, I guess if you put out days since since outage, people will know like, okay, I should do what I can to not have an outage.
每个人都知道谁在做什么,所以我们不需要责怪任何人。
And everybody knew exactly who was working on what, so we didn't have to blame anyone.
每个人都心知肚明。
Everyone just knew.
WhatsApp取得了巨大的成功。
WhatsApp was a massive success.
你认为是什么让WhatsApp在早期,尤其是产品本身上如此成功?
What do you think made it so successful in the early years especially for the product itself?
你了解过Kakao,也知道一些其他竞争性的聊天应用。
You've seen Kakao, you were aware of some of the competing messaging app.
WhatsApp 做了哪些其他应用没有做的事情?
What did WhatsApp do that others did not?
有一点网络效应的存在。
There is a little bit of the networking effect.
聊天应用的特点是,如果你在用,你需要你的朋友也用;而如果你的朋友在用,你就必须用。
The thing about messaging app is that if you use it, you need your friends to use it and if your friends use it, you need to use it.
WhatsApp 是第一个进入市场的。
And WhatsApp was the first to be on the market.
这当然有帮助,但当时竞争非常激烈。
That certainly helped, but there was a lot of competition.
但我觉得,其他很多应用和聊天软件都在追逐功能,想着添加最炫酷、最新的功能,而 WhatsApp 却非常有意识地保持简洁。
But again, I think a lot of other apps and messaging apps were chasing features, thinking about adding the the shiniest, newest features, whereas WhatsApp was very intentional.
他们实际上花了很长时间来开发视频通话功能。
They actually worked on video calling for a very long time.
在你加入Skype时,你们的创始人说我们已经有了视频功能,那时我们可能已经在开发它了。
We were probably working on it by the time you joined Skype when your founder said we have video.
我们确实在开发它,但我们直到对这项功能的质量100%有信心后,才迟迟推出。
We were working on it, but we just didn't launch it until much later when we were actually like 100% sure about the quality of the the feature.
因此,我们经常把功能保留到自己感觉真正成熟后再发布。
So we often held onto features until we felt really short before launching them.
这很有趣,因为这与常规建议略有不同,常规建议是:作为初创公司,要尽早发布,获取反馈,不断改进和迭代。
Interesting because that is a little bit of a different than the conventional advice, which is if you're a startup, launch early, get feedback, improve it and iterate it.
听起来你们的做法恰恰相反。
It sounds like you did the opposite.
就像是先打磨好,等到你完全确信后再推出。
It's like polish it and then do when you have full conviction.
是的。
Yeah.
我们内部其实一直在使用它。
We did use it internally.
在内部,我们用语音和视频通话功能与家人联系。
Internally, we used the voice and the video calling features with our families.
所以我们有一份名单。
So we had like a list.
好的。
Okay.
比如,我有一些家人。
Like, I have family members.
这些都是我父母、兄弟和姐妹的电话号码。
These are all my my parents and my brother and sister's numbers.
我们为这个测试群体启用功能,并在向公众发布之前长期使用它。
Let's enable it for this beta group and we used it for a very long time before we launched it with the public.
在WhatsApp工作两年后,2014年,Facebook宣布了有史以来最大的一笔收购——以190亿美元收购WhatsApp。
Two years into working at WhatsApp, in 2014 Facebook announces their biggest ever acquisition, WhatsApp, for $19,000,000,000.
你对这段时期有什么印象?
What do you remember of this time?
这件事有多出人意料?当时你和你的团队感受到了什么样的情绪?
How unexpected was it and what what kind of feelings, what kind of emotions went through you and the team around you?
收购发生后不久,我就开始写日记,所以我翻看了2014年那时的日记。
I actually journaled soon after the acquisition, so I looked up my journal around this time 2014.
已经过去十多年了。
So it's been over ten years.
但我翻看日记时,记得我当时正在写代码。
But I looked at my journal and I remember I was coding.
我戴着降噪耳机,播放着一个Spotify歌单。
I had this Spotify playlist with noise cancelling headphones.
我有一个叫‘让我思考’的歌单。
I had this playlist called Let Me Think.
当我需要专注时,我就听这个歌单。
This is the one I I listen to when I wanna focus.
而且,我们当时在一个很小的办公室里,我能看见一切。
And again, like, we were in a pretty small office where I can see everything.
我坐在一个比较中心的位置,所以能看到人们来来往往,这有点奇怪,但我努力忽略这些干扰,继续写代码。
I was sitting in pretty central location, so I I could see people bustling and hustling, which was a little bit weird, but I tried to tune it out so I can code.
但突然间,我从旁边看到了当时负责业务的尼拉吉。
But then from the side, I saw Niraj, who was the head of business at the time.
他正在不停地挥手。
He was just like waving his arms.
他个子很高,所以我一眼就看到了。
He's he was a pretty tall guy, so I could see it.
他朝我喊,让我马上停下手上的一切工作。
He's like like, stop whatever you're working on right now.
来进入我们那个隔出来的会议室。
Come into the we had one meeting room cut in.
来会议室一趟。
Come into the meeting room.
我当时心想:出什么事了?
And I was like, what is happening?
我们从不开会。
Like, we never have meetings.
我们,我们
Like, we we
所以你们不开会?
So you don't have meetings?
我的意思是,我们偶尔会安排一些会议,但几乎从不临时开会,而且我们平时也很少开会。
I mean, we we have scheduled meetings every now and then, but we rarely have like, we we have never had unscheduled meetings and we rarely have meetings at all.
所以我感到很困惑,就放下手头的工作,走进了会议室,然后他们让我把手机关掉。
So I was confused and I I dropped whatever I was working on and I went into the conference room and then they asked, like, turn off your phones.
那是什么?
What's that?
把手机关掉。
Turn off your phone.
那
That
这有点
that's kind
奇怪。
of weird.
对吧?
Right?
我想,天哪。
I thought, oh my gosh.
发生什么事了?
What's happening?
我们是不是倒闭了?
Like, did we go out of business?
那是我其中一个想法。
That was one thought.
我想,我们是不是要进行新一轮融资?
I thought, are we getting another raise of fund, like, round of funding?
比如,有新的投资者加入?
Like, a new investor coming on board?
不可能是我们卖了公司,因为简以前总说他永远不会卖公司。
It can't be that we sold the company because Jan used to say he will never sell the company.
他以前确实说过,卖公司就像卖自己的孩子。
He used to actually say, selling your company is like selling your baby.
我记得我们等了挺久的,因为有一个人没到。
And I remember we were waiting for quite a while because there was one person missing.
哦。
Oh.
结果发现她去修眉毛了。
And it turns out she was getting her eyebrows done.
把手机收起来了。
With her phone tucked away.
是的。
Yeah.
她是在公告之后才来的,但当时消息即将公开,他们想在新闻发布前先告诉我们。
She came she came after the announcement, but the news was about to hit the public and they wanted to tell us before the news hit.
我注意到扬和布莱恩脸上露出一种表情,但我一时看不懂那是什么。
And I I noticed that Jan and Brian were making this face and I couldn't tell what it was.
然后他们宣布了:WhatsApp被Facebook以190亿美元收购,我这才明白,原来他们当时是在努力压抑自己的兴奋。
And then they made the announcement, WhatsApp has been acquired by Facebook for $19,000,000,000 and I realized, oh, that was them trying to hide their excitement.
那真是
That was
那种似笑非笑的表情。
the Kinda smiley but not smiley.
那真是一个令人激动的时刻,我有点走神了,因为我在努力回想:等等,我到底拿到了多少股份?
And that was a really exciting moment and I I kinda zoned out for a little bit because I was trying to remember, hey, like how many shares did I get?
再说一遍,这是我人生中第一个创业项目。
Like, again, it was my first startup ever.
我甚至没去谈判过我的股权,老实说,我都记不清自己有多少股份了,还在想:十亿美元到底是多少钱?
I didn't even negotiate my equity and I honestly couldn't remember how much equity I had and I was trying to think how much is a billion dollars?
这看起来是一大笔钱。
That seems like a lot of money.
190亿美元的1%是多少呢?
And how much is like 1% of 19,000,000,000?
我算不出来。
I couldn't do the math.
我记得坐在那里,努力地算这笔账。
And I I remember sitting there thinking, like, trying to do the math.
然后我想,不管怎么算,有一件事是肯定的——我要发财了。
And then I thought, you know, no matter how the math works, I think one thing is clear, I'm gonna be rich.
然后他走了进来。
Then walked in.
扎克伯格走进了会议室。
Zuckerberg walked in to the meeting.
是的。
Yeah.
哇。
Wow.
然后你们有个问答环节之类的。
And then you had like a q and a or something.
我们有。
We did.
我们有。
We did.
是的。
Yeah.
这个时候你能问什么样的问题?
What what kind of questions can you ask at at at this point?
或者人们当时问了些什么问题?
Or what kind of questions did people ask?
当时既有兴奋也有紧张,对吧?
There was a mix of excitement and nervousness, right?
我们得把一切都改掉吗?
Are we going to have to change everything?
因为我觉得很多工程师更有经验,他们提到雅虎收购公司时,会彻底改变一切,失去了什么?
Because I think a lot of the engineers were more experienced and they talked about how when Yahoo acquired companies, they changed a 100% and lost the what is it?
业务的本质。
The essence of the business.
所以当时围绕这个问题有很多疑问。
So there there were a lot of questions around that.
马克本人其实非常有魅力,我觉得他当时给出了很好的回答。
And Mark is actually very charismatic in person, and I thought he had great answers at the time.
他确保每个人都感到安心,说不会有任何改变,他会尽可能保持原状,至少当时传达的就是这个信息。
He made sure everyone feels assured that nothing's gonna change and he will try to maintain it as much as possible, at least that was the messaging at the time.
显然,这是一次了不起的退出,直到今天,这种情况都很少被复制,也许有几家公司接近过,但绝对没有像你们这样小的团队做到过。
Clearly this was an amazing exit and to this date, it's not really been repeated, may maybe a few companies might have come close, but definitely not with with such a such a small team.
你和你的同事们是如何应对这个事实的:哇,你们刚刚获得了惊人的财务回报,但公司似乎又继续在Meta内部运作,这看起来像是两件事同时发生——你有了一次非凡的财务退出,但同时还得继续工作。
How did you and and and your colleagues deal with the fact that, wow, you've just got an amazing financial exit, but I guess the company kind of continues inside of Meta, like, it seems seems like, you know, two things at the same time, like, I have this, like, amazing financial exit, but there's also work.
我该怎么平衡?
How do I balance?
你是怎么平衡的?
How did you balance?
你怎么决定下一步做什么?
How do you decide what next?
这有两个方面。
That's twofold.
在财务方面,我们实际上得到了很多支持。
So the finance side, in terms of that aspect, we actually got a lot of support.
我们的业务负责人组织了多次与会计师甚至财务顾问的会议。
Our business person organised many meetings with, like, the accountants or even a financial adviser.
我们邀请了一位财富引擎的创始人教授,他为我们提供了一小时的财务建议,并推荐了一些书籍。
We invited a professor who was the founder of Wealthfront, and he gave us an hour of finance advice, and he recommended books.
我读了《漫步华尔街》,这是一本非常好的书。
I read the Random Walk Down Wall Street, which is a great book.
如果你们对财务管理感兴趣,我推荐你们读一读这本书。
I recommend people read it if you're interested in financial management.
我还读了其他几本书,以便真正提升自己,应对作为一名29岁年轻人突然获得的这笔新财富。
And I read several other books to really educate myself to be able to manage this new wealth that I came across as a young 29 year old.
是的。
Yeah.
一旦你正式成为Facebook的一员,日常生活发生了什么变化?
What changed to the day to day once you officially became part of Facebook?
你们需要换办公室吗?
Did you have to move offices?
你们的职位有没有被添加到Meta的组织架构图上,诸如此类的事情?
Did you get a new title added to like the the Meta org chart, that kind of stuff?
起初的变化非常缓慢。
The changes were very slow in the beginning.
我们甚至直到收购后好几年才搬进Meta(当时还叫Facebook)位于门洛帕克的总部。
We didn't even move into the Meta, or at the time it was called Facebook headquarters, Menlo Park, until at least a couple years after the acquisition.
所以一开始,一切都和往常一样。
So in the beginning, everything was same as usual.
我们仍然在原来的办公室工作。
We still had our old office.
哦,我们确实搬到了一个更好一点、稍微大一点的办公室。
Oh, we did actually move to a little bit nicer office, a slightly bigger office.
但除此之外,一切照旧。
But other than that, it was business as usual.
当时是约翰和布莱恩,我们在招聘,但并不是以那种快速、稳定的速度进行。
It was John and Brian and we were hiring but not, you know, at our similar, like slow, steady pace.
我认为,直到我们真正搬进Facebook办公室后,才开始感受到一些文化上的影响和融合。
And I think not until when we actually moved into the Facebook office, we started seeing a little bit more cultural influence and merging.
比如,我们开始使用他们的HR服务或招聘服务之类的。
Like, we started using their HR services or recruiting services and things like that.
但这是一个非常缓慢的渐进过程。
But it was a very gradual change over time.
当WhatsApp成为Facebook的一部分时,据我了解,直到今天它仍然是Facebook内部一个独立的组织,比如Facebook内部还有Messenger、Facebook群组等不同团队。那么,WhatsApp是否在一定程度上保持了自身的独立性,与Facebook其他部分保持了隔离?
And then when WhatsApp became part of Facebook, as I understand it it it still is even to this date its own organisation, like inside of Facebook, I understand there's organizations like Messenger or like there's the Facebook group etcetera, so like did WhatsApp reign its own kind of organization a little bit shielded from the rest of Facebook?
我们有自己的区域,WhatsApp团队。一开始,我们甚至有自己的椅子、墙壁和装饰品,都是我们自己带过去的。
We had our own area or WhatsApp And in the beginning, we even had, like, our our own chairs and our own whatever, like, walls and decorations that we were using, we brought them all over.
但随着时间推移,越来越多的融合发生了。
But over time, you know, there was more and more mixing.
收购之后,你们是如何开始招聘更多人的?项目又发生了哪些变化?
After the acquisition, how did you started to hire more people, how did the projects change?
目标是否变得更加雄心勃勃了?
Did things become more ambitious?
你们是否开始增加更多功能?
Did you start to add more features?
因为很明显,你们最初只有大约30人,但几年内,就有数百人开始为WhatsApp工作。
Because clearly, like, you were about 30 of you and then few in a few years, there was hundreds of people working on WhatsApp.
如今,肯定已经有数千人在为WhatsApp工作了。
These days, it must be thousands of people.
像这些新员工,又因为WhatsApp原本非常极简,甚至有点简陋,所以出现了哪些新的工作内容呢?
Like, with those people, like, what work new work came up because, again, originally, WhatsApp was so minimalist, right, and kind of so scrappy.
我想我们是主动选择保持小规模,而不是因为没活干。
I guess we were choosing to be small, not that there was not enough work for us to do.
对吧?
Right?
所以我们还想保持小规模的一个原因,其实是布莱恩和简不希望筹集太多资金。
So one of the reasons why we also try to remain small was actually Brian and Jan did not want to raise too much money.
而服务这么多用户其实要花很多钱。
And it actually costs a lot of money to serve so many users.
你得支付服务器的费用。
You have to pay for the servers.
你得支付短信注册验证码的费用。
You have to pay for the SMS registration codes.
每年,简和布莱恩都会召开一次全员会议。
Every year, Jan and Brian would do an all hands meeting.
所以我们确实有开会。
So we did have meetings.
一年一次?
Once a year?
布赖恩非常透明。
And Brian was very transparent.
他会详细讲解我们的收入和支出。
He will walk through our earnings and expenses.
哦,有意思。
Oh, interesting.
是的。
Yeah.
我当时对这些情况了解很多。
Well, I had a lot of information around this.
我们支出的三大主要类别是:服务器成本约占三分之一,工程师的工资约占三分之一,其余三分之一则是短信费用。
So the three main buckets of our spending was server cost, was about a third, and then about a third on salaries for the engineers mostly, And then a third, the rest was for the SMS fee.
当你尝试注册时,会收到那个验证码,而我们必须支付那10美分,或者 whatever 它发送国际短信的费用。
When you try to register, you get that code and we have to pay that 10¢ or whatever how much it costs to send up international messaging.
这些数字,我的意思是,当你有数百万用户使用你的应用时,它们会累积起来。
Those numbers, I mean, they add up when you have millions of people using your app.
所以他们实际上并不想增长得太快,因为那样成本会变得非常高。
So they actually didn't want to grow too fast because it gets very expensive.
WhatsApp 在第一年是免费的,之后每年收费1美元。
WhatsApp was free for the first year and then after that, WhatsApp was charging $1 for every year.
但他们只在某些国家使用这种收费方式,实际上是为抑制增长,因为他们不希望增长得太快。
But they were only using it in certain countries really to suppress growth because they didn't want to grow too fast.
太有趣了。
Fascinating.
因为我记得在欧洲和美国,有这1美元的费用,我觉得人们都无所谓,是啊,随便吧。
Because I I remember in in in Europe and in The US, there was this $1 cost which I think people were like, yeah, well, whatever.
我们当时并没有意识到这是一种抑制增长的策略。
I don't think we realized that this was a growth suppression tactic.
很有趣。
Fascinating.
然后当Facebook收购后,我想他们就取消了这项收费。
And then when Facebook acquired, I guess, they got rid of it.
是的。
Yeah.
Facebook说,我们不需要这一美元。
Facebook said we don't need the dollar.
我们可以尽情增长,因为他们有足够的资金支持。
We can grow as much as we can because they had the funding for it.
那么增长速度是不是就加快了?
And then growth just did it did it speed up?
你还记得吗?
Do you remember?
确实加快了。
It did.
是的。
Yeah.
细节太惊人了。
Incredible detail.
你用支付来减缓增长。
You you use using payment to slow down growth.
关于这一美元的较少人知道的细节是,这一美元足以支付所有这些费用:服务器成本、工资和短信验证码。
The lesser known detail about the $1 is that that $1 was enough to pay for all of these, the server cost, the salaries, and the SMS code.
每年。
Per per year.
所以你们大致收支平衡。
So you were roughly breakeven.
收支平衡。
Breakeven.
我们确实有红杉资本的投资,但从未动用过那笔钱。
We did have funding from Sequoia, but we never touched that money.
太不可思议了。
Incredible.
是的。
Yeah.
布赖恩解释说,他父亲是个企业家,他们常常半夜醒来,担心明天是否能支付员工的工资。
Brian explained it as how his dad was a business owner and they would wake up in the middle of the night worried, what if I cannot pay salaries for the employees tomorrow?
他解释说,他把来自红杉资本的资金当作后备保障。
And he explained that he took the funding from Sequoia as like a backup.
如果我没记错的话,我记得这笔后备资金是800万美元。
And I think it was $8,000,000 of funding if I recall, if I looked at that backup.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们从未动用过那笔钱。
So we we never touched that money.
那一美元支付了所有费用。
The $1 paid for everything.
这减缓了增长速度,使其变得可控。
And it slowed down growth enough to be manageable.
是的。
Yeah.
你加入Facebook时,获得了什么职位?你的职业生涯发生了怎样的变化?
When you joined Facebook, what what title did you get and how did your career change?
关于Facebook的一点是,每个人实际上都是软件工程师。
So the thing about Facebook is that everyone's actually software engineer.
我敢肯定他们至今仍然没有职位头衔。
I'm pretty sure they still don't have titles.
他们没有头衔,但有级别。
They don't have titles, but they have levels.
你入职时是哪个级别?
What what level did you come in at?
因为我是五个最年轻的人之一,所以我被定为初级工程师。
So being one of the five youngest people, I got I got leveled as a junior engineer.
不。
No.
你没有。
You did not.
是的。
Yeah.
L3还是L4?
L three or L four?
L3。
L three.
L3。
L three.
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我
I
我不得不重新爬上去。
had to, like, climb climb all over again.
天啊。
Oh my gosh.
那一定有点尴尬。
That that must have been a bit awkward.
我对此不太高兴,但还有什么别的选择呢?
I was not too happy about it, but what's the alternative?
我要放弃剩下的股份吗?
Do I wanna give up fasting the rest of the shares?
最终,我得到了晋升。
And eventually, I I got promoted.
但后来在WhatsApp里,你很快就得到了晋升。
But then it was within WhatsApp, you got promoted pretty quickly.
你在那儿一共升职了几次?
How many times did you get promoted there?
好几次吧,我最终成了工程经理。
A few times, I mean, I eventually became an engineering manager.
当你成为工程经理后,某一天你决定去伦敦帮助建立一个新的办公室,对吧?
And then as you became an engineering manager, at some point you decided to help and start a new office in London.
这个决定是怎么来的?你是怎么操作的?
How did that decision come and how did you go about it?
其实是Facebook总部提出了这个要求。
There was actually an ask from Facebook headquarters.
他们说:‘嘿,我们在门洛帕克的办公空间快不够了,而且WhatsApp在欧洲这么受欢迎,为什么不那边也设个办事处呢?’
So they said, hey, like, we're actually running out of space in Menlo Park and also WhatsApp is so big in Europe, so why not have a presence there?
因为每个人都在用WhatsApp,所以在那里招聘工程师会容易得多。
It'll be much easier to hire engineers because everybody actually uses WhatsApp.
所以我们就决定在那边开设一个新的办公室。
So let's let's start a new office there.
而且我们当时没有那么多工程经理。
And we didn't have that many engineering managers.
对吧?
Right?
我非常幸运,因为被邀请和另外几位工程经理一起去,我们三个人其实差不多同时升任经理。
I was very lucky because I got asked to go along with a couple other engineering managers, and all three of us actually became managers around the same time.
我们甚至一起接受了培训。
We actually even trained together.
我们被派去伦敦时还是相对新任的经理,但我想我们是唯一能去的人,因为其他人有孩子,得考虑孩子上学的问题,没法搬过去。
We were relatively new managers when we got asked to go there, but I I think we were the only ones who could go because, you know, people have children and they have to think about school and they couldn't go.
记得有一位我当时的总监,他没法去,因为他的妻子说不想带着孩子搬家。
Remember one, the director that I was working with, he couldn't go because his wife says she doesn't wanna move with the children.
这完全说得通。
It it makes perfect sense.
你抵达伦敦时,带着另外两三位工程经理。
You arrived in London, you landed with these two or three other engineering managers.
你们是怎么开始扩大办公室的?
How did you start to grow the office?
从实际角度来看,我能想象的是,你们是怎么开始招聘或租赁场地的?还有哪些事情是你们没想到的?
From a practical perspective, what can I imagine, like, you know, like, how did you start hiring or leasing space or what are the other things that you have to do that, you know, like, were maybe a little bit unexpected for you?
很多后勤工作都是由Facebook帮我们处理好的,因为他们那里已经有一个办公室了,所以我们直接搬了进去。
A lot of the logistical part was taken care of for us because Facebook already had an office there, so we kinda moved in.
我们得到了自己的一片区域,但面积不大,因为当时在欧洲有很多合同工,而且英国已经有一位合同工了。
We got our own section And it wasn't big because at the time, again, we had a lot of contractors in Europe, so we had one contractor already in England.
于是我们把他转为全职员工,另外在苏格兰还有一位合同工。
So we turned we converted them full time, and then we had one in Scotland.
我们也把他转为了全职,他时不时会从苏格兰过来通勤。
We also converted him full time, so he would commute from Scotland every now and then.
所以我们一开始有两位工程师加上三位经理,然后就开始在当地招聘了。
So we had two engineers plus three managers, and we started hiring there.
我觉得招聘这部分花的时间更长,才慢慢 setup 好。
I think the hiring part was something that took longer to set up.
我们与Facebook的招聘团队紧密合作,这非常棒,因为我们已经有人熟悉当地的招聘流程。
We worked very closely with the Facebook hiring team, which was really great that we already had people who are familiar with the the local recruiting logistics there.
所以我们重点关注的一点是让工程师们知道:现在欧洲正在招聘,快来申请吧,因为我们从整个欧洲乃至印度大量招聘。
So one thing we focused on a lot was really letting engineers know, hey, is hiring in Europe now, come apply because we were hiring from all over Europe and also a lot from India.
你觉得在欧洲为WhatsApp招聘更容易,是因为大家都知道这个公司吗?
Do you feel it was easier to hire for WhatsApp in Europe just because people knew about it?
你是否收到了更多热情的申请者?
Do you get more excitement, more applicants?
百分之百。
100%.
你可能想不到,我以前经常参与校园招聘,比如2013年去斯坦福之前,每次我都会走到展台前,对人们说:嘿,能给我一份你的简历吗?
You wouldn't believe, like, I used to do a lot of university recruiting and when I used to go to Stanford, maybe 2013, like any time before the acquisition, I would say, hey, like the people will come up to the booth and I would say, hey, do you want to give me your resume?
但他们总会说:你先给我讲讲你们公司是做什么的。
And they would be like, tell me about your company first.
因为他们从来没听说过WhatsApp,这到底是个什么公司?
Because they have never heard of WhatsApp, what is this company?
我都不打算给你
I'm not even gonna give you
我的简历。
my have resume.
只有这20份。
Only 20 of these.
没错。
Exactly.
而在欧洲,人们实际上很乐意和我们交谈。
Versus in Europe, people were actually excited to talk to us.
在本质上是一个远程办公室工作,有什么优缺点?
What were the good and bad things of working in what basically is a remote office?
是的,伦敦是个大办公室,但总部在加利福尼亚的门洛帕克,时差八小时,重叠时间少得多。
Like, yes, London was a big office, but HQ was in California, Menlo Park, that's eight hours of time zone difference, a lot less overlap.
这肯定有一些好处,也有一些缺点。
There's probably some good things about this and some downsides.
这点确实有帮助,我们三个都来自门洛帕克,和其他团队、工程师还有经理们的关系都处得很不错。
It helped because the three of us were from Menlo Park and we actually had great relationships with other teams and other engineers and other managers.
而且我们每个季度都会回门洛帕克,那边的领导层也差不多每个季度都会来伦敦。
And we also traveled back to Menlo Park every quarter, and then we had the leadership from Menlo Park also traveled to London almost every quarter.
所以最开始的时候双方往来非常多,全力巩固了彼此的协作关系。
So there was a lot of back and forth to really strengthen the relationship in the beginning.
你的成长历程真的很神奇:最开始你是WhatsApp里资历最浅的人之一——这么说其实有点夸张,毕竟你当时已经很有经验了,但后来你还成了Facebook的L3,这一点我至今都不敢相信,最后你还转型当上了经理。
Your your growth went to like being, I guess, the one of the most junior people in WhatsApp, which is crazy to say because you were experienced as well, but then you were also l three in Facebook, which I still cannot believe, but you you you went and became a manager.
那是什么契机让你决定,想要试着去带团队、做管理呢?
What pushed you to actually say I actually want to try to manage people?
其实管理这个岗位不是我自己主动争取来的。
I actually never asked for it myself.
是我团队里有个人央求我的主管,说‘能不能让我跟着Jean做汇报啊?’
Someone on my team begged my manager, hey, can I please report to Jean?
我就这么当上了经理。
And that's how I became a manager.
哇。
Wow.
好的。
Okay.
你觉得这个人从你身上看到了什么?
What do you think this person saw in you?
在你还不是经理的时候,他们为什么想向你汇报?
That they wanted to report to you when you were not a manager?
我是技术负责人,所以当时已经在管理项目了。
I was the tech lead, so I was already managing the project.
因此,对我来说,这是一次很自然的转变。
So it was sort of a natural transition for me.
当你成为经理后,哪些工作内容对你来说是自然而然的,哪些是你需要学习或寻求指导的?
And when you became a manager, what parts of the job came naturally to you and what parts were hard that you had to learn or get mentorship for?
我开始读书。
You know, I started reading books.
我非常喜欢读书。
I love reading books.
每当遇到新挑战时,我喜欢阅读、学习和研究。
Whenever there's a new challenge, I like to read, learn and research.
当时,实际上关于如何成为管理者的学习课程并不多,书籍也很少。
There actually, at the time, weren't a lot of courses on how to become a manager and not a lot of books.
我觉得现在仍然没有太多关于如何成为管理者的书。
Like, I still don't think there are too many books about how to become a manager.
现在稍微多了一点。
There's a little bit more now.
有三四本不错的,但都是2015年或2016年之后才出版的。
There's three or four good ones, but they all came out after 2015 or 2016.
是的。
Yeah.
当时的资源非常有限,但我尽我所能阅读了大量关于领导力的书籍,我觉得我读了很多关于沟通和心理学的内容。
The resources were pretty limited, but I did what I can to read as much as I can about leadership and I think I've read a lot about communication and psychology.
有几本书我很喜欢,比如《被傻瓜包围》。
There's several books, like I love the book Surrounded by Idiots.
你读过这本吗?
Have you read that one?
它讲的是DISC人格理论,不同类型的个性。
It talks about the disc personality, the different types of personalities.
我努力去理解,是什么激励了人们,以及如何以对方能理解的方式与他们沟通。
And I try to really understand, like, what motivates people, how do you communicate with people in a in a way that makes sense to the other person.
同时,我也反思了个人经历中,哪些是优秀的管理者,哪些是糟糕的管理者?
And also I reflected personally, like, what were some good managers and bad manager in my experience?
因为你会听到一句话:人们不是领导公司,而是领导他们的经理。
Because you hear the saying that people don't lead companies, they lead managers.
对吧?
Right?
你的经理真的能毁掉或成就你的职业生涯。
Your manager can really break or make your career.
如果你和一个合不来的人搭档,他们会让你的生活变得痛苦。
They can make your life miserable if you're, you know, matched with someone you don't vibe with.
你发现哪些特质呢?回想一下,你觉得什么样的人是好经理,你希望多学习那些做法;又有哪些是糟糕的经理,你希望避免重复他们的行为?
What are the traits that you found, like as you recall, what were things you said like, I think this makes a good manager, I wanna do more of that, and I think these were terrible managers or bad managers and I want to avoid doing that.
你记得有哪些特别突出的例子吗?
Do you remember some things that stuck out?
是的。
Yeah.
我努力去真正理解每一个个体。
I tried to really understand each individual person.
比如,我团队里有一个人特别喜欢深入钻研问题,调试并找出改进的方法。
So for example, like one person that I had on my team really loves going deep into problems or debugging and finding out how to improve things.
对吧?
Right?
而另一个人则热衷于开发新功能,你不能让这个喜欢开发新功能的人去调试十个bug。
Whereas another person really loves building new features and you cannot ask this person who loves to build new features to go debug 10 bugs.
这个人会疯掉的。
That person will go nuts.
对吧?
Right?
还有一个非常擅长开发新功能的人,却不太擅长指导新同事。
And then like one person who was really good at building new features was not so great at mentoring new colleagues.
所以我尽量去发现他们的优势,当然,你也希望给他们一些挑战,让他们也能成长,但你要做到平衡。
So I try to really look for their strengths and of course, you also wanna set them up for challenges so they can learn as well, but you wanna balance them out.
所以我通过问他们很多问题,努力去理解:他们希望怎样被挑战?
So I I try to really understand by asking them a lot of questions to understand like how do they want to be challenged?
他们在什么时候会对工作感到兴奋?
When do they feel excited about their work?
或者他们真正擅长的是什么?
Or what are the things that they're really good at?
他们希望在哪些方面有所提升?
What are the things they want to improve on?
所以我花了很多时间和他们深入交流。
So I spent a lot of time really talking to them.
作为经理,你参加过调薪会议吧?
As a manager, you were part of calibration meetings, right?
现在你不在WhatsApp,也不在Meta了,我们能坦诚聊聊这些会议到底是什么样的吗?
Now that you're not at WhatsApp, not at Meta, can we talk honestly about what are those meetings like?
你知道的,这些会议有哪些好的地方,你该如何准备,现实情况又是怎样的?
You know, what are maybe the good things about them, how can you prepare and what's the kind of reality?
因为我觉得,除了少数几个参与其中的经理,很少有人真正了解这些会议是如何进行的。
Because I feel outside of a small group of managers who are in there, not many people know like how these things go.
人们最大的错误就是以为他们的经理有权决定他们的晋升或加薪。
So people, number one biggest mistake people make is they think your manager is the one giving you a promotion or a salary boost.
作为中层经理,对吧?
Like as a manager, middle manager, right?
我其实根本没有权力给你晋升。
Like I have no authority to give you a promotion.
你没有预算。
You have no budget.
通常总监有时会有一定的 discretionary 预算来发放奖励,但就连晋升他们也无权决定。
Typically directors have a discretionary budget sometimes to be able to give a reward, but not even promotions they even they cannot give.
对吧?
Right?
是的。
Right.
奖金与你的绩效评估挂钩。
And the bonuses are tied to your performance review.
对吧?
Right?
在 Meta,每个级别都有薪酬团队设定的精确百分比。
So at Meta, for every level, there's exact percentages lined up by the comp team.
我完全无法控制。
Like, I have no control over it.
我唯一能做的就是把自己当成代表客户的律师。
The only control I have is I think of myself as the lawyer representing my clients.
哇。
Wow.
是的。
Yeah.
我在为他们争取。
I'm making a case for them.
对。
Yeah.
说明他们为什么应该获得某个绩效评级或晋升。
Why they deserve to get a certain performance review rating or a promotion.
而且显然,我希望我的客户能表现好。
And obviously, like, I want my clients to do well.
我希望我的团队能得到他们应得的认可,因为我知道他们付出了很多努力。
I want my team to get, you know, the recognition that they deserve because I know they worked hard.
但这不是我能决定的。
But it's not up to me.
其他所有经理也必须同意。
All the other managers also have to agree.
这就是绩效评估的性质。
That is the the nature of performance reviews.
具体来说,在绩效评估中,你能说说哪些人看到了那些获得高绩效评级的工程师吗?
And being specific, on a performance review, like, who were the people that you saw the engineers who got these high performance reviews from this committee?
你看到了什么样的税务情况?
What kind of taxes did you see?
有没有出现过这种情况:有些经理之间存在政治操作,比如互相打招呼、推举某人?还是说主要是按 meritocracy(功绩制)?也就是说,这位工程师确实表现优异,很多经理都看在眼里,自然就认同这位来自 Jean 团队的人应该排在我团队的优秀员工之上,我也同意这一点。
What were there things where, like, well, some managers kind of like, you know, politics where they kind of like, they're calling in favors for each other and pushing someone up or or was it mostly meritocracy, meaning this engineer was actually doing great work that a lot of managers saw and they just naturally agreed that, you know, this person who's Jean's team is actually, they should be above my great person and I kind of agree with that.
因为存在分级,对吧?
Because there's bucketing, right?
说清楚一点,确实有分级,你得把人分到不同的等级里,比如把 x 个人放进最高档、中档、最低档等等。
Let's be clear, there's bucketing, you're gonna have buckets and you need to put like, I don't know, x people in the top bucket, middle bucket, bottom bucket and so on.
是的
Yeah.
当我辅导工程师时,我了解到不同公司有不同的自我推广方式。
When I was coaching engineers, I learned that different companies have different ways of self promotion.
比如,我听说有些公司会通过邮件进行推广,每次有新版本或发布时都会发送群发邮件。
So like for example, I heard some companies use emails, like they send mass emails every time they do a new release or launch.
或者像WhatsApp,我们用WhatsApp群组做一切事情,但在Facebook,他们用Facebook Workplace,这是一种类似Facebook群组的工具,每个团队或部门都有自己的群组。
Or like at WhatsApp, we use WhatsApp groups for everything, but at Facebook, they used Facebook Workplace, which is like Facebook groups where you have a group for team or your org and your like, everything has a different group.
我在代表客户参与绩效评估时注意到,那些发帖最频繁、曝光度最高的人,通常最容易获得一致认可,因为这非常自然。
And I noticed as I'm representing my clients during performance reviews, the people who post the most often, who have the most visibility, usually get the easiest consensus because it's just like all very natural.
比如,如果我对你的工作一无所知,而你的经理告诉我你很优秀,也许吧,但我又怎么知道呢?
Like, if I have no clue what you worked on and your manager tells me you're great, maybe, but how would I know?
我对你的工作一无所知。
I don't I don't know anything about you.
因此,我更不太可能同意你经理的看法。
So it I'm less likely to be inclined to agree with your manager.
也许你的经理是对的,但我并不了解。
Maybe your manager's right, but I don't know.
而如果你一直在主动发帖,间接或直接地告诉我你做了哪些工作、取得了什么成果、学到了哪些经验、和哪些人合作,那我就已经知道了,哦,原来如此,当你的经理告诉我你准备好了,我就会点头同意。
Whereas if you have been actively posting and telling me indirectly or directly what type of work you have done and what type of impact that has made and what are the lessons that you've learned and what type of people you work with, then I already know, oh, okay, like when your manager tells me you're ready, then I say here.
关于Wolfram,这不仅仅是群组的问题,更像是一个Facebook动态-feed,有点像LinkedIn,你看到这些公司内部的帖子,有时你会点个赞。你所说的,就是如果你看到某个其他团队的工程师发帖说:‘我们上线了这个功能,我们学到了一些有趣的东西,现在用在了Facebook上’,而你点了赞,那你就会记得这件事。
In terms of Wolfram, this was actually like it's more than just groups, was like this Facebook feed where, you know, like it's a bit like LinkedIn, right, just to make it so so you see these posts come across the company and sometimes you'll put hit like and what you're saying is, like, if you've seen this post from this engineer on some other team saying, oh, we've launched this feature, here's an interesting thing we've learned that we're using for Facebook and I hit like, I now remember it.
然后当绩效评估来临时,你会说:‘哦,我记得这个人。’
And then one performance review comes like, oh, I remember that person.
他们确实写过那篇帖子。
They wrote that Exactly.
我甚至可能还会问一些问题。
And I might even have some questions.
对吧?
Right?
也许,当你的经理告诉我时,我可能会想:‘那这个呢?’
Maybe, like, if your manager tells me, I might be like, well, what about this?
那这个又怎么说呢?
What about that?
但如果你发了动态,我就能直接在评论区问你了。
But if you make a post, can just ask you directly through the comments.
对吧?
Right?
评论区里的互动交流可多了。
There's a lot of engagement happening in the comments.
那我可能就会问,你有没有考虑过另一件事?
So I might ask, have you thought about this other thing?
你有没有考虑过这件事?
Have you thought about this thing?
然后你给我答复,我就会觉得,哦,原来是这样。
And you might give me answers and I think, oh, okay.
对。
Yeah.
他考虑过这个问题。
He's thought about it.
他真的很棒。
He's really good.
这很有趣,因为听起来像是在简化,但要在Facebook上取得成功,你不仅要在Facebook应用内部表现优秀,还要做有趣的工作,并且不能隐藏,反而要让它们显而易见。
It's amusing because it sounds like simplifying a little bit, but to be successful at Facebook, you need to also be good inside of the Facebook app and and do interesting work and and not hide it, actually make it visible.
嗯。
Mhmm.
这很有趣。
That's interesting.
现在,退一步说,你曾经是Facebook的经理,见过很多工程师。
Now, stepping up a step back, and you were a manager at Facebook, you saw a lot of engineers.
除了绩效评估和人们发帖讨论之外,你记得的那些最优秀的工程师有哪些共同特质?
Outside of the performance review and and people posting about it, what traits did the the best engineers that you remember share?
也就是说,是什么让他们如此出色?
Like, what made them so good?
这个问题我有点纠结,因为衡量技能的方式是有区别的。
I struggle with this question a little bit because there's a difference between like how do you measure skill?
你怎么定义一个优秀的工程师呢?
How do you measure what a good engineer is?
一个优秀的工程师是能快速开发新功能的人吗?
Is a good engineer someone who can bang out new features?
一个优秀的工程师是能设计复杂系统的人吗?
Is a good engineer someone who can design a complicated system?
一个优秀的工程师是能沟通并把这些内容解释给非技术人员的人吗?
Is a good engineer someone who can communicate all of this and explain it to non technical people?
我对优秀工程师的定义有点犹豫,因为我可以有一个定义,但它可能因文化或公司而异。
I struggle a little bit with the definition of a good engineer because I can have a definition of a good engineer, but it may be different for every culture, a different company might have different definitions.
这个问题很好。
That's a good one.
在Facebook,你们的定义是什么?
At Facebook, what was the definition?
我记得很多都归结为一个非常简单的特质:影响力。
I remember that a lot of it went down to just a very simple characteristic impact.
对吧?
Right?
确实如此。
Definitely.
我认为衡量影响力的方式有很多,而在Facebook,他们衡量影响力的方式就是通过这些帖子。
And I think the way like, there are many ways to measure impact and definitely at Facebook, their way of measuring impact was through these posts.
如果我知道你的工作,你告诉我你有影响力,而我也认同,那就是影响力。
If I know about your work and you tell me you have impact and I agree, that's impact.
所以回到你在伦敦办公室的时候,刚开始扩张,伦敦办公室是在哪个阶段开始感觉不再像一个初创公司,而更像一家大型科技公司?
So going back to when you were in London office and start to grow, at what point did the London office start to feel less of a startup, a scrappy startup and more of a big tech?
我记得大约一年半后,我意识到我不认识那个人,也不知道他的名字。
I remember a time after about a year and a half or so, I realized I don't know who that person is or I don't know their name.
那是一个转折点。
That was a turning point.
那你是什么时候开始认真考虑离开Facebook的?
And at what point did you actually start to think of leaving Facebook?
我真的很喜欢那种亲密的氛围,所以在WhatsApp,有30名工程师的时候,我认识每个人的名字。
I think I really enjoyed the intimate environment, so I appreciate being able to like, at WhatsApp, with 30 engineers, I knew everyone's names.
我知道每个人住在哪里。
I knew where everybody lived.
我知道他们的配偶、孩子,甚至宠物狗的名字。
I knew their spouses and their children and their dogs' names.
对吧?
Right?
我真的很喜欢这种亲密的氛围。
I really like that type of intimate environment.
我们至今还经常聚在一起。
We still hang out.
我们之间有着非常牢固的纽带。
We have a pretty strong bond.
而且我觉得,即使我不认识这个人,我也感觉没那么有联系。
And I feel like when when I even when I don't even know this person's name, I I just feel less connected.
不是。
No.
所以,这就是你决定是时候离开并做点别的事情的时刻吗?
So so was this the point where you decided that maybe it's time for you to leave and do something else?
哦,好吧。
Oh, so okay.
我当时在伦敦做合同工,签了两年的合同。
I was in London on a contract, so I had a two year contract.
他们说:‘去那边开个新办公室吧。’
They said, hey, like, go start this office.
合同结束后,我可以选择继续留在伦敦办公室工作,或者回到门洛帕克。
And then once the contract ended, I had the option to either stay there to continue working in the London office or I could come back to Menlo Park.
但那时我已经在那里工作了八年,老实说,我觉得自己已经精疲力尽了。
But then at that point, I had been working there for eight years and honestly, I think I was pretty burned out.
我这种性格的人,总想每件事都做到完美。
I'm the type of personality who likes to get A plus on everything I do every single time.
是的。
Yep.
八年后,这真的让人很疲惫。
So it was pretty tiring after eight years.
我需要休息一下。
I needed a break.
对。
Yeah.
你离开WhatsApp后,决定做什么呢?
And when you left WhatsApp, what did you decide to do?
我说的是WhatsApp,但那时候其实已经是Facebook了。
What I say WhatsApp, but it was Facebook at that point.
对。
Yeah.
实际上,因为我了解自己的性格,我从不休息。
I actually, because I know my personality, I don't take breaks.
所以我给自己设了一个目标,很简单:我要在接下来的六个月里什么都不做。
So I actually had a goal, it's simple but I said I will do nothing for the next six months.
我要挑战自己,在六个月里什么都不做。
I'm going to challenge myself to do nothing for six months.
你做到了吗?
Did you manage?
我做到了。
I did it.
我做到了。
I did it.
我读了很多书。
I did read a lot.
我锻炼了。
I exercised.
我去了很长的散步。
I went on long walks.
我参加了多次冥想静修。
I did multiple meditation retreats.
但那是我给自己设定的挑战:六个月不工作。
But that that was my challenge to myself to not work for six months.
所以在成功地什么都没做六个月之后,当你设定了这个目标,你是怎么决定下一步做什么的?
So after six months of successfully doing nothing, after setting yourself that goal, what did you do to figure out what next?
起初,我想也许我应该创办一家新公司,或者加入另一家初创企业,因为我喜欢工作。
So initially, I thought maybe I want to go start a new company or join another startup because I like working.
我喜欢创造东西。
Love building things.
所以我决定,好吧,我要开始和其他创始人、招聘者,或者打算创办新公司的人交谈。
So I decided, okay, I'm gonna start talking to other founders or people who are hiring or people who are looking to start a new company.
所以我实际上访谈了100位创始人。
So I I actually talked to 100 founders.
我有一个电子表格
I have a spreadsheet
哇哦。
Wow.
为了真正看清有哪些可能让我感到热情的机遇,可以加入或创建。
To really see like is there any interesting opportunities that I might feel passionate about joining or building.
在与100家初创公司交流后,我意识到自己其实对加入其中任何一家都没有真正的热情。
And then after talking to 100 startups, I realized I wasn't really passionate about joining any of them.
于是我开始想,什么样的事情会让我更有热情?过去八年在WhatsApp工作时,我最喜欢的是什么?
And I thought, like, what would I feel more passionate about and what was the thing that I like the most about working at WhatsApp for the past eight years?
我意识到,我其实非常喜欢当管理者,因为我感到自己在营造一种支持性的文化,让其他人能够真正地学习、成长,并且自由地做事,而不必时刻被人盯着。
And I realized I actually really liked being a manager because I felt like I was creating a culture of, like, support so that other people can really be learning and thriving and, you know, be able to do things freely without people breathing down your neck.
职业生涯中有许多让人快乐的因素,但我发现,从每个人身上发现他们的需求,并真正帮助他们、创造这样的环境,让我感到特别有成就感。
There are many things that make for a happy career, but I found it really gratifying to be able to find that from each person and really try to help them out and create whatever that is.
对不同的人来说,这可能意味着不同的东西,而我的目标是帮他们扫清障碍,让他们真正茁壮成长。
It might be different for different people and trying to unblock them so they can really flourish.
于是我想到,如果这真是我真正想做的事,我就不必创办一家新公司。
And I thought, well, if that's what I really wanna do, I don't have to start a new company.
我只需要做这一部分就行了。
I'll just do that part.
于是我开始探索各种方式,比如指导他人、做一点辅导(虽然现在不做了),还有在YouTube上制作视频、写作,所有这些都为了找到最好地支持他人的方法。
But I started exploring, like, mentoring people, I did a little bit of coaching, I don't do anymore and making videos on YouTube, writing, all of that to see how how would I find the best way to support other people.
你在YouTube和LinkedIn上分享了大量你的见解和观察。
And on on YouTube and on LinkedIn, you have been sharing a lot of your learnings, your observations.
是什么促使你比以前更积极地分享呢?
What what pushed you to to start sharing way more than than before?
我觉得你是在离开Facebook之后才开始公开分享这些内容的。
Like, I I think you started to do this publicly after you left Facebook.
我当时其实正在写一篇关于这个的博客。
I was actually writing a blog about this.
就在上周,我在YouTube上的订阅者数量刚刚突破了十万。
So I actually just hit 100 k subscribers on YouTube, like last week.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我一直在反思。
And I was reflecting.
我差点放弃做YouTube了,因为我真的很不习惯在公众面前露面。
I almost gave up doing YouTube because I was really not comfortable being seen in public.
我一直在反复思考这个问题。
And I I I've been thinking a lot about this.
我奶奶来自朝鲜。
Like, my grandma's from North Korea.
她在战争期间逃了出来。
She escaped during the war.
在那种文化里,你不能公开讲话。
And in that culture, like, you are you do not speak publicly.
你不想被看见,因为那样很危险。
You don't wanna be seen because it's dangerous.
我认为那种世代相传的观念仍然在我身上有所体现。
And I think there's generations of that still kinda installed in me.
害怕发声的恐惧是真实的,我感到非常不自在,因此差点放弃了做YouTube。
The the fear of speaking up is real and I felt really uncomfortable, so I almost stopped doing YouTube.
早年我的一个视频突然走红,我感到特别不自在。
Once one of my videos went viral from early on and I felt really uncomfortable.
但幸运的是,我跟我的一位导师聊了聊,她说:做你喜欢的事情没关系。
But luckily, was talking to a mentor of mine and she said, hey, it's okay to do something that you enjoy doing.
就试着去做吧。
Just give it a shot.
于是我就坚持了下来。
So then I I stuck with it.
我很庆幸自己坚持了。
I'm so glad I did.
说到目前正在发生的事情,当然就是人工智能了。
Speaking of the thing that is happening, of course, right now, AI.
你也在你的YouTube频道上谈到过这一点。
You you spoke about this on on your YouTube channel as well.
但从你的角度来看,AI是如何改变工程师和管理者的工作方式的呢?
But from your your vantage point, how is AI changing how engineers work, how managers work?
我发现,随着AI的发展,我们正看到越来越小的团队出现。
I do find it really interesting how with AI, we're seeing smaller teams emerge.
我知道很多团队都说,我们变小是因为AI,但我怀疑这是否真的与AI无关。
I know that a lot of teams are saying, well, we're small because of AI, but I wonder if it's independent from AI.
当团队规模小时,效率自然更高,因为WhatsApp并没有使用AI,但我们因为团队小而高效。
When you're small, you're just more efficient because WhatsApp did not use AI, but we were efficient because we were small.
我甚至觉得,即使在今天,我也很难指出还有多少团队能像WhatsApp那样小却有如此大的影响力。
And I almost feel that even today, I can't cannot really point to too many teams that are as small as WhatsApp and have that kind of impact, maybe.
可能有人会想到Telegram,但我认为它们的规模也更大。
And traffic might come to mind, I think even they're bigger.
所以我在想,也许这一切最终还是要回归到最基本的东西上。
So I I wonder if if there's a maybe just going back to basics with all of this.
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