本集简介
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你有没有觉得你就像一个市场营销专业人士,只是
Does it ever feel like you're a marketing professional just
对着虚空说话?
speaking into the void?
虚空。
Void.
虚空。
Void.
但通过LinkedIn广告,你可以确信自己正在触达正确的决策者,事实上,这个网络中有1.3亿人。
But with LinkedIn ads, you can know you're reaching the right decision makers, a network of a 130,000,000 of them, in fact.
你甚至可以根据职位、行业、公司、职级、技能来定位买家,我提过职位了吗?
You can even target buyers by job title, industry, company, seniority, skills, and did I say job title?
看看如何通过LinkedIn广告避开虚空,触达正确的买家。
See how you can avoid the void and reach the right buyers with LinkedIn ads.
在你的首个活动中花费250美元,即可获得下一次活动的250美元免费额度。
Spend $250 on your first campaign and get a free $250 credit for the next one.
立即在 linkedin.com/campaign 开始使用。
Get started at linkedin.com/campaign.
条款和条件适用。
Terms and conditions apply.
本节目由 Odoo 赞助支持。
Support for this show comes from Odoo.
经营企业已经够难了,为什么还要用十几个互不相通的应用程序让事情更复杂呢?
Running a business is hard enough, so why make it harder with a dozen different apps that don't talk to each other?
隆重推出 Odoo。
Introducing Odoo.
这是您唯一需要的商业软件。
It's the only business software you'll ever need.
它是一个全集成的一体化平台,让您的工作更轻松。
It's an all in one fully integrated platform that makes your work easier.
客户关系管理、会计、库存、电子商务等。
CRM, accounting, inventory, ecommerce, and more.
最棒的是什么?
And the best part?
Odoo 以远低于成本的价格取代了多个昂贵的平台。
ODOO replaces multiple expensive platforms for a fraction of the cost.
因此,成千上万的企业已经切换到了 Odoo。
That's why over thousands of businesses have made the switch.
那你呢?
So why not you?
立即免费试用 Odoo,访问 odoo.com。
Try Odoo for free at odoo.com.
就是 odoo.com。
That's odoo.com.
特朗普政府对可能与委内瑞拉开战有何想法?
What is the Trump administration's thinking on a possible war with Venezuela?
他
He's
他心里可能在想,通过展示实力,我可以以极低的代价取得重大胜利。
probably thinking in his mind, with a show of strength, I can get a big win on the cheap.
我是约翰·费纳。
I'm John Feiner.
我是杰克·沙利文。
And I'm Jake Sullivan.
我们是《长远博弈》的主持人,这是一档每周播出的国家安全播客。
And we're the hosts of The Long Game, a weekly national security podcast.
本周,我们深入探讨委内瑞拉、美中人工智能竞赛,并分析泽连斯基总统和普京是否应该接受美国支持的和平协议。
This week, we dig into Venezuela, The US China AI race, and game out whether President Zelensky and Putin should accept The US backed peace deal.
这一集现已发布。
The episode is now out.
请在您收听播客的平台搜索并关注《长远博弈》。
Search for and follow the long game wherever you get your podcasts.
从西方的视角来看,产能过剩是个问题,但在中国看来,这不过是通过生产超出自身需求的产品,然后以残酷的价格出口,甚至在某些方面亏本销售,从而实现对其他国家的去工业化。
Overcapacity is seen as a problem from a Western lens, but through China's lens, this is just something where by producing more than they need and then exporting it at cutthroat prices or even losing money in certain respects, I mean, they're just deindustrializing other nations.
这不利于以利润为导向的资本主义。
And that's not good for sort of capitalism in the profit sense.
但如果你将此视为产业外交,甚至不是战争,利润就不是目标。
But if you're using this as industrial statecraft, if not war, profit is not the goal.
欢迎来到《中国解码》。
Welcome to China Decode.
我是韩爱丽丝。
I'm Alice Han.
我是詹姆斯·金。
And I'm James King.
在今天《中国解码》的节目中,我们将讨论中国如何与英伟达竞争,以及人民币为何仍被严重低估。
In today's episode of China Decode, we're discussing China's strategy to compete with NVIDIA, why the renminbi remains so undervalued.
之后,我们将对话帕特里克·麦吉,他撰写了引人入胜的著作《苹果与中国:全球最伟大公司的被俘》,探讨苹果与中国复杂的关系。
And later, we'll speak with Patrick McGee, author of the fascinating book, Apple and China, the capture of the world's greatest company, about Apple's complex relationship with China.
更多精彩内容,敬请期待。
That's all coming up.
但首先,让我们快速了解一下中国股市本周初的表现。
But first, let's do a quick check-in with how the Chinese markets are starting the week.
周一,上证A股指数上涨了0.5%。
On Monday, the Shanghai a share index rose 0.5%.
恒生H股指数收跌1.2%,创下逾两周来最大跌幅。
The Hang Seng h share index closed down 1.2%, its largest loss in over two weeks.
泡泡玛特国际股价下跌超过8%,因市场持续担忧其北美销售趋势;而中国芯片制造商中芯国际股价上涨3%,投资者正试图从正在兴起的本土芯片竞赛中获利。
Popmart International closed down over 8% on continued fears over North American sales trends, and Chinese chipmaker, SMIC, increased 3% as investors look to profit off of the budding domestic chip race.
但关于这一点,我们稍后再详细讨论。
But more on that in just a moment.
好的。
Alright.
詹姆斯,我们直接进入正题吧。
Let's get right into it, James.
中国的芯片竞赛刚刚开辟了新的战线:一家由前英伟达中国高管创立的初创公司More Threads,在上海上市首日股价暴涨超过400%,融资超过10亿美元,瞬间成为北京在打造国产英伟达替代品征程中的最新芯片冠军。
China's chip race just opened up a new front, More Threads, a startup founded by a former NVIDIA executive in China, exploded more than 400% on its first trading day in Shanghai, raising over $1,000,000,000 and instantly becoming Beijing's latest chip champion in its push to build a homegrown alternative to NVIDIA.
这家公司尚未盈利。
The company isn't profitable yet.
它受到美国制裁,而且与台湾或美国相比,仍远未达到技术前沿。
It's under US sanctions, and it's still nowhere near the cutting edge relative to, say, Taiwan or The States.
但其庞大的首次公开募股(IPO)标志着更大的趋势。
But its monster IPO signals something larger.
中国正投入前所未有的资金和政治力量来制造图形处理单元(GPU),希望缩小差距,巩固技术自主的又一支柱。
China is pouring unprecedented capital and political muscle into manufacturing graphic processing units or GPUs, hoping to close the gap and secure another pillar of technological independence.
詹姆斯,除了‘More Threads’这个名字很棒之外,让我觉得有趣的是,它在上市首日就实现了如此巨大的涨幅。
James, beyond this name being great, More Threads, what strikes me as being fascinating is the fact that you have such a huge gain on its frustrating day.
我查了一下,与英伟达甚至中芯国际相比,这个涨幅是数量级上的巨大差距。
I looked it up relative to, say, Nvidia or even SMIC, and this is order of orders of magnitude larger.
中芯国际在上市首日股价飙升了64%。
SMIC opened 64% on its IPO day stock surge.
卡皮科恩公司则上涨了230%。
Capricorn was 230%.
这是425%。
This is 425%.
我们现在可以讨论它是否被高估了,但很明显,中国大陆对中国的芯片制造商充满热情。
Now we can talk about whether or not it's overvalued, but what is clear is that there's a ton of enthusiasm on The Mainland for Chinese chipmakers.
这一点我们过去曾指出过。
This is something that we flagged in the past.
但你能非常快速地谈谈这只股票是否被高估了,以及为什么我们看到如此多的狂热追捧这家试图成为中国英伟达的新入局者吗?
But what's your take very, very quickly on whether or not this is an overvalued stock and why we've seen so much frenzy for this new entrant into the domain who that is really trying to be the NVIDIA of China?
是的。
Yeah.
艾丽斯,说实话,目前很难判断这种狂热是否合理,但我认为这反映了中国半导体行业的规模、该领域的体量以及该行业未来的前景。
Alice, I mean, it's really hard to know whether this frenzy is justified at the moment, but what I think it does speak to is the size of the Chinese semiconductor industry, the size of the sector, and, you know, the the prospects that this sector has.
中国已经是全球最大的半导体市场。
Already, China is the world's biggest market for semiconductors.
今年,中国在购买半导体上的支出可能会超过2000亿美元。
This year, maybe there's gonna be more than 200,000,000,000 US dollars spent in buying semiconductors in China.
这家名为摩尔线程的公司,基本上想取代英伟达。
And this company, Moore's Threads, basically wants to replace NVIDIA.
我的意思是,这听起来目标很大,也许摩尔线程永远无法成为中国的英伟达。
I mean, this sounds like a like a big aim, and it may be that, you know, Moore's Threads will never be the NVIDIA of China.
但目前来看,市场似乎在押注:它至少能部分取代英伟达在中国的部分销售额。
But at the moment, it looks like the market is betting on well, maybe that it will partly, replace some of NVIDIA's sales in China.
这可是个非常大胆的说法,因为英伟达今年在中国的销售额约为170亿美元。
So that's a very big thing to say, straight off because NVIDIA sells about 17,000,000,000 US dollars in China this year.
这约占其全球收入的13%。
That's about 13% of its global revenues.
正如我们都知道的,英伟达是全球最大的公司。
And as we all know, NVIDIA is the world's biggest company.
所以,和往常一样,艾丽丝,我们的讨论涉及的范围非常宏大。
So as usual, in our discussions, Alice, we're painting on a huge canvas here.
这里可能发生或不发生的事情,其影响真的极其重大。
The implications of what may or may not happen here are really enormous.
另一点是,正如你已经提到的,中国有着明确而明确的政策,旨在促进国产芯片的销售。
The other thing is that, as you've already mentioned, China has a clear and explicit policy to boost sales of domestic chips.
也就是说,支持国产芯片,而非进口芯片。
That's domestically made chips and not imported chips.
正如我们所见,中国正在言行一致地投入资金。
And as we've seen, China is putting its money where its mouth is.
它有一个名为‘大基金’的项目。
It's got something called the big fund.
用正式名称来说,它叫作国家集成电路产业投资基金。
To give it its proper name, it's called the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund.
这笔资金大约为1000亿美元,分三期拨付,作为对有前景的中国半导体公司的补贴。
Is basically around a 100,000,000,000 US dollars in three tranches that are given as subsidies to promising Chinese semiconductor companies.
最新的一期资金约为500亿美元。
And the latest tranche is about 50,000,000,000 US dollars.
因此,中国政府大力支持像摩尔线程这样的公司,这些公司旨在取代向中国销售半导体的外国企业。
So the Chinese state is very much behind companies like Moore's Threads that are aiming to replace foreign companies selling semiconductors into China.
所以目前来看,所有这些因素似乎都对这家中国小公司——或者说相对较小的公司——不利。
So at the moment, all those things seem to be sort of stacked against this small, Chinese company or, well, relatively small.
我的意思是,它起步的基础很低。
I mean, it's it's starting from a low base.
它还没有盈利。
It doesn't make a profit.
它被列入了美国的出口管制名单。
It's on The US export control list.
因此,有很多因素并不一定预示着它前景良好,但从宏观角度看,市场规模、政府支持力度,以及它生产的产品——所谓的GPU——旨在直接取代英伟达在中国的相当一部分销量,这些因素都支持着它极高的估值,以及中国投资者对它的大力支持。
So there's a lot of things that are not necessarily auguring that well for it, but the big picture, the size of the market, the size of the government support, and the fact that it makes a product or makes so called GPUs, which are intended to directly replace quite a few of NVIDIA's sales in China.
我认为,所有这些因素都促成了它极高的估值,以及中国投资者对它的大力支持。
All of those things, I think, are behind this enormous valuation and the way in which, obviously, investors at China are getting behind it.
但总体而言,我认为目前还太早,无法判断这家公司是否会成功。
But overall, I'd say at the moment, it's too early to say whether this company will be successful.
你的看法是什么?
What's your what's your take?
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得现在说还为时过早。
I I think it's too early to say.
关于这一点,詹姆斯,我再补充一些细节。
And just some details about this to your point, James.
他们已经大大加快了这家公司的上市进程。
They've really expedited the IPO for this company.
他们仅用88天就获得了上海证券交易所的上市批准,这创下了上交所的历史纪录。
They obtained the IPO approval from the Shanghai Stock Exchange in eighty eight days, and that's a record in SSE history.
此外,还有其他即将上市的公司也值得关注。
And then we've got other listings that are coming down the pipeline as well that's worth watching.
据称,上海证券交易所已经批准了其他芯片制造商的上市申请,比如MetaX、集成电路、SJ半导体、小满UX IC。
Apparently, this Shanghai Stock Exchange has approved applications from other chipmakers like MetaX, Integrated Circuits, SJ Semiconductor, Xiaoman UX IC.
所以,正如你正确指出的,詹姆斯,整个生态系统中正涌现出一大批企业,他们正在全力加速构建芯片产业。
So there's a whole host, as you're rightly mentioning, James, within an ecosystem that they're really trying to rapidly build in chips.
但看涨的观点是,它最终会成为类似Camricorn的公司,这是一家AI加速器芯片制造商,其第三季度收入增长了14倍。
But the bullish case is that it's gonna end up being something like Camricorn, which is a chipmaker for AI accelerators, and that's seen a 14 fold surge in revenues in q three.
现在这家公司终于在经历亏损后实现了盈利,但你知道,我们当时一起算过账。
Now the company's finally profitable after running losses, but, you know, we were doing the maths together.
今年前三个季度,收入同比上涨了181%。
The in the first three quarters of this year, revenues are up a 181% year on year.
但在过去三年里,More Threads累计亏损了60亿美元。
But still in the last three years, More Threads has run 6,000,000,000, I mean, be of losses.
它至今仍未实现盈利。
It's still not yet profitable.
正如我们之前在本集开头提到的,2023年10月,摩尔线程被美国列入实体清单。
And as we mentioned previously at the top of this episode, twenty twenty three, October twenty twenty three, Morse Threads was added to The US's entity listing.
因此,它被禁止进口某些产品。
So there's a ban on what it can import.
而目前,正如你所说,詹姆斯,他们正试图提供一套完整的芯片、网络和软件解决方案,用于在数据中心运行这些芯片。
And right now, to your point, James, they're trying to offer these GPUs within a full stack of chips, networking, and software that is used to run the chips in data centers.
所以其目标实际上是帮助进行人工智能训练、三维图形渲染和物理模拟。
So the goal really is to help in AI training, three d graphics rendering, and and physical simulation.
他们是否能实现这一目标并在英伟达面前具备竞争力仍有待观察,但这个故事确实引人入胜,不仅因为政府的支持,还因为创始人的背景。
Whether or not they can get there and be competitive in NVIDIA remains to be seen, but it certainly is a compelling story, not just because of the government push, but even the background of the founder.
这位人士曾在英伟达负责中国业务长达十五年。
This is a guy who worked at NVIDIA at the China desk for fifteen years.
他曾是英伟达中国区的负责人。
He was the head of China.
他毕业于南京理工大学计算机科学专业,在加入英伟达之前曾供职于惠普和戴尔,如今他和许多同事一起成为新晋亿万富翁。
He was a computer science graduate from Nanjing University of Science and Technology, worked for HP and Dell before NVIDIA, and now is a newly minted billionaire along with a lot of his other colleagues.
所以我们拭目以待,看他能否成为中国的新黄仁勋。
So we'll see whether or not he can be the new Jensen Huang of China.
但毫无疑问,我认为我们都会同意,詹姆斯,这位创始人以及他身后其他新兴公司都得到了政府的大力支持。
But, certainly, I think we agree, James, that there's a lot of government backing behind this guy as well as the other companies that are coming up behind them.
就这样。
That's it.
当然。
Absolutely.
我认为,美国有不少人会注意到,这家名为摩尔线程的公司的创始人曾担任英伟达在中国的业务负责人,不禁思考:有多少美国技术和专业知识正通过后门流向中国公司。
And I think, quite a few people in The US will be looking at the fact that the founder of this company, Moore's Threads, used to head up the operations of NVIDIA in China and thinking, you know, how much American technology and know how is kind of going out the back door to Chinese companies.
我并不是说这违法,但随着中国逐渐追赶上来,你提到了一些案例,比如寒武纪,当然华为也推出了一些芯片,现在正在中国市场上与英伟达竞争并赢得大单。
I'm not saying this is illegal, but, you know, as China begins to catch up, and you've mentioned some of the cases there, you mentioned Cambricon, and, of course, Huawei has got some chips which are now competing and gaining some big contracts in the China market, now competing also with NVIDIA.
我认为,美国很多人正在疑惑:我们该如何阻止技术与专业知识从我们一些最大公司的后门流向中国竞争对手?
I think quite a lot of people in The US are wondering, you know, how do we stop know how and technology going out of the back door of some of our biggest companies to Chinese competitors?
我认为,这又是一个案例,将引起华盛顿政策制定者以及行业其他人士的高度关注。
And, I think that this is another case that really will concentrate the minds of policymakers in Washington and other people in the industry as well.
好的。
Okay.
短暂休息后,我们马上回来继续。
We'll be back with more just after a quick break.
请继续关注。
Stay with us.
本期节目由阿波罗全球管理公司赞助。
Support for today's show comes from Apollo Global Management.
如果我们固守的现状已经不复存在呢?
What if we're clinging to a status quo that no longer exists?
如果公开市场不再反映经济现实呢?
What if public markets no longer reflect the economy?
如果你的投资组合中有数百个公开持股,却只讲一个故事呢?
What if your portfolio has hundreds of public holdings but only one story?
如果增长发生在指数无法覆盖的地方呢?
What if growth lives where the index doesn't?
如果大型项目持续时间超过了原本为其提供资金的资本呢?
What if large scale projects outlast the capital intended to fuel them?
如果私人市场支撑了美国超过80%的贷款呢?
What if private markets power over 80% of US lending?
如果‘银色海啸’早已不再只是未来前景呢?
What if a silver tsunami is no longer on the horizon?
它已经来了。
It's here.
如果传统退休计划存在漏洞呢?
What if there's a hole in traditional retirement plans?
如果我们一直低估了变革的影响呢?
What if we've constantly underestimated the impact of change?
如果金融世界的工作方式与你想象的完全不同呢?
What if the financial world doesn't work the way you think it does?
这些不仅仅是假设。
These aren't just hypotheticals.
在一个不断前进的世界里,你的思维不能停滞不前。
In a world moving forward, your thinking can't sit still.
请前往 apollo.com/ask-what-if 预订首版内容。
Reserve your first edition at apollo.com slash ask what if.
本周《净资产与放松》节目中,我邀请了博士。
This week on Net Worth and Chill, I'm joined by Doctor.
大卫·金,持证皮肤科医生,LightSaver防晒品牌创始人,以及拥有近70万粉丝的极简护肤专家,正在改变我们对皮肤投资的认知。
David Kim, board certified dermatologist, founder of LightSaver Sun Care, and the minimalist skincare expert with nearly 700,000 followers who's changing how we think about investing in our skin.
从斯坦福医学院到塞夫韦的货架,大卫从临床皮肤科医生转变为企业家和创作者经济领域的巨头,其经历堪称将专业知识转化为多重收入来源的典范。
From Stanford Medicine to Sephora shelves, David's journey from clinical dermatologist to entrepreneur and creator economy powerhouse is a masterclass in turning expertise into multiple revenue streams.
他揭开了护肤品和治疗手段真正值不值得你花钱的真相。
He's breaking down the truth about what skin care products and treatments are actually worth your money.
准备好迎接一场对话吧——它将帮你节省开支、消除护肤困惑,并证明有时最好的投资,就是镜子里那个凝视着你的自己。
Get ready for a conversation that'll save your finances, clear up your skin confusion, and prove that sometimes the best investment is the one staring back at you in the mirror.
请在您收听播客的任何平台收听,或在youtube.com/yourrich BFF观看视频。
Listen wherever you get your podcasts or watch on youtube.com/yourrich BFF.
欢迎回来。
Welcome back.
随着我们步入2026年,全球市场最大的未解之谜之一,就是中国是否终于准备好让人民币实现有意义的升值。
As we head into 2026, one of the biggest open questions in global markets is whether China is finally ready to let the renminbi strengthen in a meaningful way.
从纸面来看,人民币严重低估,根据所使用的衡量标准,其历史低估幅度高达40%至50%。
On paper, the currency is deeply undervalued and historically so by as much as 40 to 50% depending on the metric you use.
中国内外的经济学家表示,更强的人民币可以刺激家庭消费,缓解与世界其他地区的贸易紧张关系,并帮助北京摆脱出口导向型增长模式。
And economists inside and outside China say a stronger yuan could boost household spending, ease trade tensions with the rest of the world, and help Beijing pivot away from its export led growth model.
但从政治上看,习近平团队在希望提升人民币的全球信誉与在通缩、内需疲软和房地产行业脆弱的时期保持汇率严格控制之间左右为难。
But, politically, Xi Jinping's team is caught between wanting global credibility for the yuan and wanting tight control over the exchange rate at a time of deflation, weak domestic demand, and a fragile property sector.
让我们回到基本原理:一种货币相对于其他货币的价值之所以重要,是因为它决定了该国商品相对于其他国家商品的贸易竞争力或便宜程度。
Just to walk us back to first principles, the reason a currency's value matters relative to other currencies is that it decides the trade competitiveness or cheapness simply relative to other currencies.
因此,如果中国一直相对于世界其他货币贬值其货币,实际上就是在使中国商品相对于全球其他商品变得更便宜。
So if China is and it has been devaluing its currency relative to other currencies around the world, it effectively is making its good cheaper relative to other goods around the world.
这就是为什么在讨论贸易失衡时,货币问题依然至关重要。
So that's why this currency issue remains salient when we're talking about trade imbalances.
过去几年我们做了一些内部计算,结果显示,如果考虑国际收支的内外部动态,人民币可能被低估了多达20%。
You know, we've done some internal calculations over the last few years, and it seems that the currency could be devalued by as much as 20% if you are accounting for internal and external dynamics in the balance of payments.
我们可以深入探讨国际收支的细节,以及为何它与中方官方公布的海关数据存在巨大差异。
We can go into the nitty gritty of the balance of payments and why they diverge so much from the customs data that the Chinese government officially present.
但我认为布拉德·塞茨的观点很有说服力,布拉德·塞茨是我在这个领域非常推崇的人物。
But I found compelling Brad Setsz's point, and Brad Setsz is really someone I rate highly in this space.
根据国际货币基金组织的数据,我们可以看到人民币可能被低估了18%至30%,最高可达30%。
Based on the IMF data, we could see the currency being devalued between 18 to 30%, so as much as 30%.
这之所以重要,是因为它直接关系到中国与美国、欧洲以及世界许多国家的贸易顺差,也关系到中国经济结构长期严重失衡的现状。
And the reason this matters is because it is fundamental to China's trade surplus with America, with Europe, with many countries in the rest of the world, and it's fundamental to the fact that Chinese economy remains structurally very imbalanced.
你知道,当一种货币疲软时,出口商就会受益。
You know, when you have a weak currency, it benefits the exporters.
它有利于中国的出口导向型增长模式,但却不利于普通家庭和普通中国人——他们用人民币购买外国商品时,这些商品会相对更贵。
It benefits China's export led growth model, but it does not benefit everyday households, everyday Chinese who are buying and choosing to use the CNY to purchase, say, foreign goods that are relatively then more expensive.
因此,我认为,对于许多西方观察者来说,中国一方面希望重新平衡经济,另一方面却仍坚持人民币低估的模式,这令人费解,因为归根结底,这种做法实际上有损于促进家庭收入、提振国内需求的再平衡努力。
So it it's baffling, I think, to a lot of Western observers why as as China wants to rebalance its economy, it remains still wedded to a low CNY model because at the end of the day, it seems to be at a disservice to the rebalancing efforts to to support the household, to support domestic demand.
但我的看法是,詹姆斯,我想快速听听你的意见:归根结底,尽管他们口口声声谈再平衡,但整个经济模式仍然高度依赖出口。
But my own take, and I wanna get yours very quickly, James, is that at the end of the day, as much as they talk about rebalancing, this whole economic model is still highly dependent on exports.
它仍然高度依赖制造业。
It's still highly dependent on the manufacturing sector.
而且,我们将在三月全面公布的五年计划似乎表明,他们打算进一步强化这种以制造业为导向的增长模式。
And if anything, the five year plan that we'll see unveiled fully in March seems to suggest that they wanna double down on this manufacturing led growth.
所以我认为,尽管他们最近更倾向于谈论中国国内更强的人民币,但我很难看到他们会放弃这种较弱的人民币政策。
So I think even although they wanna talk about more recently in domestic China, a stronger CNY, it's hard for me to see them let go of this weaker CNY policy.
但我查阅了自2021年以来中国货币贬值的数据。
But I I looked at the data of China's currency devaluation since about 2021.
我们看到人民币贬值了18%,而同期美元和欧元等其他货币自2021年底以来却在升值。
We've seen it go down 18%, whereas the other currencies like the dollar and the euro have risen since the end of 2021.
更重要的是,今年我们看到,尽管人民币对美元相对走强,但如果你看贸易加权的一篮子货币——这一点很重要——即CFETS和MEB指数,反映的是人民币相对于其他贸易相关外币的汇率。
And more importantly than that, actually, what we saw this year, in spite of the fact that the currency has been relatively strong to the dollar, if you look at the trade weighted basket, and this is important, the CFETS and MEB index, that's China's currency relative to a basket of other trade related foreign currencies.
自今年年初以来,这一篮子指数一直在下降。
It's been going down since the beginning of this year.
因此,人民币相对于欧元、日元以及其他许多贸易货币一直在贬值,而这还不包括美国——显然,今年美元疲软导致人民币相对走强。
So it's been depreciating relative to the euro, to the GPY, to a lot of these other trading currencies, and this is excluding The US where, obviously, we've seen this weak dollar story that's driven some degree of of relative CNY strength this year.
但詹姆斯,关于这个问题,我唠叨得够多了。
But, James, enough of of my rambling about this.
你对人民币及其重要性有什么看法?
What's your hot take on on the CNY and why it matters?
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我的意思是,就在中国公布11月贸易顺差后的几个小时,我们就在讨论这个问题,这意味着今年前十一个月,中国的商品贸易顺差已经超过了1万亿美元。
I mean, we're speaking just a few hours after China announced its trade surplus for November, and that means that in the first eleven months of this year, the Chinese trade surplus for goods already is in excess of 1,000,000,000,000 US dollars.
这意味着全年可能达到约1.2万亿美元,根据我所查阅的各种估算,这可能是历史上最高的贸易顺差之一,大致相当于二战末期美国所经历的巨额顺差。
And that means that for the full year, it might be about 1,200,000,000,000.0 US dollars, which according to various estimates that I've been looking at means that this could be one of the highest trade surpluses in history, roughly equivalent to the some of the huge surpluses we saw The US have in the last years of the second World War.
所以我们谈论的确实是异常高的贸易顺差。
So we're really talking about exceptionally high trade surpluses.
而其中的一个原因当然是人民币、元、CNY——无论你怎么称呼它——被低估了。
And one of the reasons for that, of course, is that the renminbi, the yuan, the CNY, whatever we call it, is undervalued.
这意味着根据经济学家们的各种估算,中国向全球出口的所有商品都比应有的价格便宜得多。
That means that all of China's exports to the world are much cheaper than they should be according to various different estimates that economists make.
我认为现在这一点如此关键,是因为一些人——虽然不多,但在中国内部已经开始讨论人民币升值的窗口期。
And I think the reason that this is so key right now is that some people, just a few, not that many inside China are starting to talk about a window for renminbi appreciation.
所以真正引起我注意的是一个叫毛彦良的人。
So the person that that really came onto my radar was a man called Mao Yan Liang.
他是中国中金公司的首席策略师,这是一家著名的中国投资银行。
He is chief strategist at the China International Capital Corporation, which is a famous investment bank in China.
有些人称它为中国版的高盛。
Some people call it the Goldman Sachs of China.
他说,由于中国制造业的竞争力非常强,人民币升值的窗口正在打开。
And he said that because China's manufacturing competitiveness is so strong, a window for renminbi appreciation is opening.
还有另一位颇具影响力的中国声音,魏正山,他是总部位于香港的私募股权公司PAG的首席执行官。
And then another, quite influential Chinese voice, Wei Zhengshan, who is chief executive of a private equity company called PAG, He's based in Hong Kong.
他说,这甚至更令人震惊:在未来五年内,人民币汇率逐步升值至少50%是可行的,并且对中国有利。
He said, and this is even more dramatic, that a gradual appreciation of at least 50% in the value of the renminbi over the next five years would be both feasible and beneficial to China.
所以我不确定是否同意他关于超过50%的估算,但根据几位经济学家的观点以及你刚才引用的一些数据,人民币确实被严重低估。
So I don't know if we agree on the, on his estimate there of over 50%, but, you know, in the minds of several economists and and some of the data that you've just been quoting, the renminbi is severely undervalued.
我们谈论的是2030年。
We're talking 2030.
所以,如果这种情况真的现在发生了,即使未来几年人民币逐步升值,也会带来许多变化。
And so if this really does change now, even if there's a gradual appreciation that goes on for several years to come, so many things will change.
中国对进口的需求可能会发生变化,因为这意味着进口商品对中国民众来说会变得更便宜。
China's appetite for imports may well change because it means that imports will become cheaper to Chinese people.
也许全球的投资者会想,随着人民币对美元升值,中国资产相对于美元将变得更有价值,因此我们该买一些中国股票了。
Maybe investors all over the world will say, oh, Chinese assets are going to become more valuable relative to the US dollar as the renminbi climbs against the US dollar, and so therefore, let's buy some of these Chinese stocks.
我的意思是,我记得八十年代在日本的时候。
I mean, I remember I was in Japan in the eighties.
我记得在1985年广场协议之后,日元开始升值,当时发生了巨大规模的变化,我们看到了大量资本涌入日本市场。
I remember that happening in such a massive way in the eighties after the yen began to appreciate post the plaza record in 1985, I think it was, and we saw huge tidal waves of capital inflows into the Japanese market.
我不是说这次一定会发生同样的情况。
I'm not saying that's gonna happen this time.
我认为历史不会完全重演,但可能会有相似之处。
I don't think that history will repeat itself, but it could rhyme.
你知道的?
You know?
我们可能会遇到一种情况,即中国资产在全球投资者中变得更加受欢迎和更具吸引力。
We could get a situation in which Chinese assets become more popular, more attractive to, investors around the world.
最后我想提一下一件有点幽默的事情,那就是所谓的巨无霸指数。
So the last thing I'd mention, which is a slightly humorous thing, is the so called Big Mac Index.
这是《经济学人》杂志的一种粗略估算,用以判断某种货币是被高估还是低估,它基本上比较了美国麦当劳出售的巨无霸价格与在中国的情况。
This is The Economist magazine's, kind of back of the envelope calculation on whether or not a currency is overvalued or undervalued, and it basically compares the price of a Big Mac sold at McDonald's in The US, let's say, compared to, in this case, China.
目前,美国麦当劳的巨无霸售价为6.01美元,而在中国,其价格相当于3.6美元。
And currently, a Big Mac in McDonald's in The US costs $6.01, whereas in China, it costs the equivalent of 3.6 US dollars.
因此,即使根据《经济学人》的巨无霸指数,人民币也明显被低估了。
So you can see that even according to the Big Mac Index of The Economist, the renminbi is severely undervalued.
所以,让我们看看情况会如何发展,但整个经济中最重要的价格,莫过于本国货币相对于其他货币的价格。
So, you know, let's see how this goes, but there really is no more important price in the whole economy than the price of its currency relative to other currencies.
因此,如果人民币开始升值,很多事情都会发生变化。
So if the renminbi does start to appreciate, a lot of things will change.
是的。
Yeah.
我对您提到的这些声音在这场辩论中占据主导地位持一定程度的怀疑态度。
I'm somewhat skeptical that the voices that you mentioned will be the dominant ones in this debate.
你知道,詹姆斯,在过去十多年里,我们一直听到很多关于中国需要更强货币以推动人民币国际化的讨论。
As you know, James, for the better part of a decade, we've heard a lot of talk about China needing a stronger currency to promote the renminbi internationalization.
但当我们查看数据时,人民币在全球外汇储备中的占比、在全球支付中的占比实际上并没有太大变化。
But when we look at the figures, they haven't really moved that much in terms of the share of global FX reserves, in terms of the share of global payments.
现在,它们在全球支付中的份额只是略有增加。
Now they've marginally increased in the share of global payments.
但如果你看外汇储备的占比,美国仍然约占56%。
But if you look at the share of FX reserves, The US is still at about 56%.
中国的份额约为全球外汇储备的2%。
China's is about 2% share of global FX reserves.
而且,如果他们真的关心加强人民币,这实际上有助于使人民币在贸易计价和作为其他国家外汇储备的组成部分时更具吸引力。
And, look, if they really cared about strengthening the CNY, this could help actually make CNY more attractive for payments in trade invoicing and for an FX reserve in the share of other countries' global FX reserves.
所以我们需要密切关注这一领域。
So we'll have to watch this space.
我更倾向于持怀疑态度。
I'm a bit more on the skeptical side.
我想补充一点,因为我们目前仍处于中美贸易协议第二阶段的过程中。
One thing that I will add, as we're still in the midst of this phase two of a trade deal between The US and China.
当我去年十一月在中国时,曾有人讨论过一个‘安静的广场协议’。
When I when I was in China in November, there was some discussion about a quiet plaza accord.
你知道,上世纪八十年代日美之间有过这样的情况:日本在美方压力下悄悄让日元升值。
You know, other eighties between Japan and The US, wait Japan quietly appreciated its currency, facing pressure from the Americans to do so.
类似地,2016年中美之间也发生过类似情况。
Similarly, we saw something happen between China and The US in 2016.
当时曾有人讨论过‘上海协议’。
There was discussion about a Shanghai Accord.
你看。
Look.
我认为这可能是中国在贸易谈判中提供帮助的一种方式,因为最终特朗普希望美元走弱,他相信汇率确实驱动着贸易失衡——无论这种看法对错与否。
I think this could be a way in which China helps in the trade negotiations because, ultimately, Trump wants a weaker dollar, and he believes that currencies really drive trade imbalances rightly or wrongly.
所以,我再次强调,我们应该关注这一领域,因为我认为这在华盛顿与北京正在进行的贸易谈判中具有政治重要性。
So I again, we we should watch this space because I think it's politically salient in the ongoing trade talks between Washington and Beijing.
当然,美国本届政府非常关注汇率问题,所以我们得看看是否会对人民币施加压力。
Certainly, this administration in in The US cares a lot about currencies, so we'll have to see if there is pressure put on the CNY.
好吧,最终我们在某件事上意见不同了,爱丽丝。
Well, finally, we disagree on something, Alice.
你不像我那样相信人民币升值的说法,我觉得是这样,但这很有趣。
You you're you're not buying this story of renminbi appreciation as much as me, I think, but but that's interesting.
我的意思是,我们走着瞧吧。
I mean, let let's see how it goes.
我完全理解你的观点。
I I fully get your point.
这就像那只从未吠叫的狗,在过去二三十年里,这种情况发生了太多次。
This is the dog that didn't bark on so many occasions, on so many occasions in the last twenty, thirty years.
我记得,每当中国以外的人都对人民币升值感到兴奋时,但往往最终都没有发生。
I can remember when everybody outside China was getting really excited about the renminbi appreciation, and often it never happened.
在某些情况下,情况恰恰相反。
And in some cases, the opposite happened.
人民币贬值了。
The renminbi depreciated.
所以,你知道,也许你是对的,但这次我要大胆表态了。
So, you know, maybe you're right, but I'm gonna I'm gonna stick my neck out this time.
我觉得这次可能会发生。
I think it might happen this time.
我还注意到,法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙最近刚访问过中国,他谈到了欧洲潜在的保护主义威胁,还有类似的问题。
And I also note that president Emmanuel Macron of, France, who was in China just recently, was talking about, the threat of potential protectionism in Europe and, you know, things like that.
所以,中国可能已经意识到,如果不允许人民币升值,它可能会在其最重要的出口市场积累更大的压力。
So maybe it's on China's radar that unless it allows the renminbi to appreciate, it could be storing up quite a bit more pressure from some of its most important export markets.
是的。
Yeah.
当然。
Definitely.
好的。
Okay.
我们再做最后一次短暂休息,然后回来继续与帕特里克·麦吉对话。
Let's take one last quick break, and we'll be back with Patrick McGee.
请继续关注我们。
So stay with us.
如果你在世纪之交时经常上网,那么AIM(AOL即时通讯)很可能对你的社交生活至关重要。
If you were a person online around the turn of the century, there's a good chance that AIM, AOL Instant Messenger, was crucially important to your social life.
对我们这一代人来说,它是我们学会使用LOL、LMAO、JK和BRB等方式交流的途径。
For a whole generation of us, it's how we learned to LOL and LMAO and JK and BRB.
它教会了我们如何在线上与人相处。
It's how we learn to be people online.
本周的《版本历史》是一档关于旧技术的新聊天节目。
And this week on Version History, a new chat show about old technology.
我们将全面讲述AIM的故事,从它在AOL内部的秘密开发阶段,到最终被短信彻底淘汰的悲惨结局。
We're talking about the whole story of AIM, from its skunkworks era inside of AOL to its very sad death at the hands of text messages.
所有这些内容都在Virgin History,无论你在哪个平台收听播客。
All that on Virgin History wherever you get podcasts.
欢迎回来。
Well, welcome back.
我们现在邀请到了记者帕特里克·麦吉。
We're joined now by journalist Patrick McGee.
他是令人着迷的著作《苹果在中国:全球最伟大公司的崛起》的作者,该书今年早些时候出版并广受好评。
He is the author of the fascinating book Apple in China, the Capture of the World's Greatest Company, which was published earlier this year to widespread acclaim.
帕特里克,非常感谢你加入我们。
Patrick, thanks so much for joining us.
由你作为我们的首位嘉宾,似乎再合适不过了。
It seems quite fitting that you are our first guest.
我相信你和詹姆斯之间也存在某种联系。
I believe there is a an Feet connection with James as well.
但你无疑是首位荣誉嘉宾,欢迎来到《中国解码》。
But you are the honorary first guest, so welcome to China Decode.
太棒了。
Amazing.
巨大的荣誉。
Huge honor.
谢谢你,爱丽丝。
Thank you, Alice.
谢谢你,詹姆斯。
Thank you, James.
那我们直接进入你的书吧,我目前正在读,非常喜欢。
Well, let's go straight into your book, which I am midway reading, and I am absolutely loving it.
你的书带领读者回顾了苹果公司近年来在中国的惊人投资。
Your book takes the reader through the recent history of Apple's incredible investment in China.
让我感到惊讶的是,作为一家年收入达4000亿美元的公司,苹果与大多数美国科技公司截然不同。
What's striking to me is that Apple as a company earning $400,000,000,000 in revenues is unlike most US tech companies.
它非常依赖硬件,也非常依赖中国。
It is very hardware dependent and very China dependent.
事实上,在其发展历程与中国的关系中,苹果公司反而进一步加强了对中国市场的依赖。
And in fact, in the course of its evolution and a relationship with China, it's actually doubled down on its China dependency.
而iPhone仍然是其最重要的产品,由于其与中国的关系和联系,它仍存在巨大的脆弱性。
And the iPhone is still its most important product with huge vulnerabilities because of its relationship and ties to China.
在你看来,为什么中国在过去几年里反而更加坚定了这一战略,使其对中国更加依赖,而不是减少依赖?
Why, to your mind, has China doubled down on this strategy that's made it even more reliant on China in the last few years and not less?
这本书的副标题是‘对全球最伟大公司的掌控’,这是因为世界上根本没有其他地方能让苹果以所需的质量、尤其是所需的规模和成本来生产产品。
Well, the subtitle of the book is the capture of the world's greatest company, and it's because there just is no other place on the planet where Apple can build products in the quality it needs, but especially at the quantity it needs and then, of course, at the cost that it requires.
他们过去二十五年来一直在中国的数百家工厂进行投资。
They've been making, you know, investments in China across hundreds of factories for twenty five years.
没有任何其他地方能带来同等的投资回报,也没有任何其他地方能实现苹果所要求的水平。
There's just no other place where those investments would have the same return on investment, and there's no other place just capable of achieving what Apple, has demanded.
因此,这段历史实际上讲述的是苹果与中国如何逐渐成为合作伙伴的故事。
And so the history really is a narrative of how Apple and China sort of came to be partners.
对吧?
Right?
这里有一种技能与规模的结合。
There's sort of a a marriage here of skill and scale.
我认为苹果公司内部存在某种傲慢,认为看看我们过去二十五年做了什么。
And I think there's a bit of hubris within Apple that thinks, look at what we did the last twenty five years.
现在我们可以把同样的模式复制到印度。
Now we can do that in India.
出于一些原因——我希望这些原因是错误的,因为我真的很希望印度能取得成功——但我并不认为这种照搬复制的策略真的能奏效。
And for a bunch of reasons that, like, I wish were incorrect because I would love to see things take off in India, I just don't think that copy and paste strategy is really going to work.
我认为,出于多种原因,他们的命运与中国的联系密不可分;至于他们想把生产转移到美国之类的观点,我觉得这太不切实际了,如果我们真以为这是可行的选择,只会导致一系列糟糕的政策。
I think their fate is really tied to China for a host of reasons and, you know, ideas that they're gonna move production or diversified production to The United States, for instance, I think are fanciful, and we're gonna have a whole host of bad policies if we think that's a realistic option.
再简单追问一下。
And just a quick follow-up.
为什么摆脱对中国如此依赖如此困难?
Why is it that it's so hard to get off this China dependency?
中国的情况究竟有什么独特而优厚的地方,使得它如此难以替代?
What is it that's so so generous and unique about the China case that makes it so captive?
苹果的产品非常复杂,而且是以巨大的规模生产的。
Apple's products are just really complicated, and they're doing so at huge scale.
如果你还记得2007年的第一代iPhone,当时他们只生产了大约500万台,而且仅限于美国市场。
So if you remember the first iPhone in 2007, they only made about 5,000,000 of them, and it was only a US product.
对吧?
Right?
它甚至无法在美国以外的AT&T网络之外使用。
It didn't even work outside of AT and T networks in The United States.
到2015年,他们每年生产2.3亿部。
By 2015, they were building 230,000,000 of them a year.
对吧?
Right?
每部iPhone内部包含上千个零部件。
There are a thousand components within each iPhone.
如果你在旺季每天生产上百万部,那么每天就要处理十亿个零部件。
If you're building up to a million a day in peak season, you're operating with a billion components per day.
我的意思是,美国根本没有工厂能制造这些零部件,更不用说所有零部件了。
I mean, America just doesn't have factories to really make any of those components, let alone all of them.
在21世纪初,中国引入了一种叫做‘邻厂制造’的模式,要知道,前几年苹果还在台湾生产,但依赖的是分布在新加坡、泰国、马来西亚等地的供应链。
And China introduces in the early two thousands sort of something called next door manufacturing where, know, you in the previous years, Apple would be building in Taiwan, but relying on a network that would be in Singapore, Thailand, you know, Malaysia.
中国只是其中一部分,还有日本和韩国。
China would be part of it and Japan, and Korea.
当你在进行原型设计时,你真的要跨越海洋,去完成组装,然后让产品运转起来。
And, you know, when you were prototyping something, you were literally crossing bodies of water, right, to sort of do the assembly and then make things work.
然后再长途跋涉回到加州,给史蒂夫·乔布斯展示。
And then crossing all the way back to California to show it to Steve Jobs.
对吧?
Right?
这属于早期阶段的事情。
This is sort of in the early chapters.
中国让这一切不再需要跨越海洋、通过海关等繁琐流程,而是变成了一次步行就能完成的短途出行。
China made that instead of crossing bodies of water and going through customs and all this sort of stuff, it made it a walk down the street.
对吧?
Right?
他们建设了世界领先的港口、八车道高速公路和高速铁路,中国这种效率在地球上其他任何地方都看不到类似的规模。
The way that they introduced world leading ports, eight lane highways, high speed rail, the efficiencies in China just aren't seen on a similar scale anywhere else on the planet.
我的意思是,我曾与苹果公司二月份的高层人士交谈过,他们甚至说,即使我们知道习近平在iPhone诞生时在位,你们还能去哪呢?
I mean, I've talked to people really senior at Apple in the February who would say, even if we knew Xi Jinping was coming when the iPhone was birthed, where else would you have us go?
当时根本不存在另一个地方,能像凯尔·陈所说的那样,具备吸收并实施苹果经验的‘吸收能力’。
There was just no place where you had the sort of what Kyle Chan has called absorption capacity, to understand and deploy Apple's lessons.
所以,我想可能还有其他原因,但我希望这能为你提供一个合理的概览,说明为什么中国如此主导,以及为什么苹果别无选择。
So, I mean, there's probably other reasons, but I hope that's a decent overview as to just why China's so dominant and why Apple has no other choice.
当然。
Absolutely.
很高兴你能来,帕特里克。
And, terrific to have you on, Patrick.
我对这件事的政治背景有点兴趣。
I I'm just interested a little bit in the political context of this.
我的意思是,你一开始向我们展示了苹果是如何被中国所掌控的。
I mean, you you started off by, showing us how Apple has been captured by China.
中国对苹果的掌控是否赋予了中国在华盛顿或其他方面的任何政治影响力?
Does China's holdover Apple give China any kind of political influence in Washington or other forms of influence?
你对此怎么看?
What do you think about that?
嗯,是的。
Well, yes.
我的意思是,中国对苹果的掌控只是众多因素中的一个。
I mean, obviously, China's holdover Apple is just one of many factors.
所以也许很难明确指出这一点,但我只是觉得,当唐纳德·特朗普在最近几个月针对中国发动‘特朗普2.0’时,北京根本不需要做太多。
So maybe it's difficult to pinpoint that expressly, but I just think when Donald Trump went after, China in in in Trump two point o, right, in just the recent months, Beijing didn't have to do a lot.
对吧?
Right?
只需稍微卷起袖子,展示一下实力就够了。
Sort of lifted its sleeves just to show the muscle.
我的意思是,许可稀土矿物用于任何产品的政策根本就没有实施,但仅仅是这一威胁就被视为‘打破玻璃’的时刻,华盛顿对此提出了抱怨。
I mean, the policy of, you know, licensing rare earth minerals for any sort of product wasn't even something that took effect, but the mere threat of that essentially was considered a break the glass moment, and Washington complained about it.
但本质上,特朗普不得不退让。
But, essentially, Trump had to back down.
我的意思是,我认为他采用的策略可能在2016或2017年有效,但他没有意识到这次中国已经准备得更加充分了。
I mean, I think he's deploying a strategy that might have worked in 02/1617, not realizing just how more prepared for it China is this time around.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,想想‘一带一路’倡议这样的政策。
I mean, you think of policies like the Belt and Road Initiative.
我的意思是,‘一带一路’是多方面的,但其中一点是确保在欧洲和美国之外存在繁荣的市场,让中国能够向这些市场出口产品。
I mean, that is many things, but one thing it is, it's it's an initiative to make sure that there are thriving markets outside of Europe, outside of America, where China can send its exports to.
我认为‘中国制造2015’是中国在十个不同产业中实现主导地位的极其成功的计划。
Made in China 2015, I think, has been a wildly successful plan on the part of China to become dominant across 10 different industries.
这本书提出一个观点:苹果公司无意中成为了‘中国制造2015’最大的支持者,这是一个相当惊人的说法,但我认为这一观点在400页的叙述中得到了充分支持。
And the book makes the case that Apple, however, inadvertently is the biggest supporter of Made in China 2015, which is a fairly stunning claim, but I think one that's pretty well backed up in the 400 page narrative.
嗯,帕特里克,我书中另一个让我觉得有趣的地方是,某种程度上——我是推断的——如果没有苹果在中国,就不会有华为和小米在中国。
Well, I the other thing that struck me as interesting, Patrick, in your book is the fact that in a way, and I'm inferring it, you can't have Huawei and Xiaomi in China without Apple in China.
在一些
That there were, in some of
这些
these
合同中,嵌入在原始设备制造商供应商与苹果之间的关系里,它们不能对苹果过于依赖。
contracts, embedded within the relationship between the OEM suppliers and Apple that they couldn't be the suppliers too dependent on Apple.
你能为我们详细解释一下吗?
Can you walk us through that a little bit?
因为当我想到苹果、特斯拉等西方公司的进入时,我觉得这很有趣:它们在某种程度上启动了一个如果没有它们就不会存在的本土生态系统。
Because I find that fascinating when we think about the introduction of these Western companies like Apple and Tesla, that in a way, they kind of kick start a domestic ecosystem that wouldn't have existed without them.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,这可以说是苹果业务在你国家存在的第二层、第三层影响,而我认为这本书对苹果历史的最大贡献在于:苹果并不是以传统方式外包的。
I mean, this is sort of like a second order, third order impact of what it means to have Apple operations in your country, which is that, like, the biggest contribution I think the book makes to Apple history is that Apple doesn't outsource in the traditional way.
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对吧?
Right?
如果你和我一起开发或设计一个产品,找外包商的意思就是,找一个真正懂得如何实际制造产品的人。
If you and I build a product together or design a product together, the idea of finding an outsourcer is, you know, someone that's competent in in in in the wherewithal of how to actually build something.
前提是,市场上有能完成制造的生产商。
The the assumption is that there is a a producer available to do that.
在中国的叙事,或者苹果在中国的叙事中,他们并不是在中国找到了这种能力。
In China's narrative or Apple in China's narrative, they don't find the competence in China.
而是在中国培养出了这种能力。
They build the competence in China.
literally 就是带着大量苹果工程师,从零开始进行工程培训,而苹果所颠覆的行业之一,就是航空业。
Literally just engineering one zero one with so many, Apple engineers that, you know, among the industries Apple disrupts is the airline industry.
对吧?
Right?
联合航空开始飞往杭州、成都这样的城市,这些地方在联合航空整个航线网络中是最偏远的之一,他们每周飞三次,前提是苹果会购买大量头等舱机票,即使飞机其他座位空着也无所谓。
United begins flying to places like Hangzhou and Chengdu, places that are as furthest away, like, as as is possible in United's entire network, and they begin flying there three times a week with the understanding that Apple will buy so many first class tickets that it doesn't matter if the rest of the plane is empty.
对吧?
Right?
因此,他们在提升能力方面做出了巨大贡献。
So they are having an enormous contribution building up the competencies.
事实上,他们购买了设备,并安装在所有这些工厂的生产线上。
In fact, purchasing the machinery and installing it on the production line of all these factories.
所以,你知道,这是这本书最重要的启示:苹果对这些工厂产生了巨大的影响。
And so, you know, that's just, like, sort of the biggest takeaway of of of the book that Apple had this massive influence on all of these factories.
一旦苹果建立了这些能力,他们就会发现,如果你还记得最初的五、六、七代iPhone,它们的设计都发生了重大变化。
So once Apple has built up these competencies, what they experience is that, you know, if you remember the first five, six, seven iPhones, they were pretty major changes to those designs.
因此,基本上,每当他们淘汰了某些零部件,也就同时淘汰了对应的整个供应商。
And so what would happen basically is is if they obviated the need for certain components, ipso facto, they were obviating the need for that entire supplier.
由于苹果是一家极其保密的公司,这些供应商往往直到最后一刻才得知这一消息。
And because Apple's such a secretive company, that supplier would find out sort of at the last possible second.
如果你还记得,iPhone的产量从2007年的500万台增长到2015年的2.3亿台,想象一下,当你身处这种指数级增长的起点,苹果却在你投入了大量资金、人力、地产和设备之后突然切断了合作。
And, if you remember going from 5,000,000 iPhones in 2007 to 230,000,000 by 2015, Imagine you're on the ground floor of of of that sort of exponential growth, and then Apple just cuts you off after you've made all sorts of investment and you've got all sorts of, people and real estate and machinery.
我的意思是,你直接就破产了。
I mean, you would just go bankrupt.
我的意思是,这种情况一直在发生:每当苹果做出这样的转变,就会引发各种政治问题,因为他们和富士康这样的公司合作,而这些公司又牵涉到当地的政界和基层。
I mean, so this was just happening kind of all the time where if Apple made that sort of turn, it was causing all sorts of, sort of political problems because they'd be working with you know, the likes of Foxconn would be working with, who's on the politics and the grounds there.
于是苹果制定了一个名为‘50%规则’的政策,即告诉供应商:无论你们与我们的增长速度多快,你们也必须以同样的速度与其他客户增长。
And so Apple instituted this rule called the 50% rule, which was that they would tell the supplier, however fast you're growing with us, you need to grow that fast with somebody else.
所以这其实是一种利己的考量。
So it was a self interested reason.
它给了苹果更大的灵活性。
It gave Apple flexibility.
对吧?
Right?
他们觉得这样可以在不造成太大破坏的情况下灵活调整方向。
They felt like they could pivot without sort of causing such damage.
但如果我是深圳一家做镜头技术的公司,苹果一直告诉我、教我,而且明确地共同创造——帮助我建立设施和流程,把康宁公司按米切割的玻璃进一步切割、钢化,以及用多点触控技术蚀刻它。
But if I'm lens technology in Shenzhen and Apple's been telling me and teaching me, and co creating, to be clear, you know, facilities and and processes to take Corning glass that's cut by the meter and then cut it, temper it, you know, help etch it with multi touch technology.
那我拿这些想法能做什么呢?
Well, what am I gonna do with that with those ideas?
我要教本地的本土供应商。
I'm gonna teach the local homegrown suppliers.
我要教华为、OPPO、vivo 和 小米。
I'm gonna teach Huawei and Oppo and Vivo and Xiaomi.
因此,苹果在某种程度上培育了自己的竞争对手,这些竞争对手能够依赖苹果带到这个国家的那些能力。
So Apple, in a sense, built up its own competitors who were able to rely on, the very competencies that Apple had brought to the country.
我对这一点的调侃是,在西方,我们常常认为苹果淘汰了诺基亚。
My sort of quip about this is that in the West, we often think that Apple killed Nokia.
对吧?
Right?
诺基亚无法跟上多点触控技术和 iOS 软件。
Nokia wasn't able to keep up with multi touch technology and and software, the iOS.
我认为这更像是一个硬件故事。
I think it's much more of a hardware story.
但如果这是一个硬件故事,苹果从未强大到足以击败诺基亚。
But if it's a hardware story, Apple was never big enough to kill Nokia.
诺基亚在某些市场经常占据50%的份额。
Nokia often had 50%, penetration in certain markets.
苹果在全球的市场份额从未超过20%。
Apple's never had more than 20% globally.
那么是谁杀死了诺基亚?
So who'll who killed Nokia?
答案是那些中国竞争对手,苹果通过建立供应链,使它们变得如此强大,以至于它们都能依赖这套体系。
And the answer is the Chinese competitors that Apple had made so good by building up a supply chain that they could all rely on.
太有趣了。
Fascinating.
向前看一点,帕特里克,如果我们试着展望十年或五年后,你认为世界其他地区——尤其是西方——还有多少希望能打破中国对苹果及其他大型科技公司的掌控?
Just looking forward a little bit, Patrick, I mean, if we try to think forward maybe a decade or five years or something like that, what hope do you think, the rest of the world, I mean, the West has to loosen China's capture of Apple and and other big tech companies, not just Apple?
就苹果而言,目前正试图在印度推动制造业务。
I mean, in the case of Apple, there is this attempt to get manufacturing going in India.
我见过各种数据,但现在确实有不少iPhone在印度生产。
I've seen various numbers, but there there are quite a few iPhones now being made in India.
你认为这是长期战略吗?
Do you think that's a long term strategy?
你认为这种做法在五到十年内能取得成果吗?还是说,我们正处在一个中国掌控苹果、主导智能手机供应链的未来格局中?
Do you think it's something that could bear fruit over a five, ten year time scale, or are we basically in a world in which China captures Apple, dominates the the supply chain for for smartphones for the foreseeable future?
书的结尾持一种非常悲观的观点,而不幸的是,我至今仍持这种看法。
It's such a pessimistic outlook at the end of the book, and it's unfortunately the one that I still have now.
我总是希望有专家能让我摆脱这种悲观情绪,过去六个月里,我一直在向我遇到的各类人坚定地提出这个问题。
I'm always hoping that some expert is able to shake me out of my pessimism, and I've sort of been asking that, you know, adamantly of all sorts of people that I've been meeting over the last six months.
但基本上,没有人能做到,他们甚至根本没打算这么做。
And, basically, just nobody has been able to do it, and they're not really even trying.
我的意思是,你对这些领域的了解越深,就越能理解中国在这些行业中的主导地位,以及其它地区——尤其是美国,但不幸的是,印度由于种种原因——是多么无能为力。
I mean, the sort of the more you know about the fields, the more you understand about China's dominance in these sectors and how incapable other places, are, not not least of which America, but, unfortunately, India for a host of reasons as well.
所以,我的意思是,那些代表苹果或其供应商(如富士康和塔塔)在印度工作的工程师和高管们,才是真正说‘这并不像我们期望的那样有效’的人。
So, I mean, look, it's it's basically, you know, engineers and executives that are working in India on behalf of Apple or its suppliers like Foxconn and Tata that are the ones that are saying, like, this isn't working the way that that we need it to.
对吧?
Right?
如果你谈论印度的速度,那并不是相当于深圳或中国速度。
If you talk about India speed, you're not talking about as the equivalent of Shenzhen or China speed.
不幸的是,这是一个贬义词。
It's, unfortunately, a pejorative term.
印度根本没有类似的邻近设施或生态系统。
India just doesn't have the same next door facilities, or ecosystems.
他们想要高附加值的东西,比如韩国人特别擅长的那些领域。
They want to have the higher value added stuff, the sort of things that the Koreans, for instance, are really great at.
但他们并没有真正理解,让中国如此强大的原因在于拥有全部环节。
But they don't quite get that what makes China so good is having everything.
对吧?
Right?
富士康拥有技术精湛的博士,同时还有外来劳工,这些工作甚至可以在周一短短二十分钟内教会你。
Deeply skilled PhDs at Foxconn coupled with migrant labor, where the job can literally be taught to you in twenty minutes on a Monday.
到了周五,你已经达到了体力和能力的巅峰,能够完成这项工作。
And by Friday, you're already at the peak of your strength, your abilities to be able to pull that off.
印度某种程度上不想扮演这些角色,或者说,像泰米尔纳德邦和卡纳塔克邦这样推动变革的部长们并不想扮演这些角色。
India sort of doesn't wanna play those roles, or rather the ministers driving the change in certain provinces like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka don't want to play those roles.
但如果他们不这么做,就永远无法与中国竞争。
And yet if they don't, they're never gonna compete with China.
因此,不幸的是,我对我们的前景相当悲观,我只想引用一些基本统计数据和预测,比如联合国的预测:今天中国占全球制造业附加值的约三分之一,而到2030年的预测是中国将占据45%。
So, unfortunately, I'm quite pessimistic about our chances, and I would maybe just point to basic statistics and projections like from the United Nations that would say China today has roughly one third of the value added in manufacturing, and their projection for 2030 is that China will have 45% of it.
我本想更乐观一些,但当我们所处的大环境就是如此时,乐观的依据又在哪里呢?
I wanna be more optimistic, but when that's the sort of broader paradigm that we're working in, where is the optimism coming from?
完全正确。
Absolutely.
如果我可以提一个简短的后续问题的话。
If I could if I could just have a quick follow-up.
我的意思是,这会给中国带来怎样的地缘政治影响力?
I mean, what kind of geopolitical power does this give China?
我的意思是,如果到2035年,中国占了全球制造业附加值的45%,是这样吗?
I mean, if China's making 45% of the world's manufacturing value added by 2035, was it?
还有人提到,称中国是中间产品的欧佩克,因为它生产了世界上几乎所有产品所需的大批零部件。
And and there's another reference to a a scholar calling China the OPEC of intermediate products because it makes so many of the components that the world needs to make just about everything.
这将赋予中国怎样的地缘政治力量?
What sort of geopolitical power does that give China going forward?
我的意思是,这是否意味着中国可以随时挟持他人,实施经济胁迫,以在政治或经济事务上达成自己的目的?
I mean, does that mean that China can basically hold everybody to ransom, indulge in a bit of economic coercion when it wants to get its way in the world, either politically or or in economic matters?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,我们难道不是已经在目睹这种情况了吗?
I mean, aren't we already seeing that?
我的意思是,我认为过去六个月左右的经验已经说明了这一点。
I mean, that's that's sort of the lesson, I think, over the last six months or so.
所以,我想说,我们正在亲眼见证这一切的发生。
So I I I would sort of say we're just watching that play out.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,即使在特朗普2.0之前,就是拜登对中国出口的电动汽车征收了100%的关税。
I mean, even before Trump two point o, it was Biden that put a 100% tariffs on EVs coming from China.
如果欧洲不采取类似政策,你会看到越来越多的电动汽车占据市场。
And if, Europe sort of doesn't impose that sort of policy, you're just gonna see more and more electric vehicles taking over.
我特别喜欢诺亚·史密斯的一句话,这位经济学家认为,从西方的视角来看,产能过剩是个问题,但在中国看来,这不过是通过生产超出自身需求的产品,并以残酷的价格出口,甚至在某些情况下亏本销售,来实现其他国家的去工业化。
There's this line from Noah Smith that I really like, you know, the the economist who talks about how, overcapacity is seen as a problem from a Western lens, but through China's lens, this is just something where by producing more than they need and then exporting it at cutthroat prices or even losing money in certain respects, I mean, they're just deindustrializing other nations.
这对资本主义的盈利逻辑来说并不好。
And that's not good for sort of capitalism in the profit sense.
但如果你把这当作产业战略,甚至视为一种战争手段,那么盈利就不是目标了。
But if you're using this as industrial statecraft, if not war, profit is not the goal.
这是个很好的思考方式。
That's a great way to think about it.
帕特里克·麦吉,非常感谢你。
Patrick McGee, thank you so much.
这是一个绝佳的案例,展示了真正与中国脱钩有多么困难。
This is a great case study for how hard it is to actually decouple from China.
帕特里克·麦吉是《苹果在中国》一书的作者。
Patrick McGee is the author of Apple in China.
帕特里克,非常感谢你抽出时间。
Patrick, thank you so much for your time.
谢谢。
Thank you.
非常感谢。
Appreciate it.
好了,詹姆斯。
Alright, James.
该做预测了。
It's predictions time.
你这一周的预测是什么?
What's your prediction for the week?
我会坚持人民币。
Well, I'm gonna stick with the renminbi.
正如我所说,我会坚定地站在这一边。
And, as I say, I'm gonna nail my colors to the mast.
我几乎肯定会错,因为我觉得我见过的每一个货币预测都以某种方式错了。
I'll almost certainly be wrong because I think every currency prediction I've ever come across has been wrong in some way.
但我还是想说,因为我觉得这非常重要:我认为明年,也就是2026年,人民币对美元将升值10%。
But I'd like to say because I think it's so important that I think next year, 2026, the renminbi will appreciate by 10% against the US dollar.
这将对全球产生巨大影响,既包括资本流入中国,也可能影响中国人对购买外国进口商品的兴趣。
And this will have enormous impacts all over the world, both in flows of capital into China and potentially, you know, the interest that Chinese people show in buying foreign imports as well.
这就是我的预测,爱丽丝。
So that's my prediction, Alice.
我知道这是一个大胆的预测。
I know it's a bold one.
我可能不对,但我确实想表达的是,我认为未来的发展方向会是这样。
I may not be right, but I do think that you know, what I'm trying to get at is the the direction that I think this is going to take.
我认为人民币会升值。
I do think the renminbi will appreciate.
好吧,詹姆斯,既然你这么说了,那就让我们拭目以待,看看明年年底是否真的要为这一预测干杯。
Well, James, it's good to put your money where your mouth is, and so we'll see at the end of next year, whether or not we drink a toast to that trade.
好的。
Okay.
我的预测更多基于法国总统马克龙最近对中国进行的访问,那次访问感觉非常具有战略目的。
So my prediction is more on the back of French president Emmanuel Macron's recent trip to China, which felt very goalist.
如果你熟悉六十年代的历史,就会明白其中的原因。
You know, if you're a student of history and the sixties, you'll understand why.
他在中国的受欢迎程度令人惊叹。
The fandom that he received in China was pretty incredible.
但我认为这是在掩盖中欧之间日益恶化的合作关系。
But I think it's paint over a relationship that is deteriorating between Europe and China.
2024年,欧洲对华贸易逆差高达3500亿美元。
Europe runs a huge deficit with China to the tune of 350,000,000,000 in 2024.
我可以想象中国会伸出橄榄枝,这么说吧。
I could see the Chinese offer olive branches, so to speak.
那里有空客的官员。
There were Airbus officials there.
过去,他们在之前的贸易会谈中也曾有空客官员出席,但我认为中国可能会通过购买更多空客飞机来伸出橄榄枝。
Now in the past, they've had Airbus officials in previous trade meetings, but I think that the Chinese could potentially offer the olive branch of buying more Airbus planes.
我还能看到他们可能会终止对欧洲猪肉的某些调查,以改善双边关系。
I could see them dropping certain investigations into, say, European pork, again, to help the relationship.
他们显然已经开始对法国白兰地这么做了。
They've certainly started to do this French cognac.
但另一方面,我感受到欧洲方面——我也想听听你的快速看法——在欧洲背景下,我预测我们将看到更多针对中国商品的贸易调查、关税和非关税壁垒,并且会更加努力地降低对中国的依赖。
But on the flip side, I sense in Europe, and I wanna get your quick take on this too, my prediction in the European context is that we're gonna see a lot more in the form of trade investigations, tariffs, and non tariff barriers against Chinese goods, and a more concerted effort to derisk from China.
我认为关键矿物这一部分也是其中的重要一环。
I think the critical minerals part is a big part of this as well.
所以我认为,这种关系将呈现出两面性的特点。
So I think we're gonna have a, you know, two pronged nature to this relationship.
一方面,中国试图缓和关系。
On the one hand, China trying to make nice.
另一方面,欧洲人则完全处于另一个世界,他们非常非常担心对中国的依赖。
On the other hand, the Europeans on a totally different planet where they're very, very concerned about the dependency on China.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,欧洲确实对与中国的巨额贸易逆差感到非常不满。
I mean, I think that Europe is certainly getting very hot under the collar about the size of its deficit with China, its trade deficit in in particular.
但我认为,对欧洲来说,征收关税会很困难。
But I think tariffs will be difficult for Europe.
更容易实现并且我预计会看到更多的是非关税壁垒。
What will be easier and what I expect to see much more of is non tariff barriers.
我认为2026年——这与你的预测一致——很可能会成为欧洲设立非关税壁垒的一年,旨在一定程度上遏制这些极具竞争力的中国出口产品。
And I think 2026, you know, which chimes with your prediction, may well be the year of non tariff barriers in Europe aimed at keeping these super hypercompetitive Chinese exports out to some degree.
definitely.
Definitely.
拭目以待。
Watch this space.
我知道你即将前往欧洲,所以我们下周一定会再联系。
And I know you're heading to Europe, so we'll we'll definitely, touch base next week.
好的。
Alright.
本期节目就到这里。
That's all for this episode.
非常感谢您收听《解码中国》。
Thank you so much for listening to China Decode.
本节目由Professor G Media制作。
This is a production of Professor G Media.
我们的制片人是大卫·托莱多。
Our producer is David Toledo.
我们的助理制片人是埃里克·贾尼卡斯。
Our associate producer is Eric Janikas.
我们的视频编辑是内斯·史密斯·萨瓦多夫。
Our video editor is Ness Smith Savadoff.
我们的研究助理是丹·沙兰。
Our research associate is Dan Shalan.
我们的技术总监是德鲁·伯罗斯。
Our technical director is Drew Burrows.
我们的工程师是威廉·弗林n,执行制片人是凯瑟琳·迪伦。
Our engineer is William Flynn, and our executive producer is Katherine Dillon.
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Make sure to follow us wherever you get your podcasts so you don't miss an episode.
下周再和你们聊。
Talk to you again next week.
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