本集简介
双语字幕
仅展示文本字幕，不包含中文音频；想边听边看，请使用 Bayt 播客 App。
本节目由VCX赞助，VCX是私营科技公司的公开股票代码。
Support for the show comes from VCX, the public ticker for private tech.
美国股市开启了历史上最大规模的财富创造浪潮。
The US stock market started history's greatest wave of wealth creation.
从底特律的工厂工人到奥马哈的农民，任何人都能拥有美国伟大公司的股份。
From factory workers in Detroit to farmers in Omaha, anyone could own a piece of the great American companies.
但如今，我们最具创新性的公司长期保持私有状态，这意味着普通美国人直到现在才得以参与。
But today, our most innovative companies are staying private longer, which means everyday Americans are missing out until now.
隆重推出VCX，私营科技公司的公开股票代码。
Introducing VCX, a public ticker for private tech.
访问getvcx.com获取更多信息。
Visit getvcx.com for more info.
那就是getvcx.com。
That's getvcx.com.
投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括投资目标、费用和风险。
Carefully consider the investment materials before investing, including objectives, risk charges, and expenses.
更多相关信息可在getvcx.com上的基金招募说明书里找到。
This and other information can be found in the fund's prospectus at getvcx.com.
这是一则付费赞助内容。
This is a paid sponsorship.
光秃秃的墙壁、整洁的表面，极简主义风格正风靡一时。
Bare walls, clear surfaces, the minimalist aesthetic is having a moment.
对一些人来说，这是一种反抗的形式。
And for some, it's a form of resistance.
我觉得很多人意识到，我们生活在一个高度消费主义的社会中，因此产生了一种想要抵制这种趋势的渴望和需求。
I think a lot of people have a sense that, like, we live in this very consumerist society and feel kind of a desire and need to, like, push back against that.
如何过更少物质的生活。
How to live with less.
本周《为我解释》就聊到这里。
That's this week on Explain It To Me.
新节目每周日上线，各大播客平台均可收听。
New episodes, Sundays, wherever you get your podcasts.
我是梅根·拉皮诺。
Megan Rapinoe here.
本周《更进一步》节目中，朱朱·沃特金斯加入我们，聊聊她离开球场但从未远离赛场的一年。
This week on a touch more, Juju Watkins joins us to talk about her year off of the court, but definitely not on the sidelines.
我们还将关注SEC锦标赛中出现的冷门，以及这些结果可能如何影响选拔周和她在信念杯上展现出的美国球员代际跨度。
We're also looking at the upsets coming out of the SEC tournament and how that might impact selection Sunday and the intergenerational span of US players on display at the She Believes Cup.
此外，我们还有一位惊喜嘉宾。
Plus, we have a surprise guest.
你绝对不能错过。
You won't wanna miss it.
请在你收听播客的平台或YouTube上收听我们最新一期的《更进一步》节目。
Check out the latest episode of our podcast to touch more wherever you get your podcasts and on YouTube.
第387期。
Episode 387.
387是波斯尼亚的国家代码。
3 eight seven is the country code assigned to Bosnia.
1987年，《公主新娘》首映。
In 1987, The Princess Bride premiered.
这太令人兴奋了。
This is exciting.
他们要拍一部全由土豆出演的《公主新娘》翻拍版。
They're remaking The Princess Bride with an all potato cast.
你好。
Hello.
我叫爱达荷·蒙托亚。
My name is Idaho Montoya.
你剥了我父亲的皮。
You peeled my father.
准备好下油锅吧。
Prepare to fry.
不错。
That's good.
去吧。
Go.
去吧。
Go.
去吧。
Go.
欢迎收听Profg播客第387期。
Welcome to the three hundred and eighty seventh episode of the profg pod.
怎么回事？
What's happening?
我们正在直播，太激动了。
We are live on sub what a thrill.
我知道你昨天在想什么。
I know what you were thinking yesterday.
我会更好，我会更有精神。
I'd be better I'd be in better shape.
如果Profg能在Substack上直播，我就能减掉这五磅腹部脂肪，改善与孩子和丈夫的关系，解决与父母的所有问题。
I could lose this five pounds of belly fat and have a better relationship with my kids and my husband, resolve all my issues with my parents if profg just was live on Substack.
我和我的联合主持人埃德·埃尔森、爱丽丝·哈恩、詹姆斯·金和杰西卡·塔罗夫致力于让你更深入了解推动市场、政治和社会的力量。
That's where me and my cohost, Ed Elson, Alice Hahn, James King, and Jessica Tarlov try to make you smarter about the forces moving markets, politics, and society.
在profgmedia.com，你可以找到我们制作的所有内容——播客、通讯、独家内容，全部集中在一个地方。
At profgmedia.com, you can find everything we make, podcast, newsletters, exclusive content all in one place.
内容非常多。
A lot of content.
如果你决定付费，因为我们希望发展订阅收入。
If you decide to pay, so we wanna develop a subscription revenue.
所以首要的一点是，没有广告。
So first and foremost, no ads.
播客里没有广告。
No ads on the pods.
轻松收听。
Easy listening.
不必再快进那十五或三十秒的按钮。
Don't have to slam that fifteen or thirty second forward button.
Profg Plus 会员可以享受我们所有节目的无广告版本。
Profg plus members get ad free versions of all our shows.
所有节目都无广告。
All shows ad free.
这能为你每周节省大约半小时，包括这一期。
That gives you back probably a half an hour a week, including this one.
你还将获得我们所有通讯的完整存档，以及 Profg Plus 独家内容，包括深度解析：我们会用数据和毫不留情、毫无偏见的直白分析，拆解重大议题，还有与节目好友的直播对话，比如希瑟·考克森·理查德森、德里克·汤普森、萨姆·哈里斯等。
You'll also get a full archive of our newsletters plus profg plus exclusives including deep dives where we break down big topics with data and our no mercy, no malice unfiltered analysis, live stream conversations with friends of the pod, including Heather Cox Richardson, Derek Thompson, Sam Harris, and more.
直播问答环节是我们专门为订阅者解答问题的环节。
Live q and a is where we answer questions exclusively from subscribers.
最后，我们正努力打造一个社区，一个可以评论、辩论并与其他听众互动的地方。
And finally, we're trying to build a community, a place to comment, debate, and engage with other listeners.
我们对这个计划充满期待。
We are super excited about this.
信不信由你，订阅者能享受到的内容比非订阅者多得多。
And believe it or not, there's more content than not for subscribers than nonsubscribers.
所以，朋友们，我就像是九十年代的美国在线（AOL）。
So, folks, I'm like AOL in the nineties.
抵抗是徒劳的。
To resist is futile.
现在就前往 profgmedia.com 订阅吧。
Subscribe now at profgmedia.com.
另外，如果价格对你来说太高，但你又喜欢我们的内容，请发送邮件至 officehours@profgmedia.com，我们会想办法为你提供奖学金。
Also, if the price point is too much for you and you love our content, please email us at officehours@profgmedia.com, and we'll figure out a way to get you a scholarship.
好了，继续往下说。
Anyways, moving on.
在今天的节目中，我们采访了地缘政治战略家、Zion on Geopolitics 的创始人彼得·泽汉，他加入了我们的对话。
In today's episode, we speak with Peter Zeihan, a geopolitical strategist and founder of Zion on Geopolitics, who joins us.
你现在在哪里？
Where are you?
你在科罗拉多吗，彼得？
Are you in Colorado, Peter?
我今天在家。
I'm home for a change.
是的。
Yes.
科罗拉多。
Colorado.
好的。
Alright.
我们直接切入正题吧。
Let's bust right into it.
我们是在2026年3月9日录制的，正值美国和以色列对伊朗展开军事行动的一周多一点。
We're recording this on 03/09/2026, just over a week into The United States and Israel's military campaign against Iran.
伊朗的宗教领导层确认，在早期空袭中，已故大阿亚图拉哈梅内伊的儿子被选为该国的新最高领袖。
Iran's clerical leadership confirmed that the son of the late Ayatollah Khamenei has been chosen as the country's new supreme leader following his father's death in the early strikes.
与此同时，全球能源市场处于紧张状态。
Meanwhile, global energy markets are on edge.
由于担心冲突可能扰乱霍尔木兹海峡的航运——这条海峡承担着全球约五分之一的石油供应——油价已飙升至每桶100美元以上，这是自2022年以来的首次。
Oil prices have surged past a $100 a barrel for the first time since 2022 amid fears that the conflict could disrupt shipping through the Straits Of Hormuz, the choke point that carries roughly one fifth of global oil supply.
彼得，你如何看待这场战争的当前局势？
Peter, how do you see the current moment in this war?
你认为我们现在处于什么阶段？
Where do you think we are?
在你看来，目前的态势如何？
What's the state of play in your mind?
回答这个问题的部分困难在于，我们仍然不清楚政府的目标是什么，因此无法判断什么是成功或战争的终点。
Part of the problem with answering that question is we still don't know what the administration's goals are, so there's no way to judge what success or the end might be.
但让我先提出两点，来开启这场对话。
But let me put out two things just to kinda start the conversation off.
这是霍尔木兹海峡有史以来首次被封锁。
This is the first time that the Strait Of Hormuz has ever been blocked.
我们正面临98%的交通量下降，保守估计意味着每天有1500万桶原油无法运出。
We're looking at a 98% reduction in traffic, which conservatively means that 15,000,000 barrels a day are not getting out.
现在已经进入第10天，累计总共有1.5亿桶原油被滞留。
We're in day 10, and we're at a 150,000,000 barrels total so far.
我们已经关闭了每天400万桶的原油产量。
We've already had 4,000,000 barrels per day of crude be shut in.
所以，即使海峡明天就重新开放，这些产能也需要至少60天才能恢复。
So even if the strait were to open tomorrow, that won't come back on within sixty days.
因此，即使现在就停止这一切，已经造成的损害也足以引发一场全球性的能源衰退。
So there's already enough damage to cause a global energy induced recession, even if this stops right now.
在天然气方面，全球20%的液化天然气运输已被阻断。
In natural gas, 20% of global LNG has been blocked.
所有这些都来自一条排水沟。
That all comes out of gutter.
这个设施恢复运行需要更长的时间。
That facility takes even longer to bring back online.
所以，暂时撇开以色列、美国、伊朗以及物理破坏、无人机战争等一切因素，我们已经处于全球衰退的环境中。
So putting aside Israel and The United States and Iran and the physical damage and the drone war and all of that for the moment, we're already in a global recessionary environment.
起点。
Starting point.
其次，新任最高领袖是旧任领袖的儿子，该怎么概括这个人呢？
Second, the new supreme leader is the son of the old one, and what's the best way to sum this guy up?
他就是唐纳德·小弟梦想成为的那种人。
He's what Don Junior wishes he was.
所以他不仅擅长通过空壳公司隐藏金融资产。
So he doesn't just have a lot of experience in hiding financial assets behind shell companies.
他还真正与将军们并肩作战，军事经验远胜于他的父亲。
He actually has been in the trenches with the generals and has military experience much more so than his father.
因此，他没有父亲执政数十年后所拥有的威望或政治资本，但他无疑是一位军事领袖。
So he doesn't have the gravitas or the political cachet that his father might have had after running the country for a few decades, but he's definitely a military leader.
这告诉我们，伊朗愿意接受美国提出的任何要求，答案不言而喻。
And that tells us everything we need to know about the willingness of Iran to accede to whatever it is the Americans demand upon.
顺便说一句，自战争开始以来，美国人提出的要求每三十六小时左右就变一次。
And by the way, what the Americans have been demanding upon has changed about every thirty six hours since the start.
所以你认为会升级吗？
So do you see escalation?
你认为有派地面部队的可能性吗？或者爆发更广泛的地区战争的可能性？
Do you think do you think there's an opportunity for boots or an opportunity possibility of boots on the ground or a wider regional war?
我的意思是，问题的一部分在于，当你不知道目标是什么时，你就无法预料会发生什么。
I mean, part of the problem is when you don't know what the goals are, you don't know what to expect.
唐纳德·特朗普最近提到的两件事之一是，他希望亲自挑选下一位领导人。
Two of the more recent things that Donald Trump has said is that he wants to be able to handpick the next leader.
另一件事是他声称要求伊朗无条件投降。
The other one is that he says he demands an unconditional surrender at Iran.
除非你有百万大军进驻该国，并以我在伊拉克、阿富汗、越南或朝鲜都未能实现的方式彻底镇压反对声音，否则这两种要求都极其不切实际。
Both of those are wildly unrealistic options unless you have a million troops in the country and have physically crushed dissent in a way that I would add we were unable to do in Iraq and Afghanistan or Vietnam or Korea.
只要我们仍以这个为起点，我们就根本不知道终点在哪里。
As long as that's our starting point, we have no idea what the ending point is.
我们只知道伊朗会抵抗，因为看起来他们没有任何办法能安抚特朗普政府，更不用说这是他们的家园，他们不可能就此离开。
All we know is that the Iranian will resist because there's nothing it seems that they can do to appease the Trump administration, not to mention that this is their home and they can't just walk away from it.
所以特朗普明天一觉醒来可能会说：你知道吗？
So Trump could wake up tomorrow and say, well, you know what?
我们赢了，事情结束了。
We won, and and we're done.
也许伊朗方面会说：是的。
And maybe maybe the Iranians were like, yeah.
这完全没问题，现在我们可以和平相处了。
That's totally fine, and now we can get along.
过去一年里发生过更离谱的事，但这是一个非常具体且极不可能出现的情形。
Stranger things have happened in the last year, but that is a very specific and very unlikely scenario.
对于我在这个话题上的观点，我收到了一些合理的反对意见。
So I've gotten pushback, justifiable pushback on my views on this topic.
我想跳出这个框架，听听你对政府决定打击伊朗的看法。
I wanna zoom out and get your take on the administration's decision to strike Iran.
你看，我总是喜欢问自己，什么事情可能会顺利。
Do you see I always like to ask myself what could go right.
你有没有看到，对伊朗采取军事行动可能带来哪些不对称的积极影响？
Do you see any potential asymmetric upsides to this to a potential military action in Iran?
伊朗长期以来一直是美国的眼中钉，削弱他们的军事力量，尤其是准军事能力，这显然有一定吸引力。
Iran has been a thorn in the side of The United States for quite some time, and the idea of taking down their military and especially their paramilitary capacity down a few notches, I you know, obviously, there's some attraction there.
但我明显感觉到，这场战争根本没有做好准备。
But I'm really getting the look that this this war was not prepared for.
首先，在战术层面，我们知道他们拥有成千上万的沙希德无人机。
First, on the tactical side, we knew they had thousands of shaheds.
目前既没有有效的反沙希德策略，也无法阻止来自中国的零部件流入。
There's no anti shahed strategy, either neither for shooting them down or preventing the components to come in from China.
中国货轮仍在驶入伊朗港口，运送更多设备。
Chinese cargo ships are still docking at Iranian ports, bringing in more equipment.
在我看来，这应该是你首先应该解决的问题。
That seems to me one of the first things you should have done.
其次，波斯湾霍尔木兹海峡易受攻击这一观点，自20世纪60年代以来一直是美国战略决策的核心，但我们至今没有看到任何应对策略或调整，以应对全球15%的石油供应如今在前端就已丧失的事实。
Second, the idea that the Strait Of Hormuz is vulnerable is something that has been core to American strategic policy making since the nineteen sixties, And we're we've seen no strategy whatsoever and no adaptation whatsoever to deal with the fact that we have 15% of global oil that's just gone now on the front end.
如果你还记得特朗普第一任期，他组建内阁时大量任命了军事背景的人，因为他们会服从命令。
If you remember back to Trump one, Trump stacked his cabinet with lots and lots and lots of military folks because they followed orders.
但这些人受过专业训练，因此当特朗普提出一些未必最佳的主意时，他们会温和地向他解释哪些方案可行、哪些不可行以及原因。
But they were trained in their jobs, and so when Trump would come up with an idea that maybe wasn't the best, they would try to gently educate him about what would work and what wouldn't work and why.
而特朗普讨厌每一次这样的对话，最终他解雇了所有从军方引进的人。
And Trump hated every single one of those conversations and he in in the end, fired all of the people he brought in from the military.
这次，当他下台后，他改变了共和党，取消了其政策部门。
This time, when he was out of power, he changed the Republican Party to remove the policy arm.
因此，现在不再有招募和培训。
So there's no longer recruitment and training.
也不再有一批共和党人可以进入新政府，协助总统工作。
There's no longer a cadre of Republican people to come into a new administration and help the president.
他只是招进了那些在任何话题、任何场合都不可能比他更聪明的人。
He just brought in people who would never be smarter than him on any topic in any room.
我不在乎你有多聪明。
And I don't care how smart you are.
你不可能在每个话题上都是房间里最聪明的人。
You can't be the smartest person in the room on every topic.
当然，当他第二次当上总统时，他清除了政府中前6000名顶尖人员，却几乎没有替换任何人。
And then, of course, when he became president the second time, he purged the government of the top 6,000 people and really replaced none of them.
因此，原本能帮助总统做出决策的优质信息本身就非常有限。
So there's not a lot of good information that makes it to the president in the first place to help make decisions.
但据我所听到的信息，过去四十五年来情报和国防界的一致观点是：在对伊朗的空战中，我们根本没有理由认为能实现任何有意义的长期改变。
But from what I've been hearing is, you know, the the position of the intelligence and defense community of the last forty five years is that in an air war against Iran, there's zero reason to think we can affect meaningful long term change.
即使你要发动地面战争，也是在一个人口近九千万的山区作战，而美国陆军根本做不到，就是这样。
And even if you're gonna do a ground war, you're doing a ground war in a mountainous area that has almost 90,000,000 people, and the US army cannot do that, period.
看起来这一切都被忽视了。
It appears that all of that was ignored.
因此，我们现在陷入了一种他凭直觉制定政策的境地。
And so now we're in a situation where he's making policy by fields.
当然，你可以用美国军队把那个国家炸得稀巴烂，但如果你没有明确的目标，也没有应对对方优势的策略，那你就只是陷入了一场毫无意义的消耗战。
And while you can certainly bomb the crap out of the country with the American military, if you don't have an end goal, don't have a strategy for dealing with the other side's strengths, you're just in a pointless grind.
而我们现在似乎就处在这个境地。
And that seems to be where we are right now.
你认为他们有可能宣布胜利然后撤军吗？
Do you think there's a likelihood they sort of declare a victory and leave?
比如说，我们想摧毁他们的发射装置。
Say we wanted to take out the launchers.
我们想削弱他们的军事基础设施，破坏他们制造武器的能力。
We wanted to impair the military infrastructure, their ability to to manufacture weapons.
我们想把他们浓缩铀的能力彻底摧毁，还要替换他们的领导层。
We wanted to further we wanna take their capability to enrich uranium back to less than zero, and we wanted to replace leadership.
我们赢了。
We've won.
我们撤了。
We're out.
你觉得这是个可行的策略吗？
Do you think that's a viable strategy?
这确实是可能走向的一种方式，因为成功的标准每天都在变化。
That that's absolutely one of the ways that this can go because the the the the terms of success are being changed every day.
不过，这样做会带来几个问题，我们将不得不面对几十年。
A couple problems with that, though, that we will then be dealing with for decades to come.
我们先从铀浓缩说起。
Let's start with enrichment.
我们知道，八天前，至少有50个我们已知的核设施是隐蔽且加固过的。
We know that as of eight days ago, there were at least 50 different nuclear sites that we knew about that had been hidden and hardened.
假设我们摧毁了所有这些设施。
And let's assume that we got all of those.
但我们肯定没找到那些我们还不知道的设施。
We certainly didn't get the ones we don't know about.
如果你想制造钚弹，甚至根本不需要铀浓缩项目。
And if you want to build a plutonium bomb, you don't even need an enrichment program.
你只需要一座核电站，而他们已经有了。
You just need a nuclear power plant, which they have.
因此，除非这座核电站被拆除，否则他们仍然有能力提取钚并走这条路。
So unless and until that is gone, they still have the capacity to extract plutonium and go that route.
这是第一个问题。
That's problem number one.
第二个问题是，伊朗——正如情报界一直警告美国任何一位总统的那样——认为拥有核武器会招致自动干预，因此他们退了一步。
Problem number two, Iran, as the intelligence community has always warned the American president, whoever happens to be, Iran believed that a nuclear weapon would invite automatic intervention, and so they went with one step back.
他们想要一个可信的核计划，不直接拥有武器，但如果你在几周到几个月内 flip 一个开关，就能立刻拥有核弹。
They wanted a credible nuclear program that didn't have a weapon that but if you flipped a switch within a matter of weeks to months, you could then have a nuke.
这是他们试图建立的威慑力。
That was their attempted deterrent.
去年六月遭到袭击后，伊朗内部的争论是，这种策略是否仍然有效，因为他们显然已经遭受了攻击。
After the attacks of last June, the debate within Iran was whether or not that was still a good strategy because, obviously, they had been attacked.
因此，有迹象表明他们正在缩短反应时间。
And so there were signs that they were moving to shorten the window.
现在最高领袖已被暗杀，大规模空战也已爆发，显然伊朗认为他们现在必须获得核武器，因为这是他们唯一的选项。
Now that the supreme leader has been assassinated, now that there's a wide ranging air war, obviously, the Iran's think they need to get a nuke now because it's their only option.
所以，如果你宣布胜利并撤军，即使他们行动非常缓慢，一年内也会拥有核武器。
So if you declare a victory and go home, they will have a nuclear weapon within a year if they're really slow about it.
我们已经改变了伊朗国内的战略平衡。
So we've changed the strategic balance within the country.
我们逐渐意识到，现已去世的最高领袖在伊朗标准下实际上算是一位战略上的温和派，而我们现在正迎来一代对美国更加敌视的新领导人，他们有充分且近期的理由如此敌视。
We're starting to come to the conclusion that the supreme leader who's now dead was actually kind of by Iranian standards a strategic moderate, and we're ushering in a new generation of people who are a lot more hostile to The United States with good and recent reason to be so.
我总是喜欢问：可能发生什么好事？
I always like to ask what could go right.
你认为太阳会不会公开采取强硬立场，但私下里联系美国方面，说：好吧。
Do you think there's a chance the Sun takes a hard line publicly but reaches out to, you know, offline to American resources and says, alright.
我们会保持中立。
You know, we're gonna be neutral.
我们不会反西方。
We're not gonna be anti West.
我会给你一个台阶下，而我会被视为那个把美国人带离这里的人。
I'm gonna give you an out, and I'm gonna be seen as the guy that got the Americans out of here.
因为我觉得，如果我们继续这样做，特别是摧毁他们的石油基础设施，那么在美军撤离后，他在中长期治理上将面临巨大困难，因为太多人的生计都依赖于伊朗继续生产和销售石油的能力。
Because it strikes me that if we continue to do this and specifically take out their capacity to their oil infrastructure, that he's gonna have a difficult time governing over the medium long term after after the Americans leave because so many people have their livelihoods connected to Iran's capability to continue to produce and sell oil.
如果他们现在离开，而他的大部分石油基础设施仍然完好，油价保持在每桶80或90美元左右，他就有足够的资金来应对任何对他领导能力的批评。
That if if they leave now and the majority or a large portion of his oil infrastructure is still is still intact and oil stays at, say, 80 or $90, he's gonna have the money to service Neosporin for any criticism of his leadership.
现在他难道没有动机去寻找一种方式，表面上强硬对抗，私下里却达成某种解决方案吗？
Isn't there an incentive right now for him to figure out a way to be publicly defiant but privately figure out some sort of resolution?
这想法真不错，但他才上任48小时，我们还得看看他治理政治体系的能力究竟如何。
Oh, that's a lovely thought, but he's only been there for forty eight hours, and we'll see how good is he is at managing the political system.
伊朗是个非常混乱的地方，比伊拉克或阿富汗更难统治。
Iran Iran's a messy place, much messier than Iraq or Afghanistan to rule.
大约一半的国民是波斯人。
About half the country is Persian.
其余的则是各种少数民族，而这个国家至今能勉强维系，靠的是一支百万大军来镇压本国人民。
The rest are a wide variety of minorities, and the only way the country is kinda held together to this point is to have a million man army to occupy its own population.
所以，这背后的运作机制非常复杂。
And so just the mechanics of that are messy.
至于目前的石油情况，在此之前，他们每天出口约一百万桶，这比上世纪七十年代峰值时的四百万桶以上要低得多。
As for oil right now well, before this started, they were exporting about a million barrels a day, and that is down from their nineteen seventies peak of over 4,000,000 barrels a day.
因此，要达到你所说的那种‘新孢子虫式绝望’所需的基础设施建设规模，十年内是不可能实现的。
So the degree of build out that you would have to have to get to a point where they have, as you say, neosporin despair, that's not gonna happen in less than ten years.
要长期公开支持一个刚刚轰炸过你的政府，这很难让人接受。
That's a long time to be seen as publicly toting up to a government that just bombed you.
我不想说‘不行’。
I don't wanna say no.
这是中东。
It's The Middle East.
奇怪的事情时有发生，但在我看来，这并不现实。
Strange things happen, but it doesn't strike me as very realistic.
战争初期，其中一个潜在的积极面是，美国、以色列和海湾地区的温和国家之间形成了一种非正式联盟，基本上就是除了伊朗以外的所有国家。
It felt like at the beginning of the war, one of the potential upsides was that there was this sort of informal alliance between The US, Israel, and moderate nations in The Gulf, basically everyone but Iran.
你认为这种状况还能维持吗？还是说你会开始看到，原本与海湾地区温和国家之间潜在的更紧密关系，会逐渐瓦解？
Do you think that holds, or do you think you're gonna start to see what felt like potential for a closer relationship with moderate states in The Gulf, or do you think it's gonna get it it's gonna fray?
这一点现在非常不确定。
That is very much in question.
我们现在正处于一场热战中。
We're in a hot war now.
局势有很多可能的发展方向。
There's a lot of ways that it can evolve.
所以一开始，无论是科威特、沙特、阿联酋、卡塔尔还是其他地区国家，普遍都认为他们找到了与伊朗共处的方式。
So at the start, whether you were Kuwait or Saudi or UAE or Qatar or the rest, there was a general belief that they had found a way to get along with Iran.
我并不是想说他们就是朋友或盟友，但他们确实找到了一种彼此容忍、相安无事的方式，而美国和以色列则在做自己的事。
I I don't wanna suggest that they were friends or allies, but they had figured out kind of a way to grind past one another while The United States and the Israelis were doing their thing.
伊朗的武器系统性质，我们本该预见到这一点。
The nature of the weapon system in Iran, we probably should have anticipated this.
我本人确实没有预料到。
I certainly did not.
他们几乎没有能力对以色列造成损害。
They don't have a good chance of damaging Israel.
距离太远了。
It's too far away.
即使不考虑美国的介入，这些武器在抵达目标前也有太多被拦截的机会。
There's too many opportunities for the weapons to be intercepted even before you consider the involvement of The United States.
而且这些沙希德武器是笨拙的。
And the shaheds are dumb weapons.
你给它们一个GPS坐标，而真正优秀的沙希德武器他们并没有多少。
You give them a GPS coordinate and a really, really good shahed of which is they don't have a lot.
它们飞向那个坐标，然后有一个非常简短的决策链：寻找轮廓，然后直飞过去。
They fly to that one coordinate, and then they have a very short decision tree where they look for silhouette, and then they beeline to it.
这就是它们精度不高的原因之一。
That's one of the reasons why they're not particularly accurate.
你无法用这种武器瞄准移动的船只。
You can't target a moving ship with that.
所以美国海军在面对导弹和无人机时基本上是免疫的。
So the American Navy is functionally immune to the missiles and the drones.
在最初的48小时内，伊朗所有的舰船都被击沉了。
In the first forty eight hours, every ship the Iranians had got sank.
他们所有的飞机都被击落了。
Every plane they had got shot down.
没有空军了。
There's no air force.
没有海军了。
There's no navy.
所以如果你是伊朗，你的选择只有两个：一是攻击以色列，但知道超过90%的武器都会被拦截；二是攻击一些你可能打得中的目标。
So if you're Iran, your choices are shooting at Israel knowing that well over 90% of the weapons are gonna get shot down or shoot at something that maybe you can hit.
于是他们瞄准了科威特、卡塔尔、巴林、沙特、阿联酋，甚至延伸到了土耳其、阿塞拜疆和阿曼。
And so they targeted Kuwait and Qatar and Bahrain and Saudi and UAE and even a little bit into Turkey, Azerbaijan, and, Oman.
通过这样做，他们改变了冲突的性质以及整个地区的格局。
And in doing that, they've changed the nature of the conflict and the nature of the region.
到目前为止，他们可能已经发射了两千到三千枚沙希德导弹，并且已经耗尽了海湾国家80%到90%的拦截弹。
They've probably fired somewhere between two and three thousand Shaheds at this point, and they have probably exhausted over 80 to 90% of the interceptors that the Gulfies have.
一枚爱国者三型导弹的成本是400万美元。
One PAC three missile costs $4,000,000.
一枚沙希德导弹的成本是4万到5万美元。
One Shahed costs 40 to $50,000.
美国每年大约能生产700枚爱国者三型拦截弹。
The United States can make about 700 PAC three interceptors in a year.
伊朗每周大约能生产700枚沙希德导弹。
The Iranians can make about 700 Shaheds in a week.
因此，我们距离拦截弹耗尽只剩下几天时间了。
So we are literally days away from there being no interceptors.
虽然你无法用沙希德导弹击中移动的船只，但你完全可以击中泵站、油田、炼油厂或装卸平台。
And while you can't hit a moving ship with a Shahed, you can absolutely hit a pumping station or an oil field or a refinery or a loading platform.
因此，在非常近的未来，我们极有可能失去波斯湾作为全球重要烃类能源来源的地位，而这比一场能源衰退要严重得多。
And so there's a very, very real possibility here in the very short term future that we just lose the Persian Gulf as a significant source of hydrocarbons from the world, and that's a lot worse than an energy recession.
这绝对会彻底改变所有人与伊朗、海湾国家、以色列和美国的关系，而这种情况可能就在这周发生。
And that will absolutely change the nature of the relationship of everyone with Iran and with the Gulfies and with Israel and with The United States, and that might happen this week.
是因为封锁霍尔木兹海峡，还是因为生产能力的问题？
And is that because of choking off the Straits Of Hormuz or just production capability?
目前，霍尔木兹海峡已经关闭，但石油设施本身仍然完好无损。
At the moment, Hormuz is closed, but the oil facilities are physically intact.
我所指的是，我们可能很快就会在石油设施上越过红线，因为我们用来防御沙赫德无人机的策略，需要的弹药供应极其有限，无法及时补充，而且价格极其昂贵。
What I'm suggesting is we might cross the Rubicon on the oil facilities very, very soon because the the the strategy that we have to defend against the Shaheds requires ammo that is available in very, very limited supply that cannot be replenished and is very, very expensive.
我们基本上忽视了乌克兰战争的教训，而伊朗在针对这些目标时的成本效益比非常有利。
We've basically ignored the lessons of the Ukraine war, and Iran's cost benefit ratio here is quite robust when it comes to targeting these things.
这很有趣，因为我一直以为我们在这种不对称战争中占据优势，但我听到的数据说，他们发射的弹药数量已经下降了83%，说明他们快耗尽了。
It's interesting because I always thought there was asymmetric advantage to us that I hear these numbers that the number of projectiles they're firing has declined by 83% that they've run out.
而你所说的是，我们其实处于这种不对称战争的劣势一方，因为他们能大规模生产这些廉价的弹药。
And what you're saying is we're on the wrong side of this asymmetric warfare that they can produce these cheap projectiles.
而我们习惯于使用昂贵的防御系统，根本跟不上他们廉价武器的生产速度。
And we're used to expensive defense systems, and we can't keep up with the cheap ones.
你觉得弹药方面的优势在伊朗那边吗？
You think the advantage around projectiles goes to Iran?
我们来分两个类别讨论一下。
Well, let's break it into two categories here.
如果你说的是导弹，那么你需要一辆经过特殊改装的50吨卡车，才能把导弹运到发射位置。
If you talk missiles, there, you need a 50 ton truck that is specially modified in order to take the missile in the first place and get into position to fire.
发射能力。
Launch capability.
没错。
Exactly.
这种发射系统不是随便哪个下午就能搞出来的。
And that's not that sort of launcher system is not something that you can just whip up in an afternoon.
这需要大量的工作。
That requires work.
很多零部件都得从国外进口。
A lot of the components have to be imported.
因此，美国和以色列基于充分的理由，优先打击导弹，因为每枚导弹造成的破坏要大得多。
And so The United States has, for solid reasons Israel, for solid reasons, has gone after the missiles first because per unit, they can cause a lot more damage.
它们更难拦截，因为你只能在它们终端飞行阶段进行拦截，仅此而已。
They're a lot more difficult to intercept because you basically get them on their terminal approach, and that's it.
这就是爱国者三型系统的作用。
And that's what the PAC threes are for.
沙赫德无人机的发射系统只是一根可以固定在皮卡后部的简易导轨，一名焊工大约四小时就能组装一个。
Shaheds, their launch system is a little rail that you can bolt onto the back of a pickup, and it takes one welder about four hours to put one of those together.
他们拥有的沙赫德无人机数量远多于导弹。
And they have a lot more Shaheds than they have missiles.
因此，在导弹这一方面，我们的状况其实还算良好。
So on the missile side of the equation, we're actually in reasonably good shape.
伊朗人将大量这类武器储存在我们已知的地下设施中，所以我们只需封堵入口，就不用再担心它们了。
The Iranians stored a lot of these things underground in places that we knew, so we just collapsed the entrance and, you know, don't have to worry about those again.
但你可以在车库里制造一架沙赫德无人机。
But you can make a Shahed in a garage.
它由泡沫塑料和胶合板等部件组成。
It's got components that are Styrofoam and plywood.
它们实际上非常容易组装。
They're really hard easy to put together.
它们直线飞行。
They fly in a straight line.
用多种武器系统都可以相对容易地拦截它们。
They're fairly easy to intercept with any number of weapon systems.
但如果你每天持续发射几百枚，而这正是一直在发生的情况，最终总会有一些突破防线，造成实质性影响，因为我们终将耗尽拦截弹。
But if you keep firing them a few 100 a day, which is exactly what has continued to happen, Eventually, enough are going to get through to make a difference because we will run out of interceptors.
我们稍后回来，插播一条简短广告。
We'll be right back after a quick break.
拉姆·伊曼纽尔大使曾担任奥巴马总统的幕僚长，那届政府不得不应对相当多的全球冲突。
Ambassador Rahm Emanuel served as president Obama's chief of staff, an administration that had to deal with its fair share of global conflicts.
他直接与以色列总理打交道，并深入思考过伊朗的威胁。
He dealt directly with Israel's prime minister and thought plenty about the threat from Iran.
但埃马纽埃尔告诉我，这位总统在中东的行动节奏快得让他头晕目眩。
But Emmanuel told me that the pace of action from this president in The Middle East is giving him whiplash.
在十五个月内，这位总统已经对八个国家采取了军事行动。
In fifteen months, this president has taken military action against eight countries.
我现在才刚进行到第五十次，但还有三年多的时间要走。
I just just in fifty now we got three more years to go.
在十五个月内，伊朗就遭遇了两次打击，还有叙利亚、伊拉克、索马里、委内瑞拉。
In fifteen months, Iran twice, but you have Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Venezuela.
你瞧，我现在连尼日利亚都要丢了。
You I was now I'm losing Nigeria.
《今日解读》，工作日和周六都在你的信息流中更新。
Today Explained, in your feed every weekday and on Saturdays too.
本节目由丽莎赞助。
Support for profg comes from Lisa.
如果你曾经睡过一张和地板差不多硬的床垫，那你一定知道什么叫彻夜难眠。
If you've ever slept on a mattress that didn't feel that much different from the floor, then you probably know what a miserable night feels like.
而且这还不只是晚上。
And it's not just the night.
一个糟糕的夜晚之后，一整天都会感觉像一场噩梦。
The entire day after a rough night of sleep can feel like a walking nightmare.
但Lisa来帮您了。
But Lisa is here to help.
他们的床垫能为您提供急需的REM睡眠，让您应对一天中的各种挑战。
Their mattresses can get you the much needed REM sleep you need to tackle all the challenges of the day.
Leesa提供一系列精心打造的床垫，专为您的睡眠习惯量身定制。
Leesa has a lineup of beautifully crafted mattresses tailored to how you sleep.
每款床垫都根据特定的睡姿和用户偏好进行设计。
Each mattress is designed with specific sleep positions and field preferences in mind.
从第一晚开始，Leesa相信您就会感受到由优质材料带来的显著差异，无论您如何睡眠，都能获得极致的舒适感和全身支撑。
From night one, Leesa believes that you'll feel the difference with the premium materials that deliver serious comfort and full body support no matter how you sleep.
此外，Leesa床垫均在美国精心设计和组装，确保卓越品质。
Plus, Leesa mattresses are meticulously designed and assembled in The USA for exceptional quality.
前往 leesa.com 获取 20% 折扣，并使用专属促销码 prop g 再减 50 美元。
Go to leesa.com for 20% off, plus get an extra $50 off of promo code prop g exclusive for my listeners.
那就是 leesa.com。
That's leesa.com.
促销码 prop g，享受 20% 折扣外加额外 50 美元优惠。
Promo code prop g, for 20% off plus an extra $50 off.
支持我们的节目，并在结账后告诉他们是我们推荐的。
Support our show and let them know we sent you after checkout.
leesa.com，促销码 prop g。
Lisa.com, promo code prop g.
本节目由 VCX 赞助，这是私营科技公司的公开股票代码。
Support for the show comes from VCX, the public ticker for private tech.
几代以来，美国公司凭借其创造力和决心推动了世界前进。
For generations, American companies have moved the world forward to their ingenuity and determination.
几代以来，普通美国人通过或许是人类最伟大的创新——美国股市，得以参与这一进程。
And for generations, everyday Americans could be part of that journey through perhaps the greatest innovation of all, The US stock market.
无论你是底特律的工厂工人，还是奥马哈的农民，都无关紧要。
It didn't matter whether you were a factory worker in Detroit or a farmer in Omaha.
任何人都可以拥有这些伟大的美国公司的股份。
Anyone could own a piece of the great American companies.
但如今这种情况已经改变了。
But now that's changed.
如今，我们最具创新性的公司选择保持私有，而不是上市。
Today, our most innovative companies are staying private rather than going public.
结果是，普通美国人被排除在投资之外，越来越落后，而少数人却一直独享所有收益，直到现在。
The result is that everyday Americans are excluded from investing and getting left further behind while a select few reap all the benefits until now.
推出VCX，一家面向私营科技公司的公开股票代码。
Introducing VCX, a public ticker for private tech.
VCX由Fundrise提供，让每个人都有机会投资于下一代创新，包括该公司引领的人工智能革命、太空探索、国防科技等。
VCX by Fundrise gives everyone the opportunity to invest in the next generation of innovation, including the company's leading AI revolution, space exploration, defense tech, and more.
访问getvcx.com了解更多信息。
Visit getvcx.com for more info.
那就是 getvcx.com。
That's getvcx.com.
投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括目标、风险费用和开支。
Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risk charges, and expenses.
更多信息可在 getvcx.com 上的基金招募说明书里找到。
This and other information can be found in the fund's prospectus at getvcx.com.
这是一则付费赞助内容。
This is a paid sponsorship.
伊朗长期以来一直未能发挥其应有的实力。
Iran has been punching below its weight class for a while.
我喜欢你刚才提到的数据，他们曾经每天生产400万桶石油。
I love the stat you just threw out that they used to produce 4,000,000 barrels a day.
现在只剩100万桶了。
Now it's 1,000,000.
一个更稳定的中东，一个中立的伊朗——不一定是亲西方的，但更稳定——将大幅提升产量，降低油价，而最大的税收减免或增加，几乎完全取决于油价。
And a more stable Middle East, a neutral, not necessarily a pro Western Iran, but more stable one, vastly more production, lower oil prices, biggest, you know, biggest tax cut or increase is pretty much around the price of oil.
本质上，中东实现温和结盟与和平，你知道，我一直认为，一旦10月7日的局势平息，沙特阿拉伯和以色列这两个最大经济体之间可能会出现关系正常化。
Essentially, moderate alliance, peace in The Middle East where everyone you know, I I always thought that once October 7 has calmed down, you might see a normalization relationships between the two biggest economies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
伊朗是长期最大的国家支持恐怖主义的国家。
Iran, longer the largest state sponsor of terror.
我看到了这里巨大的上升空间。
I saw a lot of upside here.
听上去，如果你是——也许你确实是。
It sounds to me like if you were and you may be.
我知道你为跨国企业提供地缘政治方面的建议。
I know you advise corporations on geopolitical concerns.
但如果你在为美国政府提供建议，听起来你的基本建议会是尽快结束这场冲突。
But if you were advising the US government, it sounds to me like your basic advice would be end this thing as quickly as possible.
我是不是在替你说话？
Am I putting words in your mouth?
天啊。
God.
我多希望事情能有那么简单。
I would love to say that it was that simple.
我们现在已越过界限了。
We've we've crossed the line now.
伊朗必须根据美国随时可能对其采取行动这一概念，调整其战略政策。
Iran has to change their strategic policy based on the concept that The United States can come for them at any time.
这意味着至少要有一个可投送的核武器项目。
That that means more at a minimum, it means a nuclear program that has a deliverable weapon.
我们已进入这一阶段中更加危险的时期。
We're we've entered a much riskier part or stage of this.
现在，如果你对比他们过去使用的、我们极为反感的工具——尤其是遍布该地区的准军事组织，如今这些活动已降至四十年来的最低点，这得益于奥巴马、特朗普和拜登政府对伊朗石油销售的严厉打击。
Now if you compare the tools that they were using before that we really hated, most notably paramilitaries operating throughout the region, that is at a four decade low now because of what the Obama, the Trump, and the Biden administration did in cracking down on their oil sales.
由于缺乏资金，他们已无法再持续为这些组织提供控制所需的资源。
Without the money, they weren't able to keep flushing these groups with, the resources that were necessary in order to control them.
因此，在这场战争爆发十天后，中东地区已很少再出现我们曾在反恐战争期间常见的教派暴力，因为伊朗根本没钱了。
So there are now very few places in The Middle East after ten days of war where we're seeing the sort of sectarian violence that we used to see during the war on terror because the Iranians just don't have the cash.
所以情况正在发生变化。
So the picture is evolving.
但当我们直击要害时，却促使他们转向了其他手段。
But by going for the throat, we've encouraged them to reach for different tools.
我认为关键数字是100，昨晚油价飙升至约112美元。
And I think the key number here is a 100 and that is oil spiked about a $112 last night.
现在油价大约在100美元左右。
Now it's around 100.
谈谈你看到的次级影响吧。
Talk about the second order effects here you saw.
比如，我们看到韩国KOSPI指数下跌了6.5%，而我们却只关注汽油每加仑上涨了50美分。
I mean, for example, we saw the COSPI, the essentially, the Dow of South Korea off six and a half percent as we're focused on gas going up 50¢ a gallon here.
亚洲市场正在崩盘。
We have markets crashing in Asia.
油价达到100美元以上的三倍高位，会带来哪些次级影响？
What are the second order effects of $100 triple digit oil?
好吧，让我先说，昨天市场的反应过度了。
Well, let me start by saying that the market reaction yesterday was too much.
基本上，我们首次遭遇了能源资产被针对。
Basically, we had our first energy assets targeted.
以色列人袭击了德黑兰周边的一些石油储罐，所有人都以为这意味着石油生产设施被摧毁了。
The Israelis went after some oil depots around Tehran, and everyone thought that meant that oil production infrastructure was gone.
但实际情况并非如此，因此我们看到了价格大幅回落。
That is not what happened, and that's why we saw quite a big drop back.
但整体上，这件事确实意义重大，这个观点是成立的。
But the overall theme that this is a really big deal is a solid point.
目前，波斯湾的正常出口量约为每天两千万桶，占国际交易石油的一半。
Right now, the Persian Gulf at normal exports about 20,000,000 barrels a day, which is half of internationally traded oil.
其中大约80%运往东亚，中国是最大的进口国，其次是印度，第三是日本，第四是韩国。
Roughly 80% of that goes to East Asia, With China being the number one country to take it, India number two, Japan number three, Korea number four.
根据你所采用的数据，东亚沿海大多数国家的石油进口储备可支撑200天，而印度的储备远达不到这个水平。
Based on whose numbers you're using, most countries in the East Asian Rim have two hundred days of import cover that Indians don't have nearly that much.
展开剩余字幕（还有 245 条）
关于中国石油储备是否存在，目前还存在争议。
And there is a debate as to whether or not the Chinese oil reserve exists.
中国的数据，我们根本无从知晓。
Chinese numbers, we just don't know.
但他们的石油进口储备可能只有短短四十天。
But they may have as little as forty days of import cover.
所以，如果这场冲突持续一个月——我们就姑且假设一个月，这已经足以击垮东亚大多数国家的经济模型。
So if this conflict lasts for let's just pick a number, a month, that's enough to probably break the economic models of most of East Asia.
如果生产原油的实体设施遭受严重破坏，那么东亚就完了，而且永远不会恢复，而中国将是第一个倒下的，因为他们从其他地方根本找不到足够的替代来源。
And if we have the physical assets that produce the crude take significant damage, then East Asia's gone, and it never comes back with China being the first one to go down because they just don't have sufficient alternatives from anywhere else.
这还假设欧洲不会继续对俄罗斯油轮的影子船队进行打压，而过去两个月里，这种打压已经急剧加剧。
And that assumes that the Europeans do not continue with their crackdown on the shadow fleet of Russian tankers, which has been accelerating massively over the last two months.
这是我十年前就指出的众多因素之一，当时我基本谈到了什么会终结全球化。
This is one of the many, many things that I identified ten years ago when I basically talked about what would end globalization.
这是其中之一，它足以单独促成这一结果，而无需其他任何因素的助力，而如今我们正身处其中。
This is one of them that would do it without any of the help any help from any of the others, and now we're here.
你所说的似乎意味着，每桶100美元的油价对俄罗斯有利，但对中国非常不利。
It feels as if what you're saying in terms of I mean, it feels like $100 oil is probably good for Russia and very bad for China.
这是一种过度简化吗？
Is that an oversimplification?
前提是他们还能继续出口。
If they can continue to export.
由于欧洲对影子船队采取的行动，他们可能即将失去每天400万桶的出口能力。
With what the Europeans are doing with the shadow fleet, they may be about to lose 4,000,000 barrels a day of exports.
再多说说欧洲如何阻碍影子船队吧。
So say more about Europeans getting in the way of the Shadow Fleet.
是的。
Yeah.
我们从当初没人敢碰这个，原因多种多样，到现在每隔几天就有一个欧洲国家扣押另一艘油轮。
So we've gone from nobody wanting to touch it for a very various reasons to now we have every couple of days another European country taking another tanker.
上周末，瑞典刚扣押了一艘油轮。
Sweden was the last one to take a ship over the weekend.
比利时上周扣押了一艘。
Belgium took one last week.
再之前一周是法国。
France, the week before.
他们正在从法律和制度层面建立一套规范的操作体系。
They're building up the legal and institutional infrastructure to do it by the book from their point of view.
当然，美国已经针对委内瑞拉的影子船队采取了行动，印度也扣押了几艘伊朗影子船队的船只。
And, of course, The United States has gone after the Venezuelan shadow fleet, and the Indians have taken a couple ships from the Iranian shadow fleet.
所以，除非我们在不远的将来出台一项显著有力的政策转变，否则这将是最后一年。
So this is the last year for that unless we have a starkly robust change of policy in the not too distant future.
而将波斯湾从这个局面中排除，可能正是推动他们采取行动的关键因素。
And having the Persian Gulf removed from the equation might be what pushes them in that direction.
但我们现在正处在一个完美的风暴中，影子船队看起来非常不稳定。
But we're kind of in this perfect storm here where the shadow fleet is looking really wobbly.
目前波斯湾已经退出，而全世界都忘记了一件事：在奥巴马政府时期通过的2015年综合拨款法案中，美国总统获得了仅凭一纸命令即可关闭所有石油出口的权力。
The Persian Gulf for the moment is gone, And one of the things that everyone in the world forgets is under the 2015 omnibus bill during the Obama administration, The US president got the authority to, with a flick of a pen, shut off all oil exports.
无需审查，无需国会批准，也不需要协商。
No review, no congressional approval, consultation required.
所以我们现在面临一种情况：全球可能同时失去波斯湾、俄罗斯和美国的原油，届时将会引发一场动荡。
So we're in a situation here where the world might lose Persian Gulf, Russian, and American crude all at the same time, and there would be a show when that happens.
到目前为止，谁是赢家？
Who are the winners so far here?
现在还为时过早，无法判断。
It's too soon to tell.
以色列当然认为自己是赢家，因为他们已经让美国基本上替他们打了这场仗。
Israel certainly thinks that they are a winner because they've gotten The United States to basically fight their war for them.
目前，由于影子船队仍在运作，俄罗斯看起来形势不错。
Russia at the moment with the shadow fleet still in play looks good at the moment.
由于需求旺盛，乌拉尔原油在印度的交易价格已经高于所有国际基准。
Urals crude trading in India is already priced higher than all the international benchmarks because of the demand.
当然，还有美国，因为我们拥有这项条款，允许我们脱离全球能源市场，而任何同时重创欧洲和东亚的事件，都会从消费品角度严重打击我们，因为我们的制造业尚未充分发展。
And then, of course, The United States because we have that clause that allows us to remove ourselves from global energy, and anything that wrecks Europe and East Asia at the same time will really hurt us from a consumables point of view because our manufacturing hasn't been built out.
但从长远来看，这可能会对许多国家来说是一场终结社会的事件，但在这里不会。
But longer term, I mean, this is a society ending event potentially for a lot of countries, but not here.
所以感觉伊朗现在正在把所有媒体注意力都吸走了。
So it feels as if Iran testifiably is sucking all the media out of the room right now.
你关注什么？
What do you focus on?
你认为目前除了伊朗之外，最重要的地缘政治事件是什么？
What do think is the most important thing geopolitically occurring outside of Iran right now?
除了伊朗，乌克兰正经历一个非常非常短暂的阶段。
Outside of Iran, Ukraine is getting a really interesting, very, very short version.
星链系统曾被允许用于引导俄罗斯的巡航导弹和无人机，长期来看甚至能打击移动目标。
Starlink was being allowed to be used to guide Russian cruise missiles and drones, long term about allowing to even hit moving targets.
所以，无论是俄罗斯版还是伊朗版的沙赫德无人机，只要在上面加装一个便携式星链终端，就能实时引导它，直到最后一秒。
So you take a Shahed, whether it's a Russian Shahed or a Iranian Shahed, and if you put a portable STARLINK on it, you can guide it in real time all the way to the last second.
因此，对直线飞行的限制就消失了。
And so the restriction is on straight line flight go away.
你只能在发射时选择目标的想法已经不复存在了，它们实际上正在击中移动的火车。
The idea that you can only target something that you've chosen at the time of launch goes away, And they were literally hitting moving trains, with these things.
在乌克兰人通过回收的设备向世界证明，星链系统实际上在主动协助并参与大规模屠杀后，星链修改了部分政策，现在在战区不能再以移动方式使用星链，必须被列入白名单。
After the Ukrainians proved to the world, using the equipment recovered, that Starlink was basically actively aiding and embedding in mass murder, Starlink changed some of their policies, and they can no longer use Starlinks in the theater, in a moving way, and you have to be part of a white list.
通过这样做，他们基本上摧毁了俄罗斯军队在前线之间及前后方通信的能力。
And in doing that, they basically gutted the ability of the Russians to communicate to and from and among the front.
因此，在过去一个月里，乌克兰军队在前线多处发动进攻，实际上收复了大量领土。
And so in the last month, the Ukrainians have been on the offensive throughout many parts of the front and actually captured a lot of territory.
这突显了这些新技术，首先，并不受政府控制。
It's kind of underlined how these new technologies, number one, aren't under government control.
它们掌握在平民手中。
They're under private citizen control.
其次，它们能够被扩展或切断，会对战略决策产生巨大影响。
And two, their ability to be extended and removed can have massive impacts on strategic decision making.
战前，俄罗斯军队内部的通信能力就很差，这也是战争第一年局势如此糟糕的原因之一，比如基尔森反攻就让他们蒙受了巨大耻辱。
The Russian ability to communicate among their forces prewar was pretty poor, and that's one of the reasons why the first year of the war went so badly and how the Kirsten counteroffensive, for example, was so humiliating for them.
他们随后大规模地使用了星链系统。
They then basically used Starlink wholesale.
他们一直使用西方平台进行通信。
They've been using Western platforms to communicate.
因此，当这些平台中的一些被移除后，他们几乎没有比无线电更复杂的备用方案，而无线电是可以被窃听的。
And so now that some of those have been removed, they really don't have a fallback plan that is more sophisticated than radio, and radio can be tapped.
所以我不想说我们正在目睹前线的崩溃。
So I don't wanna say we're suggest suggest that we're seeing a collapse of the front.
那太过极端了。
That's way too extreme.
那里遍布大量雷区。
There's a lot of minefields.
事情没那么简单。
It's not that simple.
但他们在过去一个月里管理前线的能力已经彻底瓦解。
But their ability to manage the front has just dissolved in the last month.
那么，你是否希望看到这场冲突达成和解？
And so are you hopeful that we might see a settlement?
在我看来，美国提出的和平计划本质上就是俄罗斯的和平计划，而我们理想中希望看到的是，乌克兰在谈判时处于强势地位，最终可能达成一项和平方案。
It strikes me that the peace plan offered by the Americans was basically a Russian peace plan, and it feels as if we want ideally, we wanna see Ukraine in a position of strength when they negotiate what ultimately might be a peace plan.
如果你要推测的话，一年后这场冲突会发展到什么地步？你的观点是什么？
Where do you think, if you were to speculate where we would be in a year in that conflict, what is your what is your thesis?
当时没多少人预见到乌克兰战争会爆发。
There weren't a lot of people who saw the Ukraine war coming.
我是其中之一。
I was one of them.
我可能是对乌克兰前景最乐观的人，甚至一度认为这场战争一年内就会结束。
I was probably the most optimistic for the Ukrainians chances, and I even I thought this was all gonna be over in a year.
如今我们已经进入第五年了。
Here we are in year five.
因此，我对未来的任何预测都会非常模糊，我对此几乎没有信心。
So any forecast that I make on that is gonna be very loosey goosey that I have very low confidence in.
技术正在变化。
The technology is changing.
政治联盟也在变化。
The political alliances are changing.
星链系统，五年前谁能想象得到呢？
The Starlink thing, who could have even imagined that five years ago?
我要说的是，在俄罗斯历史上，俄罗斯人从未在没有获胜或尚未失败的情况下谈判结束一场冲突。
What I will say is that not once in Russian history have the Russians ever negotiated an end to a conflict unless they had already won or already lost.
认为这次会有所不同，这种想法太愚蠢了。
And the idea that this somehow is going to be different is stupid.
从俄罗斯的角度来看，他们必须抵达多瑙河、喀尔巴阡山、维斯瓦河和波罗的海，否则他们绝不会停止。
From the Russian point of view, they have to reach the Danube, the Carpathians, the Vistula, and the Baltic, and they will not stop until they get there.
任何关于谈判的讨论都只是空谈。
And any talk of talks is just that.
这只不过是俄罗斯人趁机要求别人给予他们军事上未能夺取的东西，然后一旦准备就绪，他们就会再次推进。
It would simply be an opportunity for the Russians to insist that somebody else give them something that they haven't been able to capture militarily, and then as soon as they're ready, they push again.
任何告诉你不是这样的人都根本不了解俄罗斯人。
And anyone who tells you otherwise really doesn't understand the Russians.
我注意到，俄罗斯的核心能力之一是媒体，而且我需要土地承认。
It strikes me that the core competence of Russia is, you know, the media is and and I need the land acknowledgment.
每一位美国军人的死亡对他们的家庭来说都是一场悲剧。
Every every death of an American service serviceman or servicewoman is a tragedy for their families.
我们已经失去了七个人，这引发了大量媒体报道和公众的愤怒。
We've lost seven people, and it's got a disreport a lot of warranted media mentions and people outraged.
俄罗斯人失去了什么？
What are the Russians losing?
每天一千人？
A thousand people a day?
两万，我的意思是，这让我觉得，俄罗斯人承受损失的能力简直是他们的核心能力。
Two I mean, it just strikes me that the Russian capability to endure loss is kind of their core competence.
我想起软银的孙正义说过，你更愿意跟一个非常聪明的人打，还是跟一个非常疯狂的人打？
And I'm reminded what Masayoshi Son, the head of SoftBank said, who would you rather be in a fight against someone who's really smart or someone who's really crazy?
他说，你最好避免和那个疯子打架。
He said, you wanna avoid the fight with the guy who's crazy.
你觉得，坦白说，我们缺乏承受痛苦的意愿，这对我们有害吗？
Do you think that it hurts us that, quite frankly, we just don't seem to have a willingness to endure much suffering?
你知道，自内战以来，美国从未处于背水一战的境地。
You know, The United States has not been in a position where it's back best been to the wall since the civil war.
所以，老实说，我们从未像世界上许多文化在过去一个半世纪里那样被真正考验过。
So, honestly, we've not been tested in a way that a lot of cultures in the world have faced in the last century, century and a half.
这根本不是我们曾经需要应对的事情。
It's just not something we've ever had to deal with.
我的意思是，我们上一场具有存在意义的外部战争是与墨西哥的战争。
I mean, the last existential external war that we fought was with Mexico.
那对大多数美国人来说并不是一段平静的经历。
That wasn't a serene experience for most Americans.
你真的得追溯到1812年战争，才能找到我们面对一个真正可能击垮我们的外部力量的时刻。
You really have to go to, like, back to the war of eighteen twelve for us facing an external force that really could have had us.
所以我认为这种比较并不公平，我个人是这么认为的。
So I I don't think that's a fair comparison, personally.
自二战以前，美国军队的设计目的就是向外投射力量。
The United States military since before the World Wars has been designed to project power out.
如果你要向外投射力量，就永远不可能靠人数取胜。
And if you're gonna project power out, you will never win on the numbers.
你必须依靠技术、射程、速度、杀伤力，以及选择战斗时间和地点的能力来取胜。
You have to win on technology and reach and speed and lethality and being able to choose the time and place of the fight.
如果你这么做，为了投射力量，每个人所花费的成本会远高于只是给一个人发支枪、派他们冲锋陷阵的做法。
And if that is what you're doing, you spend a lot more money per person in order to project than you would by just putting a gun in someone's hand and sending them charging the front.
因此，当我们遭受伤亡时，其影响会被放大。
And so when we do suffer casualties, it's magnified.
这确实是真的，但这几乎是刻意为之的设计。
That's absolutely true, but that's that's by design almost.
我们出动的是航空母舰。
We show up with an aircraft carrier.
其他人都骑着驴来。
Everyone else shows up with a donkey.
这是另一种类型的战斗。
It's a different type of fight.
关于欧洲，它在过去三十年里一直处于一种自我施加的昏迷状态，你怎么看？
And thoughts on Europe, which has just been in sort of a it feels like a self induced coma for the last thirty years.
对欧洲的影响是什么？
Impact on Europe?
如果波斯湾的原油真的消失了，他们将不得不对俄罗斯和乌克兰做出一个艰难的决定。
If Persian Gulf crude really does go away, they're gonna have to make a really hard decision about Russia and Ukraine.
如果你五年前问我，他们是否会以现在这种方式对抗俄罗斯，我会嘲笑你，因为在过去的二十年里，他们抓住每一个机会向俄罗斯妥协，尤其是在能源政治上。
If you had asked me five years ago whether or not they would have stood up to the Russians in the way they have, I would have laughed at you because they had taken every opportunity in the previous two decades to give in with the Russians at every opportunity, especially on energy politics.
只有在乌克兰问题上，他们才意识到这真的关乎他们的长期生存。
And it's only with Ukraine where they where they realize this really is about their long term survival.
但如果地球上唯一的其他原油来源突然消失，那么很多国家将面临非常艰难的抉择。
But if all of a sudden the only other source of crude on the planet goes away, then a lot of them have some very difficult decisions to make.
欧洲的能源密集度远低于美国，它们用大约一半的原油就能获得相同的GDP，但这并不意味着它们不需要原油，也不意味着存在良好的解决方案。
They're not nearly nearly as energy intensive as in The United States as they probably get the same amount of GDP for half the crude, but that doesn't mean that they don't need it, and that doesn't mean that there's a good solution.
总的来说，欧洲的绿色技术不如美国那样有效。
Green tech in Europe as a rule doesn't work nearly as well as it does in, say, The United States.
它们没有像美国大平原或西南部那样适合风能或太阳能的地区。
They don't have the equivalent of the Great Plains or the American Southwest that are good for wind or solar.
所以，即使它们能奇迹般地挥一下魔杖，让每个人都开上电动车，也仍然无法做太多事情。
And so even if they were to somehow magically wave wave a wand and everyone had an EV, they just wouldn't be able to do much.
它们根本没有足够的充电能力。
Like, they don't have the charging capacity.
即使基础设施到位，气候条件也不利于它们。
Even if the infrastructure was there, the the climate doesn't help them there.
因此，它们的未来很可能是煤炭，特别是褐煤，这对它们来说将是一个苦涩的抉择。
And so their future is probably coal, specifically lignite, and that will be a bitter pill for them to swallow.
但如果你要在环保目标和国家安全之间做选择，我知道德国人和波兰人会选什么，因为它们真的别无选择。
But if your choice is your environmental goals or your national security, I know what the Germans and the Poles will select because they really don't have another option.
但我们确实正目睹欧洲公司时代的终结。
But we are certainly looking at the end of Europe Inc.
作为全球主要制造力量的时代。
As a major manufacturing presence in the world.
与此同时，我们也正见证中国公司的终结。
At the same time, we're looking at the end of China Inc.
作为全球主要制造力量的时代。
As a major manufacturing presence in the world.
任何一个问题都会带来全球性的灾难性影响，而当两者同时发生、且我们还面临全球能源危机时，情况就更加严峻了。
And either of those issues would be globe spanning catastrophe impacts, and to have them both at the same time at the same time we have a global energy crisis.
我不妨直说，我写过一本关于这个主题的书。
Not to put too plain a point on it, but I wrote a book about this.
让我有点沮丧的是，这本书成真之前我还没能退休。
And it's a little frustrating that I haven't retired before it came true.
所以我们现在就在这里。
So here we are.
假设这场战争进展不顺。
Say the war does not go well.
它会损害美国的声誉，但中国是完全能源独立或依赖的国家，而亚洲大部分地区都依赖能源，俄罗斯则深陷战争泥潭。
It damages damages The US reputationally, but China, who is totally importer energy independent or dependent, most of Asia energy dependent, Russia bogged down in a war.
显然，这对伊朗来说并不好。
Obviously, this is not good for Iran.
它继续对欧洲造成经济压力。
It it continues to be an economic impairment for Europe.
就像美国，它是能源独立的，拥有强大的内需经济，也没有人轰炸它。
It's like The US, which is energy independent, very strong internal consumption economy, no one bombing them.
即使我们在全球范围内因声誉受损而疏远了盟友，我们不就像现在的美元一样吗？
Even if we lose damage reputationally across the globe and affrays our alliances, aren't we kinda like the US dollar right now?
人人都在嘲讽美元，但他们还能往哪儿去呢？
And that is everyone shitpost the dollar, but where else are they gonna go?
即使在这里，这场战争导致情况恶化，整个世界都衰退了，我们难道不是全球超级大国中受损最少的吗？
Even if even if things go wrong here with this war and the whole world is diminished, aren't we the least diminished of the world's superpowers?
关于这一点，有两点要说。
Two things on that.
第一，从经济角度看，美国真正的弱点仅在于制造业，无论是原材料的初级加工，比如钴、锂或其他任何材料，还是汽车、飞机以及其间的所有产品。
Number one, from an economic point of view, the only real weak weakness The United States has, is in manufacturing, whether it's the primary processing of raw commodities, like, say, cobalt or lithium or whatever else or cars or jets and everything in between.
我们是一个服务型经济。
We're a services economy.
我们设计了所有人都在使用的系统，但我们尚未建立起使我们能在世界上独立运作所需的工业设施。
We design the systems that everybody else uses, but we have not built out the industrial plant that is necessary for us to fly solo in the world.
我们在拜登执政期间开始着手解决其中一些问题。
We started working on some of that under Biden.
但由于关税政策，这些努力在特朗普时期崩溃了，因为没人知道规则是什么。
It collapsed under Trump too because of the tariff policy because no one knows what the rules are.
在过去一年里，我们实际上经历了6000次关税变动。
We've literally had 6,000 tariff changes in the last year.
因此，企业基本上已经停止了生产。
And so businesses has basically stopped building things.
他们完成了已经开始的工作，但没有人再启动任何新项目。
They'd finished what they'd started, but no one is starting anything new.
因此，在这种特定情况下，我们真的会被狠狠打击，我认为这是一个值得认真讨论的现实问题，因为现在我们必须在缺乏所有曾能帮助我们更快建设的资源的情况下完成这一切。
And so we're really gonna get sucker punched in this specific scenario, which I think is a realistic conversation to have because we have we will now have to do all of that while we have a shortage of everything that would have allowed us to build it faster before.
至于美元，从长期来看，拥有两大洋、全球主导的军事力量、人口众多且年轻、以消费为主的人口结构，以及需要将工业产能扩大一倍，这些因素都支持美元走强。
As for the dollar, long term, two oceans, globally dominant military, strong population, young population, consumer based population, the need to double the size of the industrial plant.
所有这些因素都表明美元在未来将保持强势。
All of those argue for a strong dollar going forward.
但就在十一天前，我们在监管和税收政策上仍然摇摆不定。
But until eleven days ago, we had an erratic policy on regulation, on tax.
法治正在被破坏。
Rule of law was being broken down.
我们故意破坏了与那些融入我们制造体系的国家的贸易关系。
We were deliberately breaking our trade relations with countries that are integrated into our manufacturing system.
所有这些短期问题都指向美元走弱。
All of the short term issues argued for a weaker dollar.
你发动一场战争，所有那些细枝末节就都不再重要了，因为我们现在正亲眼目睹支撑整个世界运转的基础正在被主动摧毁。
You throw a war and all those minor details really don't matter anymore because we're really looking at the bedrock of what allows the rest of the world to function being broken actively here.
所以，是的，现在只有一处可以投资，那就是这里。
And so, yeah, there's only one place to put your money, and it's here.
我们马上回来。
We'll be right back.
本周《版本历史》——我们的科技史上最重要、最有趣产品的聊天节目——将讨论1998年最热门的玩具。
This week on Version History, our chat show about the most interesting and important products in the history of technology, we're talking about the hottest toy from 1998.
没错。
That's right.
当然，我说的是Furby。
Of course, I mean, the Furby.
那个放在你桌上的小玩意儿，没有关机按钮，不说英语，让所有认识的人都烦不胜烦，但你却爱它爱得不行。
The little thing that sat on your desk and didn't have an off button and didn't speak English and annoyed everyone you knew, but you loved it to pieces anyway.
事实证明，在Furby的兴起背后，藏着一段引人入胜的技术乃至人工智能故事。
It turns out there is a fascinating technology and even AI story behind what happened with Furby and why it took off.
这就是本周《版本历史》的全部故事，无论你在哪儿听播客。
That's the story this week on Version History wherever you get podcasts.
战争的问题在于，你的敌人也有发言权，而且总有一个未知因素。
So the thing about war is that your enemy gets a voice, and there's always an x factor.
而中东的战争感觉像是未知因素的平方。
And it feels like war in The Middle East is x squared factor.
你根本不知道接下来会发生什么。
There's just you just don't know what's gonna happen.
对吧？
Right?
或者你知道，未知的东西很可能终将显现。
Or you know you know the unknown is likely to become visible.
你有没有考虑过或思考过任何潜在的黑天鹅事件？比如欧洲抛售我们的债务导致通胀飙升，或者核爆炸？
Have you thought about or thought through any potential black swan events, whether it's Europe selling our debt and spiking inflation or a nuclear detonation?
当你在为一些企业客户评估风险时，我想你一定被问到过这些问题。
When you think if if you're I imagine you're asked to assess risk for some of your corporate clients.
我们现在没有看到的风险有哪些？
What are the risks that we're not seeing right now?
我对债务问题并不担心，塔罗普。
I'm not worried about a debt, Tharop.
假设全世界的人都在同一时刻抛售他们的债券。
Let's say everyone around the world decided to sell their bonds at the same moment.
于是它们开始以20美分甚至更低的价格交易。
And so they start trading at 20¢ on the dollar, maybe even below.
美国联邦储备系统可以在三十秒内扩大货币供应量，然后以20%的成本回购全部债券。
US Federal Reserve, in thirty seconds, can expand the money supply, and they just retire all of it at 20% of the cost.
我的意思是，从经济角度来看，这简直太棒了。
Mean, I honestly, from an economic point of view, that would be lovely.
如果所有人都同时这么做，我会非常高兴。
I would love it if everybody did that at the same time.
那将会太完美了。
That would be fantastic.
所以对那个我不担心。
So not worried about that.
两周前，核武器的事我也没怎么担心。
Nukes, two weeks ago, wasn't really worried.
但现在我认为这是一个非常现实的场景，因为如果你是一个濒临崩溃的政权，你的最高领导人已经死了，而且被要求无条件投降，你为什么不制造并使用核武器呢？
Now I see that as a very realistic realistic scenario because if you're a run and you've got you're a dead supreme leader and you're being demanded to surrender unconditionally, why would you not build and use a nuke?
向美国运送核武器会是个难题。
Delivery to The United States would be the complication.
这意味着核武器可能需要通过货运设施进入港口，而安检是在陆地上而非海上进行，这最有力地指向了休斯顿或纽约市。
It suggests it would need to come in on a cargo facility into a port where the screening is on land and not at sea, and that would argue most strongly for Houston or New York City.
这些是实施此事最合乎逻辑的地点。
Those are the logical places to do it.
这件事从我完全不担心的状况，突然变成了最值得关注的场景之一。
And that has gone from something I really didn't even worry about at all to something that all of a sudden is one of the leading scenarios.
你认为有没有哪个国家能在这里发挥领导作用，无论是阿曼还是像瑞士那样的中立国，能够促使更冷静的头脑占上风？
Is there a country that you think plays a leadership role here in being whether it's Oman or being sort of the Switzerland here that can somehow get cooler minds to prevail?
现在有没有一个我们原本没指望会发声的国家或英雄出现？
Is there is there a nation or a hero we need right now that we weren't expecting to hear from?
没有哪个国家或领导人是特朗普足够尊重到可以充当调解者的。
There is no country and no leader who Trump respects enough to serve as a mediator.
事实上，特朗普认为自己才是唯一的调解者，仅此而已。
In fact, Trump thinks that he should be the only mediator, period.
所以我觉得这不太可能。
So I find that unlikely.
伊朗的新领导人是个非常非常暴力且军国主义倾向的人。
For the new guy in Iran, he's a very, very violent militaristic individual.
他掌权时间还不够长，我们尚不清楚他的地缘政治偏好，但我很难相信，当他正在巩固总统权力时，他的第一反应会是寻求第三方介入。
He hasn't been in charge long enough for know us to know what his, geopolitical preferences are, but I find it difficult to believe that as he's building up his institution of the presidency that his first thought will be to reach out to a third party.
即使他真这么做了，我也想不出谁能胜任这个角色。
And even if he did, I'm not sure who that could be.
真正还有些影响力（尽管非常微弱）的国家，只有中国。
The only country that really has any influence, and it's very, very thin, would be China.
习近平有点像特朗普，因为他已经大规模清洗了身边的人，导致他也得不到好的信息。
And Xi is a little bit like Trump in that he's purged the system around him to such a huge degree that he's not getting good information either.
所以剩下的就只有普京了。
So all that leaves us with is Putin.
我们已经在乌克兰前线看到一些变化，因为伊朗曾在乌克兰战争期间是俄罗斯的主要武器供应商，但这一供应一夜之间归零了。
And we're already seeing some of the differences on the front line in Ukraine because the Iranians were primary weapon suppliers to Russia during the Ukraine war, and that has gone to zero overnight.
因此，假设特朗普对此有所察觉，我很难想象他会接受普京作为调解人。
So assuming that Trump has any awareness of that, it's difficult for me to see Trump accepting Putin as a mediator either.
我只是看不出会是谁。
I just don't see who it could be.
有很多国家可能愿意提供良好场所，也就是不充当中介，只是 hosting 谈判，但没有人能对任何一方进行干预。
There are plenty of countries that might offer good offices and, you know, be not the broker, but just host the talks, but no one who can intervene on either side.
没关系。
It's fine.
我们美国过去曾是那个操作系统，试图掌控石油供应或石油根基，并确立美元地位。
We The US used to be the operating system trying to, you know, securing the supplies or the roots of oil, settle in dollars.
这是我们冷战期间与所有盟友达成的协议。
That was the deal we cut with all the allies during the Cold War.
我们确保石油持续流动。
We keep the oil flowing.
你站在我们这边。
You're on our side.
还有我们的法律、知识产权保护，可以说是整个操作系统，用来保护或压制、制约那些流氓国家。
And our laws, our IP protection, kind of the operating system, and protecting or suppressing or keeping in check rogue nations.
在某种程度上，我们如今似乎成了那个流氓国家。
And it feels to a certain extent like we are now that rogue nation.
这种说法公平吗？
Is that fair?
流氓国家是指那些违反现有秩序的国家。
Rogue nations are ones that violate the existing order.
如果根本不存在现有秩序，那还有谁算得上是流氓国家呢？
And if there is no existing order, is anyone really a rogue nation?
我对特朗普政府在专业、战略和个人层面都有很多不满。
I've got lots of beefs, professional, strategic, and personal with the Trump administration.
我并不刻意隐藏这些看法，但全球化注定会失败。
I don't make a lot of I don't put a lot of effort into hiding that, but globalization was always going to fail.
全球人口结构正在朝着年轻人数量不足的方向发展，而这些年轻人本应是推动贸易所需的消费主力。
The the global demographic picture was evolving in the direction where there just weren't gonna be enough young people to do the consuming that would make trade possible.
在冷战结束后，当各方对谁是敌人没有共识的情况下，美国继续撑起全球秩序的设想，注定会失败。
And the idea that The United States would continue to hold up the ceiling in a post Cold War world when there was no agreement as to who the bad guy was, that was always gonna fail.
我整个职业生涯都在预测，2025年到2035年将是这一切彻底崩溃的十年。
And between 2025 and 2035 is always the decade that I have identified my entire professional career about when it was all gonna break.
特朗普正在加速这一进程。
Trump is speeding that process up.
他正在压缩时间表，这将给美国各地带来巨大的痛苦，仅此一点就足以说明。
He's compressing it, and that's gonna cause a lot of pain in a lot of places in The United States just for one.
但认为这件事永远不会发生，我认为那是自我欺骗。
But to think it wasn't ever going to happen, I think, is deluding ourselves.
我们终究会走到现在这个状态，以及即将面临的情况。
We were always gonna get to some version of where we are now and where we're about to be.
那么让我们回到现实。
So let's bring this home.
当你的客户问你，美国经济和政治局势的现状如何时，你的回答是什么？
When your clients ask you to give them the state of play in The US economically and in terms of the political landscape, what's your answer?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，从经济上讲，这几年我一直告诉他们，如果你依赖中国，那就应该假设所有这些都会归零，你什么都得不到。
Well, I mean, economically, I've been telling them for, several years now that if you're dependent on China, you just should assume that that all goes to zero and you get none of it back.
最近我确实解约了几个客户，因为他们就是拒绝接受，因为到目前为止，这纯粹是在浪费我的时间。
I've actually let go a couple of clients recently who just refused because it's it's it's a waste of my time at this point.
现在的问题是，你是否能在美国极端监管不确定的环境中建立制造工厂。
The question now is whether or not you can build out manufacturing plant in an environment of extreme regulatory uncertainty in The United States.
这是迄今为止我一生中对商业界最敌视的政府，因为无时无刻不在变化的混乱局面，但这就是我们必须面对的现实。
This is by far the most hostile administration in my life to the business community because of all the constant ambient chaos changes, but this is what we have to deal with.
因此，你必须找到一种方式扩展生产线，将那些不在西半球的环节纳入其中，而且你必须立即行动。
So you have to find a way to expand your production lines to take in the steps that are not in the Western Hemisphere, and you have to do it now.
是的，这肯定会很昂贵，是的，资本成本比以前更高，是的，劳动力成本也比以前更高，更别提还加上了移民 crackdown，但这就是你所处的环境。
And, yes, that's gonna be expensive, and, yes, capital is more expensive than it was, and, yes, labor is more expensive than it was even before you consider the immigration crackdown, but this is just the environment that you have.
你不可能再回到东亚沿海地区了。
And there is no going back to the East Asian rim.
也许到今年年底，你也无法再回到欧洲了。
And maybe by the end of this year, there's no going back to Europe either.
因此，你只能面对现实，而现实就在这里，这意味你要与特朗普共处，无论好坏。
So you have to deal with what you have, and what you have is here, and that involves Trump for better or for worse.
但我们现在已到了准备时间耗尽、关键时刻到来的时刻。
But we're now at the moment where we've run out of prep time, and the day has arrived.
你对2026年的中期选举，或者2028年共和党或民主党候选人有什么预测吗？
Do you have any predictions for 2026 in terms of the midterms or who you think will be the Republican or Democratic nominee in '28?
我没有。
I do not.
共和党已经不复存在了。
The Republican party is gone.
国家安全保守派、财政保守派、商业保守派和法律与秩序保守派都被逐出了该党。
The national security conservatives, the fiscal conservatives, the business conservatives, the law and order conservatives have all been ejected from the party.
现在只剩下特朗普了。
It is simply Trump now.
所以，假设当我们到达那个节点时特朗普还活着，他会亲自挑选任何人选，而这个人必须在所有事情上都服从他，直到选举发生。
So assuming that Trump is still alive when we get to that point, he will handpick whoever it is, and whoever it is will then have to toe the line with him on everything until such time as the election happens.
因为如果他们不这么做，他就会更换人选。
Because if they don't, he will then change his choice.
他依然在MAGA群体中拥有类似狂热的忠诚，无论他的精神状态如何，他都能毫无障碍地做到这一点。民主党则一片混乱。
And he retains a cult like devotion from MAGA, and he will have be able to do that without a problem no matter what his mental state happens to The Democrats are simply chaotic.
他们已经失去了拉丁裔选民。
They've lost the Hispanics.
他们已经失去了有组织的劳工。
They've lost organized labor.
他们失去了年轻选民的支持。
They've lost the youth vote.
所以，认为这两方中的任何一方未来还能赢，简直有点可笑，但总得有一方输得更惨。
So the idea that either of these sides can win ever again is kind of funny, but someone has to lose more.
因此，我完全无法预测，因为它们正在竞相跌向谷底，完全丧失了吸引任何人的能力。
And so I have no prediction whatsoever because they're just in a race to the bottom in terms of their capacity to attract anyone.
双方的优势在于他们吸引选民的能力，而我现在也说不清哪一方更糟。
Their the strength on both sides is their ability to repel voters, and I can't tell you which one is worse right now.
彼得·泽汉是一位地缘政治战略家，也是《泽汉地缘政治》的创始人。
Peter Zeihan is a geopolitical strategist and founder of Zeihan on geopolitics.
我只是想说，我很喜欢美国的一点是，你们能够培养出如此有趣的人才，并给予他们发挥影响力、过上体面生活的机遇。
I just you are really one of the things I love about America is that you can we mature such interesting people and give them the opportunity to have influence and make good livings.
你简直就是从一些平庸之人的零件中组装出来的工厂产品。
And you are just you were built in a factory from parts of lesser people who do that.
我真的很着迷于你这样的人，也非常感谢你今天抽出时间，彼得。
I'm really just I'm fascinated with you as our people and very much appreciate your time here, Peter.
本集由詹妮弗·桑切斯和劳拉·詹纳制作。
This episode was produced by Jennifer Sanchez and Laura Jenner.
卡米·里克是我们社交媒体制作人。
Kami Riek is our social producer.
比安卡·罗萨里奥·拉米雷斯是我们视频编辑。
Bianca Rosario Ramirez is our video editor.
德鲁·伯罗斯是我们技术总监。
And Drew Burrows is our technical director.
感谢您收听Prop G Media的Prop G播客。
Thank you for listening to the Prop G Pod from Prop G Media.
关于 Bayt 播客
Bayt 提供中文+原文双语音频和字幕，帮助你打破语言障碍，轻松听懂全球优质播客。