37. 间谍，与本·麦金泰尔

音乐，也许是雪莉·巴西，也许是阿黛尔，或者考虑到我的共同主持人多米尼克·桑德布鲁克，也许是杜兰·杜兰。

Music, perhaps by Shirley Bassey, perhaps by Adele, or perhaps knowing my co presenter Dominic Sandbrook by Duran Duran.

然后

Then

肯定是保罗·麦卡特尼在威翼乐队时期。

Paul McCartney in wings, surely.

一个熟悉的旋律响起。

A familiar theme strikes up.

我们正面对着枪口。

We're looking down the barrel of a gun.

多米尼克从画面右侧出现，身着笔挺的黑色燕尾服，大步走过白色背景，突然，他转身开枪，对着镜头摆出姿势。

Dominic appears from the right of the frame dressed in a smart black tuxedo, strides across a white background before bang, he swivels and shoots the camera holding the pose.

红色缓缓流下。

Red trickles down.

画面切入风格化的标题卡，上面显示着：‘其余的，都是历史。’

Cue stylized title card which reveals the words, the rest is history.

欢迎收看本节目。

Welcome to the show.

多米尼克，你觉得自己像詹姆斯·邦德吗？

Dominic, do you fancy yourself as, as James Bond?

说实话，我觉得你更像勒卡雷笔下的人物，汤姆？

I I actually, to be honest, I see you see you as more a kind of le Carre figure Tom?

躲在幕后。

Lurking in the background.

这个开场简直处处冒犯。

Everything about that introduction has been quite offensive.

从你模仿邦德式出场的讽刺语气，到暗示我像乔治·史迈利。

From the sort of parodic tone with which you did my Bond like appearance to then the implied comparison with George Smiley.

当然，事实上，我们每个人心里都觉得自己是詹姆斯·邦德，对吧？

And, of course, the truth is we all fancy ourselves as James Bond, don't we?

但如果你读过那些史迈利的小说，就会发现书中对他的描述——一个穿着雨衣、在倾盆大雨中从一个图书馆跋涉到另一个图书馆的邋遢男人。

But if you ever read those Smiley books, and there's that sort of description of him, the sort of shabby man in the Mac trudging from a library to library in the pouring rain.

我的意思是，这基本上就是历史学家的生活。

I mean, that basically is the life of a historian.

但你看，我甚至连乔治·斯迈利都算不上。

But you see, I wouldn't even be George Smiley.

真的吗？

Wouldn't you?

你不会是说，我会是……

Would you be I'd

我会太没用了。

be so use I'd be so useless.

我会错过所有关键线索，最后在某条小巷里被卡拉枪杀之类的。

I'd miss all the key clues and kind of end up shot by Carla in some backstreet or something.

不过，幸运的是，今天我们邀请到一位嘉宾，正如你们可能已经猜到的，我们的主题是间谍史、 spying 的历史。我们请来了一位几乎掌握所有相关知识的人——不是关于间谍小说，而是关于现实，尽管他的书在很多方面比小说还要引人入胜。

However, fortunately, we do have as our guest today, and our theme, as you probably guessed by now, is history of espionage, history of spying, we do have someone who knows pretty much everything there is to know, not about the fiction of spying, but the reality, even though his books are in many ways more gripping than fiction.

他就是本·麦金泰尔，著有《间谍扎加》《小计谋行动》《间谍朋友》等众多作品。

It is, of course, Ben McIntyre, author of Agent Zigzag, Operation Mincemeat, Spy Among Friends, among many others.

其中一本，本，是《间谍与叛徒》，讲的是奥列格·戈尔迪耶夫斯基。

One of which, Ben, was The Spy and the Traitor about Oleg Gordievsky.

我提到这本书，是因为这是我最近读过的一本你的著作，去年冬天我在圣彼得堡读的。

And I name checked that because it was the most recent of your books I read, and I read it last year in a wintery Saint Petersburg.

这本书的主题和地点简直是天作之合。

And it was the perfect fit of subject matter to location.

所以，本，非常感谢你来到《余下的都是历史》节目。

So, Ben, thanks so much for coming, on to The Rest is History.

很高兴能来这里。

Delighted to be here.

非常感谢你的邀请。

Thank you so much for inviting me.

我非常期待这次对话。

I'm looking forward to this.

我们刚才一直在谈论詹姆斯·邦德和乔治·史迈利。

We've been talking about, both James Bond and George Smiley.

对我们英国人来说，有一个风险，那就是我们往往将间谍历史完全视为虚构的故事。

And I guess for us in Britain, there is a risk that we tend to see the history of espionage almost entirely in fictional terms.

你觉得这是真的吗？

Do you think do you think that's true?

我觉得这是真的。

I think it's true.

我认为还有一个奇怪而持久的联系，那就是英国小说与间谍活动之间的关联，因为我认为，二十世纪许多最伟大的小说家本身就是间谍，并非偶然。

I think it's also true that there is a there is a strange and enduring link, I think, between British fiction and espionage because it's no accident, I think, that many of the greatest novelists of the twentieth century were themselves spies.

你提到了伊恩·弗莱明和约翰·勒卡雷。

You've mentioned Ian Fleming and John LeCarrie.

他们俩都曾在情报部门工作，但还有更多人，比如萨默塞特·毛姆和约翰·布坎。

They were both in in intelligence, but there are many more Somerset Maughan, John Buchan.

但我觉得，这种联系非常奇特，因为在很多方面，间谍的工作与小说家的创作并没有太大区别。

But there are I mean, it's an uncanny link, I think, because I think in lots of ways, the work of espionage is not so far removed from the work from from what novelists do.

你试图构建一个虚构的世界，并试图吸引他人进入其中，而你构建这个虚构世界的能力越强，你就越能成为一个出色的间谍。

You you you try to imagine an artificial world and you try to lure other people into it, and and the better you are able to frame this artificial imaginary world, the better spy you're gonna make.

格雷厄姆·格林是另一个绝佳的例子。

Graham Greene's another brilliant example.

我想，他们都通过间谍工作学会了小说创作的技艺。

They all learned the trade of fiction, I would say, through espionage.

所以我认为，这两者在英国文化中如此紧密地交织在一起，并非偶然。

So I think it's no accident that the two are, particularly in British culture, deeply intertwined.

事实上，有趣的是，当斯特拉·里明顿卸任英国军情五处负责人后，她做的第一件事就是开始写小说。

In fact, funny enough, I thought I thought it was rather telling in a way that when Stella Rimington stepped down as head of MI five, the first thing she did was to start writing novels.

我的意思是

I mean

好吧，本，但你知道，实际上那是卢克·詹宁斯。

Well, Ben, I but but, you know, she actually, was Luke Jennings.

我可以这么说吗？

Am I allowed to say that?

谁写的？

Who who who wrote it?

然后去写了《维拉·奈尔》。

Who then went on to write Villa Nail.

我希望我没有泄露太多秘密。

I I I hope I'm not betraying too many secrets there.

你打破了这个幻觉。

You've shattered the illusion.

但是，本，这难道不会引发一个问题吗？

But, Ben, isn't that doesn't that then raise a question?

如果你想想像格雷厄姆·格林的《哈瓦那的人》或勒卡雷的《巴拿马裁缝》这样的书——后者某种程度上受此启发——你会发现，整个故事，当然我不会剧透这些书的全部内容——给人一种感觉：间谍在向上级售卖一个关于该国真实情况的虚构故事，同时也售卖了关于自身影响力以及间谍活动重要性的虚构叙事。

So if you think about a book like Graham Greene's, A Man in Havana, or Le Carre's, The Tailor of Panama, which is kind of inspired by that, there's a sense that the whole thing I mean, without giving the sort of the the those books entirely away, there's a sense that the whole thing is a fiction, that the spy is selling a fiction to their superiors, a fiction of what's happening in the country, but also fiction of their own influence and and and the fiction that spying matters.

我的意思是，这重要吗？

I mean, does it matter?

你提到《哈瓦那的人》真好，因为格雷厄姆·格林的《哈瓦那的人》正是直接基于一个真实的间谍案件。

I mean, lovely that you mentioned Our Man in a Vanner because, of course, Our Man in a Vanner is directly based by Graham Greene on a real intelligence case.

它基于加博案。

It's based on the Garbo case.

加博案是二战期间一个非凡的双重间谍。

Now the Garbo case was this extraordinary double agent in the second world war.

他的真名是胡安·普霍尔。

His real name was Juan Pujol.

他原本是个失败的西班牙养鸡场主，但最终出现在英国，实际上是被英国军情五处带去的。

He was a failed Spanish chicken farmer, believe it or who turned up in Britain, he actually was brought to Britain by m I five in the end.

他虚构了一整支间谍网络。

And he invented an entire sort of army of sub agents.

他最终拥有23名下属，每个人都有不同的背景、妻子等，而这些人全都是他编造出来的。

He ended up with 23 people, each of whom had a different backstory and wives and so on, all of whom were completely invented.

在诺曼底登陆前夕，他们向德国人传递了极其重要的虚假情报。

And they were used to feed back very, very important disinformation to the Germans on the eve of D Day.

格雷厄姆·格林知道这个故事。

Grengrine knew about this story.

所以他吸收了这个看似有趣的情节——而加博本人本身也是一名失败的小说家。

And so he absorbed this, what seems like a fun, I mean, and Garbo himself was a failed novelist.

我的意思是，这正是他真正想做的事。

I mean, that's what he really wants to do.

所以他创造了一个虚构的世界，这个世界直接影响了现实，之后又重新变成了虚构。

So he created this fictional world, which then had a direct impact on reality and then became fiction again afterwards.

因此，他在战争期间编造的那些东西改变了历史，之后又再次变成了虚构。

So the makey uppy stuff that he was doing during the war changed history and then became fiction again.

另一个绝佳的例子是‘明兹米行动’，我也写过这个故事，它奇妙地起源于一群沮丧的小说家或诗人的头脑中，他们都是情报官员。

I mean, another great example is the Operation Mintzmy story, again, I've written about, which wonderfully sort of started as an as a as a sort of mad idea in the mind of a of a group of intelligence officers who were all frustrated novelists or poets.

他们所做的，是为一个死去的人创造了一个完全虚假的身份，然后把这个身份送到西班牙海岸，对西西里岛的入侵产生了重大而戏剧性的影响，因为它成功让德国人相信，进攻实际上会来自希腊。

I mean, it's and and they what they did was to create an entirely false identity for this dead man who then was shipped onto the coast of Spain and had a dramatic and very important effect on the invasion of Sicily because it it helped convince the Germans the attack was actually coming in Greece.

战后，这个行动被达夫·库珀写成了一部小说，因为他当时不被允许以真实事件的形式出版。

Now that that was revealed as a novel by Duff Duff Cooper after the war because he wasn't allowed to publish it as reality.

一旦它变成了虚构作品，这个计划的一位作者便被允许将其写成一本真实的书籍，后来又被拍成了电影《那个从不存在的人》，而这本书又在我这里变成了非虚构作品，现在它即将再次被拍成电影。

And then once it had become a fiction, then one of the authors authors of the of the plot was allowed to turn it into a real book, which then became a film, the man who never was, which then became a nonfiction book in my case, and then it's about to be a film again.

因此，这两者之间奇妙的互动仍在继续。

So the weird interplay between the two continues.

但要回答你的问题，你看。

But but to answer your question, very look.

大多数间谍活动并没有造成巨大的影响。

Most espionage doesn't make an enormous amount of difference.

作为一个已经写了大约十二本关于间谍活动书籍的人，这么说似乎很奇怪。

That seems a strange thing to say from someone who has written now, I think, something like 12 books on espionage.

但因为大多数间谍活动相互抵消，我们知道他们知道我们知道他们知道我们知道。

But because most espionage cancels itself out, we know what they know that we know that they know that we know.

而你在这种奇怪的连续体中的位置，决定了你在间谍游戏中是赢还是输。

And where you are on that kind of strange continuum is kind of where you're winning or losing in the spy game.

麦克米伦一直认为，我们应该彻底清除所有间谍，或者干脆把一切信息公之于众，那样就不会有问题了。

Macmillan was always of the view that we should just get rid of all spies completely, or indeed just tell everybody everything, and then there would be no problem.

通常来说，间谍活动——这个词本身带有很强的色彩——实际上是在为传统的外交工作润滑。

Very and usually what espionage does, and espionage is itself a rather loaded word, but but what the the sort of spy game does is that it oils the wheels of traditional diplomacy.

当它有效时，它能让我们接触到重要信息，从而让我们更安全；当它失效时，却会让我们变得极度危险。

It it allows access sometimes to important information that makes us safer when it works, and makes us radically more unsafe when it doesn't work.

我的意思是，我们来想想海湾战争。

I mean, so let's think of the Gulf War.

我的意思是，当情报被赋予了超出其实际价值的重要性时，可能会造成灾难性后果。

I mean, you know, when intelligence is privileged beyond what it is worth, it can be catastrophic.

但极少数情况下，它确实会对国家的行为方式产生战略影响。

But very occasionally, it does have a strategic impact on the way states behave.

‘中速行动’就是一个很好的例子。

And Operation Mid Speed is a good example.

诺曼底登陆的欺骗行动是另一个非常好的例子。

The D Day deception is another very good example.

我的意思是，如果没有这次间谍行动的成功，诺曼底登陆会成功吗？

I mean, without without the success of that spy operation, would the Normandy landings have worked?

也许会。

Well, possibly.

伤亡会更惨重吗？

Would there have been greater blood pressure?

当然，毫无疑问。

Absolutely, certainly.

本，本，为了那些对这两项行动不熟悉的人，你能简单介绍一下这两项行动具体是什么吗？

Ben Ben, just just for the benefit of those who are not familiar with either of those operations, could you just sketch out exactly what those two operations?

它们都发生在第二次世界大战期间，而且正如你所说，都是虚构的计划，旨在欺骗纳粹，让他们以为会发生一些根本不会发生的事情。

They're both in the Second World War, and they're both, as you say, kind of almost fictional projects designed to deceive the Nazis into thinking something's gonna happen that doesn't.

非常乐意。

With pleasure.

依次来说，‘肉馅行动’旨在说服德国人，从北非出发的庞大英美舰队并非计划登陆西西里——尽管西西里显然是目标，而是整个舰队将前往希腊。

I mean, in order, Operation Mincemeat was an attempt to persuade the Germans that instead of landing in Sicily, the great Anglo American armada that was setting off from North Africa, that instead of aiming for Sicily, which was the obvious target, that whole flotilla was heading for Greece.

这是一个非常复杂的整体欺骗计划，但其关键部分是一个听起来完全疯狂的主意：找一具尸体。

And it was a very complicated general deception plan, but the key element of it was what sounds like a completely bonkers idea, which was to get a dead body.

事实上，这个想法——这里还有一个关联——来自弗莱明。

And in fact, the idea, here's another link, comes from Fleming.

因为伊恩·弗莱明在担任海军情报部门负责人助理时，被要求提出一系列欺骗手段，其中他提出了一项名为‘鳟鱼备忘录’的方案。

Because Ian Fleming, when he was head assistant to the head of naval intelligence was asked to come up with a list of ruses, one of which he produced something called the trout memo.

这份‘鳟鱼备忘录’之所以这么叫，是因为他把抓捕间谍和整个间谍工作比作飞蝇钓鱼。

And the trout memo was so called because he compared catching spies and and and the whole work of espionage to fly fishing.

在这份疯狂点子清单中，第51条是：找一具尸体，把它丢在德国间谍能找到的地方，因为一具尸体比活人更可信。

And number 51 in this list of totally mad ideas was let's get a dead body and drop it somewhere where the German spies will find it because a dead body is more believable than a living person.

于是他们真的就这么做了。

And so they they did exactly that.

他们找到了一具尸体，并非法获取了它。

They got hold, they found, it took it illegally.

他们在国王十字车站的一处仓库里找到了一具尸体。

They found a dead body in a in a warehouse in King's Cross.

他们把死者的真实姓名格伦多尔·迈克尔，改成了一个完全虚构的身份。

They turned him his name his real name was, Glendoer Michael, but they turned him into someone completely different.

他们把他伪装成一名海军陆战队少校，为他配备了制服、背景故事，以及小说家会设计的一切细节。

They turned him into a major in the in the Marines, and they equipped him with a uniform and a backstory and everything that you would if you were a novelist.

同时还附上了关键的伪造文件，包括高级指挥官写的信件，明确暗示希腊即将遭到进攻，而撒丁岛战役则是个彻头彻尾的骗局。

And also with key counterfeit papers, papers, letters from senior commanders that indicated quite clearly that an attack was looming in Greece, and that the Sardinian campaign was a complete fate.

他们带着这具尸体，将其运送到中立国西班牙的海岸，那里有一个特别有效的德国间谍在活动。

And they took this body and they shipped it ashore on the coast of neutral Spain, where they knew that a particularly effective German spy was operating.

这招出奇地有效，得益于布莱切利园的情报截获。

And it worked astonishingly, because of the Bletchley Park intercepts.

你可以追踪这个谎言的传播路径：从西班牙南海岸到马德里，从马德里到柏林，从柏林到希特勒的指挥部，最终直抵德国最高统帅部。

You can follow this lie, as it goes from the South Coast Of Spain to Madrid, Madrid to Berlin, Berlin to hit the third quarters, and then straight down the gullet of the of the German high command.

这招成功了。

And it worked.

我的意思是，他们确实将大量部队从地中海的一侧调动到了另一侧。

I mean, they they moved considerable numbers of troops from one side of the Mediterranean to the other.

这就是那个古怪的‘肉馅行动’故事。

So that's that's the bizarre operation mincemeat story.

另一个或许更为重要的行动，则围绕着诺曼底登陆的欺骗计划展开，涉及使用双重间谍。

And the other one, perhaps even more significant, was the one surrounding the d day deception, which involved the use of double agents.

他们是这一计划的关键要素。

They were the key elements in this.

这些人都曾是德国派往英国刺探英国情报的间谍，但被英国抓获，要么被处决后由英国人冒充，要么被策反，或以其他方式用来向德国传递虚假信息。

Now these were people that the the Germans had sent to Britain to spy against the British who had been picked up by the British and either executed, and then impersonated or turned or otherwise used to feed information back.

而令人费解的是，同样因为布莱切利公园的情报工作，英国不仅能截获部分潜入英国的德国间谍，而是所有间谍都能被截获。

And and the bizarre thing about that was, again, because of Bletchley Park, the British were able to intercept not just some of the German spies that were coming to Britain, but all of them.

每一个，只有一个例外。

Every single one, bar one.

还留下一个未解之谜。

There's one remaining mystery.

有一位荷兰特工，空降到英国，他的名字简直无可挑剔——恩格尔伯特斯·富肯。

There was one particular Dutch agent who parachuted into Britain who went by the unimprovable name of Engelbertus Fucken.

而恩格尔伯特斯·富肯至今

And Engelbertus Fucken has never

他的代号

his code name,

不是他的代号。

not his code.

那就是他的真名。

That was his real name.

天知道他的代号是什么。

God god knows what his code name was then.

我的意思是，这

I mean, what is

像是007电影里的名字，对吧？

a Bond film name, isn't it?

他是被发现的，我再说一遍，恩格尔伯特·富肯被发现藏在剑桥的一个掩体里，没人知道他是怎么潜入英国而没被抓住的。

Novelist, but but so he was found, Engelbert's I'm gonna say it again, Engelbert's fucking was found in in a in a in a a bunker in Cambridge and nobody knew how he got into Britain without being caught.

他的存在让军情五处陷入恐慌，因为他是唯一一个漏网之鱼，但除此之外，他们抓获了大量间谍并加以利用，比如我们前面提到的加尔博，但还有其他一大批人。

They put a real panic through MI5 because he was the only one, but otherwise they captured a lot of them and they used them and Garbo was an example that we talked about at the top of the cast, But there were a whole set of others.

其中有五个关键人物，他们利用这些人传递信息，暗示这次明显的目标——加来——才是真正的目标。

There were five essential ones, and they used them to send information indicating this time that the obvious target, which was Calle, was the target.

所以，这在某种程度上，是西西里欺骗行动的反向操作。

So it's the reverse, if you like, of the Sicilian deception.

而且，它所做的就是让大量德军被困在加来，等待一场从未发生的入侵。

And again, it what it did was it it buttoned up large numbers of German troops in in Calais waiting for an invasion that never happened.

现在，要量化这会产生多大影响几乎是不可能的。

Now it's it's almost impossible to quantify what impact that would have had.

所以你处于一种假设性历史的情境中，因为这种假设性历史其实从未真正奏效过。

So you're in the because what if history doesn't, there's never really worked.

但你知道，我认为这是完全合理的，因为你可以看到部队的部署情况，这是为数不多的几次情报直接进入战略思维并切实影响和改变人们行为的案例之一。

But you know, it is perfectly reasonable, I think, because you can see the troop deployments that it has, it's one of the very few occasions when intelligence goes straight into strategic thinking that it actually materially affects and changes the way people behave.

我的意思是，你也提到了戈迪耶夫斯基，汤姆。

I mean, you mentioned Gordievsky as well, Tom.

我的意思是，这是另一个极少数真正对西方对苏联政策产生实质性影响的案例。

I mean, that's another one of the rare ones that really did actually materially impact Western policy towards Soviet Union.

你提到了戈迪耶夫斯基，而你的两个例子都是二战时期的案例。

So you mentioned Gordievsky, and and your two examples are are kind of second world war examples.

但大多数人一想到间谍活动，首先想到的就是冷战。

Now but the the thing that the conflict that most people think about with spying is the cold war.

我的意思是，冷战在很多方面是由间谍活动定义的。

I mean, the the cold war is in many ways defined by spying.

你知道的，邦德、勒卡雷，还有那种从冰天雪地中走来的间谍。

You know, Bond, Le Carre, the sort of spy who came in from the cold.

你认为在冷战中，间谍活动的重要性能和二战时期相提并论吗？

And do you think spying mattered in the cold war as much as it mattered in in World War two?

如果你用间谍活动是否真正影响了国家行为来衡量其重要性的话？

If you're measuring mattered by actually having an impact on the way states behave?

我认为其实不然，因为冷战毕竟是‘冷’的。

I think not really because of course, the cold war was cold.

我的意思是，它从未像在某些地区那样真正爆发，也从未导致直接冲突。

I mean, it was never it never it never actually led to to what it did inside certain areas, but it never led to direct conflict.

因此，尽管冷战时期的间谍活动规模庞大得多，远超二战时期的任何行动。

So so while it was hugely extensive, far more extensive, the espionage of the Cold War era than than anything that was going on in in the second world.

而二战时期的间谍手段，实际上有种令人欣喜的业余感。

And there's something delightfully amateurish really about the way it was done in the second world war.

它变得更加专业化，也获得了更多的资金支持。

It became much more professionalized, it became much better funded.

它产生了深远的影响吗？

Did it have a profound impact?

说实话，我认为是的。

Really, I think.

但这个问题可能还没有完全得到解答，因为许多材料、许多档案资料仍然处于保密状态。

But with that, that question may not have been fully answered yet because, of course, a lot of the material, a lot of the archival material is still closed up.

但比如戈迪耶夫斯基就是一个非常好的例子。

But there are I mean, Gordievsky is a very good example.

这确实是一个很好的例子，这位间谍能够向他的主子——也就是英国军情六处和美国中情局——透露敌方的想法。

I mean, that's a really good example of a spy who was able to inform his masters, in this case, m I six and the CIA, able to inform them what the enemy was thinking.

而这正是间谍活动的关键所在。

And that's that's the critical element of espionage.

我们能够进入对方的思维，不仅了解他们在做什么，还能知道他们计划做什么。

We can get inside the head of the other of the opposition, and not only find out what he's doing, but what he's planning to do.

你在戈尔迪耶夫斯基所做的事情上已经领先了一大步。

You're you're you're a big step ahead and what Gordievsky did.

戈尔迪耶夫斯基是一名职业克格勃官员。

Gordievsky was a career KGB officer.

我的意思是，他生来就在克格勃里。

I mean, he'd been born into the KGB.

他是一名非常出色的克格勃官员。

He was a very good KGB officer.

事实上，他可以说是带着克格勃的血脉出生的。

In fact, he sort of came with the came with the blood really.

但在20世纪60年代的哥本哈根，他倒戈了，而且几乎完全是出于意识形态的原因。

But in Copenhagen in the 60s, he turned, and he turned really almost entirely for ideological reasons.

这在间谍活动中非常罕见，大多数间谍活动都是为了钱。

Again, a very rare thing in espionage, most espionage about money.

在这个世界里，大多数人——尤其是特工——都是被现金、实实在在的金钱所驱动的。

Most people are in that world are particularly agents are motivated by cash, cold hard cash.

但戈尔迪耶夫斯基的情况并非如此。

That wasn't the case with Gordievsky.

他是个极具智慧的人，他意识到自己效忠的是一个残酷的压迫性政权，因此他真的需要转向另一边。

He he's a highly intellectual man, he decided that he was serving a brutal repressive regime, and that he really needed to, you know, that he really needed to flip to the other side.

于是，戈尔迪耶夫斯基倒戈了，在十年间持续向英国军情六处和美国中情局传递情报。

So Gordievsky was turned, and for a decade, was passing information to MI six and the CIA.

这些情报不仅直接送达唐宁街，还直达白宫椭圆形办公室。

That was going straight to not just Downing Street, it was going to the Oval Office.

它们直接送到了里根的办公桌上。

It was going straight to Reagan's desk.

显然，他所揭露的一些信息极大地改变了里根和撒切尔夫人对苏联的看法。

And it is clear that some of the things he was able to reveal materially changed the way that Reagan and Thatcher perceived the Soviet Union.

在很多方面，他为冷战走向终结拉开了序幕。

And in many ways, he sort of paved the way for the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

我只举一个例子给你听。

And I'll just give you just one example.

这是两个绝佳的例子。

These are two terrific examples.

其中一个例子是，戈尔季耶夫斯基最终被任命为克格勃在英国的负责人，这意味着他能够接触到核心机密，掌握克格勃在英国的所有行动。

One is that the Goryuvsky ended up as the sort of designated head of the KGB in Britain, which meant that he would have access to the crown jewels, really, had access to everything the KGB was doing in this country.

当戈尔巴乔夫在1984年12月进行那次著名访问时，克格勃交给他的任务是起草一份备忘录，规定他该对撒切尔说什么。

And when Gorbachev visited, the famous visit in December 1984, Gorbachev's job for the KGB was to draw up a memo of what Gorbachev should say to Thatcher.

然而，这份备忘录实际上是由军情六处起草的。

Now that memo was actually, of course, drawn up by MI six.

因此，这里出现了一种独特的情况：一名间谍同时在为双方提供如何与对方交谈的建议。

And so you have a unique situation here, where one spy is advising both sides on what to say to the other.

所以当撒切尔从那次会面中走出来，说‘这是一个可以与之做生意的人’时，背后有着非常简单的原因。

So so when Thatcher emerged from that meeting saying, this is a man we can do business with, well, there was a very simple reason for that.

戈尔季耶夫斯基已经操纵了整个局面。

Gordievsky had rigged the business.

我的意思是，整个对话脚本都是事先写好的。

I mean, the whole script had been written beforehand.

所以，这只是一个例子，说明国家间关系的细微之处如何因间谍活动而产生实质性影响。

So that's just an example of how, you know, and that's a small way that that that the sort of the minutiae of relations between states can be materially affected by espionage.

但本，我觉得这还只是个更大的例子。

But, Ben, I mean, a bit a much bigger one.

关于间谍活动是否会影响局势这个问题，正是戈尔迪耶夫斯基向撒切尔和里根透露了那件事，对吧？

And on the whole question of of does spying affect things is that it's Gordievsky, isn't it, who tips Thatcher and Reagan off that what was it?

在1983年，北约发起‘射手行动’，试图模拟一次核攻击，而苏联却误以为这是北约准备发动首次核打击的真实信号。

In 1983 with operation Archer, this this NATO attempt to simulate a nuclear attack, that the Soviets thought that this was genuine preparation for a first nuclear strike by NATO.

完全正确。

Absolutely.

这简直处于核战争的边缘。

Well, that is teeteringly close

离核战争只有一步之遥。

to to to nuclear war.

所以，这极大地影响了里根最终的想法——我们必须彻底实现核裁军。

So, I mean, that that then has a a a seismic impact on the way that that Reagan ultimately thinks Hugely we've got to we've got to denuclearize.

极其重要，但事实上却被大大遗忘了。

Hugely important and and and much forgotten actually.

整个阿贝尔射手行动的故事，实际上令人毛骨悚然。

The whole Abel Archer story, which would which is was terrifying actually.

我的意思是，一些历史学家认为——这一点有充分的理由——这是自古巴导弹危机以来，世界最接近核末日的时刻。

I mean, some historians think, and I think there's a good argument for this, that it was the closest the world came to nuclear Armageddon since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

如今，这件事几乎完全不为人知，但最近才开始逐渐浮出水面。

And it's almost completely unknown, these days, it's beginning to sort of emerge.

戈迪耶夫斯基向他在伦敦的联络人解释，并转达给华盛顿的是：这可以说是克里姆林宫的真正偏执——如果你能用这个词的话——克里姆林宫真的相信，这场军事演习，尤其是这次防御行动的部署，被他们误认为是真实的核攻击准备。

And and what Gordievsky was able to explain to his handlers in London and then passed on to Washington was that this was if you like, it was genuine paranoia on the part of the if you can have such a thing on the on the part of the Kremlin, that the Kremlin genuinely believed that this the build up particularly to this defense operation, was just a practice run really, was being perceived as the real thing in the Kremlin.

从那一刻起，你可以看到里根和撒切尔的言辞与姿态发生了显著变化。

And you can see a dramatic change in the rhetoric and the posture of Reagan and Thatcher from that moment.

他们意识到，自己被视为了侵略者，而他们从未真正这样看待过自己。

They realized that they were being perceived as the aggressors, which they'd never really thought of themselves as.

你可以开始看到一种温和的缓和趋势，这种趋势一直持续到柏林墙倒塌。

And you can start to see a gentle thawing that then continues right to the to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

这绝对非常引人入胜，但你可以说，戈尔迪耶夫斯基在让我们所有人都更安全、避免一场可怕的误解方面发挥了关键作用。

And it's absolutely fascinating, but but you can argue that the Gordievsky played a signal part in making us all safer, you know, in preventing an appalling misunderstanding, if you like.

而这一切源于他能够揭示当时统治苏联的那群老人内心真实的想法。

And that came from being able to to point out what was actually going on inside the heads of the sort of gerontocracy that was running the Soviet Union at that point.

但戈尔迪耶夫斯基也提出一个非常有趣的问题，在你的许多书中，尤其是冷战题材的作品中，

But Gordievsky also raises a really interesting question, is there actually in a lot of your books, certainly the the Cold War ones.

都涉及间谍与叛徒之间的那条分界线。

It's about that that that dividing line between the spy and the traitor.

因为，戈尔迪耶夫斯基对他自己的国家来说是个叛徒。

Because, I mean, Gordievsky was a traitor to his country.

但对我们而言，他却是个英雄。

I mean, he's a hero to us.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

而且他就是这样被看待的。

And he's viewed as such.

你显然在最近的书中写过菲尔比、金·菲尔比和间谍索尼娅。

And you've obviously written about Philby and Kim Philby and and agent Sonnya in your most recent book.

这些人物中，让我觉得有趣的是，他们都非常模棱两可。

And a lot of these people I mean, that what's fascinating about them to me is they're so ambiguous.

他们是英雄，还是说你知道的，你怎么看待这个问题？

Are they heroes, or are they you know, what how do you deal with that?

嗯，是的。

Well, it's yes.

我的意思是，确实如此。

I mean, think that yes.

我们的英雄就是叛徒。

Well, I mean, our hero is traitor.

他们的叛徒就是我们的英雄。

Their traitor is our hero.

我的意思是，戈尔迪耶夫斯基本人会彻底否认他背叛了任何人，但我在为那本书做采访的许多克格勃同事却把他看作我们看待金·菲尔比那样——无论你对那个政权持什么看法，他们的论点是从人性层面出发的。

It's I mean, Gordievsky himself would utterly reject the notion that he betrayed anybody, but his KGB colleagues, many of whom I interviewed for that book, regard him as we regard Kim Philby, that he was a rank, whatever you felt about the the regime, their argument is on a human level.

我的意思是，他们中的许多人告诉我，我们都觉得苏联问题重重。

I mean, many of them said to me, look, we all felt that the Soviet Union was troubled.

它正一路下滑，一败涂地，但只有戈尔迪耶夫斯基决定背叛。

It was all going down the going down the going down the pan, but only Gordievsky decided to betray.

只有他决定转身反叛。

Only he decided to turn around.

因此，那个标题中的矛盾意味完全是刻意为之的——《列车上的间谍》，不过我认为这里还是有区别的。

And so the ambivalence in that title is completely intentional that that the spy on the train, I think there is a distinction to be made, though.

但归根结底，菲尔比和戈尔迪耶夫斯基显然是最明显的对比对象。

And in the end, but I mean, Philby and Gordievsky are the obvious comparisons.

不过确实存在差异。

There is a difference though.

而最终的差异，是一种道德层面的差异。

And the difference in the end is a sort of moral one.

金·菲尔比效忠于一个残酷压迫的斯大林主义政权，这个政权屠杀了数百万人，而他对此心知肚明。

Kim Philby was serving a brutal repressive Stalinist regime that was murdering millions of people, and he knew it.

我的意思是，金·菲尔比作为军情六处负责苏联事务的官员，拥有独一无二的视角，能够了解真实发生的一切。

I mean, he was in a unique position, Kim Philby, as an MI six officer on the Soviet desk to know what was really happening.

他无法声称自己对正在发生的事情一无所知。

He couldn't claim ignorance about what what was going on.

戈尔迪耶夫斯基亲眼见证了双方，而他则截然不同地认为，一方代表正义，另一方则不是。

Gordievsky had seen both sides, and he too he came well, he, in sharp contradistinction, decided that one side was on the side of right and one wasn't.

因此，在冷战中存在着重要的道德区别。

So there is an important moral distinction in the Cold War.

此外，还有一个更实际的因素：菲尔比对数百人的死亡负有责任。

And then there is a sort of much more practical element, which is that Filby was responsible for the deaths of many, many hundreds of people.

他知道，他向苏联泄露信息的那些人将会被处决。

He knew that the people he was he was tipping off, the Soviets too were going to be executed.

他们甚至都不会经过审判。

They weren't even gonna be tried.

戈迪耶夫斯基将不因他的行动导致流血牺牲作为与军情六处合作协议的核心内容。

Gordievsky made it a central part of his agreement to work for m I six that there would be no bloodshed as a result of what he was doing.

因此，不同的体系存在差异，你知道，戈迪耶夫斯基向西方指认的那些苏联间谍被追踪，最终被捕、受审，有些甚至被监禁。

And so there are different systems, you know, the people that that Gordievsky identified to the West as being Soviet moles were tracked, they were eventually arrested, they were tried, and in some cases, were put in prison.

而在另一方，由菲尔比和为苏联工作的其他人所指认的人，则被逮捕、酷刑折磨，然后枪决。

On the other side, those that were identified by Filby and others working for the Soviet Union were rounded up, tortured, and shot.

我的意思是，这中间确实存在实际层面的显著差异。

I mean, so there is a there is a there is a difference of practical difference in in that as well.

本，我觉得我们刚才只是浅尝辄止，但时间已经到了该休息的时候了。

Ben, I I feel we've we've almost just skimming the surface here, but we've already already time for a break.

所以我们先短暂休息一下，然后回来继续。

So we're have a short short interlude, and then we'll come back.

我有个问题想接着你刚才说的问一下。

And I've got a question for you following on from that, what you were just talking about.

你好。

Hello.

欢迎回到《历史的余音》。

Welcome back to the rest is history.

我们今天邀请到了本·麦金泰尔。

We are with Ben McIntyre.

我们正在讨论间谍活动的历史。

We're talking about the history of espionage.

本，在广告之前，你谈到了间谍活动中的意识形态维度。

And, Ben, before, the break, you were talking about, the ideological ideological dimension of spying.

我想问一下，这是否在国家竞争之外，又增添了新的因素？

And I want does that add something extra to the mix on top of national rivalries?

因为我想到了近代早期，间谍活动的黄金时代是弗朗西斯·沃尔辛厄姆，伊丽莎白一世的间谍头子，而那正是天主教与新教之间激烈对抗的时期。

Because I'm thinking the early modern period, the heyday of spying then was Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth the first spymaster, and that, of course, is the great rivalry between Catholics and Protestants.

而当你看到俄国共产主义革命时，你会感受到共产主义与资本主义世界之间一场宏大的史诗级对抗。

And what you get, I guess, with the the communist revolution in Russia is the sense of a great titanic struggle between communism and the capitalist world.

这种意识形态的对立，是否比十九世纪甚至第一次世界大战时期，更强烈地推动了间谍活动的发展？

Does that kind of really soup up espionage in a way that that that that perhaps it hadn't been before in the nineteenth and and even in the First World War period?

毫无疑问。

Undoubtedly.

因为你面对的是这两种世界意识形态之间的一种二元对立的斗争。

Because you have these two you have a sort of Manichean struggle between these two world ideologies.

但坦率地说，它们都志在称霸世界。

But it's, let's be honest, bent on world domination.

我的意思是，当 stakes 不可能再高时，在冷战中，你还加入了全球毁灭的可能性。

I mean, you've got you've got when the stakes don't get much higher and and and thrown into the mix in the cold war, you also have the possibility of of global annihilation added in as well.

所以，你知道， stakes 极其高昂。

So you've got, you know, the stakes are incredibly high.

现代间谍活动的一个有趣之处在于，尽管它确实具有意识形态维度，比如我们谈论伊斯兰原教旨主义等等。

And it's one of the interesting things really about modern espionage is although it does have an ideological dimension that's, know, we're talking if we talk about Islamic fundamentalism, and so on.

但正如我们所见，国内情报本质上是关于民族主义的。

But but much as it were domestic intelligence is really about nationalism.

现在，它关乎以其他手段投射权力。

Now it's about the projection of of sort of power by other means.

这并不是一场巨大的意识形态分裂。

It's not really a massive ideological cleavage.

我的意思是，亚历山大·杨格最近，前军情六处负责人就说过，俄罗斯是主要威胁。

I mean, Alexander Alexander younger recently, former head of m I six was saying, you know, Russia is the main threat.

在间谍世界里，这可能是对的，但这并不是真正的意识形态冲突。

And that is that is probably right in an espionage world, but it's it's not it's not really an ideological conflict.

这更多是关于权力、影响力和经济的投射。

It's it's it's about projection of power and influence and economics in a huge way.

所以我认为，是的，我们必须对意识形态保持一点警惕，因为我们刚才谈到了金·菲尔比。

So I think, yes, I mean, one has to be a bit careful of of ideology, though, because we were talking about Kim Philby.

金·菲尔比是剑桥五人组中最臭名昭著的间谍。

And Kim Philby was famously the most infamous of the Cambridge Five spies.

他年轻时是一名共产主义者，早在上世纪30年代就加入了克格勃的前身，并对军情六处造成了难以估量的破坏。

And he was a communist as a young man who had signed up in the 30s with the predecessor of the KGB, and then did unbelievable damage to MI six.

他一直把自己描绘成一名意识形态的战士和斗士。

And he always painted himself as a sort of ideological warrior and crusader.

这么说并不完全准确。

It's not quite accurate that.

我的意思是，他最初确实是一个坚定的共产主义者。

I mean, he he certainly he was a committed communist to begin with.

但随着时间推移，许多其他因素——这在许多间谍身上都成立——影响了他的行为方式。

But over time, many other influences, and this is true of many spies, came to inform the way he behaved.

这些因素包括傲慢、野心以及间谍活动的成瘾性。

And they included hubris, ambition, and the drug of espionage.

我的意思是，保密的成瘾性非常强烈。

I mean, the drug of secrecy is a very strong one.

它非常有毒，一旦尝过滋味，就很难戒掉。

It's very toxic, and it's very difficult to give up once you've tasted it.

还有一种诡异的冒险精神，以及一种韧性，有人将其描述为对私人权力的无情运用。

And, you know, a sort of certain macabre love of adventure to and a kind of a resilience and a sort of somebody wants to describe it as the ruthless exercise of private power.

我认为这非常接近于描述许多动机，这些动机完全脱离了任何意识形态的承诺。

I think that is I think that comes very close to describing a lot of the motivation, which is out with any kind of ideological commitment.

我坚信，到他真正流亡莫斯科、逃离金·菲尔比的时候，他已经不再相信共产主义了。

And it's my firm conviction that by the time he was actually, he sort of went into exile in Moscow, by the time he escaped Kim Philby, he really didn't believe in communism anymore.

他只是沉迷于这场游戏，无法抽身，还有其中的浪漫色彩。

He was just hooked on the game and couldn't give it up and and the romance of it.

所以，某种程度上，这又让我们回到了间谍活动本质上是一种富有想象力的事业。

So again, in a way that takes us back to the the whole it's an imaginative business espionage.

一旦你深陷其中，成为自己人生戏剧中的演员，就很难停下来了。

And once you've sucked yourself into that story, and you've you've become as it were an actor in your own in your own drama, You know, you're it's very hard to stop.

所以我认为，虽然存在意识形态型的间谍，但它们非常罕见。

So I think it's well, while there are ideological spies, they're quite rare.

戈迪耶夫斯基就是一个很好的例子。

Gordievsky is a good example.

他至今仍展现出一种强烈的道德正直感，认为自己站在正义的一边。

He's someone who who still today exudes a kind of sense of his own moral rectitude in doing in doing what he did that he feels he was on the side of right.

这让他有时很难相处，因为狂热者往往不是容易共事的人。

Doesn't make him it's sometimes an easy character to deal with, because zealots are often not not easy companions.

但他非常罕见。

But so but he's very rare.

我的意思是，那些纯粹出于信念而行动的人，在这个世界上凤毛麟角。

I mean, those those people who are purely motivated by a belief are hen's teeth in this world.

到目前为止，我们谈到的所有人，本，都是男性。

All the people we've talked about so far, Ben, have been men.

但显然，人们对女性间谍有着极大的兴趣，比如玛塔·哈里那样的原型，还有像《007之铁金刚勇破神秘岛》里那种魅力四射的特工。

But obviously, there's a there's a huge fascination with female spies, kind of Mattaharry archetype, and the sort of James Bond, you know, the spy who loved me, this sort of glamorous agent.

而你最近的著作《索尼娅特工》讲述的是一位并不怎么光彩照人的女性。

And your most recent book, Agent Sonya, is about a woman who's not, I think, a terribly glamorous character.

我甚至觉得她谈不上有什么魅力。

I I wouldn't even more affect

多米尼克，我们应当提一下在Twitter上关注我们的J.H.G.S.，他刚刚正好问了我们这个问题。

Dominic, we we we should we should name check j h g s, one of the on Twitter who who has actually asked us on that

正是这个问题。

that very question.

问题。

Question.

历史上有哪些女性间谍？

Which female spies in history?

他说，哪些女性间谍值得被搬上银幕？

Well, he says which female spies deserve to be depicted in film?

也许间谍索尼娅会是一部很棒的电影。

And maybe you could you know, maybe agent Sonny would make a great film.

但我的问题是，女性是否更容易成为优秀的间谍，因为她们不太容易被怀疑？

But my question was really, do women make better spies because they're less likely to be suspected, do you think?

因为人们的刻板印象往往都是男性。

Because people tend to, our archetypes are so often male.

这毫无疑问适用于间谍索尼娅，她的真名是乌尔苏拉·科辛斯卡。

Well, that is undoubtedly the case of agent, about agent Sonia, who whose real name was Ursula Kocinski.

她的故事极其非凡，因为确实，从玛塔·哈里开始，乃至更早之前，历史上一直都有女性间谍，但她们通常只是被男性招募来执行特定任务的特工，比如信使。

She's, her story is absolutely extraordinary because, yes, there have been women spies throughout history from Mata Hari onwards, they, and before actually, but they tend to be agents, they tend to be people recruited by men to do a specific job, you know, their couriers.

二战期间的特别行动执行处特工也是如此，乌尔苏拉·库钦斯基，也就是索尼娅特工的与众不同之处在于她是一名职业特工。

And this is true of the SOE agents in the Second World War, you know, they are that what makes Ursula Kuchinski, Agent Sonya different is that she was a pro.

她是受红军训练的专业情报官员，并将此视为自己的事业。

She was a professional intelligence officer trained by the Red Army, and she regarded it as a career.

她最终晋升为红军情报部门的上校，而这个组织并不以推行平等机会政策著称。

Rose to become a colonel in the the Red Army Intelligence Service, not an organization noted for its equal opportunities policies.

我不了解二十世纪有任何其他女性能在情报机构中达到如此高的职位。

And she's I don't know of any woman who rose so high in any intelligence service in the twentieth century.

因此，她确实非常独特。

So it makes her pretty unique.

但她的性别在很多方面正是她最强大的武器，因为她深知，在当时普遍的观念下，一个有三个孩子、丈夫陪伴、在科茨沃尔德一个小村庄里烤司康饼的女性，根本不会被人怀疑是超级间谍。

But but her gender was in many ways her her most powerful weapon because she knew given the prevailing views of the time that a mother with three children and a husband, in her case, baking scones in a tiny village in the Cotswolds was not going to be suspected of being a sort of super spy.

她毫不留情地、极其出色地利用了这一点。

And she played that card ruthlessly and absolutely brilliantly.

因为当五处最终意识到出了问题、追踪到无线电信号时，她已经在后院厕所里建了一个功率强大的无线电发射器。

Because when am I five did finally get around to realizing that something was going on, they picked up the radio signal, she built a very powerful radio transmitter in the privy in the back garden.

无线电截获服务一直在接收这些信号。

And the radio interception service was picking up the signals.

他们最终还是来对她进行了询问，而她表现得极其出色。

And they did eventually come to interview her and she was absolutely brilliant.

我的意思是，两个留着长胡子、戴着软呢帽的男人出现在前门，她立刻就知道他们是谁，以及他们来干什么。

I mean, these two men with long mustaches and trilby hats turned up at the front door and she knew exactly who they were and what they were up to.

她说：‘哦，我要不要叫我的丈夫？’

She said, Oh, should I get my husband?

她说完就回去继续烤她正在做的生日蛋糕。

She said, and went back to sort of baking a birthday cake, which she'd been making.

因此，这次会面后MI5的报告极其出色，回过头来看也非常幽默，报告中写道：‘这不可能是伯顿太太，因为她太忙于家务了，不可能参与任何间谍活动。’

And and the the m I five report as a result of that meeting is utterly brilliant and very funny in retrospect because it says, well, it can't possibly be missus Burton because, she's far too big in her domestic duties to be involved in any kind of espionage.

而乌苏拉完全知道自己在做什么。

And and and Ursula knew exactly what she was doing.

我的意思是，她对此事非常幽默。

I mean So she's very funny about it.

所以，本， presumably，最好的间谍是那些不会出现在你书里的，因为我们根本不知道他们是谁。

So, Ben, presumably, the the best spies are the ones who are not going to be featuring in your books because we don't know who they are.

我的意思是，啊。

I mean Ah.

这其实是合乎逻辑的推论。

It would be the kind of logical implication of that.

嗯，你说得对。

Well, you're right, actually.

我们谈的是，但间谍的类型其实非常多。

Well, we're talking but there are so many different sorts of spy.

我的意思是，你提到的是潜伏特工，也就是俄国人所谓的‘非法人员’，这些人通常以平民身份潜入外国，融入当地社会，然后等待行动指令。

I mean, you're talking about sleepers, if you're talking about the, as it were, what the Russians used to refer to as illegals, people who are implanted in foreign countries under usually under civilian cover, in order to sort of absorb into the local populace and then be deployed.

每个国家都这么做。

And everyone does this.

我的意思是，俄国人在这方面特别擅长。

I mean, the Russians were particularly good at it.

他们有一个专门的部门，用于伪造身份，将人员植入外国。

They had a whole section of of the new Bianca that was used to create false identities to implant people in foreign countries.

你的部分听众可能听说过、看过那部关于一个看似普通的家庭其实都是间谍的美剧。

And some of your listeners would have heard, would have watched, the Americans that that that series about an apparently normal family who are actually sort of saviots.

这虽然有些夸张，但也不算离现实太远。

It's fanciful, but it's also not that far from reality.

我的意思是，直到今天，我们身边仍然潜伏着 sleeper，它们以各种形式存在。

I mean, right up until the present day, there are sleepers among us, they come in different forms.

情况并不完全相同。

It's not quite the same.

现在不再有那种必须突破的、僵化的意识形态铁幕，才能安插间谍。

It's not there isn't that rigid ideological iron curtain that you need to get around in order to plant your spies.

但请相信我，他们就在我们中间。

But believe me, they're among us.

戈尔迪耶夫斯基认为，目前在西方活动的各类非法间谍数量，比冷战高峰期还要多。

And and Gordievsky is of the view that there are more illegal spies of different shapes and sorts operating in the West than at any time, including the height of the Cold War.