64. 希特勒，与伊恩·克肖——第二部分

希特勒所做的，是以一种独特的方式宣传了原本陈腐的思想。

What Hitler did was advertise unoriginal ideas in an original way.

他能够以他人无法做到的方式，表达出恐惧、偏见和怨恨。

He gave voice to phobias, prejudice, and resentment as no one else could.

其他人也许会说同样的话，但却毫无影响力。

Others could say the same thing but make no impact at all.

重要的不是他说了什么，而是他如何说的。

It was less what he said than how he said it that counted.

欢迎来到‘余下皆为历史’。

Welcome to the rest is history.

今天我们与伊恩·克肖爵士讨论希特勒，这显然是希特勒系列的第二部分。

We are with Sir Ian Kershaw talking about Hitler, and this obviously is Hitler part two.

你好，汤姆。

So hello, Tom.

期待听到更多关于希特勒的内容吗？

Looking forward to a bit more Hitler?

总是期待更多关于希特勒的内容。

Always looking forward to a bit more Hitler.

尤其是因为第一部分中，我们其实涵盖了太多内容。

Not least because really in part one, you know, we we there was so much we covered.

希恩爵士给了我们太多引人入胜的信息。

There was there was so much fascinating stuff that Sir Ian was was giving us.

他的演说能力、对犹太人的仇恨根源，甚至邪恶的本质。

There were his powers of oratory, the root of his hatred of the Jewish people, actually even the nature of evil.

所以这不仅仅是一档关于希特勒的播客。

So this isn't a podcast just about Hitler.

这是一档探讨极其广泛主题的播客，而这些主题几乎在思考希特勒时不可避免地会被引发。

This is a a podcast about incredibly broad themes, the kind of themes that contemplating Hitler almost inevitably provokes.

我们才刚勉强讲到二十世纪二十年代。

And we barely made it out of the nineteen twenties.

所以，如果你错过了第一集，请务必回头找来听听，再听这一集。

So, if you missed that first episode, please do make sure you go back and and find it before you listen to this one.

不过，希望你已经知道这个故事的结局了。

Although, hopefully, you already know how the story's gonna end.

是的。

Yes.

上次我们聊到了希特勒的演讲风格，以及他那种近乎超能力的特质——如果这么说不显得太俗气的话——那就是他的煽动能力。

So we were talking last time about Hitler's rhetoric and his sort of superpower as it were, if that's not too trite a way of putting it, being his sort of demagoguery.

我想这把我们带回到了下一个向伊恩爵士提出的问题。

And I think that takes us back into our next question to Sir Ian.

所以，汤姆，希特勒用来对德国人民施加影响的，不只是言辞，对吧？

So, Tom, it wasn't just words, was it, that Hitler used to impose his will on the German people?

不是。

No.

希特勒及其身边的纳粹分子所采用的方法，用他们的批评者的话来说，是卑劣的，甚至是犯罪的。

The methods that Hitler employs and and the Nazis around him are mean, well, they're they're described by his critics as as criminal.

他们使用暴徒手段、暴力和勒索。

They they employ thuggery, violence, blackmail.

你认为希特勒自己认为自己是罪犯吗？

Do you do you think that does Hitler think of himself as being criminal?

他是否意识到自己内心存在这种犯罪倾向，还是完全坚信自己始终正直？

Is he conscious of of of this strain of criminality within him, or is he wholly convinced of his own rectitude throughout?

他坚信自己是在为正义事业而战。

He's convinced of his own rectitude that it's in a just cause.

当然，他意识到自己从事的活动被视作犯罪行为。

He recognizes, of course, that that that he's engaged in in activities which are regarded as criminal.

毕竟，1922年他曾因支持者在啤酒馆斗殴事件而入狱短暂服刑，后因承诺改过自新而获释，但他于1923年背弃了这一承诺。

After all, he was sent to jail for a short period of time in 1922 for the thubbery of his supporters in a beer hall brawl, and let out on promise of good behaviour, which of course he reneged on in 1923.

因此，当时这些行为就被视为犯罪，而不仅仅是事后才被贴上罪犯的标签；希特勒本人也一直认为真正的罪犯是谁，从1920年代初起，他就不断提及‘十一月罪犯’。

So these things were seen as criminal at the time, it wasn't just that people were subsequently seen as criminals, but Hitler saw them, he saw the real criminals, he always spoke about from the early 1920s, he always spoke about the November criminals.

在他看来，正是这些人引发了1918年的革命和德国民族的毁灭，而他认为这群所谓的‘十一月罪犯’的核心正是犹太人。

These were the people in his view who brought about the revolution of nineteen eighteen and the destruction of the German nation, and he saw central to that bunch of so called November criminals Jews.

因此，对希特勒而言，打击他眼中的真正罪犯，是一种正义之举，是政治上的正当行为。

So for Hitler, an action which was served at attacking the real criminals as he saw it, was a matter of rectitude, of political rectitude.

因此，在1923年啤酒馆政变失败后，他自豪地站在受审的法庭上，以高祭司的姿态宣称：我对此负责，因为这实际上是在保卫德国、支持德国，维护德国利益，对抗那些真正的罪犯——这些十一月罪犯。

And so after the Phil Putch attempt in 1923, he took pride in standing before the court where he was arraigned a high priest and saying I was responsible for it because this was actually defending Germany, supporting Germany, upholding German interests against the real criminals, these November criminals.

因此，他始终认为自己是在履行一种正义的使命，包括后来也是如此。

So he saw himself as serving a purpose of rectitude throughout, including, of course, later on as well.

在希特勒心中，他从未怀疑过自己所做的是错误或邪恶的事情。

So there wasn't a question in Hitler's mind that he was doing something that was wrong or evil.

在他自己看来，他所做的一切都是正确的。

He was doing something in his own mind that was right.

在整个这一时期，希特勒和纳粹分子，正如汤姆所说，充满了暴力行为。

And Hitler's throughout this period, the Nazis, you know, as Tom says, there's a lot of thuggery.

有冲锋队之类的组织。

There are the stormtroopers and stuff.

暴力是他们整个时期意识形态的一部分，你知道的。

Are there there is violence is part of their ethos, you know, throughout this whole period.

你认为，对希特勒而言，这种暴力是第一次世界大战的产物吗？

Is that, do you think for Hitler, is is that a product of the First World War?

他在战壕中的经历是否让他对暴力变得麻木？

Has he been desensitized to violence by his experience in the trenches?

因为在1914年之前，他并不是一个暴力的人，据我所知，他也从未特别谈论或沉迷于暴力。

Because he's not a violent man before 1914 and not someone who particularly, as far as I'm aware, talks about violence or revels in violence.

所以你认为这是更广泛故事的一部分吗？还是说，他之所以对暴力的代价如此麻木，背后有什么心理原因？

So do you think that's part of this sort of wider story, or is it some or is or is there any psychological reason why he he particularly could be so inured to the costs of violence?

当然，第一次世界大战结束后不久，暴力并不仅仅局限于德国。

Violence was not just confined to Germany, of course, in the period immediately following the First World War.

因此，历史学家们常使用‘暴力化’或对暴力麻木这一概念，来解释战后初期被法西斯运动吸引的人们的行为。

So this notion that there was a level of brutalization or insensitivity to violence is something that historians have utilized as an explanation for the behavior of people who are drawn to fascist movements in different countries in the immediate period after the First World War.

毫无疑问，第一次世界大战的暴力经历，使许多人逐渐接受了暴力，而这种程度的暴力在战前欧洲大部分地区是前所未有的。

And certainly the First World War, the violence of the First World War helped to inculcate a readiness in many people then to accept violence, which had not been part anything like this extent of society in most parts of Europe.

有些地区在战前就非常暴力，但在西欧，暴力水平确实是全新的。

Some parts that were very violent before the First World War, but in Western Europe certainly the levels of violence were new.

希特勒属于这一普遍趋势，这并非仅针对他个人，而是适用于许多其他人。

And Hitler was part of this general trend, so it's not a matter of just for Hitler personally, but for many other people too.

我们现在看到，人们越来越愿意接受暴力作为实现政治目标的正当手段，正如汤姆之前直接指出的那样，这种态度在以前是不存在的，而希特勒正是20世纪20年代初这一趋势的一部分。

We see that now there's a readiness to accept the correctness, to use Tom's directitude, to use Tom's point previously, of violence to bring about political aims in a way that hadn't been there before, and Hitler is part of that trend in the early 1920s.

而运用暴力的能力，恐吓他人的能力——你知道，你提到这是他的巨大天赋：他能敏锐地察觉弱点，并在机会出现时果断出击。

And the ability to use violence, the ability to to menace people, the know, you talked about this is his his great talent, his ability to sniff out weakness and to to strike when when opportunity presents.

与此相反的是，也许事情本可能搞砸，局势本可能完全不同。

The the converse of that, I guess, is also that that it might have gone wrong, that circumstances might have worked out very differently.

那么，希特勒究竟有多接近彻底失败呢？

And and how how close does Hitler come to failing completely?

非常接近，尤其是在1923年11月的啤酒馆政变，以及1924年4月他受审时，他仅被判处了非常宽松的几个月监禁，甚至提前获释——尽管以他之前的罪行，本应被关押更久。但正是在这个节点，他最接近失败，甚至可能被驱逐出德国，因为当时他并非德国公民，仍为奥地利人。这本是他彻底失败的时刻，然而巴伐利亚司法系统的宽大处理让他逃过一劫，使他出狱后得以重建自己的政党。

Quite close, in particular with the with the Putsch, of course, in '19 in November 1923, and when he was on trial in April 1924, he was sentenced to a very lenient few months in jail, and then even let out earlier, although he shouldn't have been given his previous offence, he should have been kept in there, but that was the point where he comes closest to failure probably, and where he could have been expelled from Germany even he wasn't a German citizen at the time, was still an Austrian that was a point where he had actually failed, and yet the leniency of Bavarian justice let him off the hook and allowed him then to rebuild his own party after he came out of prematurely, out of jail.

正如我之前所说，他在监狱里过得非常舒适。

And as I said before, while he was in prison he was very comfortable in prison.

他有很多访客。

He had lots of visitors.

他在狱中塑造了自己的公众形象，因此这是一次近乎失败的重大时刻。

His own image was built up while he was in there, so that was a big moment of near failure.

还有其他人，仅举一例：1932年，他几乎就要成为德国总理，当时纳粹党内部分裂、一片混乱，纳粹党的第二号人物格里戈尔·斯特拉瑟希望加入一个民族主义政府担任副总理，但希特勒断然拒绝。

There were others as well, just point to one, the 1932 where on the verge of him becoming Chancellor of Germany, He, with the Nazi party divided and in a mess, the second most important leader of the Nazi party, Grigel Strasser, wanted then to go into government as the vice chancellor of a nationalist government, and Hitler refused point blank.

那是一个党派可能分崩离析的时刻，但希特勒像往常一样，诉诸于身边人的忠诚，他们重新聚集在他周围，转而反对斯特拉瑟，最终希特勒依然作为党领袖留了下来，几周后，他被任命为德国总理。

It was a moment there where the party could potentially have fallen apart, but Hitler did as he did so often: he appealed to the loyalty of those around him, they rallied to him, they turned on Strasser, and eventually Hitler was still left there as leader of a party, and a few weeks later he was made chancellor of Germany.

但这也是另一个可能彻底搞砸的时刻。

But that was another moment where potentially things could have gone very wrong.

正如你所说，仅仅几周后，他就成了德国总理。

And then as you say, just a few weeks later, he becomes chancellor of Germany.

他众所周知是被国内的民族主义者、右翼势力和保守派——比如兴登堡——通过内部权谋推上台的，这些人以为自己在利用这个奥地利下士，之后就能把他甩掉。

He's famously, you know, maneuvered into office by the sort of internal machinations of the kind of nationalists and the right and and stuff, the conservatives around it, Hindenburg who think they're using this Austrian corporal and then they'll discard him.

而他却逐渐积聚了越来越多的权力。

And then he he accumulates more and more power.

然而，我记得二十年前读你的传记时，被一个让我震惊的发现深深触动——因为我当时对这方面知之甚少：希特勒作为政府首脑，实际上极其无能。

And yet the the I remember reading your biography twenty years ago and being so struck by what was to me a revelation because I didn't know much about it, about how useless Hitler was as a kind of administrator, as the head of a government.

你知道，他很懒。

You know, he's lazy.

他起床很晚。

He gets up late.

他给人的印象是，你有一个连 paperwork 都靠不住的人，诸如此类的事情。

He does he's he gives the impression that you have somebody you can't trust to do his paperwork, all this kind of stuff.

我想问题是，你在书中提到过一种概念，即人们都在朝着元首的方向努力，揣测希特勒想要什么，想象出一些激进的想法并试图付诸实施。

And I guess the question is, I mean, you have a concept in your book of people kind of working towards the Fuhrer, of people imagining what, Hitler wants and imagining kind of rad some radical idea and and trying to deliver it.

但有没有某个时刻呢？

But was there a point?

在纳粹高层指挥层或行政体系中，有没有人曾认为，元首简直是个废物？

Were there moments where people high up in the kind of Nazi high command or in the administrative machine where they thought, you know, the Fuhrer is a bit of a dead loss?

他整天睡到中午，行为还有点怪异，这类情况难道就从未让他们意识到吗？

He he he is, you know, sleeping in all morning and and, you know, he's a bit weird and this sort or did that just never seem to dawn on them at all?

嗯，我认为即使他们意识到了，也极其谨慎地保持沉默，但你必须记住，这毕竟是一个拥有顶尖文官体系的现代化国家，能够自主推进事务，以某种方式预判行动。

Well, don't think if it dawned on them, were very careful to keep quiet about it, I think, but you have to remember of course this was a very sophisticated modern state with a top civil service who could carry out things, that could anticipate actions in certain ways.

他们并不只是等待希特勒下达指令，而是在主动准备各种事项。

They didn't just wait for directors to come down from Hitler, but they were preparing things.

所以他制定了指导方针。

So he laid down guidelines.

你不能做任何直接违背这些方针的事情。

You couldn't actually do something which went directly against those guys.

你不能在1937年或1938年跑来说：‘我觉得犹太人挺好的，我们为什么不大力扶持他们呢？’我的意思是，这些想法根本是不可想象的。因此，只要遵循这些指导方针，公务员、还有很多人，甚至军方，都有很大的空间去进行富有想象力的发挥。

You couldn't come along in 1937 or '38 and say, well basically I think Jews are a good thing and why don't we actually promote them?' I mean these were things that were unthinkable, so as long as you have to follow the guidelines there was a lot of room and scope for imaginative development there on the part of civil servants and many others, and military too.

希特勒所做的事，实际上正是绝大多数军事领导人想要的。

Hitler was doing things that the vast majority of military leaders actually wanted.

当然，有些人对与西方列强开战感到犹豫，但总体而言，希特勒的做法是加强武装力量等等。

So of course some of them had cold feet about a war against the Western powers, but in general terms what Hitler was doing was building up the armed forces and so on.

所以直到战争后期事情出了问题，那里也没有太大的敌意。

So not until things went wrong later in the war, then there was no great antagonism there either.

因此，在这一切中，你看到的是一种领导层，它代表了政权许多部分真正想要并愿意配合的东西。

And so in all this you have a leadership which is representing things that many parts of that regime actually want and go along with.

所以，他缺乏官僚效率这一点，在大多数时候其实并没有造成太大影响。

So the fact that he wasn't bureaucratically efficient didn't really make much of a difference for most of the time.

当然，在外交政策的关键决策上，以及后来涉及反犹主义等问题时，希特勒确实做出了这些决定。

And of course in the key decisions on foreign policy and then when it came down to it on anti semitism and so on, Hitler did make these decisions.

因此，并没有人认为他实际上软弱无力或对事务漠不关心。

So there wasn't a notion that he was actually just feeble and not interested in things.

他会关注并适时采取行动，而在其他时候，事情则按照他期望的方向自然推进。

He would take interest in it and act when it was necessary, and otherwise things ticked along in the way that he wanted them to go.

那么，他担任总理时具备哪些特质，使他能够取得成功呢？

So so what are the qualities that he brings to his his chancellorship that that enable him to become a success?

很大程度上，这在于他定下基调、发布指令，然后让各种力量自行动员起来。

A lot of it was this setting the tone, setting the directives, and then letting the forces then mobilize themselves.

他并没有事无巨细地微观管理，而是释放了那些早已积压已久的力量。

So it didn't actually micromanage, but rather unleashed forces, which were already in many ways pent up there.

例如，大萧条之后，经济上存在着巨大的潜在需求。

There was pent up economic demand following the Great Depression, for example.

他推动了汽车工业的发展。

He set the motor industry going.

他那时就不需要再做更多了。

He didn't need to do any more then.

你有汽车工业的人，他们非常乐意去推动发展。

You've got people in the motor industry who are only too anxious then to build it up.

军队也在运作，因此他释放了内部许多乐于朝他期望方向前进的力量。

You've got the military going, so he unleashed a lot of forces from within that were very happy to move in the direction that was that he wanted them to go in.

当然，从当时大多数德国人的角度看，他还取得了一系列成功：经济本就准备从大萧条中复苏，但他恰好赶上了这一时机，因此他主导了这场重建，人们都注意到经济在重建后显著好转。

And then of course he had a whole series of successes seen from the point of view of most Germans at the time, successes in the economy was already going to rebound from the Great Depression anyway, but he was fortunate enough to be on at the time the timing of that meant that he presided over that rebuilding, and everybody noticed how well things were going economically after this, that the rebuilding was taking place.

在外交政策方面也有诸多行动。

There was also activity in terms of foreign policy.

早在1930年代初，他就取得了多项重大成就，西方领导人纷纷登门拜访并认真记录他的做法。

A number of big successes then already in the early 1930s, and you had the Western leaders who are coming to his door and taking notes of him.

德国重新登上国际舞台，从1936年起，一系列重大的外交政策成功接踵而至，德国的军事化再次成为关键因素。

Germany was back on the scene, and then from 1936 a succession of major foreign policy successes, German militarization, was again a major factor in this.

因此，希特勒显得非常成功，只要他持续成功，人们就愿意给予他几乎想要的一切。

So Hitler seemed to be very successful, and as long as he's successful people were prepared to grant him more or less what he wanted.

所以，他不需要做更多了——我这样说听起来可能有点微不足道，但像莱茵兰行动这样的决定确实是重大的政治决策，而希特勒定下了基调，下达了指令，释放了这些早已蓄势待发的资源，让它们朝着他所期望的方向前进。

So he didn't need to do more than I say it sounds a bit puny when I put it that way, because of course decisions like the Rhineland and so on, they were big political decisions, but Hitler set the tone, set the directives and then freed up these resources and unleashed the pent up resources which were all ready to go and which then acted in the ways that were moving along the in the direction that Hitler himself wanted.

这听起来可能是个奇怪的问题，因为它与我们对历史实际发展过程的认知相悖。

And this may sound an odd question because it runs counter to our knowledge of how history actually worked out.

但是否存在这样一个世界：纳粹独裁政权能够变得稳定，并逐渐实现某种意义上的去激进化？

But is there a world in which the Nazi dictatorship could have become stable and could have become sort of, as it were, deradicalized?

人们喜欢幻想那种《高堡奇人》式的情景，想象纳粹赢得二战后的世界。

So, you know, people love to do these sort of man in the high castle type fantasies of a world in which the Nazis win the Second World War.

那么，二十世纪五十年代或六十年代的纳粹欧洲会是什么样子？

What what does a Nazi Europe look like in the nineteen fifties or nineteen sixties?

那样的世界可以想象吗？

Is that world imaginable?

是否存在这样一个世界：阿道夫·希特勒领导着一个德国政府，这个政府已经变得几乎——这么说听起来可能非常惊人——但近乎一种小写的保守派、稳扎稳打的政府？

Is a world in which Adolf Hitler leads a German government that has just become sort of almost I mean, this would sound an extraordinary thing to say, but almost a kind of small c conservative, steady as she goes government.

还是说，纳粹体制中始终存在一种内在的加速机制，必然导向更极端的激进化，导向一次次更引人注目的政变和赌博？

Or was there an inbuilt ratchet always towards greater radicalization, towards, you know, ever more sort of eye catching coups and and gambles and so on?

在我们所熟知的纳粹主义中，直到1945年，激进化的目标从未停止。

In the Nazism that we actually know, down to 1945, there was no stopping the aim of radicalization.

毕竟，在种族灭绝的政治中，大屠杀并非终点，党卫军在1942年就已经在制定计划，即他们所谓的《东方总计划》，预计在未来约二十五年内清除大约三千万人，

And after all, in genocidal politics, it didn't stop with the the Holocaust at all, but the SS were working out plans in 1942, or as they called the General Plan for the East, which anticipated the removal I.

E.

E.

这需要扩展并控制大片德国领土。

Killing of around 30,000,000 people over about the next twenty five years, and this demanded an extension and control of wide swath of German territory.

而这显然依赖于德国的军事胜利。

Now that depended upon German, obviously upon German military victory.

这种彻底的军事胜利，对我们而言确实难以想象，因为可以说1942年是关键的一年，当时德国形势看似有利，而其他国家则陷入困境；但即便在1942年，德国就已经在试图夺取高加索油田等目标时过度扩张了。

That military victory, total military victory, is difficult for us really to conceive, I think, because it meant, you could say 1942 was a pivotal year when things were looking good for Germany, bad for other countries, and yet in 1942 you already see Germany is overextending itself in the attempt to gain the oil of the Caucasus and so on.

而且我们已经知道，美国人正在组建一支规模庞大的军队，远超实际参与诺曼底登陆的兵力，最终将用于对付德国。

And we already know that the Americans are building up an enormous force, much bigger than the one that actually took part in D Day and so on, to tackle Germany eventually.

因此，那种认为德国最终会取得胜利，并在希特勒之后由一位领导人将其转变为稳定持久的政府形态的想法，在我看来几乎是不可想象的。

So the notion of a final German victory, which would need to establish it, where there would be a leader after Hitler who would turn this into a steady and stable form of established government, is to me more or less unthinkable.

所以我看不出这有什么超出幻想和小说家想象的范围，我认为这根本不可能实现。

So I can't see that that is apart from the realms of fantasy and novelist, and so I can't see that's really was ever a realizable prospect.

为了进一步说明这一点，无论怎样，二十世纪三十年代末或四十年代后期，欧洲都必然会发生一场大规模战争。

And just to follow-up on that, and there's no scenario in which there would not have been a a major European war, at the end of the nineteen thirties or sometime later in the nineteen forties.

因此，不存在希特勒会接受德国更有限的领土扩张——比如苏台德地区之类的——然后安定下来，成为一个普通欧洲国家的情景。

So there's no scenario in which Hitler would have accepted, a more modest expansion of Germany's borders, you know, the Sudetenland or whatever, and then sort of settling down as a normal European state.

这是因为这根本不符合他的意识形态。

That was because that didn't feature in his ideologies.

是这样吗？

Is that right?

完全正确。

That's absolutely right.

对希特勒来说，我认为第二次世界大战是第一次世界大战未竟事业的延续。

For Hitler, I think the Second World War was the unfinished business of the first.

另一场战争必须扭转第一次世界大战的历史。

Another war had to undo the history of the first.

从某种意义上说，这场战争是末日般的，必须摧毁德国的敌人，而这些敌人并不局限于地球的某一特定地区。

It was apocalyptic in a sense, had to destroy the enemies of Germany, and they weren't confined to one particular part of the globe either.

他们是国际性的，遍布各地。

International, they were all over.

因此，这场战争本可以被限制并最终平息——当然，这是像张伯伦这样的人所犯的错误，他们以为希特勒只是一个极端的民族主义者，仅此而已。

And so that war could be limited and settled down into just of course the mistake that people like Chamberlain made and thought that Hitler was actually an extreme nationalist, but nothing more.

但实际情况远不止如此，对他和纳粹领导层的其他成员来说，这远远不只是调整德国边界的问题，因此根本不可能平息下来。

It was something more, and this was for him and for other parts of the Nazi leadership as well, this was something was far more than just a matter of adjusting Germany's borders, and so it could never have settled down.

战争在某个时刻是不可避免的，而且很可能在任何民族主义领导人掌权时都会爆发，而不仅仅是希特勒，但那将几乎肯定是一场不同的战争。

War was inevitable at some point, and would probably have come about under any nationalist leader, not just Hitler, but it would have been a different sort of war almost certainly.

那么，他的成功无疑会助长他追求更多成功的野心，并拓展他的视野，让他觉得自己能实现更宏大的目标。

And presumably then his success fuels his ambition for more success and broadens his horizons and the scope of what he thinks he's capable of doing.

而这又进一步推动了他对东方、特别是对犹太人，以及他所征服的其他许多民族的计划。

And that's then what feeds into his plans for, for the East and, I guess, specifically for for Jews, but for for many other of the people that he's conquered as well.

因此，征服的过程不可能不催生越来越宏大、越来越恐怖的野心。

So, there is no way that the process of conquest will not fuel ever more grandiose, ever more horrific ambition.

是的。

Yes.

我认为这完全正确。

I think that's absolutely correct.

而且，希特勒在这一切中并不是一个完全独立的行动者，其他国家也在行动。

And also this Hitler is not just a free agent in all this, but other countries are also acting.

到1941年，他在短短几周内取得了击败法国的非凡胜利。

And by 1941 he's achieved the extraordinary triumph of the defeat of France within a matter of a few weeks.

然后他做了什么？

And then what does he do?

他立即开始筹备次年对苏联的进攻。

He immediately turns to preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union the following year.

对希特勒来说，这当然是一个富有远见的举动，具有意识形态色彩，但也具有战略目的，因为他无法摆脱英国，而一旦美国参战，后果将不堪设想，因此在他自己的思维中，必须尽快进攻苏联。

Now this is a visionary thing for Hitler, of course it's ideological, but it also has strategic purpose for it because he's unable to get Britain out here that what will happen if Americans come into the war, so he has to attack the Soviet Union in his own thinking then as soon as possible.

因此，意识形态与战略在这一点上融合在了一起。

So the ideological and the strategic come together in that.

而且，我的意思是，说到希特勒参与第二次世界大战，如今在西方，人们普遍认为他疯了。

And and do I mean, by the point, you know, Hitler's involved in in World War two, it's it's become a commonplace at this point in the West that he's mad.

所以你一遍又一遍地听到，丘吉尔和英国报纸都说，希特勒是个疯子，他身边都是罪犯。

So you hear it again and again, Churchill and and British newspapers will say, Hitler is a madman, and he's surrounded by criminals.

这是一个有趣的问题，尤其是在战争进入后期阶段时。

It is an interesting question, isn't it, particularly as the war reaches its later stages.

希特勒真的疯了吗？还是说，‘疯了’只是个方便的借口，用来回避关于希特勒政治的更困难问题？

Is Hitler mad, or is that merely a convenient sort of get out to escape the more difficult questions about Hitler's politics?

正如你所说，这确实是个方便的托词。

As you've put it, certainly, a convenient get out.

关于疯狂的问题，你可以说，也许在战争最后几周，他靠服用各种药物和药片维持，那时在那种压力下，勉强可以说他精神有些失衡，这还是说得轻的。

The question of madness is, you could say that maybe at the very end there in the last weeks of the war he was living on a diet of pet pills and medicines of one sort or another, and then under that strain you could speak about some mental imbalance, to put it mildly.

但在大部分早期阶段，他并没有疯，这又是一种辩解。

But for the most part then in the earlier period there was no madness there, and it's an apology again.

如果希特勒疯了，那所有一直追随他的人——无论处于哪个层级——又该怎么说呢？

Mean if Hitler was mad, well it's about all the people who followed him all the time, know, at different levels of this.

所以这根本不是一个好的论点，他当时的行动实际上是有战略考量的，即使这些行动建立在对世界权力的巨大赌注之上。

So it's not a good argument at all, and there was actually strategic sense in what he was doing, even if it was built upon this enormous gamble for world power.

甚至那个总被指出为疯狂终极表现的举动——即1941年12月对美国宣战——也是如此。

And even the thing that's always pointed about the ultimate moment of madness, which is then the declaration of war on The USA in December 1941.

这背后确实有战略目标，但这也确实是一次绝望的举动。

There was a strategic aim, but it was a move of desperation, it's true.

这一行动的战略目标是将战争推向太平洋，让德国潜艇切断美国对英国的物资供应。

There was a strategic aim in that which was to move the war to the Pacific and to allow German U boats to cut off the supply of materials from America to Britain.

因此，即使这一举动再绝望，也包含着一定的战略考量。

So even that move, however desperate it was, had some strategic element to it.

这并不是一个疯子的举动，正如我所说，认为希特勒疯了，只不过是一种回避真正分析德国为何陷入这种困境的借口。

It wasn't the move of a madman, and as I say, I think the notion that Hitler was mad is simply a way of avoiding any real any real analysis of of the the reasons why Germany got into that plight in the first place.

汤姆，这个观点太有意思了，不是吗？

Tom, that's such an interesting point, isn't it?

因为我们在几期播客前还讨论过尼禄。

Because we've talked about Nero a couple of podcasts ago.

他又是历史上一个常被人们说成像卡利古拉或那些罗马人物一样疯狂的角色。

And he's another, you know, character from history that people always say, oh, he was mad like Caligula or like any of these sort of Roman figures.

所以关于疯狂、邪恶这些说法，对你来说一定很有共鸣，还有那种‘是的’。

So that must be quite resonant with you, that stuff about insanity and evil and and Yeah.

被用作一种贬义的表达。

Used as a sort of pejorative.

我认为，说一个人疯了，是因为这似乎能解释一切，但实际上什么都没解释。

Well, I think that saying someone is mad because it explains everything, it explains nothing.

对。

Yeah.

所以毫无疑问，你可以说德国疯了

So absolutely, you know, you can say Germany went mad

但就连这一点也不足以

But But even that doesn't

是的。

yeah.

这太不够了，不是吗？

It it it's inadequate, isn't it?

这就是为什么我们需要伟大的历史学家去超越这一点。

Which is why we need great historians to to go beyond that.

我来告诉你这让我想起了什么。

I'll tell you what it reminds me of, actually.

我们之前在播客里稍微谈过斯大林。

We talked a little bit before about Stalin in an earlier podcast.

斯大林并不疯狂。

So Stalin wasn't mad.

斯大林非常聪明，他完全清楚自己在做什么，和希特勒一样，他是受意识形态驱动的。

Stalin was very clever, and Stalin knew exactly what he was doing, and he was ideologically driven as Hitler was.

我认为这种比较——当然，这种比较已经被说了无数次了。

And I think that that comparison is I mean, it's obviously been made a billion times.

所以我说的这些，又陷入了历史陈词滥调。

So I've just said just descended into historical banality as ever.

总之，我们会在广告后回来，回到那个周一的话题上，然后谈谈衰落的问题。

Anyway, so we're gonna come back after think we should come back after the break on that on that Monday note, and, we will talk about the downfall.

你好。

Hello there.

我是阿尔·默里。

Al Murray here.

我想占用您一点时间，为DKMS慈善机构发出一个呼吁。

I'd just like a moment of your time to make an appeal to you on behalf of the charity DKMS.

我想，既然你们是历史爱好者，或许愿意以自己独特的方式提供帮助。

I thought because you're fans of history, you might like to make some in your own personal way.

DKMS运营着一项造血干细胞捐献服务，帮助血液癌症患者。

DKMS run a blood stem cell donor service to help people with blood cancer.

一次造血干细胞捐献可以挽救一个人的生命，或者为他们及其家人赢得宝贵的时间。

A blood stem cell donation can save someone's life, or it can buy them and their family precious time.

我了解到DKMS是因为我的侄子患上了儿童白血病，这是一种极其残酷的疾病。

I found out about DKMS because my nephew is very ill with a childhood leukemia, a bitterly cruel disease.

目前唯一已知的治愈方法是造血干细胞捐赠。

The only known cure is a blood stem cell donation.

多亏了三位捐赠者，他至今仍健在。

Thanks to three donors, he is still with us.

DKMS 所做的事情非常简单，却悄然伟大。

What DKMS do is very simple yet quietly amazing.

他们能让你成为一名随时待命的救生者。

They can make you into a lifesaver in waiting.

以下是具体方法。

Here's how.

访问他们的网站 www.dkms.org.uk，了解你是否有资格捐赠造血干细胞。

Go to their website, www.dkms.org.uk, and find out if you are eligible to donate blood stem cells.

在他们的数据库中注册，他们会寄给你一个拭子包。

Register on their database, and they will send you a swab pack.

一年半前，当我刚开始为 DKMS 做宣传时，我还需要解释什么是拭子包。

A year and a half ago, when I first started campaigning for DKMS, I had to explain what the swab pack was.

自从新冠疫情以来，也许你们对这个都更熟悉了。

Since COVID nineteen, perhaps you're all a little more familiar with it.

你擦拭一下脸颊，把拭子放进信封，然后寄回给DKMS。

You swab your cheeks, pop the swabs in an envelope, and return them to DKMS.

然后，如果你被发现与需要你造血干细胞的人基因匹配，就像指纹一样，但更精确。

Then if and when you are found to be a genetic match for someone who needs your blood stem cells, it's like a fingerprint, only more so.

他们会与你联系。

They will get in touch.

你的造血干细胞可能会送往世界任何地方。

Your blood stem cells could go anywhere in the world.

无论Finley身在何处，你都可能帮助到他。

You could help someone like Finley wherever they are.

自疫情以来，登记人数有所下降，如果我们共同努力，能做点什么就好了。

Since the pandemic, registration has fallen, and it would be great if between us, we could do something about it.

前往dkms.org.uk，查看你是否有资格捐献造血干细胞。

Go to dkms.org.uk to see if you are eligible to donate blood stem cells.

非常感谢。

Thanks very much.

欢迎回到《历史其余部分》，今天我们与伊恩·克肖爵士讨论阿道夫·希特勒。

Welcome back to The Rest is History, and we are talking Adolf Hitler with Sir Ian Kershaw.

我们已经谈到第二次世界大战的后期阶段。

And we've reached the late stages of the Second World War.

德国的形势并不乐观。

Things are not going well for Germany.

我想知道，克肖爵士，您认为希特勒是什么时候意识到大势已去的？

And I wonder, Sir Ian, when do you think Hitler realized that the the game was up?

我认为在斯大林格勒战役之后，从高加索撤退，以及北非战败，到1943年，炸弹已经开始猛烈轰炸德国城市。

I think by after Stalingrad and the retreat from the Caucasus and the defeat in North Africa, By 1943, the bombs are then raining down on German cities.

我认为到那时他已经意识到，战争不可能像他原先预期的那样获胜，但战争无法获胜并不等于战争已经失败。

I think by that time he realises that the war cannot be won in the way that he'd anticipated, but the war not being won is different from the war being lost.

我认为他直到很晚才接受战争最终失败的事实，甚至在1944年12月阿登攻势（美国人称之为突出部战役）时，那仍是一次试图扭转局势的最后努力，当然最终证明是徒劳的。

And I think it was very late in the day when he accepted that the war was finally lost, that even as late as December 1944 with Ardennes offensive, or what the Americans called the Battle of the Bulge, there was a last, of course it proved out to be a vain attempt then to turn the tide.

所以我认为，当时有一种想法，认为西方最终会介入，因为很明显，西方资本主义和苏联共产主义组成了一个非常不光彩的联盟。

So I think there was a notion that at some point then the West will intervene because it's obvious that you've got a very unholy alliance between the West, Western capitalism and Soviet communism.

西方会介入，看清形势，并达成某种协议。

The West will intervene, see sense, and come to some sort of deal.

有些人甚至提到苏联可能会这么做，但我认为这从来不是希特勒的选项；但西方会介入的想法，我认为在他心中持续了一段时间，还有德国人会获得改变战局的神奇武器，甚至原子弹的想法。

Some even talked about the Soviets doing that, but I don't think that was ever a starter for Hitler, but the notion that the West would intervene, I think was something which stayed with him for a while, then also the idea that Germans will get wonder weapons which will then turn the tide, atomic bombs even.

所有这些，我都直到很晚才接受，战争已经无可挽回地失败了；而一旦承认这一点，战争就彻底失败了，那时他也就准备好了接受结局。

All these were I sorry, didn't accept until very late on that the war was now irredeemably lost, And when it was, then it was lost completely, and then of course he was ready to take it.

德国人民、德国国家本身都与他同在，他说：我们可能会覆灭，但我们会一起沉没。

And the German people, the German state itself with him, and said we might go down, but we'll sit down and hold with us.

因为在我看来，希特勒最后的日子、最后几个月、最后几年中最令人震惊的一点是，我知道他曾遭遇过刺杀企图，但即便苏联军队已经逼近柏林，即便一切都在分崩离析，他依然没有被抛弃。

Because because that's what I find most amazing in a way about the the last days, the last months, the last years of Hitler, is that that I know that this assassination attempt against him, But even as the Russian forces are moving in on Berlin, even as it's evident that everything is falling to pieces, he's not abandoned.

他的魅力依然存在。

He the magnetism holds.

他依然能维持元首的地位。

He is able to remain the fuhrer.

我的意思是，这对我来说简直令人难以置信。

I mean, it just seems astonishing to me.

嗯，越来越多的人，包括越来越多的领导人，都在抛弃他，他们都在寻找自己的退路。

Well, he is abandoned by increasing numbers of people amongst the population, but also by increased numbers of the leaders who are looking to find their own way out.

所以到了最后，他身边只剩下一小撮人，当然，都在地堡里，其中一些人权力很大、非常重要。

So by the end, he's he's got a coterie of people around him, of course, in the bunker, and some of these are very powerful and important people.

但当然，在最后几天的地堡里，他解除了第二号人物戈林的职务。

But of course then in the end he dismisses Goering, the second man in the Reich, from his offices in the final days in the bunker.

领导层正在崩溃，但你必须记住，直到这些最后的日子，他依然掌握着权力。

It is things are then falling apart in monster leadership, but what you've got to remember this, not just Hitler personally, but he has got there still until these very last days.

像戈培尔负责宣传事务，鲍曼掌管党及其镇压机器，施佩尔负责军备和建设，这些关键人物在最后时刻仍支撑着政权，尤其是希姆莱掌控着整个警察系统。

People like Goebbels in charge of the propaganda operation, Bormann in charge of the party and all its repressive apparatus, Schwerd in charge of the armaments and building program, and these crucial figures who help to prop up the regime right then, not least Himmler in charge of all the police apparatus.

因此，这是一个仍然拥有强大实力的独裁政权，军事领导人这次在经历了失败的政变后，虽然绝望地搓手，但他们仍看不到除了遵从希特勒命令之外的其他选择，因为除此之外他们还能怎么办呢？

So this is a dictatorship that has still got very strength, and the military leaders are this time, are having seen the failed putsch, they're wringing their hands in desperation, but they still see no way other than actually trying to follow-up Hitler's orders, because what alternative do they have then?

除了政变之外，没有其他方式能推翻他，而那已经在1944年7月失败了。

There is no way of bringing him down except through a putsch, and that's failed already in July 1944.

因此，他们实际上被判处了毁灭，与希特勒一同覆灭。

So they are condemned then really destruction of Germany and go down with Hitler in a sense.

但在最后时刻，大多数德国领导人仍在寻找各种逃生途径，有些人选择自杀，但更多人则试图逃离并向西方投降。

But at the very end, most of the German leadership is looking for an escape in one way or another, some of them by suicide, but more more of them by trying to get out of it and giving themselves up to the West.

然后，一个一直让我着迷的问题是：希特勒死后，第三帝国崩溃，德国经历了一个可怕的、近乎末日般的时期，仿佛二战结束时迎来了‘零年’。

And then one question that's always fascinated me is, you know, Hitler dies, the Third Reich collapses, and Germany goes through this this, you know, sort of dreadful period of sort of apocalyptic period, really, the year zero kind of sense at the end of the Second World War.

那些曾经投票支持希特勒、加入希特勒青年团、墙上挂着希特勒画像、给他写过粉丝信的人，他们当时都在想什么？

And and what do all these people think who have who have voted for Hitler, who've been members of the Hitler Youth, who have had, you know, Hitler's picture on the wall, who have written him fan letters?

我的意思是，我们谈论的是数量庞大的人群。

I mean, we're talking about colossal numbers of people.

当然，他们眼睁睁看着自己的世界在身边崩塌。

Of course, they've seen their world collapse around them.

但当你进入五十年代初、中期，西德从废墟中重建时，他们是否都开始认为，一切错误都是希特勒的错，他是个疯子、怪物，而自己只是被欺骗了？

But when you get into, I don't know, the early fifties or the mid fifties or something, so West Germany is being rebuilt from the ruins, do they all think then that everything was Hitler's fault and he was actually a madman and a monster and, you know, they were duped?

还是说，其中一些人内心深处仍认为，元首是对的，只是结局太可惜了？

Or does some of them still deep down think, you know, the Fuhrer was right and it was a shame that it ended as it did?

你知道，我对去纳粹化这个问题很感兴趣，因为人们并不会一夜之间就抛弃他们所有的信仰，对吧？

You know, I mean, I'm fascinated by that issue of kind of denazification, because people don't tend to ditch everything they believe in overnight, do they?

是的。

No.

去纳粹化在很大程度上是失败的，当这项工作交由德国人自己执行时，它简直成了一场闹剧。

Denazification was, of course, in large measure of failure, and when it was handed over to the Germans themselves to do it, it became nothing more than a farce really.

当然，许多人仍然坚持原有的观点，只是现在不再轻易表达出来。

So many people did of course hold on to the views, but they were more quiet about expressing them now.

如果你查看当时的民意调查，就会发现一个令人惊讶的现象：即使在20世纪50年代初，仍有一部分人——虽然比例在下降——但仍有约10%的人认为希特勒是德国的好领袖，他只是犯了几个错误。

If you look at opinion surveys then it's remarkable in a way that already still in the early 1950s, a percentage of people it's a declining percentage, but still 10% or thereabouts still think Hitler was a good leader for Germany, and he just made a couple of mistakes.

一个是发动战争，另一个是对犹太人的迫害，你或许会说这些都是小错误。

One was the war and the other was the treatments of the Jews minor mistakes you might say.

因此，许多人仍然认为1944年7月试图刺杀希特勒的人是错误的。

So people were, and many people still thought that the actions of the people who tried to kill Hitler in July 1944 were wrong.

当时仍存在一定程度的对纳粹主义的支持，当被问及纳粹主义是好事、坏事，还是好事办砸了时，大约有一半的人做出了回应。

So there were residual levels of support for narcissism at the time, and about half the population when they were asked was narcissism a good thing, a bad thing, or a good thing badly carried out?

他们大多认为，这是一件本意良好但执行糟糕的事情。

They largely said it was a good thing that was badly carried out.

并且准备把责任归咎于希特勒及其其他领导人，认为是他们把人们引向了错误的方向。

And prepare to blame Hitler, and his other leaders too, for leading them in the wrong direction.

但总体而言，仍有许多人支持这样一种观点：希特勒和纳粹所尝试的并非全然错误。

But in general terms there was a lot of support still for the sense that not everything had been wrong that Hitler and the Nazis had tried to do.

我们必须指出，到了20世纪50年代，阿登纳政府当然尽其所能助长了对这段历史的集体遗忘，通过不刻意强调过去、努力摆脱历史阴影来推动德国重建。

We have to say of course by the time you're into the and maybe two other points very briefly one is that the Adenaar government in the 1950s of course did what it could to help the collective amnesia of this period, and to build up Germany by not making a big deal about the past and try to get away from the past and move forwards.

第二点是，阿道夫·希特勒的政策逐渐变得受欢迎，经济奇迹正在发生，因此大多数德国人并不愿意去思考希特勒统治时期发生的事，而此时希特勒已被视为自俾斯麦以来最伟大的领袖，而希特勒本人则逐渐沦为仅由极少数始终不变观点者所坚持的残余符号。

And the second thing was that you had also the fact that Adolf Hitler's policies were becoming popular, the economic miracle was taking place, and so most Germans were not intent on thinking about what had got on under Hitler, and by this time was regarded as the greatest leader since Bismarck, and Hitler had faded into a residue of a very small percentage of people who would never really change their views.

而慢慢地，我想，或者是否是缓慢地，希特勒的声誉逐渐变成了我们在节目开头所讨论的那种恶魔形象。

And slowly, I guess, or is it slowly, Hitler's reputation becomes that of the satanic figure that we talked about right at the top of the program.

但这种情况是否确实是一个逐步演变的过程呢？

But is it the case that that that is a process?

因为另一个关于希特勒的解读脉络——尤其在德国以外——是，他被视为一个荒诞可笑的人物，有着他的小胡子、夸张的手势和单睾丸的传闻。

Because another strand in Hitler's the way that Hitler is understood certainly beyond Germany is that he's a ludicrous figure, that he's he's a comic figure with his moustache and his gesticulations and his single testicle.

事实上，希特勒只有一个睾丸？

In fact, Hitler only have one ball?

我想，这可能是另一个关键问题，关于

That's, I guess, maybe the key question of Another the

传说。

legend.

另一个传说。

Another legend.

不是的。

No.

医疗报告表明，这方面是完全正常的。

The medical reports suggest it was perfectly normal in that capacity.

但这是一个过程吗？

But was it a process?

当然，查理·卓别林对希特勒的讽刺形象在外国产生了很大影响，人们纷纷嘲讽希特勒。

Well the Charlie Chaplin caricature of course had a big impact in foreign countries and people caricaturing Hitler.

在德国，你永远不可能把希特勒当作一个笑柄。

You could never in Germany see Hitler as a figure of thumb.

至少直到最近，他都是一个太过邪恶的人物，不可能被如此看待。

Not until very recently anyway, he was far too malign an individual for that.

但有一种说法，也就是说，结合多米尼克几分钟前提出的问题，在战后初期，希特勒成了一种民族的替罪羊——人们可以把一切错误归咎于希特勒和纳粹领导人，而不去深入探究普通人在各种生活中为维持这一政权所做的事情。

But there was a sense, I mean also linking on with what Dominic was asking a few moments ago, there was a sense in the immediate post war period that Hitler became a sort of alibi for a nation, that you could blame Hitler and the Nazi leaders for what had gone wrong, and not turn too closely to investigate what ordinary people had done in all sorts of walks of life to make this regime function.

这是一个漫长的过程，人们逐渐将注意力从希特勒身上转移，转而审视德国社会本身，探究为何这一政权能够如此运作，为何希特勒能够在德国产生如此大的影响。

And that was a lengthy process by which people turned their attention away from Hitler to looking at German society itself and seeing why this worked in the way that it did, and why Hitler was able to have the impact that he did within Germany.

从20世纪60年代起，德国史学界开始转向，不再认为这一切只是希特勒和纳粹领导人所为，而是更广泛地考察德国社会中各种促成这一局面的结构。

And from 1960s onwards there was a turn away from in German historiography, away from the notion that this was Hitler and the Nazi leaders who had done this, to looking more widely at various structures of German society which have made this possible.

但直到20世纪80年代，人们的关注才真正大规模地转向更广泛的德国社会。

But it was only really in the 1980s that the attention moved in a big way towards looking at the German society more generally.

因此，关于第三帝国的德国社会史发展得非常缓慢。当我20世纪70年代初到德国开始研究这一课题时，这一领域尚处于萌芽阶段，我惊讶地发现当时对德国基层社会的研究几乎空白，但到了80年代，这一领域取得了巨大进展。

So German social history of the Third Reich was very slow to develop, and when I went to Germany, I started working on this in the 1970s, was at the infancy of this, was quite astonished that I was at how little had been done on the grassroots of Germany at time, but that made big strides forward in the 1980s.

接下来的一步，是将希特勒重新纳入这一图景之中。

And then the next step was that Hitler was reinserted into this picture.

因此，现在不再是将德国社会结构或对希特勒的过度关注分开来看，而是将希特勒与使这一切成为可能的德国社会结构联系起来。

So instead of being now either structures of German society or a fixation on Hitler, it became linking Hitler into the structures of German society that have made this possible.

我认为，到20世纪90年代时，我们已经真正达到了这种认识。

I think that's a process that really we'd arrived at by the time we got into the nineteen nineties.

那么，关于希特勒如何成为邪恶化身的这种观点呢？

And then what about this idea of Hitler, the way that Hitler has become this sort of embodiment of evil?

因为这现在已经成为常态，不是吗？

Because that's now the norm, isn't it?

我的意思是，正如汤姆在录音一开始就说过的，现在人们普遍认为希特勒是一个持久的参照标准。

I mean, as Tom said right at the beginning of the of of the recording, there's this sort of sense now that that Hitler is the enduring benchmark.

你知道，如果你不喜欢唐纳德·特朗普，你就会拿他和希特勒作比较。

You know, if you don't like Donald Trump, you compare him with Hitler.

如果有人发表了你不同意的观点，你就会随手搬出希特勒来作类比。

If somebody says an opinion you you disagree with, Hitler is the comparison that you kind of dust down.

作为英语世界最权威的希特勒研究专家，当你看到这些现象时，是会感到不适，还是认为它们作为一种警示故事或政治工具具有某种价值？

Do you sort of as a as as the well, you know, certainly the leading English speaking expert on on Hitler, do you do you wince when you see all this, or do you think it has a value as a kind of cautionary tale, as a kind of political tool?

更偏向前者的话，我想我稍微占上风，不是因为我对希特勒所代表的任何东西有任何异议——当然没有，那绝对是令人憎恶的罪恶。

Turning more towards the former, I think I win slightly, not because I have any trouble with anything that Hitler ever stood for, of course I don't, it's absolutely abhorrent and abomination.

但用希特勒来攻击某人，把他们和希特勒联系起来，这实在太容易了，这让我想起二三十年前，只要有人的观点你不同意，就会被称作法西斯分子，而‘法西斯’那时就成了对任何你不认同的政治立场的万能标签。

But it's a very easy device, isn't it, to attack someone with, to link them with Hitler and so on, and in a way it reminds me two or three decades ago anybody whose ideas you disagreed with was called a fascist and so on, and so fascism was then just a catch all for some political line that was disagreeable.

现在，与希特勒挂钩成了指责某人道德卑劣的捷径，但道德上的卑劣本身需要独立评估，不能简单地把一切责任都推给希特勒，这实在是一种过于便捷的逃避方式。

Now, association with Hitler is a shortcut for some moral despicability on somebody's part, And the moral despicability needs to be assessed in its own right, not by just turning to blame Hitler for all this, and so it's a very easy resort.

希特勒无疑是个极其恶劣的人物，从影响力来看，你甚至可以说他是二十世纪上半叶最重要的人物。

And Hitler was absolutely a terrible figure, perhaps the dominant in terms of his impact, you could argue that he's the most significant figure in the first half of the twentieth century.

但当然，还有其他人，你不必只盯着希特勒去找邪恶之徒，也不只是斯大林，还有许多其他人，比如穆西·通，以及众多类似的家伙。

But there were others as well, of course, you know, and you don't need to stop at Hitler to look for malign figures, and you not just Stalin either, but many others, and Mousy Tongue too, and many of them.

正因为我们将注意力过多集中在德国，而德国离我们较近，是我们能够理解、且有大量往来的一个社会，所以我们更关注它；毕竟，我们不久前才刚与这个国家打过一场战争，第二次世界大战已成为英国战后神话的核心，我认为。

So because we've concentrated so much on Germany, and Germany is fairly close to us and it's a society we understand and we have a lot of dealings with, we focus much more on that, and we were after all involved in a war against this country not that long ago, and the Second World War has become the central point of British post war mythology, I think.

因此，以种种方式，希特勒已沦为政治邪恶的中心象征，于是，将他与任何持有令人反感观点、或我们当前不认同并想加以凸显的人联系起来，就变得轻而易举。

So in all these ways Hitler has become then the central figure of political evil, and it's a very easy move then to use that to associate Hitler with anybody else who's used repulsive views or whatever we disagree now and and want to highlight.

不过，反过来想，我们有个来自彼得·埃文斯的问题：许多过去犯下大规模屠杀和种族灭绝暴行的人物，比如尤利乌斯·凯撒和成吉思汗，最终似乎都被平反了，他们的罪行被开脱或遗忘了。

Well, turning that on its head, we we have a question from Peter Evans who who asks, so many figures from the past who committed atrocious acts of mass murder and genocide, and he cites Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan, seem eventually to be rehabilitated, their crimes excused or forgotten.

那么，希特勒在两百年或五百年后也会这样吗？

Will that happen to Hitler in, say, two hundred years or five hundred years?

我们活不到看到两百年或五百年后会发生什么的时候，所以我不知道这个问题的答案。

We won't be around to see what happens in two or five hundred years, so I don't know the answer to that question.

但我可以想象，姑且不论其他，也许在一千年之后，希特勒会成为这样一个角色——他那些极其恐怖的暴行会被相对化。你刚才提到成吉思汗，我想，还有瑞士作家布克哈特，这位文化历史学家在讨论历史伟人时，曾将成吉思汗视为一位伟大的领袖。

But I could imagine that, just for the sake of argument, I could imagine in a thousand years that Hitler will be one figure whose absolutely horrific acts are then relativized, As you mentioned Genghis Khan, I think, a little while ago, and one Swiss writer, Burkhardt, cultural historian actually writing about historical greatness singled out Genghis Khan as a great leader.

我们现在看待他，更多是聚焦于他所犯下的恐怖罪行，但这其实反映了我们对这些历史人物的道德评判方式。我认为今天很少有人会特别在意成吉思汗的道德问题，但希特勒离我们太近了，所以我们对他格外关注。

We think of him now in terms of the horrors that he perpetrated, but it's very much how we look on these characters morally, and I don't think many people today are very preoccupied by the morality of Genghis Khan, but Hitler is very close to our time, so we are preoccupied with him.

五百年或一千年之后会怎样，我不知道。

How it will be in five hundred or a thousand years, I don't know.

但我可以想象，在此期间会出现其他更令人震惊的恶魔，人们那时会更关注他们，而不是希特勒。

But I could imagine that there'll be other monsters that come along in the meanwhile that are more preoccupied with them than we are with Hitler.

是的。

Yeah.

所以希特勒的这种地位，我的意思是，汤姆和我以前在这个播客里讨论过道德与历史，纳粹如何已成为一种道德基准。

So Hitler's sort of status he he won't I mean, Tom and I have talked before in this podcast when we talk about morality and history, the way in which the Nazis have become this sort of moral benchmark.

但你不认为这种状态会持久下去。

But you don't think that will endure.

我是说，随着第二次世界大战逐渐成为历史，你觉得这种地位还会维持多久吗？

I mean, so that will have a shelf life as the Second World War recedes into history, do you think?

我们会不会创造出新的、类似宗教偶像的人物，用来评判政治家？

And peep we will, you know, we will develop new kind of quasi religious figures to judge politicians against?

我认为在可预见的未来，我们仍会将纳粹视为政治邪恶的标杆，而且这完全合理。

I think for the absolutely foreseeable future, we will continue to see that as the benchmark of of political evil, and quite rightly so.

但这种认知在漫长的历史进程中会如何演变，我们无法预测；无论如何，我只能想象，它最终会变得相对化。

But how that will materialize over a lengthy period of time is impossible for us to say, and I can just imagine at any rate that that will be relative wise then.

历史上几乎所有事情都是相对的。

Practically everything in history is relative wise.

当你思考政治领袖的遗产时，无论他们生前被如何看待，其影响力通常都会逐渐消退，或许只有少数宗教领袖的遗产能在几个世纪中保持不变。

I mean when you think of the legacy of political leaders, however great those leaders have been seen in their own time, the legacy tends to fade, and maybe it's only a small number of religious leaders whose legacy has been impermeable over those centuries.

所以我认为，未来可能会出现某种方式，使纳粹不再成为邪恶的唯一或首要标杆，但这类推测性问题，历史学家其实无法回答，其他人也同样无法回答。

So I think there probably will be some way in which that is no longer the sole or the leading benchmark of evil, but I think it's that sort of speculative question is one that historians can't really answer, and nor nor can anybody else for that matter.

我认为，以一个连历史学家、甚至你，伊恩，都无法回答的问题来结束这一集，或许是为这场绝对的精彩对话画上完美句号的最佳方式。

I think I think leaving the episode on a question that historians, even even you, Ian, cannot answer is perhaps the best note on what to end this absolute tour de force.

我真不知道该怎么感谢你们才好。

I I can't thank you enough.

除非，多米尼克，你还有什么问题吗？没有。

Unless, Dominic, you have any No.

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

问题。

Questions.

我认为我们应该让伊恩爵士休息一下了，他表现得非常出色，而且他早就该好好休息了。

I think we should, Sir Ian has has has performed manfully, and I think he probably is long overdue for a rest.

不管怎样，和你们两位交谈非常愉快，也非常感谢你们提出的问题，以及那些送来问题的观众。

It's been very enjoyable talking to you both anyway, and thank you very much for the questions and for the people who sent the questions in.

是的。

Yes.

这周提出了一些极棒的问题，当然，回答更是出色。

Some fantastic questions, this week and even better answers, of course.

汤姆，这个话题真有意思，不是吗？

Tom, such an interesting subject, isn't it?

我的意思是，这看起来如此熟悉，因为希特勒已经深深植根于当代人的想象之中。

I mean, it it seems such a it's so familiar because Hitler is sort of so deeply embedded in the contemporary imagination.

而且我们已经讨论了太多关于希特勒作为恶魔的这种观念，你知道的，这种观念我们都非常熟悉。

And I mean, we've talked so much about this idea of Hitler as the devil, you know, which which we're all so familiar with.

当你在你那本关于基督教的书里提到——这是我第一次有机会——

When you, in your book on Christianity, I mean, is your first chance

来宣传你的基督教著作。

to plug your book on Christianity.

整整两集都没有提到HG多米尼克。

Two whole episodes without Two HG Dominic.

是的。

Yeah.

请您原谅他，伊恩爵士。

You'll have to forgive him, Sir Ian.

抱歉，打扰了。

Sorry about this.

但你不是正好把希特勒推到了前台吗？

But but you sort of tee up Hitler, don't you?

他是终极的反基督教人物。

He's the the ultimate anti Christian figure.

你觉得他会

And do you think he'll

在这一点上也和我们一样吗？

be with us in in that respect?

所以这两集的主题是一位伟大历史学家剥去神话，展现真实，呈现这个人。

So what what these two episodes have been about is a great historian kind of paint stripping myth to show us the reality, to show us the man.

但我认为，这个神话本身已经成为历史中一个至关重要的事实。

But I I think that the myth has become a a crucially significant fact of of history in its in itself.

因此，人们心中对希特勒的幻想，那种将他视为邪恶本质的感觉，某种程度上，他已经变成了一种神学形象，我认为。

So the myths that people believe of Hitler, the sense they have of him as the essence of evil, in a sense, he's become a theological figure, I think.

所以我认为，他在我们的想象中已经取代了魔鬼。

So I think he's replaced the devil in our imaginings.

我说过，奥斯维辛就是地狱，纳粹乃至希特勒所造成的恐怖，在人们的想象中已经取代了传统的基督教神话，成为了一种新的神话。

And I've said, you know, Auschwitz is hell, The horrors that the Nazis and ultimately Hitler brought about, you know, that that that in the imaginings of people has replaced the kind of Christian mythology, and it's become a new mythology.

因此，从某种意义上说，希特勒与他所引发的恐怖之间的关系，引发了关于各种神学问题的思考。

And so in a sense, the relationship of of of Hitler to the horrors that he unleashed prompts all kinds of theological questions about

是的。

Yep.

关于责任，关于邪恶的本质，关于我们自身潜在的邪恶能力。

Responsibility, about the nature of evil, about our potential for evil.

你知道，我们每个人内心是否都潜藏着一个希特勒？

You know, is there a Hitler within us?