72. 越南战争

但你知道，戴高乐是对的。

But, you know, De Gaulle was right.

你可以说，好吧。

And you could say, okay.

法国人确实犯了这些错误，但他们从错误中吸取了教训。

The French made those mistakes, but then they learned from the mistakes.

但美国人说，我们不是法国人。

But the Americans said we're not the French.

所以还有另一个明显的维度，那就是英国人。

So there's another obvious dimension which is the British.

对吧？

Right?

美国人不也跟英国人交谈吗？

Don't the Americans also talk to the Brits?

英国人显然也在马来亚，他们在马来亚与叛乱分子作战。

The Brits are obviously in Malaya at the same The Brits are fighting insurgents in Malaya.

英国人难道不会说这是个非常糟糕的主意，你不该这么做吗？

And don't the Brits say this is a very bad idea and you shouldn't do this.

你应该吸取我们的教训，还是说这里另有故事？

You you should learn our lessons or or what's the story there?

问题是这样的。

Well, here's the thing.

直到六十年代中期到晚期，当越南战争明显是个错误时，他们才这么说。

Only later do they say that, in the mid to late sixties, when it's clear when Vietnam's clearly a bad idea.

五十年代的美国人，也就是美国在加强南越的力量。

The the Americans in the, in the nineteen fifties so The US is building up South Vietnam.

美国也在菲律宾进行一场规模小得多的反叛乱战争，对付胡克运动——那是一群左翼民族主义者，类似于菲律宾的越盟叛乱。

US is also fighting a counterinsurgency, much smaller counterinsurgency war in The Philippines against the Huks who were a leftist nationalist, kinda like the Viet Minh insurgency in The Philippines.

所以他们在帮助菲律宾人对抗这场叛乱。

So they're they're they're helping the Filipinos fight that insurgency.

他们也在从英国在马来亚的经验中获得协助，但更重要的是从中学习。

They're also assisting from but really learning from the British in Malaya.

因为英国在五十年代于马来亚对抗中国共产党领导的叛乱。

Because the British are fighting a counterinsurgency in the fifties against Chinese communists in Malaya.

这很成功。

That works, that's successful.

直到今天，它仍被奉为开展反叛乱行动的典范。

And it's still to this day, it's held up as how to do counterinsurgency.

看看马来亚。

Look at Malaya.

别看越南。

Don't look at Vietnam.

看看五十年代的马来亚。

At Malaya in the in the nineteen fifties.

因此，美国认为，既然有英国的大量建议，又在菲律宾有过类似经验，所以觉得：是的，我们也能做到。

And so The US thinks because it's got all this advice from the from Britain, because it's kinda had this experience in The Philippines, it thinks, yeah, we can do this.

我们可不是法国人。

We're not the French.

我们正在向英国学习。

We're learning from the British.

我们正在运用在菲律宾实施过的策略。

We're we're taking our ideas applied in The Philippines.

我们能做到。

We can do this.

我们有这个能力。

We've got this.

他们没有意识到，面对越南的共产主义者和民族主义者，他们对抗的是最优秀、最坚韧、最坚定的战士。

Not realizing that in you know, against the Vietnamese communists and nationalists, they are up against, like, the the best, most hardened, most committed fighters.

其中一个问题是，他们选错了敌人、选错了地点、选错了时机。

They just one of the things is they just picked the wrong enemy in the wrong place in in the wrong time.

我们有一个来自约翰·吉姆·康迪的问题，关于英国和越南。

Could I we've got a question from John Jim Condie on Britain and Vietnam.

他问英国有多大可能介入？

And he asked how close did The UK come to getting involved?

他引用了马来亚的经验。

And he he cites the experiences in Malaya.

不提供援助的决定对哈罗德·威尔逊与美国的关系造成了多大影响？

And how much damage to the decision not to assist affect Harold Wilson's relationship with The US?

是的。

Yeah.

威尔逊当时处境极其艰难，因为林登·约翰逊对他施加了巨大压力，要求他派兵。

Wilson was in a really, really tough tough spot because LBJ put huge Lyndon Johnson put huge pressure on Wilson to send troops.

威尔逊非常巧妙地——我的意思是，这简直是天赐良机。

Wilson very very conveniently, I mean, was a real stroke of luck.

他找到了一个借口，而林登·约翰逊希望他无视这个借口，但威尔逊可以依靠它。

He had an out and and LBJ wanted him to ignore this out, but Wilson could fall back on it.

在1954年法国被赶出后，召开了日内瓦会议，各大国无视越南人民的意愿，也违背了胡志明的意愿，决定将越南以17度纬线为界一分为二，这就是北越和南越的由来，苏联和中国也同意了这一决定。

And it was that Britain and the Soviets so in 1954, when the French are kicked out, there's a big conference in Geneva and the great powers decide against the against the Vietnamese will, against Ho Chi Minh's will, they decide, and the Soviets and the Chinese agree to this, they're they're gonna split Vietnam in two at the 17th Parallel, that's where you get North and South Vietnam.

越盟主要在北越，而美国则在一定程度上监督着南越。

And the Viet Minh are are are in North Vietnam and and The US kind of oversees South Vietnam.

这本应是临时的，但最终变成了永久性的。

And that was supposed to be temporary, but it becomes permanent.

为了监督这一安排，确保一切公平，这让我回到威尔逊身上——当时成立了一个委员会，负责监督越南的分裂，并确保未来两年即1956年将举行自由公正的选举以实现国家统一。

And overseeing that arrangement to make sure everything was fair, this brings me back to Wilson, there was something there was a commission created to oversee the partition of Vietnam and the fact that it would be free and fair there would be free and fair elections to reunify the country two years later in 1956.

英国和苏联被指定为该委员会的共同召集国，负责监督越南的情况。

And Britain is one of the Britain and The Soviet Union are made the kind of co conveners of that commission to oversee what goes on in Vietnam.

即使到了六十年代，这个委员会在技术上仍然存在。

And that commission is technically still around in the sixties.

尽管它没有任何实权，也没人听它的。

Even though it has no power, nobody listens to it.

所以当约翰逊施加巨大压力要求威尔逊派兵时，威尔逊说：‘哦，我当然愿意，但该死的。’

And so when Johnson puts all this pressure on Wilson to send troops, Wilson says, oh, you know, I'd love to, but Damn.

我不能。

I can't.

我有这个命令。

I've got this command.

该死。

Rats.

要求我保持客观。

Requires me to be objective.

你知道，我真想派给你，是的。

You know, I'd love to send you yeah.

LBJ看到了内衣。

LBJ sees underwear.

LBJ说，就给我派一支队伍吧。

LBJ says, just send me a band.

就给我派一支行进乐队之类的，好让我能告诉别人英国人参与了。

Just send me a marching band or something so that I can tell people the British are involved.

威尔总是设法推脱。

And Will always weasels out of it.

嗯，我不会那样做，那就是

Well, I'm not gonna that's that's a

挺不错的事。

pretty nice thing.

但澳大利亚人

But the Australians

他们去了

They went

他们报名了。

they sign up.

所以你确实既有板球场地，也有棒球场地。

So you you do get cricket pitches as well as baseball pitches.

没错。

That's right.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Absolutely.

来了解我的板球方法。

Get in my method of cricket.

这要追溯到多姆或类似的人一开始提出的问题，关于误解。

So this goes back this goes back to a question that Dom or something Dom raised at the beginning about misconceptions.

我们以为全世界都反对美国介入越南战争，而事实上大多数国家确实如此。

I mean, we think that the whole world was against American involvement in Vietnam, and most of it was.

几乎整个欧洲都是如此。

And pretty much all of Europe was.

加拿大也是，而且美国本身也有相当一部分人反对。

And Canada was, and a, you know, a good chunk of The US itself was.

拉丁美洲也是如此。

Latin America was.

大多数前殖民地国家都反对。

Most former colonial countries were.

但东南亚地区的一些国家，大多数都自愿派出了军队。

But the countries in Southeast Asia, in the region, a lot of them most of them voluntarily sent troops.

澳大利亚、新西兰、台湾、韩国、菲律宾、泰国。

Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, The Philippines, Thailand.

你知道，他们也害怕共产主义的扩张。

You know, they were they were kinda scared of a communist advance as well.

这并不意味着干预越南就是对的，因为在我看来，这明显是不对的。

It doesn't mean that it made it right, intervention right, in Vietnam because it to me, it clearly wasn't right.

但情况很复杂。

But it is it is complex.

有一位澳大利亚记者曾被一位美国反战抗议者问过。

And there was an Australian journalist who was asked by an American anti war procester.

这是关于这场战争最棒的引述之一，很可能和越南战争中最出色的那些引述一样，完全是虚构的。

It's one of the it's it's a great quote from the war that is probably like most of the best quotes from the Vietnam war, completely apocryphal.

但这个引述实在太好了，我在教学中经常使用。

But it's such a good quote that I use it all the time in teaching.

那位美国反战抗议者问那位澳大利亚记者：你们为什么要把军队派往这场明显不正当、不合法的战争？

And the American anti war protester asked the Australian journalist, why are you, you know, why are you sending troops to this clearly unjustifiable, illegitimate war?

据说那位澳大利亚人回答说：对你们美国人来说，这是远东，但对我们澳大利亚人来说，这是近北。

And the Aussie is reported to have said, to you Americans, it's the Far East, but to us in Australia, it's the Near North.

我的意思是，这是我们自己的后院。

I mean, this is our this is our backyard.

所以，事情有时比我们想象的要复杂一些。

So it's it's sometimes it's a little more complex than we think.

但是，安德鲁，这引发了一个非常有趣的问题。

But but, Andrew, that raises a really interesting question.

显然，我们这一代人或之后的人，在研究这段历史时，都带着这样的成见：这是一场彻底的灾难，是一场不正义的战争，美国人投放了大量凝固汽油弹，摧毁了城市，杀害了大量无辜平民，诸如此类。

So, obviously, anybody of our generation or or later comes came to the study of this with this baggage, with this sense, know, it was a complete disaster and it was a legitimate war and the Americans dropped all this napalm and they destroyed, you know, cities and killed lots of innocent people and all this.

要摆脱这种观念非常困难。

It's very hard to rid yourself of that.

但确实有一个问题。

But there is surely a question.

我的意思是，英国人在马来亚成功了，你知道，马来西亚现在还存在。

I mean, the British succeeded in Malaya and they you know, Malaysia exists.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，他们基本上建立的这个国家依然存在。

I mean, the state that they basically created exists.

同样地，在韩国，美国干预了韩国。

Similarly with South Korea, the Americans intervened in South in Korea.

他们创造了一个类似南越的成功模式，至今依然非常成功，而人们现在并不认为它不合法，尽管那场战争极其血腥和残酷。

They created a sort of Korean South Vietnam that worked, that's still very successful, and that's you know, people don't see that now as illegitimate or even though that was an incredibly bloody and horrible war.

所以，如果它成功了，我们对越南战争的看法还会一样吗？

So had it succeeded, we wouldn't think the same way about the Vietnam War, would we?

我的意思是，如果它成功了，人们就不会把它看作是帝国主义和不合法的。

I mean, if it had worked, then people wouldn't see it as imperialist and illegitimate.

他们会吗？还是不会？

Would they, or or would they?

不会。

No.

这确实直击了越南战争中最困难的问题之一。

It get it it really cuts right to the core, right to the heart of one of the most difficult things about the Vietnam War.

所以，美国，我仍然认为这场战争是不正当的，而且是不必要的。

So The US, I still think that the war was illegitimate, and I still think that it was unnecessary.

我一直这么认为，我的观点从未真正改变过。

I always have, and my my view on that hasn't really changed.

当你审视实际发生的事情时，正如你所说，美国在印度支那、越南、老挝和柬埔寨投下的炸弹吨位几乎是四倍。

And when you look at what actually happened, as you were saying, The US dropped almost four times the bomb tonnage on Indochina, on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

几乎是四倍。

Almost four times.

差不多是三到三倍半。

It's like three over three and a half times.

然后，所有各方在二战期间投下的炸弹总量都没这么多。

Then it dropped then all parties dropped in all of World War two.

我的意思是，这太惊人了。

I mean, that's incredible.

这一点简直令人难以置信。

On this it's incredible.

我的意思是，这完全违背了逻辑。

I mean, it's just it's just it just defies logic.

老挝是按人均计算被轰炸最严重的国家，也是世界上被轰炸最严重的国家。

And Laos is the most heavily bombed per capita, it's the most heavily bombed country in the world.

这里有一件非常奇怪的事。

Here's a really weird thing.

在美国投下的所有炸弹中，数量超过了二战期间所有参战国在所有战场投放的炸弹总和，不仅仅是美国的炸弹。

Of all those bombs that The US dropped, more than everyone did in World War two, in all theaters of World War two, not just The US bomb not just US bombs.

在所有参与二战的国家中，美国在越南、老挝和柬埔寨投放的炸弹数量，超过了二战期间所有战场的总和。

With every country that fought World War two, The US dropped more bombs in Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia than in all of World War two.

单是这一点就令人震惊。

That in itself is staggering.

但当你进一步思考时，美国在20世纪60年代和70年代在印度支那投放的炸弹中，轰炸自己的盟友南越的次数，比轰炸任何其他地方都多。

But then when you think about that of the bombs that The US dropped in in Indochina in the nineteen sixties and seventies, it bombed its ally, South Vietnam, more than it bombed anyone else.

我的意思是，美国投下的大部分炸弹都是落在它的盟友南越的。

I mean, the majority of the bombs that The US dropped were on its ally, South Vietnam.

我的意思是，这说明了

I mean, that speaks to

困难所在。

the difficulty.

蠢问题。

Dumb question.

他们为什么要这么做？

Why are they doing that?

战争就在那里。

That's where the that's where the war is.

叛乱就在那里。

That's where the insurgency is.

对。

Right.

好的。

Okay.

不。

No.

这并不是一个愚蠢的问题。

It's not it's not a dumb question.

它再次直指这场奇特的战争，这种近乎非理性的战争。

It again, it gets right to the this this bizarre war, this sort of illogical war.

但回到汤姆的问题，朝鲜战争同样血腥。

But going back to to to Tom's question, the Korean War was just as bloody.

我的意思是，按比例计算，它的伤亡比你所想的更惨烈，尽管实际战斗只持续了三年。

I mean, proportionally, it was bloodier than if you sort of it was only three years long, the actual fighting.

所以，如果按作战时间调整，朝鲜的破坏和死亡人数比越南更多。

So if you adjust it for the for the amount of time they spot fighting, there was more destruction, more death in Korea than there was in Vietnam.

这是一场残酷而可怕的战争，在国内也不受欢迎，这就是为什么哈里·杜鲁门没有再次竞选总统，因为朝鲜战争太不得人心了。

It was a brutal, awful war and it was unpopular at home and that's why Harry Truman didn't run again for president, because Korea was so unpopular.

然而，它最终却成了一个成功的故事。

And yet, it turned out to be a success story.

因此，这引发了我非常喜欢和学生讨论的问题：结果是否决定了道德性？

And so it it raises this question that I love to discuss with my students if, you know, is the result what determines morality?

我的意思是，有时候显然并不是这样。

I mean, sometimes it doesn't clearly.

有时候，某些事情就是错的。

Sometimes things are just wrong.

我仍然认为越南战争是错误的，但当你看看朝鲜战争时，你会发现干预的理由与越南战争相同，暴行的规模、凝固汽油弹的使用、对平民目标和平民人口的无差别轰炸，所有这些都如出一辙。

I still think the Vietnam War was wrong, but it's when you look at Korea where the reasons for intervention were the same as they were in Vietnam, the scale of the brutality, the use of napalm, the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, civilian populations, all that kind of stuff.

这和越南战争是一样的。

It's the same as in Vietnam.

我的意思是，这基本上是一场有着关键差异的相同战争。

I mean, it's basically the same war with key differences, course.

但本质上，它就是一场相同的战争。

But in essence, it's the same war.

然而，当人们看到韩国和朝鲜的现状时，没有人会想回到过去并抹去朝鲜战争，对吧？

And yet nobody would wanna sort of go back and undo the Korean War now, right, when you look at South Korea and North Korea.

我的意思是，这种力量的悬殊太大了。

I mean, it's it's the scale of the mismatch.

这就像大卫和歌利亚的对决，我想这正是它如此吸引人的关键所在。

It's the David and Goliath that I I guess is kind of a key part of the of the fascination of it.

也许我们可以看看美国公众舆论对它的反应，以及它在后半段的政治影响，我们该休息一下了。

And I maybe we could look at the kind of, you know, the the way that American public opinion responded to it and the politics of it in the second half, and we should have a break.

但最后，我想回答一个来自弗里德曼的问题：越共是不是二十世纪后半叶最厉害的军队，击败了两个超级大国和红色高棉？

But just just to end with, a question from Vriendman who asks, is Viet Cong the most badass army of the second half of the twentieth century beating two superpowers and the Khmer Rouge?

是的。

Yes.

好的。

Okay.

那么，就此

Well, on that

请注意，二十世纪后半叶最厉害的军队，我们先休息一下。

note, the most badass army of the second half of the twentieth century, we'll go to a break.

你好。

Hello.

我是多米尼克·桑布鲁克。

Dominic Sandbrook here.

自从我还是个孩子时，我就热爱历史。

I've loved history since I was a boy.

我小时候读过许多关于冒险与战斗的刺激故事，比如少数英勇战士飞越英吉利海峡，以及安妮·博林走向断头台时的恐怖场景。

I grew up reading swashbuckling stories about adventures and battles from the courage of the few as they soared above the channel to the terror of Anne Boleyn on her way to the scaffold.

几年前，我想为我儿子找一本类似的书——一部生动有趣的第二次世界大战叙事史，但书店里都没有我想要的那种。

A couple of years ago, I tried to find something similar for my own son, a rollicking narrative history of the second world war, but none of the bookshops had quite what I wanted.

最后，我决定自己来写。

So in the end, I decided to write it myself.

而且不止一本书，而是一整套系列，名为《时光冒险》，由企鹅出版社出版。

And not just one book, but a series, Adventures in Time, published by Penguin.

关于第二次世界大战和亨利八世的六位王后的前两本书现在已经出版。

The first two books about the second world war and the six wives of Henry the eighth are out now.

它们有着激动人心的故事和鲜明的人物，正符合你对儿童读物的期待。

They've got exciting stories and great characters, just as you'd expect from a children's book.

正如我儿子所说，这很有趣，但也是历史。

As my son puts it, it's fun, but it's history.

《时光冒险》系列现已上市，适合8岁到80岁的孩子阅读。

Adventures in Time are available now for children from eight to 80.

所以，这就是我，多米尼克·桑布鲁克撰写的《时光冒险》。

So that's adventures in time by me, Dominic Sandbrook.

如果还不满意，你知道该去哪儿申请退款。

And if they don't satisfy, you know where to go for a refund.

他的名字叫汤姆·霍兰德。

His name is Tom Holland.

欢迎回到《历史其余部分》。

Welcome back to The Rest is History.

我们现在在越南，与剑桥大学的安德鲁·普雷斯顿教授一起，他正在为我们梳理这场战争。

We are in Vietnam with professor Andrew Preston from Cambridge University, and he's talking us through the war.

安德鲁，这个问题一直让我很困惑。

Andrew, so this is a question that has always puzzled me.

我的意思是，你大概还记得我们还是博士生时出版的那本书，迈克尔·林的《越南：必要的战争》。

I mean, you probably remember a book when we that came out when we were PhD students together, Michael Lin's book, Vietnam, the necessary war.

是的。

Oh, yeah.

那本书是一种对战争的修正主义解读，认为这场战争打得对，美国为盟友争取了时间，诸如此类。

And this was a sort of revisionist account of the war that said it was, you know, it was the right war to fight and all and they you know, America bought time for its allies and all this kind of thing.

所以，谈到关于这场战争的棘手问题和修正主义观点，这里有一个问题。

So thinking about difficult questions about the war and sort of revisionist questions, here's one.

美国本可以赢得这场战争吗？

Could The US have won it?

我的意思是，他们拥有如此多的军事装备，难道不能赢吗？

I mean, couldn't they they had so much military hardware.

有一些右翼修正主义美国历史学家认为，美军是被公众舆论背叛的，这一直是将军们的观点。

Is there a case that a sort of right wing revisionist American historians say that they were stabbed in the back by public opinion and that basically that and this was always the general's case.

对吧？

Right?

将军们说，只要再给我们一点时间，只要让我们使用更多火力，我们就能把他们炸回石器时代。

The general said, if you just give us more time, if you let us use more firepower, we will bomb them back to the stone age.

这可是他们常用的表达。

I mean, that was their expression.

这种情况可能发生吗，还是这只是一个幻想？

Could that have happened, or was that just a fantasy?

我认为这是一种幻想。

So I think it's I think it's a fantasy.

我认为他们不可能赢得这场战争。

I don't think they I don't think they could have won the war.

将军们确实这么说，但最初在1963、1964、1965年林登·约翰逊总统时期，并非如此，因为大规模的美国战争是从1965年开始的。

The generals were saying that, but not at first in '63, '64, '65 when LBJ is because the big war, the big American war begins in the 1965.

于是约翰逊开始询问所有人——中央情报局、参谋长联席会议、国务院——我们该怎么办？

And Johnson is then asking everyone, the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, everyone, what should we do?

而且他们举行了这些会议，你知道的，多姆。

And they have these I mean, you know this, Dom.

你也看过这些材料。

You've looked at this stuff too.

他们举行了一连串没完没了的会议。

They have these endless series of of meetings.

而在1965年最不希望开战、不希望打一场大规模战争的人，是国务院里的一些人。

And the people who are least keen on going to war, on on having a big war in 1965 there are some people in the State Department.

你可能会怀疑，或者预期会这样。

You'd suspect that or you'd expect that.

但参谋长联席会议真的——我觉得你不能称他们为反战派，因为那样你会想象那些四星将军们烧胸罩、留长发，举着标语牌游行。

But the Joint Chiefs are really I I don't think you could call them anti war because then you're picturing these sort of four star generals burning bras and and wearing long hair and sort of marching with pickets.

并不是那样的。

It's not that.

但他们告诉林登·约翰逊，如果我们要赢得这场战争，就需要超过五十万人。

But they told LBJ this is this war if so they say, if we're going to win this war if we're going to win this war, it's gonna take more than half a million men.

这将需要很多很多年。

It's gonna take many, many years.

这需要长期的坚定投入。

It's gonna take a really long commitment.

你必须清楚自己将要面对什么。

You have to know what you're getting into.

即便如此，我们获胜的几率也不大。

And even then, our chances of winning aren't great.

我的意思是，他们非常现实。

I mean, so they were super realistic.

并不是说他们

It's not like So they

完全清楚自己将要面对什么。

absolutely know what they're getting into.

他们清楚自己将面对什么，这不像2003年的伊拉克，当时人们以为这会很简单。实际上，美军在2003年对伊拉克的态度非常谨慎，但情况不同于伊拉克战争，那时像布什和拉姆斯菲尔德这样的人以为这会是一场轻松的胜利。

They know what they're getting it's not like Iraq in 2003 where they're just and actually the military was very cautious about Iraq in 2003, but it's not like Iraq 2003 where you have people like Bush and Rumsfeld thinking this is gonna be a cakewalk.

这会很容易。

This is gonna be easy.

没人对越南战争抱有这种想法。

Nobody thought that about about Vietnam.

一旦他们介入，将军们就会说，好吧。

Once they're in, then the generals are like, okay.

我们已经介入了。

We're in.

既然我们介入了，就一定要赢。

If we're in, we're gonna win.

至少对我来说，很难相信美国曾帮助击败了纳粹德国和日本帝国，你知道，美国是二战中唯一真正参与全球性战争的国家。

It's hard to believe, at least for me, it's hard to believe to think that The US, helped defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan you know, The US is the only party in World War two that fought a truly global war.

英国也参与了，但美国的参与程度要大得多。

Britain did as well, but The US to much to a much greater extent.

这需要付出巨大的努力。

That took a lot of doing.

对吧？

Right?

因此，很难相信他们竟然无法击败越南，甚至只是北越——那个从未真正实现工业化的、极其贫穷的部分。

And so it's hard to believe that they couldn't then defeat not just Vietnam, but just North Vietnam, half of the the part of Vietnam that was didn't really ever industrialize and was very, very poor.

但要做到这一点，就得把他们炸回石器时代。

But it what what it would have taken, it would have taken bombing them back to the stone age.

还得用当时的一个说法，把北越变成一个停车场。

It would have taken making, to use another expression from the time, making North Vietnam a parking lot.

而且，你得问一句，这值得吗？

And, you know, you have to ask, is that worth it?

这可行吗？

Is it feasible?

之后你该怎么处理这个国家？

What do you do with the country afterwards?

所以从绝对意义上讲，美国可能确实能赢得胜利。

So winning on a winning in absolute terms, yeah, The US probably could have done that.

但以任何可接受的条件赢得战争呢？哪怕按照美国自己参战的理由标准？

But winning on any kind of acceptable terms even by The US's own standards of why they were fighting the war?

不行。

No.

我认为这是不可能的。

I don't think it was possible.

所以我想问你们两位，因为我知道你们对这个问题都有深刻见解，特别是关于约翰逊总统。

So a question for both of you, because I know that you both have very informed opinions on this, from Jack Hennison about LBJ.

林登·约翰逊的遗产是否因为他在越南战争中的升级而被不公平地玷污了？毕竟他的国内政策在他任内大多取得了成功。

Is is Lyndon, Johnson's legacy unfairly tarnished due to his escalation of the Vietnam War as his domestic policies were largely successful in his lifetime?

而且我看到，不知道你们上周有没有看到一份报告，关于美国总统的自恋倾向，说确实如此。

And I see I don't know if you saw last week, there was a a a report on, the narcissism of US presidents saying that Yeah.

越自恋的总统，越可能发动战争，而约翰逊是其中最自恋的一个。

The more narcissistic they were, the likely they were to go to war, and LBJ was the most narcissistic of them all.

那你认为呢？

So what do you think?

我觉得他确实是最自恋的，我认为他就是最自恋的。

That's pretty I think well, I think he was the most he I think he was the most narcissistic.

我觉得他也是最不自信的。

I think he was the most insecure.

汤姆，我也读过那个故事。

But I did read that story as well, Tom.

我觉得是在《纽约时报》上看到的。

I think it was in the Times.

至少我是在《纽约时报》上读到的。

At least I read it in the Times.

我还没读过全文，但一开始我就持怀疑态度，因为林登·约翰逊并不想打仗。

And I haven't read the the full article, but I was immediately skeptical because LBJ did not want to go to war.

如果他能让越南问题消失，他一定会这么做。

And if he could have made Vietnam disappear as a problem, he would have.

他并不想打仗，这正好回应了你刚才提出的问题。

He and he didn't wanna go to war, and this gets to your questioner or the the question that was just asked.

他不想打仗，因为他担心战争会掩盖他的伟大社会计划。

He didn't wanna go to war because he worried that the war would then over overshadow his great society.

它会掩盖民权改革的成就。

It would overshadow civil rights reforms.

它会掩盖、削弱，甚至可能最终毁掉他所推行的这项非凡的国内改革计划。

It would over overshadow and undermine and maybe eventually ruin this this incredible domestic reform program that he had.

安德鲁，让我插一句。

Andrew, let me jump in there.

你的朋友，或者说我们的朋友弗雷德·洛吉维尔，是的。

Your mate well, our mate, Fred Logueville Yeah.

他写了一本叫《选择战争》的书，是的。

Has a book called Choosing War Yeah.

他在书中认为，人们普遍误以为是肯尼迪的责任，其实正是林登·约翰逊故意选择了战争。他指出，部分原因在于约翰逊缺乏安全感，想展示自己在冷战中的魄力，因为他感到肯尼迪的遗产压在头上，而约翰逊是故意这么做的。

Where he argues that it was, you know, the common he he says it's a common misconception that it was Kennedy's fault, that Kennedy that it was Lyndon Johnson deliberately chose war, he argues, partly because he was insecure, because he wanted to, you know, show his cold war kind of cojones, because he felt the kind of Kennedy legacy hanging over him, and he and Johnson deliberately did it.

你说你不认同这一点。

And you say that you don't buy that.

这是一档家庭播客。

This is a family podcast.

你真的可以在上面说‘cojones’吗？

You can say cojones on here?

汤姆·霍兰德谈论了太监和

Tom Holland talks about eunuchs and the The

想象一下我们之前讨论过的生殖器切割，我没想到我们会在这档播客里涉及这个，但是

imagine genital mutilation we've had on this, and I didn't think we'd be getting it into this, into this podcast, but

但话说回来，嗯，

yet again Well,

我们确实谈到了。

we have.

这就是编辑的用处所在。

That's what that's what editors are for.

对吧？

Right?

可以说是成功做到了。

As it were, pulled it off.

不。

No.

弗雷德说得对。

Fred's absolutely right.

这是一本叫《选择战争》的书。

This is a book called Choosing War.

这是我关于这场战争最喜爱的书之一。

It's one of my favorite books on the war.

它改变了我的整个观点，我读博士时这本书刚出版。

It changed my whole it came out when I was doing my PhD.

正如多姆所说，它彻底改变了我对这场战争以及我博士研究方向的看法。

As Dom said, it changed my whole thinking on the war and and and the course of my PhD.

所以我觉得这是一本很棒的书。

So I think it's a great book.

我同意弗雷德的观点，即林登·约翰逊选择了战争，当时其实还有其他选择。

And I agree with Fred that that LBJ chose war, that there were alternatives.

这正是关键所在，因为关于这场战争的一个长期争议是，批评肯尼迪尤其是约翰逊让美国卷入越南是不公平的，因为他们继承了这一长期承诺。

That's the basic because one of the one of the long standing arguments about the war is that it's unfair to criticize Kennedy and especially Johnson for getting The US in in into Vietnam because they inherited this long commitment.

在冷战背景下，批评他们卷入战争就像是用今天的视角去评判过去，你知道的，这是事后诸葛亮。

It was the Cold War criticizing them for getting involved is is sort of using 20, you know, using hindsight.

事后诸葛亮总是明明白白的。

Hindsight's twenty twenty.

我们现在知道那是错误的，但回到六十年代初和中期，指责他们未能预见到这会变成一场灾难是不公平的。

We realize it's a mistake now but going back to the early and mid sixties, it's unfair to criticize them of not knowing that it would become a disaster.

但他们其实知道，就像我之前提到的参谋长联席会议那样。

But they knew, like I was saying about the Joint Chiefs.

我的意思是，他们是知道的。

I mean, they knew.

林登·约翰逊知道这将至少会极其艰难，而他最终选择了战争。

LBJ knew that it was going to be, at the very very least, it was going to be extremely difficult, and he ultimately chose war.

也许是因为他缺乏安全感。

And maybe it's because he was insecure.

也许甚至是因为他有自恋倾向。

Maybe it's even because he was narcissistic.

但我的观点是，当时并没有急于开战。

But my point is that he there was no rush to war.

他花了将近两年时间斟酌是否要参战，并一直在寻找脱身之策。

He deliberated for almost two years as to whether to go to war and he kept looking for an out.

最终他选择开战，是因为感觉自己被逼入绝境，无路可退。

And eventually he went to war because he felt backed into a corner, painted into a corner.

也许这是由于国内政治因素，也许是因为他对自己男子气概缺乏信心，或者其他原因。

And maybe that was because of domestic politics, maybe that was because of his he was insecure about his manhood or or whatever.

所以他确实选择了战争，但我不确定。

So he did choose war, but I don't know.

像特朗普这样的人，或者其他人，在我看来，如果他们想动手，就会非常积极、非常急于采取行动，而约翰逊则绝对犹豫不决。

A narcissist like Trump or somebody else to me seems pretty keen and pretty eager to sort of pull the trigger if he wants to pull the trigger, and Johnson was absolutely reluctant.

我认为这确实损害了他的声誉，对吧？

I do think I mean, it has tarnished his legacy, hasn't it?

因为他确实也做过。

Because he did also.

这完全毁了他的声誉。

It's it's totally tarnished.

但在某些方面，这又是一个伟大的遗产。

And it in in some ways, it's a great legacy.

民权、移民改革，虽然没有实现全民医疗，但至少为老人和穷人提供了全民医疗。

Civil rights, immigration reform, not quite universal health care, but universal health care for old people and poor people.

因此，关于林登·约翰逊总统任期及其后续事件的背景，是日益加剧的反战抗议，我们收到了许多关于这个问题的提问。

And so the so the context for, LBJ's presidency and then everything that follows is escalating anti war protests, and we've got a number of questions on that.

我们收到了两位经常提出精彩问题的听众的提问。

So we've got one from two listeners who regularly contribute great questions.

我们有来自迭戈·莫尔加多的问题：美国的反战运动是由受过大学教育的中产阶级年轻人推动的，他们只是不想参战，还是比这更广泛、更深刻？

We've got Diego Morgado, who asks, was the anti war movement in The US driven by university educated middle class kids who just didn't want to go to war, or was it more politically deep and widespread than that?

我们还有一个来自切特·阿奇博尔德的问题，他似乎是加拿大人。

And we've got one from Chet Archbold, who also Canadian, I think.

到六十年代末和七十年代初，反战情绪有多普遍？

How broad was the anti war sentiment by the late sixties and early seventies?

是主流观点，还是仅仅是一群声音响亮的少数派？

Was it a majority view or just a vocal minority?

这种情绪在多大程度上是那十年美国文化巨大变迁的结果，或者说是其原因？

And to what degree was it a product or a cause of the great sea change in American culture during that decade?

我知道你们两位对此都有太多话要说，我们可能聊上好几个小时。

And I know that both of you would have so much to say on that that we could be here for hours.

请你们两位都简短回答一下。

Just very short answers from both of you.

我

I

我认为对于第一个问题，两者都是。

think in answer to the first question, it was both.

这既是一种有原则的立场，也是因为很多人不想去打这场难以解释的战争——这场战争在极其艰难的环境下进行，而很多人认为其理由不道德、不合法。

It was both a principled stand, and it was both people didn't wanna go fight this very difficult to explain war, a war that was being fought in in very tough circumstances under very tough conditions for reasons that a lot of people just thought were immoral and and illegitimate.

而那些抗议的人，正是那些不得不去参战的人。

And, course, the people who were protesting were the ones who would have had to go fight that war.

所以他们对此有切身利益。

And so they had they had a stake in it.

对吧？

Right?

他们绝对不是无关者，他们对此有直接利害关系。

They they they definitely weren't, they had an interest in it.

因为我们要

There was Because we

应该向听众说明，美国当时实行征兵制。

should explain to listeners that The US had a draft.

有征兵制。

Had a draft.

没错。

That's right.

你知道，你的号码被抽中了，然后你就得去服役。

You know, your number was drawn, and then you had to go.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

你看看唐纳德·特朗普，他不是脚有问题什么的吗？

You're, Donald Trump, you could didn't he have a dodgy foot or something?

嗯，他有骨刺，而且

Well, yeah, he had bone spurs and

找了医生

and got doctors

或者至少他找了个医生证明他有骨刺。

or at least he got a doctor to say he had bone spurs.

是的。

Yeah.

很多有强大背景的人都通过这种方式逃避了征兵。

A lot of powerfully connected people got out of the draft that way.

还有其他办法可以逃避征兵，那是什么？

And there were other ways you could get out of the what's that?

比尔·克林顿。

Bill Clinton.

比尔·克林顿不是吗？比尔·克林顿并没有找什么可疑的医疗理由，而是跑去Studio 54派对，躲避性病——而唐纳德·特朗普却说那是他的越南。

Didn't Bill Clinton well, Bill Clinton Bill Clinton, he didn't come up with a kind of dodgy medical reason, and then go party at, Studio fifty four and avoiding STDs, which Donald Trump says was his Vietnam.

比尔·克林顿实际上写了一封充满痛苦的信，解释他为什么不想参战。

Bill Clinton actually wrote he this says a lot about American politics.

比尔·克林顿写了一封充满痛苦的信，说明他为什么不愿参战。

Bill Clinton wrote a sort of anguished letter, saying why he didn't wanna fight.

当时他正在牛津，我想，写下了这封信，说明他为什么不想参战。

And he was in Oxford at the time, I think, when he wrote this letter, saying why he didn't wanna fight.

所以，你知道，我们可以说比尔·克林顿很多坏话，但他确实采取了一种有原则的立场。

So, you know, there are a lot of bad things we could say about Bill Clinton, but, you know, he he kinda took a principled stand.

回到你最初问的问题，汤姆，关于这究竟是中产阶级的抗议，还是背后有更深层的原因？

Just to go back to the first question that you asked, Tom, about, you know, what was the is this really just middle class protest, or is there something deeper to it?

我常给学生讲的一个最喜欢的故事，来自《时代》杂志一位报道1960年芝加哥反战游行骚乱的记者。

One of my favorite stories that I tell my students, it was from a Time Magazine reporter covering the riots in Chicago, the anti war riots in Chicago in 1960.

这场骚乱并非由学生引发，而是由警察——芝加哥警方——引发的。

A riot that wasn't caused by the students, but was caused by the police, the Chicago PD.

去年有一部很棒的电影，讲的是

There was a wonderful movie last year called, the one with

萨沙·拜伦·科恩。

Sacha Baron Cohen.

萨沙·拜伦·科恩，是的。

Sacha Baron Cohen who yeah.

还有《芝加哥七人案》

And The Trial

对吧？

of the Chicago Seven, isn't it?

没错。

That's it.

《芝加哥七人案》审判。

The Trial of Chicago Seven.

一部很棒的电影。

Fantastic movie.

真的，非常好。

Really, really good movie.

从历史角度看，它为了讲好故事有时会做一些艺术加工，但确实是一部非常出色的电影。

And it's historically I mean, it plays fast and loose sometimes to tell a good story, but it's a really good it's a really good movie.

我看过好几次了。

I've seen it seen it several times.

当时有一位《时代》杂志的记者正在报道这些骚乱。

There was a Time Magazine reporter who was covering the riots.

这基本上就是芝加哥警方对这些抗议者宣战的时刻。

This basically where the Chicago PD declared war on these protesters.

而且，这简直好得离谱。

And, again, it's it's it's almost too good.

这个引述简直好得过分。

This quote is almost too good.

这很可能是个虚构的故事，但既然有报道，我就当它是真的了。

It must be apocryphal, but it was reported, so I'm gonna go with it.

当时一名警察正在殴打一名抗议者——一个大学生，用警棍狠狠地打他。

And it's where a police a policeman was beating a protester, this kid, this university kid, and beating him with his nightstick, his billy club.

当警察举起警棍，准备给予最后一击时，这名学生举起拳头大喊：‘无产阶级万岁！’

And as the cop raises his his club to sort of land the the final blow, the student raises his fist and yells, long live the proletariat.

警察却说：‘我就是无产阶级。'

And the cop says, I am the proletariat.

然后继续把他打得不省人事。

And then proceeds to beat him senseless.

现在这又触及了这场战争和抗议运动中另一个根本矛盾：这场战争被称为工人阶级的战争，因为大多数被征召去参战的都是工人阶级，而他们支持这场战争。

Now it it gets at this another one of these fundamental contradictions in in the war and the protest movement that it's been called a working class war because most of the draftees who went off to fight it were working class, who supported the war.

抗议者大多是大学生，大多来自中产阶级。

The protesters were mostly university age, mostly middle class.

这种社会动态，我认为从六十年代到今天，我并没有画出过于清晰的界限。

There is that social dynamic and that social dynamic, I don't think I'm sort of drawing too neat a line from the sixties to the present.

这种动态与今天美国政治中，尤其是唐纳德·特朗普和保守派群体身上所看到的完全一致。

That's the same that's the exact same dynamic we see through American politics right up to today with Donald Trump and the conservative population.

我完全认同这一点。

I completely buy that.

我的意思是，‘沉默的大多数’这个说法，是的，就源于这个时期。

I mean, the the phrase, the silent majority Yeah.

这个词就出自那个时代。

Comes from this period.

理查德·尼克松发表了一次演讲，称‘我向你们——伟大的沉默大多数’发出呼吁。

Richard Nixon gives this speech talking about, I'm appealing to you, the great silent majority.

在这一时期，尼克松常戴着安全帽摆拍形象。

And he this is the period in which Nixon is posed wearing a hard hat.

我的意思是，现在看起来简直就像乔治·奥斯本一样。

I mean, very George Osborne ish now.

但在当时，因为纽约市的建筑工人——戴安全帽的工人——曾在1970年左右袭击过示威者。

But at the time, because men building workers in hard hats had had attacked in New York City, I think 1970.

1970年。

1970.

没错。

That's right.

那正是那种典型的示威场景，你知道的，一群长发、富裕的中产阶级孩子。

A a demonstration of precisely that kind of, you know, middle class affluent kids with long hair.

但那些留长发的孩子们，其实才是对的。

But the kid the kids with long hair were right, though.

这正是我想补充的关于战争的观点。

That's that's what I would like to add to to that about the war.

另一个让这一动态更加复杂的问题，来自阿德里安·RP。

Another question further complicating the dynamics of this from Adrian RP.

你能评论一下美军士兵的种族构成，以及穆罕默德·阿里所说的美国派黑人青年去杀死自己的兄弟吗？

Can you comment on the racial makeup of US soldiers in relation to Muhammad Ali's comments that America was sending black boys to kill their brothers?

是的。

Yeah.

非裔美国士兵的征召率是其在总人口中比例的两倍。

It so African American troops were drafted at twice their rate or twice their proportion of the general population.

一旦进入越南，他们被分配执行战斗任务的比例远高于其在美军总人数中的占比，且他们占了约四分之一的伤亡人数。

And once they were in Vietnam, they were given combat duties at grossly disproportionately high rates, well out of proportion to their makeup of The US military personnel, and then they made up around a quarter of casualties.

他们约占总人口的10%到12%。

So they're about 10%, 12% of the population.

但在越南战争中，他们却占了约25%的伤亡人数。

They end up making about 25% of the casualties in Vietnam.

我的意思是，好吧。

I mean Okay.

这个基本数字本身就足以让人深思。

Just that basic figure kind of gives you should give you pause.

不可避免地，这正是我们一提出关于越南的问题时就知道会出现的问题。

And there is inevitably this is the question that we knew was going to come up the moment we asked for questions on Vietnam.

这是来自约翰·桑兹的问题。

It's a question from John Sands.

在越南战争中，新入伍的战斗士兵的平均年龄是多少？

What was the average age of new combat soldiers at Vietnam?

对于那些不熟悉保罗·哈德卡斯尔1984年或1985年的热门歌曲的人，这首歌基本上就是讲述越南战场新兵的平均年龄。

And for those not familiar with Paul Hardcastle's, I think 1984, '85 hit, which basically consisted of him talking about the average age of new combat soldiers to Vietnam.

他说，在二战期间，战斗士兵的平均年龄是26岁。

He says in World War two, the average age of the combat soldier was 26.

而在越南，他们只有19岁。

In Vietnam, he was 19.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

19岁。

19.

这是真的吗？

Is that true?

放弃。

Pass.

放弃。

Pass.

你不知道吗？

You don't know?

好吧。

Okay.

保罗·保罗·哈德卡斯尔说对了。

Paul Paul Hardcastle got it right.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我不知道。

I don't know.

谁知道呢？

Who knows?

他说对了。

He got it right.

那后来呢？

What about then?

谁知道呢？

Who knows?

安德鲁在粉碎一个谣言，说黑人士兵，特别是黑人士兵，会故意把手榴弹改装来杀害他们的军官？

Andrew is fragging a myth that, black salt particularly black soldiers would, you know, would they rig a grenade to kill their officers?

是这样吗？

Is that right?

是的。

Yeah.

没发生过那种事。

Not a that happened.

我不清楚关于种族的问题。

I don't know about the racial.

我不知道是不是主要是黑人针对白人之类的。

I don't know if it was predominantly blacks on whites or anything like that.

但确实是有过。

But it was yeah.

如果你处在战争的最后几年，尼克松终止了征兵，于是不出所料，抗议活动开始减少。

If you're in the last years of the war, Nixon ended the draft, and and all of a sudden, not coincidentally, you see protests start to decline.

他还开始撤出美军。

He also began to withdraw US troops.

你知道，就像约翰·克里还是学生时对国会说的那样。

You know, it's like John Kerry said to congress when he was a student.

那是1973年左右，或者1972年，他在国会作证时说：你怎么能要求一个人为一个错误而成为最后一个死去的人？

This is in, like, 1973 or something or '72, and he was testifying to congress, he said, how do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?

所以在战争的最后几年，吸毒现象增加了。

So in the last few years of the war, drug use goes up.

发生了针对军官的投掷手榴弹事件。

There are incidents of fragging against officers.

我的意思是，拜托。

And you would I mean, come on.

如果你坐在那里，身处你的基地，能听到交火声，然后一名军士或少尉跳起来说：对。

If you're if you're you're sitting there and you're in your you're in your base and you can hear a firefight and then a sergeant or a lieutenant jumps up and says, right.

咱们去把那些共产分子打退。

Let's go fight those commies.

你心里肯定会犯嘀咕，而且美国明摆着已经要从这场战争里抽身了。

You're like, you know and The US is clearly on the way out of the war.

对啊。

Yeah.

我是说，你根本不可能

I mean You're not

你根本就不会有心思参与这件事了。

gonna you're not gonna be up for it.

在我们进入正题之前，我先问你一个小问题。

Here's a quick question for you before we get up for it.

我们得聊聊流行文化。

We need to talk about popular culture.

我觉得汤姆应该想聊聊电影相关的内容。

I I imagine Tom wants to talk about films.

我确实喜欢。

I do.

但在你这么做之前，你提到了尼克松。

But just before you do that, you mentioned Nixon.

我确实提到了。

I did.

尼克松从1969年1月就任总统到1973年，一直因继续战争而受到极其负面的舆论抨击。

So Nixon at the time and afterwards has got an incredibly bad press for continuing the war from January when he becomes president to 1973.

我一直以来都对此感到疑惑，因为我总觉得尼克松根本不可能直接抽身退出，他无法说走就走。

I've always wondered about that because I've always thought it was almost it was impossible for Nixon to just cut know, he couldn't, as it were, cut and run.

我的意思是，美国对南越做出了巨大的承诺，而到了那个阶段，他其实已经骑虎难下。

I mean, The US has made this massive commitment to South Vietnam, and he was kind of stuck at that stage.

你觉得我对尼克松是不是太宽容了？

Am I being too kind to Nixon, do you think?

这是个引导性问题，因为多姆，我知道你是理查德·尼克松的粉丝，而且你以前当大学讲师时，还教过一门非常受欢迎的关于尼克松的课程。

It's a leading question because, Dom, I know you're a fan of Richard Nixon, and and you used to teach a very popular course when you were when you were a university lecturer on Nixon.

我觉得有点东西，我知道你希望我怎么回答。

I think there's something so I know the answer you want me to give.

请说说你的答案。

Give my answer please.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我不认为

I don't think

我可以。

I can.

我不认为

I don't think

我可以给出完整的答案。

I can give the full answer.

我

I

只是需要

just needed

多姆·桑德布鲁克，但我认为这其中有些东西，我觉得其中有门道。

the Dom Sandbrook But I think there's something I think there is something to it.

这就像一个毒酒杯，从越南撤军。

It's a it's a poison chalice withdrawing from Vietnam.

你难道只是，你知道的，正如那句俗话所说，只是掉头逃跑吗？

Do you just do you just, you know, as the expression was, do you just turn tail and run?

我的意思是，尼克松认为你不应该这么做，因为这会损害美国的信誉，我相信这是真的。

I mean, Nixon thought you shouldn't because it would damage American credibility, and I'm I'm I'm sure that's true.

不过，我认为尼克松和亨利·基辛格夸大了这种损害的程度，因为他们仅仅因为继续留在那里就已经开始损害美国的信誉了。

Although, I think that Nixon and Henry Kissinger exaggerated the extent to which that would be damaged because they started damaging American credibility just by staying in.

真正的悲剧在于你离开的时候，而我们现在在阿富汗看到的就是这种情况。

The real tragedy is when you leave, when you and we're seeing this in Afghanistan right now.

对吧？

Right?

如果你离开了，而且是突然离开，那些被你抛下的人会怎么样？

Where if you if you leave and if you leave very suddenly, what happens to the people you're leaving behind?

是的。

Yeah.

当美国最终在1973年撤离，而整个局势在1975年彻底结束时，那些反共人士遭到了大屠杀，其中许多人是天主教徒。

And when The US eventually did leave in '73 and then when the whole thing was then all over in '75, you know, there was a bloodbath of the people who were anti communist, and a lot of them were Roman Catholic.

他们并不想要共产主义。

And they didn't want communism.

这些人是南越人。

These are South Vietnamese.

他们受到了极其、极其、极其严酷的对待。

And, you know, they they were treated really, really, really harshly.

如果你是1975年、1976年的南越人，你可能会想：等等，这不对劲。

And you could you know, if if you're South Vietnamese in 1975, '76, you're thinking, hold on a second.

好的。

Okay.

你知道，美国人可以回家，但我们该怎么办呢？

You know, the Americans can go home, but but what what do we do?

而且现在很多阿富汗人也在这么想。

And and a lot of people in Afghanistan are thinking that now.

我仍然认为美国从越南撤军是正确的。

It doesn't I still think it was right for The US to leave Vietnam.

我认为美国从阿富汗撤军也是正确的。

I think it's right, actually, that it's right for The US to leave Afghanistan as well.

但这付出了巨大的、巨大的、巨大的代价。

But it comes at a huge, huge, huge cost.

好的。

Okay.

多米尼克让我做了一个关于尼禄的播客，所以我觉得我也该让他做一期关于尼克松的播客。

Dominic allowed me to do a podcast on Nero, so I think I've got to allow him to do a podcast on Nixon at some point.

所以这是对历史的致敬。

So Greeting of history.

所以，我们暂且放下尼克松，再谈两个我认为相互关联的话题。

So just just moving away from Nixon because I two further, which I think are interconnected.

我们收到了来自斯尼克斯·麦考伊的一个问题。

So we got a question from Sneaks McCoy.

为什么美国军方在越南战争期间允许记者对军事行动进行如此广泛且前所未有的接触？

Why did the US military allow journalists such unrestricted and unprecedented access to military actions during the Vietnam War?

他们希望从中获得什么？

What were they hoping to gain?

这是一场广为人知的战争。

So this is this is a war that is massively people know about it.

这是一件大事。

It's it's a huge deal.

它出现在全世界人们的电视屏幕上。

It's in people's television sets around the world.

然后，我们还收到了很多关于为什么越南战争在流行文化中如此受关注的问题。

And then we had a lot of questions about, why has Vietnam been such, you know, such a focus for for popular culture?

我提到了保罗·哈德卡斯尔的歌曲，但显然电影尤其如此。

I mentioned Paul Hardcastle song, but obviously films particularly.

作为本集的最后一个问题是，我认为布洛克·麦克布洛克会说，哪部电影最准确地描绘了这场战争。

And then as a a finishing question for this episode, I think, blocky Macbloch faces which film is the most accurate portrayal of it.

但首先，斯尼克斯的问题是，为什么美国允许记者获得这样的访问权限？

But Sneaks' question first about what, you know, why why did The US allow journalists the access that they did?

我的意思是，这又回到了我们最初讨论照片时的话题。

I mean, it's going back to the, I I guess, the discussion about photos that we we began with.

是的。

Yeah.

而且，确实，我们还没完全讲完那个话题。

And and also that, yeah, we didn't really finish that.

我们只谈到了三张照片，但我觉得还有几张标志性的图片我们还没提到。

We we only came up, I think, with three photos, and there are a couple, I think, that are that are missing of sort of iconic images that we might get to.

这是个很好的问题，因为显然，大量媒体报道对战争或关于战争持批判态度。

It's a great question, because, of course, a lot of press coverage was was critical to the war, or critical about the war.

但大部分并不是这样。

Most of it wasn't, though.

这是我们另一个误解。

That's another misconception that we have.

多姆之前提到过‘背后一刀’，但实际上并不存在‘背后一刀’，因为直到非常、非常、非常晚的时候，美国媒体一直支持这场战争。

And Dom mentioned stab in the back before, but there was no stab in the back because the press until very, very, very late, the the American press was on side with the war.

如果他们有批评，也只是因为他们如实报道了正在发生的事情。

And if it was critical, it was only simply because they were reporting what was actually going on.

他们报道了真实发生的情况，而这与官方说法相矛盾，因为回到你提问者的问题，美军几乎不受限制地获得了战争的准入权。

And they were reporting what was actually going on, which contradicted the official line because, to go back to your questioner, US troops had almost unfettered access to to the war.

他们可以跳上直升机、卡车或吉普车，直接前往战斗发生地进行报道。

They could hop on a on a helicopter or on a truck or a jeep or whatever and go cover the fighting right where it was.

然后将报道发往香港的办事处，立即就能刊登在《纽约时报》或《洛杉矶时报》上。

And then send a dispatch to Hong Kong, to a bureau in Hong Kong, and it would get to the New York Times or LA Times right away.

而这与官方说法相矛盾。

And that would contradict the official line.

所以问题来了，为什么美国政府允许这些记者这样做？

So the question is, why did the US government allow these journalists to do that?

他们后来在伊拉克战争和海湾战争中吸取了教训，记者被紧密地嵌入军队，受到严格控制。

Which which they've since learned from, right, in the Iraq war, in the Gulf War, reporters are embedded with the military control very tightly.

其中一个原因是，当时并没有正式宣战。

One reason is because there was no declaration of war.

因此，当时官方的想法是，由于没有正式宣战，从法律上讲，我们不能对媒体施加太多限制。

So officially, at the time, the thinking was we can't really impose a lot of restrictions on the press because there isn't a declaration of war legally.

我们怎么能这么做呢？

How can we do this?

如果我们从法律和技术上讲都没有处于战争状态，又怎么能开始压制媒体呢？

How can we start clamping down on the press if we're not officially technically at war?

越南战争之后，五角大楼和白宫对这类法律问题不再那么顾忌了。

After Vietnam, the Pentagon and the White House aren't so squeamish about legalities like that.

但在当时，这确实是一个原因。

But at the time, that was that was one reason.

然后，美国官方声称，他们是应南越政府的邀请前往的。

And then officially, The US is there at the invitation of the South Vietnamese government.

而南越政府从未实施过新闻审查。

And the South Vietnamese never imposed censorship.

因此，记者们可以自由地前往各地报道战争。

And so the reporters can go off and just and just cover the war.

没错。

And Right.

你有了大卫·哈伯斯塔姆、尼尔·希恩和马尔科姆·布朗这些著名的记者，他们在20世纪60年代初最初是支持战争的。

You get your David Halberstams and your Neil Sheehan's and your Malcolm Brown's, these really famous reporters who who were initially very pro war in the early sixties.

他们希望看到南越不被共产主义接管。

They wanted to see South Vietnam not go communist.

但当他们开始报道战争时，发现一方面，关于战争的种种说法全是谎言，另一方面，战争局势并不顺利，而且以任何可以接受的代价都可能无法取胜。

And then they start covering the war, and they see that, a, there are all these lies that are being told about the war, but also just that it's not going well, and that it's probably unwinnable at any acceptable cost.

他们开始报道这些情况。

That's what they start reporting.