布莱克·肖尔，Boom Supersonic创始人兼首席执行官

对。

Right.

你们无法实现音爆技术。

You couldn't do Sonic Boom.

好吧。

Okay.

没错。

Right.

人们总以为整个公司创立就是为了解决音爆问题。

Like, people people people think that the whole company was created to solve sonic boom.

实际上，我们取名'Boom'有多重原因，包括我们当时认为音爆根本不会成为起步阶段的障碍。

And and and in reality, we called it boom for a bunch of reasons, including that we thought the boom was just not gonna be a blocker to to getting off the ground.

要不要我讲讲我们实际是如何解决这个问题的？

And and we I I can I should tell the story about how we actually solved it?

这很大程度上算是件幸运的事。

It was very much a like kind of a lucky thing.

我们我们并非发现，而是重新发现。

We we had discovered not discovered.

其他人也在做这件事。

Other people do this.

就像，有一种已知的物理现象叫马赫截止，基本上在特定条件下，音爆会掉头，根本不会传到地面。

Like, there's there's known physics called Mach cutoff that basically under certain conditions, the boom makes a u-turn and the atmosphere never reaches the ground.

而且，你知道，人们理论上讨论这个现象已经很久了。

And, you know, people had sort of talked about it theoretically for a long time.

这些物理现象并非我们发明的。

We didn't invent those physics.

当我们把引擎外包给劳斯莱斯时，我们研究过能否让飞机实现这一点，答案是否定的，我们做不到。

And we when we were outsourcing our engines to Rolls Royce, we looked at whether we can make the airplane do it, the answer was no, we couldn't.

引擎的动力不足以支撑所需的飞行剖面。

The engines didn't have the power to to fly the required flight profile.

所以我们暂时搁置了这个想法。

So we sort of put it aside.

好吧，就这样。

It's like, okay.

这是改天再考虑的想法。

It's an idea for another day.

从商业计划来看，我们不需要解决这个问题也能推出最小可行产品。

Our business the spreadsheets say we don't have to solve this to have a minimum viable product.

然后我们在今年一月进行了首次超音速演示飞行。

And and then we went and did our first supersonic demo flight this year, January.

在准备期间，我和团队在一起，我说我们即将进入超音速时代。

And in the lead up to that, I I was with the team and I was like, you know, we're gonna go to the supersonic.

全世界都会关注。

The world's gonna be watching.

我们真的应该了解音爆会是什么样子，这样才能设定大家的预期。

Like, we should really know what the sonic boom is gonna be like, so we can kinda set everyone's expectations.

如果情况很糟糕，我们应该提前知道。

Like, if it's real you know, if it's gonna be really bad, like, we should know.

团队说，不行。

And the team is like, no.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

它会在无音爆状态下飞行。

It's gonna be in the boomless condition.

起初我有点失望，因为我其实挺想听听音爆声的。

And I was like at first, I was disappointed because I kinda wanted to hear it.

我还问，我们能制造音爆吗？

And I was like, can we make a sonic boom?

我其实挺想制造音爆的。

Like, I kinda wanna make a sonic boom.

已经

It's been

很久没人听到过这个了。

a while since anyone's heard that.

对吧？

Right?

于是我们就去做了，团队还很有先见之明地布置了一堆麦克风来捕捉和确认这一点。

And so we we went and did it, and the team had the insight to, like, have a bunch of microphones set to like capture and confirm this.

这其实不是什么策略。

And this this was like not strategy.

只是我们当时在做的事情。

It was just kind of what we were doing.

所以我们就这样去做了。

And and so we go do it.

全世界都真正注意到了，你知道的，整个事件。

The world really noticed, you know, the overall event.

这极大地改变了我们公司的形象。

It massively changed our profile as a company.

然后，你知道，我就上了推特。

And, you know, and then I'm on Twitter.

推特上有人说，这家公司就是专门解决音爆问题的。

And and like Twitter is like, this company is all about solving sonic boom.

我就说，不，我们不是。

And I'm like, no, we're not.

我无法说服人们我们不是在解决音爆问题。

And I like couldn't convince people that we weren't about solving sonic boom.

然后我突然想到，等一下。

And and then I thought, wait a minute.

我们几年前就已经和劳斯莱斯分道扬镳了。

We've been we we we broke up with Rolls Royce years ago.

现在我们正在优化自己的发动机。

We're now we're optimizing our own engines.

每次我去参加发动机技术会议时，总听到人们说我们在跨音速性能方面领先。

And every time I go to, like, technical meetings on the engine, that we I keep hearing we're the transonic performance.

这意味着我们的加速高度在不断攀升。

It means our acceleration altitude keeps going higher.

要让这个方案可行，你必须能在3000英尺以上可靠地突破音障。

And, like, you have to for this to work, you have to be able to reliably break the sound barrier above 3,000 feet.

而劳斯莱斯在26000英尺以上就做不到。

And Rolls couldn't do it above 26.

每次工程会议，性能指标都提升了一千英尺。

And, like, every engineering meeting, it's like a thousand feet better.

用的是你们自己的发动机。

And With your own engines.

用我们自己的发动机。

With our own engines.

对吧？

Right?

是啊。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

结果这成了我们做过最具争议的决定，但也是公司史上最重要的决策。

Which, you know, it turned out to be, like, the most controversial decision we ever made, but it will be the most important decision the company ever made.

事实上，我认为没有这个决定就不会有今天的我们。

And in fact, I think we wouldn't be here without it.

不过...确实。

But but yeah.

所以这个数值是在缓慢攀升的。

So it's it's like slowly creeping up.

我心底隐约有个想法：或许该重新计算一下，看看无音爆方案是否真的可行。

And I sort of had in the back of my head, like, well, maybe we should rerun the math and see whether see whether boomless is actually practical.

然后我突然意识到——这事必须立刻着手。

And I realized, like, okay, we have to do that right now.

于是我紧急召开了周六的工程会议，然后我说，好吧各位。

So I I called emergency Saturday engineering meeting, and and I was like, okay, everybody.

我们必须重新计算引擎的数学参数。

We have to rerun the math with our engines.

你们觉得，它能原封不动地工作吗？

You know, does it work unmodified?

这是否太过冒险了？

Is it a bridge too far?

我们是否需要采取非常手段才能让它运转？

Would we have to do something unnatural to make it work?

那是个九十分钟的会议，基本上就是刷新电子表格数据的讨论。

And it was a ninety minute, like, kinda like hit refresh on the spreadsheet kind of conversation.

团队反馈说，我们不需要做任何改动。

The team is like, we don't have to change anything.

它直接就能用。

It just works.

然后我说，好吧，你能告诉我为什么这不切实际吗？

And I was like, okay, would you tell me why this is not practical?

然后大家都说，嗯，你知道，你需要获取实时天气数据，但这种数据是存在的。

And everyone's like, well, you know, you'd have to get real time weather data, but like that exists.

我说，好吧，那为什么这不切实际呢？

I'm like, okay, so why is it not practical?

然后大家都说，我们认为这行得通。

And everyone's like, we think this works.

我说，好吧。

I'm like, okay.

这太疯狂了。

This is nuts.

于是我就打电话给营销团队。

So then I called the marketing team.

我说，好吧。

I was like, okay.

我们要围绕‘无声’概念重新推出公司。

We're gonna relaunch the company around boomless.

你知道的，所有人都会觉得这原本就是计划的一部分，但其实完全不是。

And, you know, everyone's everyone's gonna think it was the plan all along, but totally it wasn't.

哇。

Wow.

我能问个愚蠢的物理问题吗？

Can I ask a dumb physics physics question?

可以。

Yeah.

之所以‘无声’，是因为你们在30公里以上的高空，地面上听不到声音吗？

Is it boomless because you're so high, you're 30 or above, that, like, down on Earth, you can't hear it?

就像森林里倒下的树。

It's like the tree falling in the forest.

是实际上产生了音爆但我们听不见，还是根本没产生音爆？

Is it actually making a boom but we can't hear it, or is it not making a boom at all?

它确实产生了我们听不到的爆炸声，但原因不同。

It's making a boom that we can't hear, but for a different reason.

所以是的。

So the Yes.

高度越高，仅因距离产生的衰减就越大。

The higher you are, the more just attenuation there is just from the distance.

对吧？

Right?

但这其实是不同的物理原理。

But this is actually different physics.

有一种现象叫折射。

The There's something called refraction.

你们应该都记得初中科学课上学过，波在穿过不同介质时会弯曲。

You know, if you all remember back to, like, I don't know, junior high science class, waves waves bend as they go through different media.

就像那个经典演示实验：把吸管插进水杯里，吸管看起来像是断了一样。

So there's that sort of, you know, famous demo of like, take a straw, drop out a glass of water, the straw looks broken.

为什么？

Why?

因为当光线从空气进入水中时，由于光在液体中的传播速度与在空气中不同，光波会发生弯曲。

Well, as the light goes through the from the air into the water, the the waves bend because the speed of light is different in a liquid than it is in in air.

声波同样会发生弯曲。

And it's a sound waves similarly bend.

它们会折射。

They refract.

声速并非在所有地方都恒定不变。

And the speed of sound is not constant everywhere.

它是温度的函数。

It's a function of temperature.

在大气层的前36,000英尺范围内，高空较冷而低空较暖，这意味着高空的声速较低而低空的声速较高。

And the first 36,000 feet of the atmosphere, it's colder up high, warmer down low, which means the speed of sound is lower up high and higher down low.

声波会发生弯曲，它们会向速度较低的区域折射，这意味着音爆会向上弯曲。

And waves bend, they refract towards lower speed, which means that the boom curls upward.

所有声音都会向上弯曲。

Any sound curls upward.

因此，音爆从飞机脱离的角度是速度的函数。

And and so the the angle at which the the boom comes off the airplane is a function of speed.

如果你刚好在1马赫左右，能量实际上是向前传播的。

This If you're like right at Mach one, effectively the energy is projected forward.

速度越快，能量向下传播的比例就越大。

The faster you go, the more the energy is projected downward.

假设你处于轻度超音速状态，大气中的温度梯度会使音爆折射形成一个大U形转弯，关键在于U形底部不接触地面。

So if you are, let's call it, lightly supersonic, the temperature gradient in the atmosphere refracts the boom and it makes a big u-turn, and the art is that the bottom of the u doesn't touch the ground.

所以地面上听不到任何声音。

So there's nothing to hear on the ground.

这再次印证了众所周知的物理原理。

And this this is again, like, well known physics.

你只需要具备两个条件。

You just have to have two things.

第一点是他们必须拥有计算这个的软件。

One one is that they have to have the software to calculate this.

顺便说，这都是计算机图形软件。

By the way, it's all computer graphics software.

这就是光线追踪。

This is ray tracing.

在实现超音速飞行的过程中，有多个环节表明来自电脑游戏的算法至关重要。

There are multiple things in like unlocking supersonic flight where it turns out algorithms out of computer games are important.

有意思。

Interesting.

是啊。

Yeah.

所以你必须拥有这样的软件，它能根据当天天气告诉你飞行速度应该多快，才能让音爆以足够平缓的角度脱离飞机，确保飞机与地面之间有足够高度完成U型转向。

So so so you have to have you have to have software that basically says, given today's weather, here's how fast you can fly, such that the boom comes off, you know, at a sufficiently shallow angle that there's enough altitude between you and the ground for it to complete the u-turn.

其次你还必须配备能实际执行所需飞行方案的发动机。

And then you have to have engines that can actually fly the required flight profile.

所以，你知道，我们

So, you know, so we

那么回到刚才，这就是他说软件实际上解决了问题时的意思。

So coming back, that's what he meant when you said software actually solved it.

软件。

The software.

这软件本质上是一种自动驾驶软件，输入天气数据，输出则是根据你所在的高度，计算出可以飞行的速度以确保音爆不会传到地面。

The software is Effectively, it's autopilot software that Where the the input is weather, and the output is for the altitude you're at, here's the speed you can fly such that no boom will reach the ground.

顺便说一下，我们已经跳到了我问题清单的最后一页。

So by the way, we've skipped ahead to, like, my last page of questions.

也许我们可以

Maybe we can

我们倒回去？

we go back?

在讨论那个令人兴奋的1月25日突破音障等话题之前，我需要再多了解一些。

I have to to understand a little bit more before we talk about that exciting, you know, January 25 breaking the sound barrier and everything.

首先，你能简要提醒我们协和飞机为何失败吗？

First, can you sort of briefly remind us why the Concorde failed?

好的。

Yeah.

表面原因和深层原因都有。

So there's a superficial reason, and there's a deeper reason.

表面原因是这产品从未找到市场定位。

The the the superficial reason is this is something that never had product market fit.

这是架100座的飞机，相当拥挤。

Here's a 100 seat airplane that's pretty cramped.

那些座位，你可能会误以为是西南航空或瑞安航空的。

The the seats, you could be mistaken, you know, for coming out of Southwest or Ryanair.

然而票价高达2万美元一张，整架飞机才100个座位。

And yet, it's $20,000 a pop, and there are 100 seats in the airplane.

早期我做过一件事——当时很难说服自己该有勇气研究超音速飞机。

And the one of things I did in the very early days, I had a hard time convincing myself, like, I should have the courage to look at supersonics.

我考虑过创办一家航空公司。

I looked at starting an airline.

所以我模拟了航空公司的经济模型。

So I modeled about airline economics.

如果你了解航空经济学，首先要知道的关键因素之一就是座位填充率至关重要。

And if you understand airline economics, one of the very first things you know matters is the fill rate on the seats is critically important.

要知道，如果一个座位空着飞行，那就是只有成本没有收入。

You know, if a seat flies empty, it's all the cost and no revenue.

所以...是的...

So so getting yeah.

座位数量和定价必须与市场需求相匹配。

The the seats and the price the seat count, the price has to be in alignment with the market.

因此在1970或80年代，100个座位每个2万美元的定价根本行不通。

So a 100 seats at $20,000 each in the nineteen seventies or eighties really doesn't work.

尤其是对于并不舒适的乘坐体验来说，市场需求量根本不够。

There's not that much demand, especially for a product experience that's not that comfortable.

因此，在近三十年的飞行中，协和飞机几乎有一半时间是空载飞行。

So through thirty, like, almost thirty years of flying, Concorde flew half empty.

即便是纽约到伦敦这条航线——对于高端超音速喷气机来说堪称全球最佳航线。

Even New York to London, which is like the best route on the planet for a premium supersonic jet.

所以这根本不符合产品市场匹配原则。

So there's no product market fit.

然而它却成了独一无二的孤品案例。

And then and yet, it was like an n, you know, n of one product.

而世人却从协和飞机以偏概全地推及所有超音速飞行器，得出了完全错误的结论。

And the world sort of generalized from Concorde to all of supersonic and and drew all the wrong conclusions.

这就像如果我们当年在UNIVAC之后停止研发计算机，现在所有人都会对乔布斯说'你不可能造出掌上电脑，因为计算机只能是银行买得起、房间那么大的设备'。

You know, it almost as if, like, imagine we stopped building computers after the UNIVAC, and then everyone would tell Steve Jobs, you couldn't possibly make a pocket computer because computers are affordable to banks in the size of a room.

是啊。

Yeah.

荒谬至极。

Ridiculous.

荒谬。

Ridiculous.

想想看。

To think that.

是啊。

Yeah.

所以，所以，所以根本没有产品市场契合度，这，这算是表面现象。

So so so there's no product market fit, and and that that was sort of the superficial piece.

而更深层次的问题，实际上是关于一个行业的创业精神的兴衰。

The the deeper piece was really about the the birth and death of entrepreneurship in an industry.

曾经有过创业精神，你知道，从1903年莱特兄弟开始，一直到六十年代。

And there had been entrepreneurship, you know, from, you know, nineteen o three from the Wright brothers forward really through the the sixties.

六十年代，最后一批创始人退休了。

In sixties, the last founders retired.

就像，我们所熟知的那些伟大航空公司——波音、洛克希德、道格拉斯，它们都诞生于这个黄金时期，从1903年到1921年左右。

Like, all the companies that we think of the great aviation companies, Boeing, Lockheed, Douglas, they were all founded in this sort of golden period from, you know, nineteen o three through to 1921.

然后他们都退休了。

And and they all retired.

最后一批人在六十年代退休。

The last ones retired in the sixties.

这恰好与第一架喷气式客机的问世时间完美吻合。

It coincides perfectly with the introduction of the first jetliner.

实际上，第一架喷气式客机是由德哈维兰公司推出的。

Like, literally, the first jetliner was introduced by de Havilland.

当时德哈维兰本人还担任公司董事长。

Well, de Havilland himself was still chair of the company.

嗯。

Mhmm.

随后这种模式就中断了，我们从商业主导、私营引领的创新模式，转入了国家威望主导的冷战时期。

And then and then that that stopped, and we went from a commercially led, privately led model of innovation to a national prestige cold war era.

所以在1969年，我们实现了登月，并让协和超音速客机翱翔天际。

So in 1969, we landed on the moon, and we flew Concorde supersonic.

而现在，要知道，当时所有人都觉得这太不可思议了。

And now, know, and and at the time, everyone's like, this is amazing.

你知道的，超音速太空探索之类的。

You know, supersonic space exploration, blah blah blah.

但我有个相当有争议的观点，我认为这两者都是糟糕的主意。

But, you know, I have I have a fairly controversial view, which I think both were terrible ideas.

我认为阿波罗计划摧毁了太空探索，在这个行业里相信这种观点简直是亵渎。

I don't think we I I think Apollo destroyed space exploration, which is like sacrilege in this industry to believe that.

我认为协和飞机摧毁了超音速飞行。

I think Concorde destroyed supersonic.

为了让这个观点稍微可信些，记住，我们现在既不能登月，也无法进行超音速飞行了。

And and to make this, like, slightly plausible, remember, we can't go to the moon anymore, and we can't fly supersonic anymore.

这些本应代表进步的事物，却出了问题。

So these things that are supposedly about progress, something went wrong.

问题在于我们抛弃了经济可行性。

And the thing that went wrong was we dropped the economics.

于是我们有了这些政府专项项目，预算几乎无上限，它们没有动力去创造产品市场契合度，还导致整个供应链体系习惯了无限资金。

And so we had these, like, government spec projects with effectively unlimited budgets that that had, you know, had no incentive to create product market fit and had and and they caused the entire supply base behind them to to to get used to unlimited money.

所以所有经济考量都被抛弃了。

So all the economics dropped out.

然后最糟糕的事情发生了——航空航天变成了国家间的竞争。

And then and then the worst thing happened, which was now now aerospace became a competition between nations.

哦，糟糕。

Oh, shit.

现在我们又卷入了政治和保护主义。

Now we've got politics and protectionism.

而协和飞机的美国竞争对手由纳税人资助、FAA专项立项，其产品市场契合度甚至比协和还差。

And the American competitor to Concord, which is funded by taxpayers, spec ed by the FAA, was going to be worse at product market fit than Concord.

这个项目最终被取消了。

That gets canceled.

表面看是好事，但当时人们还没意识到协和飞机已经注定失败。

Nominally a good thing, but it wasn't yet obvious just how DOA Concord was.

所以现在我们试图阻止它。

So now we try to block it.

1973年，我们出台了一项表面上是为了保护公众免受音爆影响的法规，但它其实不是噪音限制。

And in 1973, we put in place a regulation that ostensibly was about protecting the public from sonic boom, but but it wasn't a noise limit.

它是速度限制。

It was a speed limit.

这是对超音速飞行的禁令。

It was a ban on supersonic.

而这项法规，它是

And that regulation, which was

以速度而非声音来评判。

Judged by speed, not sound.

以速度而非声音来评判。

Judged by speed, not by sound.

对吧？

Right?

它甚至可以从大气中吸收噪音。

It could, like, suck noise out of the atmosphere.

你可以设计一种能抵消哈雷摩托车噪音的超音速飞机，但它仍然不会被允许。

You could design a supersonic jet that, like, cancels out, you know, Harleys, and and it still wouldn't be allowed.

这简直太荒谬了。

So it's totally nuts.

这实际上就像是对创新的禁令。

It's literally like a ban on innovation.

而且它禁止了真正正确的最小可行产品。

And that And what it did is it banned the actual correct minimum viable product.

因为真正正确的最小可行产品是一种能搭载五人、可以在美国东西海岸之间飞行的超音速私人飞机。

Because the actual correct minimum viable product is a supersonic private jet that had That can carry five people and it could fly coast to coast in The US.

这才是最小可行产品。

That's the minimum viable product.

如果当初没有这个禁令，我们现在早就能以五马赫的速度飞行了。

Had that not been banned, we'd all be going Mach five by now.

天啊。

Oh my gosh.

好吧。

Okay.

让我们回到你的故事，既然现在有了些背景，你开始质疑现状。

So let's go back to your story though, because now that we have a little bit of the background, you are questioning things.

你在计算数字并思考着——我能让这个项目成功。

You're crunching numbers and thinking this I this I can make this work.

我们上次说到。

We left off.

你说要么放弃。

You you said I either give up.

要么我不是合适人选，要么就去组建一支顶尖团队。

I'm not the right person, or I go assemble a kick ass team.

显然你选择了组建一支顶尖团队。

You obviously went and assembled a kick ass team.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

你是怎么找到这些人的？

How'd you find these people?

你在航空航天圈子里并没有人脉。

You didn't have contacts within the aerospace community.

结果发现，超音速飞行的关键赋能技术之一是领英。

So it it turns out one of the key enabling technologies for supersonic flight is LinkedIn.

我记得2014年在湾区的地下室里上领英搜索，行业选航空航天，联系人选一度人脉，结果显示为零。

I remember going to I remember going to LinkedIn, you know, back in '14 in my basement in the Bay Area, and I go, you know, industry equals aerospace, connection equals first degree, and it said no results.

真的，我当时一个人都不认识。

Like, I literally didn't know anybody.

我在这个行业里一个熟人都没有。

I know know a single soul in the industry.

哦，

Oh,

天啊。

man.

所以，好吧。

So, okay.

我能怎么办呢？

What could I do?

这就像是二度人脉，有个在SpaceX工作的家伙是通过我在Groupon的一个直接下属联系的，于是我就给我的Groupon朋友发了邮件，我说，嘿。

It was like a second degree, and there is this guy who worked at SpaceX who was connected through one of my direct reports at Groupon, and it turned and I so I emailed my, you know, Groupon friend, and I'm like, hey.

你了解杰米吗？有多熟？

Do you know how well do you know Jamie?

他说，嗯，我们大学时一起打过冰球。

And he's like, well, we played hockey in college together.

我可以帮你给他发邮件。

I could email him for you.

不错。

Nice.

然后我说，好吧。

And I'm like, okay.

所以我得到了那个介绍，而我没有任何资历，我唯一能让自己在这些事中显得稍微可信的方式，就是至少我能亲自驾驶飞机去参加会议。

So I got I got that intro, and I had I had no cred, and and that my own my my only way to, like, be semi plausible in any of this is I could At least I could show up to a meeting in an airplane I'd flown myself.

于是我从帕洛阿尔托租了架飞机，飞往人才所在地，然后让人在机场接我。

So I so I'd rent I'd rent an airplane out of Palo Alto, and I'd, like, fly to wherever the talent was and, you know, and then, you know, have people meet me at the airport.

所以我驾驶

So I fly

小型飞机对吧。

in a small aircraft because Yeah.

从帕洛阿尔托起飞必须是小型飞机。

Flying out of Palo Alto, you have to be small aircraft.

你当时是

Were you, like,

是想要进行评估吗？

trying to have assessment?

引擎螺旋桨飞机。

Engine propeller plane.

是的。

Yeah.

我回想那时候，我已经升级驾驶西锐飞机了，就像是

I I think back then, I'd I'd upgraded to a Cirrus, which was like

好的。

Okay.

更高级的塞斯纳飞机版本。

A nicer it's like a nicer version of a Cessna.

所以我经常飞行，从湾区到霍桑的SpaceX基地，或者到莫哈韦沙漠那些疯狂实验飞机爱好者聚集的地方执行多次任务。

So I'd fly and I I did a bunch of sorties from the Bay Area down to Hawthorne where SpaceX was or kinda out to the Mojave Desert where all the, like, crazy experimental airplane people were.

然后他们就会勉强和我开会。

And and they would, like, kinda take meetings with me.

而且那里有个传说，总有些互联网人带着飞机点子出现。

And and there was this lore down there that there are always these Internet guys with with airplane ideas.

那些真正有所建树的航空人，早就习惯了被不懂行的互联网人推销想法。

And, like, all the airplane guys that have done anything, they're all used to getting pitched by internet people who don't know what they're talking about.

嗯哼。

Mhmm.

我能理解。

I can see that.

实际上，这还有个专门术语。

And in fact, there's a term for it.

他们管这叫‘疯子’。

They call it fruitcake.

真的吗？

Really?

哦，没错。

Oh, yeah.

这个嘛，我也说不上来。

That's It's just a good I don't know.

就像那个想法是胡闹一样。

Like, that that idea is fruitcake.

这完全说不通。

It doesn't make any sense.

就像是，根本没人想要。

Like like, no one wants it.

这算是温和的贬义词。

It's like benignly pejorative.

好吧。

Okay.

就像是实际上没人真正喜欢。

Something like no one actually likes it.

没人真正喜欢，但你知道，人们还是会尝试

No one actually likes it, but everyone you know, people try

试图得到它。

to get it.

好的。

Okay.

所以我记得，我记得第一次参加的会议上有人说，那可不是胡闹。

So I I remember I remember the the first meeting I was in where someone said, that's not fruitcake.

哦。

Oh.

补充。

Complement.

于是我大致解释了我的做法和原因，并展示了当时我已经建立的第一性原理电子表格模型，可以给工程师们看。

So I sort of explained what I was doing and why, and I sort of showed the at this point, I had a first principle spreadsheet model that I could show the engineers.

通常的反应是，嗯，这有点道理。

And the usual reaction was, well, this kinda makes sense.

于是我开始递归式地在我的关系网中搜寻。

And so I I basically like searched my network recursively.

所以与SpaceX那位工程师的初次会面中，我问他的问题是：如果你能挥动魔法棒，让地球上任何一个人来参与这个项目，

So that first meeting with a SpaceX guy, the question I asked him was, if you could get anybody in the planet to come work with you on this, you wave a magic wand.

不考虑他们是否有空、住在哪里、是否愿意做这件事，

You know, forget whether they're available, forget what with where they live, forget whether they wanna do this.

只思考——这个人是不是你希望与你并肩解决这个问题的理想伙伴？

Think only about, is this the person you want in the trenches with you on this problem?

比如，你会选谁？

Like, who would you get?

能给我五个名字吗？

Can you give me five names?

然后我会联系这五个人，并向他们提出同样的问题。

And and I I would get the five names, and then I would like talk to those five people and I'd ask them the same question.

这就像是在社交网络中进行一种递归式的树状搜索。

So it was sort of this, you know, recursive tree search of the social network.

很快，我就真的联系到了这个领域全球最顶尖的人才。

And pretty pretty soon, I was actually talking to the best people on the planet.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

这很聪明。

That's clever.

所以，是的，这个这个技巧效果相当好。

So, yeah, this this this technique works quite well.

他们当时愿意和你合作吗？

And were they keen to join forces with you?

他们很感兴趣。

They were intrigued.

我记得最后成为我们首席工程师的那个人，我和他谈话时，他，你知道的，他他嗯。

I remember the guy who ended up being our first chief engineer, I remember talking to him and he, you know, he he yeah.

我们在旧金山机场外的地铁站见的面。

We met, like, outside SFO at the subway in the airport.

我给他看了电子表格，他说，哦，没想到你们已经进展到这个程度了。

And I showed him the spreadsheet, and he's like, oh, I didn't think you'd be this far along.

然后我们又聊了更多，他说，我习惯了那些天花乱坠的提案，但这个确实言之有理。

And then we talked more, and he's like, I'm used to these airplane pitches, but this one actually makes sense.

这看起来确实很实用。

It seems like actually practical.

他说，我想让你雇我当顾问。

He's like, I you to hire me as a consultant.

我说，我不会那么做的。

And I'm like, I'm not doing that.

要么你来这里工作，要么我们就免谈。

Either either you come and you work here, or we're not doing this.

他对此有点抱怨。

And he he sort of grumbled about it.

他说，这种事会把首席工程师累垮的，顺便说一句，他说得没错。

He's like, these things burn out chief engineers, which by the way, was right about.

而且你知道，他就是忍不住要参与其中。

And, you know, anybody couldn't help himself but to work on it.

然后他就说，'哦，我其实做了一个比你那个电子表格更复杂的版本，而且得出的答案差不多'。

So he's like, he's he's like, oh, I built I built like a more sophisticated version of your spreadsheet, and it like, kinda gives the same answer.

就这样，我最终筛选出了五六位候选人，准备填补公司最初几个职位。

And and so I got to a point where I had a half a dozen candidates for the first few jobs in the company.

当时我自己也还在摸索阶段，完全不知道该怎么面试这些人。

And and I was still early enough in my own journey that I don't know how to interview these people.

那我该怎么办呢？

So what can I do?

或许可以试试把所有人同时聚在一个房间里，通过引导他们对话，我就能从他们的交谈中判断出谁真正懂行。

Well, maybe I could if I could get them all in the same room all at the same time and facilitate a conversation, maybe I could figure out who is what they're talking about just from listening to them talk to each other.

所以

So

我当时就说，'好吧'。

I was like, okay.

我决定一次性把他们都飞过来面试。

I'm gonna fly them all out at the same time.

好的。

Okay.

我们该在哪里开这个会？

Where are we gonna have this meeting?

比如，在我家地下室开？

Like, we have this meeting in my basement?

呃，这样可没法给人任何信心啊。

Like, oh, that's not gonna inspire any confidence.

所以我给红杉的朋友打电话问，能借会议室用几天吗？

So I I called a friend up at Sequoia, and I was like, can we borrow a conference room for a couple days?

哦。

Oh.

几天

Couple

时间。

days.

大胆的举动。

Bold move.

这可是个大忙。

That's a big favor.

是啊。

Yeah.

没错。

Yeah.

他说，当然可以。

He's like, sure.

没问题。

Of course.

对吧？

Right?

所以我逐渐意识到，创始人的核心工作之一就是解决鸡与蛋的难题。

And so the a thing I've come to believe is one of the core jobs of founders is to solve chicken and egg problems.

解决鸡与蛋问题的方法之一，就是同时招募鸡和蛋。

And one of the ways you one of the ways you solve chicken and egg problems is to basically recruit the chickens and the eggs in parallel.

所以这个想法是，我们有一些在航空领域相当出色的人，他们会与红杉资本的人打交道，这样对投资者来说会显得很有吸引力。

So the so the the idea was we had these actually fairly impressive people in aviation that would be bopping around the Sequoia people, so that would be impressive to the investors.

而我能够说服红杉给我一间会议室这件事，可能会让我听起来像是，也许我能为这个项目筹集资金。

And the fact that I was able to get Sequoia to give me a conference room might like might make me plausibly sound like, you know, maybe I could raise money for this thing.

对。

Right.

因为你那时还没筹集到任何资金

Because you hadn't raised any money at

那个时候。

that point.

是这样吗？

Is that right?

我那时确实一分钱都没筹到。

I hadn't raised any money.

比如，这些，这些都是用我的积蓄在支撑。

Like, this is, you this is all funded off of my savings.

对。

Right.

而且你是独自一人。

And you are by yourself.

这个项目里你没有联合创始人。

You don't have a cofounder in this venture.

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

好的。

Okay.

是的。

Yeah.

最终我们从那个房间里雇了两个人，后来我称他们为联合创始人。

I ended up we ended up hiring two people out of that room, and I ended up calling them cofounders.

你知道，实际上他们是最早的员工，而且我是用自己的积蓄支付他们工资的。

You know, but they're really first employees, and I was paying them out of my savings.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

所以

So

那你是什么时候遇见山姆·奥特曼的？

when did you then so when did you meet Sam Altman?

因为他在你与Y Combinator相关的故事中扮演了重要角色。

Because he was integral in your story as it relates to Y Combinator.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

我是说，萨姆在整个故事中以多种方式扮演了关键角色。

I mean, Sam's been integral in the story in many many ways.

不过确实如此。

But yeah.

于是我们雇佣了...我从那间屋子里招了几个人。

So the so we hired so I hired a couple people out of that room.

我搬去了丹佛。

I moved to Denver.

当时的问题是，我们该搬到哪里去开展这个项目？

It was like, where where are we all gonna go move to do this?

房间里大致达成的共识是丹佛会是个好地方。

And and sort of the consensus in the room was Denver be a good place.

所以我就想，好吧。

So I was like, okay.

那我就搬去丹佛吧。

I'll move to Denver.

现在实际上我们是在丹佛我家的地下室里工作。

And and now we're actually working out of my basement in Denver.

好的。

Okay.

而且，你知道，我们通过这种递归网络搜索的方式招聘人员。

And, you know, and we're hiring people out of this, like, recursive network search thing.

我记得我们当时大概招到了八个人左右。

And I think we got up to, like, eight people or something.

所有这些资金都完全来自我的家庭储蓄。

And I'm just funding all of this, like, literally out of, like, family savings.

你说家庭储蓄时，当时你已经结婚有孩子了吗？

And and when you say family savings, were you married with kids at this point?

是的。

I was yeah.

我刚开始创业时，有三个未满18岁的孩子。

My I had three kids under under 18 when I started.

有一对双胞胎，卡罗尔。

There's some twins, Carol.

有一对双胞胎。

There's some twins.

你有的

That you had

双胞胎。

twins.

好的。

Okay.

功能性三胞胎。

Functional triplets.

哇。

Wow.

哇。

Wow.

天啊。

Oh my gosh.

而你决定这么做。

And you decide to do this.

好吧。

Okay.

是啊。

Yeah.

我就是有点，不知道怎么说，把一切都调到最高档，当时没完全意识到自己在做什么。

I I just kinda, I don't know, set everything to eleven, and I didn't didn't totally realize that's what I was doing.

没错。

Yeah.

我妻子做过最支持我的事，就是愿意搬到丹佛去。

The most supportive thing my wife ever did was be willing to move to Denver.

我记得当我告诉她我要做这个时，她翻了个白眼，然后说，好吧。

I remember when I told her I was doing this, she was like she rolled her eyes, and and she was like, okay.

你有一年的时间来折腾这件事，然后我希望你能找份工作。

You've got a year to screw around with this thing, and then I expect you get a job.

好的。

Okay.

公平。

Fair.

是啊。

Yeah.

这相当公平。

That's pretty fair.

没错。

Yeah.

所以，当时其实没人真正相信。

So, like, nobody nobody actually believed back then.

我记得第一次跟朋友提起时，我说我要去研究超音速飞机，就能看到他们翻白眼的样子。

I remember when I was first talking to my friends about it, you know, I I would tell I would tell people I'm gonna go work on supersonic jets, and I could just watch their eyes roll back.

知道吗，有些人会说，回头再联系我。

Know, and some people would say, call me back.

你能不能找个不那么好高骛远的人？

Will you get somebody less pie in the skies?

有个人，有个人告诉我去放手一搏。

And one guy one guy told me to go for it.

其实是Avitul Garg，我高中同学，他卖过几0几家。

It was actually Avitul Garg who I'd gone to high school with, and he sold a couple companies.

他住在硅谷。

He's out in the valley.

所以他叫我我去试试。

So he told me to go for it.

顺便说一句，多年后他说，是的，我没有我以为你疯了，但我能看出你真的很热情，所以我不能告诉你不去做。

And by the way, years later, he said, yeah, I didn't I thought you were crazy, but I could tell you were really passionate, so I couldn't tell you not to do it.

所以所以其实很支持。

So so actually it's Supportive.

是啊。

Yeah.

所以实际上当时是零个人相信。

So so it was actually zero people believed.

但不管怎样，我们到了这样一个阶段：我已经聚集了一批简历漂亮的人，正用积蓄支付工资，我就想，好吧。

But but, anyhow, we get to the point where I've I've collected enough people with good resumes that I'm paying out of savings, and I'm like, okay.

我不能再和我的银行账户玩胆小鬼游戏了。

I gotta quit playing chicken with my bank account.

我得去为这事筹钱了。

I gotta go raise money for this thing.

对吧。

Right.

于是我就联系了在我第一家公司赚到钱的人，他们有些人说，我们真的很欣赏你当时的处理方式。

And and so I called the people who had made money in my first company, and, you know, some of them had said, you know, we really respect how you handled that.

你知道，你以后做任何项目我们都会投资的。

You know, obviously, we'll invest anything you ever do.

然后他们会说，但我们没想到你会做这个。

And then they'd say, but we didn't think you'd do this.

我们原本期待的是某种SaaS项目。

We were looking for some SaaS.

是啊。

Yeah.

所以从我在第一家公司时的投资者，到Boom的种子轮投资者，转化率大约是50%。

So there's about 50% conversion rate from investors in my first company to seed investors in Boom.

然后我试着找其他我认识的...

And then I tried to find other people I who were

我刚想说这个比例比我想象的要高。

was just gonna say that's higher percentage than I thought.

真的吗？

Really?

我...我不确定。

I I I don't know.

我原本预期能达到100%或200%的转化率。

I expected it to be like a 100% or 200%.

你懂吗？

You know?

你显然是个乐观主义者。

You're an optimist, obviously.

是啊。

Yeah.

我觉得要做这事必须得是个乐观主义者。

I think you have to be an optimist to go do this.

不过后来我就想，好吧。

But but then I was like, okay.

我得找些志同道合的人，其中一位就是萨姆。

I gotta just find other people who are excited about this, and and one of them was Sam.

因为他对此很感兴趣，是的。

Because he he was into like, was yeah.

山姆他有飞行员执照吗？

Did he does Sam have his pilot's license?

他有。

He does.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

我记得和萨姆通电话时，我们在他做Looped项目时见过面，因为那时我在Kleiner投资的Looped竞争对手公司工作。

I remember talking to Sam on the phone, and we'd, like, met each other when he was doing Looped because I was working at, like, the Kleiner funded competitor to Looped back then.

哦。

Oh.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

所以没关系。

So it's Okay.

是啊。

Yeah.

所以我们算是偶遇的，你知道，大概就是他在舞台上大放异彩的那个时候。

So we'd sort of bumped into each other, you know, around the time he was, like, got the pop collars on stage.

当时的情况是，本该由我所在的那家初创公司上台展示，结果被他抢先了。

It it was like, like, the startup I was at was supposed to have that stage slot, and he had scooped it.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

不会吧。

No.

就像是

Like a

一小段轶事。

little piece of lore.

哦，没错。

Oh, yeah.

它

It

是。

is.

你说他抢先了是什么意思？

What do you mean he scooped it?

当时有两家公司的电梯演讲内容几乎相同。

So there were two two companies with, like, approximately the same elevator pitch.

一家由红杉资本投资，另一家由凯鹏华盈投资。

One funded by Sequoia, one founded funded by Kleiner.

Sam运营的Loop是红杉支持的公司，而Jeff Holden运营的Pelago由凯鹏华盈投资，我是Pelago的首位员工。

And and and Sam was running Loop that was the Sequoia company, and Jeff Holden was running Pelago, which is funded by Kleiner, and I'd been first employee at Pelago.

Pelago在时间点上几乎完全同步，但对iPhone重要性的认识却反应迟缓。

And Pelago virtually identical timing, and the Pelago was like slow to realize how important the iPhone was.

不过我们通过John Doerr的关系走后门——应用商店上线时会有三个推荐应用，我们本应占其中之一。

And so but we gotten, you know, through John Doerr, we gotten the like we've been like walked around to the back door, like, okay, when the app store launches, they're gonna be like three featured apps and we were gonna be one of them.

长话短说，我们那个项目做得很糟糕，应用状态很不理想。

And long story short, we did a crappy job of the project, and the app was not in good shape.

它还没准备好发布。

It was not ready to launch.

基本上就是唾手可得的机会，但我们搞砸了。

And and it was it was like basically a pillow goes to lose, and we lost it.

哦。

Oh.

这里面有很多关于组织运作和创始人关系的教训——当时CTO独自在封闭环境下运作这个项目却不成功，而CEO的态度就是'好吧'，我认为这些因素都是导致失败的原因。

There were a bunch of organizational dynamic lessons learned and cofounder dynamics that I think were part of that story that the CTO kind of went off and ran the project in a in a silo, not successfully, with the the CEO kind of like, okay.

好吧。

Okay.

那就交给你负责吧。

I'll let you take it.

我记得在WWDC大会前三周跑去CEO办公室说：这应用根本还没准备好。

And then and then it was like I remember going to the CEO's office like three weeks before the WWDC, and I'm like, this app isn't ready.

我们要完蛋了。

We're gonna get screwed.

然后我们试图在三周内修复它。

And then we tried to fix it in three weeks.

但时间根本不够。

It just wasn't enough time.

所以他们最后关头选择了Loop吗？

And so did they choose looped at the last minute?

他们在最后一刻选择了循环播放。

They chose looped at the last minute.

所以，所以，你知道，是山姆告诉的

So so so it was, you know, it it Sam told

他在这个播客上讲过那个故事，他说，我以为我在试镜时表现得很糟糕。

that story on on this on this podcast, and he's like, I thought I did a really bad job when I was trying out for this.

然后他们第二天打电话来说，不。

And then they called me the next day and say, no.

不。

No.

我们喜欢你。

We liked you.

所以也许这个故事还有更多内情。

So maybe there there's more to this story.

嗯，我是说，我想如果Pelago表现好的话，结果会怎样？

I well, I mean, I think I think there could, you know, if if Pelago had shown up well, what would have happened?

我不知道。

I don't know.

我有点觉得John Doerr有影响力能让这事成，但我觉得我们的应用实在太烂了。

I I kinda I kinda think John Doerr had the influence to make it happen, but I think I think what happened is, like, our app just sucked.

好吧。

Okay.

抱歉跑题了。

Sorry for the digression.

就是单纯的拒绝。

It was just No.

这些事情很迷人。

These things fascinating.

对吧？

Right?

非常有趣。

Are so interesting.

没错吧？

Right?

而且，这里面有各种值得吸取的教训。

And, like, there are all kinds of lessons learned there.

比如在关键时刻遇到这些大人物时，绝不能搞砸。

Like, when you get these big shots at important moments, can't miss.

此外，这里面还包含一个创始人模式的教训。

And also, there's a founder mode lesson in there.

就是这种，你知道的，完全信任团队的理念经常被误解。

Like, it's this whole, you know, trust your team thing is often mistaken.

比如，如果杰夫当时对那个项目事无巨细地管理，历史可能会完全不同。

Like, if if Jeff had micromanaged that project, history might have gone differently.

在我们跑题之前，回到山姆的话题。

So back to Sam before we digressed.

你见到山姆了，他感兴趣吗？

You met Sam, and was he interested?

他提出要投资，还是建议你们去YC？

And did he offer to invest, or did he say you should do y c?

他提出要投资。

He offered to invest.

但他对估值不满意。

He didn't like the valuation.

所以他当时说，我只能给你大概2.5万美元这样。

So he he was like, I'm only gonna give you, like, 25 k or something.

他认为我们定价过高。

He thought we were overpricing it.

但后来他们还是投资了，所以我们勉强凑齐了资金。

And, you know, but then he they invested, and so so we scraped together.

结果金额几乎和我第一家公司种子轮融到的完全一样。

It turned out to be almost exactly the same dollar amount I'd raised in the seed round for my first company.

是77万美元。

It was 770 k.

然后Sam一直说'你们应该参加YC孵化器'。

And then Sam kept saying, you should do YC.

而我一直在想'我不太理解'。

And, you know, I kept thinking, like, I don't get that.

感觉这像是针对移动社交应用的，而不是超音速飞机项目。

Like, this seems this seems to be, you know, for mobile social apps, like, not for supersonic jets.

我能学到什么呢？

Like, what am I gonna learn?