迪米特里·达迪奥莫夫，Modern Treasury联合创始人兼首席执行官

我是杰西卡·利文斯顿，和卡罗琳·利维共同担任社交雷达的角色。在这档播客中，我们与硅谷一些最成功的创始人畅谈他们的创业历程。近二十年来，卡罗琳和我一直在Y Combinator携手帮助数千家初创企业。请随我们一同聆听创始人的真实故事。今天，我们邀请到Modern Treasury的德米特里·达达亚莫夫，这家公司是Y Combinator在2018年投资的。

I'm Jessica Livingston, and Carolyn Levy and I are the social radars. In this podcast, we talk to some of the most successful founders in Silicon Valley about how they did it. Carolyn and I have been working together to help thousands of startups at Y Combinator for almost twenty years. Come be a fly on the wall as we talk to founders and learn their true stories. Today, we're talking with Dmitry Dadayamov of Modern Treasury, a startup Y Combinator funded in 2018.

德米特里工作的领域至关重要却鲜为人知——企业资金的流入与流出。让我们跟随资金流向一探究竟。卡罗琳，我太兴奋了！今天我们请到了Modern Treasury联合创始人兼CEO德米特里·达达亚莫夫，该公司在2018年夏季批次获得Y Combinator投资。嗨，德米特里。

Dmitry works in a very important world whose existence is hidden from most people, the movement of money into and out of companies. Listen in as we follow the money. So, Carolyn, I'm so excited. We are here today with Dmitry Dadayamov, who is the cofounder and CEO of Modern Treasury, who Y Combinator funded in the summer two twenty eighteen batch. Hey, Dmitry.

嗨，德米特里。

Hey, Dmitry.

很荣幸见面，谢谢邀请。

It's a great meeting. Thank you.

噢，见到你真高兴！有件事必须分享，德米特里，那实在让我忍俊不禁。卡罗琳你还不知道，我和德米特里的渊源要追溯到2006年。

Oh, we're so glad to see you. I can't wait to catch up. I have to share something with you, Dmitry, because I got such a kick out of it. Carolyn, you don't know this story, but Dmitry and I go back to the 2006. Okay?

当时他是斯坦福大学本科生，担任BASES（该校本科创业社团）主席。那时Y Combinator刚举办首届冬季批次，我们计划在斯坦福举办创业课程——2005年首次创业课程是在哈佛举办的，这次就想在办公室附近的斯坦福再办一场。

He was a student at Stanford University, an undergrad, and he was president of BASES, which is their sort of undergrad entrepreneurial society there. Right? Y Combinator, this was our first winter batch, and we were gonna host a startup school. The first startup school we did at Harvard in the 2005 and we thought, well, let's do it on the West Coast. We'll do it at Stanford, right down the road from our offices.

我们联系德米特里后，他爽快答应合作。我至今保留着2006年2月7日的邮件——哎呀没错——你在邮件里写道：「嗨杰西卡，我已提交教室预约申请，现在只需等待。」最有趣的是后面：「能否发些正式资料给我？比如去年的议程表也行，我需要向校方证明这不是临时起意的活动。」

So we reached out to Dmitry and he was like, we'd love to work with you on this. And so I have an email from 02/07/2006. Uh-oh. Yeah. From you, and you say, you know, hey, Jessica.

任何辅助材料都可以，关键是要证明活动的真实性。

I submitted the form to get a room reserved for start up school. Now we just have to wait. Then this is the funny part. You said, could you email me anything with official looking information about it so that I could show them that this is legitimate? Last year's agenda you showed me is good.

（当时）这类正式材料的匮乏确实反映了那个时代的特征。

Any kind of other info is great. I just need to show them that this is not out of the blue and that this will happen. A

那个时期确实普遍缺乏正规材料。

dearth of legitimate materials would probably characterize that era.

我知道。我们当时太不知名了，以至于他需要一些能让我们显得

I know. We were so unknown that he needed something that made

更正规的东西。只有一期项目。你还记得是谁引荐我们的吗？

us even legit. There was only one batch. Do you remember who introduced us?

是萨姆·奥特曼吗？

Was it Sam Altman?

是萨姆。对。我记得他负责了第一期，然后接下来这个应该是第二期，在冬天，在山景城。是的，没错。

It was Sam. Yeah. And I think he had done the very first batch, and then the there was I think this was about to be the second batch was in the winter in in Mountain View. So Yeah. Yeah.

非常早期的时候。

Super early.

确实，但我只是觉得我们当时默默无闻的程度很有趣。

It was but I just was amused at how how unknown we were.

你在回复中凑出了什么材料发给他？

What did you manage to rustle up to send him in that response?

天啊。我不记得了。大概说了句‘好的，我会发些资料给你’，然后不知道找了什么。唯一可能凑出来的就是我们曾在哈佛大学校报上出现过，因为创业学校活动，仅此而已。实在没什么可凑的，因为除此之外没有任何关于Wycombe和他头衔的新闻报道。

Gosh. I don't know. I think I said, sure, I'll send you something, and then I don't know what I found. The only thing I could have possibly wrestled up was we were in a Harvard University, like, school newspaper for the start up school event, but that was it. There was nothing to rustle up because there were no news articles otherwise about Wycombe and his title.

完全没有。我是说，我可能有名片吧。不过我们确实在克雷斯吉礼堂办了活动。那时候和迪米特里共事很愉快。

No nothing. No. I mean, I had a business card, maybe. But anyway, we did have the event at Kresge Auditorium. I loved working with Dimitri back then.

我们玩得很开心，不是吗？

We had a lot of fun, didn't we?

我们确实办过。我至今记得首届创业学校那种神奇又充满活力的时刻，所有人涌进校园的场景。当时是在一个叫克雷斯吉的礼堂，现在那里都不复存在了。但那真是超级有趣。

We did. And I still remember the very first start up school was such a, like, magical electric kind of moment to have everybody show up on campus. It was at this auditorium called Kresge that's no longer even around. Oh. But, yeah, it was super fun.

我自己都没意识到我们最早可以追溯到2006年2月，那真是非常早期的日子。总之觉得挺有意思的。多年后我们在2018年通过Y Combinator投资了你们。不过首先我想快速回顾下——你从斯坦福毕业，做过几份不同的工作，这个我稍后会详细问。

I hadn't realized myself that we actually go back to 02/2006, like early, early days. So anyway, thought that was amusing. Many years go by and we fund you in 2018 with Y Combinator. But first, I wanna quickly go in here to remembering you graduated from Stanford. You had a few various jobs, which I'm actually gonna ask about later.

后来你开始在Lending Home工作。

But then you you start working for Lending Home.

没错，2015年的时候。

That's right. The Twenty fifteen.

2015年的线上抵押贷款平台。你和Sam、Matt当时都在Lending Home工作，发现有个巨大痛点困扰着你们。说说那个决定创业的瞬间吧，是什么最终推动你们下定决心要解决这个问题？

The online in 2015. Yes. Online marketplace for residential mortgages. So you, Sam, and Matt were were working at Lending Home, and you noticed that there was this huge need that was causing you guys pain. So tell me about the moment when you decided to start a company or, like, what caused you to to go over the edge and be like, we need to solve this problem.

当时我作为产品经理负责平台投资者端。最初我们需要为个人投资者搭建完整的用户流程，主要涉及翻新装修类贷款。我们内部戏称这是'丑版Airbnb'，因为虽然模式类似，但每套房产都有水渍或其他问题需要整修再出售——而这正是投资者的标的物。

Yeah. We I was a product manager running the investor side of this marketplace. And so the beginning was we really had to build the user flows for individual investors to come in, and this was mostly, like, fix and flip kind of renovation loans. So we jokingly would call it internally, like, ugly Airbnb because it was a little bit like Airbnb, but every property had some sort of water damage or some sort of some sort of issue with it that people were buying and renovating and putting out of the market. And that's what you're investing in.

这就是投资能获得的价值所在。我们搭建了开户流程、资金存入钱包等全套系统。但随着规模扩大，问题变得棘手：需要对接银行处理ACH借记/贷记、电汇，核对账目，实时更新资金到账状态。

That was sort of the value that that you would you would get by investing in it. And so, you know, we built out the user flows. We built out how do you open an account. We built out all the pieces around how do you upload, you know, like, bring funds into the wallet. And then it became, like, really painful as it scaled because we had to integrate with banks for ACH debits, for ACH credits, for wires, for reconciling all of this stuff, for being able to update the kind of statement in the right time when funds actually arrived.

虽然很多投资机构都面临类似问题，但他们规模尚可手动刷新银行页面查看资金状态。而我们每月要处理五六万笔支付，可以想象有多痛苦。更糟的是，公司每个部门都会来询问支付相关问题——财务部、资本市场部...

And, you know, this is a problem that a lot of investment, you know, groups might have, but they are doing it at a scale that allows them to just sort of, you know, refresh the bank portal and see when the funds arrived. We were doing $50.60, 70,000 payments a month, and so you can imagine that this gets pretty painful. And then the thing that I also didn't quite appreciate was every part of the company would come to us with questions about something payment related. And so this was finance. This was capital markets.

客服部也是。比如客户来电询问某笔延迟到账的款项，人们会拿着黄色标记的银行流水来质问：这笔是什么？那笔又是什么？

This was customer service. Like, somebody calls and asks about a payment that maybe should have gotten there or maybe it's, you know, a day late. And people would show up with bank statements highlighted in yellow and just say, like, what is this? What is this? What is this?

有个周三的会议让我特别厌恶。就像今早我兴奋地准备播客的相反感觉——当时醒来就想着：又要去开那个全公司都来质问银行流水的会议了。于是我开始四处咨询其他公司的朋友：你们是怎么处理这类问题的？

And I had this meeting on Wednesday. I just hated it. You know that feeling when, like, you wake up in the morning and it was the opposite feeling that I had this morning when I woke up of being excited for this podcast. It was very different to wake up and be like, I'm gonna go into this meeting, and we're gonna have everyone in the company ask us questions about the these bank statements. And so this was you know, I started kind of running around just asking friends of friends who worked at different companies and asking them like, hey.

你们的产品的核心功能之一就是处理资金流转。你们是怎么做到的？我曾接触过湾区所有你能想到涉及资金流转的公司——无论是Uber、Airbnb、Coinbase还是AngelList等众多企业。虽然它们业务目的不同，但归根结底，ACH转账就是ACH转账，电汇就是电汇。而不是简单地说'哦对，有个现成工具很好用，操作特别简单'。

You you guys move money as a core part of your product. How do you guys do this? And I went to, you know, all the companies that you can think of that were in the Bay Area that that moved money. So whether it was Uber and Airbnb and Coinbase and AngelList and lot of different companies that, you know, the purpose is different, but at the end of the day, ACH is an ACH, a wire is a wire. And instead of saying, oh, yeah.

所有公司都表示'天啊，我每周四都要开这个烦人的会议，你要是有解决方案一定告诉我'。所以我们开玩笑说这算是'愤怒创业'。

There's this tool that you should just use, and it's great, and it's like makes it very easy. All of them said, oh my god. I have a Thursday meeting, and I really hate that. And, like, if you find anything, like, let me know. So we joke that sometimes it was, like, rage founding.

就像在说'怎么会没人解决这个问题？这明明这么明显'。

Like, it was just like, oh my god. Like, how's nobody solved this? It's so obvious.

这个说法很精辟。

That's a great expression.

当你反复看到这种现象，意识到每家公司都配有支付工程团队、财务团队和运营团队，日复一日处理这种手工苦力活时——这本该是计算机擅长的事。这促使我们决定：看来得把这个做成产品，因为似乎没人愿意做。

It's it's just like, you know, like, when you see it enough times and you realize that every one of these companies has a payments engineering team, has a finance team, has an ops team that are, like, dealing with this, like, manual drudgery, like, day in, day out. And, you know, like, this is the kind of thing that computers should be good So that kind of led us to say, Like, I think we should probably build this as a product because nobody else seems to want to.

是啊，可能你们当时够天真才敢做？

Yeah. And you guys were naive enough maybe to do it?

是愤怒值够高。愤怒驱动。

Yeah. Enraged enough. Enraged

没错。我们目睹太多案例后，就像PG那篇《琐事盲症》文章说的——对，就是那种'琐事盲症'促使我们行动。

you were yeah. We just saw it. We just saw it in enough places that it just you know, it's a little of the it's a little bit of that, like, schleb blindness essay that PG has of just, like Yes. The schleb blindness. To do this.

有意思。你们自己遭遇这个巨大痛点后，发现同行公司都面临同样问题，却没人能提供好方案。

So that's interesting. You had this own really pain big pain point, but then you talked to colleagues, if you will, in other companies, and they had the exact same thing. And no one had a good solution.

正是如此。

That's right.

所以你看到了这个机会。让我做一件事，因为这是一家金融科技公司，我想确保观众理解你们的业务。我知道它像是用于转移和对账资金的API。但当我问保罗，你会如何描述Modern Treasury的业务时？他说这是企业的金融管道。

So you saw the opportunity. Let me do one thing, just because this is a sort of a fintech company and I wanna make sure the audience understands what you do. I mean, I know it's like an API to move and reconcile money. But when I asked Paul, hey, how would you describe what Modern Treasury does? He said it's financial plumbing for companies.

我觉得或许可以直接问你，能否简单描述一下Modern Treasury是做什么的？

And I feel like maybe I could just ask you, can you just very simply describe what Modern Treasury does?

是的。Modern Treasury是一个帮助资金流动的软件平台。当你思考资金流动时，这是企业存在的一个非常核心、近乎定义性的原因。而我们的银行系统有着自己的遗留技术，所以实际上相当复杂。

Yeah. Modern treasury is a software platform to help money movement. So when you think about money movement, it's a very core, you know, almost definitional reasoning for why companies exist. And we have a banking system that is, you know, has its own legacy technology. And so it's actually pretty complicated.

我们认为每一笔支付都将从软件开始到结束。那些软件系统、网页应用、移动应用之间的连接——任何可能有类似‘按下这个按钮后资金应该移动’的功能——与银行系统的对接相当痛苦。其中一部分是如何将信号翻译并指令给银行系统，另一部分是对账环节，即执行后发生了什么？

We think about every payment we think will start to end in software. And that connection between software systems, web apps, mobile apps, whatever it might be that has some sort of button that says, like, you know, after after you press this button, money should move. And connecting that into the banking system is quite quite painful. And so part of it is about how do you translate and instruct as a signal to the banking system. And then the other piece of it is the reconciliation piece, which is once you've done that, what happened?

对吧？如果你想想，你支付了某人，你想收到资金实际移动的通知并确认，然后确保没有问题。很多这类金融管道正是如此——连接着一切赖以运行的银行金融系统与人们想构建的任何有趣事物。这在规模扩大时会变得尤为棘手。

Right? If you think about, you know, you you paid somebody, you wanna get the notification that the money actually moved and confirm that and then know that you don't, you know, you don't have any issues. A lot of that kind of financial plumbing is is exactly that. It's the connection between the financial kind of banking systems that everything runs on and, you know, whatever fun thing somebody wants to go build. It can be pretty painful, especially at scale.

这类事情你可以手动做一次、两次、十次，但总有一天会崩溃。到某个时候，你需要自动化。

It's one of these things that you can do by hand once, you can do it twice, you can do it 10 times. At some point, it's gonna break. Right. And at some point, you need automation.

就像在Lending Home时，你们处理的数量太多，手动对账变得不可能。

Like it was at Lending Home, you were just doing so many. It became impossible to sort of manually reconcile.

没错。这是个好问题，但也是个真实存在的问题。

That's right. And it's a good problem to have, but it's a it's a real problem.

好的。所以你们认为这里有需求，你们可能是实现它的团队。告诉我你们最初是如何起步的，以及如何说服银行与你们合作的？

Right. Okay. So you guys think there's a need here. We we might be the team to do it. Tell me about how you first started out and how did you convince banks to work with you?

你们的第一个客户是谁？发生了什么？

Who's your first client? You know, what happened?

是的。我们始于2018年。当时我们加入了YC孵化器，开始同时搭建市场的两端——一边对接银行，一边对接企业。我们四处奔走，与各家潜在合作银行洽谈。

Yeah. So we started in the 2018. We started, you know, we we got into YC and we started working kind of on both sides of the marketplace, if you will. We have banks on one side and companies on the other. So we started running around and talking to what what banks we wanted to work with.

当然，2018年硅谷银行（SVB）是所有YC初创企业的默认选择，与他们合作是顺理成章的事。但寻找首位客户却充满挑战——人们可能口头称赞产品很棒，但真正要让企业信任我们这家三人无融资的初创公司来接管银行业务这种虽非核心但极其关键的环节，需要突破巨大的信任壁垒。毕竟没人愿意将基础设施决策权长期交给早期初创团队。

Of course, SVB was a very much a default bank back in 2018 for every startup that was going through IC, so it was a kind of a no brainer to start working with them. And then, you know, we're looking for the right first customer because, you know, one of the things that I think has been is is really challenging for products such as this is that people might smile and nod and say, this is a great product, and we can definitely do this in a better way. But overcoming that, like, trust barrier to say, and I'm gonna trust a three person startup with no funding to take over this very critical thing, which is not core to my business. Like, it's not core to a insurance company or to, you know, an online marketplace or what have you to be the best at kind of banking integrations, but it is very critical that it work well. And so people generally don't wanna trust, like, early early startups with infrastructure decisions for, like, for, you know, for a long time.

那你们如何赢得首位客户的？这想必是个巨大挑战吧？

How did you get your first client then? How did you do it? Because I I imagine this was a huge challenge.

我首先想到熟人资源。经过漫长努力，首位客户是我在健康福利领域创业的同学。他们作为三四人的初创团队，深知不想重复造轮子，且需要频繁资金流转。我们通过他们与SAP银行完成了首次'三角全链路'对接。

My first instinct was to go to folks that we already knew. And it took us a long time, but our first client was actually a classmate of mine who had started a company in kind of the health benefits space. It was a startup. It was three or four people, but they had seen that problem before and they knew they didn't wanna build it from scratch and they knew they were gonna have to move a lot of funds around. And so we started working with them and SAP is their bank, that was kind of the first connection of the full the full triangle, if you will, that that allowed us to to go live.

有趣的是，我们花了五六个月才正式上线。YC毕业时我们的增长曲线几乎是平的——部分因产品尚在完善，更多是因为需要时间建立信任感，让客户确信我们会长期深耕这个领域。

But, you know, one thing that was that's interesting is it took us about five or six months to go live. By the time we ended YC, we we were not that company with a graph that went up into the right. Like, we our graph was, like, flat the entire time because we were still I mean, part of it was just still building the product, but part of it was also that we just you know, it took a while to get people to really feel comfortable that, hey. We're actually committed to this, and we're really gonna be around and do this for a long time. That even folks that, like, were primed to trust us, like, actually trusted us to to power their companies.

你们是在获得首位客户前就与SVB达成合作的吗？

Did you get SVB to agree to work with you before you actually got that first customer?

算是也不是。本质上我们是企业内部的软件服务商。记得有次我和那位创始人隔空协作：他要求我们配合其供应商，而我随后单独致电供应商协调——这种'为共同客户服务'的灵活方式，加上我们在Lending Home积累的金融系统经验，让我们早期就能与银行展开专业对话。

Yes and no. I mean, in a sense that at the end of the day, we are a software product that lives inside the envelope of a company. And so I remember sitting at, actually, this desk, but in a different place, sitting with the founder of this company that I just mentioned, and we were kinda calling us to be one off. And he was saying, you know, I just want you to work with this vendor that we work with, and I would call them five minutes later separately and tell them, I'm just trying to make our mutual customer happy and and trying to get it live. And so, you know, we were we knew we had built a little bit of this at Lending Home, so we actually knew quite a bit about how systems worked.

因此我们很早就具备了与银行进行深度业务洽谈的能力。

And so we were able to have pretty pretty sophisticated conversations with the banks pretty early on, I would say.

这肯定起了关键作用，Dmitry。你们虽年轻但展现的专业度——不是刚毕业的行业新人那种青涩——想必给银行留下了深刻印象，增强了他们的信心吧？

That must have made a big difference, Dmitry. Your your level of sophistication, even though you're, you know, relatively young, you weren't right out of college never having worked in this industry. So that level of sophistication, understanding how things work must have impressed them or given them some confidence a little bit, don't you think?

确实。2018年10月上线首单后仅一个月，银行就开始主动为我们引荐客户。那时我们已同步对接第一共和银行和富国银行。当企业向银行提出定制需求时，银行会推荐我们——因为他们见证过这种转型的成功轨迹。

Yeah. Yeah. The thing that was amazing is actually so we went live in October of of eighteen with this first company, and literally a month after, we started getting introductions from the banks to companies. And then by that time, we were live with First Republic and Wells Fargo as well. And we started getting introductions to individual companies who were coming to the banks and saying we wanted to go build something, and they were having a hard time because, you know, on the bank side, they've seen this move before.

所以他们看到有人对此非常兴奋，但随后却难以真正整合资源和专业知识来实现自动化。而这家只有三个人的公司，他们原以为不会这么快上线，结果因为使用了我们的产品，两周后就正式运营了。这并不是后来形成的那种大型正式合作关系，而是在个人层面上，我们确实有几个支持者。

So they've seen somebody being really excited about it and then have a hard time actually pulling together the resources and the know how to actually kind of automate this. And here was this company with three people that they didn't think was gonna be live, they're live two weeks later because they used our product. It wasn't like a big formal partnership that came later, but it was on an individual level, we certainly had a few a few champions.

这其实很吸引人。由于你们提供的服务，你们帮助银行的客户更快地启动业务，是这样吗？

That's fascinating actually. You helped sort of get their the bank's clients spun up more quickly because of what you were offering. Is that right?

是的。而且我们向公司收费，对银行分文不取。所以对他们来说非常划算。

Yeah. And we charged the companies. We didn't charge the banks anything. So it was a very it it was a good deal for them.

确实如此。哦，这很有意思。你觉得你们作为Y Combinator投资的公司有没有带来任何帮助？在和SVB交流时，这一点有没有被提及？

Yeah. I'll say. Oh, that's interesting. Do you think it helped at all that you were a Y Combinator funded company? Did that come up at all, like, with SVB?

肯定有帮助。他们有针对早期公司的专项服务。作为YC系公司，确实能获得更多重视，或者在与银行产品负责人沟通时获得更多宽容——换作其他情况，这些人可能会更谨慎些。

I'm sure it did. Yeah. They have they had a practice for early stage practice, kind of early stage companies. And being a YC company was certainly an added bonus to be kinda taken a little bit more seriously or maybe get a little bit more leeway in talking to, you know, the product people at the bank that, you know, that they maybe would have guarded a little bit more otherwise.

你们有没有回头联系最初交谈过的公司，去理解需求并说：还记得我们当时的对话吗？现在产品做好了，愿意成为我们的首批用户吗？你们...

Did you go to the original companies that you spoke with to sort of understand the need and say, hey. Remember when we had that conversation? Well, here you go. Will you be one of our first users? Did you

问过他们？今早我还收到一封邮件，来自2018年7月接触过的公司。纽约这家公司的COO通过投资人朋友介绍认识，邮件开头写着：我关注你们五年了，现在时机成熟了。

ask them? Amazing. I got an email this morning from a company that we talked to in July 2018, and it's from a, like, a COO of this company in New York that we had been introduced to by, like, an investor friend. And it starts I think it's like, I've been following you for five years. I think it's time.

这种情况很常见。销售周期可能很长——这有好有坏。我们常开玩笑说，只要活得够久，所有人都会成为客户，因为这个问题在不同层面上困扰着每个人。

We see this quite a bit. You know? For good or for bad, I think sales cycles can be pretty long. But but we joke sometimes that if we're around long enough, everybody will be a customer because it's a problem that everybody has at some level.

哇。那实际开发耗时多久？因为这是别人都不愿碰的东西，大家都觉得这是个棘手问题但没人愿意解决。

Wow. Wow. How long did it actually take to build? Because this this is something that nobody else wanted to build and everyone was like, ugh. This is a huge problem, but I'm not gonna do it.

从开始开发到获得第一个客户，用了多长时间？

How long when you started to when you actually had that first customer?

五个月。

Five months.

五个月。

Five months.

是的。但关键在于我们之前其实已经构建过一个类似版本。明白吧。要知道，理解如何构建这个系统以及为何通常耗时较长的一个挑战是，你必须从根本上理解支付系统如何运作，包括美联储层面的机制等等。所以有这本600页的NACHA手册，里面全是关于ACH支付的各种规则条例。

Yeah. But I think the the thing is we're really we had built this a version of this before. Okay. And so, you know, one of the challenges of understanding how to build this and why it takes a long time oftentimes is that you really need to understand how payments work at a very basic level at the kind of the Federal Reserve and and so on. So there is this 600 page NACHA book, and it's like all the kind of all the rules and regulations around how ACH happens.

存在各种奇怪的边界情况需要考虑。我记得最早的照片之一就是Sam订购这本书后，开玩笑地发到我们与合伙人的WhatsApp群里，说这是我们第一笔资金用途——花了大概

There's all these, like, weird kind of edge cases that you end up having to think about. And I remember one of the first, like, photos I have is of Sam who had ordered this book and would jokingly send it to our, like, WhatsApp group with our group partners saying, like, this is our first use of funds is, you know, we spent, like,

你知道的，

you know,

129美元左右。对，大概一百多，不算太贵，但这类知识确实需要掌握。比如后来——大概一年后——Matt写的文章登上了黑客新闻榜首，标题是《当你给死人发起ACH转账会发生什么？》，因为银行对于账户持有人死亡及账户关闭等情况有特定的处理规范。

a $129 or something. It was, like, a 100 yeah. It was not that expensive, but it was one of those things that, you know, like, you really need to understand. So for example, later on, this was maybe a year after that, we we ended up kind of at the top of hacker news with a post that Matt wrote, which was what happens when you ACH a dead person? Because there are specific rules and regulations around what happens to banks and how the banks communicate if, like, somebody is, you know, deceased and the account is closed.

这类事情平时根本不会想到，但以银行系统的规模，确实会发生。所以最终你会遇到大量边界案例。总之我们花了五个月构建，API和应用是同步开发的。虽然我们都渴望自动化，但我觉得永远不可能完全自动化。

And and it's one of those things that, like, you don't don't think about as that actually happens, but the scale of the banking system, it happens. And so you end up you end up with a lot of a lot of edge cases. And so, yeah, it took us about five months to build it. We built the API and the app at the same time. As much as we all want automation, I think it's gonna be ever be perfectly automated.

总会存在需要人工处理的边界案例。所以我们从一开始就同时开发了应用端。当然，如果要从零学习所有这些知识，耗时肯定会更长。

So there's always going to be, you know, edge cases and things that people have to do by hand. And so we from the get go, we're building, like, the app as well. Yeah. But it probably would have taken us longer if we hadn't if we had to learn all this stuff from scratch.

确实。话说当时你们团队只有三个人，现在有多少员工了？

For sure. And then how many you were, of course, three back then. How many employees does do you have now?

一百七十人。

One seventy.

这个规模很不错。哇。我确实听过一期播客，你在那期金融科技播客上说过。你说，对，我们不是典型的YC公司，因为我们花了五个月才推出产品。

It's a good size. Wow. I did hear a podcast that I listened to that you were a fintech podcast that you were on. And you were saying, yeah. We weren't the typical YC company because it took us five months to launch.

你知道，我们并没有在YC期间就推出产品。我是说，你们打造了一个非常复杂的产品，当然需要更长时间，投资者肯定也理解这一点，对吧？

You know, we didn't launch during YC. I mean, you've built a really complex product. Of course, it's gonna take you longer, and and investors must have understood that. Right?

没错。我清楚地记得有一次我们小组的周二聚会，当时我们没有任何可以展示的进展。我们就说了类似‘哦，我们还开了个第一共和银行的账户’这样的话。我记得亚伦·哈里斯当时就说，你们倒是挺确信这能成事的。而我们回答，是的，我们觉得会。

Right. I distinctly remember one of the one of the Tuesday get togethers with our group, and, you know, we hadn't had any progress that we could, like, demonstrate at all. And we said something like, oh, we also opened a First Republic bank account. And I just remember Aaron Harris being like, you guys are awfully sure this is gonna lead to something. And and we were like, yeah, we think it will.

但是，你知道，在取得可展示的进展之前，我们花了很长时间——除了‘我们写了一些代码，和一些人谈过’之外。现在回想起来，可能没那么久，但当时感觉像永远。

But, you know, but but it took us a long time before we had demonstrable, you know, progress other than like, well, we wrote some code and we talked to some people. It took a long time. Looking back on it, it it maybe doesn't seem that long, but at the time it felt like forever.

第一次真正感到胜利是什么时候？就是那种你们会兴奋地在周会上汇报的突破？还记得那种‘天啊，我们居然搞定了，之前都不确定能不能成’的时刻吗？

What was the first feeling of, like, a real win that you would have been, like, really psyched to report at your weekly group meeting? You know, do you remember one of those, oh my gosh, we got this to work, and and I we weren't sure if we were going to.

与其说是技术突破，不如说是获得了人和公司的认可。我记得一个例子是我们和一家年资金流动量达数十亿的公司签了意向书。虽然这不算合同，他们未必会真的执行，但他们明确表示这确实是个真实问题，他们有很多人在处理。

It was it was less about getting something to work and more about having validation from people and companies. One I remember is we we signed an LOI with a company that was moving, like, billions of dollars, you know, a year. And it was like you know, it didn't mean that much because, obviously, it wasn't a contract. They weren't gonna necessarily commit to doing it. But they basically said this is really, like, a true problem, and we have a lot of people working on it.

所以如果你们能提供比我们现有方案更好更便宜的产品，我们肯定会考虑采用。这对我们来说是重大胜利。

And so if you can deliver a better product at a lower price than it takes us to, like, deliver it otherwise, like, we would we would certainly consider it and and do it. And so that was a big win for us.

我觉得意向书就是重大胜利，你不这么认为吗？

I think LOIs are a big win. Don't you care?

它们必须转化为正式合同才算数。不过没错，绝对是。那份意向书后来成真了吗？没有，并没有。

They have to turn into real contracts. But, yes, absolutely. Did that one turn into a real contract? No. It did not.

可惜了。

Shoot.

还没。还没。还没。还没。好了。

Not yet. Not yet. Not yet. Not yet. Okay.

天啊。过不去然后它就会了。对吧？

Oh my goodness. Can't go by and then it will. Right?

是的。完全正确。

Yeah. Exactly.

哦天哪。好吧。我说这话你别介意，你们在解决一个非常重要但非常不性感的问题，大多数人根本不会想到。甚至那些本该考虑这个问题的人可能也没优先处理，直到，你知道，出了问题，直到可能发生灾难。我想聊聊去年三月。

Oh my gosh. Okay. So don't be offended why when I say this, but you are solving a very important but very unsexy problem that most people don't think about. And even the people that are supposed to be thinking about it probably aren't maybe prioritizing it until, you know, there's a problem, till there's a possible disaster. And I want to talk about last March.

我想聊聊是什么时候来着？大概是3月10号左右，硅谷银行基本倒闭了，所有存钱的人资金都被冻结了。我想让你带我回到那个周末，因为我记得，你知道，我紧张地密切关注着事态发展。但说说你当时的世界是怎样的？给我讲讲那时的故事。

And I wanna talk about when was it? I think, like, March 10 or something when Silicon Valley Bank was basically shut down and everyone's who had their money, their money was frozen. I want you to take me back to that weekend because I remember, you know, I followed it very closely and nervously, as you can imagine. But like, what was your world like? And what tell me some stories about that.

你预见到这个情况了吗？

Did you see this coming?

三四年过去了。我们发展了很多。现在有170名员工。我们有几十家，可能上百家公司与SVB深度合作。目前我们与约30家银行合作，所以它不是我们唯一关注的银行，但对早期客户来说仍然非常重要。

So three or four years went by. We've grown a lot. We're a 170 people. We have, you know, dozens, maybe a hundred hundred plus companies that were deeply integrated with SVB. We, at this point, work with about 30 banks, and so they're not the only bank that we focus on, but it's still a very important bank, especially for the, of course, the early stage clients that we have.

在那个周末之前，甚至周三周四，我就开始收到投资者等人的短信，问：'嘿，就想确认下，你们公司有多少资金存在SVB？'收到足够多这类询问后，我就想，如果每个创始人都收到这种消息，情况就不妙了。当然可能因为我们与银行联系更多，人们觉得我们知道得多些。

So before the weekend, even on, like, that Wednesday, Thursday, I started getting texts from, you know, investors and folks saying, hey. Just, like, just checking. Like, how much of your funds as as the company are sitting at at SVB? And and I started getting enough of those where I was like, if there's if a lot of these, you know, hit every single founder, like, that's not gonna be a a very and, of course, maybe we're more connected to banks. People thought we knew a little bit more.

但说实话，没有。我们没预见这事。我认为没人真正预料到它会以这种程度和速度发生。我们可以讨论导致这种情况的原因。但银行挤兑其实很罕见——过去不罕见，后来我们引入很多监管措施让它变罕见了。

But, you know, just a question, no. We didn't see it coming. I mean, I think that it's something that no nobody really saw coming to the degree that it sort of happened and how quickly it happened, and we can talk about what contributes to that. But, you know, bank runs are pretty rare. Like, they they they used to not be rare, and then we introduced a lot of kind of regulatory things that made them a lot more rare.

所以你不会真的预期它发生。然后突然之间，我们看到很多人开始撤资。我开始收到大量咨询建议的请求，甚至有些根本不是我们客户的公司也来问该联系哪些其他银行。

And so you don't really expect one to happen. You know? And then all of a sudden, we started seeing a lot of people withdrawing funds. And I started getting just a lot of, like, people asking for advice. I mean, companies that weren't even necessarily customers of ours or, like, using our products or or, like, what other banks to talk to.

他们想要介绍。他们喜欢这类东西。而且，你知道，SAP一直是我们非常好的合作伙伴。我认为他们在这个生态系统中是如此重要的参与者。所以我们主要专注于确保现有客户有备用方案以防万一，但并没有试图在系统中制造更多担忧。

They want introductions. They things like that. And, you know, we were SAP has been a really, really good partner for us. I think they were such an important player in this ecosystem. And so we sort of focused on making sure that our existing customers had had a plan b if something happened, but really weren't trying to, you know, incite more more kind of worry into the system.

嗯。但到了周五早上，FDSE介入并基本上关闭了它。于是事情变得非常现实，因为现在有这么多公司，很多媒体报道集中在工资发放上，这对员工有直接影响，对董事也有法律后果。所有公司，包括我们的SAP客户都在担心这个。但我们还面临更复杂的情况，有些公司用现代财务系统发工资，或者处理福利，这些都是他们业务中非常关键的部分。

Mhmm. But then on Friday morning, the FDSE stepped in and basically shut it down. And so then then it sort of became very real because now you had all these companies and a lot much of it has been in the media around payroll, which, of course, was there's, like, personal ramifications for the employees, for the for the directors, like, legal ramifications for the directors. All companies, our SAP were worried about that. But we had the added complexity that there's companies that run payroll using modern treasury or they run benefits, you you know, or they run things that are just, you know, again, kinda critical to their business.

所以，你知道，我们做了很多牵线搭桥的工作。那个周五晚上我们意识到一点独特优势：当很多人只在推特上发表意见时，我们确实能为对话增添独特价值——我们连接了所有合作公司的支付系统。于是我们建立了一个状态页面，每隔几小时就更新一次。

And so, you know, we were doing a lot of introductions. So one one of the things that we realized probably that Friday night is we had a one view that was unique. So there's a lot of people pontificating on Twitter. We actually had something to add to the conversation that was a little bit unique in that we were connected to all the systems, all the payment systems across the various companies that we worked with. So we put together a status page, and we put together sort of a page where we would just update every couple hours.

这里实时更新ACH、电汇、报表和国际汇款的情况。比如想汇国际款项时，通常需要经过代理银行。这个页面被广泛传播，因为当时存在巨大的不确定性和担忧。整个周六我们都在工作。

Here's what's happening to ACH, to wire, to reporting, to international wire. What's happening with like, if you wanna send a wire internationally, you have to go send it to a correspondent bank oftentimes. It became something that was being spread around because a lot there's so much uncertainty and so much, like, worry about what was happening. It's all through Saturday. You know, we're working through the weekend.

我们与各公司合作，有时帮他们联系其他银行。有些公司虽然已有其他银行账户但未启用，现在正试图重建资金流。然后周日晚上，我们支持的另一个银行Signature Bank也被接管了。于是我们说：我们有模板了。

We're working with companies. Sometimes we're introducing them to other banks. Sometimes they had other bank accounts that they were open already, but they hadn't actually set anything up, so they're kinda trying to rebuild some of their flows. And then Sunday night, Signature Bank, which is another bank that we supported also, also goes into receivership. And so we're like, we got a template.

我们可以为Signature Bank建立状态页面。于是我们也这么做了。当然，我认为监管机构做得很好，周一早上他们就设法以不太破坏性的方式支撑住了银行。虽然信任受到动摇，但实际资金流动方面，大家都能通过SEB的系统操作。

We can go build the status page for signature bank. And so we went ahead and and did that as well. And then, of course, you know, I think the regulators did a really good job in the sense that by Monday morning, they'd figured out how to, you know, prop up the bank in a way that wasn't actually that disruptive. So, you know, Monday morning, there's a lot of trust that was shaken. But in terms of actual money movement, like, everybody was able to kinda move money through the systems that SEB had.

我们监控着系统逐步恢复，有些功能恢复得更快些。这确实是段疯狂的经历，每个客户面临不同不确定性，配置也各不相同：你有什么其他银行？行动快慢对你有什么影响？

We were kinda monitoring them as they're coming back online. Some things came back faster than others. And so, yeah, it was a it was a very kinda crazy thing to live through because there's so much uncertainty for every client, and everybody has a slightly different setup. Like, what other bank do you have? What are the ramifications for you of moving or not moving faster?

这是段相当狂野的经历，但也是个特权位置——能亲眼见证这样的历史事件展开。

And it was a pretty wild thing to live through, but also a pretty privileged place to just, like, get to see this kind of historical event unfold.

就财务健康度而言，你们那些准备完美的客户是如何轻松应对这种潜在灾难的？相比之下，那些措手不及的公司又是什么情况？

In terms of, like, financial hygiene, what was a client of yours who who had everything set up perfectly and could handle this, like, potential disaster with ease versus, like, an ill prepared company caught with their pants down, basically?

是的。准备不足的公司通常是早期企业，只有单一银行关系。建立新账户需要时间，并不容易。他们可能在同一银行开设了多个账户，比如工资账户和运营账户，也可能是存放融资款项的地方。

Yeah. So the ill prepared company oftentimes, they're earlier stage companies. They only have one bank relationship, and it takes time to set it up. It's not super easy. So they go set up an account, and then they go maybe set up a couple of different accounts with the same bank where they have, like, a payroll and operating account where they're maybe that's where they're, like, equity setting that they raised.

但他们还有另一个账户，用于业务目的。那个账户连接着类似现代财务系统的东西。我们能通过API调用连接报告等功能。当那家公司遭遇变故时，他们别无选择来维持运营。这就是问题的一个极端。

But then they have another account, which is for the purpose of their business. And that account is connected to something like modern treasury. We're able to connect API calls to reporting things like that. And so if that company when when that happened, they had no other place to basically run their operations through. So that's like one end end of it.

另一个极端是某公司在多家银行开设了多个账户。出于各种原因，它建立了现代财务系统来连接这些账户。可能是不同产品需求，也可能是监管要求——毕竟各家银行提供的服务差异很大。

The other end of it is a company that had set up multiple bank accounts at multiple banks. And for various reasons, it set up modern treasury to connect into those accounts. And that can be you know, maybe it's a different product. Maybe there's different like, there there maybe regulatory reasons. Like, banks are actually quite heterogeneous in the services they offer.

从产品层面看，与多家银行合作确有充分理由。那家公司可以轻松决定：'通常不走这家银行的ACH流程，我要转到另一家'。这操作很简单，因为他们已搭建好整套系统。还有些处于中间状态的公司——账户开了但系统没配置好，周末不得不紧急重建。

So there's good reasons why you might want to work with multiple banks just at a product level. And so that company was able to basically just say, well, don't normally do my kind of ACH flows through this bank. I'm going to move it to the other bank. But it's it's sort of an easy thing to do because they've already set it all up and it's working. And then there was companies in the middle that were basically they had set it up or, like, they opened the account.

账户是开通了，但系统没准备好。他们周末只能加班重建。打个比方：想象你必须在周末把网站从亚马逊迁移到谷歌云，周一早上6点前无论如何都要在新平台上线——这要求相当苛刻。

The account was open, but it wasn't set up. And so they had to go kind of rebuild stuff over the weekend. So, you know, maybe an analogy for it is imagine if over the weekend you have to rebuild your website from Amazon to Google Cloud or something. And you by Monday morning at 6AM, you have to be live on on the new one no matter what. And like that's a pretty pretty tall order.

是啊。希望大家吸取教训，在银行选择上要分散风险。

Yeah. Well, I hope people learned a good lesson is to sort of diversify in terms of the bank.

我们正看到这种趋势。很多董事会都在询问公司的银行关系数量、资金存放位置及应急方案。银行风险管理原本无人重视，如今成了企业关注焦点。

I think we're seeing that. I think we're seeing a lot of boards, I think, are asking companies about, like, how many bank relationships and where is the fund sitting and how do we react. But yeah, I think it's something that risk management around banks was not top of mind for anybody and became a little bit more top of mind for companies today.

这很可能会写入股票购买协议，成为新的公司代表条款。但你说得对，过去没人担心这个，因为我们这个时代从未发生过类似事件。

We're probably gonna end up seeing this in, like, stock purchase agreements. It's gonna be a new company rep, something about banking relationships. But you're right. Like, this is just not something anyone worried about in the past because they had we had not seen it in this era.

确实可怕。想想看，Y Combinator的初创公司大多把钱存在SVB。我有个问题：FDIC行动如此迅速，是否因为可能引发全国性区域性银行挤兑？这不仅是硅谷科技圈的问题吧？

No. It was pretty frightening, especially, you know, Y Combinator startups, as you can imagine, had a lot of their money in in SVB. I have a question, and and I don't know that much about all of this. Do you think one of the reasons the FDIC acted so swiftly was because it really could have triggered sort of a national bank run on regional banks? It wasn't just a technology Silicon Valley issue.

我不认为这是硅谷特有的科技问题——其他银行也曾倒闭或出问题。但新时代的特点是资金提取速度。上世纪二三十年代，你要取款得亲自排队填表，整个过程有缓冲时间。

I don't think it was a technology Silicon Valley issue in the sense that other banks had also failed or had other issues. It's not specific to startups. I do think there's something new that hasn't existed before, which is the speed of how fast you can withdraw funds. So if you think about back in the day, back in, you know, the twenties or thirties or something, if you found out that you had to go withdraw funds, like, you probably had to go there in person. So there's a certain feedback cycle to how long it takes to show up and fill out the form and stay in line, and and you just, like, can't withdraw that quickly.

如今发几条短信、打开手机应用就能瞬间转走所有资金，这种快速挤兑对银行而言极难应对。无论是WhatsApp群组还是社交媒体，恐慌一旦蔓延就很难遏制。从银行角度看，这意味着必须准备更多现金储备——要么来自美联储，要么来自同业拆借——因为危机爆发的速度远超从前。我记得看到过SVB在周四和周五（周五上午9点就结束了）被提取的资金数额...

I think today, a few text messages and you open up the mobile app and then you just sort of withdraw everything, like, that's a really short cycle for banks to be ready for. And so whether it's WhatsApp groups, whether it's social media, once that kind of panic sets in, that's a really, really difficult thing to fight. And so when you think about it, what that means from a bank perspective, it sort of means you have to have more cash, like, ready to be accessed from the Fed or from other banks or something than you did before because the speed with which these things can develop is much faster. Like, I think I saw the the amount of funding that was withdrawn from SVB on that Thursday and Friday, and Friday, like, ended at 9AM. Right?

所以那真的只是一天之内就达到了420亿美元。哇。基本上就是在36小时内。而在2008年，SCB算是第二大倒闭案例，最大的则是美联银行。

So it was really on just one day was $42,000,000,000. Wow. And that's basically in, like, thirty six hours. And in 2008 so the the SCB was, like, in the second biggest sort of failure. Wachovia was the biggest one.

听起来在2008年2月时，提取100亿美元需要四十天。哇。现在资金流动的速度，你知道的，公司拥有更多资金。所以一家公司决定提款可能就是1亿美元。对吧？

Like, it sounded like forty days to withdraw 10,000,000,000 back in 02/2008. Wow. So just the speed with which with which people are able to kinda move funds around, you know, companies have more amount money. And so, you know, one company deciding to withdraw could be a $100,000,000. Right?

这是我们以前没怎么见过的。所以我认为银行业技术格局确实发生了一些变化。

Which is not something that we've kind of seen. So I think there is something that's changed a little bit in the banking technology landscape.

这需要持有大量流动性。真是巨额流动性。和我最爱的电影《生活多美好》里乔治·贝利银行的挤兑场景完全不同。你还记得那个场景吗？

That's a lot of liquidity to have to have. That's a lot of liquidity. And it's a lot different than from my the scene from my favorite movie, It's a Wonderful Life, the bank run at at George Bailey's bank. Do you remember that scene?

是啊。说个趣事，我其实从没看过那部电影。

Yeah. Yeah. Fun fact, I've never seen that movie.

天啊，卡罗琳。好吧。整个硅谷银行事件发生得实在太快了。

Oh my god. Carolyn. Okay. So wow. The whole s v b thing happened so quickly.

感觉它爆发得突然，解决得也迅速。在那大约72小时里你还看到其他疯狂的事情吗？任何异常行为？或者...

Like, I feel like it happened quickly and it was resolved quickly. Was there anything else crazy that you saw within that sort of seventy two hours or whatever? Any weird behavior? Or

我觉得创始人、投资者和财务主管们面对这类危机事件时的反应都很反常。就像任何压力情境一样，这暴露出某些人的本质——什么对他们更困难或更容易。但最讽刺或者说难以抉择的是，当银行挤兑发生时，个人层面正确的做法确实是提取资金——你根本不知道会发生什么。所以很多人面临道德困境：是该传播恐慌加剧问题，还是优先保障自己公司或投资组合的安全？

Well, I think there's a lot I think there's a lot of weird behavior on the part of founders and investors and heads of finance and how everybody kinda responds to to this type of stressful event. So I think that it you know, like anything stressful, I think it shows, in some cases, what people are made of and what's harder, what's easier for for folks. But I think one of the things that's really ironic or or kind of hard to resolve is when a something like a bank run happens, the the right answer really on a personal level really is to withdraw the funds. Like, you just don't know what's gonna happen. And so I think a lot of people faced sort of an ethical dilemma of, like, do I, you know, spread the worry and do I contribute to this problem, or do I keep my company or my companies and my portfolio or what have you safe?

是的。我并不认为哪一方绝对错误。这很艰难——当你意识到问题存在时，确实负有受托责任应该采取行动。但这种情况之前没人预想过，就这么突然爆发了。

Yeah. And it's not it's not obvious to me that either side is in the wrong. I think there's, like it's hard. I mean, I think there's a fiduciary duty of, like, what you should be doing once you know there's more of an issue and and and things like that. But I think that it's really something that, again, nobody's thought of and it just sort of popped up.

而当你开始思考可能引发的连锁反应时，就会意识到必须立即行动——越早越好。所以...

And then when you start thinking about the implications of what can happen, you you kind of realize that you need to go act and and the sooner is better. So yeah. It's

或许解决方案是向前看，分散在几家银行开户，这样你就不会总想着‘天啊，这可是我们全部的钱，万一出事怎么办？我得赶紧取出来’。你知道，这种心态就像在说‘让我们撑过去’。

And maybe the solution is going forward, have a few banks so that you're not thinking, oh my gosh. This is all of our money. What are we gonna do? I have to take it out. You know, you're sort of like, let's ride this out.

看起来情况会好转的。我们不需要动用这个账户发工资，可以用另一个账户支付薪资。

Seems like it's gonna be okay. We don't need it to make payroll. We can make payroll with the other account.

是的。我认为企业经营必须保持韧性，虽然没人预料到这点，但支付运营和财务操作这类场景确实也需要纳入考量。当然，你会从团队建设、技术架构等方面着手准备，但现在财务层面的风险也不得不防。

Yeah. I think you have to run kind of companies in a resilient way, and I don't think anybody thought of it, but payment ops and financial kind of operations in, like, that that scenario that you have to think about as well. Obviously, you you do that from a you know, as far as your team and as far as, like, your technology and infrastructure and things like that. But now you have to worry about that from the financial

这个问题可能有点冷门——你们是否注意到客户出于防范心理正涌向全国性大银行而避开区域性银行？这种趋势是否会导致整个生态系统走向整合？如果所有人都只认摩根大通、摩根士丹利，区域性银行该怎么办？

Well, this is a little bit obscure, but have you noticed your customers kind of going towards the big national banks and avoiding the regional ones just as a precaution, which just sort of leads this, is that the kind of consolidation that's good for the whole ecosystem if everybody wants JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley and not any of these regional banks?

确实有讨论说要把资金转移到美国四大银行。但现实是，硅谷银行（SCB）曾是个非凡的合作伙伴——虽然现在还不清楚被第一公民银行收购后，未来几个月它会变成什么样。

Yeah. There's certainly been a discussion about let's move funds into the the big four banks in The US. I think the reality is SCB was such an amazing partner. And and I I should say they may they may be again. We don't know quite what SCB looks like under the first citizens banner in in a few months.

SCB在业务支持上真的无可挑剔。就拿我们来说，当初只是无名小卒，却能和他们建立合作，还通过他们迅速接触到其他客户。要成为硅谷的好伙伴确实需要独特的思维方式——不是说大银行做不到，但这并非他们的传统优势。

But but but SCB's been such an amazing partner in enabling. I mean, like, even our story, like, we as I shared, like, we were, you know, we were sort of nobodies and we're able to go partner with this bank and we and they and we got introductions to other clients that pretty quickly from them. So, like, I think there is an element of being a good partner to Silicon Valley does require certain unique, like, different mindset. And not to say that the big banks can't have it, but it's not natural to them. It's not it's not something that they've done historically.

这正是我的想法。人们可能会经历一段恐慌期扎堆四大行，但慢慢就会怀念区域性银行那种知心服务。虽然教训深刻，但我同意你的观点——客户最终还是会回归区域性银行的特色服务。

That's what I was thinking. Like, people might get you know, there might be this period of nervousness where they really want to be at the big four, and then gradually, they're gonna miss that. They're gonna miss how understanding and how these banks these regional banks really got them, and then maybe they'll they'll come back to some degree. I mean, obviously, I don't think that those lessons will be undone, but I agree with you. I think people really will want those, again, those purse that that that part of that regional banking.

德米特里，我对你的经历特别好奇。申请资料显示你从斯坦福毕业后，先在某处担任驻场企业家，又去风投机构做分析师，后来在哈佛读了MBA。这些经历——尤其是MBA和风投工作——是如何为你现在执掌Modern Treasury做准备的？

Dmitry, I have a question about your background that I was just so curious about. I was looking at your application, and I saw that after Stanford, you were like an entrepreneur in residence somewhere, an analyst at a VC firm, then you got your MBA at Harvard. And I'm curious to know what those things, your MBA, your working at VC firms, how did they prepare you, if at all, for what you're doing at Modern Treasury?

其实我在几家初创公司的工作经历更重要。比如在Better Place（电动汽车基础设施公司）时，我看着团队从我加入时的10人扩张到离职时的600人。组织扩张中最复杂的其实是人事管理，这段观察让我受益匪浅。而在风投机构的短暂经历帮我建立了判断标准——某个发展阶段的好公司应该是什么样。

Well, I'd worked at a couple of startups. That was actually the bigger part of my background was watching companies, you know, from the inside as as an employee, watching them scale from 10 people when I joined Better Place, which is an electric car infrastructure company, to about 600 on my left. And so watching all the people stuff is actually the stuff that I think is the most complicated about scaling organizations, and I think watching that was super helpful. You know, a lot of this pattern matching is just really spending a little bit of time at at a venture fund helped me see companies. Like, what does a good company at a certain stage look like and not?

比如如何向风投推销项目？所有这些经验都让我们能相对顺利地创立Modern Treasury，毕竟这不是我第一次见证这个过程。至于商学院，那是我探索其他行业的窗口。而Modern Treasury最让我兴奋的，正是我们能助力医疗、教育、房地产、网络安全保险等各行业的公司成长。

What does it look what does it look like to pitch a VC? So all of that, I think, has contributed to us being able to come in and build modern treasury up in a relatively smooth way from the from the beginning because it wasn't, like, the very first time that that I'd seen that. And, you know, business school for me was a way to go explore and and learn about other industries. And by far, my favorite thing about modern treasuries is that we get to go power all these companies and get to learn about them and get to help them in in all different industries. Like, we're helping companies in health care and education and real estate and cyber insurance.

因此我认为，作为一个商业爱好者，去了解这些事物如何运作、不同行业面临的挑战有何异同，本身就是商学院案例教学法的强化版。现代金融体系某种程度上也是这种理念的升级版。希望我们在帮助企业设计底层架构时——比如资金实际流向这种现代金融的核心问题——能体现出这种专业视角，当然我们的价值远不止于此。

And and so I think that that being sort of a business nerd and just, like, learning about how these things work and what are the challenges that are different and how are they the same and how are they different between different industries is something that, obviously, the business school case method and all that is sort of just that on steroids. And I think modern treasury is a little bit of that on steroids as well. So, hopefully, that's something that comes through when we're helping companies and actually helping them come up with the right architecture for how to build these things at a very mechanical level, which is where modern treasury comes in. Like, where do the funds actually go? But it obviously is much much more than that.

有意思的是，保罗可能都不认同我的观点——他大概会说大学毕业后就该直接创业。但如果要我建议最佳时机，我会说：先上大学广结人脉博览群书，然后进入社会积累商业经验。最好加入初创公司，亲身体验创业的疯狂历程。

Yeah. It's interesting because a lot of times and and Paul might even disagree with me. I think he'd say, oh, go start a start up right out of college. But I feel like if I could tell someone what the ideal timing would be, it would be go to university, make lots of friends, study lots of things, expose yourself to a lot, and then go get like a little go into the world and get a little business experience. Ideally, work at a startup where you can observe what one is like and all the crazy things that happen.

这样才能真正理解现存问题。要不是你们在Lending Home工作过，可能根本意识不到这个痛点。

Learn about what problems are out there. Because if you guys hadn't have worked at Lending Home, you might not have felt this pain point.

我可能更赞同保罗的观点。最近我一直在思考：作为优秀创始人，激情与恒心哪个更重要？所谓激情就像有人突然痴迷某个创意，但这种狂热往往难以持久。

I think I would agree with Paul. I don't know if you would agree with it, but I I think I would agree with him. I think that I've been thinking a lot about what is the difference between intensity and consistency, and which one's more important to be a good founder. And intensity maybe to define intensity, there's you know, you see intensity where somebody comes in and they're, like, obsessed with this idea and they're sort of it's, like, it's very hyped up and that's all they can think about. And that doesn't always last.

对吧？狂热终会消退。2020-2021年硅谷就经历过这种集体亢奋期。但真正伟大的事业需要时间沉淀，看看Sam的OpenAI——

Right? Like, at some point, you're sort of, like, over it. And then you see that oftentimes, and we just went through a phase in, I think, twenty twenty, twenty one where, like, a lot of people in Silicon Valley were, like, very intensely excited about technology. And it's like, when you look at the people that build meaningful things, like, it just takes a long time. And you look at, you know, what Sam's doing with OpenAI.

再看看马斯克的星舰计划，他从2004年就开始筹备。当然他有睡工厂地板的激情时刻，但不可能持续二十年。媒体总爱追逐高光时刻，可当你真正想解决重大问题，持久力同样关键——如何数十年如一日地坚持？

When you look at something like, you know, Elon and Starship like, he was working on Starship in 02/2004. So, like, yeah, of course, he brought intensity at certain moments when he was, like, sleeping on the floor of the factory, but he didn't do that for twenty years. And I think the media and journalists oftentimes, like, get attracted to the really intense moment. And when you start a company and you wanna go build and, like, solve a problem in a big in a big way, you kinda have almost consistency is just as important. It's like, how are you gonna stick with it for a very long time?

我不知道该如何测试或筛选这种特质，甚至不确定它是否重要。但...

And I don't know how you test for that. Don't know how you select for that. I don't know if that matters. But

这非常重要！创业本质是场持久战，除非遇到最好情况。要让人类承受这种长期高压，必须找到可持续十年的运作方式。

It does matter. It it is a huge problem. I mean, startups are a very long game except in the best case scenarios. And in order for a human being to endure such an intense long game, we have to figure out, you know, you have to figure out how to make it doable for a, you know, twenty year period, ten years at the minimum.

德米特里，听你讲述的最大启示就是：你在解决自己的痛点。你发现了问题并想修复它。

You know? Would phrase this as a similar way with listening to you talk, Dmitry. Like, the huge takeaway here is you're scratching your own itch. Right? You found a problem.

没人能预知何时会遇到这种契机——可能是刚毕业时，也可能是工作五年后突然觉得'这事必须改变'。所以时机选择完全因人而异。我能问个随机问题吗？

You wanna fix it. And so I think you don't know when you're gonna get itchy right after college because you've figured out something that you wanna you know, you figured out or five years into your career because you have said like, this bothers me. I want to fix it. So I think that's why the timing question ends up just being super personal. Can I ask a super random question?

这件事我一直都挺好奇的。你们以前叫Turnkey Treasury，或者可能只用Turnkey这个名字很短时间，但我对命名总是很感兴趣。

This is something I really always kind of am curious about. So you used to be Turnkey Treasury, or maybe you were just Turnkey for a very short time, but I'm always interested in names.

是啊。我们当时为取名纠结了很久，申请时用了Turnkey Treasury这个名字。我们入选后还没正式注册公司，就发现这个名字有问题——你知道，人们经常会把Teams这类词直接当作公司名来称呼对吧？

Yeah. Well, we struggled with the name and we applied as Turnkey Treasury. And we got in, and we hadn't incorporated yet. And we just realized that that name has a problem, which is when, you know and and why see oftentimes people refer to Teams as, like, the name of the company. Right?

就像Stripe被叫成Stripes，Airbnb被漏掉n的发音。我们就成了'turkeys（火鸡）'。我们可不想当火鸡，真的不想。

It's like the Stripes, it's Airbnb's, and nobody heard the n. So we were the turkeys. And, like, we didn't wanna be the turkeys. Turkey. So we were like, we do not wanna be the turkeys.

必须想办法解决。人们会很困惑：为什么是火鸡？这和业务有什么关系？所以...

We gotta fix that somehow. And so people are just confused there, like, why is it you know, why why Turkey? Like, what does it have to do with anything? And so

他们真的问'为什么是火鸡'？

They really said why Turkey?

因为Turkey treasures（火鸡宝藏）啊。当时我们在找名字，Matt在飞机上用即时域名搜索找7美元左右的可用.com域名。发现moderntreasury.com可用时，我们觉得这名字朗朗上口很合适，就买下域名改了公司名。

Well, because Turkey treasures. So we we we were named we were kinda looking for a name, and and and Matt was on a flight, and he was on instant domain search just, like, searching for .coms that were available for like $7. And moderntreasury.com was available and we're like, this it has a ring to it. It's like it works. And so we we we got the .com and then we renamed the company.

或者说我们是在注册公司时正式定名的。

Or I should say we named the company as incorporated.

真高兴我问了这个问题。这...

Super glad I asked that question. Oh, that's

太奇怪了。

so strange.

就是啊，我完全不知道。那应该是在YC开始之前吧？你们是先被录取然后才改名的？

I know. I had no idea. That must have been very at the was that even before YC started? Like, you were accepted and then did this?

是啊。因为如果你要成立公司的话，

Yeah. Because if you were incorporating,

肯定是你当时立刻就想到

it must have been immediately that you're like

大概是五月左右吧，我记得我们可能是6月1号开始的。

May or something, and I think we started June 1 maybe.

我们绝对不能当冤大头。不可能。是啊。不。因为你们是现代财政体系。

Like, we cannot be the turkeys. No way. Yeah. No. You're because you are the modern treasuries.

比如说，如果我说，哦，我们要去看看现代财政体系。对啊对啊。你不工作的时候喜欢做什么？

Like, if I said, oh, we're gonna go see the modern treasuries. Yeah. Yeah. What do you like to do when you're not doing work stuff?

从

In terms

长远考虑来说，你闲暇时喜欢做什么？

of thinking about longevity, what do you like to do in your downtime?

我特别喜欢户外活动。对我来说，最好的放松方式就是去远足、滑雪、漂流，去那些远离城市的地方，在大自然中度过时光。住在湾区对实现这个特别有利。

I love spending time outdoors. So I think a big release for me and a big way to kind of, like, unplug is to just go and go hiking, go skiing, go rafting, go somewhere that's, you know, far away and out of the city and and and just spend time outdoors, which being in the Bay Area is a pretty good place for that.

你身后那张照片是约塞米蒂国家公园的酋长岩吗？

Is that a is that a photo of Yosemite, like, Capitan behind you?

是的没错。我姐姐就住在国家公园边上，我经常去那儿。前几天刚在默塞德河漂流过，简直太疯狂了

It is. It is. Yeah. My sister lives out right outside the national parks, and I'm spending a lot of time there. Actually, just went rafting down the Merced River, which has been such a crazy

这里的积雪。

snowpack here.

河流水量充沛，现在正是最佳漂流时节。有些河流因水坝调控可随时前往，但像默塞德河这样的自然河流就得把握季节，比如五月左右最合适。

The waters and the rivers well, the rivers are just so full of water right now. It's it's like the best time to go. So there's some rivers that are damned, so they're like planned release and you can go whenever. But there are certain rivers like the Merced that are free flowing, and so you kinda have to catch your season. Like like, you know, May or something is, like, the best time to go.

真的吗？你擅长激流漂流吗？

So Really? Are you good are you a good whitewater rafter?

我正在进步。

I'm d I'm getting decent.

你妹妹呢？

How about your sister?

差不多。我们2019年去了大峡谷，最初只有我们俩，后来队伍扩大到十人。那次私人旅行持续两周，完全没有手机信号。

Yeah. It's the same. We did a Grand Canyon trip in 2019. Actually, it was it was you know, we'd start we'd start empty, and we'd we grew to about 10 people. And then we end up we decided I get an opportunity to go on a private trip down the Grand Canyon, which is, like, two weeks with no cell connection or anything.

当时我犹豫这是否算逃避创始人责任，但最终庆幸成行——这是毕生难忘的旅程。同时也考验了团队，证明没有我他们也能运转良好。

And I remember being like, oh, should I do this or is this kinda to the consistency point, like, is this going to be me just ignoring my duty as a founder? And I'm so glad I did it because it's one of those trips that's a kind of an amazing trip for of a lifetime. But, you know, it's a good stress test for the team. Make sure that, like, everything is fine without me. You don't really need me.

嗯。我很好奇Modern Treasury的未来规划？接下来重点是什么？

Yep. I'm kinda curious, like, what's the future for Modern Treasury? Like, what are your what what's next?

我们正与更大企业合作。软件支付化趋势正在加速，许多传统行业开始意识到需要升级系统，我们参与了这类对话。美国即将推出FedNow新支付系统——相比其他国家实时结算的支付网络，美国现有系统效率低下，联邦储备局正着手改进。

Well, we're starting to work with much bigger companies. I think one of the things that is just so interesting is this whole trend of payments starting in software is only accelerating. And a lot of, shall we say, sleepy industries are kind of waking up that they need to go revamp some of their software systems, and so we get to be part of some of those conversations. There's a new payment rail coming to The US called FedNow. And so if you think about payments in The US specifically, they're pretty slow.

七月份推出的FedNow将彻底改变企业支付方式。我们期待协助企业和银行思考如何应对这波变革浪潮，探索最佳实施方案。

A lot of other countries have much faster payment rails that are real time. They're twenty four seven. They don't have, like, a three day settlement period, and the Federal Reserve is working on fixing that. And Fed now is this new payment rail that is launching in July. And so when you think about revamping, like, every business of how actual payments happen, there's a huge wave that we are very excited to help companies think through and figure out what's the right way to do it and the banks as well.

银行必须想办法服务客户，客户也得学会如何与银行打交道。很少有人会日复一日地思考这个问题，尤其是考虑到我们要合作的各种不同类型的银行机构。所以在这个充满极客精神的支付领域，现在是个相当激动人心的时刻。

The banks have to figure out how to serve customers. The customers have figure out how to work with banks. Very few people are, like, really thinking about this day in, day out, and especially across all the different kind of banking institutions that we get to work with. So it's a it's a pretty exciting time in this nerdy world of payments.

我认为现在正是银行业超级有趣的时期，因为它可能停滞了一段时间，接下来将迎来巨变，而你们正好处于一个非常有利的位置，可以抓住这个机会做各种有趣的事情。

I think this sounds like a super interesting time to be in the banking business just because it's, like, stagnated maybe for a while, and then there's just gonna be a ton of change, which you guys are in a really interesting position to to capitalize on that and do all kinds of interesting stuff.

我知道。而且我得说，有时候最让我兴奋的是那些在做这类困难技术的公司——我一直这么说，虽然听起来不够酷，不是面向消费者的，但它太重要了。太多人需要它了，这真的让我超级兴奋。

I know. And I have to say, like, sometimes I get most excited about companies that are doing this sort of difficult technology that's sort I keep saying it, but unsexy, you know, not consumer y, but it's so important. So many people need it. Like, I just get super jazzed.

杰西卡，不知道你还记不记得。我想你跟我讲过这个故事，那时候你刚写完《创业者》这本书，正在想办法实际资助公司，你要去银行拿YC投资的纸质支票，刚开始时还得处理公司注册之类的事。从某些方面来说，当时的产品门槛真的不高。

Jessica, I don't know if you remember this. I think you told me a story. This was like you had written Founders at Work, and I think you were figuring out how to, like, actually fund companies, and you're, like, getting the paper checks for, like, the YC investments. And you had to go to the you had to go to, like, the bank to get the paper checks and and incorporate and when you were just getting started. And I mean, in some ways, the product bar is not very high.

你懂吧？这方面有很多改进空间。

You know? There's there's ways to improve that.

说起来有点尴尬，但在2005年——说实话我觉得直到2007年2月我们还在这么做——我们用的是剑桥当地某家银行（我忘了是不是叫剑桥银行），我为Y Combinator开了个零售账户，支票簿上印着Y Combinator、花园街之类的信息。

This is, like, embarrassing, but, you know, back in 2005 and I honestly, I feel like we still did it through 02/2007. We had the regional Cambridge. I forget it was like the Bank of Cambridge or whatever. I set up a retail account for Y Combinator. Had little checkbooks that said, you know, Y Combinator, Garden Street, all of that.

我们会给公司投资，凯伦·卡罗琳会帮忙填写所有公司注册和股权分配文件，然后他们签署Y Combinator的投资文件。而我 literally 会手写支票给公司，底下还有复写联——他们管那个叫复写副本。我的记账方式就是保留支票簿上那张复写联。

We'd fund the company, Karen Carolyn. I'd I I would help them fill out all the paperwork to incorporate and assign stock, and then they'd sign the Y Combinator investment docs. And I would literally, like, write a check to the company and there would be that The carbon. They call it when it's the carbon copy underneath. So like my records were that carbon copy on my little checkbook.

现在想想，这显然不是个妥当的做法，但当时我就是这么干的。

I mean, surely, that just doesn't seem like the way to do things, but that's how I did.

复写联这事太疯狂了。我最近才偶然知道这个奇葩冷知识：你知道为什么在美国的餐厅吃饭会拿到两张收据吗？一张是详细消费清单，另一张是需要你签名的收据？

The whole carbon copy thing is crazy. I just I just found out as such a random, crazy, like, fact. Do you know why when you go to restaurants in the in The US at least, you get two receipts? Like, you get a receipt with all the line items and you get a different receipt that you have to, like, sign?

为什么？

Why? Why

他们

do they

他们吗？

do they?

比如，他们为什么要打印两份那个。是的。纸张？所以当Visa在七十年代创立时，他们主要关注的是零售店和餐馆。记得那时候，有个大块头的机器，还有

Like, why would they print twice the Yeah. Paper? So when Visa was started in the nineteen seventies, they were primarily focused on, like, retail stores and restaurants. And remember this was, there was a big chunk machine and there

就像是，

was, like,

复写纸那种东西？

carbon copy thing?

是的。

Yes.

所以有趣的是，他们当时非常害怕餐馆不会接受Visa，因为如果有人真的去翻垃圾，看到最畅销的商品是什么，他们可以拿到复写纸，实际上知道每家店最畅销的商品是什么。那是个实际的反对理由。记得，这还是在数字化之前。没有云端存储之类的。所以他们非常害怕没人会采用它。

So the funny thing about it is they were terrified that, like, restaurants wouldn't, like, adopt Visa because if somebody just, like, literally went through the trash and saw what the best selling items were, they could get the carbon copies and actually know, like, what the best selling items were at every place. That was an actual objection. Remember, this is, like, predigital. There's no, like, centralized cloud anything. So they were, like, terrified that nobody would adopt it.

于是他们说，我们要把它分成两部分。你需要保存的是这个有签名的部分，但它没有关于购买物品的信息。他们可以扔掉另一部分，那部分实际上包含了所有那些，你知道的，机密信息，比如有人点了橙子鸡。所以

And so they said, we're gonna split it in two. Thing you have to store is this thing that has the, like, the signature, but it has no information about what the person bought. And they can throw away the other one that actually has all this, like, you know, confidential information about, you know, that, like, somebody ordered orange chicken. And so

好的。是的。

Okay. Yeah.

那就是那是

That is That was that's

原因。

the reason.

这就是原因。哇。是的。所以接下来的五十年我

That's the reason. Wow. Yeah. So the next fifty years I was

正想说五十年后，我们还在做这个？

gonna say fifty years later, we're still doing this?

是的。有些公司正在帮忙，比如对账，把明细列出来，试图重新关联到那个东西上。我是说，我们也做一些这类工作。这就是为什么在信用卡领域，你

Yeah. And there's companies that are helping, like, reconcile, like, get the line items out and try to reconnect it to the thing. And, I mean, we do some of that. And it's like, that that's the reason why in the credit card world You

完全可以走进一家餐厅问，比如，大家都点什么？你们的招牌菜是什么？然后服务员会告诉你。这简直是我听过最蠢的事。我简直不敢相信。

could literally walk into a restaurant and say, like, what does everybody get here? What's what's your best seller? And, like, the waitress will tell you. Like, it's the dumbest thing I've ever heard. I can't believe that.

是啊。你知道，这种破碎感让我觉得，到处都是新公司生长的沃土。这个领域的每个角落都是。

Yeah. You know, this kind of brokenness just leads me to believe there's, like, fertile ground for new companies Everywhere. Everywhere in this area.

因为五十年来没人重新审视过。这时间真的太长了。

Because nobody revisited for fifty years. Like like, that's such a long time.

嗯，真高兴你们做得这么好。SVV周末听到那些事让我着迷。我喜欢了解内幕消息。今天很高兴和你聊天，谢谢你的到来。

Well, I'm so happy that you guys are doing so well. And I was fascinated to hear about all that stuff over the SVV weekend. I love the inside scoop about what's going on. Really glad to talk to you today, and thank you for coming on.

是啊。见到你真好。

Yeah. Great great to see you.

见到你真好。

It's great to see you.

谢谢。

Thank you.

谢谢，德米特里。再见。再见。卡罗琳，和德米特里聊天真是太有趣了。是的。

Thanks, Dmitry. Bye. Bye. Carolyn, that was so much fun talking to Dmitry. Yeah.

他太棒了。他是不是很棒？我简直不敢相信我从2006年2月就认识他了。我都忘了这件事。

He's great. Isn't he great? I can't believe that I've known him since 02/2006. I've forgotten that.

回过头去找那些奇怪的旧邮件，看看以前的自己谈论一些你现在甚至不再做的事情，是不是很有趣？

Isn't it fun to go back and find these weird old emails of, like, your prior self talking about something, you know, that you don't even do anymore?

是的。但感觉太不真实了。尤其是他当时说，你能不能给我发点东西，让斯坦福的管理层觉得这事是合法的？你知道吗？是的。

Yes. But it just felt so unreal. And especially how he was like, can you send me something that legitimizes this to, like, the Stanford administration? You know? Yeah.

不过很有趣的是，信不信由你，如果要我说YC头五年里我个人最大的痛点之一，那就是为创业学校找一个礼堂。这件事让我压力最大。

It's funny though, like believe it or not, if I had to tell you in the first five years of YC what one of the biggest pain points for me personally was, it was securing an auditorium for startup school. That caused me the most stress.

是啊。我不惊讶。租用场地至今还是出奇地不方便和烦人。嗯，不是租用，卡罗琳。

Yeah. I'm not surprised. Facility rental remains shockingly inconvenient and annoying. Well, it wasn't rental, Carolyn.

这就是为什么压力这么大。

This is why it was so stressful.

哦，是免费的。是免费的。

Oh, it's free. It was free.

因为我们负担不起。我们负担不起那样的活动场地，比如一个礼堂。所以我们和斯坦福的一个本科生组织合作。对，Bases，和他们合作很愉快。顺便说一句，我们资助了大概10位Bases的前任主席。

Because we couldn't afford it. We couldn't afford an event space, like an auditorium like that. So we'd partner with Stanford with one of their undergrad organizations Right. Bases, which was wonderful to work with. And by the way, we funded like 10 presidents, past presidents of bases.

哦，这个统计很有意思。你知道，Yin Yin就是其中之一。确实有很多这样的案例。总之，我们与基地合作。作为斯坦福团体的一部分，他们会负责确保礼堂的使用权。

Oh, that's that's a cool statistic. You know, Yin Yin was one and Yeah. There are a whole bunch of there are a whole bunch of them. Anyway, so we partner with bases. They then would, as a part as a Stanford group, would secure the auditorium.

然后Y Combinator基本上会包揽所有工作。是的，明白吗？这样学生们就不用操心了。对吧。

And then Y Combinator would do all the work, basically. Yeah. You know? So that the students wouldn't have to do it. Right.

但每次都要等三个月才能获得校方批准在我们想要的日期使用礼堂，这过程压力巨大。

But it but it was always like a three month wait for the administration to grant the auditorium on the date we wanted, and it was incredibly stressful.

是啊。听起来那个礼堂现在已经不存在了？他们直接拆掉建新的了？

Yeah. And it sounds like the the auditorium doesn't exist anymore. They just rip it down and build something new?

拆掉了。那曾是最棒的礼堂，有595个座位，几乎落地的大窗户。

Ripped it down. And it was the nicest auditorium. It had 595 seats and almost floor to ceiling windows.

嗯。

Yeah.

那个礼堂的光线特别好，空间宽敞明亮，氛围愉悦。现在那里建了什么我完全不知道。不过话说回来，Dimitri和我认识很久了。我们以前总开玩笑说他看起来比实际年龄老成许多。

And so the light in this auditorium, it was just a great size and very light filled and very cheerful. I have no idea what's what's on there now. But anyway, so Dimitri and I go way back. And you know, we always used to joke. He always seemed, you know, a lot older than he actually was.

确实如此。我记得他就像个智者，比他的时代更成熟。但很高兴他创业了，YC还投资了他们，

And it's true. That's that's how I remember him as as sort of wiser, you know, wise man and older than his his time. But I'm so happy that he did a start up, that YC funded them,

而且他们发展得这么好。真的很棒。我完全真心觉得银行业虽然像你说的不够酷，但这个行业确实即将涌现许多新事物。

and that they're doing so well. Yeah. It's great. And and I was totally sincere. I actually think the banking industry is, you know, unsexy, like you said, but there I do think it seems like there's just gonna be a lot of new different stuff coming up in this in this industry.

所以他们现在的位置正好能抓住这些即将到来的变革机遇。

And so he I think they're sort of perfectly positioned to take advantage of all the changes that are probably coming.

是啊。嗯，那真是太棒了，能和他叙旧真好。嗯，下次活动见吧。

Yeah. Well, that was awesome and so great to catch up with him. And, yeah. I'll see you see you at the next one.

回头见。下次再会。

See you later. See you next time.

拜拜。耶。再见。

Bye. Yay. Bye.