Dropbox创始人兼首席执行官德鲁·休斯顿

我是杰西卡·利文斯顿，与卡罗琳·利维共同担任‘社交雷达’的主持人。在本播客中，我们将与硅谷一些最成功的创始人探讨他们的创业历程。近二十年来，卡罗琳和我一直在Y Combinator携手帮助数千家初创企业。欢迎像墙上的苍蝇一样旁听我们与创始人的对话，了解他们的真实故事。今天我非常激动，因为Dropbox的创始人兼CEO德鲁·休斯顿将做客‘社交雷达’。

I'm Jessica Livingston, and Carolyn Levy and I are the social radars. In this podcast, we talk to some of the most successful founders in Silicon Valley about how they did it. Carolyn and I have been working together to help thousands of startups at Y Combinator for almost twenty years. Come be a fly on the wall as we talk to founders and learn their true stories. I'm so excited because today on the social radars, we have Drew Houston, founder and CEO of Dropbox joining us.

嗨，德鲁。嘿。今天见到你真高兴，好久不见了。

Hi, Drew. Hey. Today. I'm so happy to see you. It's been a while.

确实很久了。

It has.

我们有很多话题要聊，因为自2006年就认识你了——当时你作为Zobney的亚当·史密斯的客人首次参加YC晚宴，他——

We have a lot to cover because we have known you since 2006 when you first came to a YC dinner as a guest of Adam Smith of Zobney, who was

没错。

That's right.

你在MIT兄弟会时是他的学长对吧？

You you were his big brother in the your fraternity at MIT. Right?

对，对。我们现在仍是很好的朋友。上周末他刚过生日，老YC团队很多人都还保持联系，经常聚会。

Yep. Yep. And we're still really good friends. He just had his birthday this last weekend, so we're all a lot of the old YC crew were still in touch and hang out all the time.

天啊，这真让人开心。稍后再聊这个。当时你们都在波士顿，那时你已经从MIT毕业了？

Oh my gosh. That makes me so happy. Well, I'm gonna come back to that in a second. But so you were both in Boston. You had graduated from MIT at this time.

你当时是在SAT备考公司Accolade工作吗？

And were you working on the is it Accolade, the SAT prep company?

备考。

Prep.

好的。没错。他当时在做僵尸项目，所以他说，嘿，你想来参加这个晚餐吗？

Okay. Yep. He was working on Zombie and so he said, hey, do you wanna come to this dinner?

是的。

Yep.

他们一定是受到启发才来参加晚餐的。

They must have been inspired having come to the dinner.

噢，完全没错。实际上，YC的很多故事——或者说至少我与YC的关联——就是从那时甚至更早开始的。我在2005年那批申请了YC，因为听说过保罗·格雷汉姆，他在2001年左右做过反垃圾邮件的项目。当时我是带着在线SAT备考的想法申请的。稍等一下。

Oh, totally. Well, the actually, there are a lot of the YC story starts or at least my my connection to YC starts around then or even before then. So I actually applied to YC in the 2005 batch because I'd heard of Paul Graham because of the anti spam stuff he had done in like 2001 and then applied with the applied with the online SAT prep idea. Hold on one second.

等等，你关注过反垃圾邮件的事？

Hold on. You followed the spam stuff?

对。

Yeah.

这么多年我一直不知道，因为这个领域挺小众的。没错。好吧，所以你2005年带着SAT备考项目申请的？

I never knew that after all these years because that's that's pretty niche. That's right. Okay. So you applied in 2005 with the SAT prep?

没入选那批。顺便说，这决定完全正确。那家初创公司确实存在很多问题。但我和很多朋友都有个梦想，就是大学毕业后——我们很多人来自MIT——搬到加州创业。当时有股西迁浪潮，亚当也是其中一员。

Didn't make it into that batch. Totally right answer, by the way. Like, there was there are a lot of issues with that first company. But but yeah, a lot of a lot of my friends and I had had this dream of like graduating from college and a lot of us had gone to MIT and moving out to California and starting companies. And there are these waves of people moving west, including Adam.

后来我在波士顿待得有点焦躁。和亚当参加了那场YC晚餐，我其实就是那个不懂规矩、问太多问题的烦人客人。

And then I was getting a little bit getting antsy, being stuck in Boston. I went to that first YC dinner with Adam. I was actually that annoying guest that asked like way too many questions and like didn't get the memo about etiquette. Well,

这事我记得。你知道——不确定你是否知情——那次晚餐后我们立了条规矩吗？对，很棒。是的。

do I remember that? And do you know I don't know if you ever knew this, but do you know that we instituted a rule after that dinner? Yeah. Great. Yeah.

我们喜欢有客人来访，但不允许客人提问？是的。我们对客人就是这么说的。

We love having guests, but the guests are not allowed to ask questions? Yeah. We said that to the guests.

没错。

Right.

所以我觉得这很棒

So I think it's great

你能提问真是开创性的。确实。不，我进入YC的路有点坎坷。

that you asked. Pioneering. So yeah. No. I I the path into YC was a little rough.

然后我是说，后来不久我就自己申请了Dropbox，因为——让我稍微回溯一下。当时我和Adam在波士顿共进晚餐，因为他刚和他的联合创始人Matt以及他们的公司Zobni完成了YC。但几个月后他们就搬走了。在演示日之后，他们搬到了加州，从Fanod Khosla那里筹集了500万美元。

So and then I mean, then then taking then eventually applying myself with Dropbox not long after that because, I mean so I'll back up a little bit. So, like, I I I went to the dinner with Adam in Boston because he had just done Y Combinator with his cofounder Matt and his company, Zobni. But they a couple months after that moved away. So after demo day for their batch, they moved to California. They raised $5,000,000 from Fanod Khosla or something.

所以我越来越感觉自己被排除在这些事情之外。那时候所有YC公司都会搬进我们称之为'Y Scraper'的大楼，就像是一个创业宿舍，里面有十几家公司。

And so I just felt like increasingly, like, removed and left out of all of this happening. And these were the days when all the Y Combinator companies would move into this big we called it the Y Scraper. So it's like sort of a startup dorm. There were like a dozen companies all in there.

所以Y Scraper在你之前就开始了。这我已经学到了新东西。它始于前一年的Zobny团队。好的。明白了。

So the Y Scraper sort of started before you then. This is I'm already learning something. It started with, like, the Zobny guys the year before. Okay. Alright.

是的。我会去拜访，但感觉越来越疏远，无法真正参与其中。

Yep. And so I would visit, but I was sort of felt like increasingly removed from that being involved.

但后来我记得你参加了创业学校，还向Trevor展示了Dropbox。我们都知道你因为那次著名的唐人街巴士之旅而改变了想法——你忘了带U盘，非常沮丧，决定解决自己的问题。所以换了项目。这是个重大决定吗？还是说只是随便想想'唉，我就做这个吧'？

But then I think you you came to start up school and you actually showed Trevor Dropbox. Because we all know that you took you came up with you switched ideas because you had the famous ride on the Chinatown bus and forgot your thumb drive and were so frustrated that you wanted to solve your own problem. So you switched ideas. Was that a big deal or were you just messing around sort of like, ugh, I'm gonna just build this?

是的。Dropbox的起源其实是在做SAT备考公司期间。我遇到的基本问题是需要在不同电脑间工作——这在当时是个小众需求，大多数人只有一台电脑，而我有笔记本和台式机。

Yeah. The origin of Dropbox was actually during that SAT prep company. And the prob the problem I had was very basic, which is I had needed to work across different computers. And the which is kind of a niche use case. Most people just had, one computer, but I had, like, a laptop and a desktop.

当时有很多东西需要来回传输，而那时最先进的技术就是U盘。大学毕业后，许多朋友搬去了纽约，我想去拜访他们，并想找个理由证明这趟旅行值得。我心想，带上所有东西就能在路上完成工作。结果上了巴士才发现出问题了。

And and there's a lot of stuff that needed to move back and forth. So the state of the art back then was a thumb drive. And after graduating from college, a lot of my friends had moved to New York and and I wanted to visit them and I'm to justify taking the trip. I'm like, oh, I'll get all this work done because I'll bring all my stuff with me. And then I get on the bus and realized something had gone wrong.

我忘带U盘了，把它落在家里电脑上。于是原本计划在往返巴士上各工作四五个小时的我彻底没辙了。那时候从波士顿到纽约的唐人街巴士上既没有WiFi——那还是iPhone和WiFi普及前的年代。

I had forgotten my thumb drive. I'd like left it in my computer at home. And so then instead of having this like, you know, four or five hours each way on the bus to work, I was just like out of luck. And this was there were no there's no, like, Wi Fi on the Chinatown bus from Boston to New York back then. This was, like, pre iPhone, pre Wi Fi.

而且我笔记本里连《恶搞之家》之类的剧集都没存。我只能干坐着自我厌恶。虽然我平时很散漫，但这次我下定决心再也不让这种事发生。后来我开始写代码解决这个问题——其实用户只有我自己。之前也遇到过类似情况，我决定要彻底解决这个痛点。

And, you know, may I didn't have any, like, Family Guy episodes on my laptop or anything. So I was just, like, doing nothing and just, like, hating myself. And I'm, I'm so disorganized, but then I'm, like, I never wanna have this problem again. And then I started coding more just, again, for customer was just me. I had had issues like this before, and I'm like, I have no I wanna, like, permanently solve this problem.

不过这并非什么重大顿悟，更像是众多业余项目中的一个。但这个项目很快吸引了我全部精力，因为我意识到：这对我而言是个极其痛苦的问题，更令人沮丧的是，我试遍了所有号称能解决'随处访问文件'的工具，没一个靠谱的。

But it wasn't some, like, grand, you know, revelation. I think it was more just like, oh, yeah. Here's another little side project after it many little side projects. But this was one that really kind of kept pulling me very quickly after starting to work on it because I'm like, oh, this is a really like, this is a really painful problem for me, but then it's also frustrating because I tried all these other tools that are supposed to solve this genre of problems with, getting to your stuff from anywhere, and none of them worked. So Mhmm.

最初这根本不算创业项目，只是作为被科技产品折磨的用户，我实在受够了这种状况。

It it wasn't it didn't start as, a company, but I was like, I really just don't want to deal with this as a frustrated user of technology anymore.

是啊，那些方案确实都不行。我记得当时有很多解决方案，但没一个真正好用的对吧？

Yeah. And nothing did work. And that's what I remember. There were a lot of solutions, but none of them actually were very good. Right?

没错，失败原因五花八门。当时缺乏整体性解决方案，很多初创公司只是零敲碎打地解决问题。你可能需要注册一个备份服务，再注册个大文件分享服务，还要装个电脑间同步工具。

Yeah. And they a bunch of different reasons. I think there's no, like, cohesive holistic solution. So a lot of the other startups at the time kinda nibbled around different edges of the problem. So you'd sign up for one service like backup your computer, but then you'd sign up for another service you needed if you needed to share big files with someone, you'd sign up for another service to, like, sync things between different computers.

首先你得同时用五六个这类工具，其次它们都半吊子。我的测试方法就是去看这些工具的客服论坛——简直像战地医疗帐篷，满屏都是'我的结婚照不见了''报税文件消失了'的哀嚎。

And so, you know, first problem is that you had, like, five of these things. Second problem was that all of them, like, only half worked. So my litmus test for this would be, like, to go in the support forums of these tools, and it would be, like, being like a battlefield medical tent or something like all these poor people are like, oh, my wedding photos are gone. My tax returns are gone. And I'm like, oh my god.

居然没人做出可靠方案。不过当时我也没想着创业，只是觉得：我的文件太重要了，不能交给这些半成品。这需要彻底重新思考——如果有个能自动同步的魔法文件夹就省事多了。

Like nobody has made like a reliable version of this. But again, wasn't like a startup idea. It was just more like I I this is too my stuff is too important to trust to these, like, half baked things. And this, like, really needs a rethink. And, like, it would just be a lot easier if I just had, like, one magical folder that would sync everywhere.

后来是什么让你决定带着这个点子申请YC？是突然意识到这个需求其实很大吗？

So what made you apply to YC with this idea? You thought, wow, actually this is pretty big and there is a need. I think I'll try it?

是啊是啊。我看到亚当那帮人搬到旧金山后玩得多开心，他们几乎都是大学一毕业就一起过去的。大家那时都玩疯了，那真是个疯狂的时代，因为Justin TV就是其中一家公司。他们就像《楚门的世界》那样全天候直播一群创业极客写代码、开公司、开着Zipcar在旧金山到处转悠的生活。

Yeah. Yeah. And I just saw how much fun that Adam and, you know, all the that that whole cohort of people who had all moved to San Francisco, like right out of college together. Everybody was just having a blast and, you know, it is a wild time because Justin TV was one of the companies. And so they would, you know, it's kind of like Truman Show twenty four seven broadcast of like a bunch of startup nerds, like writing code and starting companies and, you know, riding around in zip cars around San Francisco.

但我当时有种强烈的错失恐惧症（FOMO），其实我甚至不太在意自己有什么创业点子，就单纯想进Y Combinator或者那个创业生态圈。不过后来明显觉得Dropbox更适合我，毕竟那时我已经做了几年SAT备考辅导，开始感到倦怠——现在回头看更明显。虽然我像其他人一样喜欢标准化考试，但某天突然意识到：'我再也编不出关于平行线或孟菲斯凌晨4:22发车的火车的数学题了'。那时我总被其他事情分心，直到那次公交灵感和项目启动后，我就完全沉迷于解决这个问题了。

But I just felt had this big FOMO where it was actually like, I didn't even really care that much about what idea I had. I just wanted to get into Y Combinator or wanted to get into that ecosystem, but it was also pretty clear that Dropbox was something that was like a better fit for me personally because I had done the SAT prep thing for a couple years at that point and was kind of burning out on it, especially it's more obvious in hindsight. I was like, you know, as much as I love the standardized tests as much as anyone can, at some point you you're like, I don't know if I can write another question, like math question for a fake test about parallel lines or like the train leaving Memphis at 04:22. And I was just like, I can't and I just kept thinking distracted by other stuff. But then after having that ride on the bus and starting it, I was just like just became obsessed with solving this problem.

后来很明显这是个适合Y Combinator的项目。我当时白天还在做工程师的工作，结果连YC录取都没等到就辞职了，心想'我要全力投入这个，最坏能怎样呢？'

And then it was very clear that this would be a a good candidate for for Y Combinator. I mean, I was even working at another job, like as an engineer during the day. So I like quit that job even before getting into YC, because I'm like, I I just wanna go all in on this and, know, what's what's the worst that could happen?

我能稍微回溯一下吗？你从小就有造东西的习惯吗？比如第一次编程是几岁？

Can I quickly back up? I wanna just ask you, did you grow up building things? Like how old were you when you first started programming?

对，我从小就爱捣鼓东西。五岁写了第一行代码——我爸在客厅放了台PCjr电脑，那是我们的'秘密基地'。

Yeah. I grew up building things all the time. I I my first line of code was I was like five. My parents yeah. My dad had a PC junior in the living room and that was like our thing.

他先教我打游戏，后来我想自己做游戏。大概五六岁时他教我写BASIC代码，小孩子时间多嘛，我提前完成了'一万小时定律'的训练量。

He would show me how to play games on it and then I wanted to make my own games. Ah. Okay. He showed me my first like lines of basic code when I was like five or six, but then you have a lot of time on your hands as little kids. So I got, you know, I got my like ten thousand hours in way ahead of schedule Wow.

在编程方面。

When it came to programming.

我也在波士顿郊区长大，但从没接触过编程或创业。你那时除了父亲的PCjr还接触过什么？

I grew up outside of Boston too, and I was never exposed to programming or startups. What kind of things were you exposed to back then besides your dad's PC junior?

其实我是通过游戏进入编程和创业的。先玩游戏，然后想自己做游戏，就这样先学了BASIC，后来是Pascal、C等语言。我第一份非保姆的工作是给现在所谓的'大型多人在线游戏'公司当程序员——最初其实是免费测试员。

It was really I got into programming, and I got into startups through playing games. So initially, I would play the games, and then I wanna make my own games. So that's really how I learned programming first in basic, then in Pascal and c and a bunch of other languages. And my first job my first programming job, my first, like, non babysitting job was actually for this this game company that was building what we would now call, like, a massively multiplayer online game. And I signed up to be a beta tester for free.

但测试游戏很无聊，因为开发进度慢。我就开始研究游戏底层代码，发现各种安全问题，然后冒充开发者给自己发消息说'伙计们，这里需要修复'。

But I found, like, the testing testing the game is kinda boring because it just took took the developers a long time to make it. And so I there wasn't that much to do. So I started poking around under the hood of the game and finding all these security problems. And so, like, I would like send the developers like messages from themselves being like, hey, guys, you should

真的要靠他们自己来解决这个问题。是的。

really fix this in this. From themselves. Yeah.

那简直就像，你知道的，在游戏里用闪电球杀死所有人，有点像是，嗯，一些不当行为。但最终，我联系了他们，我说，嘿，你们应该这样修复系统，而且不该信任这个。明白吗？

That's so You know, killing everybody in the game with lightning bolts and things like I mean, know, a little bit of malfeasance. But eventually, I was like, I reached out to them. I'm like, hey. You should, like, here's how to fix the system and this, and you shouldn't trust this. And you know?

他们回复说，酷，你想帮我们解决这个问题吗？因为我们有个程序员刚辞职。我说，嗯，我不打算搬到科罗拉多，我住在波士顿。

And they're like, cool. Do you wanna fix that for us? Because one of our programmers just quit. And I'm like, well, I'm not gonna move to Colorado. Like, I live in Boston.

但如果可以远程工作，而且如果我爸爸能代签文件（因为我还不到18岁），那好吧，我们干吧。于是我得到了一份远程编程工作，持有一家毫无价值的初创公司股权，那是几次类似经历中的第一次。哇。

But if I can do it remotely, and if it's okay if that my dad signs the paperwork because I'm not 18, then, yeah, let's do it. So I I had a remote programming job. I had equity worthless equity in a startup that never went anywhere. It was the first of a few of those experiences. Wow.

总之，我原以为自己会成为一名职业游戏开发者，但那段远程经历没持续多久，几个月后我转到了另一家本地初创公司做更常规的实习，他们不做游戏。后来我本想继续做游戏开发并创作自己的东西，但最终转向了直接创业，开任何公司都行。其实我也不确定最初这种冲动从何而来。

But yeah. So I I just sort of I I thought I was gonna be a career game developer, but then that, like, remote experience, it didn't last. It was a few months that bridged me to getting a more, like, normal, like, internship at another local startup, which wasn't doing games. But then but yeah, I thought I was gonna be a game developer, but then and and just make my own stuff and then that shifted to just starting the company, any company. I'm not really sure where that initial instinct came from.

这显然由来已久。我是说，你五六岁就接触了BASIC语言。好吧，这就解释了一切。

Well, it clearly goes way back. I mean, you're Yeah. You saw your first lines of basic when you were five or six. Okay. That explains everything.

于是你开始全职投入Dropbox，辞掉工作申请YC，收到保罗的邮件说'我们想邀请你面试，但顺便说，你最好找个联合创始人'对吧？

So you start working on Dropbox full time. You quit your job. You apply to YC. You get an email from Paul that says we'd like to invite you to interview, but by the way, you should probably get a co founder. Right?

是啊，那段时间挺难的。在SAT备考公司工作有个好处，就是你必须了解大学录取流程。YC申请很像这个——核心问题是申请者众多而名额有限。

Yeah. Yeah. That was rough because I mean, one good thing about working on the SAT prep company was you had to understand college admissions. And and why see it was a lot like that. Like, fundamental issue is, like, there's a million people applying for, not many spots.

所以问题就像大学申请一样：能否找到某种亮点或差异化？或者有没有旁门可走？我尝试过几种进入YC的'偏门'方法都不太顺利。除了在那次晚餐上出丑，我还曾试图在申请前突击参加YC晚餐，想提前给保罗看Dropbox demo——因为在收到那封邮件前我就开始找联合创始人，有个人说'如果保罗觉得这项目靠谱我就加入'。

And so the question is, like, as with college admissions, can you get some kind of hook or differentiate yourself or, you know, is there some kind of side door? So I tried to find a couple side doors into YC that didn't go very well. One was besides like embarrassing myself at that dinner, that wasn't the only thing. Like I also tried to drop in at one of the YC dinners before the application to see if Paul would be willing to see an early demo of Dropbox because I during that co founder hunt, which started before that Paul email, one guy was like, I'd be interested in joining if I if Paul thinks this is a good idea. So I'm like, okay, I'll drop by the YC dinner because I was in California for the few days.

结果搞砸了。不请自来果然是个馊主意。唉。

And like that did not go well. I was like showing up unannounced was like a bad idea. Oh, no.

保罗会感到非常内疚的。

Paul's gonna feel really guilty.

不，不。这让我感到尴尬。完全是的。没错。

No. No. This is making me cringe. Totally. Yeah.

不，这完全是应得的。那是一段艰难时期，不仅没有得到反馈，我觉得招生办主任也不喜欢我。但是

No. It was totally deserved. It was a rough, like, a rough period being like like, they all not only did I not get feedback, but I think the dean of admissions is not a fan of me. But

但是等等。你成功向特雷弗展示了演示，就是那些严肃的系统编程内容，保罗可能根本理解不了，而特雷弗明白了。他当时说，这真的很棒。所以我们邀请了你。是的。

But but hold on. So You managed to show the demo to Trevor who, you know, the serious systems programming stuff that Paul wouldn't have even understood anyway, and Trevor got it. And he was Trevor was like, this is really good. So we invited you to an to this. Yeah.

对。顺便说一句，你在那次晚餐上提问时并没有让自己难堪。我只是想借此机会教你一些东西。

Right. And by the way, you did not embarrass yourself at that dinner where you asked questions. I just like to teach you about it.

嗯，我是说，事情还在继续，因为我去了那家初创公司。YC每年都会举办创业学校，之后还有小型聚会。我就延续了那种风格，真的带着笔记本电脑在聚会上走来走去，向任何愿意听的人展示，'看，这就是Dropbox，它能做所有这些事'。但这一切都是为了，怎么说呢，即使牺牲一些尊严也要让自己脱颖而出。

Well, I mean, it it continued because I went to that start up so YC does a start up school every year and there's little, you know, after party thing. And so I I was like in a in that vein of being that guy. I was literally like walking around the party with a laptop, like showing anyone who who would listen like, oh, yeah. This is Dropbox. It does all but but again, was all in service of like, how do I sort of differentiate myself even at the cost of some dignity, I guess.

但不对。德鲁，你在坚持。这说明你就是要冲破重重阻碍。懂吗？如果有人那样拒绝我，我早就消失了。

But No. But you're persevering, Drew. This is like an indication that you were just going through walls. You know? If someone had told me no like that, I would have disappeared.

你没有消失。你坚持下来了。

You didn't disappear. You stuck with it.

是的。永不言弃的机智。让我们努力践行这一点吧。

Yeah. The relentlessly resourceful. Let's let's try to embody that.

所以你参加了创业学校的聚会，展示演示，我们邀请了你。嗯。告诉我们你是怎么找到阿拉什的，我知道我们节目里请过凯尔·沃格特，他提到是他介绍你们认识的。

So you come to the startup school party, you show demos, we invite you. You Mhmm. Tell us how you got Arash because I know we had Kyle Vogt on the on the show and he talked about how he had introduced you guys.

是的。所以我当时只是想去旧金山拜访一下，见见这些人，包括你提到的凯尔·沃伊特，他是Justin TV的创始人。这就是我认识他的背景，我们在MIT相识，因为他比我低几届。我们在创业者俱乐部相遇。我去旧金山主要是为了寻找潜在的联合创始人，就像摇树摘果一样。

Yep. So I had I I would just like visit the visit San Francisco and visit all these guys including Kyle Voigt, who you mentioned, who's who started Justin TV. So that was the context where I knew him, and I had met him at MIT because he was a few years behind me. And we met each other at the entrepreneurs club. And I would just go to San Francisco and kinda try to shake the trees for potential co founders basically.

我会问：‘你知道有什么合适的人选吗？知道谁比较厉害吗？’然后凯尔提到他宿舍有个叫阿拉什的室友，也在MIT参加过编程比赛，可能适合和我聊聊。于是凯尔介绍我们认识了。

I'd be like, alright. Do you know anyone good? Do know anyone good? And then Arash Kyle mentioned that he had a floor mate from his dorm named Arash who also did like programming competitions in MIT and might be someone for me to talk to. And so Kyle introduced us.

我去了MIT的学生中心，因为阿拉什当时还在上大学，大概是大三或大四。我开始试探他是否愿意辍学加入——要知道干这事就得放弃学业。我们是在某个周一见的面，我本以为这需要个过程，比如得打电话给他父母证明我不是什么怪人之类的。但阿拉什出人意料地（或者说我们俩都挺莽的），几天后就真的辍学加入了。我们组队后去YC面试了。另一个帮我们进入YC的关键是，我做了个演示视频发到Hacker News上。

I went down to the student center at MIT because he was still Arash was still in college, like he was maybe a junior or senior. And I started chipping away at him to see if he'd be willing to you you would have to drop out of school to do this. So I was you know, we met on a we met on, like, a Monday or something, and I'm expecting, you know, for this to be a a process and, like, to have to, like, call his parents to convince him I'm not some weirdo and things like that. But to Hiraj's kind of enormous credit or maybe our collective folly, like we just he just dropped out of school a couple days later to do this and we threw in together and went to go interview at YC. And the and the other thing we did that helped get us into YC was I made this like demo video and put it on Hacker News.

这个视频确实起了作用，因为它其实带着那种大学招生式的思维。我读过一本叫《游击营销》的书，讲的是没钱时如何吸引产品关注。这些策略就是书中案例的实践。于是我做了这个Dropbox演示视频，想着保罗·格雷厄姆（YC创始人）每天大概率和我们一样会刷Hacker News。

And so that also played a role here because that that was actually that video, again, like through that college admissions kind of thinking, and I'd read a book called Guerrilla Marketing, like how do you attract attention to your product or service if you have no money? So these kinds of tactics were like an example of what the book talked about. And so I made this like demo video of Dropbox. I figured like, well, what does Paul likely do most days? Like, probably what the rest of us do, like hit refresh on Hacker News.

我就想，如果能在那儿引起他注意，或许对找联合创始人也有帮助。果然，我做了个三分钟的视频（现在还能搜到），结果在Hacker News榜首挂了两天。

So I'm like, oh, if I can get in front of him there, maybe that'll be good. And then maybe that'll also help with this like co founder search. And sure enough, I I made this like three minute video. It's still out there. And it hit the top of hacker news for, two days.

哇哦。

Oh, wow.

虽然收到些 colorful 的评论和质疑，但主要是让我们有了知名度，引起了保罗注意。实际上在凯尔介绍前，阿拉什就看过这视频。这成了Dropbox从概念转向落地的关键转折点。

They got some, like, colorful, you know, comments and skepticism. And so but, like, mostly it just could put us on the map and, like, got Paul's attention. Actually, Rasha had seen the video before Kyle introduced us. So that ended up being, like, the most pivotal thing to get Dropbox to transition from kind of just being this concept to starting to take on a life of itself.

太棒了。我记得面试时我们都觉得‘这项目绝对行’，所以当场就通过了。

I love it. And I remember the interview. I remember we were all like, oh, yeah. Definitely. So we we said yes.

对了，我刚在听之前对你的采访录音。你当时是...

Now I was listening earlier to this interview I did with you. What were you

准备怎么做？其实还有件事——我们接到通知电话后...

gonna do? Just Well, there's one more one more thing. So after we got the call saying This

这正是我要问你的。这就是我要问你的。讲讲这个故事吧。

is what was gonna ask you about. This is what I'm gonna ask you about. Tell the story.

于是我们愉快地完成了面试。接到保罗的电话说，嘿，我们想投资你们。我们当时觉得太棒了。事情就这样推进着。然后我们回到Zipcar租的车里，结果发现车窗被砸，笔记本电脑被偷了。

So, like, happily, we do the interview. We get a phone call from Paul saying, hey, we'd like to fund you. We're like, this is great. So that's moving forward. And then we go back to our Zipcar and and then we discover that our laptops, the car had been broken into and our laptops were stolen.

不过还好，因为所有资料都在Dropbox上，所以实际上没丢失任何数据。

And but it was okay because like literally all of our stuff was on Dropbox, so we didn't actually lose any data.

哦，那真是

Oh, that's a great

太疯狂了。我都忘了这个故事，卡罗琳。今天早些时候，我重温了2010年和德鲁做的那段尴尬到不行的视频采访。我当时表现太差了，连自己都听不下去。

That is Insane. And I had forgotten that story, Carolyn. And earlier today, I revisited this total cringe worthy video interview that I did with Drew in 2010. It was I was so bad. I couldn't even listen to myself.

但他讲了这个故事，我差点从椅子上摔下来。完全不记得这事。不过我打赌你当时心情不错吧，德鲁。我猜

But he told that story, and I almost fell out of my chair. I did not remember that story. I bet you were in a pretty good mood though, Drew. I bet

我们当时嗨翻了。

you were We were really high.

接到电话后很兴奋。所以我对回忆下融资经历特别感兴趣，因为你们有些有趣的故事。嗯。你们是07年夏季剑桥班的对吧？那时我们还兼顾东西海岸。你们的演讲很有意思，实际上当着观众面删掉了PPT，就为了展示产品功能。

High after that call. So I'm really interested to to reminisce a little bit about fundraising because you had some interesting stories happen. Mhmm. Now you you were in the summer o seven group in Cambridge because it was in the summer when we still did both coasts. And your pitch was very interesting because you actually deleted the PowerPoint mid pitch in front of the audience to sort of showcase how the product worked.

当时这么做紧张吗？

Were you nervous about doing that?

当然。我们总在想怎么脱颖而出。有个小花招就是在演示时关闭并删除文件，然后展示Dropbox能通过版本历史恢复文件。那时候我们忙得昏天暗地，根本没心思想'要是搞砸了怎么办'这种事。

Yeah. I mean, we're always the same thing. We're just like thinking how do we differentiate ourselves? But one of the gimmicks or hooks we put in the in the demo was, yeah, close the presentation, delete it, and then Dropbox lets you like undo or have version history for everything so you could bring back the file. You know, I I think that period was just so, like, sleepless and crazy that I I don't think we even thought about, like, oh, what if this doesn't work?

我们当时就觉得，这必须得成。所有东西都是临时拼凑的，就像用胶带粘起来一样。只有这一条路可走。但最终效果出奇地好，我觉得这点给很多投资人留下了深刻印象。

We're like, this has to work. Everything is, like, duct taped together. Like, there's only one way through this. And but, yeah, it worked great. And I think it was like something that stuck with a lot of the investors.

你曾把那段融资时期形容为疯狂的发烧梦。能详细说说吗？

You once described that fundraising time as a crazy fever dream. Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

那简直太疯狂了。在波士顿，我们做了同样的演示，但投资人基本都在挑刺。他们说'这个领域就是个坟场'、'很多初创公司都失败了'、'谷歌微软会碾碎你们'。

Well, it was wild. The you know, in Boston, we did all the same demo and everything, but mostly the investors just pointed out potential problems. They're like, well, you know, that it's this is not a great there's a lot this is kind of a graveyard. A lot of startups have failed at this. You know, Google, Microsoft are gonna kill you.

说实话他们也没说错，我当时也觉得大概率会这样。但当我们去加州山景城演示完删除后恢复数据的流程——我们是中场休息前最后一组，突然有个投资人冲过走廊。我还以为他是来找我的。

Which by the way, didn't it's not like it's not even wrong. I'm like, that's probably what will happen. But we go to California and we go to Mountain View and, yeah, do the whole delete the pitch and restore it and finish our demo. And we were like the last company before a break, and then this investor comes, like, sprinting up the aisle. And, you know, I'm I'm thinking he's, like, wants to talk to me.

结果他直接掠过我，用波斯语和阿拉什聊起来（他俩都是波斯人）。这位佩吉曼先生突然说'我想天使投资你们'，可我们根本不认识他。

But he, like, blazes by me and starts speaking to Arash in Farsi because they're both Persian. So his name's Pejman. And, you know, this was just like yet another ridiculous thing. So he he so he's like, you guys, I'd love to talk to you about angel investing. And, you know, we we didn't really know who he was.

连他公司都没听过。我满脑子问号，但他特别热情诚恳，我们就答应了。

Didn't recognize his firm. So we're trying I was sort of like, who is this guy? But he's very persistent and kind. So he's like, yeah. And we're like, sure.

说好去帕罗奥图拜访。结果当天租了Zipcar赶到大学街时，发现要迟到了——根本找不到停车位。

We'll we'll come visit you in Palo Alto. And then the day comes and we, like, rent a Zipcar and we go down to University Ave. And I'm like, oh, man. We're running late. Where there's there's no parking spot.

好不容易停好车，抬头看见'勋章地毯画廊'的招牌。我核对邮件地址后彻底懵了：既迟到又迷路。

Okay. We find one. And then I look up and I'm like, medallion rug gallery. I'm like, that doesn't I'm like checking the email on my phone. I'm like I'm like, now I'm late and I'm lost.

虽然门牌号没错，我还是硬着头皮推门，对着前台说'非常抱歉打扰，请问佩吉曼在这里吗？'

And so we like open the door, but I'm it is that same street number. So okay. Like, let's see what happens. And I open the door and I'm like, I'm so sorry to bother you, the receptionist. But like, is Pedro on here?

她爽快回答'当然'。环顾四周才发现，这里真是卖地毯的，还有顾客在挑地毯。

And she's like, oh, yeah. Absolutely. And of course, the and you look around, it's like rugs and people looking at rugs.

我知道徽章地毯画廊。这就是为什么我笑得特别厉害。

I know medallion rug gallery. That's why I'm laughing extra hard.

我想我知道

I think I know

它也是。是的。但后来发现，当然，帕洛阿尔托的地毯画廊有一个秘密的后门通向一个为初创公司路演准备的会议室。所以我们和他谈了Dropbox，他和Pejman，真的很贴心。他为我们引荐了红杉资本。

it too. Yeah. So then but it turns out, of course, Palo Alto, the the the rug gallery has like a secret back exit into a boardroom that's set up for startup pitches. And so he so we, like, talked to him about Dropbox and he and Pejman, it's really sweet. He's, made an introduction to Sequoia.

而且，你知道，我们当时觉得我们还没准备好。这应该晚点再谈，但他又一次非常坚持和友善。于是转眼间，我们周五就到了红杉资本的办公室。Pejman和我们一起去了，所以他算是和我们一起坐在路演现场，后来我才知道这很不寻常。那天晚上我接到我们那边合伙人的紧急电话，说，嘿。

And, you know, we we were like, we're not ready for this. Like, we're that that that should come later, but he was, again, very persistent and kind. And so next thing we knew, we're at Sequoia's offices on a Friday. Pejman came with us, and so he was, like, sort of sitting with us in the pitch, which is, I learned later, quite unorthodox. I think I get a urgent phone call that night from from our partner there saying, like, hey.

Mike Moritz想见你。我们希望你和整个合伙人团队见面，但Mike不会在场。他只能明天周六早上见面。所以我说，好的。可以。

Mike Moritz wants to meet you. We'd like you to just meet the partnership, but Mike's not gonna be there. He can only meet on Saturday morning tomorrow morning. So I'm like, okay. Yes.

然后我们问，哦，你想在哪里见面？我说，北滩有很多不错的咖啡店，或者你可以来Dropbox世界总部，算是开个玩笑。他说，哦，太好了。地址是什么？

And then we're like, oh, where do wanna meet? Well, I'm like, well, there's a lot of great, like, coffee shops in North Beach or you can come to Dropbox World HQ, sort of as joke. And he's like, oh, great. Yeah. What's the address?

我们会去的。你知道，我环顾我们的公寓。这是公司提供的住房。我们刚搬回来，甚至还没拆箱，因为我们几天前才搬到加州。

We'll be there. And, you know, I'm looking around our apartment. It's like corporate housing. It's like, we've moving back. We haven't even like unpacked our stuff because we'd only been in, like, moved to California a few days before.

所以我们开始打扫，我记得那天早上，我心想，糟糕。我们没有饮料什么的。所以我跑到哥伦布咖啡馆，买了一堆伏特加。我们在客厅里给Mike做路演，我们的另一个噱头是用手机拍照，然后照片会自动保存到Dropbox。哦。

So we're like cleaning up and I remember the morning of, I'm like, oh shit. We don't have any like, drinks or anything. So I like run down to the Columbus Cafe, buy a bunch of vodualas. And we pitch Mike in our living room and another one of our gimmicks was like we would take photos during our on our phones, and then the the photos would save to Dropbox. And so Oh.

我们有一张很棒的照片，Mike和Pejman就坐在我们后来玩Xbox和Rock Band的沙发上。周六，我们和Mike聊了聊，他面无表情，只是问了一些关于竞争的问题，其他没说什么。周一我们向红杉资本的合伙人团队做了路演，当晚就达成了100万美元种子轮的口头协议。所以，一个工作日内搞定，太疯狂了。然后一周后，或者几天后，你要处理的事情就是他们说的，好吧。

We have this great great photo of, like, Mike sitting Mike and Pejman just sitting on our couch where we would play, like, Xbox and Rock Band later. And so Saturday, we talked to Mike, had a pretty good poker face, just, you know, asked a little bit about competition, but otherwise didn't say much. Pitched the partnership at Sequoia on a Monday, and that night had a handshake deal for a million dollar seed round. So, like, one business day turnaround, which was nuts. And then a week later or, you know, a couple days the kinds of things you have to deal with here are like they're like, okay.

太好了。恭喜。这太棒了。给我们你的汇款信息。我们说，什么？

Great. Congrats. This is awesome. Send us your wiring instructions. And we're like, what?

去剑桥银行。对吧？

To the Cambridge bank. Right?

当时的情况是，我们就在购物中心——剑桥侧廊商场里的美国银行开了个企业账户。然后我们就想，天哪，我甚至不知道这账户能不能电汇？于是我和阿拉什走到美国银行的北滩分行，你知道这些银行的布局，有柜员窗口，还有皮椅区，我们觉得这应该是皮椅区业务，就坐下了。

It was like, we set up a business account literally in the the mall, like the Cambridge side Galleria in the, yeah, the Bank of America there. And so we're like, oh god. I don't even know if it does this have wiring capabilities? Like so, like, Arash and I walk to the North Beach branch of Bank of America and, you know, like, the way these things are laid out, there's like the, you know, the tellers and then there's like the leather seat people, and we're like, think this is a leather seat thing. So we're like, grab a seat.

我把公司借记卡递给她，她正在调取账户信息，可能看到里面只有60美元左右。我问她这个账户有存款上限吗？她反问什么意思？

I hand her my like corporate debit card. She's like pulling up the account. She probably sees it has like $60 in it. And I'm like, is there a limit to how much this bank account can hold? And she's like, what do you mean?

我说没有上限吗？又问能存一百万美元吗？她说应该可以。我再问能帮我们处理电汇吗？我们当时穿着连帽衫、短裤和人字拖，邋里邋遢的。

Like, no. And I'm like, can it hold like a million dollars? She's like, I guess. And I'm like, is there can you help us with the wires? You know, we're like disheveled, like hoodies and shorts and flip flops.

天知道她当时怎么想的，但总之我们拿到了需要的账号信息。后来我就像过圣诞一样不停刷新页面

So like, God only knows what she thought it was, but we got the numbers we needed. And then sure enough, you know, I'm hitting, like, refresh, like, Christmas

嗯。

Yeah.

看着我们美国银行的账户余额从60美元变成1,200,060美元。

On our Bank of America account, watching it go from, like, $60 to, like, 1,200,000.0 and $60.

这故事太疯狂了。马瑞兹周六早上还坐在你们没家具的公寓里，周一联系了合伙人，第二天钱就到账了。简直不可思议。

That's just the wildest story. And to have Maritz sitting in your unfurnished apartment, you know, on a Saturday morning, and Monday hit up the partnership and the money wired the next day. I mean, it's insane.

是啊，精彩的故事。她当时肯定按了桌下的安保呼叫按钮，保安估计就在附近盯着呢。绝对的。

Yeah. That's a great story. She probably hit that button under her desk that calls security. They were probably hovering. Totally.

没错。现在，

Yeah. Now,

你不必指名道姓，但能讲讲我最喜欢的那个关于波士顿风投的故事吗？你可以就说那位你认识的波士顿风投。你在想是哪件事吗？对。好的。

you don't have to name names, but please, will you tell my favorite story about the VC in Boston? You can just say the VC in Boston who you had known. Are you thinking what the story is? Yeah. Okay.

我想有好几个。东海岸有好几位风投。我是说，特别有一位在我们获得融资后——我当时一直

I think there are a couple. There are couple East Coast VCs. I mean, there's one in particular that after we got a I I had been

像是在交谈

like talking

和他保持联系。对。比如，他早就

to him the whole time. Yeah. Like, I He had

认识你。和你有交情。我先铺垫下背景，因为Carolyn不知道这事。我们邀请他是因为Drew认识他，问他能不能来剑桥的路演日？他来了，我送别时他说‘谢谢，这活动挺可爱的’。

known you. He had a relationship with you. And let me just set the table because Carolyn doesn't know this. He we invited him because Drew knew him and was like, will you invite him to demo day to the demo day in Cambridge? And he came, And I was saying goodbye to him and he's like, oh, thanks.

用‘可爱’形容活动。现在可以讲故事了。

That was really cute. Called the event cute. Yeah. So tell the story now.

天啊。对。我当时在Bit nine公司做工程师，主要做应用白名单和网络安全，其实和Dropbox遇到的问题很像。总之他是那家风投机构的合伙人，人特别好。我认识他是因为我是工程师，认识那家公司的创始人——后来那些创始人也投资了我们。

Oh, man. Yeah. So I had been working as an engineer at this company called Bit nine doing a lot of kinda application whitelisting and security stuff, which actually had a lot in common with the kinds of problems that we saw with Dropbox. But anyway, so he was the one of the venture investors, the partners. Was actually really kind and, like, I got to know him because I was an engineer and I knew the founders of of that company who ended up founders ended up investing and doing well.

我从餐巾纸创业阶段到Y Combinator期间都和他聊Dropbox。他来了路演日但没表态。等我们去了加州拿到红杉的条款书，他突然出现说‘我们可以给你无上限票据’。我说‘这有点晚了吧’。

But I I talked to him about Dropbox, like, from the napkin stage through Y Combinator. And I guess he came to demo day, but didn't actually engage. Then we go out to California, we get a term sheet from Sequoia, he comes back. He's like, we'll give you any it'll we'll give you, like, a totally uncapped on, you know, note. And I'm like, it's a little late to Yeah.

他不是传真了份数字空白的条款书给你吗？

Didn't he say didn't he fax you a term sheet with empty numbers?

可能吧——记不清了。太疯狂了。

That's Maybe maybe recollection. It was crazy.

我比你更记得这个故事，这真的很可悲吗？因为我只是觉得这简直是最疯狂的故事。我相信他给你传真了一份条款清单，是的，估值那些地方都是空白的。

Is this really sad that I remember this story better than you do? Because I just I just felt like this is the most insane story. I believe he faxed you a term sheet Yeah. With blank spaces for the valuation and stuff Evaluation.

让你自己填。对。对。

To fill it out. Yep. Yep.

那真是绝望时刻的表现。

That's desperation time right there.

很疯狂，但他本可以在其他人之前投资的。这恰恰说明了，是的，多么...

It's crazy, but he could have invested before anyone else. It just goes to show Yeah. What a

疯狂 这很艰难。我是说，我不怪...我不太责怪那些早期投资者，或者说潜在投资者，因为...我为类似的情况感到难过，因为他...他看到了尴尬的青春期阶段。大多数演示日的投资者看到的是一个非常...他显然还是应该投资这家公司的。但你知道，人们指出的很多问题，比如竞争问题，我就想，是啊。

crazy It's rough. I mean, I think it I don't blame like, it's I don't blame some of the early investors too much because I or pros you know, prospective investors because, like well, I I feel bad for something like that because he's like you know, he he saw the awkward adolescence. Like, most of the demo day investors saw, like, a very kind of airtight I mean, he should have still invested in the company, obviously. But, you know and a lot of the things that people pointed out is, like, competitive problems. I'm like, yeah.

我同意你的看法。是啊，我们很可能会被微软、谷歌或雅虎这些公司干掉。那时候。是啊，我们可能会死。

I agree with you. Like, yeah. We probably will get killed by Microsoft or Google or Yahoo, these companies Yeah. Back then. Like, yeah, we're probably gonna die.

然后我们会做点别的。所以我真的不怪人们有那种看法，因为那时候太早期了，太原始了。

Like and then we'll do something else. Like so I I I don't really blame people for having that kind of perspective because it was, like, so early and so, like, raw back then.

这观点很大度。

That's a generous perspective.

做得好，Pageman，能看出这是一家多么伟大的公司，你们是多么伟大的创始人，还真的帮你们牵线搭桥。我是说，这也是故事中如此精彩绝伦的一面。是啊。好了，所以你现在在加州。

Good work, Pageman, for seeing what a great company it was and what great founders you were and really helping you guys with the introduction. I mean, that is just that's also such an amazing fabulous side of the story. Yeah. Okay. So you're now out in California.

你们搬进了Y Scraper。你们就像在那里扎根了。所以是Justin TV那帮人，Zobny，

You've moved into the Y Scraper. You are like in the zone there. So it was the Justin TV guys, Zobny,

Scribd、Weebly、Reddit。没错，就是这些公司。

Scribd, Weebly, Reddit. Yep. All those guys.

你在那里是什么感觉？是完成了大量工作，还是主要社交场合，或者其他什么？

Did you what was it like? Did you get a lot of work done there or was that your social scene or what?

兼而有之。它之所以成为这些创始人的热门落脚点，是因为按月租赁的企业住房全配齐。所以你有基本配置，生活方式与刚大学毕业的人非常契合，就像从大学宿舍过渡到创业宿舍，生活方式很相似。

All of the above. It was what was great the reason that became such a popular landing site for these founders was because it was month to month, how, like, corporate housing fully furnished. So you Yes. Have, like, basic, like, so you're kinda, like, kitted out enough, and there's very compatible lifestyle wise with people who are just, like, graduated from college, and then it's sort of, like, going from, you know, a a college dorm to, a startup dorm. So, like, the lifestyle is very similar.

我们抵达后的第一件事就是租车去宜家，买些廉价家具，摆好电脑。这是每位新员工的必经仪式——‘欢迎加入Dropbox’。我们的首位员工Aston就经历了这个传统：订购所有电脑配件并组装。

And the first thing we would do after landing was rent a car, go to IKEA, get like cheap furniture, set up our computers. And that was like that was like the pilgrimage we made with every new employee. It's like, alright. Welcome to Dropbox. Like, Aston, our first employee is like, go to have this ritual around, like, order all your computer parts and see and modes.

好的，所以你们带他们去宜家了？

Yeah. Okay. So you took them to to Ikea?

对。我们先把电脑配件寄到Dropbox总部或我们的小公寓，然后去机场接人，直奔宜家买同样的桌子和廉价椅子。首要任务就是组装电脑——这就是当时的入职培训全部内容。

Yeah. We're like, first, like, ship all your computer parts to Dropbox HQ or our little apartment. And then, you know, pick them up from the airport, go to IKEA, get the same table and, you know, cheap chair and everything. And first task is like build your computer and that was like the onboarding. That was That's the extent of onboarding at times

我想问，当时银行里有120万美元，你们是立刻开始招聘吗？具体计划是怎样的？最终招了多少人？

like I'm just gonna ask what you had you had 1,200,000 in the bank. Did you did you hire right away with that money? Like, what what were your plan? Yeah. So you how many people did you hire?

我们最初大概招了8到10个人。

We probably got up to around 10 people, eight or nine people on that first

但你们没法...

But you couldn't but

没法全安置在Wisecraper吧？是不是得另找办公室？

you couldn't keep them all in the Wisecraper. Did you have to go get a new office?

我们确实需要换新办公室。我们曾尝试把六个人塞进两居室公寓，就像把沙发竖起来腾空间那样。翻看那些照片时，我发现我们把沙发直立起来就为多放一张办公桌，简直像贫民窟。所以是的。

We did have to get a new office. We certainly tried to we put we put, like, six people in a two bedroom apartment, you know, like like flipping up a sofa. I mean, I was going through some of those those pictures. I was like, we we've we've put one of the sofas up vertically so we can make room for another desk, And it was squalor. So yes.

出于诸多原因，我们不得不找新办公室。后来我们在科尔尼街的沃尔格林药店楼上随便租了间办公室，最终搬了进去。从2007年9月红杉资本首轮种子投资开始，到产品公开发布及一年后的A轮融资，我们都在那里办公。

Like, for many many reasons, we had to get get a new office. So we we got some random office space above the Walgreens on Kearny Street and eventually moved in there. And that took us from kind of September 2007 when Sequoia first did the seed round through our public launch and our series a a year later.

哦，不错。

Oh, nice.

当时市场竞争激烈。所有人都在抱怨'不想投资你们，赛道太拥挤''会被谷歌碾压'。为什么Dropbox能成功？这正是它的美妙之处——

Okay. It was a crowded space. Everyone was complaining, oh, we don't wanna fund you too crowded or you're gonna get squashed by Google. Why did Dropbox work? Because that was the beauty of Dropbox.

它确实成功了。这是个优雅、美妙又简洁的解决方案。是因为你和阿拉什编程水平高超，还是你们做了些别人没注意到的事？

It actually worked. It was this elegant Yeah. Wonderful, simple solution that worked. Was it because you and Arash were great programmers, or was there something that you guys did that other people didn't see?

我认为两者兼有。每个初创公司都需要些运气——幸运的是当时大公司都没开发出好用的同类产品。但时机也很关键，加上我们的工程实现和其他因素最终起了决定性作用。真正的难点在于要跨多个不同领域都做对。

I think it was a little of both. And I think you also need like, every startup needs some measure of luck. So I think there's luck in that none of the bigger companies built, like, good versions of this earlier. But there were a lot of things that were sort of the timing was right, and then the engineering execution and some other things ended up being really critical. So I think what made it hard was you had to get some things right across some pretty different disciplines.

首先是同步准确性问题。多数人的同步体验都很糟糕——就像早年用PalmPilot时数据错乱那样。这本质是个数学难题，算法和正确性方面绝不能出错。

So one problem is that it's correctness. Right? So most people's experience with sync is that it, like, doesn't work and it breaks all your things, you know, and that's that's like forget files, but like your even like your PalmPilot back in the day. Like, you'd have problems with sync. And reason you have problems with sync is because it's like a actually, like a mathematically pretty tricky problem, and there's like a whole correctness and algorithmic piece of it, which you just can't get wrong.

我在MIT最喜欢算法和分布式系统这类课程。但另一方面还需要深入操作系统底层做云适配——在无法获取Windows和Mac源码的情况下。其他应用的缺陷在于操作后缺乏视觉反馈。

And like, I love that stuff. So I'd like those are my favorite classes at MIT, like algorithms distribute systems. And that that's more of a mathy abstract thing. Then there's, like, a whole grungy different like, systems engineering, which is more like getting into the guts of an operating system and basically cloud enabling, you know, Windows and Mac without the source code. And one of the problems with the other apps is, like, you could you had no visual feedback when you change something.

我们决定用绿色勾号表示已同步，蓝色图标表示同步中。这种视觉反馈很重要，但Mac系统本身不提供这种机制。最后我们不得不像开发恶意软件那样劫持Finder，在窗口刷新时绘制图标——这些技巧来自我先前工作的安全公司。

And so you didn't know if it was working. And and we're like, well, you should put little green check boxes if it's, like, up to date and a little blue syncing icon if it's, like, being updated or or or not saved yet. So just that visual feedback seemed like a really important piece of of the UI, but there was no mechanism to do that on Mac, for example. So we ended up having to basically use, like, all these malware techniques to like hack up the finder and draw icons whenever the Windows refreshed. You know, I had to I learned that kind of thing from my the security company I'd I'd worked at.

除了科学和工程层面，设计也需克制。早期想要文件同步功能的客户总要求各种复杂设置——比如凌晨5点备份、覆盖9个文件夹之类。这些软件的UI就像车祸现场般混乱。

Yeah. And then so there's sort like the the science and the engineering, and then there's design. Like, you have to build you have to, like, have some restraint in what the UI of this thing should be. And so for example, actually, lot of the early customers who wanted, like, Windows file synchronization software were pretty bad because they actually wanted, like, all the knobs and dials and, like, oh, we should do backups at 5AM and should cover these nine folders. But you look at the the interfaces for these the UIs of these things were just like a car crash with, like, all these complicated settings.

所以我们不得不设立严格限制，决定只做一个文件夹，并真正把设计和易用性做到位。这种坚持源于，除了是那个六岁就玩游戏、尝试写游戏的孩子，我还是邻居们常叫去修电脑的小孩。现在我在Dropbox也经常扮演IT支持的角色。

And so we had to, like, really have restraints to be like, no. It's gonna be one folder, and we're gonna really get the design and ease of use right. And the impart of where that came from was, in addition to being the, you know, six year old who was playing games and trying to write games, you know, I was also the kid that was called in by neighbors to like fix their computer. So and I'm still like the IT guy at Dropbox often.

天啊。我

Oh my god. I

热爱...因此你会对电脑上哪些操作简单、哪些困难有更直观的体会。我认为这种共情能力非常重要。另外，大学时我还用Photoshop给兄弟会做T恤，甚至伪造过假身份证。

love And so you you get kind of an appreciation or like a much more visceral sense of like what is easy and what is hard on a computer. And so I think that empathy was really important. And then, I mean, random stuff. Like, I made, like, t shirts and Photoshop for my fraternity when I was in college. Made fake fake IDs.

哇不是吧。你造假证。赚到钱了吗？

Oh. No way. You made fake IDs. Made money.

利润丰厚的生意啊。

A lucrative business.

时效过了。

Did limitation is up.

怎么...

How did

没赚钱。我没卖它们。

Didn't make any money. I didn't sell them.

等等，为什么不卖？你是白送给别人的？

Wait. Why not? You didn't sell you gave them to people?

我...我是按材料成本价卖的，就...

I I I save I I mean, I sold them at, like, cost of materials to, like, have

德鲁，你想知道现在这些东西卖多少钱吗？我刚好知道行情。

Do do you wanna know what they go for these days, Drew? I happen to know this.

不知道。不。知道。或者说，是啊。那那是从哪来的

Don't know. No. Know. Or so yeah. What what is what is that from

中国产的，大概200美元。好吧。很便宜。

China and they're about $200. Okay. Just cheap.

我以为你是 是啊。就像是

I thought you were Yeah. It's like

我们说的是青少年市场。你不能定价太高。所以有人发现200美元是个甜蜜点——青少年能凑出这笔钱。

We're talking about teenagers here. You can't you can't charge too much. But so I someone figured out that's the sweet spot. Teenagers can scrape together $200.

哇。但然后是啊。所以这里有个线索。就像，像是逆向工程。

Wow. But then yeah. So there's yeah. There's a thread here. Like, it's like reverse engineer.

我当时会借我妈妈的驾照拍照，网上有些模板——在互联网的阴暗角落。但那些模板不够好，我就挑剔说蓝色色调不对，还要求必须有全息防伪。想登记器官捐献？没问题。

I'm like, I would borrow my literally my mom's driver's license and like photograph it and then they would have they had like some templates online, like in shady corners of the Internet. But like the templates weren't good enough and I'm like, no, the blue is off here and like, no, you need to have. So like, yeah, I had I I had like holograms. If you wanna be an organ donor, no problem.

太搞笑了。天啊。确实。

That's hilarious. Jeez. True.

我

I'm

所以

So

逆向工程逆向工程绝对是一个线索。

reverse engineering reverse engineering is definitely a thread.

它们是马萨诸塞州的身份证吗？

Were they Massachusetts IDs?

马萨诸塞州。是的。更蠢的是，本来应该选择像夏威夷或新泽西这样要求不那么严格的地方。

Massachusetts. Yeah. Which also dumber is like way would have been good to do like Hawaii or New Jersey or something where there's less stringent.

哇，我对你了解了很多。这真有趣。

Wow. I'm learning a lot about you. This is so interesting.

所以这里有一个设计元素，也就是说，这里有一个设计元素。是的。就像在视觉设计上抠细节，结果变得非常重要。但这就像是我之前经历中这些非常不同的线索都汇聚到了一起。

So there was a design all that is to say, there was a design element here Yeah. Like sweating the details on the visual design that end up being really important. But it's sort of these very different strands of my previous experience all coming together.

神奇地汇聚到了一起。

All coming together magically.

结果变得很重要。

Ending up being important.

嗯，我只是在想德鲁住在我隔壁，所以他可以来帮我解决我妻子那些显而易见的五个问题。但我也想说的是，德鲁，你的YC申请在竞争对手部分确实指出了你的竞争对手或潜在竞争对手会遇到的一些困难，而且看起来相当准确。就像在2007年2月，你就有点像是说，哦，这个太重了。你知道，他们不擅长网络整合。就像你有点知道。

Well, I'm just thinking that Drew lived next door to me so he could come troubleshoot my white obvious wife five problems. But also, I wanted to say, you know, Drew, your your YC application actually does in the competitor section, you point out some of the difficulties that your your competitors or potential competitors were gonna have, and they they seem pretty spot on. Like, back in 02/2007, you were kinda like, oh, this is too heavyweight. This is you know, they're not good at the web integration. Like, you you kinda knew.

换句话说，我并不惊讶人们会说，哦，是的。这家伙做对了，因为你发现了其他人做错了什么。所以相当令人印象深刻。是的。

In other words, I'm not surprised people were like, oh, yeah. This guy's got it right because you figured out what the other people were doing wrong. So pretty impressive. Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我是你们最早的用户之一，这太棒了。

I've been one of your earliest users, and it's fabulous.

所以它是最棒的。它就是最棒的。

So it's the best. It's the best.

它在成长。你们做得很好。我想问你们关于2010年的一件事，当时史蒂夫·乔布斯在台上，他称它为“功能”，而非“产品”。

It it's growing. You guys are doing well. I wanna ask you about I think it was 2010 when Steve Jobs was up on stage, and he called it, quote, a feature, not a product.

是的。

Yep.

那打击很大吗？你们当时是什么感受？

Was that crushing? How did you feel?

这里面有几件事。一是我们在2009年2月被召去见史蒂夫，然后他们在2011年推出iCloud时，把Dropbox说成是某种过时的东西。这两件事都让人压力很大。第一次见史蒂夫是因为MobileMe团队（iCloud的前身）的人对我们文件上的这些复选框UI感到困惑。我们被工程团队和他们的并购团队之间踢来踢去。

So there are a couple different things. So one one is we got sort of summoned to meet Steve in 02/2009, and then they launched iCloud in 2011 where they called Dropbox out as sort of this archaic thing in the launch of iCloud. So both both of those were stressful. The first the meeting with Steve happened because well, Apple people on the MobileMe team, which was sort of the precursor to iCloud, they were, like, confused as to how we had this, like, UI of, like, these check boxes on these files. And and we're sort of kicked around between sort of an engineering team and their m and a, like, corp dev team.

经过几轮这样的折腾后，我最终被邀请去见史蒂夫。

And after a couple rounds of that, we ended up I ended up getting invited to meet Steve.

哦。他是你童年的偶像吗？

Oh. And Was he a childhood hero of yours?

算是也不是。我成长在PC和Windows的环境里，当时觉得Mac用户有点烦人。但后来iPhone和MacBook Air这些产品推出后，我就想，好吧，我明白人们为什么喜欢了。

Yes and no. So I had grown up kind of on the PC and Windows side of the tracks, and I thought like Mac people were kind of annoying at the time. But then the iPhone had launched and, like, the MacBook Air and these and I'm like, okay. That's I I see what people are

好吧。

Okay.

非常兴奋。是的，我当时，可以说，有一大堆...我是说，我认为他是史上最伟大的玩家。但这确实让人感到压力山大。我还有其他一些朋友有过与史蒂夫不同的接触经历，他们基本上分为两类：要么觉得他魅力十足，要么认为他是个彻头彻尾的混蛋。

Excited about. So, yes, I had, like, a ton of I I mean, I think he's, the best to ever play the game. But so it was intimidating for sure. I I I had a bunch of other friends who had had different Steve experiences, and they're like very into one of two buckets. Like, either it like totally charming or like totally an asshole.

而且，你永远猜不到会遇到哪一面。幸运的是，在我们...然后我们驱车前往无限循环路1号。我心想，哦，这地址已经存在我的iPhone里了，真方便。好吧。

And, you know, you didn't know what you're gonna get. And fortunately, in our and then we we roll up to one infinite loop. I'm like, oh, the address is already in my iPhone. That's convenient. Okay.

你知道吗？就是些小细节，比如走进主入口时，前台接待员听说我们要见史蒂夫·乔布斯，只是淡淡说了句'请坐'。我和阿拉什当时就暗叫不妙。

You know? And and just little things like you go in the main entryway and you're like, the receptionist there. You're like, I'm here to see Steve Jobs. She's she's like, have a seat. And then Arash and I are like, oh, shit.

不知道我们的演示是否...我们准备了全套演示流程，包括测试账户什么的。正忙着设置时，总之我们后来在董事会会议室见到了史蒂夫。起初他非常亲切，说'你们打造了很棒的产品'，我问要不要看演示，他却说'不用，我看过了'。

I don't know if our demo is like like, we had this whole demo ritual where you have to have all like the fake account and all this. So we're like setting all that up and then but anyway, so we go meet Steve in the boardroom and initially he was very charming. He was like, oh, you guys have built a great I'm like, do you guys do you wanna see a demo? He's like, no, I've seen it. You guys have built a great started he by saying, you've built a great product.

所以实际上，我在心里的人生清单上默默打了个勾：史蒂夫·乔布斯说我们产品很棒——完成。好了，值了，我可以走了。

And so actually, you know, under the table on my bucket list, I'm like, Steve Jobs said we built a great product check. Okay. Good. I'm good. This is I'm out.

我的任务完成了。说真的，正式会面部分很短，他就说了句'你们应该加入苹果'。

I'm done. Our work here is done. And, yeah, actually, the formal part of the meeting was pretty short. Like, he was like, you should join. You should throw in with Apple.

他说我们就像个资源充足的创业公司，开始滔滔不绝地游说。我当时想着我们并不打算出售公司，这种会面很难把握分寸——既不想激怒他，也不想让他过于兴奋，我们本质上希望保持现状，不要有后续。

We're like a startup with a lot of resources and, you know, sort of going through his pitch. And and I was like, we're you know, I was thinking we're not looking to sell. And so this is a tricky needle to thread as how to approach a meeting like this because we mainly, we just didn't wanna piss him off. And we also didn't wanna get him super excited. We basically wanted to do nothing, have, like, no follow-up.

就是留个好印象，但别太好，也别得罪他。所以当他说'你们应该加入苹果'时，我回应道'很乐意与你们合作，我非常钦佩你们的成就，愿意以任何形式与苹果合作'。

Like, leave a good impression, but not too good, and don't, like, antagonize him. So he's like, you you should throw in with us. You should join Apple, and we're like and I'm like, you know, I would love to work with you guys. I'm a huge admirer of everything you've built. I'd love to work with Apple in any capacity.

合作方式有很多，但我和阿拉什真的很享受作为独立公司打造Dropbox的过程，相信你能理解。这时他开始变得尖锐，说'你们做的只是个功能，不是产品'。

There's a lot of ways we could do that, but, you know, I'm I'm Arash and I feel like we're really having a great time, like, building this Dropbox as an independent company. I'm sure you understand. And then he started getting more prickly. He's like, alright. You guys are a feature, not a product.

他说'你们没有分销渠道，必须依赖合作，不掌控操作系统'。我回应说'但安卓也不掌控MacOS或谷歌啊'。

You don't own distribution. You have to partner. You have you you don't control the operating systems. And I was like, yeah. But then every you know, Android doesn't control the Mac Mac OS or Google.

要知道，每两家公司之间都存在某种不兼容性。所以，这正是为什么你需要像Dropbox这样的通用中间层。他说的没错，获取分发渠道最终变得极其重要，而我们也采用了非传统的方式来实现这一点。

You know, the every pair of companies has, an incompatibility. So, like, that that's actually why you need this like common layer of something like Dropbox Yeah. In the first place. And he was right. Like getting distribution ended up being very important and we had an unorthodox way of doing that too.

但当时我有个悬而未决的问题：Dropbox应该像杀毒软件那样预装在每台电脑上吗？还是得另辟蹊径？他确实说对了——如果必须通过合作伙伴获取渠道，我们会因缺乏议价能力而举步维艰。虽然我们争论不休，但最后我想通了：无论认同与否，别惹恼他就对了。

But there was an open question for me, like, should Dropbox just be like pre installed on every computer like antivirus? Or we have to figure something else out? And so he was right in that if we had to go through partners, it would be pretty difficult to get distribution because we didn't have any leverage. And so anyway, we were sort of haggling over these points, but eventually, I'm just like, oh, you know, agree, disagree, like, don't piss him off. Okay?

正式会议部分大约十分钟就结束了，但他又逗留了近一小时闲聊。我问他为何重返苹果——那是1997年，公司离资金链断裂只剩六周。

And then so the formal meeting part of the meeting was over in, like, ten, fifteen minutes, but then he hung around for another for, like, the rest of the hour just being like, oh, where are guys from? And, you know, I asked him about coming back to Apple and, like, why he did that. And he was like, yeah, I couldn't understand. This is the 97. They were like, you know, six these these are days where they were like six weeks from running out of cash or whatever.

他说实在想不通，这家年收入70亿美元的公司怎么还能年亏10亿。后来媒体报道了很多他当时的言论。整段经历很酷，除了他说'我们要自建系统干掉你们'的部分——这类狠话他说了不少。

He's like, yeah, couldn't figure out this company could be making you know, have its customers paying it, like, $7,000,000,000 a year in revenue and still manages to lose a billion dollars a year. And then a lot of the other stuff that he said about that time that he's that's been reported on pretty broadly. But it's a very cool experience except for the part where he's like, yeah, we're gonna have to like build our own thing and kill you. And so there are a few things like that.

如果当时他开出某个金额，会让你重新考虑独立发展的决定吗？

Is there a dollar amount he could have mentioned where you would have second guessed your decision to do this by yourself?

不会。不是因为不在乎钱，而是首先我压根没考虑这个问题——我刻意回避诱惑。其次当公司像我们这样每年十倍增长时，苹果根本构不成威胁。

Not really. Not because I didn't care about financial pieces, but more like my my view is that well, one, I didn't even think about that question. I didn't even, like, try to I I didn't wanna get tempted by it, so I'm just like, we're gonna I'm just gonna not Ask. Go there. And then secondly, it's, you know, when your company is kinda up into the right the way we were and, like, 10 x ing every year, I'm like, Apple's not going anywhere.

今天无论X是多少，明天只会更高——除非遭遇重大变故。也许这个判断有误，但我们愿意承担风险。

Like, if whatever whatever that x dollars is today, it'll probably go up tomorrow unless we have, like, something completely unforeseen happens. And, you know, maybe that's wrong, but, like, we're willing to take that risk.

史蒂夫·乔布斯被直接拒绝肯定很郁闷吧？这种经历对他应该很新鲜。

I bet that was a weird experience for Steve Jobs, having somebody just be like, no thanks. Like, he must have been pretty frustrated.

确实。那是我唯一一次见他，后续也没机会了解他的真实想法。

Yeah. He it's hard to know exactly what that was the only time I met him, so I didn't really get a debrief afterwards. Yeah.

我突然想起来——他当时是不是朝你扔了支笔？

Is jogging my memory. Didn't he throw a pen at you?

他没有。幸运的是，当时没有发生暴力事件。哦。不过好吧。是的。

He did not no. Fortunately, he was there was no violence. Oh. But Okay. Yeah.

我在试着...我想...但我听过其他人讲类似的故事，不是和我们。他其实很尊重人，我是说，除了那种说我们‘战略上完蛋了’之类的话。对，对。

I'm trying to I think but I I'd heard stories like that from other people, not not with us. He was like very respect I mean, other than sort of saying like, we're strategically effed, like Yeah. Yeah.

好的。明白了。

Okay. Like Alright.

我得...他没事的。

I'm have to He was fine.

我得想想我认识的人里有谁被他气得扔过钢笔。对我来说那特别好笑。对，就是看他那么激动。

I'm gonna have to figure out who I know that he threw a pen at in frustration. And if to me, it was very funny Yeah. Like, that he got agitated.

我是说，他对其他人会有尖刻的批评...我知道他听过类似的故事，比如我有个朋友曾在微软工作，向史蒂夫推销他的东西。史蒂夫就说‘这看起来像是微软的人会设计的产品’，直接粉碎了他的信心。哇。他在这些会议上并不总是表现得很得体，所以不知道那天他是心情好还是怎样。

I mean, he he would have withering criticisms of other like, I'd know that he heard stories of like, you know, another friend of mine that he'd spent some time working at Microsoft and was pitching his thing to Steve. And Steve's like, yeah, this looks like something this looks like a product a Microsoft guy would design and just like crushed his slips. Wow. He wasn't always like on his best behavior with these meetings, so I don't know if he just got him on a good day or or what. But

好吧。那还不错。当他在发布会上说Dropbox只是个功能而非产品时，你没被打击到是因为他一年前私下已经这么告诉过你了。

Alright. So that's good then. When when he said that Dropbox was a feature, not a product up on stage at this launch, you weren't crushed because he had already told you that in private a year earlier.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。那我的问题有答案了。

Okay. That answers my question then.

但当时有更多人在起哄。当然。对。他说什么‘把文件存在硬盘或Dropbox上是过时的想法，未来所有东西都会在云端，在iCloud里’之类的。

But it was a much bigger peanut gallery Sure. Yeah. Of him saying this idea of, like, storing your files on your hard drive or on Dropbox is, like, an anachronism. You're gonna everything's just gonna be in the cloud. It's gonna be in iCloud.

所以他非常明确地表示，我们将会被淘汰。你可以想象这对公司造成了多大冲击。当时我们都在看那场主题演讲，所有人都盯着我，好像在说：好吧，德鲁，现在怎么办？这绝对是几个关键竞争时刻之一，我们当时的反应就是：行吧。

So he was pretty explicit that we were, like, gonna be obsolete. And and then you can imagine the impact that had on the company. You we're all watching that keynote, and everybody's looking at me being like, alright, Drew. How are now what? And so it definitely was that that was one of, you know, several of these competitive moments where we're like, okay.

是的。最终Google Drive推出了，iCloud推出了，OneDrive也推出了，这标志着公司进入了一个新时期。

Yeah. Eventually, Google Drive did come out, and iCloud came out and OneDrive came out, and that demarcated a new period for the company.

这个新时期确实遇到了一些困难。能和我们聊聊其中的挑战吗？

So this new period had some real struggles in it. Can you tell us about some of them?

没错。你知道，Dropbox最初几年经历了那种超高速增长的狂热阶段，这是每个创始人都渴望经历的。虽然压力很大——就像业余冲浪者突然面对百米巨浪，根本顾不上姿势优美，只求不被浪打翻。但最终这种状态会逐渐平稳。

Yeah. So, you know, the first several years of Dropbox were kind of that hyper growth fever dream.com thing every founder that experience every founder hopes to have. It was still stressful, you know, sort of like you're an amateur surfer and then suddenly you're on a, you know, 100 foot tall wave and you're like, there's no style points. You're just like trying to hold on. But at some point, like, that smooths out.

当巨浪过去后，你就得开始划水了。而竞争正是开启公司第二阶段的导火索，这个阶段更具挑战性，但并非我预期的方式。iCloud上线、Google Drive上线、微软推出他们的产品，还有很多其他竞争者。但查看我们的数据时，你根本看不出这些事件的影响。媒体通常把竞争描写得像散弹枪扫射。

And then or that big wave and then you gotta start paddling. And and competition was what kicked off that second period of the company, which was a lot more challenging, but not in the way that I was expecting. So, you know, iCloud launches, Google Drive launches, Microsoft launches their thing, lots of others. But you would look at our analytics and not be able to tell when that happened. And the press usually writes about competition like it's like a shotgun blast.

就像，哦，好吧。Google Drive上线了，Dropbox就完蛋了。但这并非我们的实际经历。更像是它制造了大量噪音。不过，回顾初创公司与行业巨头竞争的历史案例，比如看看网景浏览器。

Like, oh, okay. Google Drive launches, Dropbox is dead. And that wasn't our experience per se. It was more like it it it creates a lot of noise. But, like, looking at past examples of startups competing with incumbents, you know, looking at something like Netscape.

网景并非真正被IE 1.0击败，而是被IE 3.0、4.0、5.0这些持续迭代的产品逼入绝境。所以竞争更像是蟒蛇而非散弹枪——它们会不断缠上来。我们的情况也类似，虽然从数据中能看到端倪，甚至开始发现科学规律。在Dropbox大部分历史中，其泛用性本是优势而非缺陷，因为它具有普适吸引力。但这反而带来了问题：我们常被问‘Dropbox到底是做什么的？’

And Netscape didn't really get killed by Internet Explorer one point o, but Internet Explorer three point o, four point o, five point o, they just keep coming at you. So like competition is more like a boa constrictor than a than a shotgun blast, meaning they just keep coming. And our version of that, like even though we can see in the numbers, we can sort of start seeing science. So ranging from for most of our history, the fact that Dropbox is so general is a feature, not a bug because, you know, it had this universal appeal. And and and this actually created some problems because we're like, well, what's Dropbox for?

就像问‘手机是做什么的？电脑是做什么的？’这导致我们在产品定位描述上遇到困难。我常以‘你还用U盘吗？’作为解释切入点——人们立刻就能理解，他们不再需要那样做了。

It's like, well, what's a phone for? What's a computer for? And so the the the so it creates some issues with, how do we describe what it does? And I would often go to, like, the you know, do you carry a thumb drive as the question that actually made sense to people? Like, you don't have to do that anymore.

但这也意味着用户将Dropbox用于各种迥异的场景，每个场景都是独立市场。我们逐渐陷入多线作战，对抗资金更雄厚的竞争对手，几乎与所有人开战。在基础云存储层面，我们要与手机备份功能竞争，与操作系统竞争，甚至与硬件设备竞争——这些领域我们永远没有主场优势。

But what it also meant was people are using Dropbox for a lot of different use cases that were each their own different market. So peep we were and and so what that meant was we're we're increasingly fighting this, like, many front war against much better funding competitors and kind of fighting with everyone. So on the back on the sort of basic cloud storage side, we were, like, competing with the phone to back up your phone. Like, we're competing with the operating system. We're competing with the device in ways that where we were never gonna have a home field advantage.

就像苹果绝不可能说‘新iPhone请安装Dropbox’，他们肯定推广iCloud。这就像当年IE被捆绑在Windows里一样。

So it's like, there's no world where Apple's gonna be like, hey. Install Dropbox with your new iPhone. They're gonna promote iCloud. And so you know? And that was you know, Explorer, like, was bundled with Windows.

这被设为默认选项。所以，我对这种动态非常熟悉。我觉得这不是一个稳固的基础来构建我们的业务。当时很多人用Dropbox分享照片——那些照片和相册本质上是以文件和文件夹形式存在的。

It's made the default. So, like, we're very I was very familiar with that kind of dynamic. And I'm like, that's not a good fault line to be building our house on. Then a lot of people are using Dropbox for photo sharing. These are, like, photos and effectively photo albums that were in the form of, like, files and folders.

这存在几个问题：首先，这完全是另一批竞争对手的领域，比如Facebook、Snap、谷歌、苹果。而且我们的文件文件夹界面根本不适合照片分享，尤其在移动端。同时人们也在用Dropbox处理大量工作事务。

That had a couple issues. First, like, that was a whole different set of competitors. That was, like, Facebook, Snap, Google, Apple. And then, by the way, our UI of, like, files and folders was, like, not the right metaphor for photo sharing and especially on mobile. And then people are doing a lot of productivity in Dropbox.

对他们而言，Dropbox更像虚拟工作空间，让你能随时随地办公，像个数字游民。很多人依赖Dropbox实现这一点，因为你可以跨设备跨平台使用。但这完全是另一套使用场景。很明显所有这些领域都将面临冲击。我还看到一些早期领先却被蚕食的公司案例，觉得都是前车之鉴。

And for them, it was more like Dropbox was like this virtual workspace or office where, like, you could actually work from anywhere and be like this digital nomad. And Dropbox for a lot of people was, like, facilitated that because you could use any any device, any platform, anywhere, anytime. And so that was a whole other set of engagement and usage. But it was, like, pretty clear that all of them were gonna be under siege. And then there are other examples of companies that kinda got picked apart despite getting an early lead, which I thought were cautionary tales.

比如Craigslist。它原本包罗万象——租房、找工作...

So, like, take something like Craigslist. Right? Craigslist used to be very horizontal. You could rent an apartment. You could, you know, get a job.

甚至能在Craigslist上干些不正经的事。但最有价值的部分逐渐被蚕食：Airbnb抢走短租市场，Upwork分走其他业务。Craigslist虽仍在运营且出奇地盈利，但这绝非我们的目标。

You could, you know, do all kinds of ungodly things on Craigslist. But, like, the most valuable parts of that got picked off by more you know, Airbnb took the a lot of the short term rental piece away. And then Upwork took a lot of, you know, other things. Craigslist still exists. It's actually, like, a surprisingly profitable company, but that was not our aspiration.

所以我们既要拓展业务版图，又要应对这些战略问题。为此我们开发了照片分享应用Carousel，收购了邮件应用Mailbox来多元化布局。但一年后谷歌相册横空出世，永久免费提供无限视频存储。

Right. So we're both trying to spread our wings as a company and do more stuff while also dealing with some of these strategic issues. So we built a new photo sharing app called Carousel. We bought a mobile email app called Mailbox to kinda diversify. And that was great until about a year after that, Google Photos launches and gives everybody, like, free unlimited video storage for life.

这让我切身领教了行业巨头的玩法：复制你的产品，捆绑进他们的平台，然后免费提供。谷歌直接永久免费，不惜烧掉数十亿——虽然他们硬盘采购成本只比我们略低。这些人烧钱根本不在乎回报逻辑。

And that was, like, my rude personal introduction to, like, the incumbent playbook, which is or they'll copy your product, they'll clone it, they'll bundle it with our platforms, and they'll give it away for free. Either, like, for free with their bundles or just give it for free period. And Google just gave away Just for free period. And they're just, like, torching billions of like, we you know, Google can buy hard drives cheaply, so can we that maybe a little bit cheaper than us, but not much. And I'm like, these guys are just, like, torching billions of dollars without even a theory of how this will, like, come back around.

更让我自责的是，这本可预见。这明显是他们的下一步棋。我竟让公司陷入如此险境。无论是照片分享还是存储业务，我们在多数战线都难取胜。业界已开始出现质疑声浪：Dropbox不过如此...

And then it was also more personal for me because I'm like, this was, like, easy to foresee. Like, this would have been, like, the obvious next move for them. Like, how did I get us into this, like, really precarious situation? So, you know, with the photo sharing or, you know, similar things for the storage or a lot of these different fronts, I'm like, we're just like not gonna win the wars on most of these fronts. And the there's already some skepticism starting to build in the industry about, oh, it's Dropbox.

当人们夸赞公司到一定程度后，就会转而想写'其实这公司不过是纸牌屋'。

Like at some point, people write enough nice things about the company where they get tired of that and they wanna write how like actually this thing is a house of cards.

我了解，嗯，Y Combinator。

I'm familiar with Yeah. Y Combinator.

当时公司内部对此充满焦虑。Google Photos上线时，我就觉得情况不妙。我独自离开去思考，重读了安迪·格鲁夫的《只有偏执狂才能生存》。原来英特尔也曾经历过类似困境，这正是他书中所探讨的——关于战略转折点及其应对之道。

And then internally, there was a lot of angst about this. And so Google Photos launches, I'm like, this is bad. I kinda go off and I need to think and I reread Only the Paranoid Survive by Andy Grove. And it turns out Intel went through something like this too, and this is what his book is about. It's about these strategic inflection points and and how to deal with them.

以英特尔为例，我们都知道它是微处理器'Intel Inside'公司，但它最初其实是做内存起家的，生产电脑里的RAM。但随着时间推移，他们发现自己在与日本企业竞争时，对方在各方面都逐渐超越——性能更好、速度更快、价格更低。书中描述了创始人安迪·格鲁夫（后来成为CEO）与另一位创始人戈登·摩尔讨论这个困境的过程。

So in their case, we know Intel as like the microprocessor Intel Inside company, but they actually started as a memory company. Like, would make the RAM that goes in your computer. But over time, they found that they're competing with Japanese companies that were over time, it's like better, faster, cheaper, just like outgunning them on every dimension. And so the book goes through, like, you know, they're Andy, who is the one of the founders and became CEO, and then Gordon Moore, one of the other founders, they're, like, discussing this. And they're like, alright.

他们自问：'如果我们是自己的咨询顾问，会如何处理这个局面？'结论显而易见——应该退出内存业务，全力投入微处理器。这听起来简单合理，但实际执行就像谷歌突然宣布要放弃搜索业务转做Gmail一样，简直荒谬。

If we were consultants to ourselves, what would we do with the situation? And they're like, obviously, we'd get out of the memory business and we'd go all in on microprocessors. And that sounds like very tidy and sensible, but in practice, it's like Google saying, hey, we're gonna get out of search and like go on on Gmail or something. It's like Yeah. Ridiculous.

说易行难。书中提到CEO通常想保留所有选项，但真正该做的是全力押注单一方向。我认真采纳了这个建议，七月四日假期回来后立即行动：停掉Carousel，关闭Mailbox，砍掉所有非生产力工具项目。某种程度上这个决定不算艰难，因为当时我们80%的用户都在用Dropbox办公。

So easier said than done and book talks about how CEOs usually wanna keep all their options open and hedge, but what you really wanna do is just go all in on one thing. And so I took that pretty seriously and literally and came back from fourth of July and just, like, like, we're killing car we're killing carousel. We're gonna kill mailbox. We're gonna kill anything. Like, everything that isn't productivity, which, you know, in in one sense was, like, not that difficult of a decision because, like, most of our subscribers at the time were using Dropbox for work.

整整80%的用户都用于工作场景。

Like, 80% were using Dropbox for work

明白了。

Okay.

但现实并非童话结局。这个决策让公司舆论形象急转直下——从'下一个谷歌'变成了将被谷歌、亚马逊、微软、苹果等巨头碾压的'首个陨落的百亿独角兽'。这类报道层出不穷，最直接影响是逆转了我们原本强劲的人才吸引力，使得招募高管尤其是产品高管变得极其困难，开启了公司最艰难的时期。

Work, you know, use case. But then, you know, I wish I could say that, oh, then we lived happily ever after. But that that actually, like, completely set the company into a tear like, a tailspin from a narrative standpoint. Like, you know, Dropbox is gonna get, you know, get roadkill for from being the next Google to, like, roadkill by, like, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, like, Apple, everybody. First dead Decacore and, like, lots of these kinds of articles started cropping up, which then the main effect of that was just kinda threw the talent flywheel, which was, like, flying in our direction, like, throwing it into reverse.

谷歌事件就像第一发信号弹：我们砍掉大量业务后，人们自然要问'那我们接下来做什么？'我的回答很尴尬：'如果我知道答案，我们早就在做了。'这标志着公司进入了更为艰难的第二篇章。

Like, became extremely hard to recruit, like, the next levels of, like, execs and especially, like, product execs that we needed and set off a super difficult period. So that was sort of the beginning. The the opening salvo of that Google thing was like, alright. Well, then we're gonna shut down a lot of stuff, but then people are like, alright. Well, what are we gonna do?

那段时期确实开启了公司的第二篇章，过程远比想象中困难。

I was like, if I had, like, a great answer to that, we'd be doing it. Right. It was pretty awkward. Yeah. So it was that began, like, the second chapter of the company, which is a lot more difficult.

我有个问题，不知是否与第二篇章相关。之前听你谈到九型人格测试后——你可能不信——我自己也去做了测试。德鲁，你猜怎么着...

So here's a question, and you can tell me if this relates to the second chapter. So I was listening to you talk about the Enneagram test. You will not believe this, but after I listened, I took the test, Drew, myself. What

你是？

are you?

我是七号。等等，你不也是吗？

I'm a seven. Wait. Isn't that what you are?

测试。什么测试？

Test. What's the test?

对，对。

Yeah. Yeah.

好吧，我昨天刚做过。我还没看完整个报告。告诉卡罗琳那是什么。我没法读那份报告

Okay. I just did it yesterday. I haven't read the whole report. Tell Caroline what it was. I couldn't read the report

因为好吧。

because Okay.

我太逃避冲突了，甚至无法忍受别人说我逃避冲突。告诉卡罗琳这是怎么回事。

I'm so conflict avoidant that I couldn't even bear to be told that I'm conflict avoidant. Tell Carolyn what this is.

是的。好吧。九型人格是一种性格分类系统，有点像迈尔斯-布里格斯，但我觉得更有用也更容易理解。作为CEO，公司规模扩大时的一个挑战是，公司的性格或怪癖会继承创始人的怪癖和盲点。所以你的公司会继承你作为个人的某些功能障碍，而大多数时候你甚至意识不到。

Yeah. Okay. So the Enneagram is a personality typing system, kinda like Myers Briggs, but I think a lot more useful and sort of easier to understand. And one of the challenging things about scaling a company is like as CEO, like your company your company's personality or quirks are gonna be kind of inherited from the founders quirks and blind spots. And so you're gonna have some kind of your your company will inherit whatever kind of dysfunction you have as a person, and most of the time you won't even know about it.

因此，每位创始人的工作就是找出哪些性格怪癖或缺陷会像鱼雷一样摧毁公司，并采取行动。有很多方法可以做到这一点，但其中之一就是通过性格分类等工具提高自我认知。我们最喜欢的是九型人格。基本上，你会得到一个1到9的数字。

And so you have one every founder's job is to figure out like what personality quirk or defect is like in a torpedo your company and like do something about it. There's a lot of ways you should do that. But one of the ways is just to like better self awareness and and through tools like personality typing. And our favorite is the Enneagram. And basically, it's similar in that you get a number one through nine.

所以，你知道，杰西卡和我是七号。总共有九种类型。比如，和平主义者是九号，改革者是一号，助人者是二号，成就者是三号。这并不意味着人只有九种，而是有九种性格区域代码。嗯。你基本上属于同一个区域。

So, you know, Jessica and I are sevens. We're like, there there there's nine of them. So, you know, there's a peacemaker is a nine, and a reformer is a one, and a helper is a two, and achievers is a three. And so it doesn't mean that there's like only nine dots of people, but there's sort like nine area codes Mhmm. Of personalities where you're sort of all in the same zone.

这最终变得非常有用，因为九型人格相较于迈尔斯-布里格斯的一个优点在于，其理论更侧重于你根本的动机是什么。比如，你在追求什么，又在逃避什么？而我觉得迈尔斯-布里格斯更像是在描述，比如，好吧，你是个内向的人。

And that ends up being really helpful because one of the things that's great about the Enneagram versus Myers Briggs is the theory is more around, like, what fundamentally motivates you. Like, what are you what are you running towards and what are you running away from? Whereas I find that Myers Briggs is more descriptive. It's like, okay. You're an introvert.

你是个外向的人。很好。但这实际意味着什么？而九型人格中关于七号的理论则是，好吧，这些类型源于你的基因和早期童年的混合影响，它们关乎你应对世界的策略。

You're an extrovert. Great. Like, what does that actually mean? Whereas with the Enneagram, the the theory of sevens is like, alright. Well, these these types originate from a mix of like your genetics and your early childhood, and they're about of like your strategy to cope with the world.

七号人格类型的优势在于非常有创造力，擅长综合不同事物。他们往往能激励他人，善于建立良好的人际关系。但发展领域往往是同一枚硬币的另一面，比如，你很有创造力，喜欢新想法，但你会对常规感到无聊且注意力分散。或者你很喜欢与人建立良好关系，但你会非常回避冲突。

The seven personality type, the strengths are like very creative, like lots like synthesizing across lots of different things. They really like ins they're ins they tend to be like inspirational and really like building good relationships with people. And but then, you know, the development areas are often the other side of the same coins, which are like, alright. You're really creative and like new ideas, but then you're really bored by routine and scattered. Or you really like building good relationships with people, then you're very, like, conflict avoidant.

你不喜欢告诉别人他们不想听的事情。而且，你知道，你在混乱中非常坚韧和自在。好吧。但你会为团队创造一个非常混乱的环境，却没有意识到不是每个人都喜欢这样。所以它给了你一个默认的地图，告诉你这些是自然优势，而这些是弱点。

You don't like telling people things they don't wanna hear. And, you know, you're really resilient and comfortable in chaos. Okay. But then you create a very chaotic environment for your team, and you don't really recognize that, like, not everybody likes that. So it gives you a bit of a it gives you, like, a good default map of, like, here are the natural strengths that follow from this, and here are the weaknesses.

所以你要在优势上加倍努力，同时弥补弱点。就我而言，我需要建立一个最低限度的组织系统。我需要意识到，我不应该让公司同时做10个不同的项目，比如照片分享应用和电子邮件应用等等。我明白了。

And so you wanna, like, double down on the things that are strengths and then offset the things that are weaknesses. So in my case, it would have been things like, alright. I need to figure out a minimum system of, like, organization. I need to recognize that, like, I probably shouldn't be asking the company to do, like, 10 different, like, oh, photo sharing app and email app, all this stuff. I'm like, okay.

这些事情根植于我的个人心理，你知道，你必须想办法应对。

These things have some roots in like my personal psychology and, you know, you just have to like figure out how to deal with that.

这真的触动了我的心弦。你说，我需要确保公司不会过多暴露于我的个人问题。你为此做了很多自我调整吗？

It really tugged at my heartstring. You said, I I needed to make sure that my company is not so exposed to my personal dysfunction. Did you have to do a lot of work on yourself?

我做了大量的调整。是的，很多个人发展。是的，那段时期有几件事很困难。

I had do a ton of that. Yeah. A lot of personal development. Yeah. There were a couple of things that were, like, difficult about that period.

一个是战略性的。我们讨论过，好吧，计算所有竞争对手会做什么？我们如何生存？我读了一本很棒的书，叫《Playing to Win》，作者是Roger Martin和AG Lafley。AG Lafley是宝洁公司的CEO。

One is just, like, strategic. So we talked about it, like, alright, the calculus of what are all these competitors gonna do? How do we survive? I read this, like, great book called Playing to Win by Roger Martin and AG Laffley. So AG Laffley was CEO of Procter and Gamble.

实际上，推动这一切的是，我一直听到人们说，存储是商品。存储是商品。然而，我们的业务一直在增长，价格随时间上涨而非下降。这看起来不像是商品。但我还是接受了。

And I the actually, the impetus for this was, I kept hearing people saying, storage is a commodity. Storage is a commodity. And yet, like, our business just kept growing and, our prices would go up over time, not down. Like, this doesn't really seem like a commodity in that sense. But but I'm like, alright.

比如尝试销售纸巾，这是宝洁公司的业务。他们是如何应对的？他们有一套清晰的框架：选择目标市场和客户，确定竞争领域，然后通过差异化取胜。这些理论框架对学习很有帮助。

Well, try selling paper towels, which is what, you know, Procter and Gamble does. And like, how do they deal with that? Yeah. And they have this very lucid framework for like, yeah, here's you have to like choose your market and your customer, like where you play and then how you win with your differentiation and stuff. So there's a lot of kind of academic stuff that helps to learn in these frameworks.

但长期经营公司最难的部分，尤其在困境中，是处理盲区问题。比如你是否在无意中损害公司利益？这不是个人问题，每个人都有需要克服的障碍。存在这些问题并非坏事，但必须面对它们。

But I think the hard part of running a company for a long time, especially when it's difficult, is also dealing with, like, your blind spots. Like, yeah, what is how are you sort of inadvertently torpedoing the company? And it's not it's not personal. It's like everybody has these kinds of like, some level of issue that they need to work through. So it's not the the presence of that isn't necessarily bad, but it's like, you do have to deal with it.

另一个挑战是如何长期消化压力。更基本的问题是：Dropbox的全球定位是什么？或许我们已实现目标——毕竟人们不再需要随身携带U盘了。

Yeah. And then the other is just like, how do you metabolize a lot of the stress, like, and just like the challenge of this over a long period of time. And then also, even something more basic, which is like, you know, what does Dropbox need to be in the world? Like, maybe we did it. Because, like, people don't really need to carry around a thumb drive.

我们拥有海量用户。在谷歌照片事件后，我在夏威夷重整旗鼓。18岁的自己可能会说：你成功了，有什么好生气的？

We have a bajillion users. Like, I you know, I'm sort of picking my teeth up off the ground in Hawaii, like, after the Google photo stuff. I'm like, well, at least I'm in Hawaii. My 18 year old self would be like, why are you so pissed off? Like, you did it, dude.

我需要重新连接使命感和动力，这在YC阶段是预设好的路径：中学、大学、进入YC、获得红杉投资、完成ABC轮融资，就像既定路线图。

You're good. But I had to kinda reconnect to a sense of purpose and motivation, which is kind of prewired for you in the, you know, at the YC stage. It's sort of like school. You, like, go to middle school, then high school, then get into a good college. Then for me, was like literally after that, alright, get into Y Combinator, get Sequoia funding, then do your series a, b, c, and it's like this very linear prescribed path.

真正的困难在于：竞争日益激烈。经营一家默默无闻的挣扎公司已属不易，但更糟的是搞砸一家成功企业——这关乎上千名员工和数百万客户的期望。

But at some point, you know, one of things hard things for me to deal with was like, okay. Actually, the competition is getting a lot harder. It's quite embarrassing. Like, I I ran, like, kind of an irrelevant company in obscurity that struggled, which was difficult enough, but it's it's it's a lot worse to run to run a company that, like, was succeeding and then you screwed it up. It was, a thousand people, employees that are depending on you and, like, millions of customers like that.

还要面对媒体的口诛笔伐。九型人格这类工具能帮你绘制内心地图：什么在驱动我？我在逃避什么？

Yeah. And and a lot of press that's, like, tearing you down. It's, okay. How do you deal with that? So I think things like the Enneagram help give you a bit of a map to figure out like where what motivates me?

我该如何应对这些问题？

What am I running away from? You know, what do I do about it?

你们2018年上市后，扭转局面的最关键举措是什么？

I mean, you went public in 2018. So what what was the most important thing that you did to right the ship, if you will?

就像丘吉尔说的：身处地狱，就要继续前进。我们做了几件事：首先是梳理战略叙事，退出无法盈利的领域，停止必败的竞争。

Yeah. So I mean, think it's sort of one of these where it's like, if, you know, I think it's like Churchill quote or something, if if going through hell, keep going. So like so it it was a number of things. I mean, first was just like cleaning up the strategic story. So like getting out of these unprofitable businesses or stop fighting these wars, which we can never win.

这其中有个非常明显的财务问题——我们不得不从‘圈地模式’（不惜一切代价追求增长和支出）转向更合理的财务状况。我们每年在这些免费存储或无利可图的业务上亏损数亿美元。幸运的是，大部分调整都是战术性的：关掉愚蠢的资金阀门，停止在这些事情上烧钱。嗯。

There's a very obvious financial piece of this where we had to kind of gear shift from like land grab mode, spend growth at all costs, spending at all costs to, like, a more reasonable financial picture. So we were, like, hemorrhaging hundreds of millions of dollars a year on all this, like, free storage or just on these unprofitable segments. So fortunately for us, like, most of it was pretty tactical. Like, alright. Just turn off the dumb faucets and just, like, stop blowing money on that stuff and Mhmm.

虽然涉及些变革管理，但还算顺利。真正的难点在于让公司成熟起来——就像从儿童棒球联赛打到高中、大学、职业联赛再到季后赛，每个阶段都必须升级能力，而奖励就是面对越来越强的对手，需要应对的挑战也越来越多。

Some change management, but it was okay. But, like, a lot of the harder part was more like, hey. Like, your company needs to grow up and, like, as you know, if you're playing a in a sport, like, as you go from, like, t ball to high school, baseball to college, to the pros, like, to the playoffs, each at each phase, like, you have to, like, keep leveling up. And your reward is, like, just a harder and harder opponent. And and there's a lot you need to do to deal with.

首先，如我之前所说，必须训练自己更好地掌握游戏规则，认清现在参与的是什么新游戏。当我们与谷歌、微软、苹果竞争时，感觉就像在下棋时对手有八个皇后——这游戏可不好玩。但心态很重要：你可以觉得被压榨而痛苦，也可以换个健康的角度想——‘我有资格参与这场较量’。

So first, you have to, like as I was saying before, like, I think you have to, like, train yourself or educate yourself on how to play the game better and, like, understand what new game you're playing. And so as we're, like, fighting with Google and Microsoft and Apple, I'm like, on the one hand, this is really rough. Like, it's like playing chess with opponents that have, like, eight queens in back. So it's not that fun of a game. Then But I think there's a lot of mindset stuff that comes in here where you can either feel victimized by that and burdened by it, or you can be like, well, yeah, I instead of I'm getting screwed, I think a much healthier approach is be like, I get to do this.

我有资格被碾压。这就是我梦寐以求的。

I get to get screwed. Like, this is what I dreamed of.

很好。很好。

Good. Good.

本·霍洛维茨说过，当CEO最难的是管理自己的心理状态，我深以为然。就像我从小渴望的职业——要有陡峭的学习曲线，要创造重大影响，要在最高水平竞技。

But, you know, and and I think, you know, Ben Horace says, like, the hardest thing about being CEO is, like, managing your own psychology, and I think there's a lot to that. So just like, alright. Well, you know, this is you know, I wanted when I was, like, like, even from when I was young, I wanted something like a career that have a high learning curve. I wanted to be building things that have a big impact. I wanted to be, like, playing at the highest level.

但我需要重新校准心态。我确实经历过愤怒、怨恨，觉得‘这太糟了’‘比赛被操纵了’。我通过两个问题摆脱这种状态：第一，我的人生和职业追求是什么？第二，同样重要的是，Dropbox的使命应该是什么？

But I had to kinda, like, reconnect. And and I did feel, like, pissed off and resentful and, like, oh, this sucks and this is rigged and whatever. But I had to kinda get out of that in a couple ways. Like, first is sort of, I what do I wanna do with, like, my life and career? And then equally importantly, what should Dropbox do with its life?

两者或许有交集，也可能没有。在调整心态过程中，我从历史和他人故事中学到：这类挑战在科技和商业中司空见惯——保持平常心很重要。

And hopefully, things intersect, but, like, maybe not. So as part of, like, getting my head right and things like that, a lot of it is sort of learning from other from history and other stories to feel like, okay. I'm not that personal. Like, this kind of stuff happens in tech and in business all the time. It's so a sense of equanimity about that.

没错，这就是游戏规则。其次，我下定决心要成为伟大的CEO，这比想象中困难得多。好吧。

Yeah. This is just like in the game. Second, like, I wanted like, I decided that I really do wanna become like a great CEO, and it's like a much harder game than I thought. Yeah. Alright.

但好消息是，这需要毕生甚至更长时间去精进。我想通了：这会让我保持充实，我将为热爱而战，而非金钱或其他曾经主导的动机。至于Dropbox的定位？就算它最终只是...（耸耸肩）也没关系。

But, like, good news is, you know, that's something you can that takes a lifetime be and beyond to master. So I was like, okay. This will keep me busy and occupied, and I'm gonna do this more for the love of the game than for money or for, you know, other motivations that that were very salient for most of the time. But and then what should Dropbox be? It might be okay if it's just like, yeah.

我们做到了。文件已同步完成。你看，一切顺利，无需U盘。现在我应该继续前进了。

We did it. We we synced the files. Like, you're good. No thumb drives. Now I should go and move on.

你知道，我本可以做很多事，比如经历那种科技精英式的晋升轨迹——‘我要进军太空、研发飞行汽车、解决气候问题、攻克癌症’之类的。

You know, there's a lot of stuff I could be doing, and there's sort of this, like, tech bro ascendancy that you go through. Like, oh, I'm gonna go into space. I'm gonna do flying cars. I'm gonna do climate. I'm gonna do cancer.

所以我当时想，我该追求这些吗？但在那段艰难时期重新找回目标，对我个人而言至关重要。我意识到：这是我选择的生活，没理由抱怨，反而应该感恩能做这些事。

So I was like, should I just do that? But that reconnecting to purpose and that, like, hard hard at the beginning of that hard time was, like, really important for me per personally because I'm like, alright. Or, like, I'm choosing this life. Like, I'm so, like, I can't complain about it. I get to do this.

这需要某种程度的感恩心态，而正念练习能帮你理清这些。比如冥想和教练辅导，确实帮我从挫败感中解脱出来。然后我开始思考：世界上哪些问题是真正亟待解决的？毕竟没人会反对‘iPhone该云端备份’或‘照片库该记录一生’这类显而易见的方案。

This is, you know, some level of gratitude, and there's a lot of mindfulness stuff that helps sort of frame these kinds of things for you. So, like, a meditation practice, some coaching was helpful to me in getting kind of, you know, untwisted around the axle of frustration. And then I was like, alright. What what problems really need solving in the world? Like, I you know, it's hard to argue that no one would have figured out that your, like, iPhone should be backed up to the cloud or that you should have, like, a photo gallery that has, like, your whole life.

也许我们是首批商业化这些创意的，但总该做些比‘在谷歌前十分钟发明明显功能’更有意义的事。于是我思考：哪些领域的问题真的无法自行解决？我发现效率工具领域其实存在大量未被关注的问题——这不仅仅是外部竞争压力。

Like, maybe we're the first to commercialize some of these things, but we could probably do something better than just, like, invent an obvious thing ten minutes before Google does. Yeah. And the and I'm like, where are the problems really not solving themselves? And I felt like in productivity, that was actually there's actually this whole other set of issues. So specifically, you know, during this period, it wasn't just like the external competitive difficulties.

经营公司的内部体验也异常艰难。天啊，我从在小公寓里激情编码，到现在管理千人团队——主观上说，这过程并不有趣。

It's also just like internal experience running the company. It was really rough. I'm like, god. I went from, like, coding in for the rush in, you know, a little apartment to now I have this, like, thousand person team. And I'm like, this subjectively is, like, not that fun.

整天开会，整夜回邮件，睡醒重复。

Like, I am just in, like, meetings all day, email all night, sleep, repeat.

我完全进入管理者模式了。

I'm like Manager mode. Yeah.

嗯。我意识到自己没在做任何创造性工作，只是疲于奔命。工作变成了跑步机，有段时间我甚至为此自怜——但转念一想：所有人不都在同款跑步机上吗？更奇怪的是：为什么我的大脑像卡在一档？后来我面试了SpaceX的工程总监...

Mhmm. And I'm like, and I'm like, not not doing anything creative, but I'm just like busy and overwhelmed all the time. And I'm like, what's going on? I'm actually on, like, work had just become this treadmill. And, you know, I felt a little sorry for myself about that for a while, I'm like, alright.

稍等。其实所有人都困在同样的循环里。最诡异的是，我的思维为何像卡在低速档？有次我面试过SpaceX的一位工程总监。

But wait a minute. Like, everybody else is on the same treadmill too. And, like, it's really weird that, I'm like, why is my, like, brain, like, stuck in first gear? And I interviewed a guy who worked at SpaceX. He was a director of engineering at SpaceX.

我当时就想，哇，这太酷了。你们真的要去火星啊？这到底是怎么运作的？公司怎么运作？你们是怎么一起合作的？

And I was like, oh, that's so cool. Like, you guys are actually going to Mars. Like, how how's that work? How's the company work? How do guys work together?

他反问，你什么意思？我说，我也不知道。就是你们怎么协作的？用什么工具？在SpaceX工作是什么感觉？

And he's like, what do you mean? I'm like, I don't know. Like, how do you collaborate? What tools do you use? What's it like at SpaceX?

你知道送人上火星需要什么吗？他的回答基本就是，要发很多邮件处理很多文件。这让我突然醒悟，等等，确实如此。

You know, what's it gonna take to put someone on Mars? And his answer was basically, like, a lot of emails and a lot of files. And, like, a switch flip for me. I'm like, oh, wait. Yeah.

通常我们把技术视为放大器，但从另一角度看它也是限制因素。我们的速度只能跟工具允许的一样快。当时出现了Slack等新一轮效率工具，这些工具从辅助工作逐渐变成了工作本身。小时候去爸爸办公室，很多东西都相似——有电脑有电话，但也有很多不同。

Usually, we think about technologies as, like, amplifier, but it's also, like, the limiting factor from another perspective. Like, we can only go as fast as, like, our tools will let us. And there was, like, this new round of productivity tools, things like Slack and others where the tools could kind of flip from, like, helping us do the the work to, like, becoming the work. Yeah. Like, when I visited my dad at at his job when I was a kid, you know, a lot of things were the same.

比如他可以关上门，每天只收五封邮件而不是五百封，能关掉手机。下班回家放下公文包后，直到第二天都不用想工作的事。我就想，哇，这和我们现在的状态完全不一样。

Like, you'd you'd go into his office. He had a PC. He had a phone. But a lot of things were different. Like, he could close the door.

对他而言每个新工具都像谷歌搜索省去了打电话或跑图书馆的麻烦。但当工具从10个变成100个再到1000个时，系统就崩溃了。就像电视从10个频道到1000个频道时，康卡斯特公司也懵了——我们不是在满足用户需求吗？

You know, he got five emails a day, not 500. He could turn off his phone. And when he would come home from work, like, he would, like, literally put a briefcase down and, like, not think about work till the next day. And I'm like, wow. That is just, like, not our setup here.

但当你想在千个频道里找超级碗比赛时，就会发现系统出问题了。我们需要的不是更多频道，而是像网飞那样从设计层面重构，用机器学习来优化体验。

And you can see, like, for him, each new tool, like, oh, a Google search saved, I don't know, like, going making a phone call or going to a library or something. But at some point, as you go from, like, 10 tools to a 100 tools to thousand tools, things break. Much as they did for TV, like, as we went from, like, 10 channels to a 100 channels to a thousand channels. Comcast was just like, what? Like, we're just giving people what they want.

我感觉效率工具正处于康卡斯特时代——不断往火堆添柴（更多消息更多功能），却疑惑为何工具让我们24小时被消息轰炸、分心崩溃。现代职场50%时间浪费在无意义事务上，另外50%在分心状态中，知识工作者过劳成为新流行病，这绝非巧合。

But as you're, like, trying to sift through all that, like, I just wanna watch the Super Bowl. You're like, wait. This is this broke somewhere. And what we needed was not, like, another thousand channels. What we needed, like, was a rethink of the system, and we actually needed, like, Netflix, which was re rethought from a design perspective, but then also use, like, machine learning and other things to kinda curate that experience for you.

这显然是个严重问题。

And I felt like we were sort of in, like, the Comcast era of productivity tools where we're sort throwing more logs on the fire, more stuff, more messages, and then wondering why, like, yeah, these tools are, like, pinging us twenty four seven, interrupting us, overwhelming us, distracting us. Is it really that much of a coincidence that we have this, like, new epidemic of, like, knowledge worker burnout in a world where, you know, modern work has like, 50% of the of the time is just spent on, like, bullshit tasks that don't matter, and the other 50% is, like, totally distracted and overwhelmed. I'm like, that seems like a problem.

德鲁，那个，

Drew, just and,