本集简介
双语字幕
仅展示文本字幕,不包含中文音频;想边听边看,请使用 Bayt 播客 App。
卡罗琳,今天我们请到了一位非常精彩的嘉宾。
Carolyn, we have such an exciting guest today.
我早就期待着这一天了。
I have been looking forward to this for a while.
今天我们请来了来自TBPN的约翰·库根。
We have John Coogan from TBPN on the show.
嗨,约翰。
Hi, John.
你好。
Hi.
非常感谢你们邀请我。
Thanks so much for having me.
感谢你刚结束一整天的直播节目还抽空过来。
Thank you for coming after a long day of live TV.
正如大家都知道的,TBPN是一个每天直播的视频和播客,内容聚焦于商业与科技。
TBPN, as we all know, is this daily, live video and podcast focused on business and technology.
这次我们来负责提问。
So we're gonna do the interviewing this time.
太好了。
Great.
很期待。
Looking forward
我早就想聊了。
to I can't wait.
是的。
Yeah.
我们认识很多年了。
So we go we go pretty far back.
对。
Yeah.
我们刚才还在聊呢。
And we were just talking.
Soylent
Soylent
对
Yeah.
我最早记得你,就是跟你喝这个有关。
Is what I first remember you with.
不过你刚进来之前,我跟Carolyn聊过,我说他们后来转型做Soylent了。
But I was talking to Carolyn right before you came on, I said, they pivoted into Soylent.
对。
Yeah.
我死活想不起来约翰在2012年夏天到底在忙啥项目了。
I do not remember for the life of me what John was working on in summer twelve.
说说看。
Tell the story.
好。
Yes.
这事儿可真够离谱的。
It's a wild one.
我从小在洛杉矶长大,上大学学经济学,后来因为 Hacker News 和 Y Combinator 社区,才对编程上了瘾。
So I grew up in Los Angeles, studied economics in college, got the programming bug thanks to the hacker news and the Y Combinator community.
我自学了点 Python,还懂一点 Ruby on Rails,就想着:干脆去硅谷创业,把这一切搞明白。
Learned enough to be dangerous in Python, a little bit of Ruby on Rails, and said, I'm gonna go to Silicon Valley and start a tech company and figure all this out.
那时候我跑出去创业,对任何行业都一窍不通。
And, and I went out and was at the time, I didn't know anything about any particular industry.
于是我拉了个高中时关系特别好的朋友一起干。
So I grabbed a friend from high school who I had a really good rapport with.
他现在已经是我的合伙人,一干就是十多年。
He's now become my business partner for over a decade.
我们俩一直合作到现在。
We've been working together.
我们就商量着,不如做个教育科技产品吧。
And I, and we said, let's build an educational technology product.
我们懂教育。
We know education.
我们在教育系统里待了二十年。
We've been in the educational system for twenty years.
也许我们能发现一个问题,做出自己真正想用的东西,然后分享给全世界,吸引一些客户。
Maybe there's a problem that we can identify and build something that we want and then share that with the world and get some customers.
于是我们申请了Y Combinator和Imagine K12。
So we applied to Y Combinator and Imagine k twelve.
我们入选了Imagine K12,那时候它和Y Combinator有几个共同的合伙人,结构也很相似。
We got into Imagine k twelve, which at the time had, a few partners in common, a very similar structure.
所以我们参加了2012年夏天的Imagine K12项目。
And so we were on a cadence of so we were in Imagine k twelve summer twenty twelve.
当时我们有个原型。
So we had a Can
我插一句,Imagine K12是当时唯一获得Y Combinator认可的加速器吗?
I interrupt really quickly and just say Imagine k twelve was the only accelerator that had, like, Y Combinator's blessing?
它是杰夫·拉尔森创办的。
It was started by Jeff Ralston.
对。
Yes.
我们说想帮你们,因为我们希望为教育科技公司打造一个像Excel那样的加速器。
We said we wanna help you because we want there to be an excel accelerator for ed tech companies.
没错。
So Yeah.
就是想提一下。
Just wanted to throw that out.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们和他们关系很好。
So we had a very good relationship with that.
对。
Yeah.
实际上,PG 曾来参加过我们的 Imagine K12 晚餐活动。
Actually, PG came and spoke at our Imagine k twelve, one of the dinners.
那种形式跟这个很像。
It was a very similar format.
我们刚到硅谷的时候,是借住在朋友的朋友家,但他们完全不是创业那套思维。
And so when we got to Silicon Valley, we were sort of crashing on the couch of a friend of a friend, and they were definitely not in the startup mindset.
他们更像那种朝九晚五、周末打高尔夫的普通上班族,跟我们简直格格不入——我们得拼命把公司做起来,钱却快花光了。
They were more in the, you know, relaxing corporate job golf on the weekends, and that was sort of oil and water because we needed to build a business, and we were running out of money.
那时候,Imagine K12 应该还用的是旧的融资模式。
Back then, I think imagine k 12 was still on the older funding model.
YC 已经改成了大概十五万美元的资助。
YC had moved to, I think, a 150,000.
我们呢,只有一万七千块。
We were we only had 17,000.
这一万七千块,得撑两个人的生活。
So we had 17,000 for two people to live on.
我们家根本没什么钱。
We had no we didn't come from any money.
我记得我当时信用卡欠了五千美元。
I think I had $5,000 in credit card debt.
我们也没什么其他收入来源,也没存款,刚毕业就直接来了。
And, we had no other income streams or any savings because we were straight out of college Okay.
来硅谷,想试试能不能干出点名堂。
To Silicon Valley to let's try and build something.
我们手里有一万七千美元,这可是这辈子见过最多的钱了。
And so we had $17,000, and we were like, this is the most amount of money we've ever seen.
简直不敢相信。
This is incredible.
我们准备好要干了。
We're we're ready to build.
于是我们开着一辆1995年的破旧雪佛兰Blazer,没空调,拉一箱子书,就到了硅谷。
And so we showed up in Silicon Valley with a a broken down nineteen ninety five Chevy Blazer that didn't have air conditioning and a box of books.
就是一堆关于编程和其他各种内容的书。
Literally, just a bunch of books about programming and all sorts.
想学什么,随手拿一本就看。
And you just grab a book when you wanna learn something.
后来,我们开始上网找解决方案。
Eventually, you know, started looking online for for solutions.
但那种最初的生活状态根本没法专心创业——熬夜、全天候工作、推掉聚餐,这些事在正常生活里根本不会发生。
But that initial living situation wasn't really working for building a company and being up late and working around the clock and turning down dinners and all the different things that you get dragged into when you're just living a somewhat normal life.
于是我们上了一个当时存在的网站,算是 vibe coding 的前身。
And so we go on a website that existed at the time that was kind of like the precursor to vibe coding.
那个网站叫 Padmapper,有个人……
So it was called Padmapper, and someone had
YC 的初创公司。
YC startup.
是的。
Yeah.
所以Padmapper特别棒,它把Craigslist和Airbnb的房源都整合到了Google地图上。
And so and so Padmapper was amazing because it took Craigslist listings and Airbnb listings and put it on a Google Map.
现在每个产品都这么干了,但那时候这些平台自己都没带地图功能。
Of course, this is in every single product today, but back then, these products didn't have their own mapping features.
于是有人把这个功能做成了独立产品,我们就在上面找,因为想住得离YC在山景城的办公室近一点。
So someone built this feature as a product, and we looked on there because we wanted to be near YC in Mountain View.
我们在上面看到一家公司发帖说:嘿。
And we saw a company on there that said, hey.
我们是个初创公司。
We're a startup.
我们正在参加Y Combinator。
We're in Y Combinator.
我们一看,太完美了。
And we were like, is perfect.
他们的作息和思维模式都跟我们完全一样。
They'll be on the exact same schedule, same mindset.
他们有个演示日。
They have demo day.
我们都懂这种压力。
We all understand the pressure.
我们都清楚整个流程和接下来要做什么。
We all understand the life cycle and what we'll be doing.
不会有什么太多干扰。
There won't be many many distractions.
就这么定了。
Let's do it.
于是我们就去了。
So we go.
我们去看了那个房子,网上图片看起来像宫殿一样。
We tour this place, and the listing made it look palatial.
他们说,我们有泳池。
They said, we got a pool.
我们还有个按摩浴缸。
We got a Jacuzzi.
这跟社交媒体一模一样。
It's exactly like the social network.
我刚才也在想这个。
I was just gonna I was just thinking that.
这就是社交媒体的翻版。
It's exactly the social network.
我们肯定会办派对。
We're gonna be throwing parties.
我们肯定会玩得开心。
We're gonna be having fun.
现在正式开干了。
It's game on.
我们有无限的经费,一万七千美元。
We got unlimited money, $17,000.
这个夏天我们会过得到底最爽。
We're gonna have the best summer ever.
创业这事,反而是最简单的部分。
This startup thing, that's gonna be the easy part.
最难的反而是得把上门来玩的人赶走。
The hard part's gonna be pushing people away when they're coming over to hang out.
我们过去一看。
We get over there.
泳池里全是青苔。
The pool is filled with algae.
按摩浴缸里全是落叶。
The jacuzzi is filled with leaves.
洗手间几乎没法用。
The bathrooms barely work.
天哪。
Oh, no.
只有一间卧室,要给我和我的联合创始人住。
There's only one bedroom available for me and my cofounder.
搬进去吧。
Move.
所以我们俩只能合住在一起。
And so we have to move in to together.
我们弄了两张单人床,紧挨着放在一起。
We get twin beds that butt up against each other.
我个子比较高,只好把行李箱放在床尾,脚踩在上面才能伸直。
I'm I'm fairly tall, so I had to put my suitcase at the end of the twin bed and put my feet on the suitcase to extend it.
我们只有一个用木架搭起来的桌子,所有东西都乱七八糟的,日子挺苦,但心里反而有点自豪,毕竟这段经历太有故事了。
We had one desk that was on sawhorses that and all of this stuff, it's it's miserable, but you sort of take pride in it because there's so much lore and whatnot.
当然,我们埋头干了三个月。
And, of course, we build for three months.
我学到了大量编程知识。
I learn a ton about programming.
在App Store上上线一个应用。
Get an app in the App Store.
搞到几百次下载,但根本没人用。
Get a couple 100 downloads, but nothing's working.
完全没生意。
There's no business.
我演示的时候,东西都 barely 能用。
Stuff is barely functional when I'm demoing it.
我们学到了很多,但YC的演示日到了,两家公司都得上场。
And we learn a ton, but YC demo day comes for both startups.
另一组创始人来自佐治亚理工。
And the other the other group was a group of founders out of, Georgia Tech.
他们做的是个无线网络项目,叫Meow Global Networks,后来改名叫LevelRF,有点像海盗电台那种共享互联网的Wi-Fi网状网络公司。
They were building a wireless network, that was called Meow Global Networks and then LevelRF, sort of a pirate radio, shared Internet, Wi Fi mesh networking company.
我们俩的经历一模一样。
And, we both had the same experience.
就是专注,产品开发做得特别出色。
Like, focus, incredible product development.
我们学到了很多,但业务根本还没到能拿风投的地步。
We learned so much, but the business was just not in any place to accept venture capital.
所以我们俩从演示日出来都心想,好吧。
And so both of us came away from demo day saying, okay.
那17000块现在只剩4000了,得撑到天荒地老。
Well, that $17,000 is now $4,000, and it's gotta last us forever.
因为在赚到钱或者融到下一轮之前,你根本没钱做任何事。
Because until you make revenue or raise more money, you don't have any money for anything.
于是预算大幅缩水。
So the budgets came way down.
团队也真正缩减了。
The team actually shrunk down.
最后,基本上只剩两支团队合并后的核心人员。
And, at the end, there were basically two teams that had merged.
当时一共有四位联合创始人。
There were four cofounders.
为了省钱,我们翻看了收入报表,还有那个小活期账户里的每一笔支出记录。
And as a part of trying to save money, we were looking at our income statement or the, you know, the the transactions that were going out of the small, checking account.
我们发现,房租其实早就预付了。
We noticed that we had paid our rent in advance.
我们的笔记本电脑都是自己买的。
We owned our laptops.
Wi-Fi没法取消,但伙食开销倒是挺大的。
We couldn't unsubscribe from Wi Fi, but we did have this cost of food that was pretty substantial.
在旧金山,健康、方便和便宜这三者很难兼得。
And in San Francisco, you face a trade off between healthy, convenient, and affordable.
如果你想吃得健康又方便,那就去餐厅花点钱,吃顿不错的饭。
If you want something that's healthy and convenient, you can go and pay a restaurant and get a great meal.
如果你想方便又省钱,那就只能买快餐了。
If you want something that's convenient and affordable, you buy fast food.
但显然,这样并不健康。
But, of course, that's not healthy.
如果你想既省钱又健康,那只能自己种菜、自己做饭,可这太耗时间了,而创业的时候,时间就是金钱。
And if you want something that's affordable and healthy, you can grow your own food, cook for yourself, but that's very time consuming and time is money when you're building a startup.
于是,Soylent这个想法就出现了——一种便宜的营养代餐粉,加水搅一搅就能吃。
So that's where the idea for Soylent, this this meal replacement shake, this powder that you could mix up and eat for very cheap came from.
明白了。
Okay.
所以你的初创公司失败了。
So you have your startup, which has failed.
你还和LevelRF那帮人在一起。
You've got the LevelRF guys.
加起来一共四个人。
Two so four of you altogether.
是的。
Yeah.
你们是正式合并了,还是只是随便搞搞?
Did you formally merge, or did you just was it, like, more of a casual thing?
那是在什么时候
And at what
什么时候?
point At what point?
对。
Yeah.
就是说,这个合并发生在哪个阶段?
Like, when in the cycle did this happen?
那时候人越来越少。
So the numbers were dwindling.
竞争越来越激烈,不少创始人还在上学,Demo Day之后又没拿到风投。
The battle was taking its toll, and there were a number of founders who were still finishing college and met with post demo day slump, no venture capital coming in.
他们决定回学校把学位修完,我觉得这是个正确的选择。
They made the decision to go back to school, finish their degrees, which I think was the right move.
对。
Right.
没错。
Yeah.
我直接把后路都断了。
I was I burned the ships.
我没投简历,就直接毕业了。
I had not applied to jobs, I graduated.
我可没打算回头去做金融招聘之类的工作,也没打算去谷歌上班。
And I wasn't just gonna jump back into, I don't know, finance recruiting, or I wasn't gonna get a job at Google.
说实话,那时候我编程还远远不够好。
Like, I didn't I wasn't actually good at programming yet.
所以我觉得自己没什么退路可走,但我特别喜欢我们正在做的事。
So I didn't feel like I had an easy parachute to go anywhere, and I loved what we were doing.
那段时间真的特别开心。
It was so much fun.
每周我们都会想出一个新点子,然后连续奋战八十个小时,通宵达旦,什么都不做,就专心把它做出来,之后发到 Hacker News 上,会收到几条评论。
Every week, we would come up with a new idea and go and work on it for eighty hours straight, stay up all night, do nothing except build it, and then we'd put it out on Hacker News, and there'd be a couple comments.
人们会说,这真酷。
And people would say, oh, this is really cool.
你下次应该做这个。
You should do this next.
整个过程特别有意思,我们互相拉着对方往前走。
And it was so much fun, and we'd pull each other in.
我做过其中一个项目。
I did a one of these projects.
你可能听说过 Rap Genius,就是那个给苹果歌词做注释的公司。
You might be familiar with Rap Genius, the company that would annotate Of Apple lyrics.
我们做了。
We made
当然。
Of course.
我们做了个叫 Symphony Genius 的应用,专门用来标注乐谱。
We made, Symphony Genius, an app for annotating musical sheet music.
目标用户群体特别小。
Extremely small TAM.
但特别有意思。
Very fun.
其实它涉及一个很有趣的图像处理问题。
But actually a very interesting image processing problem.
你怎么识别出五线谱的位置,还有音符在哪里?
How do you detect where, the staff is, where the music notes are?
我当时用 Python 从零写了一个图像识别算法,数黑像素和白像素的数量,所有这些现在靠 AI 轻松搞定的事,那时候全靠手动编码。
I wrote an image recognition algorithm in Python by scratch counting up the number of black pixels versus white pixels and and all this stuff that's super easy with AI today was all very hand coded back then.
不过玩得特别开心,我们一直在推出各种新东西。
But it was a lot of fun, and we were launching all sorts of things.
但这些项目都没成功。
And none of these things worked.
所以我们墙上贴满了便利贴,全是能做的点子。
So we had a whole wall of ideas with sticky notes of things we could build.
我们从墙上拿下一个点子,不像现在随便写个原型就试试,那时候得花上两周时间,做完了发出去却没人理,然后重新再来。
We'd pull one off the wall, and instead of spending twenty minutes of vibe coding like you do today, we'd spend two weeks on it and then launch it to crickets and go back in the cycle.
但真正正式合并、签合同、分配股权,都是在Soylent开始有起色之后才发生的。
But the actual, like, merger, the the official, like, employment contract equity allocation, that happened after Soylent had some traction.
我们跟YC团队聊了聊,讨论到底是再参加一次YC,还是直接拿一轮种子轮投资。
And we talked to the YC team, and and there was a debate over, should we go through YC again, or should we just raise a seed round?
那时候我们已经有不错的势头了,Kickstarter上预购额有好几百万美元,对一个刚起步的食品公司来说,这已经很了不起了。
But we had a lot of traction, and we had, I think, a couple million dollars in preorders, which was very good for a a new food company on Kickstarter effectively.
所以,正式合并之前的关键一步,其实是Demo Day之后。
And so the but the the the precursor to, like, the official merge was post demo day.
大家的钱都快花光了。
We're all running out of money.
Soylent的联合创始人来找我,直接说:嘿,兄弟。
And, my cofounder at Soylent comes to me and just says, like, hey, man.
你可以住在这儿,不用付房租,完全不用操心房租的事。
Like, you can hang out and not pay rent and don't worry about rent.
我们那时候有十五万美元。
Like, we have a 150,000.
你那时候有十五万还是十七万。
You had 15 or 17.
我觉得你整体上会很有帮助。
I think you'd be useful generally.
你就留下来吧,我们包你吃住,你就在旁边一起做点事,我们慢慢想办法。
Just stay, and we'll pay for the food and rent, and you can just kind of work alongside us, and we'll try and figure something out.
后来我就跟他一起做了几个项目。
And so I worked with him on some projects.
罗布——他后来成了Soylent的CEO——在做另一个独立项目,我们俩都在各自演示,互相帮忙,手里同时推进好几件事,直到找到真正能落地的那个。
Rob worked on, who became the CEO of Soylent, worked on a sort of a separate project, and we were both demoing those and sort of helping each other out on trying to keep a number of irons in the fire until we found something that sort of stuck.
然后罗布一发布那篇宣布Soylent的博客,立刻在Hacker News上火了,媒体蜂拥而至。
And then as soon as Rob wrote the blog post announcing Soylent and it had gone viral on Hacker News and there was intense press attention.
突然之间,很多人都争着要给我们投钱。
And all of a sudden, there were people just falling over themselves to give us money.
我们当时就想,好吧。
We were like, okay.
别管别的了,全身心扑在这上面。
Abandon everything else.
他们那时候连客户或用户都没有,所以其他项目没人会在意。
That they didn't have any customers or users, so no one's gonna miss those other projects.
咱们就全力推进这个项目。
Let's go all in on this.
然后我们正式确立了合作关系,稍微调整了一下股权分配,但因为分配空间足够,讨论起来特别快。
And then we sort of formalized the relationship, sort of reallocated the equity a little bit, but it was enough to go around that it was a pretty quick discussion.
是的。
Yeah.
现在正好是个好时机,我想跟大家分享一封我从保罗·布赫海特的软件里翻出来的备忘录。
So now is a really good time for me to share a little note that I dug up in our our, software from Paul Buchheit.
这还是在Soylent之前的事。
And this is around this is pre Soylent.
大概是2012年夏天的时候。
This is, like, around the summer twelve.
上面写着:一堆不成熟的想法,并不等于一个好点子。
It says, a lot of weak ideas does not equal one strong idea.
说得真好。
That's great.
我们当时真该听进去这句话。
We should have listened to that one.
靠便利贴墙,是做不出伟大产品的。
The sticky note wall is not the way to greatness.
明白了。
Okay.
那我们来说说Soylent吧,不过在那之前,我也想分享一个后来出现的更积极的提醒。
So let's get into Soylent, but I'm also gonna share a pause a more positive note that came after
是的
Yeah.
来自保罗·格雷厄姆。
From Paul Graham.
对。
Yeah.
那是2013年2月的事。
And this is in February 2013.
它说的是史上最大的一次转型。
It said, pivot of all time.
没错。
Yeah.
他们现在在生产一种营养代餐。
They're now making a nutritious food substitute.
我持谨慎乐观的态度。
I'm cautiously optimistic.
我特别喜欢。
I love it.
所以我们明白,你为什么想做出这种健康又便宜的食品替代品。
So we understand, like, why you why you wanted to to make this food alternative that was healthy and affordable.
那为什么它会突然火起来呢?
Why did it go viral?
谁在买它?
Who was buying it?
我觉得它走红有几个原因。
I think it went viral for a few reasons.
第一,它有点像是后来网上那些吸引争议内容的前身,当时被刻意包装得极具争议。
One, it was sort of a curse precursor to some of the rage bait that we've seen online where it was very controversially framed.
我们后来才了解到,其实有一种非常古老的营销手法,叫作压力测试。
And we actually learned this later, but there's a there's a very ancient marketing technique about around a stress test.
famously,大卫·奥格威当年在卖胶水,而胶水可是最无聊的产品之一。
So famously, there was a, David Ogilvy was trying to sell glue, and glue is the most boring product to sell.
于是他找了个演员,把胶水涂在鞋底,直接把人粘在天花板上。
And so what he did was he took an actor and put glue on the bottom of their shoes and glued them to the ceiling.
演员就靠着那双粘在天花板上的鞋,悬在半空,一边挂着一边大谈这种胶水有多厉害。
And then while the actor was glued to the ceiling by only his shoes and this glue that he was selling, the actor delivered a monologue about how great this glue is.
你根本移不开眼睛,因为一旦胶水失效,人就会掉下来,搞不好会受伤。
And you can't look away because if the glue fails, the man will fall and potentially be injured.
我们也照着这个办法做,罗伯整整三十天什么都不吃,只靠这个产品维持。
And so we did the same thing where Rob spent thirty days eating no food at all and only consuming this product.
之后他报告说,不仅活下来了,状态还特别好,体重下降了,肌肉增加了,整个人特别健康。
And then he reported that not only had he survived, but he had thrived and he had lost weight and gained muscle and just been healthy.
这种健康方面的巨大转变,总是特别容易火。
And these these, like, health transformations, they always go viral.
这类内容一直都很受欢迎。
They're very popular.
跟风减肥法早就不是什么新鲜事了。
Fad diets are super old.
这些潮流总是来来去去。
They always come and go.
总会有新的冒出来。
There's always a new one.
是的。
Yeah.
但科技圈从来没人搞过这种东西。
But the tech community had never had one.
我觉得人们没意识到,尽管 Hacker News 和科技圈这么忙、这么吵,但只要你拿出一个完全不掺和开源项目谁更强、争论用空格还是制表符、选 Python 还是 Rails 的东西,反而能一下子冲出来,因为够新鲜、够不一样。
And I think people didn't realize, like, that as busy and as noisy as hacker news and the tech community was, if you came at them with something that was completely separate from competing over which open source repo is the best or debating tabs versus spaces or Python or versus Rails, like, you could totally break through because it was fresh and different.
那就是早期的社群氛围。
And so that was the early community.
我们从 Hacker News 直接火到《Vice》和 TechCrunch,最后上了《纽约客》,Rob 还上了《科尔伯特报告》这种深夜脱口秀。
We went from, Hacker News directly to Vice Magazine and TechCrunch to eventually The New Yorker, and Rob was on The Colbert Report on late night TV.
一天就卖了一百万美元。
It drove a million dollars of sales in one day.
这简直太疯狂了。
It was the craziest thing.
那时候,
Was, like,
那会儿正是科尔伯特离开《科尔伯特报告》之前,场面特别热闹。
a heyday of this was pre Colbert leaving The Colbert Report, and it was wild.
我们查了一下,他是第一个上这个节目的科技创始人。
We we were looking it up, and he was, like, the first tech founder to go on the show.
我觉得布莱恩·切斯基之前上过,但其他人真没怎么上过这种深夜脱口秀。
I think Brian Chesky had been on before, but I don't think anyone else had really actually done the late night thing.
现在这都成常态了,很多人能上节目,也知道怎么表现。
Now it's standard practice, and, like, a lot of lots of folks can get on, and they know how to perform.
但我们当时以一种特别大的影响力,触达了非常广泛的观众,因为大家从我们身上看到了一个不一样的硅谷视角。
But we broke through in a really, really big way to a very broad audience because it was this weird lens into Silicon Valley.
我觉得人们一直觉得硅谷是个拼命工作、极度追求效率的文化,而我们就是这种文化的代表。
And I think people saw Silicon Valley as this, like, hard charging, hardworking, you know, ultimate optimizer culture, and we were the poster boy for that.
这事儿是在《超大份》上映之前还是之后?
Was this before or after Supersize Me came out?
是在那之后。
This was after.
所以用的完全是同一套套路。
And so it was the same it was the very same playbook.
对吧?
Right?
你回头看看,三十天减肥挑战、排毒计划,各种花样层出不穷。
And you can go back and find thirty day diet challenges, cleanses, all sorts of things happen.
其实没什么新鲜事,尤其是在饮食这方面。
Nothing is new ever really, but particularly in food.
但这次不一样,因为它是在一个手工写的博客上发布的,然后发在了 Hacker News 上——那地方可不热闹。
This just broke through in a very interesting way because it was delivered on a on basically a hand coded blog shared on hacker news, which is just like, it's not a noisy place.
而如果你走常规路线,比如上白天电视节目,像《观点》、《奥普拉》、《莫里》之类的。
Whereas if you do the typical thing where you say, I wanna go on, you know, like, the daytime TV circuit, The View, Oprah, Maury, whatever.
我们其实被引荐去参加那个节目,他们说:你们得举着一条超大号裤子。
Like, we actually got introduced to some of those folks to come on that show, and they were like, we want you to hold up a big pair of pants.
我们当时就想:这真适合我们的品牌吗?
And we were like, oh, I don't know if that's the brand.
但他们早就习惯了这种操作。
But but but they're they're used to that.
相比之下,那种主流电视圈反而更嘈杂,更适合玩这套套路。
And so that's actually more a more noisy space to run that playbook.
那时候,硅谷根本没人讨论食物或营养。
No one had talked about food or nutrition in Silicon Valley at all.
现在呢,健康博主遍地都是,安德鲁·休伯曼那类人和科技圈的重叠也越来越多。
Now there's a lot of health influencers, and there's a lot of overlap between the Andrew Hubermans of the world and the tech and the tech folks.
所以我觉得,现在这个世界要平得多。
So, like, the the the world is a lot flatter now, I think.
但那时候,Hacker News还没准备好迎接Soylent引发的那场争论。
But at that time, Hacker News was not was not ready for the debate that was gonna ensue around Soylent.
是的。
Yeah.
他是第一个生物黑客。
That is The first biohacker.
那可真是够多的。
That was a lot
所以风投们争着抢着要投资你们?
So VCs were tripping over themselves to fund you?
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得是这样。
I think so.
不过现在的投资竞争激烈得多,回头看当年简直算得上温和了。
Although the tripping has gotten so much more aggressive that it looks quaint by modern stats.
但那时候,两千万美元的A轮融资已经算很大了。
But at the time, a 20,000,000 series a was big.
当时500万美元的A轮融资算是正常水平。
A $5,000,000 series a was normal.
1000万美元就算是很棒了。
10,000,000 was great.
我们基本上直接跳到了B轮,因为公司上线不到一年,月收入就接近300万美元了。
And we basically jumped straight to series b because we were making, like, almost $3,000,000 a month within, like, a year of launching the company.
你当时是
When are you
制造它?
manufacturing it?
比如,具体是什么,怎么做的?原料都有什么?
Like, what and how what were the raw ingredients?
对,是的。
If you Yeah.
这么神秘吗?
So secret?
我的意思是,那些原材料,我们都是在亚马逊上买的。
I mean, the the raw ingredients, we were ordering these things on Amazon.
就是蛋白粉之类的。
It was like protein powder.
对吧?
Right?
你买点蛋白粉,再加点碳水化合物粉、脂肪、维生素和矿物质。
Like, you buy protein powder, you add some carbohydrate powder, some fat to it, some vitamins, minerals.
basically 就是生酮爱好者、健身达人或者营养狂人家里柜子里、药箱里那些东西全都有。
Like, it was just like everything in the, you know, the the biohacker or the bodybuilder or the nutrition freak's, like, closet or medicine cabinet.
把这些全混在一起做成一杯蛋白奶昔,差不多就是Soylent的配方了。
If you mix all that together into one protein shake, you kinda got the Soylent, formula.
后来我们认识了一个跟Muscle Milk有关系的人,他们掌握着整个供应链的资源。
And we met, we we met the someone who was affiliated with muscle milk, and they had all the connections in terms of supply chain.
所以整个过程其实特别顺当。
And so that was actually pretty turnkey.
有专门做粉料混合的代工厂家。
There are there are co packers that can do powder blending.
能亲眼看到这一幕还挺酷的,毕竟科技公司很少这样操作。
It was still cool to see because it's un uncommon for, for tech companies.
你走进一个巨大的仓库。
But you walk into a big warehouse.
里面有一台大型机器。
There's a big machine.
你把各种原料按比例称好,倒进去。
You pull up you you measure everything out.
然后启动机器。
You put it in.
它会自动混合,再装进袋子里。
It mixes it up, and then it puts it in bags.
整个过程就像做面条,只不过规模大了无数倍。
It's all just like making pasta but at a really, really big scale.
对。
Right.
哇。
Wow.
那你是什么时候离开Soylent的?为什么走呢?
Why did you why and when did you then leave Soylent?
我离开Soylent是因为公司已经相当成熟了。
I left Soylent because the company was pretty mature.
我当时负责电商业务,其实根本不需要专门的软件团队。
And I was running ecommerce, and we didn't really need a software team at all, actually.
我对别的东西更感兴趣。
I was interested in other stuff.
那时候整个业务正在转向线下零售,这对几乎所有从线上起步的直接面向消费者的品牌来说,都是生死攸关的转折点。
And so the the the whole business was was going through this, like, pivot to retail, which is very make or break for pretty much every direct to consumer brand that starts online.
当时风险投资机构之所以争着投我们,是因为我们在线上增长得特别快,很多投资人觉得电商就是未来——确实没错,但电商的增长本身还是非常缓慢的。
And at the time, the I part of the reason why VCs were tripping over us was because the the growth rates were so strong online, and a lot of VCs believe e commerce is the future, which it is, but e commerce still grows very slowly.
所以最终,你的增长速度就会跟电子商务本身一样了。
And so eventually, you, wind up growing at the rate of e commerce.
电子商务确实规模很大,但即便如此,它在整体商业中可能只占百分之十到二十。
So e commerce is really big, but what is that in that e commerce number, is maybe 10%, 20% of overall commerce.
但卖得很多的是电视。
But it's a lot of TVs.
还有大量的书籍。
It's a lot of books.
都是些容易运输的东西。
It's a lot of stuff that is easily shippable.
很多食品杂货依然没有在线上销售。
A lot of groceries are still not sold on e commerce.
我们已经渗透了线上蛋白粉补充剂的全部市场,接下来就得解决线下零售的问题。
And so we sort of penetrated the total TAM of online protein powder supplements, and we needed to solve retail.
所以我们请来了一支管理团队。
And so we we brought in an executive team.
我们本来也许能自己琢磨出个办法,但说实话,大家都对这个策略感到精疲力尽了,因为业务越来越偏离创新,越来越偏离我们真正擅长的东西。
We maybe could have figured it out ourselves as sort of mixed bag, but I think all of us were sort of burnt out on that strategy because the business was getting, like, farther and farther away from innovation, farther and farther away from Yeah.
我们真正擅长的领域。
What we were good at.
当时,我在Soylent的联合创始人,也是我当初搬去硅谷时一起的高中好友,正在戒烟。
And so my cofounder at Soylent and the high school friend that I had originally moved out to Silicon Valley with was quitting smoking at the time.
他说,我觉得我有个产品能解决网上运输液体这类重物的难题。
And he said, I think I have a product that solves a lot of our problems of shipping things that are heavy like liquids on the Internet.
我觉得我们可以做个尼古丁口香糖公司,因为Nicorette已经五十岁了,也该更新了。
I think we should launch a nicotine gum company because Nicorette is is in a similar place where it's 50 years old.
很多人把Soylent当成保险来用。
A lot of people were comping, Soylent to Insure.
我们就说,确实有道理。
And and we were like, yeah.
其实,这些老式的产品形态,还是有重新激活的可能。
There's something there where you can bring back these old formats.
展开剩余字幕(还有 480 条)
这行当本来就有供应链,但一直没怎么更新,也没搬到网上来。
There's supply chain for it, but it hasn't been modernized, and it hasn't been brought to the Internet.
咱们也可以照这个思路做,一包尼古丁口香糖塞进信封就完事了。
Let's do the same thing, but a packet of nicotine gum fits in an envelope.
根本不用整箱整箱地发。
Like, it's not a whole case that you have to spend.
以前做Soylent的时候,一瓶瓶寄给人家,一箱快递就得花十块钱。
We were spending $10 a box to ship it to people with Soylent, the bottles.
但做Lucy这口香糖,一包才花一块钱。
With with Lucy, the nicotine gum product, we were spending a dollar.
成本结构一下子就翻过来了。
And so the economics just flipped.
当然,其他问题多得数不清,不过这又是另一回事了,每个创业故事都差不多。
Of course, there are a million other problems, and that's a whole another story as any as any startup story goes.
但能重新开始,确实让人挺兴奋的。
But it was exciting to sort of have a fresh slate.
在Soylent的时候,我们也意识到自己有着典型的硅谷开源思维。
And we also had realized at Soylent that we had this very Silicon Valley open source mindset.
竞争没什么问题。
Competition's fine.
让别人去模仿、去推广,本来以为是好事。
Like, let peep encourage people.
但这种想法完全错了。
And that was exactly wrong.
结果我们被一堆公司疯狂抄袭,而且他们还做得比我们更好,比如
We got copied endlessly by a bunch of companies that outperformed Like,
Huel。
Huel.
Huel就是个很好的例子。
Huel was a great one.
确实如此。
Yeah.
Huel确实执行得很系统,表现也非常出色,但类似的产品太多了。
Huel really executed methodically and did very well, but there were tons of these.
还有JoyLint、Zoilint、Moilint,简直有上百万种衍生品。
There was JoyLint and Zoilint and Moilint, and there were, like, a million different spin offs.
还有开源的竞争对手。
There were open source competitors.
连麦当劳都推出了一款类似蛋白奶昔的产品。
And then there were, like, McDonald's launched something that was, like, you know, a protein shake.
所以当时的竞争真是没完没了。
And so there was just, like, endless competition.
我们后来意识到,尼古丁贴片市场的情况不一样——当时FDA正好有一次政策调整,新上市的产品必须通过所谓的PMTA审批,这几乎就像新药获批一样。
And what we realized about the nicotine gum market was that there was sort of this, like, onetime, regulatory change that was happening at the FDA where new products would need to go through what's called the PMTA process, which is almost like getting a drug approved.
我们花了差不多十年才走完这个流程。
It's taken us something like ten years to get through it.
这个过程极其艰难,但反而让这件事更像风险投资的赌注,因为结果只有两种:要么过,要么不过。
And so it would be brutal and really, really hard, but it actually turned it more into a venture style bet because you have this binary outcome.
在你经营这家公司的整个过程中,头顶都悬着一把铡刀。
You have this you have this guillotine over your head the whole time you're building the business.
但只要你熬过去了,就能成为少数几家获得许可继续运营的公司之一,竞争会急剧减少。
But if you make it through, you're one of the few companies that actually has license to continue, and so competition decreases precipitously.
是的。
And so Yeah.
这对我们来说非常有吸引力。
That was very attractive to us.
另外,我在Lucy的两位联合创始人都是加州理工学院的生物博士,他们对FDA的生物审批流程更感兴趣。
And then also, my two cofounders at Lucy were Caltech PhDs in bio and were much more interested in FDA bio.
那部分业务对他们来说更有吸引力,也是他们更擅长的领域。
That that that side of the business was much more attractive to them, and that's where they had more skills.
明白了。
So Okay.
所以我们最终选择了做这个业务。
So that's why we wind up building that business.
你们是哪一年开始做Lucy的?
What year did you start, Lucy?
那是2016年。
That was 2016.
明白了。
Okay.
我们当时带着这个项目参加了Y Combinator,是的。
And we went through YC with that one Yeah.
我觉得是2018年冬天。
I think winter twenty eighteen.
对,就是2018年冬天。
It was winter twenty eighteen.
Y Combinator这次有什么不一样?
How was y c different?
嗯,不一样的是,因为我当时已经过了12岁,所以被允许进大楼了。
So it was I mean, it was different in the sense that I was allowed in the building because I was over I was over in a magic a twelve.
你还记得吗?
Remember?
记得。
Yes.
但有意思的是,我其实通过2012年夏天那批人间接体验过YC,因为我总参加聚会,把自己当成那个项目的联合创始人,跟那批人特别熟,经常招待他们、认识新朋友。
But but but, it was interesting because, obviously, I I'd lived vicariously through the summer twenty twelve because I was going to, like, reunions as this, like, retconned cofounder and very close with everyone in that batch because we would host people and meet people.
所以我认识的不只是Imagine K12那批人,而是整个2012年夏天真正的YC学员。
So I knew a lot of people in the in the real summer twenty twelve batch, not just the Imagine k 12 batch.
但有意思的是,2012年夏天那批人把YC给撑爆了,因为规模实在太大了,
But, it was interesting because summer twenty twelve was the the batch that broke YC because it had gotten so big,
然后就
and then was
大概有七十家公司吧。
70 companies, something like that.
八十六家。
86.
八十六家。
86.
对。
Yeah.
所以我其实亲身经历了那种挺有意思的说法,就是‘YC完蛋了’这种观点。
And so I had, like, sort of lived through this interesting like, there was the YC is over hot take.
它太大了。
It's too big.
它失去本色了。
It's lost its roots.
对吧?
Right?
然后我看着Coinbase一飞冲天,Instacart、Zapier也都起来了,Soylent也做得风生水起,还有好几家公司在那段时间表现都很出色。
And then I'd watched Coinbase go to the moon, Instacart, and Zapier, and then Soylent was doing really well, and there were a bunch of other companies that were doing well.
所以这完全颠覆了之前告诉我们的那些说法,简直是个谎言。
And so it was just a total narrative violation of, like, what you were told was a lie.
那一批确实成功了。
The big batch worked.
所以再回头看这件事,规模变大之后,很明显这个模式至少在当时是能撑得住的。
And and so coming back to that and watching the bigger size, there was it was very clear that, the model did scale at least to the point that it did.
为了澄清一下,那一批并没有毁掉 YC。
So Just to clarify, that batch didn't break YC.
毁掉的是当时负责那一批的 YC 合伙人。
It broke the YC partners who were working with that batch.
这话有道理。
That's fair.
够了。
Enough.
而且那时候我们还没做分片。
There And we hadn't sharded.
所以每个合伙人都得了解全部 86 家公司。
So every partner had to know about all 86 companies.
所以再澄清一下。
So just to clarify.
对。
Yes.
没错。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
说说这事儿有多怀旧吧。
Talk about talk about quaint, though.
我的意思是,86家公司。
I mean, 86 companies.
这真是挺怀旧的。
That's quaint.
没错。
Yeah.
那露西后来怎么样了?
So what happened with Lucy?
其实,露西的经历也差不多。
So Lucy went through a similar arc, actually.
我和联合创始人一直紧密合作,怎么说呢,我虽然还在董事会,但依然在和他们一起干。
So I worked very closely with my cofounders for, I mean, I guess I was on I mean, I was still on the board, so I'm still working with them.
差不多十年了,我们把业务做得挺大,但从来没像Soylent那样经历过那种情况。
But, almost a decade, and we grew that business a lot and never had the same experience as Soylent.
从来没火过,也没上过《纽约客》。
Like, never went viral, never was in the New Yorker.
这主要是因为我们采取了完全不同的策略。
And a lot of that was because we had a very different strategy.
Soylent那个产品,虽然不是卖给孩子,但归根结底还是个食品。
Like, with Soylent, it was a it was a product that, you know, we weren't selling to kids, but, you know, it's a food product at the end of the day.
它所有成分都得到了FDA的普遍认可。
It's all generally recognized as safe by the FDA.
人们一整天都能自由决定吃些什么。
Like, people can make decisions about what they eat all day long.
尼古丁贴片、尼古丁口香糖,这些完全是不一样的东西。
Nicotine, nicotine gum, these are very different products.
它们有年龄限制。
They're age restricted.
它们受FDA监管。
They're FDA regulated.
关于这些产品,你能做的宣传声明非常关键。
The claims that you make about these products are very, very important.
比如能不能说它能帮你戒烟,其实有很多话是绝对不能说的。
Whether or not you can say this helps you quit smoking, there are a ton of things that you can't say.
所以我们并不想搞成那种爆火的爆款。
And so we didn't really want to be, like, mega viral.
后来我们还看到Juul一夜爆红,结果害得很多孩子上瘾。
And then we also watched Juul go super viral and get a bunch of kids addicted.
所以我们决定不冒这个险。
And so that was a huge risk that we didn't wanna do.
我们想做反向版的Juul。
And we were like, we want to be the anti Juul.
我们要做香烟的对立面,专门吸引那些想戒烟、正在考虑用尼古丁贴片或口香糖的人。
We wanna be the anti cigarette, and we wanna go after all the smokers who are trying to quit and are thinking, Nicorette.
那东西味道差,又难买,品牌也完全打动不了我。
That stuff tastes bad, and it's hard to find, and the branding doesn't speak to me.
用起来感觉就像在吃药。
It makes me feel like medicine.
我还是试试别的吧。
I'll try this other thing.
那就是我们的目标用户。
That was our customer.
还有那些在大学时开始用电子烟、后来随着生活变化,意识到不想在家人面前 vaping 的人群。
And then also the post vape community that had picked it up in college and then realized, like, I'm not I don't wanna be vaping around my family as I grow my life.
我真该戒掉这个了。
Like, I should get off of this.
为什么不试试那款酷酷的尼古丁口香糖呢?
Why don't I pick up the cool nicotine gum?
对吧?
Right?
所以我们特意把营销做得更精准,当然,这也意味着增长慢了很多。
And so so we were pretty deliberate about, you know, being much more targeted with the marketing, but, of course, that meant way lower growth rates.
我们花了整整十年才做到像Soylent那么大。
Like, it took us ten years to get to the size of Soylent.
所以规模小得多,也慢得多。
And so it was a lot small a lot lot slower.
然后,你还得经历从电商转向线下零售的过程。
And then, again, you go through the retail, ecommerce to retail transition.
这可不是我的强项。
That's not my strong suit.
所以疫情期间我有点无聊了。
And so I get a little bored during COVID.
我就开始拍YouTube视频,想重新跟科技圈联系起来。
I start doing YouTube videos, trying to reconnect with the tech community.
这正是我想问你的。
And This is what I was gonna ask you.
你是什么时候开始拍YouTube视频的?为什么?
When did you do the YouTube things and why?
就是疫情期间。
It was COVID.
对。
Yeah.
对,就是疫情期间。
COVID.
我一直都是全职创业者,工作时间远远超过四十小时每周。
So so I've always been very full time entrepreneur employed, which means more than forty hours a week.
我从来没同时经营过两家公司,之类的事从来没做过。
I've never done two companies at the same time or anything.
只要我在做一件事,就会全心全意只做这一件。
It's like, if I'm working on something, I'm working on it exclusively.
但疫情期间挺特别的,因为没人聚餐了。
But COVID was interesting because there were no happy hours.
也没有创投公司的节日派对可以参加。
There were no, VC holiday parties to go to.
根本没有任何社交活动。
There were no there was no there were no networking events.
连家庭聚会都几乎全没了。
There were no like, even family engagements were basically zero.
所以那段时间空闲特别多,很多人都在烤酸面包或者刷奈飞。
So it was just a lot of downtime, and a lot of people were making sourdough or watching Netflix.
我就想,不如把我朋友常问我的那些关于创业、Y Combinator的问题整理出来回答一下。
And I was saying, let me answer questions that I'm getting from my friends about business and Y Combinator and startups.
但我没发长文字,直接发了个YouTube视频给他们。
But instead of sending them a long text message, I will just send them a YouTube video.
所以你看我最早发的那些视频,是一系列关于初创公司融资的,讲的是我自己的经历,还有一些基本术语的解释。
So if you look at the first videos that I published, it was a series on startup fundraising, my experience with it, some basic definition of terms.
我算不上什么专家,但职业生涯里,我总共参与过大概十轮不同的融资。
I'm not a super expert or anything, but I've raised, I think, like, 10 different funding rounds across my career.
所以我觉得自己还是有点东西可以分享的。
And so I had a little bit to share.
我就试着把这些内容整理清楚,很多内容其实都参考了Y Combinator的资料,那些可是业内最棒的。
And so I just tried to solidify that, and a lot of it's sort of repurposed from YC's documents, which are the best in the business.
但之前没人把这些内容做成YouTube上的视频解说形式。
But those hadn't been brought to, to what to YouTube in a video essay fashion.
所以这些视频都是有脚本的,结构清晰,讲得明明白白。
So it it's a scripted it's a scripted narrative that has a clear structure.
再加上我有编程背景,对动态图形特别着迷,就顺手把这玩意儿也做进去了。
And then I was also just sort of nerd sniped by motion graphics because of my programming background.
所以我特别喜欢做那种动态的柱状图之类的东西。
And so I really liked making, like, animated bar charts and stuff like that.
那时候就是纯粹觉得好玩。
And so I was just having fun.
后来慢慢就发展成讲一些YC公司的故事,那些我欣赏的、感兴趣的公司,甚至包括科技趋势,比如元宇宙到底怎么回事,谁会在这场竞赛中胜出,还有一些评论、分析,还有很多历史背景。
And then eventually, that sort of grew into storytelling around y c companies, companies that I admired, companies that I was interested in, even just tech trends, what's going on with the metaverse, who's gonna win this race, some commentary, some analysis, a lot of history.
但这段路走完之后,我就开始想下一步该做什么。
But I sort of got to the end of that road and then was looking for the next thing.
不过中间还插了个小插曲,如果你想知道Founders Fund的事的话。
Although there was another interlude if you wanna go into Founders Fund.
我们要不要聊一聊?
Should we?
对,聊一聊。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
在Founders Fund的经历特别棒。
Founders Fund was a great was a great experience.
我当时在做YouTube视频,偶然间就注意到了Founders Fund。
So I was doing YouTube videos, and I had incidentally, I've been aware of Founders Fund.
我确实向他们提案过,但他们从来没投过我的任何公司。
I'd I'd pitched them, but they'd never actually invested in any of my companies.
所以我当时正在——
So I was
你意思是提案吗?
aware pitch?
我们当时是向彼得提案的。
We we'd pitch Peter.
有意思的是,他给的反馈精准预测了公司后来的所有发展,可惜我们没听他的。
And interestingly, he gave us the best feedback that predicted the entire history of the company, and we didn't take the advice.
真是荒唐。
Was ridiculous.
这真是
This is so that's
所以我当时就想,得走了。
why I was like, I gotta go.
得走了。
I gotta go.
得进去。
I gotta go in.
因为呢。
Because yeah.
为了Soylent。
For for Soylent.
所以我们进来后,好吧。
So we came in Okay.
我们就说,其他所有风投怎么说的,我们也同意。
And we were like, here's what all the other VCs are saying, and we agree with them.
我们根本不需要做市场推广。
Like, we don't need to market.
我们只管把产品做好。
We just build our product.
他说:不对。
And he was like, no.
不对。
No.
不对。
No.
你是例外,不按常理出牌。
You're you're the exception to the rule.
你不是在做网络效应型的业务。
You're not building a network effects business.
你也不是在打造下一个Facebook。
You're not building the next Facebook.
你是在做日用品公司。
You're building a widgets company.
你简直是抓住了天赐良机。
You you struck lightning in a bottle.
你真该知足了。
You should be so thankful.
现在该按消费品行业的传统套路来了——你卖的是可口可乐,就得投超级碗广告。
Now it's time to run the playbook that every consumer packaged goods company has run since the dawn of time, which is you are selling Coca Cola, you run a Super Bowl ad.
你得学会持续地推广和分销你的产品。
You need to get great at continually marketing and distributing your product.
你得无处不在。
You need to be everywhere.
他详细讲了消费品行业的传统打法,这套方法几十年来都没怎么变过,互联网也没能真正颠覆它。
And he laid out, like, sort of the traditional consumer packaged goods playbook, which has held up for decades and was act in fact, not really disrupted by the Internet.
当然,电商是个不错的补充,网上确实有些办法能帮上忙。
Of course, ecommerce is, like, a nice additive, and there are things that you can do on the Internet that are beneficial.
但零售销售增长的铁律依然成立。
But the the the the the iron law of, like, retail sales growth is still true.
他明白这一点。
He recognized that.
有意思的是,他说话的样子就像个普通的MBA,或者硅谷典型人物,但他的观点其实很反主流——因为其他所有风投都在说:你们在没有营销预算的情况下,靠互联网增长得这么快。
And it was interesting because it was it felt like talking to just a normal, like, MBA type, like, a Silicon Valley person, but that was the contrarian position because every other VC was saying, well, you're growing so fast on on the Internet without any marketing budget.
那还何必做营销呢?
Why would you ever need to market?
我们当时都惊了。
And we were like, woah.
真的惊了。
Woah.
好吧。
Okay.
总之,他就像个大人物,早就提醒过我们了。
So, anyway, he had a big guy told you so.
是的
Yeah.
我当时就下定决心,再也不会犯这种错了。
And I was like, I'm never making that mistake again.
所以我得去跟创始人基金的人多接触,弄清楚他们怎么看商业和科技,对什么感兴趣。
So I gotta go, work with the Founders Fund folks and understand more about how they view business and technology and what they're interested in.
那真是一段特别的经历。
And, I mean, it was a wild experience.
一开始
The first
等等。
Wait.
你不能就说一句‘我得去跟创始人基金合作’就完事了。
You don't just say, I gotta go work with the Founders Fund.
我
I
我的意思是,你到底是怎么被他们录用的?
mean, how did you get hired there?
迈克·索拉诺联系过我,因为我上过他的播客。
So Mike Solano had reached out to me because I'd done his podcast.
我们之前在网上聊过。
We'd talked online.
疫情期间,我做内容的一个主要目标,就是重新建立和硅谷的联系。
A big part of my, my goals with content creation during COVID was just to reestablish some sort of connection with Silicon Valley.
我当时住在帕萨迪纳,洛杉矶的郊区。
I was living in Pasadena, suburb of Los Angeles.
平时很难碰见科技圈的人,但在推特和YouTube上倒是经常遇到。
I wasn't bumping into people in tech that often, but I would bump into them on Twitter, and I would bump into them on YouTube.
那时候很多人对推特特别认真。
And so there were a lot of people that were taking Twitter very seriously.
很多人对Substack和播客也都很当回事。
There were a lot people that were taking Substack and podcasting pretty seriously.
当时YouTube上还有一大片空白领域,我就琢磨出了一种不太一样的做法——做视频论文。
There was this huge white space on YouTube, and I'd figured out how to do something a little bit different in the sense that I was doing video essays.
加里·谭也在做视频论文。
Gary Tan was also doing video essays.
但那时候真没多少人讲这些话题,比如Stripe是怎么起步的?
But there weren't there weren't that many, you know, what is the history of Stripe?
DoorDash的来龙去脉是什么?
What is the history of DoorDash?
Coinbase又是怎么发展起来的?
What is the history of Coinbase?
这类视频当时真的不多。
There weren't that many videos out there about that Mhmm.
我是从一个热爱科技与商业、自己也尝试创办过科技公司、有商业背景的人的角度来做的。
From from the perspective of someone who loves technology and business and has tried to build technology companies and has a career in business.
很多人根本没去过硅谷,就去维基百科查点资料,但往往抓不住真正有意思的地方。
And so there were a lot of people that who had never been to Silicon Valley and would go on Wikipedia and pull up some stuff, and they didn't necessarily nail, like, what is actually the interesting thing, I think.
所以我找到了一个独特的定位,能以创始人的视角来讲科技公司的故事。
And so I was able to carve out this niche as someone who, could tell the story of a tech company from the perspective of a founder.
后来这个方向终于火了,我开始大量采访红杉资本投资的创始人,因为如果你想聊DeepMind、OpenAI、SpaceX、Facebook这些公司,最后都会绕到红杉的投资组合里。
And so that eventually broke through, and I wound up just profiling a ton of founders fund companies because if you wanna talk about DeepMind, OpenAI, SpaceX, Facebook, like, you just wind up hitting founders fund companies.
是的。
Yeah.
如果你只关注那些有影响力的科技公司,就会发现有趣的内容大多集中在他们的投资组合里——这不只是因为他们是出色的投资者,更因为他们突破了传统的B2B SaaS模式,用了一种很特别的方式,恰好吸引了互联网上很多人的注意,毕竟大家对火箭都感兴趣。
If you just focus on, like, impactful tech companies, Andoril, like, the interesting stuff is in their portfolio, not just because they're great investors, but also because they've they've they've focused outside of the b to b SaaS playbook in an interesting way that coincidentally draws attention from people outside and just people on the Internet because people wanna know about rockets.
看火箭着陆,谁都觉得有意思。
Like, watching rockets land is universally interesting.
所以,讲SpaceX的发展故事,远比讲另一个我虽然觉得有趣但很难视觉化呈现的B2B SaaS公司要吸引人得多。
And so, you can tell a much more engaging story about the development of SpaceX than you can, say, you know, another b to b SaaS company that I find interesting, but it's harder to make visual.
没错。
Right.
对。
Yeah.
你在为露西融资的时候,有去找过创始人基金吗?
Did did you go to Founders Fund, when you were trying to get Lucy funded?
有啊。
Yes.
我们跟他们的人聊过,差点就成了。
We had talked to someone, and we got so close.
后来我进去之后,看了他们的聊天记录,才发现他们其实已经注意到其中一个关键问题了。
And when I got in, I was able to look at the Slacks, and I was able to be like, ah, they kinda clocked one of the problems.
哦,原来如此。
Oh, okay.
明白了。
Okay.
不过就算没成,其实也无所谓。
But still, you know, it it would have been it would have been fine.
对我们的项目来说,也不算什么决定性的转折。
It wouldn't have been, you know, game changing for the fun.
所以呢,我确实尊重他们的投资理念。
So, you know, I I I I I respected their their investment thesis.
不过,约翰,你真不像是那种古板的老牌风投。
I was just gonna say, though, John, you just don't strike me as a stuffy old VC.
是的。
Yeah.
嗯,
Well,
那是一次
that's once
所以我是以创业研究员的身份加入的。
So I came in as an entrepreneur in residence, specifically.
对。
Yeah.
而且我有机会参加一些小型投资委员会的讨论,特别有意思。
And and I had the opportunity to sit in on some investment mini investment committee meetings, and they were super interesting.
但我发现,那种必须立刻做决定、押注、用真金白银表态的环境,我真的不适合。
But I just I found that I do not thrive in that environment of needing to make, like, snap, expected value, put your money where your mouth is, like, go make the bet right now.
火车就要开了。
The train's leaving the station.
你要么上车,要么就别上了。
You're either in you're either in the round or you're out of the round.
我喜欢回头分析,想想未来可能往哪儿走,但真要谈具体交易条款,我就觉得特别吃力。
I enjoy looking backwards and understanding where things might go in the future abstractly, but it's much harder to do all of, like, the deal negotiation.
所以我根本没想着说,‘快把我加进去’。
So I was very much not trying to be like, oh, put me in.
我从来没打算长期留在投资团队里。
I I I I would gotta be on the investment team at any point in time.
其实我早有预感,但能亲身体验确认这一点,真的很好——如果我当时在会议室里,却一点不想留下,那我就知道,是时候去别的地方了。
And I sort of expected that, but it was great to be able to, fully validate that and scratch that itch that, like, if if if if I didn't if I was in the room and I didn't and I wasn't like, I wanna stay in this room, then I'm fine to move on to other stuff.
你待了多久?
How long did you stay?
我在那儿待了两年多。
I was there a little over two years.
明白了。
Okay.
也就是2023年到2024年。
So 2023, 2024.
到了2024年底,我开始更多地做视频随笔和纪录片,但这些项目变得越来越复杂。
And then towards the end of 2024, I've been doing more video essays and documentaries, but they were becoming more involved.
节奏也慢了下来。
There was a slower pace of play.
做个项目得花上一个月,我到处飞,采访、见人、剪辑,忙得不可开交。
It would take me, like, a month to do a project, and I was flying around doing interviews, meeting people, editing.
整个事情慢慢演变成一个规模大得多的制作。
It it were turning into this, like, much larger production.
对。
Mhmm.
我意识到自己会一直奔波在路上,这跟我的家庭计划冲突了。
And I realized that I was gonna be on the road constantly, which was not working with my family plans.
对啊。
Mhmm.
后来我跟几位做纪录片的人聊了聊,他们给我看了这条路走到顶峰会是什么样子。
And then also, talked to some folks who make documentaries, and they sort of showed me a preview of what the top of that mountain looks like.
他们说,没错。
And they were like, yeah.
确实如此。
Yeah.
你这条路走下去,就是奔着把纪录片卖给奈飞或HBO去的。
Like, you're on a track to sell a documentary to Netflix or HBO.
我当时觉得,这听起来太棒了。
And I was like, that sounds amazing.
但他们说,其实没那么好。
And they were like, it's not.
不行。
No.
我当时就说,他们却说,是啊。
And I was like like and they're like, yeah.
如果做得特别好,你可能能赚到这么多钱。
If it goes really well, you could make x.
我当时就说,这点钱不够。
And I was like, that's not enough money.
他们还说,顺便提一下,你所有热爱的东西——创作方向、你倾注其中的灵魂、你对‘商业是好事’这种观点的表达——都会没了。
And and they're like, oh, and by the way, like, everything that you love about the content that you make, like, creative direction, the soul that you put into it, your viewpoint on like, I believe business is good.
他们说,是啊。
They're like, yeah.
那些都会被拿走。
That's leaving.
这会变成一篇黑稿,他们会剪得很难看,因为这样对他们生意更有利。
It's gonna be a hit piece, and they're gonna edit it in a bad way because that's gonna be better for their business.
让人精疲力尽。
Soul crushing.
所以我就想,算了,这座山我不想再往上爬了,但我还是想继续做媒体内容。
And and so I was like, well, actually, I don't wanna climb this mountain any further, but I do wanna stay doing media.
我还是想做些有意思的东西。
I still wanna do interesting things.
于是我试了各种不同的媒体形式。
So I tried a bunch of different media products.
我开了一个个人播客,做类似的内容,但完全是即兴的。
I started a solo podcast where I would do a similar thing, but it was unscripted.
我喜欢即兴的,因为越用提词器,我就越觉得被束缚。
I like the unscripted stuff because I felt like the more I was on the teleprompter, the more I was scripted.
那种感觉越来越让人精疲力尽。
The the like, the more soul crushing it was.
我对它提不起兴趣。
I wasn't that interested in it.
我喜欢写作的过程,但念出来的时候总觉得挺麻烦的。
I like the process of writing, but then reading it was sort of a hassle.
所以我更喜欢即兴发挥的内容。
And so I like the unscripted stuff.
我喜欢跟人聊天,但真不想整天满世界飞,追着下一个大采访跑。
I liked talking to people, but I didn't necessarily wanna be flying around the world constantly chasing the next big interview.
所以那种大型访谈节目,我就没打算再碰了。
So, like, the big interview show was sort of off the table.
后来我认识了现在的联合创始人乔迪·海斯,当时是……
And so when I met Jordi Hayes, my current cofounder of
你和乔迪是怎么认识的?
TBPN tell me how you met you and Jordi met each other.
我们是通过一个共同的朋友威利·米尼蒂斯认识的,他觉得我们俩在洛杉矶有相似的背景。
So we met through a mutual friend, Will Minitis, who, just sort of identified us as two people in Los Angeles with similar backgrounds.
其实我们都曾向安德鲁·佐诺维茨筹过资。
We'd actually both raised money from Andrew Znorowitz.
我们都从谷歌融过资。
We both raised money from Google.
我们俩都有家庭,孩子也在洛杉矶,曾经都因为Soylent和他公司的Party Round在互联网上爆红过好几次。
We both had families and kids in Los Angeles, had been, like, deeply viral at certain points with Soylent and his company Party Round had gone viral many times.
所以我们懂互联网,也喜欢互联网和科技,但对科技圈又保持着一种若即若离的态度——我们从来没在那些大公司、高速成长的企业或超大规模平台里拼杀过。
And so we sort of understood the Internet, enjoyed the Internet, enjoyed tech, but had this, like, arm's length relationship with tech where we were never duking it out in the big companies in the in the scale ups and the hyperscalers.
在核心圈里。
In the arena.
在核心圈里。
In the arena.
我们只是在核心圈边上。
We were, like, adjacent to the arena.
那既然非得在洛杉矶养家,这反而给了我们什么优势呢?
And we were like, well, what what what advantage does this give us if if the nonnegotiable is having a family in Los Angeles?
其实洛杉矶的媒体资源特别丰富,如果你设计一档主打远程制作的节目,能做的东西多得很。
Well, media is actually really good in Los Angeles, and there's a whole variety of things that you can do around media if you design a show that's meant to be remote.
我们最初在洛杉矶面对面录制,之所以能这么做,是因为我们俩都在这儿。
We started in person in Los Angeles, and we were able to do that because we were both here.
后来我们开始邀请嘉宾时,就专门设计了远程访谈的模式,让人根本不会觉得‘你们要是能面对面采访十个人,那该多好’。
And then eventually, when we started adding guests, we we structured the guests' format so that it it leans into its, like, its remoteness in a way that people aren't clamoring for us to, oh, it'd be so much better if you interviewed 10 people a day in person.
就算我们的嘉宾就住在隔壁,他们也照样会说:‘我可不想为了十分钟的采访跑一趟。’
Like, even if we a lot of our guests, even if we were next door to them, they'd be like, I'm not coming over for a ten minute spot.
你懂的。
You know?
就是个简短的采访。
It's like a quick interview.
就是一条新闻快讯。
It's a one there's a news item.
你上来十五分钟,更新一下动态,说说最近融资的事儿。
You're coming on for fifteen minutes, giving us an update, telling us about some fundraising news.
就算我们只隔几个街区,他们大概还是会选择Zoom。
Even if we were even if we were a couple blocks away, they'd probably still do it over Zoom.
我刚才听你聊你的一天。
I was listening to you talk about, like, your day.
你们早上六点半一起去健身房,边练边聊,然后一起吃早餐,之后各自忙自己的事,每天再聚在一起三个小时。
You guys meet to go to the gym at 06:30, talk there, have breakfast together, and then you each do your little things, then you come together three hours a day.
卡罗琳,你一定会喜欢这个。
And then, Carolyn, you'll love this.
乔迪通常有司机接送,因为他住得有点远。
Jordy usually has a driver to take him because he lives a little bit far away.
有时候他会说,今天我不想让司机送。
Sometimes he'll be like, I don't want the driver.
我想再多和约翰待一会儿。
I wanna continue hanging out with John.
约翰,你送我回家吧。
John, you drive me home.
你们俩怎么会有这么特别的默契?
What makes you two have such a magical relationship?
就像你以前最好的朋友一样。
It's like your old best friends.
是啊。
It is.
没错。
It is.
我说不上来。
I don't know.
我觉得是因为我们在很多事情上看法一致,同时又有一些不同的观点,这样才有意思的讨论。
I think it's I think it's seeing eye to eye on a lot of things and then having enough, enough differences of of opinion that there's good debates.
你们平时具体会在哪些事情上意见不合呢?
What kinds of things do you guys disagree on, actually?
我觉得,如果一个人特别推崇科技,另一个人却反对科技,那这段关系肯定很难维持。
So I I I think it would be I think you I think if one of us was was, like, pro tech and the other one was anti tech, that would be a really hard relationship to maintain.
但如果我们俩都支持科技,只是我觉得苹果是最棒的公司,而他觉得谷歌才是最牛的,那这种分歧就特别有意思,我们能吵得热火朝天。
But if if we're both pro tech, but I think that Apple is the greatest company and he thinks that Google is the greatest company, now that's a very friendly debate that we can that we can that we can go at each other's throats Yeah.
然后还能彼此保持尊重地分开。
And then walk away from having a lot of mutual respect.
没错。
Right.
所以我觉得很难说有什么一贯不变的争论点。
And so I I think it's hard to say that there's, like, one consistent debate.
更像是一有新闻出来,我们就讨论。
It's more like some news happens.
这件事的两方观点是什么?
What are the two sides of this?
我们很快就会进入那种风险投资人和创业者之间会有的争论。
And we very quickly get to the the debate over the like, the the debate that a venture capitalist might have, the debate that a founder might have.
明白了。
Okay.
这家新公司推出了一款新产品。
There's this new product from this new company.
这对初创公司有什么影响?
How does that impact startups?
这对那些可能被这个新产品威胁的大型老牌公司又有什么影响?
How does that impact the big companies that are legacy companies that might be threatened by this new product?
这家公司是被高估了,还是被低估了?
What is this company overvalued or undervalued?
我们不会在节目里明确说,‘我们认为这家初创公司值得买入’。
We don't really disclose, like, oh, this is we think this startup's a buy on the show.
但 internally,我们确实是这么想的。
But that's internally the way we're thinking about it.
我们不会想,‘这家公司融了一十亿美元’。
We're not thinking about, like, oh, this company raised a billion dollars.
融十亿美元是坏事,绝对不该发生。
Like, raising a billion dollars is a bad thing and should never happen.
我们根本不是这么看的,因为我们支持商业,也支持科技。
Like, that that that that's just not our equation because we're pro business and pro tech.
没错。
Right.
对。
Right.
你刚开始的时候,是随便试试看,还是从一开始就觉得我们要打造一种全新的媒体公司?
When you first got started, were you, like, were were you just experimenting, or did you think we're creating this new type of media company
是的,没错。
Oh, in a yeah.
一个快倒闭的行业?
Dying business?
对。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
我们根本没想到会做到直播,没想到会每天更新,更没想到会像制作一档现代电视节目那样去运作。
We mean, we had we had no idea that we would be live, no idea that we'd be daily, no idea that we'd be effectively producing a modern television show.
我当时有很多想法。
I I had a bunch of, ideas.
其中很多都没像我预期的那样发展。
Many of them did not play out as I thought.
有一个想法是,不做嘉宾的节目会有很大的机会。
One of them was that there was a huge opportunity for a show with no guests.
但结果呢,我们反而请了最多的嘉宾。
And, of course, we have, like, the most guests.
去年我们就请了一千位嘉宾。
We had a thousand guests last year.
真是没想到。
So Wow.
所以这个想法完全错了。
So that was that was proven wildly wrong.
不过我觉得我们真正明白的是,两个主持人来回对话,能轻松填满节目时长,也更容易抓住那些错过的好故事——毕竟不可能总在合适的时间请到完美的嘉宾。
But I think I think what we did figure out was that this two host back and forth allows you to fill a lot of airtime and then creates more flexibility around not missing stories because you can't always get the perfect guest at the right time.
我的意思是,就连我们自己也遇到过这种情况——我不方便点名那家公司,但确实有不少创始人来过我们的节目。
I mean, we'll see this even with, like like, we had we I I don't wanna name the company, but we we we've had a number of founders come on.
我们跟他们建立了很好的关系,结果他们后来被收购了,或者发生了类似的事情。
We developed great relationship with them, and then they'll get acquired or something like that.
然后他们就会说:
And they will just be like, look.
现在公司公关部门不让我再上节目了,因为我现在属于一家上市公司,他们对这类事情有完全不同的流程。
The comms department doesn't want me to go on the show right now because I'm owned by a public company now, and they have a whole different process for this.
我们当然理解。
And we're like, yeah.
这没问题。
That's fine.
我们可以照样讨论这件事,分析他们的财报,给出我们的见解。
We'll talk about it, and we'll analyze the reporting and give commentary on that.
这样一来,听众还是能及时了解到这些重要动态。
And so the audience is still getting the news, which is a set agenda of things that happen.
如果你在听TBPN,以为能靠它跟上最新动态,那可就漏掉太多重要新闻了。
If you're going to TBPN and saying, like, I'm I'm using this as a way to stay up to date on the news, and we're just, like, completely missing stories.
比如,新iPhone发布,我们居然完全没提,也不知道什么原因。
Like, oh, we just didn't talk about the new iPhone because for whatever reason.
我们请不到蒂姆·库克,就干脆整个新iPhone期间都没碰苹果相关的内容?不可能。
Like, we could oh, we couldn't get Tim Cook, so we just didn't do any Apple stuff during the new iPhone release.
当然不行。
Like, no.
我们会请彭博的马克·古尔曼来聊,让他来分析。
We'll have Mark Gurman on from Bloomberg, he'll talk about it.
或者我们自己讨论,回应推特上的热议、新闻动态,还有《华尔街日报》的报道。
Or we'll just talk about it ourselves, and we'll react to the tweets and the news and the Wall Street Journal articles.
所以,任何新闻我们都能覆盖到。
And so we're able to cover any story.
有时候我们的报道特别精彩,比如独家专访那些大家都想听的人。
And sometimes the coverage is amazing where we're, like, an exclusive interview with a person that everyone's wanted to hear from.
没人知道以前发生过这种事。
No one knows that this has ever happened before.
没人知道接下来会怎样。
No one knows what to expect.
有时候呢,确实如此。
And then sometimes it's like, yeah.
我们其实根本找不到人聊这个,只能自己查资料、做研究,然后互相讨论一下。
We actually have, like, no one to talk to about this, so we're just gonna, you know, read you some information, do some research on our own, and just talk about it, between ourselves.
你是不是有个前二十名的榜单?你最爱的节目环节是哪个?
Do you have, like you probably have, like, a a top 20, but can what's your favorite segment of all time?
哦,其实有很多。
Oh, so there there's a bunch.
马克·贝尼奥夫这个人太有个性了。
I mean, Marc Benioff is such a character.
今天我们请了他做嘉宾,他整个人充满活力,我们俩聊得特别带劲,就像在打一场高能量的拳击赛。
We had him on the show today, and and he's just he's just so much energy, and we have a great, like, kind of back and forth where it feels like we're sparring really high energy.
对
Mhmm.
发生过好多特别精彩瞬间。
There's been a whole bunch of really, really amazing moments.
有个叫索汉·帕里克的先生,被人发现同时在好几家初创公司上班。
There was this very interesting moment where, a gentleman by the name of Soham Parikh was found working for multiple startups at the same time.
他居然跟七八家硅谷初创公司都签了全职软件工程师的合同。
So he was, so he had he had full employment contracts with something like seven or eight Silicon Valley startups as a software engineer.
是啊
Yeah.
大家都说他工作成果确实不错,但后来才发现,原来每家公司都在付他工资。
And everyone said that his his pro his his work product was good, but then they discovered that they were working, they were everyone was paying him.
我们很幸运地请他上了节目,当场回应这些指控。
And so, we remarkably got him to come on our show and talk about it and sort of address the allegations live on the air.
而且
And it
真是让人震惊。
was a Wow.
是个错误。
Mistake.
我觉得当时有十万人在线观看,简直不可思议。
I think a 100,000 people were watching live, which was crazy.
大家都想知道这个人是谁。
Everyone wanted to know who is this person.
以前从来没见过他。
They'd never seen him.
这挺有意思的,因为有时候我们请来的是家喻户晓的CEO,却没多少人看,毕竟关于他们的内容太多了,可能也没啥大新闻。
And that's interesting because that we will get, like, a huge household name CEO, and there won't be a 100,000 people watching because there's plenty of content about them, and maybe they don't have big news.
有时候我们就是运气好。
And then sometimes we just get lucky.
比如我们参加了GitHub Connect——微软的大会,有机会和萨提亚·纳德拉坐下来聊聊,当时我们特别兴奋。
Like, we did, GitHub Connect, which is, Microsoft's conference, and we had the opportunity to sit down with Satya Nadella, and we were so excited for this.
我们本来只是想聊聊他的职业生涯。
And we were ready to just talk to him about his career.
就是想多了解他这个人。
Just get to know him.
你知道的。
You know?
随便聊什么都行。
Talk to him about anything.
你对人工智能怎么看?
What's your opinion on AI?
能跟他聊的话题多得数不清。
All the there's million things that we could talk to him about.
但那天,OpenAI的股权结构突然被曝光了。
But that day, the news broke of the exact ownership structure of OpenAI.
于是我们瞬间拿到了对萨吉德·尼德拉的独家专访,那一刻简直像在庆祝——因为他现在可能是最顶尖的风投之一,甚至堪称传奇,为微软打造了百倍回报的项目。
And so all of a sudden, we had, like, the exclusive interview with Sajid Nidela, and it was this, like, celebratory moment because he is now maybe the greatest venture capitalist or up there with the greats and, just produced, like, a 100 bagger for for Microsoft.
顺便说一下,那些话是他原话。
That that those are his words, by the way.
他管这叫一百倍回报。
He calls it a 100 bagger.
天哪。
Oh my god.
我本来想问你,你以前挖过独家新闻吗?
I was gonna ask you, have you ever broken news?
你说你们不干新闻爆料,但这次明显你们也破了。
Because you said that's not our thing to break news, but clearly, you did kind of
是的。
Yeah.
一般来说,我们更倾向于对突发新闻做评论和解读。
In general in general, we like to be a commentary layer on top of breaking news.
大多数时候,都是新闻发生了,然后你上TBPN来进一步解释背景。
So most of the most of the time, it's news happens and you come on TBPN to further contextualize it.
而且确实如此。
And Yeah.
如果你没上TBPN,但这事是大新闻,我们可能还是会聊。
If you don't come on TBPN and it's big news, we might be talking about it.
有时候有人会说,我真想和你们一起首发这条新闻。
And then occasionally, folks will say, I'd love to break the story with you.
但我们总是建议他们,如果真有重大消息,也该找人写篇文字稿。
But we always recommend that they also do a written piece with someone if they really have big news.
不过偶尔也会出现一些独家爆料,比如有人上节目说了些前所未有的、特别有意思的话,结果就成了头条。
But then every once in a while, there are just, like, scoops or or news even in the sense of, like, someone comes on the show and they say something interesting that's unique and they've never said before, and then that just becomes a headline.
现在呢,已经有好几个媒体会把TBPN访谈里说的话改写成文章发出来,这当然对我们节目的发展很有帮助。
And we're and we're now at the stage where, there's a number of outlets that will rewrite things that are said in TBPN interviews and put them up as articles, which is, of course, great for the growth of our show.
当然。
Of course.
但有意思的是,我们其实并不刻意追求这些,只是尽量聊出最有趣的内容,回答我们真正想知道的问题。
But but it's it's interesting because we don't really we just try and have the most interesting conversation possible, answer the questions that we actually have.
然后呢,确实如此。
And then Yeah.
有时候这些内容本身就足够吸引大众,其他记者和媒体会进一步加以解读和延伸。
Sometimes those are good enough for a broader audience, and so other journalists and reporters will sort of contextualize that further.
我本来想问,那些最受关注、观看人数最多的访谈,是不是跟嘉宾的名气成正比?
I was gonna ask you if, like, the interviews that get the most attention or the most viewers, are they in proportion to how famous the guest is?
但也许也不一定。
But maybe not then.
有一点点关系。
There's a little bit.
确实有那么一点,但你可能会感到意外。
There's a little bit of that, but you'd be surprised.
事实上,很多匿名账号在X平台上往往能带来大量实时观众。
And and in fact, anonymous accounts often drive a lot of live viewership on X.
因为你可能关注过像Rune这样的博主。
So, the because you might have followed some poster like Rune, for example
是的
Yeah.
好多年了。
For years.
我觉得Rune在X上拥有几十万粉丝,但人们
And I think Rune has hundreds of thousands of followers on X, but people
他从来没被曝光过。
He's never been doxed.
对吧?
Right?
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
Yeah.
从来没人曝光过他。
Never been doxed.
而且,人们就是对这个感兴趣。
And and, also, people are just interested.
比如,我想多了解一点这种哲学。
Like, I want to know more about that philosophy.
这种天然的好奇心是存在的,没错。
There's natural curiosity Yeah.
背后那个头像下面的人。
Behind the profile picture.
所以我们创造了一个空间,让匿名者可以自由加入,保持匿名。
And so we create a space where Anans can come on, remain anonymous.
我连发消息给他们时,都不会问他们的名字。
I don't even when I'm texting them, don't even ask for their name.
如果他们主动告诉我,我也根本不在乎,完全不关心。
And if they tell me, forget it because I have no interest in that.
我真正想知道的是,他们如何看待这个世界,他们是谁,以及他们谈论这些话题的方式,其实透露了很多信息。
What I do wanna know is understanding how they see the world, who they are, and just how they talk about these topics, reveals a lot.
所以,你可以把这些Anans看作是毫无名气,也可能很有名,但他们确实能吸引观众。
And so, like, I I guess you could put the Anans at, like, zero fame or maybe a lot of fame, but they they also drive viewership.
那些有名的CEO确实能带来流量,但没你想象的那么多。
But the the the famous CEOs do drive viewership, but less than you'd think.
你们需要给这些匿名人士变声吗?
Do you have to disguise voices for these anonymous folks?
我们从来都没这么做过。
We we have never done that.
有些Anans自己会做变声处理。
Some Anans have done that on their end
嗯。
On
他们那边。
their end.
这其实就是个Zoom通话,大家想怎么加入都行。
It's just a Zoom call, so you can join using whatever.
他们大多数人并没有太当真。
Most of them don't don't take it that seriously.
明白了。
Okay.
嗯,是这样。
Okay.
我做了一点调研后,感觉你们跟YC很像,对节目的调整其实挺不固定的。
As I was doing a little bit of research, I sort of felt like you were very much like YC in that there was sort of a high variance in the the tweaks that you'd make to the show.
是啊。
Oh, yeah.
你懂的。
You know?
但你们对要传达给观众的内容却把控得很严格。
But you also were very strict about sort of what you wanted to deliver Mhmm.
对观众。
To your audience.
无论你怎么调整或变化,一直指引你的核心目标是什么?
What is your North Star that's always guided you despite the experimentation or changes or whatever?
核心目标啊,Jordy有句话,他说的是什么来着?
The North Star I mean, Jordy has this phrase where he says, what what is it?
就像我们是个面包店,要是我们不去上班,面包就没法烤出来。
It's like it's like we're a bakery or something, and if we don't show up to bed, the bread doesn't get baked.
这跟很多软件公司很不一样,软件公司你哪怕请一周假,程序照样能跑。
So that's very different than a lot of software companies where, like, you don't you you might not really be able to take a week off, but, like, you can take a week off and, like, the software still runs.
这正是软件的妙处所在。
That's the whole beauty of software.
所以从文化上讲,你确实应该在场。
And so, yes, culturally, you should be there.
是的。
Yeah.
你得进入创始人的状态。
You should be in founder mode.
这点我们都懂。
We all know this.
但说实话,你完全可以休一周假,生意照样运转——不仅因为服务器一直在跑,这正是软件的妙处,更因为你的团队早就被培养得能接手和管理一切了。
But truthfully, you can take a week off, and the business will keep humming not only because the servers keep running, and that's the beauty of software, but your employees are set up to take over and and manage things.
你说得对。
And you're you're right.
但我们没这个福气。
We don't have that luxury.
要是我们不上线,每周一、周二上午十一点(太平洋时间)不在座位上,节目就根本办不下去。
Like, if we don't go live and we're not in these chairs at 11AM Pacific every Monday, every Tuesday, like, the show just doesn't happen.
所以,这正是我们的北极星:必须坐下来,花三小时把节目做完。
And so that's been the the North Star in the sense that, like, we gotta sit down for three hours, do the show.
如果录得不好,自己都不满意,那真叫煎熬。
If it's bad and we don't like it, that's miserable.
很多公司可以生产产品,出了成果,你就能说:嗯,成了。
Are lots of companies where you can be producing a product that happens, and you're like, yeah.
我公司一共推出过五款产品。
My my my company makes five products.
我不太喜欢第六款产品,但我不需要天天用它。
I'm not a fan of product number six, but I don't have to use it every day.
我的客户才天天用。
My customers do.
这些客户根本不在乎第六款产品有多差。
And my and these customers, they don't really care about how bad product six is.
对吧?
Right?
但对我们来说就不一样了。
But that's not true for us.
因为我上节目,所以必须得听每一期。
Like, we I have to listen to the show because I'm on it.
如果哪期采访质量差,我也得硬着头皮听完。
And so if it's if there's a bad interview, I have to sit through that bad interview.
所以
And so
就像我的一样。
Like mine.
是的。
Yeah.
对吧?
Right?
我的是最差的吗?等等。
Was mine the worst Wait.
不是。
No.
不是。
No.
你的特别棒。
Yours was amazing.
我以为你们俩都喜欢我的,因为你们的工作是一样的,
I I thought you both like mine, like, like, like, you have the same job because
不是的。
you No.
你懂的,面试如果拖得太慢,你就会想赶紧结束它。
You you know from interviewing that if you have a slow interview, you're like, I wanna speed this up.
不是。
No.
我说的是,那次面试特别棒。
I'm saying interview was fantastic.
我当时感觉特别兴奋。
I was it electric.
我们玩得特别开心。
We had a great time.
就是我一个人的那次,不是那次
The one with just me, not the one
关于 Bayt 播客
Bayt 提供中文+原文双语音频和字幕,帮助你打破语言障碍,轻松听懂全球优质播客。