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卡罗琳，我真的很兴奋。
Carolyn, I'm really excited.
花了几年时间，但我们终于把保罗·格雷厄姆请回来参加第二部分了。
It has taken a couple years, but we have Paul Graham back on the show for part two.
第二部分。
Part two.
太好了。
Yay.
嘿，保罗。
Hey, Paul.
我在这儿。
Here I am.
你可能会觉得，既然我是你妻子，这件事对我应该更容易，但事实就是这样。
You'd think it would have been easier for me since I'm your wife, but here we are.
鞋匠的孩子。
The shoemaker's children.
鞋匠的孩子。
The shoemaker's children.
没错。
Exactly.
哦，我经常这么说。
Oh, I say that all the time.
回顾一下。
Recap.
我经常拿YC来说这个，总是光着脚。
I say that all the time about YC, how shoeless.
我们总是光着脚。
We're always shoeless.
上次我们聊得非常好，当时差不多就停在那里了。
So we had a great conversation the last time, and we kind of had left off.
我们谈了很多关于Y Combinator的历史，也简单聊了聊你离开Y Combinator之后的动向，但没深入讨论Y Combinator的成长，以及一旦它成功起飞之后发生了什么？
We had talked a lot about the history of Y Combinator, and we talked a little bit about what you had been up to after Y Combinator, but we didn't get into the growth of Y Combinator and what happened once we had, you know, successfully once it had gotten airborne, what happened?
我们第一批有八个初创公司。
We had eight startups in that very first batch.
我们总说它是自然增长的，但让我们聊聊它是如何增长的。
And we always say we grew it organically, but let's talk about how we grew it.
我们只是设定一个申请截止日期，人们就会申请，而且申请的人越来越多。
Well, we would just have an application deadline, and people would apply, and more and more people applied.
我们从未有意识地做过什么特别的事情来吸引更多人申请。
We never did anything all that consciously to get more people to apply.
对吧？
Right?
我的意思是，我们只是宣布了申请截止日期。
I mean, we'd announced that there was gonna be an application deadline.
我们每年都会举办创业学校，我想这可能是促使一些人申请的原因。
We would do start up school every year, and that's I think that probably caused some people to apply.
但除此之外，我们并没有任何有意识的营销努力。
But other than that, we didn't have any sort of conscious effort at marketing.
哦，我会写一些文章，人们会读这些文章。
Oh, and I would write essays, and people would read the essays.
我会放一个链接，写着‘想创办初创公司吗？’
And I would have this link, interested in starting a startup?
申请Y Combinator。
Apply to Y Combinator.
对吧？
Right?
所以这可能让更多人申请了，但我们从未有过任何刻意的增长计划。
So that probably got more people to apply, but there was never any deliberate plan to grow it.
每次我们只是收到更多的申请。
We would just get we would just get more applications each time.
与Hacker News的重叠有多少？
How much overlap with Hacker News was there?
因为我觉得，实际上，我知道Hacker News是申请者的一个重要来源。
Because I have to imagine well, I know for a fact, actually, that Hacker News was a huge source of applicants.
我认为我是在2007年左右创办了Hacker News。
Hacker News, I think I started it in, like, 2007.
所以头几年，它并不是一个因素。
So for the first couple years, it wasn't a factor.
哦，原来如此。
Oh, okay.
是的。
Yeah.
事实上，我觉得我们刚开始的时候，几乎没有媒体报道。
And in fact, I think when we were first getting going, there was very little press.
但后来我们上了《纽约时报》，这才让我们开始被更多人知道。
But then we were in the New York Times, and that kinda got us out there.
而且说实话，对于YC这样的项目，有一件事人们往往没意识到。
And, you know, honestly, the only kind of for something like YC well, this is something people don't realize.
对于YC来说，唯一重要的外部曝光，就是潜在申请者是否知道你。
For something like YC, the only kinda out there that you care about is whether potential applicants know about you.
22岁的程序员知道你们吗？
Do 22 year old programmers know about you?
所以，如果你在《纽约时报》上登了一篇关于你们的文章，但22岁的程序员根本不读《纽约时报》，你可能会觉得你们已经获得了大量曝光，但实际上并没有太大帮助。
And so if you get an article about you in the New York Times and 22 year old programmers aren't reading the New York Times, it might seem to you you've gotten a lot of publicity, but, actually, it didn't really help much.
你知道的吧？
You know?
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得创始人之间会互相交流，我觉得申请者之间也会互相交流。
I think founders talk to I think applicants would talk to one another.
我觉得这就是我们成长的原因。
I think that was why we grew.
那篇《纽约时报》的文章有没有什么主题或核心观点，不只是简单地介绍这个新事物？
Did did that New York Times article have a, like, a theme or a thesis other than just, like, check out this new thing?
我不记得了，我可能以前读过那篇文章，但真的想不起来了。
Like, I don't I don't I probably read the article at some point, but I don't I don't remember it.
一个初创企业的孵化器。
A hatchery for startups.
是的。
Yeah.
实际上很不错。
It was good, actually.
它把YCombinator描述为投资界的一种新现象，而当时确实如此。
It was it described YC as this new phenomenon in the investment world, which at that point it was.
所以这其实是一篇相当有用、很好的历史类文章。
So that was actually a pretty useful sort of good historical article.
恭喜珍妮·李促成了这篇报道。
And kudos to Jenny Lee for getting it.
没人做到过。
No one else did.
她很早就理解了什么是
She could claim to understand early on what was
正在发生的事。
going on.
你刚才提到，那个目标人群不对，对吧？因为你希望22岁的程序员知道YC。
You were talking about how the that's not the right demographic, right, because you want 22 year old programmers to know about YC.
不过，我们稍后可能会再讨论这一点。
But and we may talk about this a little bit later.
但我们也遇到了虎妈问题。
But you we also had the tiger mom problem.
还记得那时候，是的。
Remember when Yeah.
阿多拉其实是第一个以清晰的方式向我解释这一点的人，我觉得。
Adora actually was the first person to explain this, I think, to me in an articulate way.
就像，你还需要让父母们了解它。
Like, use you also need the parents to know about it.
所以也许《纽约时报》的那篇文章
So maybe the Times article
可以读《纽约时报》。
could read the New York Times.
没错。
Exactly.
这正是我的意思。
That was my point.
是的。
Yeah.
对。
Yeah.
你知道的？
You know?
事实上，早期这种情况可能并不常见，但现在情况不同了，因为初创企业现在更被人们接受。
And in fact, apart early on, this is probably not true so much now because now startups are a more accepted thing to do.
但在2005年，父母们一听说孩子辍学不去找工作，就会惊慌失措。
But back then in 2005, parents would freak out at the idea that their kids would leave school and, like, not get a job.
看起来他们不像是创始人。
It would seem like it wouldn't seem like they were founders.
看起来他们只是失业了。
It would merely seem like they were unemployed.
所以一旦YCombinator建立了强大的品牌，创始人就可以对父母说：看，妈妈。
And so once YC started to have a big brand, then the founders could say, look, mom.
我可不是在搞我那不靠谱的初创公司。
I'm not just working on my loser startup.
我入选了YCombinator。
I got into YC.
这是一个广为人知的成就，我成功入选了。
There's this well known thing that I got into.
我认为在当年这帮助很大。
I think it helped a lot back in the day.
那么在你看来，我们当时成功的秘诀是什么？
So what was the secret to our success then in your opinion?
我认为我们确实为初创公司提供了很多帮助。
I think we actually helped the startups a lot.
所以他们会互相推荐。
And so they would tell one another.
比如，如果我们做得差劲，就像你的朋友去一家餐厅一样。
Like, if we had sucked, it would be like, you know, your friends go to a restaurant.
对吧？
Right?
如果食物特别好，他们会告诉你：嘿。
And if the food's really good, they tell you, hey.
你应该去这家餐厅。
You should go to this restaurant.
食物特别棒。
The food's really good.
我觉得参加过YC的人会告诉他们的朋友，是的。
I think people who did YC would tell their friends, yeah.
我们做了这么一件事。
We did this thing.
效果非常好。
It was really good.
他们给了我们很多帮助。
They helped us a lot.
他们帮我们获得了投资。
They helped us get investment.
看看他们是怎么帮我们成立初创公司的。
Look how they incorporated our startup.
他们为我们做了这么多事情。
They did all this, like, stuff for us.
我认为这仅仅是因为它对他们帮助很大，于是他们会告诉朋友，而朋友也会去参与。
I think it was simply that it helped them a lot, and they would tell their friends, and then their friends would do it too.
然后，你知道的，这就是一种实现指数增长的模式，因为他们的朋友也会去参与。
And then, you know, well, that's a recipe for exponential growth because then their friends do it.
然后还有更多人告诉别人，它帮助了他们。
And then there's more people out there telling people that it helped them.
我认为，校友对YC的增长起到了关键作用。
The alumni were critical, I think, in the growth of YC.
因为年轻的程序员彼此都认识。
Because young programmer types know one another.
他们一起上过学。
They went to school together.
他们经常一起玩。
They hang out together.
你知道的。
You know?
所以消息传播得很快。
So word spreads quickly.
如果你让这个群体满意，消息就会迅速传播。
If you please that group, word spreads quickly.
在我们还不受空间限制的时候，校友们有时会来参加晚餐，顺道过来，向他们的投资者介绍新的初创公司。
And back when we weren't space constrained, I mean, we used to have alumni come to the dinner sometimes, drop by, and they'd they'd introduce the new startups to their investors.
那真是一个非常棒的社区。
And it was just this really great community.
是的。
Yeah.
有时还会成为他们的客户。
And sometimes become their customers.
在这个过程中，其实有很多起起落落，我不是说有特别剧烈的高峰和低谷，但确实发生过一些疯狂的故事。
Along the way, I mean, there were there were so many ups I mean, I wouldn't say there were dramatic ups and downs, but there were some crazy stories.
卡罗琳和我。
And Carolyn and I
实际上，我们经历过相当剧烈的起落。
some pretty dramatic ups and downs, actually.
我们都忘了。
We have forgotten.
但我记得，到了一天结束时，我真的觉得：天啊，这种事根本编不出来。
But I can remember feeling I can remember feeling at the end of the day, Jesus, you couldn't make this shit up.
而且我还记得，当时觉得这事儿并不陌生。
And and I remember also feeling like this was not an unfamiliar thing.
就像，灾难总是层出不穷。
Like, stuff was there was always disasters.
东西总是出问题。
Stuff was always breaking.
你知道的。
You know?
就像 Hacker News 一直出状况。
Like, just Hacker News all the time.
你忘了我得多少次冲去办公室，处理 Hacker News 突发的灾难。
You forget how many how many times did I have to run off and, like, run to my office and deal with some disaster happening to Hacker News.
对吧？
Right?
单是Hacker News这一点，我得说。
That alone Hacker News, I have to say.
你。
You.
这简直是难以置信的压力来源。
It was such an unbelievable source of stress.
回过头看，我觉得这可能是个错误。
In retrospect, I I think maybe that was a mistake.
也许我不该这么做，因为
Maybe I shouldn't have done that because
真的吗？
Really?
这实际上占了运营YC总压力的一半以上。
It really was more than half of the total stress of running YC.
哦。
Oh.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
哦。
Oh.
等等。
Well, wait.
所以你是说技术上的重大事件，比如技术上的戏剧性变化，还是社区层面的戏剧性事件，或者两者都有？
So do you mean technical ups like, technical dramatic things or community based dramatic Or both?
两者都有。
Both.
好的。
Okay.
是的。
Yeah.
社区。
The community.
是的。
Yes.
那实际上
That actually
比如文件空间耗尽、拒绝服务攻击，还有用户在网站上发生严重的争吵。
running out of file space, you know, denial of service attacks, people getting into, like, terrible fights on the site.
我的意思是， retrospectively 来看，那简直就像一个独立的创业项目。
I mean, it was like in retrospect, that was like a startup in itself.
我当时一边做YC，一边在运营一个创业公司。
It was like I was running a startup at the same time as doing YC.
你觉得Twitter对我们的增长有影响吗？
Do you think Twitter impacted our growth?
也许吧。
Maybe.
那是什么时候出现的？
When did that come around?
是的。
Yeah.
2007年？
2007?
差不多吧。
Something like that.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得可能确实有那么一点影响。
I think it it probably did a bit.
是的。
Yeah.
人们可能因为早期，尤其是那时候，所有用户都经历过不同的阶段。
People probably because early on, especially, all the users you know, the users have gone through phases.
一开始是计算机极客，后来变成了社会正义战士。
In the beginning, it was, like, computer nerds, and then it was SJWs.
而现在，变成了你知道的，特朗普支持者，或者冒充特朗普支持者的机器人。
And now it's, like, you know, Trump supporters or bots pretending to be Trump supporters.
他们很难分得清。
They're hard to tell apart.
对吧？
Right?
所以第一阶段，我们现在都忘了。
And so that first phase, we forget now.
但第一阶段，它是非常技术性的。
But that first phase, it was pretty technical.
你最喜欢的演讲者有哪些？
Who were some of your favorite speakers?
我这么问是因为我记得Twitter的创始人，他们所有人——埃文·威廉姆斯、杰克·多西和比兹·斯通——都曾来参加我们的晚餐并担任嘉宾演讲者，我特别喜欢他们来的时候。
And I asked that because I remember the Twitter founders, all of them, you know, Ev Williams, Jack Dorsey, and Biz Stone, used to come to our dinners to be guest speakers, and I used to love when they came.
你记得你最喜欢的一些演讲者是谁吗？
Who do you remember as some of your favorite speakers?
你知道吗，扎克其实是个很棒的演讲者，因为他太年轻了。
You know, Zuck actually was a pretty good speaker because he was so young.
他刚开始做Facebook的时候才那么年轻。
He was so young when he started Facebook.
即使那时他已经成名了，他可能仍然比批次里的一些创始人更年轻。
He was probably still at that point, even though he was now famous, he was probably still younger than some of the founders in the batch.
所以他们真的能和他产生共鸣。
So they could really relate to him.
我隐约能听到，当他们想到‘好吧’的时候，自己的抱负也在逐渐提升。
I could sort of hear them all becoming more ambitious as they thought, okay.
这里有这么一个人。
Here's this guy.
他非常有名，也很富有，但他看起来并不像是和我完全不同的物种。
He's like he's super famous and very rich, but he doesn't seem like he's a different species of animal from me.
既然他能做到，那我为什么不能呢？
Like, well, I could why can't I do what he did?
对吧？
Right?
你能感觉到他们都这样想。
You can sort of hear them all.
而且他非常坦诚。
And he was pretty candid.
比如，在他早期的时候，我的意思是，我希望这现在仍然基本成立，但早期的演讲者们都非常坦率。
Like, back in his early days, I mean, I hope this is still mostly true, but back in the early days, the speakers used to be completely candid.
没人担心自己说的话会外泄，因为即使真的传出去了，那也是在‘取消文化’还没出现之前。
Nobody worried nobody worried much about whether something they said would get out because even if it did get out, it was this was before cancel mobs were invented.
对吧？
Right?
能怎么样呢？
What was gonna happen?
第一年是哪一年？
What was the first year?
你们还记得他第一次来的时候吗？
Do you guys remember the first time he came?
当时发生的是
Like, what what happened was
什么？
it?
来？
Came?
是的。
Yeah.
当然是在加利福尼亚。
Well, it was in California, obviously.
那是在很早以前了。
It was pretty early on.
那一定是2007年左右吧？
It must have been, like, 2007?
是的。
Yeah.
大概是'7年或'8年吧。
'7 or '8, I would think.
对。
Yeah.
确实挺早的。
Pretty early.
我记得我们在帕洛阿尔托的一家餐厅见过他。
I remember we met him at a restaurant in Palo Alto.
你记得吗，保罗？
Do you remember that, Paul?
那时候他还没学会装得像普通人。
Well, this was before he had learned to imitate a normal person.
对吧？
Right?
就像早期的扎克。
Like, early Zuck.
你知道的。
You know?
我的意思是，我不确定扎克是否公开说自己是自闭症谱系人士，但无论如何，他当时表现得非常像。
I mean, I don't know if Zuck publicly describes himself as being an aspie, but he was he was doing a good imitation of it at any rate.
所以他有个奇怪的习惯：如果他没什么可说的，就不会用一些无关紧要的闲话来填补沉默。
And so he had this weird thing where if he didn't have anything to say, he wouldn't fill the gap with with, you know, passing
是的。
the Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
他完全不懂寒暄。
He had no concept of small talk.
如果当时他没什么想说的，就会这样沉默着。
If there wasn't anything he felt like saying at the moment, he would just go like this.
这让人感到意外地不安。
And it was surprisingly disconcerting.
直到我遇到缺乏寒暄的情况，我才意识到寒暄有多重要。
I didn't realize how important small talk was until I met the lack of it.
但如果没什么可说的，他就会一直盯着你。
But he would just stare at you if there wasn't anything.
他就像在说：我没有想说的词。
He's like, I don't have any words I want to say.
我为什么要说那些话呢？
Why should I say words?
你知道的。
You know?
没有
Didn't
罗恩安排的吗？
Ron set it up?
罗恩实际上专门提醒过我这一点。
Ron, in fact, warned me about this specifically.
他说，好吧。
He said, alright.
你会见到马克。
You're gonna meet Mark.
我现在提醒你，对话中可能会出现很长的沉默。
Now I warn you, there's gonna be some big gaps in the conversation.
对吧？
Right?
他这么说的时候，我并不明白他的意思，但后来我亲身体会到了。
When he said that, I didn't realize what he's what he meant, but then I felt it.
不。
No.
这种模仿也太逼真了。
It's such a good brought on imitation also.
我只是想夸夸你。
I just wanna compliment you on this.
听起来简直就像他。
Sounded just like him.
是的。
Yeah.
不是。
No.
我经常
I've got a
模仿你练得很多。
lot of practice imitating you on.
扎克以前常来，他会来我们的创业学校活动演讲，吸引了很多人。
Zuck used to come, and he he would speak at our start up school events, and that drew a lot of people.
对。
Yeah.
他是个大人物。
And he was a big drop.
那时候，世界对这些并不太在意。
World back then, people didn't care so much.
比如，外界对创业圈并不怎么关注。
Like, outsiders didn't care so much about the start up world.
这还是在以前，你知道的，即使现在，我们也觉得，如果创业圈发生什么大事，那就是新闻。
This was before like, in in you know, even now, we think, like, if something big happens in the startup world, it's a news story.
但为什么创业圈发生大事就该是新闻，而酒店业或矿业发生大事就不是呢？
But why should it be if something big happens in the hospitality industry or the mining industry?
对吧？
Right?
或者，像广告业，这些行业的大事并不会自动成为每个人关注的新闻。
Or, you know, like the advertising industry, it's not automatically some kind of big story for everybody.
只有那些身处这个行业的人才会觉得有趣。
It's only interesting to people who are in that industry.
对吧？
Right?
行业媒体可能会报道它。
The trade press right might write about it.
当初创公司变成公众感兴趣的话题时，我觉得这太奇怪了。
And it was so weird to me when startups became something that the general public would be interested in.
我的意思是，我能理解为什么人们对电影明星的私生活感兴趣。
I mean, I understand why they're interested in the private lives of movie stars.
为什么他们会对初创公司创始人的私生活感兴趣呢？
Why would they be interested in the private lives of startup founders?
但人们开始感兴趣了，而且至今依然如此。
But they started to be, and they still are.
这太奇怪了。
It's so weird.
但那时候，人们还不在乎这些。
But back then, this is before they cared.
那是那种现象还没开始的时候。
This is before that phenomenon had started.
所以我们只是自己的一群人，在那个……你知道的，我们就是计算机俱乐部。
And so we were just like our own little people working in the you know, we were the computer club.
那是段非常快乐的时光。
It was such happy times.
而且，实际上，当他们开始注意到的时候，那段日子依然很快乐，但一旦我不知道什么时候到了转折点，就变得非常不愉快了。
And, actually, it was still happy when they did start taking notice, but it became very unhappy once I don't know when the turning
点出现了。
point was.
发生了两件事。
Two things that happened.
对吧？
Right?
然后，当媒体开始关注硅谷时，几乎在同一时间，觉醒文化也于2012年左右开始了。
There was then the when the press started taking notice of Silicon Valley, and then almost at the same time, wokeness started, like, in around 2012.
然后他们就会去打压YC。
And then so they would they would be busting YC.
你知道的，不是只有YC，而是整个硅谷的每个人。
You know, you'd have not not YC, but just everybody in Silicon Valley.
你会感觉有一群暴民正在酝酿，随时可能成型。
You'd had you felt like there was this mob, this incipient mob ready to form at any moment.
对吧？
Right?
如果你说了或做了错事，他们就会冲过来打压你、纠缠你。
If you said or did the wrong thing, they would come and bust you and hound you.
所以这并不好玩。
So that wasn't fun.
这种被关注与觉醒文化相结合的情况。
That combination of being visible plus wokeness.
我觉得，如果回顾我在YC的经历，真正让我最困扰的，不是Hacker News，而是围绕我们的那些负面报道，以及那些基于谎言的推特暴民。
I feel like if I look back on my history of YC, the thing that not Hacker News, but what gave me the most heartburn in life was all the negative press around us and all the Twitter mobs that were based on lies.
是的
Yeah.
是的
Yeah.
是的
Yeah.
彼得的笑声。
Peter laughter.
蒂尔，彼得·蒂尔，正在秘密经营这家公司。
Thiel Peter Thiel is secretly running the company.
你知道吗？
You know?
天哪。
Oh my gosh.
等等。
Wait.
哦，我们是不是得讲讲这个故事，彼得·蒂尔的故事。
Oh, are we I think we have to tell that story, Peter Thiel's story.
当然。
Sure.
所以彼得·蒂尔，天哪。
So Peter Thiel, oh my god.
那是哪一年？
What year was this?
那是哪一年？
What year was this?
那是萨姆接管之后的事。
It it was after Sam took over.
但那是在萨姆接管后不久。
But it was soon after Sam took over.
对。
Yes.
是的。
It was.
是好朋友
Was good friends
在某一年。
in the year something.
2015年。
2015.
他没有说，嘿，彼得。
And he didn't he say, hey, Peter.
你愿意做兼职合伙人吗？
Will you be a part time part time partner?
我加了引号，因为他只参加了一次办公时间之类的。
I put it in quotes because he, like, did one office hours or something.
不。
No.
我来告诉你整个故事。
I'll tell you the whole story.
对吧？
Right?
所以我们当时有这么一个东西。
So that we had this we had this thing.
我们可能现在还保留着类似的东西。
We probably still have something like it.
我们有个东西，我主要是为了押头韵而命名为‘兼职合伙人’，指的是那些不是YC合伙人但会来帮忙、而且不要报酬的人。
We had this thing that I named mostly for alliterative purposes, part time partners, which is people who weren't YC partners but would come in and like, for no money.
他们没有任何职责。
They had no duties.
他们得不到任何报酬。
They got paid nothing.
他们本来就不该做任何事情。
They weren't really supposed to do anything.
对吧？
Right?
但一些对创业世界有专长的人会来参加，即使他们不是正式合伙人，也会为初创公司提供办公时间。
But experts in some aspect of the startup world would come in, and they would do office hours with the startups even though they weren't actual partners.
我们把这些人都称为兼职合伙人。
And we called these people part time partners.
对吧？
Right?
我们还在网站上列出了他们的名字。
And we had them listed on the website.
所以，彼得·蒂尔曾经是我们的兼职合伙人。有一次，我在推特上和一个人发生了争执，我不想点他的名，因为他后来已经道歉了，我也不希望再给他添麻烦。
And so Peter Thiel, at one point, was a part time partner, and I got into a fight on Twitter with somebody, who I don't wanna name because he's since apologized, and I don't wanna I don't wanna give him grief.
但在争执过程中，他故意拿彼得·蒂尔是兼职合伙人这件事来攻击我，就像扔砖头一样。
But in the process of this fight, he was he, like, picked up to to as if to throw at me like a brick the fact that Peter Thiel was a part time partner.
那我们什么时候才打算把彼得·蒂尔赶走？
And when were we gonna get rid of Peter Thiel?
因为彼得·蒂尔在2015年犯下了一项不可原谅的、足以被抵制的罪过，那就是公开支持共和党。
Because Peter Thiel had committed what was in 2015 an unforgivable, like, cancelable sin, which was to be openly Republican.
于是，一群人聚集起来，试图迫使YCombinator解雇彼得·蒂尔，这个故事愈演愈烈，甚至有人说彼得·蒂尔实际上——我是说，兼职合伙人根本什么都没做。
And so so there was this this mob formed to try and force YC to fire Peter Thiel, and the story grew to the point where Peter Thiel was supposedly, like, not I mean, part time partners did nothing.
对吧？
Right?
但传言却说彼得·蒂尔在掌控YCombinator，或者他是董事会主席之类的角色。
And the story was that Peter Thiel was, like, running YC, or, you know, he was, like, the head of the chairman of the board or something like that.
老实说，虽然
And, honestly, while
他和你并不是朋友，你们只见过一次面。
he wasn't friends with you, you'd met him once.
对。
Right.
是的。
Yeah.
有趣的是，当时有一群人不断告诉YC，我们必须解雇彼得·蒂尔。
The funny thing was so so there was the all this mob telling YC we had to fire Peter Thiel.
对吧？
Right?
有趣的是，就在前一年，彼得·蒂尔只参加了四次办公时间。
Well, the funny thing was Peter Thiel, like, in the previous year had done, like, four office hours.
所以萨姆本来就已经计划要终止他的合作了。
And so Sam had been planning to fire him anyway.
这里的‘终止’意思是，好吧。
Fire in the sense of say, okay.
你看起来根本没在做任何事。
You don't seem to be actually doing anything.
也许我们该停止联系，不再列名了。
Maybe we'll stop calling, stop listing.
他只是个兼职合伙人。
He was a part time partner.
所以萨姆本来计划要解雇他。
So Sam had been planning to fire him.
然后突然有一群人说，我们必须因为他支持共和党而解雇他。
And then there was this mob saying that we had to fire him for being a Republican.
所以这看起来会是个非常糟糕的决定。
And so it seemed like it would be a really bad idea.
我跟萨姆说的是，你绝对不希望成为在这种情况下树立先例的那个人。
I told what I told Sam about this was, like, you do not want to be the one who sets a precedent in this sense.
你不想成为因为某人支持两个政党中的其中一个而解雇他的公司。
You do not want to be the company that, like, fires somebody for supporting the wrong one of two political parties.
对吧？
Right?
你知道，尽管我非常讨厌特朗普，但你也不该因为这个原因解雇别人。
You know, much as I dislike Trump, you don't wanna fire somebody for that.
所以萨姆，尽管他原本计划解雇他，但现在反而不能解雇了，因为那样看起来就像是向暴民屈服。
And so so Sam, even though he'd been planning to fire him, how now had to not fire him because that would have seemed like giving in to the mob.
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而且说清楚一点，我觉得当时的意思是，嘿，彼得，你有空的时候来帮一些初创公司一下。
Well, and to be clear, I think it was like, hey, Peter, come help some some startups when you have time.
但他真的没时间。
And he literally didn't have time.
他可能就是没时间做这件事。
He probably just didn't have time to do it.
所以我甚至都不愿意说，这个人当兼职合伙人当得不好。
So I don't even I'm not even willing to say, like, the guy was bad at being a part time partner.
我觉得他就是太忙了。
I think he just was busy.
所以他没怎么露面。
So he wasn't coming around.
所以萨姆本来想说，嘿，老兄。
So Sam was gonna be like, hey, dude.
这事儿行不通。
This isn't working out.
我的意思是，我们会把你从网站上移除。
Like, you know, we're we're gonna take you off the website.
这实际上就是原本的打算。
That was literally what it was gonna be.
然后事情就演变成了整个风波，YC，你们必须解雇这个人，就像我说的，实际上，大家的说法是他几乎在运营YC。
And then it turned into this whole thing, and it was like, YC, you have to fire this guy who's like like I said, practically, I think the the narrative was he's practically running YC.
拜托。
Well, please.
这人太忙了，连露面都很少。
Like, the guy was too busy to even be around.
这真是太让人沮丧了。
It was so frustrating.
顺便说一句，如果我对此有误解，我愿意被纠正，但整个合伙关系，我记得那天的情景。
And by the way, I and and I I am happy to stand corrected if I'm wrong about this, but, like, the whole partnership I I remember this day.
我们当时都围坐在03:35的大桌子旁，每个人都说：不行。
We were all sitting around that big table in 03:35, and everyone was like, no.
这让人情绪激动，因为我们感觉受到了攻击，根本不可能因为这些人说我们必须这么做，就把他们从网站上移除。
This is like it was emotional because we felt very attacked, and it's like, no way we're gonna take them off the website just because these people are saying we have to.
这太荒谬了。
Like, that's messed up.
或者更准确地说，是反过来的。
So Or more like the other way around.
我们会让他们留在网站上，因为他们告诉我们必须留下他们，这让我们想起了当初被取消关注的群体围攻我们的感觉，类似的事情大概发生了二十次。
We're gonna keep them on the website because they're telling us we have to take Now them that we're remembering all the like, what it felt like to have a cancel mob after us, and, like, that probably happened 20 times.
对吧？
Right?
那真的很有压力。
That was pretty stressful.
有趣的是，现在‘觉醒文化’已经大大减少了。
You know, the funny thing is wokeness has now decreased so much.
我的意思是，尤其是在推特上，但总体而言，人们根本无法想象我们当年创办YC时经历的那些糟心事。
I mean, on Twitter, especially, but all it's just in general that people can't imagine the shit we went through, like growing YC.
就像，我们快速成长YC的那些年，也正是觉醒文化迅速兴起的时期。
Like, the years where we were really growing YC fast was also the exact same years that wokeness was really growing fast.
对吧？
Right?
所以你知道为什么YC遭到了这么多批评吗？
And so and and you know why YC got so much shit?
因为我们是风险投资领域里唯一一个面向大众的品牌。
Because we were the only, like, consumer brand in the venture business.
你知道，虽然有很多声望很高的风投公司，但普通老百姓根本不知道它们的名字。
You know, there's all these prestigious venture firms, but, like, ordinary people don't know their names.
YC接受来自几乎刚毕业的大学生这样的申请者，就像求职申请一样。
YC takes open applications from, like, essentially job applicants, people who are just graduating from college.
所以YC必须打造一个大众品牌。
So YC had to have, like, a consumer brand.
我们必须让每个人都知道我们。
We had to be known by everybody.
我们不只是在做A轮投资。
We're not just, like, doing series a's.
对吧？
Right?
所以这些人想把责任推给硅谷。
And so they these people wanted to blame Silicon Valley.
因为他们是局外人，不知道参与者是谁。
And since they were outsiders, they didn't know who the participants were.
他们在硅谷唯一认识的人就是YC。
The only people they knew in Silicon Valley were YC.
所以世界上所有的问题都被归咎于硅谷。
And so everything like, all the problems in the world were Silicon Valley's fault.
硅谷里他们唯一认识的人就是我，所以世界上所有的问题都被归咎于我。
The only person in Silicon Valley that they knew was me, so all the problems in the world were my fault.
你知道吗？
You know?
我知道。
I know.
你能想象吗？
Can you imagine?
有道理。
Fair.
你还记得我们是怎么开始聊这个的吗？
So you remember how we started talking about this?
真的有压力吗？
Was it actually stressful?
是的。
Yes.
做YC的时候，我在想，我觉得我们可能漏掉了什么。
Doing YC and I'm thinking, you know, I bet we're forgetting something.
那段时间肯定挺有压力的，因为我记得自己总是感觉精疲力尽。
It probably was pretty stressful because I remember feeling really beaten up all the time.
我觉得压力更多来自于各种攻击，而不是创业本身的失败。
And I'm trying I think it was more stressful because of all all of the attacks than the actual startup implosions.
实际上，做这份工作带来的压力，远不如在媒体上因做这份工作而遭受攻击带来的压力大。
Actually doing the job was much less stress than being attacked for doing the job in the press.
对吧？
Right?
没错。
Exactly.
做这份工作本身也有很多压力。
A lot of stress doing the job too.
我的意思是，是的。
I mean Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
确实有很多压力。
There was a good deal of stress.
你知道吗，我们不得不在幕后为这些初创公司争取很多，因为人们总是欺负初创公司，你得去跟对方交涉，就像两个孩子打架，父母得去互相沟通一样。
Like, you know, there was a lot of fighting that we had to do behind the scenes on behalf of the startups because people were people would maltreat the startups, and then you have to go basically it's like, you know, two kids have a fight and the parents go and talk to each other.
如果有人试图欺负初创公司，我们就得去找他们的投资人，说：别这样了。
If someone tried to maltreat the startups, we would have to go and talk to their investors and say, come on.
这不对。
This isn't right.
他们得退让。
They have to back off.
保罗一直都在做这种事。
Paul did that all the time.
你还记得Ad Grox吗？
Do you remember the Ad Grox?
你还记得他们吗？
Do you remember them?
安东尼奥写过一本关于这个的书。
Well, Antonio wrote a book about this.
这个故事会被保留下来。
This story will be preserved.
因为，是的，他们并不是一个特别特别成功的初创公司。
Because, yeah, they weren't a super, super successful startup.
这是YC的一个奇怪之处。
That this is one of the weird things about YC.
人们之所以会想象，是因为像Airbnb、DoorDash和Coinbase这样的知名成功初创公司后来广为人知，所以他们以为在孵化期内，我们所有时间都在和Airbnb、DoorDash和Coinbase打交道。
People imagine because the startups because the famous successful startups like Airbnb and DoorDash and Coinbase are what become known later, they imagine that during the batch, we were spending all our time talking to Airbnb and DoorDash and Coinbase.
但其实不是。
And no.
实际上，你知道，Airbnb可能只是25家初创公司中的一家，只获得了二十分之一的时间。
Actually, you know, Airbnb was probably in a batch of, like, 25 startups, and they got one twenty fifth of the time.
在任何时刻，我都在和一些现在没人听说过的初创公司交谈。
At any given time, I was talking to some startup nobody's ever heard of now.
对吧？
Right?
因此，初创公司造成的麻烦与它们最终能取得的规模完全不成比例。
And so the amount of trouble caused by startups is not is not remotely in proportion to how big they end up being.
事实上，这很可能是一种反比关系。
In fact, there's probably it's probably an inverse proportion.
所以，YC意味着你把所有时间都花在处理这些非常棘手的问题上。
So you spend basically YC means you spend all of your time dealing with these really naughty problems.
棘手，就像k-n-o-t-t-y（打结的）那样棘手，不是那种调皮捣蛋的棘手。
Naughty, like k n o t t y, naughty, not naughty, naughty.
你把所有时间都花在处理这些扭曲、痛苦的问题上，而这些公司无论如何都不会有什么大出息。
You'd spend all your time dealing with these contorted, miserable problems for companies that are never gonna amount to much anyway.
这就是这个行业的本质。
It's the nature of the business.
我想扭转一下话题，因为我现在感觉很消极。
I wanna flip this conversation because I'm feeling very negative.
我想谈谈那些发生过的许多积极的事情。
I wanna talk about so many of the positive things that happened.
你还记得你给一些我们最成功的初创公司提供的建议吗？那些 advice 真正帮到了他们？
Do you remember giving any advice you gave to some of our most successful startups that really helped them?
你还记得吗？
Do you remember?
Airbnb。
Airbnb.
Airbnb。
Airbnb.
当然记得。
Absolutely.
如果没有 YC，他们早就倒闭了。
They would have died without YC.
我的意思是，他们来的时候其实已经死了，只是我们当时不知道。
I mean, they were dead when they showed up, though we didn't know it.
但比如，我们告诉他们要专注于纽约，就专注于这一个初始市场，因为你需要让这个球滚起来。
But, like, telling them to focus on New York, like, just focus on that one initial market because you need to get this ball rolling.
你知道吗？
You know?
这最终成为了这家公司成败的关键。
That ended up making all the difference for the company.
所以，当你能给初创公司一些建议，让他们一飞冲天，最终变得极其成功时，这就是最理想的情况。
And so that's the best case scenario when you can tell a startup something that makes them take off, and then they become huge.
这才是梦想中的情形。
That's the dream situation.
但通常情况并不是这样。
That's not how it usually worked.
通常，你给出建议后，他们会置之不理。
Usually, you would tell people something, and they would ignore you.
对吧？
Right?
然后他们就会失败。
And then they would fail.
那就是通常的情况。
That was the usual situation.
那是中间情况。
That was the median case.
你曾经给某个初创公司说过那句著名的名言是什么？
What was that famous quote that you gave to some startup?
你说过，谢天谢地我们投资了50家初创公司，因为你正把他们推向悬崖。
You're like, thank god we fund, you know, 50 startups because you're driving into off a cliff
没错，让他们冲下悬崖，我无所谓。
right drive off a cliff, that's fine with me.
我觉得他们实际上表现得还不错。
I think they're actually doing pretty well.
你对谁说了那句话？
Who'd you say that to?
那家公司叫什么名字？
What was the company called?
创始人的名字叫布兰登。
The founder's name was Brandon.
然后我觉得
And then I think
他离开了。
he left.
科学？
Science?
不是。
No.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得是SIFT。
I think it was SIFT.
真的吗？
Really?
我觉得
I think
他们相当成功。
they're they're quite successful.
我不知道你跟他们说过那番话。
I didn't know you said that to them.
天啊。
Oh god.
那个故事被刊登在一本书记里。
That was that story was printed in a book.
那本书叫《Launchpad》。
That book, The Launchpad.
哦，
Oh,
是的。
yes.
那也会被保存下来。
That will be preserved too.
卡罗琳，有没有什么时刻？这是一个非常调皮的问题。
Carolyn, were there any moments this is a very naughty n a u g h t y question.
有没有什么保罗发给你的邮件，让你觉得‘天啊’？
Were there any emails that happened that that Paul sent that you were like, oh, geez.
哦，天哪。
Oh, gosh.
嗯，可能有，但没有。
Well, probably, but no.
实际上，我不记得我有过那种想法。
Actually, I don't think I thought that.
比如，这种邮件会让我们陷入法律麻烦之类的。
Like, oh, this is gonna get us into legal trouble kind of emails.
没有。
No.
我永远不会说那些会让我们陷入麻烦的话
I never would say things that we get us into
法律麻烦，麻烦。
legal troubles, trouble.
但只是很生气。
But just like mad.
是的。
Yeah.
就是觉得，哦，这真的会
Just like, oh, that's really gonna
哦，我肯定我当时想，这正是这位创始人需要听到的残酷真相。
Oh, I I'm sure that I was like, this is exactly, like, the harsh truth that this founder needs to hear.
我觉得我从来没有过这种反应，觉得这会搞砸。
Like, I don't think I ever had the reaction like, oh, that's gonna go over poorly.
好的。
Okay.
这很好。
That's good.
我觉得人们有时候只是需要有人直截了当地告诉他们真相。
I think people sometimes just need sort of the unvarnished truth from someone who's like, look.
这就是你需要听到的。
This is what you need to hear.
你知道，我希望他们都成功。
You know, I wanted them all to succeed.
我本不想打击他们。
I wasn't gonna be shooting them down.
保罗，没有人比你更努力地帮助那些失败的初创公司了，我发誓。
Paul, no one worked harder than you, I swear, at helping startups who are failing.
你从来不会放弃他们。
You would not you would not give up on them.
其他人可能会说，天哪。
Other people would be like, woah.
就别纠结这个了。
Just let that one go.
保罗会说：不行。
And Paul would be like, no.
我会帮他们想个新点子，或者你就拼命努力。
I'm gonna help them with a new idea, or you would just work so hard.
这次会不一样的。
This time will be different.
你什么时候开始开设办公时间的？
When did you start taking office hours?
你还记得你开发了那个让初创公司可以预约办公时间的软件吗？
Sort of what what remember when you built the software that allowed starves to book office hours?
那个Booker？
The Booker?
那是你开发的。
You built that.
对吧？
Right?
我们所有的软件都是他写的。
Wrote every bit of our software.
你难道没意识到吗？直到我退休前，我们所有的软件都是我写的，除了Hacker News上那个上下滚动按钮的JavaScript代码，那是PB写的，因为我不会JavaScript。
Don't you realize, like, up till the point where I retired, I wrote every bit of our software except the JavaScript that did the up and down up and down buttons on on Hacker News, which PB wrote because I didn't know JavaScript.
我写了所有东西。
I wrote everything.
只要我们有软件，都是我写的。
If we had software, I wrote it.
我们网站上的每一个字都是我写的。
And I wrote every word on our website.
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
我们的网站很棒。
Our website was awesome.
喜欢你们的网站。
Love your website.
现在。
Now.
我对于那个时代的记忆之一，就是你总是，嗯，经常帮助初创公司取名字。
One of my memories, of that era is how you would always, well, you would frequently help, startups with their name.
我想我们可能讨论过
And I think we might have talked about
我到现在还在这么做。
I still do that.
不是。
No.
不是。
No.
不。
No.
我知道。
I know.
所以我的问题是，你有没有特别自豪的名字，就是你会想，你们为什么不用这个名字呢？
So I I so my question for you is, do you have a name you're particularly proud of where you're like, why don't you call yourselves this?
他们说，太棒了。
And they're like, amazing.
Imgix，I m g I x。
Imgix, I m g I x.
五个字母。
Five letters.
卡罗琳根本不知道Imgix是什么。
Carolyn has no idea who Imgix is.
不。
No.
我有。
I do.
我知道，记得那个名字。
I know remember the name.
好的。
Okay.
不过，是哪个批次？
What batch is it, though?
天啊。
Oh god.
我不记得批次了。
I don't remember batches.
找，p h I n d。
Find, p h I n d.
哦，我记得这个。
Oh, I remember that one.
我觉得，每次你和创始人在办公室时间使用Instant Domain Search时，我都该赚一美元。
I feel like if I had a dollar for every time you were at instant domain search with founders during during an office hours
在厨房里。
In the kitchen.
钱。
Money.
对吧？
Right?
就直接在你的厨房台面上。
Like, right on your kitchen counter.
哦天啊，站那儿盯着你过肩看。
Oh my to stand around and look over your shoulder.
所以我就会直接在厨房的岛台上操作。
So I'd do it right on the island in the kitchen.
太多了。
So many names.
有那么多初创公司的名字都是在厨房岛台的那个角落里想出来的。
So many startups names have been found at that one corner of the island.
所以你以善于激发人们的创意而闻名，比如采纳他们的想法。
So you're kind of famous for blowing up people's ideas, like taking their idea
这里的‘激发’是积极的意思。
Blowing up in the good sense.
是积极的意思。
In the good sense.
是积极的意思。
In the good sense.
让他们明白：你也可以成为下一个谷歌。
Making them here's how you can be the next Google.
你能吗
Can you
你以前经常这么做，有些初创公司会采纳你的建议。
and you used to do this, and some startups would take your advice.
有些其他人则不会。
Some others wouldn't.
你能记得一个这样的例子吗？
Can you remember an instance of that?
因为当你回家时，你会说，哇，真厉害。
Because I you'd come home and you'd be like, oh, wow.
如果你当时在场，你根本不会相信我们想出的点子。
If you had been there, you wouldn't believe the idea we cooked up.
是的。
Yeah.
这将成为下一个谷歌。
It's gonna be the next Google.
你知道，我想不起具体的例子，因为我做得太多了。
You know, I can't remember specific instances because I would do it so much.
我的意思是，我大概在三分之一的办公时间里都会这么做。
I mean, I would do it, like, maybe one third of the office hours I did.
我们会想办法把一个点子变得更大。
We would figure out how to make an idea much bigger.
是的。
Yeah.
这种事经常发生，现在也还在发生。
It happened all the time and still does happen.
对。
Yeah.
我现在做办公时间时，依然会这么做。
When I do office hours now, I still do that.
而且你知道吗，有时我会看到这些初创公司在项目周期刚开始的时候，他们的点子还有很多扩展空间。
And, you know, I see these startups right in the beginning of the batch sometimes, and so there's a lot of room to expand their idea.
我也想聊聊你，你知道你特别擅长帮助初创公司打磨他们的演示日演讲。
I wanna also talk about your mat your you know, you're really good at working you were good at working with the startups on their demo day pitches.
跟听众说说演示日前创始人身上通常会发生什么。
Telling listeners about sort of what used to happen before demo day with the founders.
我会帮他们写演示日的演讲稿。
I would write their demo day pitches.
这些小秘密之一。
One of those one of those little secrets.
我们会做一种叫‘脊椎式办公时间’的事情，来找出他们演示日演讲的核心要点。
We would do this thing called vertebrae office hours where we would figure out what were the vertebrae of their demo day presentation.
因为演示日的问题在于，你会上台面对50家，或者现在多达300家其他初创公司。
Because the thing about demo day is you're up there with 50 or now, like, 300 other startups.
所以当投资者听到最后时，他们根本记不住你演讲的任何内容。
And so the investors are not gonna remember anything about your presentation by the time they get to the end.
他们的大脑会被清空。
They're brain will be wiped clean.
因此，在最理想的情况下，你只能希望他们记住大约五句话的内容。
And so you really can only hope that they'll remember about five sentences worth of stuff in the very best case.
所以你应该提前决定好这五句话是什么。
And so you should decide in advance what those sentences will be.
这些就是你演示日演讲的脊椎。
And those are the vertebrae of your demo day presentation.
其余的都只是填充内容而已。
The rest is just filler, essentially.
因此，我们会努力找出那五句话，每个人都应该记住关于这家初创公司的这些内容，从而促使他们进行投资。
And so we would try and figure out what are the five sentences that everybody ought to remember about this startup that would cause someone to invest in them.
这五句话各有特定的目的。
There are five sentences with the specific purposes.
比如，这将是一个巨大的市场。
So, like, this is gonna be a giant market.
我们已经比任何人都更好地解决了这个问题。
We are already we are already solving the problem better than anybody else.
胜利属于我们了。
It's ours to lose.
当我们达到那里时，会产生网络效应，这意味着赢家通吃。
And when we get there, there's network effects, and so that means it's winner takes all.
对吧？
Right?
你已经想投资了，不是吗？
That's a pretty you're already wanting to invest, don't you?
是的。
Yeah.
听起来很棒。
Sounds great.
这就是关键。
And that's the thing.
演示日的演讲不应该是那种语速飞快的营销话术。
Demo day presentations shouldn't be, like, fast talking marketing speak.
它们应该近乎是逻辑严密的论证，说明为什么这家公司值得投资。
They should be almost, like, logical proofs of why this company is good to invest in.
你知道的，就是这么个道理。
You know, like, you follow.
如果你同意这个步骤、这个步骤和这个步骤，它们都彼此连贯，最终结果就是预期价值非常高。
If you agree with this step and this step and this step, they all follow from one and the other, and the end result is the expected value is really high.
这才是一个好的演示日演讲。
That's a good demo day presentation.
但我觉得你做的不止是脊椎。
But I feel like you did more than just vertebrae.
你会在YC花上好几个小时，人们
You would spend hours and hours and hours at YC, and people
我会和他们一起只做脊椎部分，坐下来思考，好吧。
would I just come would do the vertebrae with them and sit down and think, okay.
这才是你演讲的核心所在。
This is what the core of your presentation should be.
然后他们去制作出我让他们表达的内容。
And then they would go off and make something that said what I said to say.
接着我会坐在那里，看他们练习。
And then I would sit there, and they would practice.
在演示日之前，他们会来到YC，轮流站在那里投影幻灯片并讲解。
Before demo day, they would come to YC and take turns standing there projecting their slides and talking.
我会坐在观众席上，几乎像一个剧作家一样说：不行。
And I would sit there in in the audience essentially almost like a playwright saying, no.
不行。
No.
删掉这段。
Cut that.
对吧？
Right?
说这句话。
Say that.
你就像一个剧作家。
You were like a playwright.
你会说：不行。
You'd be like, no.
说这个。
Say this.
别用那个词。
Don't use that word.
说这个。
Say this.
当时说得太具体了。
It was so such specific down.
我们总是试图让别人说话慢一点。
We were always trying to get people to talk slower.
天哪。
Oh gosh.
是的。
Yes.
对。
Yeah.
你看，你还记得。
See, you remember.
是的。
Yeah.
能记得。
Can remember.
以前不是有个人在自己的鞋子上写了‘说慢点’，这样当他们低头看的时候，就会注意到——好像一只鞋上写的是‘说’，另一只写的是‘慢点’，类似这样的事情。
Wasn't there somebody who wrote talk slower on their shoes so that when they looked down, they would it was like talk on one shoe and slower on the other or something like that.
然后
And then
我想网上有一段我坐着和布莱恩·阿姆斯特朗谈话的录音，关于他的演示日演讲。
I there's a I think online, I think there's, a recording of me sitting talking to Brian Armstrong about his demo day presentation.
我觉得那段视频可能在网上，YouTube上能找到。
I think that might be on online on YouTube.
哦，那挺酷的。
Oh, that's pretty cool.
然后我想你会像一个紧张的家长一样，整个演示日都坐在绿色休息室里。
And then I think you'd sit you'd be like a nervous parent sit sitting in the green room at demo day, the whole time.
不。
No.
不。
No.
不。
No.
我没有坐在绿色休息室里。
I didn't sit in the green room.
我只在休息时间待在绿色休息室。
I was only in the green room during the breaks.
当他们上台演示时，我会在外面做笔记。
When the when they were presenting, I would be out there taking notes.
我会想，他们会把这部分讲对吗？
And I would be wondering, like, will they get this part right?
对吧？
Right?
因为我知道他们每场演示会说什么。
Because I knew what was coming in all of their presentations.
你知道的？
You know?
我的意思是，可能有少数公司没有在YC进行过演练，所以我猜不到他们会说什么。
I mean, there may be a few who didn't come into practice at YC, and so I wouldn't know what they were gonna say.
但90%的情况下，我知道他们会说什么，我都在期待：他们会把这句话讲好吗？
But 90% of the time, I knew what what they were gonna say, and I was hoping, will they get this line right?
你知道的？
You know?
他们会表现好吗？
Will they deliver this?
是的。
Yeah.
它能打动人心吗？
Will it land?
因此我会坐在一旁，观看每一场演示，观察它们是否能产生效果。
And so I'd be sitting there over on the side watching every presentation, seeing how it seeing if it landed.
回过头来看，有很多事情。
There was a lot of stuff in retrospect.
是的。
Yeah.
对吧？
Right?
除了不断遭受媒体攻击外，我们当时还做了很多其他实际的事情。
In addition to being attacked constantly in the press, there was all this actual stuff we were doing.
我曾经说过，也一直相信，即使你的初创公司失败了，我依然坚信任何从YC项目出来的人，都会觉得这段经历非常棒且富有价值。
I used to say, and I've believed this, that even if your startup failed, I truly believe that anyone who came out of the YC program felt like it was a great experience and and valuable for them.
而且我
And I
嗯，你
Well, you
必须学到很多东西。
had to learn a lot.
是的。
Yeah.
如果你当时还醒着，你就不可能不从这段经历中学会很多东西——比如努力打造产品、将其推向用户，弄清楚如何让产品增长，以及如何向投资者解释它。
If you were if you were even awake, you couldn't avoid learning a lot from the experience of, like, trying to build something and get it in front of users and, you know, figure out how to make it grow and how to explain it to investors.
当我们做批次结束后调查时，我记得你说过，如果他们唯一抱怨的是周二晚上的饭菜，那就说明我们做对了。
And then when we do a post batch survey, and I remember you saying, like, if all they complain about is the food on Tuesday nights, we're doing it right.
对。
Yes.
每当他们抱怨饭菜时，我们都很高兴，因为这意味着没有其他更严重的问题可以抱怨了。
We were always happy when they complained about the food because that meant there was nothing there was nothing more substantial to complain about.
所以我们非常开心。
So we were delighted.
我的意思是，食物并不是有意作为预警信号的，但它最终有效地起到了这个作用。
I mean, the food wasn't a deliberate canary in the coal mine, but it ended up it ended up effectively serving that purpose.
不过我觉得现在的食物更好了。
I think the food's better now, though.
是的。
Yeah.
现在一切都不同了。
It's all different now.
你还记得那次晚餐基本上只有热橙汁吗？
Do you remember that time dinner basically consisted of hot orange juice?
我就知道你会说鹰嘴豆配橙汁的事。
I knew you were gonna say the chickpeas with the orange juice.
当时有个厨师特别爱冒险，但方式很糟糕，做了这种橙味鹰嘴豆菜。
Well, someone at one point, we had this cook who was, like, adventurous in a bad way, and made this sort of orange flavored chickpea dish.
但创始人把炖菜里所有的固体部分都挑出来了。
But the founders the founders took out all the solid bits of the stew and all of the stuff.
就是热橙汁加点洋葱。
It's just sort of hot orange juice with a few onions.
那是橙子鸡肉，卡罗琳，听起来还算正常一点。
It was orange chicken orange chicken, Carolyn, which seems a little bit more normal.
然后素食选项是同样的酱汁，橙味鹰嘴豆。
And then the veggie the veggie option was the same sauce, orange chickpeas.
鹰嘴豆难吃死了。
And the chickpeas were disgusting.
像鸡肉一样。
Like a chicken.
哦，天哪。
Oh, no.
橙汁。
Orange juice.
我觉得，保罗，你当时肯定觉得我们这儿出问题了。
I feel like, Paul, you you you absolutely were like, we've got something's broken here.
我们必须得改变。
We've got to to to change.
这次关于食物的投诉是合理的，我们真的需要做出一些改变。
There it the the complaints about the food are legit this time, and we actually need to change something.
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
我的意思是，以前关于食物的投诉经常是合理的。
I mean, the complaints about the food often were legit.
哦，是的。
Oh, yeah.
对。
Yeah.
你知道，这是YC现在可能还在做的另一件事，但你们之前做了很多，就是关键节点的办公时间，不只是这些椎骨式办公室，而是关键节点的办公时间。
Well, you know, this is the other thing that YC, I think, still does, but you guys did a lot, was inflection point office hours, not just these vertebrae offices, but inflection point office hours.
我敢肯定那些里面有一些故事。
And I I I'm sure there's some stories from those.
我确实参加过一次，真的很有意思。
I I got to sit in on one of them, and, it was really interesting.
‘转折点’这个名字其实有点乐观，因为当时的情况是这样的。
Well, inflection point is was sort of an optimistic name for what was gonna happen.
对吧？
Right?
当一家初创公司正朝着毁灭的方向发展时，我们希望转折点就是这条线开始转向的时刻。
This is when a startup is currently on a trajectory that will crash into the ground, and we're hoping an inflection point is when a line bends in another direction.
对吧？
Right?
所以当这条线正在下降时，我们希望它能开始上升。
And so this is when the line's going down, and we and we hope it's gonna start going up.
因此，转折点办公时间就是当一家初创公司状况非常糟糕的时候。
So inflection point office hours is when a startup was in terrible shape.
我们会把他们和多个合作伙伴聚在一起。
We would get them together with, like, multiple partners.
我们会坐下来，想办法怎么挽救这家公司。
We'd sit there and figure out how do we save this thing.
但我要插一句，那些公司虽然状况糟糕，但创始团队很有潜力。
But I'm gonna interject in terrible shape but had promising founders.
对。
Yes.
没错。
Right.
是的。
Yes.
因为如果他们看起来毫无希望，我们是不是该讨论一下临终关怀了？
Because if they didn't seem like they had any hope, should we talk about palliative care?
我刚刚在想，要不要
I was just thinking, should
我们真的会讨论这个吗？
we actually talk about this?
也许该是时候了。
Maybe it's time.
也许这样也没关系。
Maybe it's okay.
好的。
Okay.
因为这是我们自己的事。
Because it was our thing.
新来的合作伙伴不会用这个说法。
It's the new partners don't use this expression.
是的。
Yeah.
卡罗琳，你知道这件事吗？
Do you know about this, Carolyn?
姑息护理模式？
Palliative care mode?
当然。
Of course.
好的。
Okay.
好的。
Okay.
所以，如果一家初创公司看起来状况非常糟糕，但似乎还有希望，我们就会把他们叫来，说：好吧。
So if a startup seemed if a startup was doing really badly and it seemed like they had hope, then we would bring them in and we'd say, alright.
来吧。
Come on.
让我们想想办法，如何改变现状，让这家初创公司成功。
Let's figure out how to change things to make this startup succeed.
如果看起来他们已经无望了，还不如去给别人打工，我们就会进入一种叫姑息护理模式的状态，只是对他们特别友善。
If it seemed like they were doomed and they'd be better off just having jobs working for somebody else, we would have this thing we called palliative care mode where we would just be really nice to them.
所以，至少在他们的初创公司濒临倒闭时，他们依然能保持乐观和开心。
So at least as their startup was dying, they would be cheerful and happy about it.
所以没有严厉的爱。
So no tough love.
只有爱。
Just love.
是的。
Yeah.
没有严厉的爱。
No tough love.
不。
No.
对。
Yeah.
如果我们觉得还有希望，我们还是会采取严厉的爱。
Well, we would do tough love if we thought it might work.
对。
Right.
这正是我想说的。
That's what I'm saying.
比如，你不会对那些处于姑息治疗阶段的初创公司使用严厉的爱。
Like, you wouldn't bother with tough love for the for the palliative care startups.
你只是给予他们温和的关怀。
You just give them, like, gentle care.
你会对他们非常非常友善。
You'd just be really, really nice to them.
还有温和的关怀。
And gentle care.
所以我们知道哪些公司还有希望扭转局面，哪些公司注定失败，对于后者，我们只是会对他们特别友善。
And so we knew we knew which companies we were we we hoped we could turn around and which ones we thought were doomed, and we were just just gonna be real nice to them.
我很高兴你提到了转折点办公时间。
In I love that you brought up inflection point office hours.
那真是太
That was such
一个
a
我_fun_知道。
I fun know.
我们还做了什么，卡罗琳？
Thing that we What else, Carolyn?
你还记得什么？
What else do you remember?
嗯，我记得我们都去吃午饭了。
Well, I remember we all went to lunch.
我们可能开了合伙人午餐会，然后回来后和阿多拉进行了转折点办公时间，她大概讲了她整个“家乐”之旅，因为之前我们和她聊过这些。
We had probably had partner lunch, and we came back, and we had inflection point office hours with Adora, and she probably talked all about I mean, I know she already talked about her whole home joy journey when we talk to her.
但后来还有第二次，可惜我不记得那家初创公司的名字了。
But then there was a second one, and I'm afraid I don't remember the name of that startup.
但当创始人进来时，我们先聊了十五分钟，因为你告诉他他长得像罗马皇帝。
But when the founder walked in, we had a fifteen minute conversation first because you told him he looked like a Roman emperor.
我觉得你跟他说他长得像尼禄。
I think you told him he looked like Nero.
于是我们突然跑题，开始讨论起罗马皇帝来。
So we had this random tangent where we all talked about Roman emperors.
你希望看起来像的那个皇帝。
The emperor you wanna look like.
我想这就是为什么这件事有点争议，我们都忍不住笑，那位创始人也在笑，然后我们开始搜索罗马皇帝的相关信息。
Well, I think that's why it was somewhat controversial, and we're all, like, chuckling, and the guy and the founder was chuckling, and we're all started, like, googling Roman emperors.
总之，那个初创公司叫什么我甚至都记不起来了，事情最后怎么样我也忘了。
And, anyway, that was I don't even remember the startup or how things turned out.
但你记得那个梗吗？我只愿意投资长得像扎克伯格的创始人。
But Do you remember the meme that I only like to found I only like to fund founders who look like Zuck?
哦。
Oh.
我记得那个梗。
I do remember that meme.
是那个吗？
That one?
我记得那个梗。
I do remember that meme.
那个持续了
That lasted
在媒体中延续了多年。
that persisted for years in the press.
如果它现在还存在，我一点也不惊讶。
I wouldn't be surprised if it's still out there.
这都是因为我们曾经见过这个人，你知道，现在你了解我了。
All because we once met this because, you know, now you you're you know me.
我看到了一些东西。
I see something.
如果他们的脸有什么不寻常的地方，我就会注意到，甚至会说出来。
If there's something unusual about their face, I notice it and even say something.
所以我们曾经采访过一个长得非常像扎克伯格的人。
And so we were once interviewing this guy who looked who looked very much like Zuck.
对吧？
Right?
我们甚至还投资了他。
And we even funded him too.
我们确实投资了他。
We did fund him.
那家公司几乎没什么起色，我觉得他们连YC的结束都没撑到。
The company, like, barely I don't think they even made it to the end of YC.
没错。
No.
他们内部发生了联合创始人纠纷。
Had some cofounder dispute.
是的。
Yeah.
所以，有位记者说，当时有位记者被派驻在那个批次里，我觉得是这样。
And so I like, a reporter said there was a reporter, like, embedded in the batch that batch, I think.
他问，你能被任何人骗到吗？
And he asked, like, can you be fooled by anyone?
于是我开玩笑地、自嘲地说，显然，我容易被长得像扎克伯格的人骗到。
Well and I and I jokingly self deprecatingly said, apparently, I can be fooled by people who look like Zuck.
而且，天哪，之后整整五年，我只投资那些长得像扎克伯格的创始人。
And, man, like, for, like, five years afterwards, I was only funding founders who look like Zuck.
他们可能让硅谷的发型潮流倒退了十年。
They'd probably set back hairstyles in Silicon Valley by ten years.
你还记得有人问过你，比如，你会给出什么建议吗？
Do you also remember when someone asked you about, like, what advice would you give?
我当时把一些外国创始人——我忘了他们来自哪儿——带过来。
I'm, you know, bringing these foreign, I forget where they're from, founders over.
你会给他们什么建议？
What advice would you give to them?
我说，确保他们能流利地说英语。
I said, like, make sure they speak fluent English.
对吧？
Right?
说实话，这是你能做的最重要的事。
It's honestly that would that's the most important thing you could do.
这种状况持续了好几年。
That persisted for years.
你竟然会歧视有口音的人，而答案是：来参加演示日吧。
Like, that that you discriminated against anyone with an accent, which the answer to that is come to a demo day.
告诉我们，我们是否真的歧视有口音的人。
Tell us if we actually discriminate against people with accents.
天哪。
Oh my word.
天哪。
Oh my god.
是的。
Yeah.
再回到演示日的事情。
And back to the demo day thing.
你还记得你以前在演示日跟那些口音特别重的人合作过吗？他们说话你都很难听懂。
Do you remember you used to work with people at demo day who had such thick accents that they it was hard to understand them.
你跟他们一起工作的时候，就像
They like you worked with them like
有一位创始人。
one founder.
有一位创始人，我最后甚至把她的演讲内容按发音逐字记了下来。
There was one founder that I I I eventually got to memorize her speech phonetically.
就像ABBA乐队那样。
Like Abba, the group Abba used to do.
你知道吗，ABBA早期的歌曲听起来就像演唱者不是母语者，根本不懂自己唱的词的意思？
You know how Abba's original their early songs sound like they're not native speakers, like they don't know the meanings of the words they're saying?
那是因为他们真的不懂自己唱的词的意思。
That's because they didn't know the meanings of the words they were saying.
他们只是把那些词当作声音来唱。
They were just singing it as sounds.
有一位创始人口音太重了，以至于她不得不逐音记忆她的演示日演讲内容。
And there was one founder whose accent was so strong that she had to memorize her demo day presentation phonetically.
这太惊人了。
It's amazing.
今天我想聊一聊萨姆·阿尔特曼。
I wanna talk a little bit about Sam Altman too today.
好的。
Okay.
只要我们在谈关于YC大家常编的那些著名谎言。
As long as we're talking about famous lies everyone tells about YC.
我们来谈谈那个我们已经解雇了萨姆的谎言吧。
Let's talk about the lie that we've we've fired Sam.
哦，我们要来揭穿一些谣言了。
Oh, we're gonna do some myth busting.
首先，让我们回忆一下萨姆，因为萨姆一直是我们历史的一部分，你知道的。
Well, let's first reminisce about Sam because Sam's, like, part of our history, you know, the whole time.
实际上，如果没萨姆，卡罗琳根本不会坐在那里，因为
And, actually, Carolyn wouldn't be sitting there if it weren't for Sam because
没错。
Right.
没错。
Right.
卡罗琳是萨姆的律师。
Carolyn was Sam's lawyer.
没错。
That's right.
那就是我们认识你的经过。
That was how we met you.
辛辛那提。
Cincinnati.
是的。
Mhmm.
没错。
That's right.
萨姆的律师。
Sam's lawyer.
因为萨姆是第一个如此成功的初创公司。
Because Sam was, like, the first startup that was so successful.
真的还请了律师。
Actually had a lawyer.
没错。
That's right.
所以，我们认识萨姆很多年了，萨姆一直都在我们的生活中。
So Sam, we had known for years, and Sam was always in the picture.
即使他当时在做Looped项目，也还是会来吃晚饭。
Even when he was working on Looped, he was he would still come to dinner.
是的。
Yeah.
他总是出现在我们身边。
He was always around.
他总是在，而且绝对是我们的首选。
He was always around, and he definitely was our go to.
比如，你需要融资建议吗？
Like, you need fundraising advice?
去找萨姆聊聊。
Go talk to Sam.
是的。
Yeah.
他是最棒的。
He was the best.
即使那时，我的天啊。
Even then I mean, now, my god.
他是筹资之神。
He's the god of fundraising.
但早在早期，他就已经是硅谷最顶尖的筹资者之一。
But even early on, he was, like, among the best fundraisers in Silicon Valley.
告诉我，你在最早期、第一批时对他有什么看法。
Tell me what your opinion was him was in the very early days in the first batch.
嗯，YC投资的一些人，我后来逐渐意识到他们非同寻常。
Well, Sam, some people that YC has funded, I gradually realized were a big deal.
你知道的？
You know?
但对萨姆，我是一见就明白的。
With Sam, it was instant.
就说山姆吧，我现在还记得和他聊第一分钟的时候自己心里的想法。
Like Sam, I like, in the first minute of talking to him, I can remember thinking.
我清清楚楚记得那时候我是怎么想的。
I can remember what I thought at that time.
我那时候就觉得，行吧。
I thought, okay.
这肯定就是比尔·盖茨19岁时的样子了，毕竟山姆那时候也才19岁。
This must be what Bill Gates was like when he was 19 because Sam was 19 then.
我一直都很好奇，比尔·盖茨19岁就创立了微软，
And I I had always wondered, like, Bill Gates ended up starting Microsoft when he was 19.
那他19岁的时候到底是什么样的呢？
What could he have been like?
因为我自己19岁的时候，完全没能力创办微软这种公司。
Because I certainly was not in a position to start Microsoft when I was 19.
后来我遇见了山姆，我就懂了。
And then I met Sam, I'm like, okay.
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