斯宾塞·斯凯茨，Amplitude 创始人兼首席执行官

而且所有的投资者也都做了同样的事。

And and, like, all the investors would like, did the same thing.

这真的很酷，因为正如你所说，我认为这在YC并不是一件寻常的事。

And it was it it was really cool because, yeah, to your point that I think I don't think, you know, that was that was not a normal thing at YC.

不是的。

No.

而且我们确实获得了大量的媒体报道。

And, we actually got tons of press out

了

of

它。

it.

我喜欢这个。

I love it.

等等。

So wait.

我不想跳到演示日，因为我还想聊聊那次面试，我记得。

I don't wanna skip ahead to demo day yet because I wanted the interview, which I remember.

大家都很喜欢你们俩，但他们对这个点子有点犹豫。

Everyone loved you both, but they were sort of like, oh, about the idea.

但这正是为什么C公司那时已经学会投资创始人而非点子的绝佳例子。

But this was a prime example of why c by then had learned to, like, fund the founders, not the idea.

在场所有人都很清楚，你们俩是非常出色的创始人，而且是优秀的程序员。

And it was so clear that everyone in that room thought that you two were such strong founders and, you know, programmers.

但他们对这个点子有点怀疑，PB就是其中之一。

But they were a little skeptical about the idea, PB being one of them.

但在那三个月里，你们确实取得了一些进展，对吧？

But you had you got some traction, you know, that in the the three months.

对吧？

Right?

而且你们的演示日表现得很好。

And you had a good demo day.

对吧？

Right?

那后来发生了什么？

So, like, what happened?

是的。

Yeah.

我们有几十万次下载，也就是说，有不是我们朋友的人在使用它。

We had a few 100,000 downloads, so somebody, you know, who was not our friends was using it.

这很酷。

That was cool.

而且，在演示日我们有很多热情。

And, you know, we had a lot of excitement at demo day.

我认为我们看到的是，很难让用户留下来，因为他们只试用一两次。

I think what we saw was it was very hard to get users to stick around because they try it out once or twice.

这只是一个很酷的技术演示。

It'd be a cool tech demo.

也许会有少数人继续使用它，但你并没有获得一群对此非常热情的用户。

Maybe a few would go on to use it, but you didn't get this, like, group of very passionate users about it.

所以我们做的一件事是——这后来促成了Amplitude的诞生——我们自己构建了分析工具，因为我们想要弄清楚：我们有一个具体的问题，那就是语音识别的准确性对用户的长期留存有多大的影响？

And so one of the things we did was we you know, and this is what led to Amplitude later is we built our own analytics, because we wanted to understand, like, there was this one particular question we had, which is how much does the accuracy of the voice recognition matter for the long term retention of a user?

比如，如果用户成功完成了一次匹配事件，是否意味着他们更有可能长期留存？

Like, if someone has a successful match event, does that mean they're much more likely to stick around long term?

所以我们花了很多时间构建了一整套数据分析基础设施来回答这个问题。

So we ended up spending all this time building, this this whole, data analytics infrastructure to to answer this.

结果发现，这一点至关重要。

Turns out, it matters tremendously.

如果用户在首次使用应用时成功完成了匹配事件，他们留存的可能性是未成功者的两倍。

You're twice as likely to stick around if you have a successful match event if than than if you don't on your first try of using the app.

但我们意识到，我们无法将准确率提升到足够高的水平，因为用户第一次尝试使用时，系统常常失败，而这项技术的质量本身就不够高。

And but we realized that we could not get the quality high enough to where it would often fail the first time someone tried to use it because the quality of the technology was just not high enough.

而且，我们当时只是在使用某个未经许可的Google API，所以根本无法改进其背后的技术。

And, you know, we were just using some unauthorized Google API, and so it's not like we could under improve what was behind the scenes on that.

我们可以在这上面做一些临时解决方案，但无法真正改进核心的语音识别技术。

Like, we could do some hacks on top of it, but we couldn't actually improve the core voice recognition.

我们还与语音识别领域的多家公司进行了交流，但要找到合适的方案很难，因为我们缺乏底层算法的专业知识。

And we also we also talked to a number of other companies in the voice recognition space, and it it was gonna be hard to like, we didn't have the expertise in the underlying algorithms.

我们当时只拥有上层的用户界面，如果没有能力改进语音识别本身，很难打造出一个成功且有用户基础的产品。

We just had the user interface on top, and it was gonna be hard to to, you know, create something that that was successful and had traction, without being able to improve, on on the voice recognition itself.

在iPhone上真的无法实现这个功能吗？

Was it actually impossible to build this on iPhone?

你们是不是必须在Android上开发，因为苹果根本不可能容忍任何类似影子API之类的东西？

Like, did you have to build it on Android because there was just no way Apple was gonna tolerate any, like, you know, shadow APIs or anything like that?

其实问题并不在于影子API。

So it it wasn't actually the shadow APIs.

当时在Android上，应用可以在后台运行。

It was on Android at the time, apps could run-in the background.

因此，即使应用被关闭，你也可以保持麦克风开启，并继续在手机上做其他事情。

And so you could keep the microphone open even if the app were closed and still do other stuff on your phone.

然后你可以通过语音发送文字，系统会弹出界面，你只需对手机说话就能收发短信。

And then you could say text by voice, and then the thing would pop up, and you could send or receive text messages by by just by talking to your phone.

所以安卓手机具备这种功能。

And so Android phones had that capability.

苹果仍然非常严格地禁止应用在后台运行。

Apple still doesn't like Apple's very, like, aggressive about not letting stuff run-in the background.

所以，这就是原因。

And so, yeah, that was that was the why.

好的。

Okay.

有意思。

Interesting.

不过，你们确实开发了一些软件来分析数据和用户行为。

So you, though, you guys built some software to analyze the data and your user behavior.

对吧？

Right?

你能告诉我们，当你在做Yeah的时候，Amplitude的核心理念最初是如何诞生的吗？

Can you tell us sort of how how the kernel of Amplitude got started while you were doing Yeah.

阳光？

Sunlight?

对我们来说，构建这款产品的唯一方式就是观察用户在做什么，这再明显不过了。

So it was so obvious to us that the way to build this product was to look at what your users were doing.

就是，看看他们是怎么使用的，他们用它来做什么，喜欢什么，不喜欢什么，卡在哪些地方，为什么他们会持续回来，等等。

It was like, yeah, see what they're how they're using it, what they're using it for, what they like, what they don't like, where they're getting stuck, you know, why they keep coming back.

因为我们有互联网连接的产品，所以这种方式对我们来说太明显了。

Like, it was just so obvious to us the way you do this because we have Internet connected products.

这不像过去那样，你把光盘发出去，却完全不知道用户在桌面上如何运行你的软件。

Like, it's not like in the old days where you'd ship out a CD and you have no clue how someone's running your software at a desktop.

你可以实时看到这些情况。

It's like, you can actually see it in real time.

所以，很明显，让你的产品变得更好的方式就是去观察这些数据。

And so, obviously, the way you'd you make your product better is by looking at that.

于是我们尝试了一堆现成的工具，比如谷歌分析、Flurry等等，但它们都无法回答我之前提到的那个问题。

And so we tried a bunch of off the shelf things, Google Analytics, Flurry, others, and none of them could answer the question I had talked about earlier.

所以我们当时就想，你知道，就像两个充满傲气的工程师那样。

So we're like, you know, like a bunch of two engineers with a bunch of hubris.

我们觉得，当然，我们自己来构建它。

We're like, of course, we'll we'll build it ourselves.

我们最初用的是SQLite数据库，随着我们尝试做的事情规模扩大，后来逐渐迁移到了其他数据库。

We started with a SQLite database, and we moved to the to these others over time as we scaled what we were trying to do.

我们实际上从中获得了一些非常有价值的洞见。

And we actually got some very good insight out of this.

比如，我们发现第一场比赛的准确性极其重要，因此我们可以花大量时间来优化这一点。

Like, we found out that the the the accuracy of the first match was incredibly important, and so we could spend a bunch of time tuning that.

当我们把这个展示给我们批次中其他拥有更成功公司的成员时，我记得曾和PlanGrid的创始人聊过。

Now when we showed this to other members in our batch who had much more successful companies, like I remember talking to the PlanGrid founders.

我还记得和Gusto的创始人交谈过。

I remember talking to the Gusto founders.

我当时想，你们肯定在做更复杂的东西，因为我们自己都还没理顺，但你们作为公司肯定有办法。

I was like, you know, clearly, you guys are probably gonna be doing something more sophisticated cause we don't have our stuff together, but, you know, you guys do as a company.

但他们说：没有。

But they were like, no.

我根本不知道人们是怎么使用我们的产品的。

I have no idea how people are using our our product.

我心想：什么？

And I'm like, what?

那你们怎么改进它呢？

How are you improving it?

所以，后来他们说：这真的很酷。

And so, anyway, that ended up they were then like, well, that's really cool.

我能用你们用来搭建这个的东西吗？

Can I get this, you know, what you're using to build this too?

于是，这第一个信号表明，这里有一个机会，可以把整个东西变成一家公司。

And so that was the first signal that there was an opportunity there to, you know, turn that whole thing into a company.

这批项目结束后，这些对话是在多久之后发生的？

How how far after the batch is are these conversations happening?

比如，你知道，冬十二月是你们的演示日，然后，时间线是怎样的？

Like, so it's, you know, winter twelve is when you had demo date, and then, like, what's the timeline?

这既发生在项目末期，也紧接在项目结束后。

I I I this was both at the tail end of the batch and right after it.

我记不清了。

I can't remember.

演示日应该是三月或四月。

Demo Day must have been in March or April then.

然后，是的，我们最终在五月决定终止Sunlight项目，接着在六月决定全职投入这个新项目。

And then, yeah, we ended up deciding to wind down Sunlight in in May, and then we came on to deciding to do this full time in June.

哦，所以时间挺近的。

Oh, so it's pretty.

所以这一切都发生在2012年。

So this all happening in 2012.

这可不是几年的工作。

Like, this is not years of work.

一个接一个。

After another.

全都过去了。

All went after.

你去拿了钱，然后去雇一个团队。

Go and you didn't take any money and go hire a team.

还是只有你和柯蒂斯。

It's still just you and Curtis.

你还在摸索，这其实就是你转型的时候。

You're still just figuring out, and that's when you pivot, basically.

完全没错。

Totally.

是的。

Yeah.

我们当时筹集了大约12万美元的天使投资。

We we had raised about, you know, a 120 k in angel funding.

这还不包括当时StartFund提供的15万美元。

This was in addition to the 150 from StartFund at the time.

然后这件事特别搞笑。

And then it was so funny.

我一直以为其中一位天使投资人投资我们，是因为我们是整个项目中最有问题的公司。

I I was convinced one of the angels actually invested in us because we wanna run of the lamest companies in the batch.

不。

No.

所以我心想，如果不是这样，这根本说不通。

So I'm like, this guy this makes no sense otherwise.

是的。

Yeah.

其实那是亚当·德雷珀。

This was Adam Draper, actually.

哦。

Oh.

是的。

Yeah.

蒂姆·德雷珀的儿子。

Tim Draper's son.

既然你觉得你们是最没前途的，他为什么还会投资你们？

Why would he have invested in you as the thinking you're the lamest?

我想他的真实标准其实是投资批次中最年轻的创始人，你知道的，我们正好符合，因为我仔细看了他所有的投资，发现这些公司看起来都乱七八糟，没什么前途。

I think his actual algorithm was to invest in the youngest founders in the batch, you know, which included us because I just looked at all these you know, I looked at all of his other investments and I'm like, man, these all these companies don't seem like they have their stuff together and are going anywhere.

所以这是一种偏见。

So It's a bias

他们之所以这样，是因为这个原因。

for them to be why.

所以我认为他看到了你的潜力。

So I think he saw your promise.

他值得称赞的是，我觉得他入场太早了。

He to his credit, I think he was so early.

他有时对很多事情介入得太早了，但你知道，在风投领域，你宁愿如此。

He's sometimes too early to stuff, but, you know, you'd much rather be that in in in venture.

这真是太有趣了。

So That's so funny.

我记得你们当时看起来真的很年轻。

I do remember you guys look pretty young.

我的意思是，现在确实是这样。

I mean, now it's Yeah.

当然，现在还有18岁的孩子在参加YC。

Of course, there's the 18 year olds going through YC.

这太疯狂了。

That's nuts.

这真的太疯狂了。

That is nuts.

你觉得吗？

You think?

回顾起来，我非常感激的一点是，你为年轻人提供了一条不同于现有体制的替代路径，而这些体制对千禧一代和Z世代并不友好，我认为这太了不起了。

One of the things that I was actually in retrospect, I'm so appreciative is you've you've given, those who are younger an alternative path from existing institutions, which just have have not been kind, to millennials or Gen Z, which I think is so amazing.

年轻时的困难在于，好吧。

The hard part about being young is that okay.

有一项著名的哈佛商学院研究，探讨了世界级表现的要素，它指出有三个关键因素：持续一万小时的刻意练习、专家指导，以及热情的家庭支持。

So so there's this there's this famous Harvard Business School study that looks at elements of world class performance, and and it says there's three big ones, deliberate practice over ten thousand hours, expert coaching, and then enthusiastic family support.

因此，你真的需要第二个因素，因为向他人学习能让你快得多地掌握东西。

And so you you really need the second one, which is it's so much faster to learn something from someone else.

这就像艾萨克·牛顿说的。

It's like what Isaac Newton said.

他说，如果我看得更远，那是因为我站在了巨人的肩膀上。

It's like, you know, if I've seen further, it's because I've I've stood on the shoulders of giants.

如果代数在那时还没有被充分发展，我是不可能发明微积分的。

Like, wouldn't have been able to invent calculus if if algebra hadn't been very flushed out by the by that time.

就像一个年轻的20岁年轻人一样。

Like, same thing as a as a, you know, young 20 year old.

你需要能够向别人学习。

Like, you need to be able to learn off of someone.

因此，我特别感激的一点是，杰西卡，你、保罗、卡罗琳以及YC整体所做的一切，就是为这些人提供了一个可以去学习的地方，让他们知道他们可以获得专业的指导。

And so one of the things I've just been so tremendously appreciative about, Jessica, what you and Paul and and Carolyn and YC has has done as a whole is that it's it's provided a place where all these people can go and learn, how to do that, and so they know that they can get that expert coaching.

我们能快速聊一下一件事吗？

Can we touch on one thing real quick?

因为你提到家庭支持是三大要素之一——充满热情的家庭支持。

Because you mentioned family support is one of the three Enthusiastic family support.

所以我在想，这可能会稍微跳过一点，但你的妈妈是什么时候开始向表亲们夸耀你的？

And so I'm wondering, and this may be skipping ahead a little bit, but, like, at what point did your mom start bragging about you to the cousins?

就像，她花了多久才开始说，我儿子斯宾塞。

Like, how long did it take before she was like, my son, Spencer.

我实际上

I I actually

不知道。

don't know.

我其实也不知道。

I actually don't know.

她真是个很有个性的人。

Like, she she's a she's quite the character.

她讲的每个故事，最后总是以她最厉害结尾。

She like every story she tells, it's like it always ends with why she's the best.

那就是故事的笑点。

Like, that's the punchline of the story.

所以你只要说这句话，就能直接跳到结尾。

So you can just say that, and you'll cut to the end.

所以我其实也不知道。

So I actually don't know.

你知道的吧？

You know?

我不确定。

I I don't know.

是的。

Yeah.

我想，你知道，大概在中期，也就是我们完成几轮融资之后，事情看起来就靠谱了。

I think, you know, probably midway through, like, you know, once we had raised a few rounds of funding, it looked legitimate.

不过我们得接着说，因为你在改变你的想法。

So let's pick up though because you you're changing your idea.

你说，天啊。

You you say, gosh.

看起来我们一直在用的这些分析工具似乎引起了一些兴趣。

It seems like we have some interest in in this analytics tools, you know, that we've been using.

接下来发生了什么？

What happened next?

那是六月。

So that was June.

我们决定全力投入这个方向。

We decided to go all in on that.

这一次，我们在Sonolite期间犯的一个错误是没有贴近产品的用户。

And this time around, one of the mistakes we had made during Sonolite was we had not been close to the users of our product.

我们偶尔会做用户访谈研究，但并不是我们自己成了忠实用户，也没有花大量时间与他们相处。

And so we did user interview studies once in a while, but it's not like we were religious users and it's not like we spent lots of time with them.

这是一个巨大的错误。

And that was a huge mistake.

我们只是不停地构建、构建、构建，因为作为工程师，你只知道怎么做。

We just build build build because that's what you know how to do as an engineer.

作为工程师，你看到一个问题，就能去解决它，然后做出一个东西。

As an engineer, you see a problem, can go fix it, you build a thing.

这正是让你感到快乐的事情。

Like, that's what gives you joy.

你的思维方式就是这样。

That's how you're wired.

和用户交流这件事，你到底该怎么开始呢？

This whole talking to users thing, it's like, how do you even do that?

你怎么才能进入一个能持续获得反馈的良性循环？

Like, how do you get into a good loop where you're getting feedback?

所以我们说，好吧。

And so we said, alright.

我们必须确保不再犯同样的错误。

We need to make sure we're not making the same mistake.

所以在开始开发任何东西之前，我们先去和很多人聊聊。

And so before we build anything, let's just go talk to a lot of people.

于是我们和人交谈，并设定了一个目标。

And so we talked to we set a goal.

我们希望在开始任何数据分析功能之前，先和30家公司交流，看看是否真的有需求。

We wanted to talk to 30 companies before starting anything on the analytics side just to see if there was enough there.

于是我们就这么做了。

So we did that.

我们花了一个月时间做这件事。

We spent a month doing that.

在这30家公司中，我认为我们最终得出结论，大概有七家在我们开发出来后会实际使用。

And of those 30, I think we concluded probably about seven would actually use this if we built it.

我们当时想，你知道吗？

And we're like, you know what?

这已经足够好了。

That's good enough.

那就干吧。

Let's go for it.

但真正讽刺的是，事后回头看，这七家公司没有一家最终成为Amplitude的长期客户。

What's really ironic though is in retrospect, none of those seven ended up being long term customers of Amplitude.

他们没有一家愿意付费。

None of them actually wanted to pay.

所以那段时间，我们花了一年时间不断开发，只是恳求我们认识的任何人使用这个产品，尤其是在早期阶段。

And so it was it was kind of a it was about a year of just building and just begging anyone we knew to use the product in the early days, you know.

所以我们直接免费提供给他们。

So we just give it to them for free.

我们希望他们能使用，然后，你知道，我们的想法是过一段时间再向他们收费。

We'd hope they use it, and then, you know, the idea was sometime later we, you know, asked them for money.

那是在2012年6月到2013年之间的下一年。

And that was the next year from June 2012 to to 2013.

然后我们遇到了第一个真正的客户，这个故事我讲过很多次了，我们去了一个叫Twelve Kids的移动老虎机博彩游戏公司。

And then we met our first real customer, and I've told this story a bunch of times, but we, went to this, mobile slots casino gaming company and this company called twelve Kids.

我们进去后，我做了演示，讲到结尾时，他问了我一个我从未被问过的问题：这个要多少钱？

And we went in, I gave the demo, and we got to the end of it, and he asked me a question I'd never been asked before, which is, how much does this cost?

我当时说：什么？

And I'm like, what?

我以为我得求着你用这个产品呢。

Like, I thought I was gonna have to beg you to use this.

但你居然问我这东西多少钱？

But you're asking me how much does it cost?

所以，你知道的，我当时就想，好吧。

And so, you know, I I I was like, okay.

那这个问题的正确答案是什么？

What's the right answer on this?

我一开始想，每个月50美元？

And I first thought, $50 a month?

但我记得帕特里克·麦肯齐（Patio Eleven）的建议，就是尽量开口要最高的价格。

But I remember Patrick McKenzie, Patio eleven's advice about, like, just ask for as much money as you can.

所以我想，行吧。

And so I'm like, alright.

我能报出的最高数字是多少？

What's the biggest number I can say?

于是我提出了每月1000美元，他的反应是：哇。

So I came up with a thousand dollars a month, and his reaction was like, wow.

这也太便宜了吧。

That's so cheap.

我当时想，天哪。

And I was like, oh my god.

就在那一刻，我感到自己一直以来想做的事得到了认可——那就是让别人买下我开发的软件。

In that moment, I was validated in everything I ever wanted to do, which is to get someone to buy software I'd built.

我现在是个真正的商人了。

I'm a real business person now.

但五十美元和一千美元之间的差距太大了。

But like the difference between 50 and a thousand massive.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

Yeah.

你

You

那里真够大胆的。

had some real nerve there.

我只是按照建议行事。

Well, just was following the the the advice.

好吧。

It was like, okay.

一千是我能想到的最大数字。

I I a thousand was the biggest number I could think.

我当时想，我从50开始，然后我想，你知道吗？

I was like, you know, I started at 50 and then I was like, you know what?

让我翻倍到100。

Let me double it to a 100.

我觉得，这还不够大。

And I'm like, you know, that's not big enough.

我就在前面加个零，看看他们会有什么反应。

Let me just put a zero in front of it and just see how they react.

对我来说，当时每月一千美元是一笔巨款，但对他们来说，你懂的，他们有更大的问题，这点钱根本不算什么。

And to me, a thousand dollars a month was so much money at the time, but like to them, you know, they had bigger problems and it was nothing.

当时我就想，如果这东西能解决这个问题，那太简单了，根本不用犹豫，直接成交。

And it was like, if this thing can solve it, like, yeah, easy easy, no brainer transaction.

他有开始支付吗？他对你提供的服务满意吗？

And was he plea did he start paying that, and was he, like, pleased with your service?

是的。

Yeah.

他是我们第一个真正的客户。

He it was that was the first real customer we had.

他们开始使用它。

He they started using it.

他们给了我们大量的反馈。

They gave us tons of feedback.

我们会定期去他们的办公室，看看如何改进产品，以及他们是如何使用的。

We'd go over to their offices regularly to see how we could make it better and to see how they used it.

他们会增加发送给我们的数据量，这样我们就能收取更多的费用。

They would grow the amount of data they sent us, so we could we would charge even more.

它在2003年增长了。

It grew 2,003.

哇。

Wow.

他之所以如此兴奋，原因是我当时没意识到，但他曾是Zynga的产品经理。

And the the the the reason he was actually so excited about I didn't realize this at the time, but the reason he was so excited about it was because he was a former product manager at Zynga.

当时，Zynga有一个庞大的内部分析系统。

And Zynga at the time, they had this huge internal analytics system.

它叫什么来着，大概是Z Analytics。

It was something like Z Analytics.

他们习惯于通过数据分析来开发移动和社交游戏。

And they were so used to building their mobile and social games by looking at data.

很明显，这就是他们做事的方式。

And it was so obvious that this was way they do it.

现在他离开了，开始自己的公司，却一无所有。

Now that he had left to start his own company, he had nothing.

他对正在发生的事情毫无头绪。

He had no idea what was going on.

因此，他愿意使用一个如此初期、原始、糟糕且毫无业绩记录的产品——你知道的，当时这些创始人才24岁左右，根本不懂任何东西，也从未卖过软件，但他实在太迫切需要一个能解决他问题的工具了。

And so he was willing to use something that was so nascent and embryonic and crappy and no track record from these, you know, young, I think we're 24 year old founders this point who didn't know anything, who hadn't sold software before in their life because it he was so desperate for, something to solve his problem.

这实际上成为了我们许多早期客户的典型代表。

And that actually was the archetype for so many of our early customers.

我们确实开始接触到很多前Zynga员工，他们去了其他公司，看到了我们所做事情的价值，这些人后来成了我们大量的早期客户和投资者。

We had actually we started meeting a lot of people in the the Zynga ex Zynga network, who had gone on to other companies, and they they saw the value in what we were doing, and that was they became a lot of our early customers and investors.

这很有趣，因为他们以前在Zynga拥有一个强大而专有的系统。

That's fascinating because they used to have a robust system at proprietary at Zynga.

是的。

Yes.

于是他们离开后就想要这样的工具，而你们是唯一在做这件事的人。

And so they then left and wanted this, and you guys were the only ones doing it.

那你的竞争对手呢？

What about all the what about your competitors?

他们没有提供你们所做的东西吗？

They weren't offering what you did?

令人惊讶的是，没有。

Surprisingly, no.

我认为当时市场普遍认为，分析领域赚不到钱，你必须去开发别的东西。

What I think the market had concluded at the time was that there wasn't money in the analytics, you had to go build something else.

所以当时的主要竞争对手是一家叫Flurry的公司，他们已经从分析平台转型为广告网络。

So the the main competitor at the time was this company called Flurry, and they had pivoted from an analytics platform into an ad network.

他们的分析功能非常浅显，无法回答我提出的问题，比如什么因素能预测长期留存率，当时谷歌、Adobe，以及其他任何现成的解决方案，比如Mixpanel或Kissmetrics，也都无法回答。

And their analytics was kinda very shallow, so it didn't the questions I asked about like, okay, what predicts long term retention, they weren't able to answer, and neither was Google or Adobe or kinda anyone else off the or Mixpanel or Kissmetrics or anyone else off the shelf shelf at the time.

所以我们说，看吧。

And so we said, look.

我们就专注于这个问题，深入挖掘，不管他们需要什么，我们都直接开发出来。

Let's just exclusively focus this on this problem, and let's go deep, and just let's build whatever they asked for.

而这，你知道的，开启了Amplitude的上升之路，实际上非常直接。

And that, you know, started Amplitude's Ascent, you know, where it was actually very straightforward.

就是你去和这些客户交谈。

It was like you go talk to these customers.

你问他们如果我开发出来，愿意为它付多少钱。

You ask them what will they pay for if you build it.

你去把那个东西开发出来。

You go build that thing.

他们会为此付费，你就一遍又一遍地重复这个过程。

They'll pay for it, and you just do that again and again and again.

然后，你知道的，公司从零增长到一亿美元，靠的就是比任何人都做得更好、更深入。

And then, you know, that's been the whole growth of the company from zero to to a 100,000,000 is just doing that better and deeper than anyone else.

这正是B2B的美妙之处，回头来看，分析问题对我们来说简直是完美的切入点。

It's just and and that's the great thing about b to b is it it analyst was kind of a perfect problem for us in retrospect.

因为我们做过Battle Code项目，我们本身就是算法、分布式系统和计算机科学方面的极客。

Like, because we did the battle code thing, we were kind of algorithms, distributed systems, computer science nerds.

相比之下，与语音识别不同，分析是精确的，你可以得到一个确切的答案。

And so we and it it in contrast to voice recognition with analytics, it's precise, and you can get, like, an exact answer.

关键在于你如何更高效地获得这个答案。

And it's just a question of how do you get that answer more efficiently.

所以我们以一种其他任何公司都没有做到的方式做到了这一点，我们最终并不是因为拥有某个神奇的功能。

And so we were able to do that in a way that none of no one else we saw out there was, and so we just kind of ended up it wasn't about, like, we had one magic feature.

你只是不断构建客户要求的下一个功能、再下一个功能、再下一个功能。

It was just you just build the next thing and the next thing and the next thing that that your customers asked for.

斯宾塞，你们之前有没有融资过？显然，有人愿意付钱给你。

Spencer, did you guys have to raise like, you obviously someone wanted to pay you.

你本来就要产生收入，但在那之前，你们有没有融资来组建团队之类的？

You were gonna generate revenue, but did you raise money before that happened to build a team or anything?

我们确实融了资，当然，你可能会争论这是否是正确的决定。

We did, which, you know, you could argue whether it was the right thing to do.

我们在2013年完成了200万美元的种子轮融资，但花了大约九个月才完成这笔融资。

So we raised a $2,000,000 seed round in, 2013, and it took us about nine months to raise that thing.

这非常艰难和坎坷，因为大多数人得出了完全相同的结论。

It was brutal and and rough because most people had the exact same conclusion.

你们在YC的时候，就是那种，是的，数据分析。

You guys did in YC, which is like, yeah, analytics.

我不想投资这个，但你知道，Spencer和Curtis看起来挺有意思的。

I don't wanna invest in this, but, you know, Spencer and Curtis seem interesting.

所以我们设法从大约20位天使投资人那里凑齐了资金。

And so we were managed to scrape it together from, like, 20 different angels.

我记得第一家风投公司，一家叫Merus的公司，名为Merus Capital。

I I remember the first VC, this this company called Merus, this this firm called Merus Capital.

这位叫Peter Singh的先生，不幸的是，他几年前已经去世了。

And this guy Peter Singh, unfortunately, he passed away a bunch of years ago.

所以我们把Battlecode吹得像一件了不起的东西，说我们是最聪明、最优秀的。

So he we hyped up Battlecode as this, like, amazing thing, and we're all the smartest and best.

你知道的？

You know?

这只是一个大学竞赛，但我们向他大力宣传，说这里是所有最优秀创始人和最杰出工程师的摇篮。

And it's just some, like, college competition, but we hyped this up at the where all the best founders and most amazing engineers come out of, and we hyped that up to him.

所以他答应了。

And so he's like, alright.

好吧。

Alright.

我会给你们投资。

I'll I'll I'll put money into you guys.

所以，你知道，我们最终从Data Collective、Matt Aco、SV Angel以及其他一些人那里获得了资金，在经历了漫长的融资后，总算凑齐了种子轮。

So, you know, we and we ended up you know, we got from from Data Collective and Matt Aco and and SV Angel and a bunch of other folks, and we managed to scrape together a seed round after way too long fundraising.

就在那时，我们增加了第三位联合创始人Jeffrey Wang，并开始组建早期团队。

And then we added a third cofounder around that time, Jeffrey Wang, and then started hiring out an early team.

后来，由于Jeffrey加入了，我便全职转到了非工程岗位，而Curtis则与其他人合作开发产品，我则专注于外出与客户沟通和销售。

And then I switched full time from the engineering side because Jeffrey had joined, and Curtis could partner with someone else to work on the product to just going out talking to customers and selling them.

你们是什么时候改名的？

When did you change the name?

我都记不清了。

I don't even remember.

所以大概在2013年的时候。

So we when I sometime in 2013.

好的。

Okay.

我列出了500个单字域名，然后写了一个Python脚本，自动给这些域名的所有者发邮件，报价就是：嘿。

And I just reached out to like, I came up with a list of 500 different domains that one word domains that I thought would be good, and I wrote a a Python script to just automatically email the owners of those domains with a bid just being like, hey.

我愿意出5000美元买你的域名。

I'll pay you $5,000 for your domain.

是的。

Yeah.

在这些域名中，amplitude.com 是最好的一个。

And amplitude.com was the best one that came back out of that group.

这真是个好名字。

It is a great name.

是的。

Yeah.

确实如此。

It it is.

就是一个词，很清晰。

Like, one word, it's clear.

它在字母表中处于靠前位置。

It's got the start of alphabet positioning.

它与图表和图形相关。

It's related to charts and graphs.

你知道的，它带有‘顺势而为’的那种感觉。

You know, it has a, like, a wave, you know, ride the wave sort of thing.

所以我非常喜欢它。

So I I I love it.

所以你已经转向了，这么说对吗？为人们提供高精度的分析？

So you've moved into, like is it fair to say, like, high resolution analytics for people?

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

这么说真好。

That's a great way to put it.

好的。

Okay.

所以你有这个。

So you have that.

你转去做销售了。

You shift into sales.

销售对你来说是轻而易举的，还是觉得不自然？

Is sales does it come easy to you, or did you did it seem unnatural?

我很好奇你刚开始做销售时感觉怎么样。

I'm very curious how how you and sales got along at first.

其中有些部分我觉得我理解并掌握了，但也有一些部分我没有弄懂。

There were parts of it that I think I understood and got, and there were parts of it that I did not.

于是我聘请了一位名叫米奇·莫伦多的教练，他曾是多家公司的销售主管，专门帮助工程师学习销售技巧。

So I hired this coach named Mitch Morendo who had done, he was like an ex he was a sales leader at a number of companies, and he was just going around helping out engineers learn the craft of sales.

结果发现，销售和工程一样，其深度、复杂性和对商业成功的重要性丝毫不逊色。

And it turns out sales is as deep and complex and important to the problem, to a business' success as the engineering.

那时，公司已经运营了几年，我看到过太多这样的公司：那些才华横溢的工程师创造了令人惊叹的产品，却因为不愿去学习销售，最终未能取得成功。

And I had seen at that point, you know, this was a few years into the company, I'd seen so many companies where these brilliant engineers, had created these incredible products, but because they weren't willing to go learn this, they never got success.

他们因此输给了产品和公司都远不如自己的竞争对手。

And so they'd lose against much worse products and much worse companies because of that.

于是我心想，好吧。

And I'm like, alright.

不管这东西是什么，我都必须去学会它。

Whatever this thing is, I gotta go learn it.

实际上，作为创业者，你自然而然地就会学会如何成为一名销售人员。

Now, you naturally learn how to be a salesperson as part of being a company builder.

你一直在为你的公司推销。

You're always selling your company.

你在招聘人才，向YC、投资者和同批创业者推销自己。

You're recruiting people, you're selling yourself to y c, to investors, to your batch mates.

我想起保罗一直说的一点：只要做好产品，你就会真正相信，使用这个产品的人会因此变得更好，这种真诚自然会流露出来。

And I, you know, I I go back to to one thing, Paul has always said, is like, just have a good product, and then you will then be convicted that, you know, a customer using that will be better off for it, and that authenticity will come through.

事实上，大部分推销就是真诚地与他人分享你对你所做事情的热情。

And that's that's most of it honestly in terms of just sharing your passion for whatever you're doing with someone.

我一直对数据分析充满热情，所以这种热情自然而然地表现出来了。

And I was and I've been very, passionate about analytics, and so that just naturally comes through.

当然，这个过程还有其他更科学的部分，我当初完全不了解。

Now, there are other parts of the process which are more scientific, which I had no clue about.

比如，我以前以为只要去见客户，做个演示，然后说‘你愿意买这个产品吗？’就行了。

So as an example, one thing I thought you just, you know, show up to a meeting, give the demo, and be like, you wanna buy the thing.

但实际上，从流程上看，这完全不是那么回事。

Turns out very, very different from a process standpoint.

相反，你需要弄清楚客户想解决什么问题，他们的痛点是什么，以及这是否与你的产品匹配。

Instead, you wanna see, okay, what is the customer trying to solve and what's their pain, and can does that match up against what you do?

所以米奇总会和我每周开一次会，我们会讨论我接触过的客户。

And so Mitch would always I'd have a weekly meeting with him, and he'd be like, we talk about the customers I talk to.

我会说：我接触了一个客户，给他们演示了我们酷炫的产品。

I'd be like, I talked to this customer and demoed our cool product.

我接触了一个客户。

I talked to this customer.

我演示了我们的产品。

I demoed our pro product.

他就会说：首先，你完全搞错了。

He's like, first, you got it totally wrong.

你谈的都是你自己，而不是客户。

You're talking about yourself, not the customer.

是的。

Mhmm.

其次，你得告诉我具体的业务痛点是什么。

Second, you gotta tell me what the business pain is.

我会说，他们想要一些仪表板来替代SQL。

And I'd be like, well, they want some dashboards to replace SQL.

他会说，斯宾塞，这根本不是业务痛点。

And he's like, Spencer, that's not a business pain.

经过好几周不断被问‘痛点是什么’，我终于开始在客户对话中主动追问‘为什么’。

And so after enough weeks of just being having this question of what's the pain beaten into me, I would then, like, start to ask why in these customer conversations.

好的。

Alright.

你们想要这些仪表板。

You want these dashboards.

为什么呢？

Why is that?

这会对你们的业务产生什么影响？

How is that impacting your business?

为什么这如此重要？

Why is this so important?

你知道，你们公司里谁在乎这个？

You know, who in your business cares?

如果这件事没发生，当你真正开始理解他们是怎样的人以及他们想做什么时，会发生什么？

What happens if this doesn't and you start to really understand who they are as people, and what they're trying to do.

然后这使得销售变得容易得多，也更自然。

And then that made it much easier to very naturally sell.

因为那时你谈论的不再是自己，而是说，哦，好吧。

Because then you're not talking about yourself, you're talking about, oh, okay.

不错。

Cool.

如果我们为你做到这一点，就能解决你所有数据分析师不断写SQL的问题，而且你们高管团队根本不知道发生了什么，或者解决这个问题，或者你们的产品团队完全不知道他们推出的特性是否能成功。

Well, if we do this for you, it can solve, you know, the fact that you have all these data analysts writing SQL all the time and, you know, nobody on your executive team knows what's going on or it solves this problem, or your product team has no idea if the features they're launching are gonna be successful.

这自然地引出了，好吧。

Like, it very naturally feeds into, okay.

这是你的故事，而我能帮助你讲述这个故事。

It's your story, and here's how I can be I can help your story.

总之，我学到了这一点。

Anyway, so I so I learned that.

我还学到了很多其他东西。

I learned a whole bunch of other things.

比如，其中一个很具体的事情是，你需要关注时间线。

Like, I learned to one of the the very specific things is you wanna is timeline.

所以你要说，好吧。

So you wanna say, okay.

很好。

Great.

当你从零到一时，基本上会以能让客户立即购买的最低价格来销售你的产品。

Like, when you're going from zero to one, you're basically gonna sell your product as cheap as it takes for someone to buy it like now.

所以你会说，好吧。

So you'd be like, okay.

那么，你如何在接下来的一周内做出这个决定呢？

Well, like, how do you make a how can you make a decision on this in the next week?

你定一个日子，然后也说，好吧。

And you name a day, and then you also say, alright.

那么，价格应该是多少呢？嗯，价格太高了。

Well, what price would well, it's like, well, the price is too high.

这就像是，好吧。

It's like, okay.

那么，我们需要定什么价格才能今天、明天或者这周就促成这件事呢？

Well, what price do we need to make it happen today, you know, to today or tomorrow or this week?

然后他们会说，太好了。

And then they'd say be like, cool.

我们可以做到，你就直接去办吧。

We can do it, and you just go.

因为关键是多实践，多让一些客户付钱，你根本不用急着优化价格，那可以以后再说。

Because, like, the getting the reps in and just getting customers who are paying something, you don't really care about optimizing the price till later.

所以，无论如何，你都会学到关于销售这门艺术与科学的种种知识。

So, anyway, you learn all these things about the the art and science of sales.

我认为工程师们最大的错误是，他们以为只要读一本书就能学会这些东西。

I I think the biggest thing I'd say, the biggest mistake I see engineers making is they think they will pick up a book to learn this thing.

虽然市面上有一些很好的书和框架，但没有任何东西能比得上：第一，亲自实践；第二，获得专家的指导。

And while there's some fine books and fine frameworks out there, there is nothing that beats, one, doing it and, two, getting expert coaching on doing it.

这就像是你试图通过读书来学习如何踢足球。

It's like if you tried to learn how to play soccer by reading a book.

你应该先去踢球，然后偶尔找人指导你，帮你提升到下一个水平。

It's like you're not like, do play soccer and then get coaching once in a while to, like, direct you about how you can get to the next level.

销售也是同样的道理。

It's the same thing at sales.

这里真是金玉良言。

Pearls of wisdom right here.

是的。

Yes.

不。

No.

这非常有用，因为这真的没错。

It's so useful because it's it's so true.

就像，没有什么比亲自实践并从擅长它的人那里学习更好的了。

Like, nothing is better than just doing it and learning from someone who's very good at it.

而且还要多犯些错误，然后从这些错误中学习，你知道的？

And also making a bunch of mistakes and learning from those know?

完全正确。

Totally.

是的。

Yeah.

我的原则是，向别人学习比自己摸索快十倍。

The rule I have is you want to like, learning from someone else is 10 times faster than learning yourself.

当然，有些东西你还是得自己去学。

Now there's some things you're gonna have to learn yourself.

没有人能比你自己更了解你的客户。

Nobody is gonna teach you better about your customers than you know directly.

但如何开展销售流程，这外面已经有人做过数百万次了。

But how to do how to run a sales process, that has been done millions of times out there.

所以你可以借助他人的经验来起步，从而成长得快得多。

And so there are people you can bootstrap off of their learning and and, grow so much more quickly.

在遇到米奇之前，我根本不知道自己在做什么，浪费了大量时间去接触那些没有痛点、永远不会付费的客户。而我本该专注的是，现实是去找那些愿意付费的客户，然后跟随他们的路径，深入挖掘。

Before I met Mitch, was like, I didn't know what I was doing, and so I was wasting a lot of time with customers who didn't have pain and were never gonna pay us And instead, what I should have been focused on is, like, the reality is just go find other customers who do wanna pay and then follow their set, and then chase that down.

所以我真希望，我能早点开始这个学习过程。

And so I I wish, you know, so I wish I had I had start started that that learning process, earlier.

但你知道，这挺有意思的。

But, you know and it's funny.

这些技能是可以扩展的，销售能力也是如此。

Like, these these skills, they scale up to the sales skill scales up.

你看萨姆·阿尔特曼在OpenAI所做的一切，他简直就是世界上最好的销售员。

Like, you know, you look at Sam Altman and what he's done with OpenAI, and, like, he he's the world's greatest greatest salesman.

这完全是同样的事情。

It's it's the exact same thing.

这是每个创业者都必须掌握的核心技能，而且已经有现成的指南教你如何去做，接受他人的指导和建议，远比自己摸索要快得多。

It's a it is a core skill for for any entrepreneur to learn, and there's a playbook on how to do it, and, like, getting coaching and advice from others is is much much faster than trying to figure it out all yourself.

所以你在成长。

So you're growing.

你做得非常好。

You're doing really well.

我有点想听听关于上市的事情。

I kinda wanna hear about go you know, going public.

我也是。

Me too.

直接上市。

The direct listing.

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

关于这个，我们有太多事情要谈了。

So so many things for us to talk about on that.

我知道。

I know.

我听到的最好的建议是，上市本身就像婚礼，但更重要的是关注长期的婚姻关系。

The best advice I actually heard was that the listing itself is the wedding, and it's much more important to focus on the long term marriage.

所以要打造一家成功的公司。

So build a successful company.

别太在意上市这个事件本身。

Don't worry about the event itself.

所以这里面有很多神秘色彩。

So there's a lot of mystique.

你知道，公开市场是资本主义最伟大的体系之一，因此人们对它有很多神秘的想象。

You know, public markets are one of the kind of great systems of capitalism, and so there's a lot of mystique about it.

但我逐渐认识到的一点是，公开市场的投资者会给你很大的自由度，让你按照自己的方式定义业务。

But one of the things you I've come to appreciate is public market investors give you a lot of latitude to define your business however you want.

你当然需要报告一些被要求和预期的内容，比如你必须向美国证券交易委员会和其他相关机构提交季度财务报告。

You can you know, there's certain things you're required to report that's expected to report, like, you know, you need to report your quarterly financials that the SEC and other other groups require of you.

但除此之外，你可以自由地说明：我正在做什么，为什么这么做，以及我们的目标在哪里。

But outside of that, you can kinda define, here's what I'm trying to do with my business and why, and here's where we're going.

所有优秀的首席执行官都这么做，不要被公开市场中存在的机构和体系牵着鼻子走。

And all the great CEOs have done this and don't get too wound up on getting pushed around by the institutions and systems that exist in public markets.

所以，让我谈谈上市这件事，以及上市之后发生了什么。

So let me I'll I'll talk about the listing, and I'll talk about what happened after the listing.

尽管我得到了那条建议，也明白它的道理，但我还是过于关注婚礼和上市本身，而忽略了公司上市之后的发展。

Even though I got that advice and even though I knew it, I still was a little too focused on on the wedding and the listing itself versus the the company afterwards.

我记得当时有一批高管，我本该换掉，我知道他们不适合长期发展，但我没有这么做，因为我心想：我不想在启航前搅动这艘船。

Like, I remember there was a set of executives at that time that I should have changed out and I knew were not the right long term fit, but I did not because I'm like, I don't wanna disturb the boat before we go out.

但实际上，那正是从优势地位出发进行人员调整的最佳时机。

But that was actually the best time to change it them out from a position of strength.

是的，你必须回答问题，但无论你做什么，都得面对这些问题。

And, yeah, you have to answer questions, but you're gonna have to answer questions about whatever you do in the law.

如果你让它拖得更久，问题就会变得更严重，最终会彻底爆发。

And if you let it drag out more, it'll become more of a problem and more of an issue, and it'll blow up in your face even further.

你必须正确地经营业务，才能让公司成功，而不是为了迎合公开市场而粉饰太平。

You have to run the business the right way to make the thing succeed, not to, like, pretty it up for for for public markets.

关于上市本身，也就是婚礼筹备这件事，我强烈建议准备上市的公司选择直接上市。

And so the one thing I will say on the listing itself, on wedding planning itself that I strongly advise companies going public is do a direct listing.

看在上帝的份上，选择直接上市吧。

For the love of God, do a direct listing.

在我出来创业之前，我在金融行业工作了一年，而金融界教会我的一件事是：这是一个极度交易化、弱肉强食的世界，每个人都在寻找机会赚钱。

So I came I was in finance for a year before I came out, and one of the things you learn in finance is it's very, very transactional dog eat dog world, and everyone's always looking to make a dollar off of anything.

传统的IPO流程是金融领域最大的套利机会，他们利用那些第一次经历这一过程的CEO和管理团队，而实际上，这些公司白白放弃了数千万甚至数亿美元，送给了公开市场的投资者。

Traditional IPO processes are the biggest arbitrage existing arbitrage opportunity in all of finance, and they are taking advantage of CEOs and management teams that are going through this process for the first time when the reality is they are leaving tens or hundreds of millions of dollars and giving it away for free to public market investors.

因为人们希望股价上涨，或者想要一篇关于自己的正面报道，又或者只是太害怕逆流而行。

Because, like, people want their stock price to go up, or people want, like, a good news article about themselves or for or they're just too afraid to to buck the trend.

直接上市的不同之处在于，它通过拍卖流程让股票开盘，这与所有其他股票每日的开盘方式相同。

A direct listing what a direct listing does instead is it opens your stock the same way every single other stock opens every day, which is with an auction process.

所以，有一定数量的买家，也有一定数量的卖家，他们在中间相遇的那个点就是价格。

So you have a number of buyers, you have a number of sellers, and wherever they meet in the middle, that's the price.

这样你就知道得到的是基于市场的价格。

And so you know you're getting a market based price.

价格可能高，也可能低，但至少你知道它是由市场供需决定的。

It could be high, it could be low, but at least you know it's fulfilled by supply and demand, in the market.

而传统的上市流程则要求你人为地设定一个价格，这就像是中央计划价格与市场驱动价格之间的区别。

Whereas, a traditional listing process has you artificially pick out a price, And it's just it's like the difference between centrally planned prices versus market driven prices.

因此，银行家们不可避免地会倾向于他们的真正客户——公开市场投资者，因为他们会与这些人进行多次交易，而你只会上一次市。

And so inevitably, bankers, what they wanna do is they want to their real clients are their public market investors because they're gonna do multiple transactions with these guys, whereas you're only gonna go public once.

我记得有一次上市过程中，一位银行家威胁要暂停上市并中止流程，因为那家即将上市的公司想把价格定得太高。

And so they will I remember I heard on one listing, a banker threatened to withhold the listing and stop the process because the public company wanted to push or the soon to be public company wanted to push the price too high.

这就好比，公司才是支付给银行家数百万甚至数千万美元的一方，而你却告诉我，你不打算这么做，因为好吧。

And it's like, I'm the like, the company's the one paying the bankers millions or tens of millions of dollars in some cases, and you're telling me, like, you're not gonna do it because okay.

那你应该为谁负责？你明明应该是我的受托人。

Well, who you're fight you're supposed to be a fiduciary to me.

这到底算什么？

Like, what the fuck?

所以整个事情就是一个巨大的骗局。

So anyway, so so it's the whole thing is a giant racket.

有一位佛罗里达大学的教授，杰伊·里特，他对这个问题研究得非常透彻。

There's this one professor from the University of Florida, Jay Ritter, who studied this thing ad nauseam.

如果你不信我的话，就去查查他的任何数据。

So look up any of his data, if if you don't trust my word.

系统里还有很多像比尔·盖利这样的人，他们也对此进行了大量讨论。

And there's lots of, there's lots of people in the system like Bill Gurley and others who who have talked quite extensively about this.

但那正是我最看重的一点。

But I I that's my number one thing.

只要勇敢地去做就行了。

Just have the courage to do it.

到目前为止，已经有不少公司这么做了。

And there's been enough companies that have done it by now.

这没什么大不了的，因为你并没有免费赠送股权。

It's it's not a big deal because then you're not giving away equity for free.

你应当把股权给予那些为公司辛勤付出、真正配得上的人，而不是公开市场的投资者。

You wanna give equity to people who have earned it, who have worked hard for your company, not to public market investors.

所以，这就是我的唯一婚礼和规划建议。

So that's my one wedding and planning advice.

显然，你之所以有这种看法，是因为你曾在金融行业工作过。

So you obviously came to this with your own you knew because you worked in finance.

是的。

Yes.

但你从身边其他人那里得到了多少反对意见呢？

But how much pushback did you get from other people around you?

你可能想不到，最大的反对声音其实来自我们董事会内部。

Believe it or not, the biggest pushback was internal on our board.

所以公众市场的投资者其实并不在意，因为这已经足够标准化了，他们会的。

So public market investors, they actually don't care because it's been standard enough, and they'll yeah.

有些人可能会抱怨，怀念过去可以肆意剥削公司的美好时光，但大多数人都已经放下了。

There are some who will, you know, whine and cry about the good old days where they got to rip companies off, but, you know, most of them have moved past that.

95%的人已经放下了，无论在哪里都会购买公司。

95% of them moved past that and will just buy companies wherever it is.

是的。

Yeah.

银行家们也不在意。

The bankers, they also don't care.

你知道的。

You know?

你得找到愿意这么做的人，但我们选择了摩根士丹利，他们在这一领域处于前沿。

You have to find the right ones that will do it, but we went with Morgan Stanley, and they're on the bleeding edge of this.

他们对此很在行。

You know, they're good with it.

分析师也不在意。

Analysts also don't care.

流程上确实需要一些调整，但这些都只是小问题，根本无关紧要。

There's some tweaks to the process you have to do, but, like, they're minor, and it just doesn't matter.

信不信由你，实际上是因为我们现有的董事会成员感到担忧。

Believe it or not, it was actually fear from our existing board of directors.

我们的董事会非常强大、优秀。

And we have a very strong, good great board of directors.

你知道，当时我们有来自Benchmark的埃里克·维瑟里亚，他们是顶级的风险投资公司之一。

You know, we have we have at the time, we had Eric Visseria from Benchmark, you know, and they're, like, one of the top VCs.

我们还有来自红杉资本的帕特·格雷迪。

We had Pat Grady from Sequoia.

你瞧，这些人可不是会被轻易左右的。

You know, it's not people that are gonna be pushed around.

是的。

Yeah.

但尽管如此，还是有人建议我们考虑一下常规上市，我直接说：我绝不会同意这个方案。

But in spite of that, there was still, like, well, maybe we should consider like a regular and I'm like, no way am I signing up for that.

绝对不行。

Like, no way.

所以我说，好吧。

So I'm like, alright.

听好了。

Look.

为了满足你们的好奇心，我会走一遍这个评估流程，但最终结论肯定是：我们选择直接上市。

To entertain you guys, I'll go through this process of evaluating this, but the conclusion is gonna be we're gonna do a direct listing.

所以我现在就提前告诉你们。

So I'm just telling you now.

哇哦。

So Wow.

为你点赞。

Good for you.

我知道。

I know.

我真的很佩服。

I'm so impressed.

回顾过去，我本应该专注于提升我的管理团队和业务，但你知道，由于我一直在金融行业，我实在厌倦了看到那些公司在这上面被严重剥削。

Retrospect, I should have focused on upgrading my management team and and the business, but, you know, that was one I I just from being in the finance world, I was just very tired of getting companies that that had gotten so ripped off on this thing.

是的。

Yeah.

我其实很惊讶，为什么还有这么多承销发行。

I'm actually surprised how many underwritten offerings there still are.

比如。

Like

是的。

Yeah.

这会改变的。

It'll it'll change.

这会改变的。

It'll change.

这是一种非常基于恐惧的做法。

It's it's a very fear based thing.

就是，我没有信心，所以我需要这些虚假的系统来支撑我。

It's like, well, I don't have the confidence, so I need, you know, all these fake systems to support me.

现在，是的。

Now Yeah.

让我快速谈谈我最大的错误。

Let let me let me talk quickly about my biggest mistake.

我最大的错误是没有专注于改变业务、团队以及需要改变的方式，而是在上市后才不得不去做，这本来无论如何都必须做，但那时就更加痛苦了。

So my biggest mistake was not focusing on changing the business and the team and the way it needed to be changed, and I had to do that after listing, which was which needed to be done one way or another, but was even more painful.

我犯的一个错误是，我知道我们的股价很高。

One of the mistakes I made, I knew our stock was high.

我不知道具体有多高，但我知道当时我们正处于一个过热的市场中。

I didn't know how high, but I knew we we were in a hot overheated market at the time.

就像在2021年，SaaS被看作是自切片面包以来最棒的发明。

Like, SaaS was, you know, the best thing since sliced bread back in 2021.

我记得我想以一种恰当的方式向公开市场传达这一点。

And I remember I wanted to communicate that to to public markets in an appropriate way.

你知道，我会说，现在东西价格确实很高，类似这样的话。

You know, I'd be like, stuff is high right now, you know, something like that.

我记得我的投资者关系和公关团队对我说这种话感到极度恐慌。

I remember my eye investor relations and PR people were absolutely terrified of me saying anything like that.

他们说：不行。

They're like, no.

你必须推高你的股价。

You have to pump up your stock.

你必须这么做。

You have to do it.

而我说：我觉得现在它的价格确实偏高。

And I'm like, well, I think it legitimately is high now.

我们应该以某种方式传达这一点，以免人们受到伤害。

We should signal that in some way so that people don't get burned.

但他们说，不行。

And they're like, no.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

我们不能这么做。

We can't do that.

这不符合最佳实践。

That's not the best practice.

我就说，好吧。

And I'm like, alright.