汤姆·布洛姆菲尔德，Y Combinator 合伙人；Monzo 联合创始人

所以我们取名GoCardless，是因为如果你想不用卡片付款，就应该选择GoCardless。

And so the name GoCardless, we chose because you the way to pay instead of a card, you should GoCardless.

应该实现无卡支付。

Should pay without cards.

我们当时宣传的目标是消灭Visa和Mastercard。

And we pitched that we were gonna kill Visa and Mastercard.

太棒了。

Love it.

对。

Yes.

这听起来相当有野心。

It seemed pretty ambitious.

对。

Yes.

最终我们从伦敦的Accel和一家名为Passion Capital的小型种子基金那里筹集了资金。

And we ended up raising, from Accel back in London and a small seed fund in London called Passion Capital.

所以，我们对这个结果非常满意。

So, you know, we're pretty happy with it.

我们筹集了大约一百五十万美元，我想，估值是六百万。

We raised, like, a million and a half dollars, I think, on, 6,000,000.

记不清是融资前还是融资后了。

Can't remember if it's pre or post.

但没错，我们对这个结果非常满意。

But, yeah, it was we were pretty happy with it.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

然后搬回了伦敦。

And moved back to London.

是的。

Yeah.

因为我们能接入伦敦的支付系统。

Because we've got access to this payment system in London.

我们刚刚在伦敦获得了支付公司的监管许可，实际上，回过头来看，我们有点不敢离开伦敦。

We just got regulated as a payments company in London, and we are probably a little bit scared to leave London, actually, in retrospect.

我偶尔会问自己这个问题。

I do I I sort of ask myself this occasionally.

比如，如果我们决定留在加州会怎样？

Like, what if what if we decided to stay in California?

我们会打造出更大胆、更有野心的产品吗？

What would we would we have built something bigger or more ambitious?

也许吧。

Maybe.

我不知道。

I don't know.

但我觉得，这实际上可以说是客观事实。

But it seemed like I think this is actually sort of objectively true.

伦敦，特别是2010年到2020年期间，是建立金融科技公司的绝佳地点，因为支付系统要先进得多。

London, especially, like, 2010 to 2020, was a great place to build fintechs because the payment systems were way more advanced.

金融监管机构对初创企业友好得多。

The financial regulators were much more startup friendly.

真的吗？

Really?

是的。

Yeah.

我对此感到惊讶，因为那时候根本就没有金融科技这个说法吧？

I'm surprised by that because there weren't I mean, was fintech even a phrase that was coined back then?

没有。

No.

这个词是2013年左右才首次出现的，我想。

It's first used in 2013, I think.

我查过这个。

I looked this up.

但这个词的出现实际上是回应伦敦的创业环境，因为——我不想深入太多细节——我们在2008到2009年经历了金融危机，英国政府救助了两家规模高达500亿英镑的大型银行。

But it was coined kind of in response to London startup scene because and without wanting to get too in the weeds, we had the financial crisis in 08/00/2009, and The UK bailed out two massive banks of, like, 50,000,000,000 each.

而政府和监管机构的回应是：银行数量太少了。

And the response of the government, the regulator is like, have too few banks.

我们拥有太少的大型银行。

We have too too few large banks.

而我们真正需要的是更多的银行、更多的支付公司。

And instead, what we want is more banks, more payments companies.

他们在整个欧洲都推行了这一做法。

And they did this across Europe.

我们将降低创办新型银行或新型支付公司的准入门槛，以促进更多竞争，让整个系统更加稳健。

We're gonna make the the barrier to entry to starting a new kind of bank or a new kind of payments company lower in order to get more competition to make the system less fragile.

美国面临的问题恰恰相反，那就是银行数量太多了。

The US had the opposite problem, which you had actually too many banks.

美国当时大约有1万家银行。

It had about, like, 10,000 banks in The US.

你那儿大概有30家左右。

You had, like, 30 or something.

这真的很有趣，因为这和我印象中欧盟和英国的样子完全相反，我以为它们的监管远超必要。

That's really interesting because it is, like, that's the opposite of what I think when I think of the EU and The UK, like, way more regulatory than they need to be.

但这确实是个很有趣的事实，完全说得通。

But that's actually that's a really interesting fact, and that makes total sense.

是的。

Yeah.

因此，当时有一项名为《支付服务指令二》的具体法规，催生了这类新型支付公司，并特别允许你先以小型机构的身份获得许可。

So they there was a specific regulation called the payment service directive two, which created these new kinds of payments companies, and in particular, allowed you to get licensed as a small version first.

它可以是像电子货币发行机构这样的小型实体，资本要求非常低。

It could be, like, a small e money issuer with, like, very, very low capital requirements.

所以先起步，看看效果如何，之后再升级。

So just get going, see how it worked, then upgrade later.

因此，这真的非常具有前瞻性。

So it's really very forward thinking.

你在GoCardless待了几年。

So you're at GoCardless for a few years.

你一直稳步前进。

You're plugging along.

你获得了这笔融资。

You get this funding.

但我觉得你意识到这并不是你真正热爱的方向。

But I think you realized that this was not where your passion lay.

是的。

Yeah.

有几件事发生了。

Like, a few things happened.

我们来自Excel的主要董事会成员离开了Excel，去了General Catalyst，他们换了一位风险合伙人，这个人彻底破坏了团队氛围。

The our main board member from Excel actually left Excel to go to General Catalyst, and they replaced him with, like, a venture partner who just really ruined the vibe.

他来参加我们的第一次董事会会议时，告诉我，我觉得他说的是，我在投资委员会里投了反对票。

Like, he turned up to our first board meeting and told us that, I think he said something like, I voted against this investment in our investment committee.

我们本不该投资的。

We shouldn't have invested.

我们出价太高了，而且你们接下来要进行一轮降价融资。

We overpaid, and you're gonna do a down round.

我觉得这家公司很差劲。

And I think the company sucks.

天哪。

Oh my god.

但他的整体风格就是这样。

But, like, that was his general approach.

顺便说一下，当时Accel投资时，GoCardless的估值是1000万美元，而现在它的估值已经超过10亿美元了。

And this was, by the way, when I think Accel had, like, invested, like, a 10,000,000 post money and GoCardless is now worth, like, more than 1,000,000,000.

所以他们太娇气了，汤姆。

So They're such babies, Tom.

但这位新董事会成员根本不喜欢自己在董事会里的位置，而他那样做并没有帮助到对方。

But he like, that was not helping this, like, new board member who basically hated the fact he was on the board.

我们真的没有增长得很快。

We weren't growing very fast, really honestly.

我只是觉得B2B支付并不是我一生的激情所在。

And, I just didn't feel like b two b payments was, like, my life's passion.

讽刺的是，我离开后的那个月，可能是我们三年来增长最好的一个月。

Ironically, the the month after I left, I think, was, like, the best month of growth that we had in three years.

我们当时觉得增长了35%左右，简直疯狂。

And we're like it was, like, 35% or something crazy.

哦，天哪。

Oh, no.

大家都说，这是汤姆的问题。

Everyone's like, it was Tom.

这是汤姆的错。

It's Tom's problem.

那你离开时有什么计划？

So what was your plan when you left?

不知道。

No idea.

我从来没有任何真正的计划，我做的每件事都是这样，总是从一件事跳到另一件事。

I'd never have had a plan with any honestly, with anything I've done, it's always been, like, just jumping from thing to thing.

我觉得，冒险总的来说对我来说效果非常好。

Like like, I think taking risk, basically, has worked really well for for me.

所以我不确定。

And so I don't know.

我没有计划。

I didn't have a plan.

我曾想过写一本编程书。

I thought about writing a programming book.

我写了《Ruby on Rails》一书的前三章。

I I wrote the first three chapters of a a Ruby on Rails book.

我一直关注着这家YC初创公司Grouper。

And I I've been following this YC startup called Grouper.

我从TechCrunch上看到他们上线，然后自己去数据库里查了查。

I I saw them launch from TechCrunch, and I I looked myself up in the database.

我当时发现自己是第4000号用户之类的。

I was like, user number four thousand or something.

于是我直接给创始人发了封邮件，说：嘿。

So I just emailed the founders and said, hey.

我真的很喜欢你们的产品。

I really I love your product.

我希望你们能来伦敦。

I I'd love you to come to London.

你们有职位空缺吗？

Like, do you have any jobs?

他们干脆给我量身创造了一个职位。

And they basically invented a job for me.

跟我们的观众说说Grouper是什么吧，因为我超爱它。

Tell tell our audience what Grouper was because I loved it.

是的

Yeah.

我觉得这很棒。

I think it's great.

Grouper 的想法是一个群组约会网站。

The Grouper was this idea that it's a a group dating website sort of.

你注册网站后，提名两位朋友，系统会为你和三位同性别的用户匹配。

So you sign up to the site and you nominate two of your buddies, and group will match you with three people of your preferred gender.

通常可能是三位男生和三位女生，然后系统会把这六个人一起送到一家鸡尾酒吧。

So it might you know, typically, it might be three guys and three girls, and it, like, sends all six of you out to a cocktail bar.

每个人支付20美元，而你第一杯鸡尾酒是免费的，因为酒吧会免费提供这一轮饮品。

And everyone paid, $20, and you got your first cocktail for free because the bar basically comped that round.

所以这个商业模式非常棒。

So the business model is amazing.

我们每场约会能赚120美元。

We'd make a $120 per date.

用户本来就觉得要为第一杯鸡尾酒付钱，所以他们都很开心。

The users thought they were paying for their first cocktail anyway, so they were pretty happy.

而且这个模式非常赚钱，增长得非常快。

And it's like it was very cash generative, and it grew really, really fast.

我喜欢它的一点是，在牛津，我们有过一种叫‘团队约会’的活动。

And the thing I liked about it was, at Oxford, we'd had these things called, crew dates.

基本上就是一支男生运动队会和一支女子曲棍球队之类的配对，然后你们全部12人或18人一起去吃顿饭之类的。

It's basically like a a a guy's sports team would, like, match up with a women's hockey team or something and, like, all 12 or all 18 of you would go out for, like, a dinner or something.

这些是有趣的社交场合，而Grouper让我想起了很多类似的体验。

It was like these fun social occasions, and Grouper reminded me a lot of that.

我最喜欢Grouper的一点是。

What I loved about Grouper.

这是一种低压力的约会方式。

It was low pressure dating.

你可以出去玩得开心。

And you could go out and have a fun time.

如果你没有和任何人产生共鸣，也没关系。

And if you didn't connect with anyone, fine.

你度过了一段美好的夜晚，认识了几位新朋友，而且你本就会和你的女性朋友一起出去玩，也会玩得很开心。

You had a great night and met a couple new people, and you were out with one of like, I would have been out with one of my girlfriends, and we would have had fun.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得这是个很棒的点子。

I thought it was a great idea.

我参加过很多次Grouper活动，都非常有趣，我真的很享受。

And I went on a bunch of groupers, and they were really fun, and I I really enjoyed it.

但这个产品确实存在一些问题。

And there were just a couple of problems with the with the product.

基本上，很多人都试过一次，但几乎没人试过第二次。

Basically, everyone like, lots and lots of people tried it once, and almost no one tried it twice.

我们只是没有

We just didn't have

它。

it.

为什么？

Why?

老兄，这太奇怪了。

Dude, that's weird.

我们其实也不清楚。

We don't know really.

我的意思是，我们提出了很多种假设。

I mean, there were so many we we theorized.

其中一个主要原因是缺乏自主性。

A big one is sort of the lack of agency.

在普通的约会应用上，你会滑动选择，决定和谁匹配、和谁约会。

So on a normal dating app, you swipe and you're like, you choose who to match with and you choose who to go on a date with.

如果约会很糟，你会想，是我自己选错了。

And if it's a bad date, you're like, I made a bad decision.

下次我会更努力的。

I'll try harder next time.

使用Grouper时，所有的匹配都是由我们完成的。

With Grouper, we did all of the matching.

这完全是盲配。

It's totally blind.

你需要连接你的Facebook和Instagram账号，我们会问你几个问题，然后尝试判断该把你匹配给谁。

And so you, like, connect your Facebook account, your Instagram, and we kind of try to figure out we ask you a few questions.

我们会根据同一天注册的人，来决定把你匹配给谁。

We try to figure out who we should match you with of people who've signed up on the same night.

当你到达现场时，你会被匹配上一群人。

And you get you turn up in the state, you're matched with a bunch of people.

你会想，我和他们合得来吗？

You're like, you think I get on with them?

你怎么敢这么问？

Like, how dare you?

你觉得我怎么样？

Like, what do you think of me?

你根本没有任何主动权。

And you just have no agency.

所以你会想，小组给我匹配了一个糟糕的人。

So you're like, group has given me a bad match.

那我凭什么相信他们下次会给我匹配得更好呢？

Like, why would I trust that they give me a better match next time?

用户根本无法掌控自己会见到谁。

There's no the user isn't in control of who they're who they're meeting.

哦，有意思。

Oh, interesting.

这只是一个理论，说实话。

That's just a theory, honestly.

是的。

Yeah.

我们当时还有一些其他的理论，解释为什么它没有成功。

We had, like, other theories about why it didn't work.

但无论如何，大约一年后，公司倒闭了，基本上所有人都被裁员了。

But, in any case, after about a year, the company folded and and basically laid everyone off.

这非常令人难过。

It was very sad.

那之后你做了什么？

And then what did you do?

所以我失去了签证。

So I lost my visa.

这相当有创伤性，因为当时我持的是O-1签证，某周一早上我照常去上班，却直接被人力资源主管递上了离职文件。

It was pretty traumatic, because I was on a an o one visa at the time, and, I turned up to work on, like, a Monday morning and had my, like, termination papers handed to me by the head of HR.

我当时就想：这是什么情况？

Was like, what the hell?

这意味着我必须离开这个国家，这简直太残酷了。

Which meant I had to leave the country, which was pretty brutal.

我回到了伦敦。

And I landed back in London.

回到GoCardless后，我认识了一位女士，名叫安·鲍登，她是一位非常资深的银行家。

And back at GoCardless, I'd met this lady, this lady called Anne Bowden, who was a very, very senior, banker.

她曾是某家大型银行的首席运营官之类的职位。

She was, like, chief operating officer or something of one of the big banks.

她后来成为GoCardless的顾问，并且辗转于几份不同的工作之间。

And she'd become an adviser at GoCardless, and, you know, bounced between a few different jobs.

我每隔两三个月就会和她聊一次，她一开始想收购一家银行，并且非常密切关注监管规定。

And I was kinda chatting with her every two or three months, and she was she tried to buy a bank to start with, and she was really following the regulation very closely.

我们其实可以从零开始申请一张银行牌照。

It was like, we can actually get a banking license from scratch.

所以，我刚回到伦敦的那天，就去见了她，她已经组建了一个小团队，对我说：我要创办一家银行。

And so, like, literally the day I landed back in London, I I went to see her, and she'd assembled a small team, and she's like, I'm I'm doing I'm gonna start a bank.

这事儿特别有意思。

And I, it was very funny.

我 basically 见到她请了这么多顾问，一家咨询公司负责帮她拿牌照，另一家顾问负责写软件。

I basically met she paid all these consultants who are gonna like, one consultancy was gonna get her the license and another consultant who gonna write the software.

我进去后，就像我们之前说的，我的大脑一下子就觉得，这事儿在逻辑上根本说不通。

And I went in and, like we talked about earlier, my brain just, like, saw this stuff, and I was like, this is logically, does not make sense.

于是我仔细梳理了一遍她的计划。

So I was, like, sort of went through her plan.

我觉得这不对，那也不对，这里也有问题。

Was like, this is wrong, this is wrong, and this is wrong.

但她并没有生气或发火，反而说：‘那你为什么不帮我改一改呢？’

And rather than getting upset and getting angry, she's like, well, why don't you help me fix it then?

如果你有更好的想法，那就来当CTO吧。

Like, if you've got better ideas, like, come and you should be the CTO.

把它做得更好。

Make it better.

而我当时根本没什么事做。

And I had nothing to do.

所以我就想，嘿，不如我先留下来待一两周看看？

So I was like, oh, why don't I just hang around for a week or two?

结果我就成了，我想，首席技术官。

So I ended up becoming, I guess, the CTO.

她倒是时不时地提一下联合创始人的头衔，但这段经历真的很奇怪，因为出于种种原因，这个安排一直非常随意。

I guess, like, she sort of waved around the title cofounder, and it was a very strange experience because, for so many reasons, the arrangement was always very informal.

她总是说，别担心。

She'd always sort of say, don't worry.

我会照顾你的。

I'll take care of you.

那我的股权协议呢？

And I you know, where's my equity agreement?

我的合同在哪里？

Where's my contract?

哦，天哪。

Oh, no.

不。

No.

别担心这个。

Don't worry about that.

我会照顾你的。

I'll take care of you.

我把我的全部积蓄都投进去了。

And I put my life savings into it.

我拿出了大约十万美元的积蓄，用来支付其他人的工资，因为我招募了一群工程师。

I put about a $100,000 into of my savings to, like, pay other because I recruited a bunch of engineers.

我让乔纳斯从纽约搬过来，然后我自己掏钱给他们发工资。

I got Jonas to move over from New York, and I'd start paying them out of my own pocket.

她总是说，别担心。

And she'd always say, don't worry.

别担心。

Don't worry.

我们会我们会

We'll we'll

哇，汤姆。

Wow, Tom.

这是一大笔钱。

That's a lot of money.

是的。

Yeah.

那是25年、26年、27年的时候。

And it was 25 '26, '27 time.

那就是我所有的积蓄。

It was, like, all of my life savings.

但我认为这个想法非常宏大、令人兴奋。

But I I thought this, like, idea was so huge and so exciting.

我知道，我信任她，她总是说，别担心。

And I, you know, I trusted her, and she'd she'd say, don't worry.

我会照顾你，我相信这一点。

I'll take care of you, and I trusted that.

我们试图筹钱，但我觉得问题在于，她非常非常有经验。

And we tried to raise money, but the issue, I think, was I mean, she was very, very experienced.

她当时大概五十多岁。

She was probably in her mid fifties.

她来自一个这样的世界：对于这种交易，你会去从私募股权和银行筹集数十亿美元来收购另一家银行。

And she came from a world where, for deals like this, you'd go and raise, like, a billion dollars from private equity and and and banks to buy another bank.

对吧？

Right?

她谈论的数字都是数亿甚至数十亿美元。

And the numbers she was talking about were, like, hundreds of millions or billions.

雇用咨询公司，每家花几百万美元做一些边角工作，完全是家常便饭。

And, you know, employing consultancies for a few million each to do some, like, stuff around the side was totally normal.

于是我们去见私募股权公司时，他们看着我，心里想：这个年轻人是谁？

And so we turn up to these meetings with private equity, and they'd look at me and think, like, who is this kid?

他怎么可能是一家银行的首席技术官呢？

Like, he can't be the CTO of a bank.

但接着第二天，我们会去向天使投资人、风险投资和种子基金做推介，他们看到我，就知道我是Y Combinator的，二十多岁，自学成才的程序员。

But then we also then, you know, the next day, we'd go and pitch angel investors and venture capital and seed funds, and they'd see me, you know, like Y Combinator, late twenties, self taught programmer.

是的。

Yeah.

我们很喜欢这种形象。

We we like that profile.

然后他们再看她，一个中年银行家，就会想：她怎么会在这支团队里？

And then they'd look at her and see this, like, middle aged banker and be like, what what's she doing on the team?

所以，我们两个人简直就是一对极不匹配的搭档。

And so, like, the two of us were just, like, a very mismatched team.

而且两次

And Twice

她比你大一倍的年纪。

your she was twice your age.

是的。

Yeah.

她非常有经验，一些投资者非常喜欢她，却讨厌我。

And she was very experienced, and a certain set of investors loved her and hated me.

另一些投资者则非常喜欢我，却讨厌她。

And then different set of investors loved me and hated her.

是的。

Yeah.

但两者完全没有交集。

But there was no overlap.

没有任何一组投资者同时喜欢我们两个人。

No set of investors liked us both.

所以我们根本融不到资。

And so we just couldn't raise money.

我在那里待了大约六个月，情况却越来越糟。

And so I was there for about six months, and it just it got worse and worse and worse.

她情绪非常不稳定，那六个月里，我被解雇了三四次。

And she was quite volatile, and I I just ended up getting fired, like, three or four times in that six month period.

她总是突然暴怒，把我开除，但第二天又会打电话来道歉，把一切重新修好。

And she'd always say she'd always, like, fly into rage and fire me, and then the next day, kind of phone up to apologize and and make everything good again.

但经历了六个月这样的情况，而且钱也没融到，说实话，我真的受够了。

But after six months of that and not raising money, you know, I was just done with it, honestly.

我决定再也无法和她共事了，于是辞职了。

I just I decided I couldn't work with her, and I so I resigned.

我说，所有东西你们都留着吧。

I just said, keep everything.

我要去度假了。

I'm gonna I'm just gonna go go on vacation.

我需要休息一下。

I need a break.

她的反应是召开全员会议，当场解雇了整个团队，这简直

And her response was to call an all hands meeting and fire the entire team on the spot, which was just

什么？

What?

为什么？

Why?

她是不是以为你想偷走他们，所以决定在你们自己离开之前先把所有人开除？

Did she think you were trying to steal them or something and said she was just gonna fire everyone before they had a chance to leave on their own?

不是。

Nope.

我觉得她只是突然暴怒，无法控制自己的情绪。

I think she just flew into a rage and couldn't control her emotion.

因为她第二天出现时说：哦，不。

It was because she showed up the next day and said, oh, no.

不。

No.

我不是故意开除你的。

I didn't mean to fire you.

我们会回来的。

We'll come back.

我们会回来的。

We'll come back.

他们却说：不。

And they were like, no.

谢谢。

Thanks.

哦。

Oh

天哪。

my gosh.

好的。

Okay.

所以，这只是个有趣的故事，但有两个非常简单的教训。

So just to this is gonna this is an interesting story, but just two really simple lessons.

我知道，卡罗琳，你会同意我的看法。

And I know, Carolyn, you'll agree with me.

你不应该被老板——也就是CEO——开除好几次又重新雇用，你知道的。

You shouldn't be fired several times and rehired by your boss, you know, the CEO That's

对。

right.

是的。

Yeah.

在一家初创公司里。

At a startup.

所有事情都要写成书面形式，确保你的投资在法律上得到妥善保障。

And get everything in writing and get your investment, like, legally properly papered.

是的。

Yeah.

完全正确。

Totally.

就像股权投资一样。

Like an an equity investing.

我完全同意，你说得对。

I absolute like, this is you're absolutely right.

我当时其实也知道这一点，但我只是找借口。

And I I knew this myself at the time, and I just like, made excuses.

但你说得完全正确。

But you're totally right.

我认为，选择一个你相信具有高度诚信、聪明、勤奋且诚实的联合创始人，真的非常重要。

And, like, I think picking a cofounder that you believe is, like, high integrity and smart and hardworking and, like, honest is really, really important.

我当时只是对这个愿景和想法的潜力感到兴奋，因此忽视了很多通常你不会忽视的其他事情。

And I was just so excited by the vision and the potential of the idea that I I overlooked a lot of other stuff that normally I you know, you you shouldn't overlook.

是的。

Yeah.

这有点像陷入一段糟糕的关系。

It's kind of like being in a bad relationship.

你某种程度上忽视了一些警示信号。

You sort of overlook some red flags.

是的。

Yeah.

这太疯狂了。

It's crazy.

所以，你知道的，我当时没工作。

So I was, you know, I was out of a job.

我招的其他12个人也都失业了，我们就去了当地的酒吧。

The other, like, 12 people I'd hired were out of a job, and we went to the, like, the local bar.

过了一会儿，我们突然意识到：等等。

And, basically, after a while, we're like, wait a second.

我们为什么不自己来做这件事呢？

Why don't we just do this ourselves?

谁说的这句话？

Thought who said that?

你还记得那一刻吗？

Do you remember that moment?

我们实际上来回协商了大约两周，试图跟安妮谈，说我们都为这个项目工作了六个月到九个月。

We actually went back and forth for, like, two weeks trying to negotiate with Anne to be like, we've worked we've all worked for, like, six to nine months on this project.

你不能一个人做这件事，我们也不想再跟你合作了。

Like, you can't do this on your own, like and we don't wanna work with you anymore.

所以，我们会进行谈判。

So, like, we'll we'll negotiate.

你拿一些股权，然后退出，让我们来运营公司，因为我们不想放弃所有这些已经投入的工作。

So you take some equity and step back and, like, we'll run the company because we didn't wanna abandon all this work we'd done.

但经过两周，我们每次达成协议后，律师都会起草文件。

But after two weeks, we kept getting to an agreement and, like, lawyers would draft up the paperwork.

然后她就会突然暴怒，把文件撕掉，说你们都被开除了。

And then she would just, like, fly into a rage and rip it up and say, you're all fired again.

滚蛋。

The fuck out.

当时我就想，这到底是怎么回事？

And it was like, what the heck?

所以两周刚开始的时候，我觉得你根本不可能从头再来。

So after two weeks, at the start of the two weeks, I was like, there's no way you can start again.

之前投入的工作都白费了。

There's so much wasted work.

到了两周结束时，我们觉得，好像也没别的选择了。

By the end of the two weeks, it's like, well, there's no other option.

你知道的？

You know?

这根本不是个能和我们谈条件的人。

Like, this is not someone we can negotiate with.

她完全不讲道理。

It's not being reasonable.

所以我们只能从头开始。

So we've just gotta just gotta start from scratch.

是的

Yeah.

是的，当时她解雇了你们13个人，然后你们几周后就一起创办了Monzo？

And, yeah, it's So there were 13 of you who she had fired out of and and you all started Monzo to like, a few weeks later?

是的

Yeah.

我觉得算上她的话是14个人，而我们13个人创办了Monzo。

I think they were including her, I think they were fourteen, and thirteen of us started Monzo.

天哪。

Oh my goodness.

真是惊人。

What a stat.

但奇怪的是，我们后来才发现，我们其实并不是第一个团队。

But the crazy thing is that, so we found out later that we were actually not the first team.

她之前已经对另一个管理团队做过同样的事了。

She'd had a previous management team that she'd basically done the same thing to.

她雇了一大堆人，然后把他们全部解雇，关闭了业务，又成立了一个新实体。

She'd hired a bunch of people and then fired them, shut it down, started a new entity.

在我们之后，她又雇了第三支管理团队，哦。

And then after us, she went and hired a third management team Oh.

然后坚持了下来。

And stuck with it.

星灵银行是一家相当成功的银行。

And Starling is, like, like, a pretty successful bank.

它是一家价值数十亿美元的公司。

Like, it's a multibillion dollar company.

她实际上，我只是觉得不。

She actually, like I was just not.

建立了

Built a

一家银行。

bank.

后来怎么样了？

Whatever happened?

所以她最终还是成功了，即使她是个糟糕的老板。

So so she ended up being actually she ended up making it work even after even being a terrible boss.

是的。

Yeah.

这真是

That's

是的。

Yeah.

哇。

Wow.

没错。

Yes.

晨光公司是一家不错的企业。

Morning's a good company.

你知道吗？

You know?

他们原本更专注于B2B，但到那时，Monzo在消费者市场已经做得不错了，所以他们更多地转向了企业银行业务。

They they were more focused on b to b, but, like, by this time, Monzo was doing well in consumer, and so they focused more on business banking.

但她最终从一位对冲基金亿万富翁那里筹集了资金，基本上是个人资助了她，给了她一亿美元。

But she ultimately raised money, I think, from, like, a a hedge fund billionaire, basically personally bankrolled it, gave her, like, a $100,000,000.

而且，是的，她建立了公司，组建了团队，开发了技术，并获得了牌照。

And, yeah, she built the company, built a team, built a technology, got a license.

这真是相当了不起。

It's it was pretty remarkable.

我很惊讶。

I'm surprised.

但我也是。

But Me too.

所以你们都说，好吧。

So you all said, okay.

我们要从头开始，重写代码。

We're gonna just start from scratch, rewrite the code.

你们有没有说过，我们要改这个，或者要更专注于这个，因为这才是我们想做的？

Were there things that you said, but we're gonna change this, or we're gonna focus more on this because that was what we wanted to do?

一个大的变化是我们开始用Ruby和Go的组合来写代码，因为我喜欢Ruby，还雇了几个Ruby开发者，而其他一些程序员更喜欢Go，或者类似的原因。

Not the the a big change was that we'd started writing in a combination of Ruby and Go because, like, I liked Ruby and I'd hired a couple of Ruby devs and some of the other programmers like Go more and or whatever.

我们无法决定。

We couldn't decide.

幸运的是，我们最终放弃了所有这些，完全用Go重写了整个系统。

And luckily, we managed to scrap all that and just wrote rewrote everything in Go.

这要好得多。

It was much, much better.

但就产品而言，我们在Starling实际上没怎么开发过东西。

But, like, in terms of the product, we'd actually not built very much at Starling.

而且，确实，那时还非常早期。

And, yeah, it was just very, very early still.

所以我们从零开始。

So, we started from scratch.

我认为在Starling，或者至少我待在Starling的时候——我觉得那时候叫Starling——最初的构想其实是从不同银行供应商那里采购现成的系统。

I think we, at Starling or at least when I was at Starling, which I think was called Starling, we the initial idea was basically to go and piece together off the shelf systems from different banking vendors.

我们会通过拼凑一个核心银行系统、一个支付处理器、一个信用卡处理器，再把它们和大量外部供应商的组件整合起来，来搭建一家银行。

And we would build a bank by, like, cobbling together, like, a core banking system and a payment processor and a credit card processor and, like, kinda cobble it all together with a lot of external vendors.

我们花了四五个月的时间与这些供应商接洽，最后发现他们提供的全是空谈，不如干脆从头开始自己编写大部分代码。

And we'd spent four, five, six months meeting with them all and realized it was all just kind of vaporware, and we should just write more or less all of it from scratch.

所以当我们启动Monzo时，我们决定更多地自主研发，从零开始构建，结果效果非常好。

And so when we started Monzo, yeah, that we'll just, like, just write more of it in house from scratch, and that that works super, super well.

哇。

Wow.

我敢打赌，它的代码质量远胜于劳埃德银行之类机构能写出的东西，对吧。

I bet it was so much better written than, like, Lloyd's Bank, you know, could have ever produced Something Yeah.

大型银行的软件很多甚至是在互联网出现之前就写成的，这太疯狂了。

The crazy thing about the big banks is the software was written before the Internet existed a lot of times.

大型银行的增长方式是通过收购。

And it was, the way these big banks grew was by acquisition.

所以，曾经有很多家小型银行，一家收购了另一家，然后它们从未整合过IT系统。

So there's, like, multiple small banks and, like, one bought the other and then the next they and they never they never consolidated IT systems.

因此，它们会拥有多个不同的系统，全部是用互联网出现之前的COBOL语言编写的，它们试图让这些

So they'd have, like, multiple different systems all written in, like, COBOL from before the Internet, and they'd be try trying to have these

东西

things

在互联网上实现24/7运营的银行根本行不通。

operate a twenty four seven bank on the Internet just doesn't work.

因此，从零开始，使用现代数据库和现代编程语言重新构建，是一个绝佳的机会。银行软件本身其实并不难，但所有银行都在运行着至少50年以上的老旧技术。

So the opportunity to start again with a kind of greenfield with a, you know, modern databases, modern programming language, it's like banking software is actually not that hard, but all of the banks are running on tech that's, like, 50 plus years old.

哇。

Wow.

所以，你们的优势就在于可以从头开始全部重新构建。

So that's an advantage that you had that you could all just build it all from scratch.

是的

Yep.

我们能暂停一下吗？我想问问汤姆，这么多年过去了，你的父母对这一切、对你的整个旅程有什么看法？

Can we pause for just a second so I can ask Tom, at this point, so it's been many, many years, what are your parents thinking of all this, Your whole journey?

我妈妈不幸在Monzo建设到一半的时候去世了。

Well, my mom passed away, sadly, like, halfway through building Monzo.

我爸爸非常骄傲。

My dad is very proud.

他确实在Monzo的首轮投资中投了一笔天使资金。

I mean, he's, he put an angel check into Monzo in the first round.

真不错。

Nice.

天啊。

Oh, boy.

他和我几个朋友以及我叔叔都在首轮以1000万美元的估值进行了天使投资，所以他们都特别高兴。

He and a couple of friends of mine and my uncle all angel invested in the first round at, like, a 10,000,000 valuation, so they're very happy.

是的。

Yes.

他们都是坚定的支持者。

And they were big supporters.

比如我爸爸和我叔叔，他们几乎是产品最早的用户，给了我大量直率的产品反馈。

Like, my dad and my uncle, especially, were, like, big early users of the product, and they just gave so much, like, brutal product feedback.

你知道的。

You know?

只要有什么地方出问题，我就会收到愤怒的邮件，说‘你得修复你的产品’。

Like, whenever anything wasn't working, I'd get, like, angry emails about, like, you know, gotta fix your product.

但他们是非常非常支持我的，我觉得他们也很自豪。

But they're big, big, big supporters, and I think very proud.

而且确实如此。

And it's, yeah.

能有朋友和家人成为早期投资者，真正让产品为他们带来价值，有时还能回馈给他们改变人生的财富，这真的非常美好。

It's been really nice to have friends and family be, like, early investors and to have, like, actually made it work for them and to to give back life changing amounts of money sometimes.

我想请你告诉我们，Monzo在最初开发时，有哪些功能是被用户如此热烈接受的，比如你不需要去分行就能开设账户。

I would like you to tell us what Monzo had when you were first building this that was just so embraced by the users, like you didn't have to go into a branch to set up an account.

是的。

Yeah.

实际上，我现在正在Monzo的办公室里录制这段内容。

I'm actually in I'm recording this from the Monzo office.

我刚刚和所有的Monzo产品经理讨论了这个确切的问题。

I've just been talking to them, all the Monzo product managers about, like, this exact question.

在早期，什么是那种令人惊叹的亮点？

Like, what what was the thing in the early days that was kinda magical?

当我们刚开始做Monzo时，我们完全不知道这个问题的答案会是什么。

When we all started Monzo, we had no idea what the answer to that question was gonna be.

真的，我们根本不确定产品最终会是什么样子。

Like, literally, we didn't know what the product was really gonna be.

我们原本以为可能会做一个API，让开发者能在用户的银行基础上开发应用之类的。

We thought maybe we'd have, an API and allow developers to build apps on top of their bank or something.

我当时比较理性，觉得我们得提供大量的返现，或者很高的利率之类的。

I was quite analytical, I think, and I assumed we'd have to offer, like, loads of cash back or, like, a really high interest rate or something.

在英国，作为参考，客户使用借记卡和他们的支票账户。

And in in The UK, for reference, customers use debit cards and their checking account here.

这是他们主要的金融工具。

That's their their main financial sort of instrument.

他们没有信贷。

They don't have credit.

英国人不使用信用卡，奖励积分或返现之类的东西在这里也不是什么大事。

People don't use credit cards in The UK, and reward points or cashback, whatever, are not a not a big thing here.

我们只是假设人们注册的原因会是某种经济利益。

And we just assumed the answer to, like, why will people sign up would be something economic.

我们会给他们一些金钱上的好处，他们就会注册。

We'd give them some kind of monetary benefit, they'd sign up.

但结果证明这并不正确。

And that just turned out to not be true.

令人惊叹的是，我们是如何发现这一点的。

And the the amazing thing is how we discovered this.

所以我们原本以为拿到银行牌照需要几年时间。

So we thought it would take a couple of years to get a banking license.

事实上，我们花了三年半才拿到银行牌照。

In fact, it took us three and a half years to get a banking license.

我最近重新翻看了当时的所有笔记，里面满是YC的信条，比如尽早发布产品、与用户交流，而我们竟然两年都没有推出产品、没有上线、没有获取用户反馈，这简直让人恐惧。

And I back in the I I've just been reading all my notes from the time, and, it's full of, like, YC mantras, like launch early and talk to users or, like, this idea that we go for two years without getting a product out there, without launch, without getting user feedback was, like, terrifying.

因此，我们很早就想出了使用预付借记卡的方法。

And so we figured out a way really early to use prepaid debit cards.

这种卡有点像父母给孩子用的，不是完整的银行账户，你知道的，是的。

It's kind of the thing you give to your kids to not a full bank account, you know, like Yeah.

当时几乎没人用这种卡，但它让我们能快速原型化银行服务，迅速发放这些卡片，然后开始实验。

No one really used that back in the day, it allowed us to prototype the bank and get these cards out really, really quickly and then start experimenting.

结果发现，人们真正喜欢的是：一个极其流畅的用户界面、非常出色的客户服务、所有功能都集中在手机上，再加上一种看似人性化、亲切、真诚的品牌理念和语气，而不是那种大公司的冰冷做派。

And it turned out it's basically what people loved about it was a combination of, an amazing, like, slick user interface, really, really good customer service, everything was on your phone, and then a sort of mission and brand and tone of voice that seemed really human and approachable and honest, not like a big corporate.

但早期的产品本质上就像一张借记卡。

But the early product was basically like a debit card.

有趣的是，当你用借记卡非接触式支付时，当时银行通常需要两到三天才能将交易入账。

And the cool thing was when you tap the debit card to pay contactlessly, back then, it would take your bank normally two or three days for the transaction to actually hit your account.

作为一个收入不多的年轻人，透支总是让我很担心。

And as a young person who didn't earn very much money, going overdrawn was always a worry.

我会担心钱不够用了。

Like, I'm gonna run out of money.

我周末出去，刷啊刷啊刷啊刷啊刷。

I go out over the weekend, tap, tap, tap, tap, tap.

到了周一早上，账单更新了，天哪。

And on Monday morning, the statement gets updated like, oh my god.

我透支了一百英镑，还被扣了一堆费用。

I'm a £100 overdrawn, and I'm getting hit with all these charges.

我们做的第一件事是，因为我们用了现代软件，可以实时处理交易。

The first thing we did was because we wrote modern software, we could process the transactions in real time.

所以只要你一刷卡，手机就会震动并推送通知，余额会实时更新，你随时都能清楚知道自己还有多少钱。

And so as soon as you tapped, your phone would buzz with a push notification, your balance would update, and you'd know exactly how much money you had at all times.

今天听起来这似乎微不足道，但拥有一个即时更新的余额，才是最根本的突破。

And that just sounds so trivial today, but having a instantly up to date balance was, like, the first thing.

此外，我们改进了推送通知的内容，不再使用那种混乱的、最多18个字符的描述，而是直接显示真实的商户名称。

And then on top of that, we made the push notification, like, actually, instead of the garbled, like, 18 character description that you'd normally get, you we'd make it look like the actual merchant.

比如你刚在Pret a Manger或麦当劳消费过，通知里就会直接显示这些名字。

Like, you just shopped at Pret a Monje or McDonald's or whatever.

我们还加入了地图、商户的实际标志，并对每笔交易进行分类。

Then And we'd include a map, and then we'd the actual logo of the merchant, and we'd categorize it all.

整个体验让人感觉非常愉悦。

It's like it just felt very delightful.

它让人觉得，如果在二十一世纪设计一家银行，就该是这个样子，而不是像十九世纪的老古董。

Like, it felt like a bank should should kinda feel like if you built it in the twenty first century, not the, like, nineteenth century.

对。

Right.

但令人惊讶的是，正是这些非常细微的用户体验设计推动了大量使用，以及一系列行为心理学效应。

But, remarkably, it was a lot of those very small UX things that really drove a lot of usage and then a bunch of behavioral psychology.

实际上，我们从Grouper那里借鉴了很多这些做法。

Actually, we stole a lot of this from Grouper.

我们当时有一个等待名单，大约有三十万到四十万人在排队等一张卡片。

We had a wait list, and there was something like three or 400,000 people on the waitlist to get a card.

哇。

Wow.

一旦你通过了账户的等待名单，我们会给你一张金色门票，让你可以邀请一个人跳过排队。

And then once you'd gone through the waitlist of an account, we would give you a golden ticket, which allowed you to get one person to skip the queue.

所以这反过来颠覆了大多数公司的常见心理策略——他们会说，如果你注册，我们就给你钱。

So it kind of reverses a lot of psychology of a lot of companies will say, if you sign up, we'll pay you money.

明白吗？

Alright?

或者，如果你说服朋友注册，我们就给你50美元。

Or if you convince your friend to sign up, we'll give you $50.

这种心理机制有点像是，你知道的，去麻烦朋友本身是一件挺让人不舒服的事。

And the the psychology of that is kind of like, you know, it's kind of a grubby thing to do to hassle your friends.

所以我们决定付钱给你，让你觉得值得去做。

So we're we're gonna pay you to make it worth your while.

而对我们来说，情况正好相反：有一种稀缺且珍贵的资源，叫做Monzo卡片，它如此珍贵，所以我们只给你一张金票，因此你会更加珍惜它。

Whereas for us, it's like, there's a scarce valuable resource called a Monzo card, and it's so valuable we're only gonna give you one golden ticket, and so you're gonna value it even more.

人们甚至把这些金票放到eBay上出售，有一两年时间，金票的供应量非常大。

People, like, put these things on eBay and sold them, and it was like, for a year or two, the golden tickets were in, like, very, very high supply.

因此，我们几乎没花任何广告费用，就新增了百万级用户。

So we got to add a million customers with with basically no advertising spend.

我简直不敢相信这个故事。

I cannot believe that story.

卡罗琳，你能相信吗？一张金票竟然推动了用户增长？

Caroline, a golden can you believe that a golden ticket is what drove users?

我读到过，你们确实是从零到一百万用户，花了两年半时间，而且没花任何广告费用。

And I read somewhere that you went, yeah, from a from zero to a million users in two and a half years with no advertising spent.

太棒了。

That's amazing.

因为产品本身实在太好了。

Because the product was so good, basically.

是的。

Yeah.

每个投资者都告诉我们这不可能实现。

And every investor told us it wasn't gonna be possible.

他们就说，你得花三四百美元才能获取一个用户。

They're just like, you're gonna have to spend 3 or $400 to acquire a user.

你想拥有一百万个这样的用户。

You want a million of that.

那就是三四亿美元的广告投入。

So 3 or $400,000,000 in advertising.

根本不可能。

Like, not possible.

我们说，不行。

And we said, no.

不行。

No.

我们要完全依靠行为心理学、用户体验、口碑传播和网络效应来实现。

We're gonna do it all through, like, behavioral psychology and user experience and word-of-mouth and network effect.

每个投资者都告诉我们，我们是傻瓜，这根本不可能成功。

And every investor told us we were idiots and it would never work.

我们实际上从Passion Capital获得了前三轮甚至可能第四轮融资，他们也是投资GoCardless的那批人，是的。

And we actually raised our first three or maybe even four rounds of funding from Passion Capital, the same the same people who'd invested in GoCardless Yes.

在公司的头两年里，我们没有拿到任何其他投资条款书，因此前三轮融资都来自Passion Capital。

In our first three rounds because we didn't get a single other term sheet for, like, the first two years of the company.

不可能吧。

No way.

天啊。

Oh my god.

我喜欢这样的故事。

I love stories like this.

Passion Capital赢了。

Passion Capital wins.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

他们从中获益颇丰。

And they've done very well out of it.

但我和他们关系很好。

But, I mean, I'm good friends with them.

Aileen曾是我的董事会成员。

Aileen was on my board.

我昨晚还和她一起吃晚饭。

I I saw her for dinner last night.

我们是非常好的朋友。

We're very good friends.

她几乎是这家公司存在的主要原因，因为我们真的向每一位投资者推销过。

She's she's, like, one big reason this company exists because, literally, we we pitch to every investor.

我多次前往硅谷，向所有著名的投资者路演，他们都有一个共同的思维定式：为什么我们认为挑战型银行不会成功。

I traveled to the Valley so many times and pitched all the famous investors, and they all had they had this, like, group think of, like, here's why we all believe challenger banks won't work.

就是说，你永远无法获得客户。

It's like you'll never get customers.

或者，一旦你有了客户，你也永远无法让他们存入工资。

And it's, oh, once you've got customers, they'll you'll never get them to deposit their salary.

或者，一旦他们存入了工资，你也永远无法从他们身上赚到收入。

Or once you've them to deposit their salary, well, you'll never make revenue off them.

我们不得不逐一打破这些假设，直到最后发现，原来挑战型银行实际上是非常好的投资。

It's like, we just had to beat down each of these assumptions until eventually, like, oh, challenger banks are actually a great investment, it turns out.

所以我想问一下关于欺诈的问题，因为我知道，如果你是一家银行，这会是个大问题。

So I wanna ask about fraud because I do know that, obviously, if you're a bank, that's a huge problem.

你们在对抗它方面做得相当不错。

And you guys did pretty well fighting against it.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

相对而言，我觉得是这样。

Relatively, I think.

相对而言。

Relatively.

如果你在处理资金，你就一定会成为欺诈者的目标，这是不可避免的。

So if you're handling money, you're gonna be a target of fraudsters, and it's impossible.

要实现零欺诈的唯一方法就是干脆停业，不进行任何资金交易，但这对客户来说没什么用。

The only way of having zero fraud really is to, like, shut down your business and not transact any money, which is not that useful for customers.

所以你总是在平衡用户体验的摩擦与尽可能最大限度地减少欺诈之间权衡。

So you're always fighting this balance between, like, adding user friction and, trying to reduce fraud to the greatest extent possible.

由于我们拥有现代化的IT系统、先进的软件和机器学习技术，我们可以构建这些反欺诈算法。

And we because we had modern IT systems, modern, like, software and, like, machine learning, we could basically build, like, these fraud detection algorithms.

老实说，我们只是让几个实习生来做的。

We just got a couple of our interns, honestly, to build it.

两个叫丹尼尔和普里什的小伙子，他们都是从剑桥来的。

Two guys called Daniel and Priesh, who joined us both out of Cambridge.

他们刚毕业，正好赶上我们被欺诈问题困扰的时候。

They were both just recent grads just as we were getting hit by fraud.

当时其他人都在忙着建设银行，所以我们先让丹尼尔，然后是普里什来处理这个问题，并直接让他们去想办法解决。

And everyone else was too busy building the bank, so we we put Daniel first and then Priesh onto this problem and basically said, go and figure it out.

他当时才21岁。

He's like a 21 year old.

丹尼尔构建了一个机器学习系统，将我们遭遇的欺诈金额减少了99.5%左右。

And Daniel built a machine learning system that reduced the amount of fraud we're seeing by, like, 99.5% or something.

这简直太不可思议了。

It was absolutely crazy.

那时候真是超前沿的东西，哇。

Like, really cutting edge stuff back in the time Wow.

当年啊。

Back in the day.

这两位现在在Monzo都已经是总监或副总裁级别的了。

And both of those guys are now, like, director or VP level at Monzo still.

我正想问他们是不是还在Monzo。

I was gonna ask if they're still at Monzo.

他们俩现在还在那里。

They are both still there.

丹尼尔在与这些欺诈者斗争时气得不行。

Daniel got so angry fighting these fraudsters.

他甚至还在业余时间当起了志愿警察。

He actually became a volunteer policeman as well on the side.

因为他对那些犯罪分子迟迟得不到起诉感到非常愤慨。

Because he was so upset that some of these forces weren't getting prosecuted.

他当时说，不行。

He was like, no.

我要维护法律。

I'm gonna uphold the law.

哇。

Wow.

而且有各种各样的诈骗者。

And there were all kinds of fraudsters.

有专业的，也有业余的。

There were, like, professional ones and amateur ones.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

各种类型都有。

The full range.

最基础的诈骗方式就是，你从别处偷来一张信用卡，用它给你的Monzo卡充值，然后去ATM机把钱取出来。

And the, you know, the the most basic is like, you steal a credit card from elsewhere and use it to load money onto your Monzo card and then go and, go and, you know, withdraw the cash from ATM.

你本质上是把被盗的信用卡转换成了现金。

And you basically turn that stolen credit card into broad cash.

说到底，所有诈骗者的目标都是为了在末端拿到现金。

Like, ultimately, what everyone's trying to do, all the frauds, so they're trying to get cash at the other end.

我们可能会在加密货币网站或赌博网站上付款，以换取积分，然后再进行循环利用。

We might, like, make a payment on a crypto site or a gambling website to get credits out, to to then recycle.

这些是业余级别的诈骗，一直到像朝鲜的洗钱团伙，为朝鲜政权牟利，还有东欧的人口走私团伙，其中一些情况相当黑暗，大部分都是如此。

And those are the the sort of amateur ones all the way up to, I mean, North Korean sort of money laundering rings to try and earn money for the North Korean regime, like Eastern European people smuggling gangs, which some of some of that got pretty dark, mostly.

因此，我们会与情报部门合作，关闭实际的人口贩卖和走私团伙。

So we'd work with the intelligence services to to shut down actual, like, sex trafficking people smuggling rings.

最令人印象深刻的一次是，2017年左右我们遭遇了一波大规模的拒付交易，全部都来自加油站。

There were the one of the most memorable was we got this big wave of chargebacks in about 2017, I think, and they were all from gas stations.

人们可以去加油站，把Monzo卡插进去，然后加满一箱汽油，这在英国是很正常的事情。

So people you could go to a gas station, you could put your Monzo card in and, you know, pump a gas tank full of gas or petrol in The UK, like, fine or whatever.

那加满一油箱油要多少钱？

Like, how much is a gas tank full of of gas?

大概一百英镑吧，差不多这个数。

It's a £100 maybe, something like that.

但我们收到了高达一万或两万英镑的退款交易。

But we got these chargebacks for sort of 10,000 or £20,000.

这到底是怎么回事？

It's like, what is happening here?

结果发现，罪犯们发现只要你的Monzo卡里至少有1便士，所有的加油机就会检查到这笔金额，然后允许你无限加油。

And it turned out what the criminals had figured out that as long as your Monzo card had at least 1p on, the all of the gas machine would just the petrol pump would check that it had at least a penny on and then allow you to pump unlimited gas.

好吧。

Fine.

但问题是，他们怎么可能加超过一油箱的油呢？

But still, like, how are they how are they doing more than a tanks full?

这些家伙的做法是，把福特全顺货车改装过，在车后部装了一个巨大的油罐，半夜里开进去，插上一张Monzo卡，授权1便士，然后往车后部的油罐里加了两万英镑的汽油。

What these guys were doing was taking Ford Transit vans that they'd retrofitted and turned the back of the Transit van into a huge gas tanker and gone in the middle of the night, put a Monzo card in, authorized 1p, and then pumped 20,000 pounds worth of gas into the back of these transit vans.