中东战事扩大

我是安德鲁·施瓦茨，您正在收听《真相所在》播客，这是由战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）制作的节目，我们将剖析当日最重要的政策议题，并与能帮助我们最好理解真实情况的人士对话。

I'm Andrew Schwartz, and you're listening to the truth of the matter, a podcast by CSIS where we break down the top policy issues of the day and talk with the people that can help us best understand what's really going on.

为了深入了解以色列与哈马斯冲突后中东地区可能爆发更广泛战争的真相，我们邀请到了诺姆·鲁尔，他是CSIS跨国威胁项目（TNT）的高级顾问。

To get to the truth of the matter about the potential for wider war in The Middle East following the conflict between Israel and Hamas, we have with us Norm Rule, who's a senior advisor to CSIS's TNT Transnational Threats Program.

诺姆曾担任美国政府的伊朗国家情报负责人。

Norm is a former national intelligence manager for Iran for the United States government.

他曾经是中情局资深的中东问题专家分析师。

He's a former senior CIA Middle East expert analyst.

诺姆，关于您在美国政府漫长的职业生涯，我还能说上好多。

Norm, I could go on and on about your long career for the United States government.

首先，我要感谢您卓越的服务，欢迎来到本播客。

First I should say thank you for your incredible service and welcome to the podcast.

非常感谢你，安德鲁。

Thank you very much Andrew.

很高兴能来到这里。

It's a pleasure to be here.

诺姆，我们在中东看到了一些情况。

Norm, we're seeing stuff in The Middle East.

几个月前，你就在这档播客中预测了在10月7日对以色列发动残酷袭击以及以色列对哈马斯的回应之后，这场更广泛的地区战争将如何在中东展开。

Know, months ago you were on this podcast predicting how this wider regional war would begin to play out in The Middle East following the attacks, the vicious attacks of October 7 on Israel and Israel's response to Hamas.

而现在，这一切正按照你所说的那样发生。

And we're seeing this play out exactly the way you said it.

我知道你并不惊讶，但请告诉我们你目前看到了什么，以及我们还能期待什么？

I know you're not surprised, but tell us what you're seeing and what more can we expect to come here?

谢谢。

Thank you.

再次感谢你今天邀请我，也祝你和你的听众新年快乐。

And thank you for again having me today and happy new year to you and to your listeners.

我认为关键在于，当前中东危机中的所有行为体都没有任何战略动机会促使他们点燃一场更广泛的地区冲突或常规战争。

I think the bottom line that I would put forward is that none of the actors involved in the current Middle East crisis have a strategic driver which would compel them to ignite a broader regional conflict, a conventional war.

然而，该地区所有的侵略性行为体——主要是伊朗及其代理人——有多种动机来维持甚至略微加剧他们对以色列和美国正在进行的暴力行动。

All of the aggressive actors in the region, and here we're mainly talking Iran and its proxies, have multiple incentives, however, to maintain and even slightly increase the intensity of the existing violence they are undertaking against Israel and The United States.

这就是你的危险所在。

So here's your danger.

随着时间推移，这种暴力水平会变得正常化。

Over time, that level of violence becomes normalized.

随着时间推移，暴力的尺度往往会升级，过去被视为红线的，现在却被认为是粉线。

And over time, the angle of that violence tends to increase as what used to be red lines are deemed pink.

人们会说：‘我还没做到足够远，也许我可以再往前一步。’

And people say, well, I haven't reached far enough, maybe I can reach a little farther.

我们正目睹来自也门、可能还有伊拉克的导弹发射，而在2014年，这种行为是难以想象的，会引发国际社会对原始冲突的介入。

We're watching missiles being fired from Yemen, perhaps Iraq, that in 2014 would have been something inconceivable and deemed as a cause for an international involvement in original conflict.

然而，实际上什么都没发生。

Yet nothing really happens.

我们正在见证以色列面临第七条战线的战争，其攻击强度和频率各不相同。

We're watching, in essence, a seventh front war for Israel of varying degrees of intensity and periodicity of attacks.

再次强调，这种情形在2014年或2003年会被视为足以引爆整个地区全面战争的事件。

Again, something that in 2014 or 2003, we would have seen as something that would have ignited entire regional conflagration.

我认为这里的教训是，我们在许多方面已经脱离了原有的地图。

I think the lesson there is that in many ways we are off the map.

如果这些角色的行为符合我们对这种冲突中他们应有的行为的预期，那么这种行为的规模是现代任何政策制定者都未曾面对过的。

If the characters are behaving according to how we would expect them to behave in such a conflict, the level of all of this behavior is something that no policymaker has faced in modern times.

跟我们说说红海发生了什么。

And tell us about what's going on in the Red Sea.

胡塞武装正在向美国开火，他们是来自也门的伊朗代理势力，正在攻击美国的利益，攻击红海地区的利益。

The Houthis are shooting at The United States, Houthis, the Iranian proxies from Yemen, they're shooting at US interests, they're shooting at interests in Red Sea.

他们还在攻击以色列。

They're shooting at Israel.

为什么这种行为被允许持续下去？

Why is this being allowed to continue?

如果你听胡塞武装的宣传，他们会说他们正在攻击以色列和与以色列相关的航运。

Well, if you listen to Houthi propaganda, they would say they're attacking Israel and Israel related shipping.

但这并不是第一次发生这种情况。

And this isn't the first time this happened.

20世纪70年代初，巴勒斯坦人民解放阵线曾对前往以色列的油轮发动过类似袭击。

In the early 1970s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine undertook similar attacks against fuel tankers going to Israel.

这些袭击后来因以色列对巴勒斯坦人的行动而停止。

And those attacks were halted by Israeli action against the Palestinians.

由于全球化、目标定位粗糙，或许还有意将攻击范围扩大到以色列问题之外，这些袭击如今已波及35多个国家。

These attacks, because of globalization, because of sloppy targeting, because of perhaps intentional targeting outside of the Israeli issue, are now touched more than 35 countries.

集装箱运输已基本从红海转移，尽管部分石油运输仍在继续。

Container traffic has been largely diverted from the Red Sea, although some oil shipping continues.

红海地区仍保留着相当数量的小型船舶运输。

There still remains a fair amount of smaller shipping in the Red Sea.

集装箱运输至关重要。

The container traffic is important.

集装箱船规模庞大。

Container ships are huge.

它们可能装载4000到6000个20英尺的集装箱，运载着价值极高的货物。

They may carry 4,000, 6,000, 20 foot containers of very valuable cargo.

而且在很多方面，集装箱船比油轮更昂贵、更有价值。

And in many ways, a container ship is more expensive and valuable than an oil tanker.

而在传统上利润率就很低的航运业中，保险费率现在要高得多。

And the insurance rates in an industry which has traditionally narrow margins are much, much higher.

我们看到大约95%——这个数字每天都有变化，但今天可以说有95%原本经过红海的集装箱航运现在都改道绕行非洲。

We're watching about 95%, and this varies by day, but let's say 95% today of the container shipping that used to go through the Red Sea now divert itself around Africa.

如果你要去鹿特丹，这段航程会增加大约3000英里，运输时间延长一到两周。

A trip that if you're going to Rotterdam adds about 3,000 miles to the trip, a week to two weeks of transit.

这减少了可用货船的数量，因为它们正忙于绕行非洲。

It reduces the number of cargo ships available because they're busy going around Africa.

它将每艘船的燃料成本提高了50万至100万美元，这部分成本会转嫁给消费者。

It raises fuel costs by half 1,000,000 to $1,000,000 a ship that transfers to consumers.

并且它开始延迟一系列传统上依赖准时制供应链交付材料的行业的物资到达时间。

And it starts to delay the arrival of material for a series of industries that have traditionally succeeded because they have just in time delivery of supply.

所以你正在看到供应链扭曲开始显现。

So you're watching supply chain distortions begin to appear.

你将面临一些通胀影响，尤其是在欧洲，但我认为全球范围内正在出现的通缩压力将抵消这一影响。

You're going to have some inflationary impact, particularly in Europe, but this will be offset by the deflationary pressures I think we're seeing worldwide.

但如今这已成为一个令人担忧的问题。

But this now is a concern.

至于我们为何允许这种情况发生，这其中有一点‘它’的因素。

As to why we allow it to happen, there's a little bit of the it.

我们正在观察一系列由胡塞武装发射的导弹、无人机，以及至少一艘爆炸性无人机船。

We're watching a series of missiles, drones, and at least one explosive drone boat having been launched by the Houthis.

让我们稍微回溯一下历史。

Let's go back in time a little bit.

几年前，在奥巴马政府第二任期，胡塞武装袭击了‘梅森号’驱逐舰和‘NHTSA’。

Some years ago in the second Obama administration, the Houthis attacked the USS Mason and the NHTSA.

美国的回应被认为是适度的。

The US response was deemed proportional.

本质上，我们立即攻击了向我方舰船发射武器的雷达和发射阵地。

And that in essence was we immediately attacked the radar and the launch site that launched the weapons against our ships.

我们的船只没有受损，我们击落了这些导弹。

Our ships were not damaged, we shot the missiles down.

我们现在采取了完全不同的做法。

We have a very different approach now.

这种相称的回应现在本质上意味着：我们将防御任何攻击。

That proportional response now in essence says the following, we will defend against an attack.

如果攻击未能成功，我们不会对对手采取行动，这是一种非凡的转变。

If an attack does not succeed, we won't take action against an adversary, which is an extraordinary development.

所以本质上，如果你是对手，你的立场就是：我向以色列和美国人发射武器后，什么都没发生。

So in essence, if you're an adversary, your position is nothing happened to me when I fired against Israel and the Americans.

这很可能提升了胡塞指挥官在当地的人气，也增强了胡塞组织在国内宣称他们正在反击以色列和美国的能力。

That probably does good thing for Houthi commanders local reputation and for the Houthis ability to say domestically that they're fighting back against Israel and America.

记住他们的旗帜。

Remember their flag.

上面写着他们的口号：诅咒犹太人，死亡给美国，死亡给以色列。

It had their motto was curse the Jews, death to America, death to Israel.

所以，本质上，胡塞武装没有理由停止攻击。

So you, in essence, have no reason for the Houthis to stop attacking.

因此，他们的攻击持续下去并不令人意外。

So it's not unreasonable their attacks continue.

我们需要对这些爆炸性无人机船保持警惕。

We do need to be concerned about these explosive drone boats.

我们还需要担心胡塞武装可能会发射水雷。

And we need to be concerned that the Houthis might launch naval mines.

他们也有能力做到这一点。

They also have a capacity for that.

这在国际历史上是前所未有的。

This is unprecedented in international history.

再讲一点地理知识。

One more bit of geography.

你的听众应该同时从空间和时间（时间顺序）两个维度来思考。

Your listeners should think in space, as well as in the time, the chronology.

世界上大约有八个主要的海上咽喉要道，以及若干次要的咽喉要道。

There are about eight major maritime choke points in the world and a handful of secondary choke points.

其中三个位于这一区域：霍尔木兹海峡、曼德海峡和北部的苏伊士运河。

Three of them are in this area, the Strait Of Hormuz, the Bab El Mandab, and the Suez Canal to the north.

这是一个对全球经济极为战略性和重要的区域。

This is an incredibly strategic, important area for the global economy.

国际社会在这一极其重要区域的应对举措，必然被其他对手密切关注。

And the international community's response in this incredibly important area is certainly being observed by other adversaries.

其他对手会想，如果他们以这种方式应对曼德海峡的威胁，那又会如何应对亚洲马六甲海峡、地中海直布罗陀海峡或巴拿马运河的威胁呢？

And other adversaries will say, if they handled the Bab El Mandab threat that way, how will they handle a threat against the Strait Of Malacca in Asia or perhaps the Mediterranean, the Gibraltar or in the Panama Canal?

我并不是说这些地方一定会发生袭击，但我只是说，对手们会注意到这种应对方式，并认为这就是今后应对威胁的标准做法。

I'm not suggesting attacks will take place there, but I'm just saying adversaries will note this response and say this is now how we respond to threats.

很难相信胡塞武装到目前为止还能如此逍遥法外。

It is hard to believe that the Houthis are getting away scot free so far with this.

红线在哪里？

Where's the red line?

我们是否知道一条他们一旦逾越就会导致终结的红线？

Is there a red line that we know of that they could push on and that's the end

对他们来说，这就是故事的终点吗？

of the story for them?

这是个很好的问题。

It's a great question.

我认为首先我们应该明确，什么是红线？

I think first we ought to say, what is a red line?

红线应该是什么？

What's a red line supposed to be?

最好的红线是那些旨在支持现有国际法的红线。

The best red lines are red lines that are meant to support existing international law.

它们旨在支持由这些法律所构建的现有国际秩序和全球体系。

They're meant to support the existing international, the global order framed by those laws.

这并不是为了创造新的先例。

This isn't to create new precedents.

最好的红线是那些得到国际支持并涉及多国应对方案的红线。

The best red lines are those supported internationally and involve multinational response options.

而且，最好的红线是那些你事先做好了规划的红线。

And also the best red lines are those for which you had planning.

你不希望在危机在你周围爆发时，却从未考虑过这种情况。

You don't want to be in a situation where a crisis develops around you and you've never thought about it.

你只能边走边想。

You've got to make it up as you go along.

在这种情况下，你无法预测次生后果。

That's where you can't predict the secondary consequences.

让我们来看看亚丁湾的红线。

So let's look at the red lines with the Bab El Mandeb.

这是否违反了国际法？

Is this a violation of international law?

绝对违反。

Absolutely.

涉及许多国家。

Touches many nations.

它威胁到全球秩序吗？

Does it threaten the global order?

当然。

Absolutely.

正如我们所说，它目前正在影响多个经济体。

It's touching multiple economies right now as we speak.

这是不是多个国家会共同反对或回应的事情？

Is it something that multiple nations would defeat against or respond against?

它目前正在红海发生，无论这些国家是否参与了‘繁荣卫士’行动——我认为这个名称听起来像是中国一家人寿保险公司的糟糕翻译。

It's happening right now in the Red Sea, whether or not they're part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a title which I think sounds like a bad translation of a Chinese life insurance company.

但无论它们是否属于该特遣部队，红海和阿拉伯海地区都有多个国家在保护航运。

But whether or not they're in that task force, there are multiple countries in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea area who are protecting shipping.

因此，我们已经有了违反红线的框架。

So we have the framework for the violation of a red line.

挑战在于你打算如何应对这一情况。

The challenge becomes how you plan to respond to this.

似乎对于这一多年来相当可预测的局面，尚未充分制定相关政策。

And it appears as if perhaps either not sufficient policy thought has been given to what has been a fairly predictable situation for many years.

胡塞武装、他们的武器以及对红海能源的袭击，针对的一直是沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋，他们的敌人始终如一。

The Houthis, their weapons, their attacks on energy in the Red Sea occurred against Saudi Arabia and The Emirates, their enemies have been the same.

或者这是一种国际政策的状况——你必须说，美国、主要是英国和法国已经达成一致：我们不会做出回应，因为担心可能加剧地区冲突。

Or it's a situation where international policy, and you've got to say The United States and primarily Britain and France have agreed upon this, will be that we won't respond out of a concern that we might escalate a regional conflict.

再次强调，如果这成为你的最终回应，你就必须说：好吧，你是个胡塞指挥官或胡塞领导人。

And again, I go back that if that becomes your end response, you have to say, Well, you're a Houthi commander or a Houthi leader.

告诉我，你有什么动机停止攻击红海的船只？告诉我，你有什么动机继续攻击红海的航运。

Tell me the incentive you have to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea, tell me the incentives you have to continue attacking shipping in the Red Sea.

这种情况很可能会持续下去，这是相当可预测的。

It's a fairly predictable situation that this is going to go on.

所以，让我们再深入一点分析这个问题。

So let's pull that thread just just a little more.

那么在这种环境下会发生什么？

So what happens in this environment?

如果我们遵循当前的程序，我们将继续防御但不回应胡塞武装的攻击。

Well, if we follow our current procedures, we will continue to defend and not respond to the Houthis.

有一些迹象表明，这一政策可能即将结束。

There's some evidence that that policy may be coming to an end.

英国国防部长发表了一番相当尖锐的声明，这种声明通常是公开场合使用的，目的不是威胁，而是向盟友和对手表明我们的严肃态度。

The British Defence Minister gave a fairly stark statement, which is the type of statement you give publicly, not as a threat, but as a way to underscore that you are serious to partners and adversaries.

好吧，我们已经说明了这一点。

Okay, we've done that.

但如果这一政策持续下去，而胡塞武装继续发动攻击，那么我们要么维持不回应我们所防御的攻击这一政策，要么就会遭遇我所说的“灾难性成功”——敌方的一枚导弹或无人机可能击中一艘集装箱船的驾驶台，导致船员死亡，船只在红海中央燃烧漂浮。

But if this policy continues and the Houthis continue attacking, then we either maintain our policy of we don't respond to attacks that we defend against, or there is what I call the catastrophic success by an adversary, the Golden BB, a missile or drone that maybe takes out the bridge of a container ship and leaves it with dead crew members and with floating in flames in the middle of the Red Sea.

对油轮的袭击会造成大规模石油泄漏，实际上将导致红海航运中断或影响油价。

An attack on an oil tanker which creates a large oil spill, which in essence would shut down shipping in the Red Sea or impact oil prices.

或者，最后，一次袭击可能不仅造成海上平民人员伤亡，还会导致美国军事人员死亡。

Or last, of course, an attack that would kill not only maritime civilian maritime personnel, but US military personnel.

届时，如果以美国政府对伊拉克的反应为模板，我们可能会对一系列胡塞目标采取对等回应，以此向胡塞武装传达：你们必须停止，否则我们将采取行动。

At that point, if you take the administration's response to Iraq as a template, we would likely to respond with something proportional against a series of Houthi sites as a way of communicating to the Houthis, you need to stop and we will take the action to you.

我不认为这种做法会比此前对伊拉克的空袭更有效，因为伊朗拥有大量可以消耗的代理人。

I don't believe that will be any more successful than the strikes in Iraq have been to deter attacks against US forces, simply because Iran has a lot of proxies to burn through.

这些代理人本身对自身的损失并不太在意。

The proxies themselves don't pay a lot of attention to their losses.

最终，只有当我们采取的行动直接威胁到胡塞武装领导层的战略利益乃至其生存本身时，这种局面才会停止——即明确告诉他们：如果你们继续这样做，你们的生存将面临严重威胁。

In the end, this will only stop when whatever actions we take touch the leadership of the Houthis to, in essence, tell them if you do this, your strategic equities and indeed your existence on this earth will be threatened.

我认为我们离这一步还很远。

I think we're a ways off from that.

但我们必须意识到，任何时候——甚至就在我们交谈的此刻——那枚致命的‘黄金一击’都可能突破防御，引发一场巨大的连锁反应，将多方卷入一个无人愿见的局势。

But we need to be cognizant that any time, at any time, perhaps even while we speak, that golden terrible BB could get through defenses and create this gravity sink of actions that pull a variety of players into a situation where no one wishes to be.

你知道吗，诺姆，这很有趣。

You know, Norm, it's interesting.

以色列国防部长约亚夫·加兰昨晚告诉《华尔街日报》，他说：‘我的基本观点是，我们正在对抗一个轴心，而非单一敌人。'

The Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Golan, told the Wall Street Journal last night that, and I quote, he said, My basic view, we are fighting an axis, not a single enemy.

伊朗正在以色列周围加强军事力量，以便加以利用。

Iran is building up military power around Israel in order to use it.

以色列在他们的声明和行动中非常明确。

Israel's pretty clear in their statements and their actions.

以色列今天早上对哈马斯领导人进行了更多有针对性的打击，并针对一名真主党领导人。

Israel now carrying out more targeted strikes against Hamas leaders this morning against a Hezbollah leader.

我们可以预期，加兰特和其他以色列官员表示，这场战争现在进入了不同的阶段。

We can expect Galat and other Israeli officials have said the war is entering a different phase now.

为什么伊朗仍然被允许以这种方式渗透我们的民主盟友？

Why is it that Iran continues to be permitted to infiltrate our democratic ally in this way?

但要明确的是，这不仅是在攻击我们的民主盟友，也是在攻击我们的伙伴。

Well, to be clear, it's not only attacking our democratic ally, but it's also our partner.

它还影响着全球经济，导致物价上涨。

It is also impacting the global economy and prices will rise.

由于伊朗在红海的行动，我们的欧洲盟友和伙伴，以及美国本身，都将面临艰难的经济抉择。

There will be hard economic decisions for a number of our allies and partners in Europe and for The United States itself as a result of Iranian actions in the Red Sea.

更重要的是，那些无法选择服役地点的美国军人，现在正面临无人机、导弹和其他袭击的威胁。

And most importantly, there are American men and women in the military who don't get a vote as to where exactly they're going to serve, who are now catching drones, missiles, and other attacks.

他们的生命岌岌可危。

Their lives are on the line.

这是一个你所能提出的最重要的问题。

This is as important a question as you can get to.

我认为，问题在于我们尚未在国际社会中制定出针对灰色地带行为者的政策。

And I think the issue there becomes we have not developed a policy in the international community against gray zone actors.

关于这一点，已有许多深刻的论述。

And there's been plenty of wise writing on this.

事实上，中心的塞思·琼斯写了一本杰出的著作《三个危险的人》。

In fact, Seth Jones of the Center wrote a magnificent book, Three Dangerous Men.

我推荐给所有你的听众。

I recommend it to all of your listeners.

你能真切地感受到灰色地带活动是什么样子，以及各方行为者的思维方式。

You get a real sense of what gray zone activity is like and what the players are thinking.

同时，你应该问自己：自那以后，我们在西方、特别是美国，我们的国防战略究竟做了什么来应对修正主义行为者的侵略策略？

And at the same time, you should ask yourself, okay, since then, what exactly have we done in the West, in The United States in particular with our defense doctrine, to touch revisionist actors' aggressive strategies.

我们为对抗这种行为做了什么？

What have we done to combat that?

答案实际上是少得可怜。

And the answer is actually darn little.

中国继续在南海推进。

The Chinese continue to move in the South China Sea.

伊朗继续向各种从事致命活动的组织提供资金、人员和物资。

Iran continues to send money, people, and stuff to a variety of actors who exist to conduct lethal activity.

你甚至可以看到俄罗斯通过现已有所转变的瓦格纳集团，实施其各种灰色地带活动。

And you're watching even Russia with its variations of gray zone activity through the now somewhat transformed Wagner Group.

问题在于，你该如何应对这样的行为者？

The issue becomes what do you do against such an actor?

我认为制裁并没有被过度使用。

It's not that sanctions I think have been overused.

我认为，现在那些影响较小的制裁通常被描述为具有重大影响的制裁。

I think that less impactful sanctions are now routinely described as impactful sanctions.

如果你看看针对伊朗的石油制裁，实际上伊朗对华石油出口已达到历史最高水平，而这些出口资金正在资助伊朗的海外活动。

If you were to look upon oil sanctions against Iran, they have in essence collapsed Iran's oil sales to China, which are funding Iran's activities abroad, are at an all time high.

拜登政府和我们的欧洲伙伴在这方面几乎没有采取任何措施来遏制这一情况。

The Biden administration and our European partners haven't done much to constrain that.

事实上，我认为在过去一年中，针对伊朗石油部门最重大的行动，主要是由一个名为‘真相与贷款’的非政府组织推动的，我本人是该组织的顾问，该组织名为‘共同反对伊朗核武器’，他们协助美国司法部扣押了在墨西哥湾的一艘伊朗油轮的货物。

In fact, I think the most significant action against the Iranian oil sector in the last year was conducted largely through the instigation of an NGO, Truth and Lending, for which I'm an advisor called United Against Nuclear Iran, where they assisted the Department of Justice to seize the cargo of an Iranian oil tanker in the Gulf Of Mexico.

如果你是伊朗，你也会对胡塞武装提出同样的问题。

If you're Iran, you ask yourself the same questions of the Houthis.

我为什么要停止这些行动？

What's the reason I need to stop this?

我从事这些活动会失去什么？

What am I losing by engaging in this activity?

因此，对伊朗的回应必须与对胡塞武装的回应一致。

And again, the response to Iran must be the same as the response to the Houthis.

如果这些制裁仅仅针对那些在西方银行没有资金、不使用国际金融体系、也不去西方旅行的人，而伊朗政权也不希望他们去西方旅行，那我们凭什么认为这会影响哈梅内伊或伊斯兰革命卫队首领的思维？

If this is simply going to be a sanction against people who have no money in Western banks, don't use international financial systems, don't travel to the West, and the regime doesn't want them to travel to the West, well, why do we think that's going to touch the thinking of Ayatollah Khamenei or the head of the IRGC?

在某个时刻，政策制定者必须直面这一难题，这将是一个有争议但受欢迎的决定，但必须采取某种形式的军事行动打击伊朗的利益，同时让外界感受到美国有决心承受任何来自伊朗的反制，并坚持长期战略。

At some point, policymakers have to grab this nettle, and it would be a controversial and popular decision, but it will take some form of military action against Iran's interests, combined with a sense that The United States has the fortitude to endure any counteraction from The United States and maintain a long term approach.

如果这种情况发生，我相信伊朗会改变或缓和其行为。

If that occurs, I believe Iran will change or moderate its behavior.

如果这种情况没有发生，就没有理由期待伊朗改变其行为。

If that does not occur, there is no reason to expect Iran to change its behavior.

所以，诺姆，你提到以色列目前实际上正处于七线作战的状态。

So Norm, you mentioned that Israel is basically in a seven front war right now.

加兰特再次对《华尔街日报》表示，在加沙问题上，他们已进入战争的激烈机动阶段，将采取不同类型的特种作战。

Gallant again told the Wall Street Journal that when it comes to Gaza, they've entered an intense maneuvering phase of the war, which will take on different types of special operations.

以色列能否独自应对七线作战？

Is Israel capable of dealing with a seven front war by itself?

让我们来逐一分析这些战线。

Well, let's break down the fronts.

你有加沙、约旦河西岸、黎巴嫩、也门、伊拉克、伊朗，我想还有其他不太严重的问题。

You've got Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, think I'm less serious in something else.

所以最终，你面对的是非常不同的对手，因此可以对这些对手采取不同的策略。

So in the end, you've got very different adversaries and therefore different approaches can be applied to those adversaries.

这不仅仅是导弹的问题。

It's not all about a missile.

可能是网络攻击。

It might be a cyber attack.

可能是无人机攻击。

It might be a drone attack.

可能是海上攻击。

It might be a naval attack.

以色列在红海拥有海军力量。

The Israelis have a naval capacity in the Red Sea.

他们拥有突击队力量，但在加沙地区兵力严重分散。

They have a commando capacity, which is spread awfully thin in Gaza.

但他们拥有多种手段来应对这些行为体。

But they've got various capacities to apply against these actors.

现在，他们并不想开辟第二条战线，但必须根据其相当出色的情报能力进行权衡，撇开政治言论不谈。

Now, is not interested in creating a second front war, but it's got to calibrate based on its rather impressive intelligence capabilities and political rhetoric aside.

政治言论会让人激动，但作为一位明智的政策制定者，你应该关注行动，而非言辞。

Political rhetoric gets everyone excited, but you follow actions, not words, as a wise policymaker.

例如，他们对黎巴嫩采取的行动都是经过精心权衡的。

And their actions against Lebanon, for example, have been calibrated.

让我们来看看黎巴嫩的情况，因为我认为这将是你的下一个危机。

So let's look at the Lebanese situation, because I think that's your next crisis.

这可能是布林肯国务卿此次多国地区之行所处理的三大最重要问题之一。

And it's probably one of the top three issues that Secretary Blinken is addressing on his multi country trip to the region.

有8万名以色列人已从黎巴嫩边境南部撤离，他们的企业陷入瘫痪，孩子无法上学，生活被严重打乱。

There are 80,000 Israelis that have been moved from the Lebanese border south, their businesses are collapsing, they're out of schools, their lives have been disrupted.

这对内塔尼亚胡政府来说是一个巨大的政治难题。

That's a tremendous political problem for the Netanyahu government.

他们必须让这些人回到边境。

And they've got to return those people to that border.

让我们谈谈这条边境。

Let's talk about that border.

这条边境上没有围墙。

There is no wall on that border.

只有蓝色的桶。

There are blue barrels.

实际上，地面上有蓝色的线。

They're actually blue lines on the ground.

这是一条非常容易穿越的边境。

This is a very porous border.

让我们往北走一点。

Let's go north a little bit.

2006年，联合国第1701号决议本应包含若干原则，但黎巴嫩方面从未以任何实质性方式执行过该决议。

In 2006, United Nations Resolution seventeen oh one, which has never been executed by the Lebanese in any significant way, was supposed to include several principles.

除了联合国部队和黎巴嫩武装部队外，南部不得有其他军事力量。

No military force in the South except the United Nations forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

禁止任何武器进入黎巴嫩。

No weapons coming into Lebanon.

除黎巴嫩真主党外，解散黎巴嫩境内其他武装组织。

The disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon outside of Lebanese Hezbollah.

这些都没有发生。

It hasn't happened.

现在你提到了今天以色列报道称击毙了一名黎巴嫩指挥官。

Now you touched upon the Israeli reported killing of a Lebanese commander today.

他是谁？他在哪里？

Who was he and where was he?

他是维萨马·塔维尔。

This was Wissamatawil.

他是拉德万部队的指挥官，该部队以艾哈迈德·穆罕尼yah命名。

He's the commander of the Radwan forces, named after Ahmad Mouhaniyah.

他们是一个特种部队，过去几周内，大多数从叙利亚和黎巴嫩边境对以色列发动的袭击都由他们负责。

They're a commando group, and they've been responsible for most of the attacks on Israel from Syria and the Lebanese border in the last weeks.

他当时在哪里？

Where was he located?

距离以色列边境3.7英里，这正是他不该出现的地方。

3.7 miles from the border with Israel, exactly where he shouldn't have been.

所以以色列并没有派出成千上万的士兵。

So Israel didn't send in thousands of troops.

它也没有发动成千上万次或数百次导弹袭击。

It didn't conduct thousands, hundreds of missile attacks.

根据媒体报道，以色列实施了针对迄今为止黎巴嫩真主党在战争中损失的最高级别官员的暗杀，而这场战争已使黎巴嫩真主党损失了约130名人员。

It conducted, according to press reports, the killing of what is to date Lebanese Hezbollah most senior official lost in a war that's already cost Lebanese Hezbollah about 130 personnel.

这是一种试图进行精准威慑的行为。

That's attempted calibration.

所以当你问，以色列能否应对七条战线的战争？

So when you say, can Israel respond to the seven front war?

如果你的回答是，他们会根据情报、经验和历史，通过了解对手的思维方式，以一种有节制的方式做出回应，当然如此。

If your response is, they will respond in a calibrated manner based on their understanding through intelligence and experience and history, how their adversaries think, absolutely.

并且也会与国际社会合作。

And work with the international community as well.

好的，我们来谈一下真主党。

All right, so let's talk about Hezbollah for a second.

《以色列时报》最近的报道指出，真主党拥有的隧道网络比哈马斯在加沙的还要更加庞大。

Recent reports in the Times of Israel indicate that Hezbollah has an even more impressive, if you will, set of tunnels than Hamas does in Gaza.

他们拥有更多的导弹、更强的能力和更精锐的战士。

They have more missiles, they have more capability, they have more capable fighters.

这对以色列的安全构成了真正的威胁。

This is a real threat to Israel's security.

你认为以色列会继续以相称的方式打击真主党的关键领导人吗？或者你认为这一切会如何发展？

Do you expect that Israel will continue to proportionally try to take out key leadership in Hezbollah or how do you think this is all going to play out?

这无疑是对以色列的威胁。

Well, it's certainly a threat to Israel.

我只是想补充一个注脚。

I just want to throw the footnote in.

这对在以色列的数万乃至数十万美国人和其他国籍人士来说，也是一个致命威胁。

It's also a lethal threat to the tens, if not hundreds of thousands of Americans and many other nationals in Israel.

因此，这构成了对全球社会的威胁，就像10月7日哈马斯的袭击是对全球社会的袭击一样。

This is a threat therefore against the global community, just as the Hamas attack on October 7 was an attack on the global community.

30名美国人丧生。

30 Americans dead.

有多少英国人？

How many British?

有多少法国人？

How many French?

等等。

Etcetera.

因此，以色列要开展这样的行动，就必须动用庞大的军事力量、大规模的空袭以及一系列其他类型的攻击。

So Israel, in order to undertake such an operation, would have to go forward with a massive military force, a massive air attack, a massive series of other types of attacks.

这将极大地消耗资源和物资。

This would be tremendously consuming for resources, for material.

这是一个合理的问题。

It's a fair question to ask.

他们有足够的弹药吗？

Do they have sufficient ammunition?

这将是一场长期冲突。

And this would be for a long term conflict.

这些补给线运行得如何？

How are those supply lines working out?

他们会依赖美国提供什么？

What would they rely upon with The United States?

没有理由相信以色列会想要这样做。

There's no reason to believe that Israel would want to do this.

以色列的最佳选择是设法将黎巴嫩真主党推至利塔尼河以北，这条河与边境平行，距离边境约27公里，我认为是27公里或英里。

Israel's best option is to get a Lebanese Hezbollah somehow pushed north of the Litani River, which runs parallel to the border about 27 kilometers, I think 27 kilometers or miles from the border.

短期内，你需要应对离船最近的鲨鱼，那就是加沙。

In the short term, you deal with the shark closest to the boat, that's Gaza.

黎巴嫩真主党也是一条鲨鱼，你可能最终得对付它，但它离得更远，你有更多时间考虑。

Lebanese Hezbollah is a shark that you may have to deal with, but it's farther away, and you have more time to think about that.

你目前的目标是救回那些平民，启动一个涉及国际社会的外交进程，看看会走向何方，并实施有节制的打击，这实际上是在向真主党传递信息：听着，如果你这么做，你就会有麻烦了。

And your goal right now is get those civilians back, start a diplomatic process that involves the international community, see where that goes, and conduct calibrated attacks, which in a way are messaging to Hezbollah, which in essence says, Look, if you do this, you're going to have a bad day.

停下。

Stop.

在10月7日之前，萨拉赫·鲁里生活得安稳而幸福。

Prior to October 7, Salah Roury was living well and happily.

瓦萨马塔威尔还活着。

Wassamatawil was alive.

他们对以色列发动了袭击。

They conducted attacks on Israel.

他们为此付出了生命。

They paid for with their lives.

在这种情况下，这样的最终目标并不算不合理。

And that's not an unreasonable endgame in such a situation.

黎巴嫩方面必须进行内部讨论，思考如何做出足够有力的回应，以表明我们确实参与了抵抗行动，但又不至于激化以色列的攻击，从而保护我们的指挥官不被杀害。

Lebanese has got to have that internal discussion to say, how do we respond sufficiently to show that we have skin in the resistance game, but nothing that provokes this Israeli attack and keeps our commanders from being killed?

再补充一点，抱歉说了这么久。

One more comment, and apologize for going on.

萨拉赫·阿鲁里被杀事件，媒体报道称是以色列所为，但以色列尚未承认；而瓦萨马塔威尔的死亡，都是精准打击。

The Salah Arouri killing, which the press has reported as attributed to Israel Israel has not admitted that and the death of Wassamatawil are precision attacks.

这些行动并未造成其他平民伤亡。

It did not involve deaths of other civilians.

它们针对的是移动中的个人。

It involved attacks on moving individuals.

这表明了强大的情报能力。

And that conveys a sense of significant intelligence capacity.

因此，如果你是黎巴嫩真主党的领导人，你必须坐下来思考：现在，有人在萨拉赫·阿鲁里与五六名最核心的指挥官一同行动时，将他们狙杀，而这些指挥官负责从黎巴嫩对以色列开展行动。

So if you're a Lebanese Hezbollah leader, you have to sit there and say right now, someone got Salah El Oruri while he was moving with five or six of his senior most commanders responsible for work from Lebanon against Israel.

有人在瓦萨纳·塔维尔与另一名负责黎巴嫩真主党对以行动的指挥官一同移动时将其击毙。

Someone got Wassana Tawil while he was moving with another commander responsible for Lebanese Hezbollah operations against Israel.

如果我决定实施此类袭击，我有多大把握能在24小时后还活着？

How confident am I that if I were to make a decision to undertake such attacks, that I will be walking this earth twenty four hours later?

我认为，这本身就是一个恰当的制约因素，很可能正在影响黎巴嫩真主党的决策过程。

And I think that is in itself an appropriate constraint that probably is shaping Lebanese Hezbollah deliberation.

这理应如此。

And it should.

除了你刚才提到的对真主党的威慑之外，什么是有效的更强威慑？

And what exactly is a strong deterrent in addition to the one you just described to Hezbollah?

以色列能向其他伊朗代理势力传递的强有力威慑是什么？

What is a strong deterrent that Israel can send to other Iranian proxies?

全球政策制定者有三种选择：外交、经济压力，以及触及任何对手战略利益的致命行动。

Policymakers worldwide have three options: diplomacy, economic pressure, lethal action that touches the strategic interests of any adversary.

你或你的听众认为，外交交涉能说服黎巴嫩真主党或伊朗停止其行动吗？

Do you or do any of your listeners think a diplomatic demarche would convince Lebanese Hezbollah Iran to stop its actions?

你或你的听众认为，对黎巴嫩真主党领导人实施新的制裁，针对纳斯鲁拉，会改变他们的行为吗？

Do you or any of your listeners think that sanctioning the head of Lebanese Hezbollah, new sanction against Nasrallah, will change their behavior?

归根结底，你必须对战略领导层及其核心利益构成威胁。

In the end of the day, you have to have a threat against the strategic leadership themselves and their core equities.

因为如果你脱离了这些核心利益，他们还有大量其他利益，而他们根本不在乎自己的人民。

Because if you go out of those core equities, you've got plenty of equities and they don't care about their people.

所以，在很多情况下，杀死或施压那些并非最高层的领导人，实际上反而给了他们正当化继续攻击的理由。

So in many ways, killing someone that isn't or pressuring someone isn't the senior most leader in a way they really feel it, in essence, gives them a reason to justify their onward attacks.

因此，这是一个棘手的问题，因为政策制定者会担心升级管控的风险。

So that's a tough nettle to grab because policymakers then have the fear of escalation management.

多年来，西方在这方面可能过于拘谨了。

And the West for a number of years has been a little too much maybe constraint in that regard.

我认为，法里德·扎卡里亚在最近一篇《外交事务》文章中很好地指出了这一点：我们对自己力量的约束可能过于过度了。

I think Fareed Zakaria noted it well in a recent Foreign Affairs article about our constraint of our own power may be a little too excessive.

有时人们会有一种感觉，如果我们触动了对手，第二天就会引发30万美国人卷入一场二十年的战争。

There's sometimes a sense that if we touch an adversary, the next day means 300,000 Americans in a twenty year war.

我不明白我们如何会陷入这样一种境地：一次军事行动就被视为宣战理由，而就在最近几个月，我们目睹了大量类似行动却并未引发同样的后果。

And I don't know how we reach that situation where one kinetic action is seen as a casus belli when we've just seen in recent months, many actions for that that have not produced that same thing.

是的，法里德的文章就放在我桌面上。

Yeah, I've got Fareed's article sitting right here on my desk.

这篇文章叫《美国不应放弃它所建立的世界》。

It's called The America Shouldn't Give Up on the World It Made.

仅从标题来看，就是一篇极其出色、令人震撼的声明。

Pretty tremendous, incredible, incredible statement just in the title.

但这个问题在华盛顿已经讨论了一段时间。

But it's something that has been talked about in Washington for some time.

自我约束是恰当的。

Self constraint is appropriate.

我们是一个超级大国。

We are a ginormous power.

除非经过极其审慎的考量，否则你不希望如此强大的力量在全球范围内肆意释放。

You don't want such power unleashed in the world unless that decision has been very carefully considered.

但我认为我们在中东并不存在误判的风险。

But I don't think we really run a risk of miscalculations in The Middle East.

所有涉及的玩家都已在位很长时间了。

All the players involved have been in their chairs for a long time.

总的来说，西方玩家来来去去的频率更高。

Well, for the most part, the Western players tend to come and go with more frequency.

我们不会面临误判的风险，但正因为我们在西方的身份，我们面临的是过度计算的风险。

We don't run a risk of miscalculation, but because of who we are in the West, we run the risk of over calculation.

本质上，我们把自己拖进了拖延开会的境地，然后又转到另一个话题，两周后才开下一次会，结果我们从未真正做出如何处理某事的决定。

In essence, what if ing ourselves out of a meeting time, and then we're into another topic, and then it's two weeks later for another meeting, and we never really make decision as to how to handle something.

而对手非常享受这种局面，让胡塞武装得以继续他们的行动而无需任何明确回应。

And an adversary really enjoys such a situation, allows the Houthis to keep doing what they're doing without any particular response.

我们暂时回到加沙吧。

Let's go back to Gaza for a minute.

以色列已经将加沙北部彻底摧毁。

Israel has really flattened Northern Gaza.

他们正在加沙南部寻找叶海亚·辛瓦尔。

They're trying to find Yeriyah Sinwar in Southern Gaza.

昨天有一份报告称，前以色列将军阿莫斯·亚德林表示，他们确切知道辛瓦尔的藏身之处，但他已混入一群以色列人质当中，因此很难接近他。

There was a report yesterday, former Israeli General Amos Yadlin said that they know exactly where Sinwar is, he's just embedded himself with a bunch of Israeli hostages and so it's really hard to get to him.

我相信我们都曾在脑海中多次想象过这种情景。

I'm sure we've all imagined that scenario many times over in our heads.

你认为以色列与哈马斯在加沙的下一阶段战争最可能的发展是什么？

What do you think is most likely for this next phase of the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza?

到目前为止，这场战争并不令人意外。

The war thus far has not been a surprise.

加沙冲突在现代乃至世界军事史上都是独特的。

The Gaza conflict is unique in modern or perhaps world military history.

这不仅是一个非常狭小、人口密集的地区，而且当地居民根本无法逃离。

It's not only a very small area, densely populated with a population that really can't get away.

难民营不再是帐篷，而是建筑物，这些不仅结构错综复杂，而且相当高大，这意味着在清剿行动中，你必须逐层逐屋搜查，再加上极其复杂的隧道网络，以及当以色列军队攻击这些建筑物，或哈马斯在认为有足够多以色列人员在建筑内时炸毁自己的建筑时，你实际上又创造了更多的交火区域。

The refugee camps aren't tents, they're buildings which are not only labyrinthine in nature, but quite tall, which means you've got to go every floor, every room in your clearing operations, and you've got not only the extraordinary tunnel complex, but as the attacks take place, either by the Israeli military against those buildings, or by Hamas, which is blowing up its own buildings, if they believe they've got enough Israeli personnel in the building, you in essence create even more firing zone.

与此同时，全球多家媒体正在录像，手机也在拍摄每一次袭击和事件，并将未经筛选的正确或错误信息传遍全球。

All the while you have multiple world media present videotaping all the while you have cell phones videotaping every attack and issue and sending uncurated correct or incorrect stories around the world.

没有任何军队曾面临过这样的挑战。

No military has ever faced this challenge.

我们在费卢杰、摩苏尔时并没有遇到这种情况。

We didn't face this in Fallujah, Mosul.

这是全新的、前所未有的。

This is new and fresh.

因此，我们看到如此巨大的破坏并不意外，因为这场冲突的性质就是这样。

It's not a surprise that we've seen the devastation, therefore, because of the nature of this conflict.

现在，以色列陷入了一种无法疏散平民的境地。

Now Israel is moving into a situation where it can't move the population.

国际社会对平民伤亡的压力巨大。

World pressure on civilian losses are significant.

这如今演变成了一场更依赖情报的冲突。

This now becomes more of an intel driven conflict.

公平地说，他们已经消灭并摧毁了哈马斯的大部分作战能力。

In fairness, they have killed and destroyed much of Hamas's fighting capability.

但公平地说，他们仍未彻底消灭辛诺尔和DIF。

But in fairness, they still haven't eradicated Cinnoir, DIF.

仍有一些哈马斯作战部队在继续战斗。

There are some battalions of Hamas operatives that are still fighting.

随着以色列降低对哈马斯行动的强度，冲突的持续时间被拉长，因为这使得这些作战人员得以继续战斗。

And as Israel lowers the intensity of its actions against Hamas, that lengthens the length of the conflict because it allows these operatives to continue fighting.

这将变得更加依赖情报的战争。

This is going to become much more of an intelligence driven war.

即使在这一点上，你也必须思考情报面临的挑战是什么。

And even there, you've got to think about what the Intel challenge is.

想象一下，你进入一个环境，需要缴获笔记本电脑、成千上万份文件、数百名俘虏，并必须实时进行审讯、分析和整合信息。

Imagine going into an environment where you're capturing laptops, thousands of documents, hundreds of prisoners you have to debrief and analyze and pull together real time.

我认为没有任何情报机构曾面临过如此巨大的挑战，因为以色列希望避免平民伤亡和己方军事损失，并尽快结束这场冲突。

I don't think an intelligence service has ever had such a terrific challenge because the Israelis want to avoid civilian losses and their own military losses and bring this conflict to an end.

我认为，在审视这场冲突时，我们经常听到‘第二天’这个说法。

I think as we look at this conflict, you're often hearing the phrase the day after.

我不喜欢这个说法，因为我认为在‘第二天’之前还会有‘前几日’，而我们现在正目睹托尼·布兰克等人努力拼凑出一个方案——在‘第二天’之后五分钟，我们就得决定由谁来掌控安全事务，以防止这些成千上万的武装人员制造出‘哈马斯2.0’或‘ISIS 2.0’。

I don't like that phrase, because I think you're going to have the days before the day after, which we're watching now with Tony Blanket and everyone trying to pull together a conflict, five minutes after the day after, as we decide who is going to retain control of security so that these thousands of other armed personnel don't create a Hamas two point zero or an ISIS two point zero.

然后是‘第二天’之后的数月，我们将见证以色列和巴勒斯坦的政治进程如何展开，以建立一个框架，使我们能够在伊朗及其代理势力不会袖手旁观、静待一个接受以色列的巴勒斯坦国诞生的情况下，实现和平解决。

And then the months after, the day after, where we watch the Israeli and Palestinian political process play out to create the framework that allows us to reach a resolution during which Iran and its proxies will not be sitting by saying, we're just going to stand here until a Palestinian state that accepts Israel comes into existence.

他们一定会设法使局势更加复杂。

They're going to want to complicate the situation.

因此，我认为在这场冲突中，这三条时间线正在同时展开，而随着冲突强度降低、更加聚焦于情报工作，冲突自然会延长。

So I think we have these three different timelines playing out in a conflict that it's naturally going to be extended as it becomes lower intensity and more focused on intelligence.

什么可能改变这一局面？

What could change this?

亚希亚·辛瓦尔和迪夫明天就被捕并被击毙。

Yahya Senwar and Diif are captured and killed tomorrow.

以色列发动一系列袭击， somehow 成功击毙了大量哈马斯武装人员。

The Israelis conduct a series of attacks that somehow managed to kill a lot of the Hamas operatives.

如果这些事情发生，你会看到哈马斯的努力将分崩离析。

And if those things happen, you're going to watch the Hamas effort fragment and come apart.

最后我想说，当人们批评以色列人未能找到并杀死辛瓦尔时，我们花了多长时间才找到萨达姆·侯赛因？

I'll close by saying when people want to criticize the Israelis for not identifying the location of and killing Sinwar, how long did it take us to find Saddam Hussein?

他躲在一个洞里。

He was hiding in a hole.

如果你躲在一个洞里，而且还有隧道，那你就有了这种优势。

If you're hiding in a hole and there are tunnels, you've got that.

顺便说一下，以色列人仍然扣押着一百多名人质，其中包括美国人，这将限制他们在越来越小的区域内使用暴力的方式。

And by the way, the Israelis still have the 100 plus hostages that they've got to return, to include Americans, and that will constrain the nature of their violence in an increasingly smaller area.

这是一个前所未有的军事挑战。

This is an unprecedented military challenge.

诺姆，你知道，当你提到哈马斯2.0、真主党2.0时，你就暗示了这一点。

Norm, you know, you alluded to this when you said Hamas two point zero, Hezbollah two point zero.

如果以色列成功彻底铲除哈马斯领导层——他们已经取得了一些进展——他们可以杀死这些领导人，但无法消灭哈马斯的理念。

If Israel is successful in really decapitating the Hamas leadership, and they've already had some success, They can kill those leaders, but they can't kill the idea of Hamas.