20Sales：深入 Ramp 的销售策略：如何与 Ramp 销售高级副总裁 Max Freeman 一起构建年经常性收入达 17 亿美元的销售体系

如果我是创始人，听到这个，也想这么做，我该怎么办？

If I'm a founder then listening to this, wanting to do the same, what do I do?

我让我的工程师去搞Zoom信息吗？

I tell my engineers to get Zoom info?

不，那只是其中一部分。

No. That's part of it.

你告诉你的一两个顶尖工程师说：'嘿，我们能造出世界上最酷的产品。

You tell one or two of your top engineers that, "Hey, we could build the coolest product in the world.

但如果到不了付费客户手里，那有个屁用。

It doesn't fucking matter if it doesn't get into the hands of paying customers.

所以我们必须痴迷于增长，因为这对我们公司来说是生死攸关的。'

And so we need to obsess over growth as it's existential for our business."

我们在这里解决什么问题？

What are we solving for here?

我不明白。

I don't get it.

我们是要解决找新线索的问题，还是联系他们的问题？

Are we solving for finding new leads or for outreach to them?

怎么处理集成的问题，比如该发邮件还是发LinkedIn消息？

How do we handle the integrations of whether it should be an email or a LinkedIn message?

你要解决的是覆盖范围的问题，对吧？

You're solving for coverage, right?

在公司早期阶段，你不会有大量的市场推广人才。

In the early innings of your business, you're not going to have an army of go-to-market talent.

你可能只有三到六个人负责对外拓展。

You might have three to a half a dozen of folks that are responsible for outbounding.

你猜怎么着？

Guess what?

如果手动做的话，也许能发出几百封邮件。

If you do that manually, maybe you could get a couple hundred emails out.

也许能打100个电话。

Maybe you could make 100 dials.

这远远不够，尤其是在当今市场，潜在市场规模变得越来越没有边界。

That's not enough, especially in markets today where the TAMs are becoming more and more unbounded.

你需要杠杆。

You need leverage.

所以你要解决的问题是覆盖面、品牌知名度和让更多人知道你。

And so the problem you're solving for is coverage and brand awareness and getting your name out.

你不能只依赖销售人员来做这些。

You just can't be dependent on sellers to do that.

你不觉得效率会下降吗？也就是说，随着规模扩大，外联效果会变差。相比之下，如果我发20条非常非常好的消息，每条都经过研究、深思熟虑，还包含一个关于我们母校的笑话，以及一张我和妈妈周末散步的照片，我的效率会非常高。

Do you not think you have efficacy reduction, in other words, less efficient outbound with scale, versus if I send 20 really, really great messages that are researched, thoughtful, included a joke about our alma mater, and a picture of me and my mom walking on the weekend, my efficiency would be through the roof?

这是真心请教，不是下结论。

A genuine asking, not telling.

这确实是个问题。

That is a concern.

你必须让系统具备自我学习能力，真正了解哪些做法有效，从而随着时间不断优化。

You have to make the system recursive to actually understand what is yielding results such that it optimizes over time.

所以如果你只是依赖那些不断发出去的自动邮件，那根本没用。

And so if you're just relying on automated emails that are going out and out and out, that's irrelevant.

你必须不断进行A/B测试，把真正能带来最好结果的东西吸收进来。

You have to constantly be A/B testing and pulling in what's actually going to yield the best results.

然后你猜怎么着？

And then guess what?

你仍然允许销售团队进行手动外联，因为就像你说的，如果你要发20封精心策划的邮件，它们被回复的可能性确实更高。

You still allow for manual outreach from your sales team because they, to your point, if you're going to send 20 unbelievably curated notes, the likelihood of those getting responded, sure, it is higher.

然后系统可以识别这一点，获取反馈，吸收进来，并开始大规模地实际执行。

And then the system can identify that, take that feedback, pull it in, and start actually doing it at scale.

你们销售部门是长期配备工程师的吗？

Do you have engineers in sales permanently?

这不是那种一次性建好就完事的销售工具。

This isn't like a one and done sales tool build.

我们有一个增长工程团队。

We have a growth engineering team.

是的，我觉得至少有六位工程师真正痴迷于为市场推广打造产品。

Yeah, I think there's at least half a dozen engineers that truly obsess over building products for go-to-market.

在这种工具里做外联，好的回复率是多少？

What's a good response rate when you're sending outbound in a tool like this?

自从AI加速发展以来，回复率实际上已经明显下降了。

Response rates over time since the acceleration of AI have actually regressed pretty meaningfully.

但回复率并不是应该关注的正确指标，应该关注的是会议回复率。

But response rate isn't the right metric to index on It's meeting response rate.

因为就算有5%的回复率，但如果他们说的是“请别再给我发邮件了”或者选择退订，或者直接说“滚开”，那对方向性也没什么帮助。

Because you could get a 5% response rate, but if they're saying, "Please never email me again," or opt out or, "Fuck off," that's not directionally helpful.

就是——

It's-

所以关键是看有多少人转化为会议？

And so it's how many convert to a meeting?

我觉得略低于1%应该算是很强的标准了。

And that should be just a hair under 1%, I think is really strong standard.

所以每发一百封邮件，能转化成一个会议，那就很好了。

So for every 100 emails you're sending, those convert to one, that's great.

你多久会把销售团队按行业垂直化？

How quickly do you verticalize your sales team?

因为垂直化之后，所有这些都能变得更好、更高效、更精准。

Because all of this can become better, more efficient, more accurate with verticalization.

比如，“我们有英国航空、达美航空和瑞安航空的客户。”

"Hey, we've got clients including British Airways, Delta, and Ryanair."

“哦，哇。

"Oh, wow.

好的。

Okay.

我们主要针对旅游业，特别是航空公司。”

We're targeting the travel industry and specifically airlines."

你明白我的意思吗？

Do you see what I mean?

什么时候是合适的时机？你是怎么考虑这个问题的？

When is the right time and how do you think about that?

我觉得垂直化你的业务的最佳时机，是你需要拉动杠杆来提高转化率的时候。

I think the right time to verticalize your business is when you need to pull the lever to inflect conversion.

我认为很多公司其实垂直化得太早了，尤其是当你的潜在市场很大的时候。

I think companies actually verticalize far too early, especially if you have a huge addressable market.

你正处于抢占市场份额的阶段。

You're in land grab market share mode.

所以我觉得垂直化业务可能反而会适得其反。

And so I think verticalizing the business may actually be counterproductive to doing that.

但随着你占据越来越多的市场份额，我觉得这个数字是主观的，但我会说3%到5%，你猜怎么着？

But as you own more and more of the market, I think this is arbitrary, but I'd say 3% to 5%, guess what?

你能争取的机会总数开始变得有限。

The total amount of opportunities you can go after starts to become contained.

所以你需要拉动的杠杆是，你需要在更高的转化率下把潜在客户转化为成交客户。

And so the lever that you need to pull is you need to be able to convert leads to close one at a higher clip.

所以我觉得那就是你开始垂直化的时候。

And so I think that is the moment when you start to verticalize.

看看那些我觉得做得还不错的企业，像Oracle、Workday、SAP这些。

Looking at companies that I think have done this moderately well, the Oracles, the Workdays, the SAPs of the world.

他们就是这么做的。

That's exactly what they've done.

我喜欢销售团队垂直化的一个原因是它对销售周期的影响。

One of the reasons I like verticalization of sales teams is what it does to sales cycles.

通常信息传递更精准，价值主张更清晰，我确实看到垂直化能压缩销售周期。

Often the messaging's better, it's more accurate, the value prop's clearer, and I just see a compression in the sales cycle when I see that verticalization.

在压缩销售周期方面，你最大的经验是什么？

What are the biggest lessons you have on how to compress sales cycles?

压缩销售周期最好的方法就是更严格地筛选客户。

The best way to compress sales cycles is qualifying with more rigor.

所以在前端，你需要搞清楚，这个人有没有影响力去真正推动变革。

So upstream, you need to understand, does this person have the influence to actually effectuate change?

而且他们是否合理地承诺在12个月内完成这件事？

And are they reasonably committed to doing this within a 12-month period?

如果这些条件都满足，那就大胆去做吧。

If you could check those boxes, yes, swing at it.

那你实际上是怎么判断的呢？

How do you determine that, actually?

因为很多人会为了面子说自己很重要，也有很多人会为了讨好你说“好的，我会很快完成”。

Because a lot of people like to have ego and say they're very important, and a lot of people will like to please you and say, "Yes, I'll do it fast."

你实际上是怎么判断的？

How do you actually determine it?

对，你得测试他们。

Yeah, you've got to test them.

测试的方法就是，如果他们不是高管或者没有副总裁的头衔，你得知道他们在组织架构中的上级是谁。

The way to test them is if they're not in the C-suite or they don't have a VP title, you have to know who their boss is in the org chart.

所以如果你打了一个非常成功的电话，并且赢得了拉入其他利益相关者的权利，你就必须主动提出这个要求。

And so if you've had an unbelievable call and you've earned the right to pull in another stakeholder, you have to ask for it.

这里有个巧妙的做法，表面上像是给予，实际上是为了获取。

And there's a subtle way to do this where it's seemingly a give to get.

“嘿，哈里。

"Hey, Harry.

今天聊得非常好。

Today was awesome.

我非常有信心，我们能帮你解决这个业务问题。

I have a lot of conviction that we can solve this problem for your business.

我们一定会把这次演示做得非常出色。

We're going to knock this demo out of the park.

我会带上一批我的技术专家。

I'm going to bring on a bunch of my technical resources.

为了让他们参与进来，我希望你能把采购副总裁苏珊也带到下次的谈话中。”

In an effort to bring them onto the call, my ask would be that you bring Susan, your VP of procurement, into this next conversation."

你马上就能看出端倪。

You'll know right then and there.

哈里会把苏珊拉进电话会议吗？

Is Harry going to bring Susan into the call?

好的，太好了。

Okay, great.

那你可能找到了一个支持者。

You may have a champion.

你可能有个人能推动变革。

You may have someone that can effectuate change.

如果没有，那就会是“哦，你为什么不呢？”

If not, "Oh, why aren't you?

你只是在随便看看吗？

Are you just window shopping?

你和你的上司关系不好吗？

Do you not have a relationship with your boss?

你真的做不了这件事吗？”

Can you not actually do this?"

所以这真的是一个很好的方式来测试一下。

So it's a really good way to test that out.

我很喜欢这个，苏珊也很想来。

So I love that, and Susan would love to come.

对我们来说，现在最重要的事情之一就是控制成本。

One thing that's really important for us right now is just cost controls.

所以麦克斯，你能帮我一下吗？

And so Max, can you help me out here?

你说的是每张卡收四美元，还是每个座位四美元，还是我们卖的每件东西四美元？

You're saying that you're charging four bucks per card or four bucks per seat or four bucks per unit of whatever we're selling.

我需要降到两美元。

I'm going to need it at two.

麦克斯，你能做到吗？

Are you going to be able to meet me there, Max?

算下来能有一些折扣。

Figures to buy some discount.

嗯，哈里，我们甚至还没确定这在技术上是否适合你的组织。

Well, Harry, we haven't even determined technically if this is going to fit for your organization.

所以你看，我们可以先算算经济账。

And so look, we can figure out economics.

我觉得一旦你看到这个产品会如何改变你的业务，它对20 VC的财务影响会远远超过省那两块钱。

I think once you see how this product's going to transform and change your business, it's going to be a lot more financial impact back to 20 VC than trading two bucks.

但这么说，你们是不谈折扣的？

But so you don't engage on discounting?

因为很多创始人跟我说：“我就是不知道该怎么办。

Because so many founders say to me, "I just don't know how to do it.

我想成交，但他们要求打八折。”

I want to close the deal, but they want a 20% discount."

对，我觉得在对话早期，如果我们在第一次通话后就讨论经济和定价，那通常是个不好的信号。

Yeah, I think early on in the conversation, if we're coming to discuss economics and pricing after call one, that's usually a bad sign.

那说明对方不是个成熟的买家。

That's not a sophisticated buyer on the other end.

除非是那种特别下沉的市场，你面对的是一个十人创业公司的创始人，你想一次电话就搞定，那当然，我可能会那样做，给点折扣把单子拿下来。

Unless it's super down market and you're talking to a 10-person startup founder and you're trying to one-call close, for sure, maybe I'll engage that way and we'll discount to get the deal in the door.

但在高端市场，不行，你得和他们一起做商业价值评估。

But up market, no, you have to co-author business value assessments.

你真的得搞清楚他们想解决什么问题，总拥有成本是什么样的。

You really have to understand what are they trying to solve, and what does the total cost of ownership look like?

你是想赢得利润空间吗？

Are you trying to get a margin win?

你是想让财务部门更高效，给自己增加人力杠杆吗？

Are you trying to make your accounting function more efficient and give yourself FTE leverage?

如果你们能就这些达成共识，那就能绕开任何价格让步，因为你希望带来的是七位数的价值创造。

And if you could mutually agree to that, you could circumvent any pricing concessions because hopefully you're driving seven figures in value creation.

说到创造七位数的价值，我们得回到这个精彩的面试过程，因为我给你留下了太深的印象。

Speaking of driving seven figures in value creation, we're going to go back to this beautiful interview process because I've impressed you so much.

你特别希望我第一天就加入Ramp，想给我一份工作，现在该谈薪酬方案了。

You're so excited for me to join Ramp day one, and you want to give me a job, and it's time for comp design.

对吧？

Okay?

薪酬设计。

Compensation design.

你能帮我吗？

Can you help me?

对于第一个AE和第一个SDR，你会怎么建议创始人设计薪酬方案？

How do you advise founders on comp design for the first AE and the first SDR?

我通常建议不要设置提成方案。

I usually advise to not have aComp plan.

我通常建议至少前两个季度采用100%的OTE（目标总收入）。

I usually advise to do 100% OTE for at least the first two quarters.

你只是不知道你不知道什么。

You just don't know what you don't know.

而且我确实见过一些创始人遇到麻烦，他们设定的配额在头六个月就被超额完成，然后就是，“天哪，我欠这个销售员几十万。”

And I've actually seen founders get into some trouble where they make a quota that gets blown out in the first six months and it's, "Holy shit, I owe this seller multiple six figures."

我也见过相反的情况，你随便拍脑袋定个数字，比如“我觉得这个人能签这么多单”或者“我觉得这个人能约这么多会”，结果根本达不到，然后你就很难建立起势头和动力。

I've seen the inverse happen as well, where you arbitrarily finger in the air, "Oh, I think this person could close this amount," or, "I think this person could book this many meetings," and it's not attainable, and then you're struggling to get momentum and a tailwind going.

然后信心就会受挫，而且我觉得信心一旦失去就很难再找回来。

And then confidence gets hit, and confidence is hard to regain once lost, I find.

对。

Correct.

不过我也见过这种情况，就算他们表现还行，我随便举个例子，比如他们完成了250，但你给我定了500。

I've seen it, though, where even when they do okay, I'm making up numbers, say they close 250, but you set me 500.

其实250本来是可以接受的。

250 would've actually been okay.

已经不错了。

It was solid.

算是还行，不算差的开局。

Like decent, not a bad start.

但因为你定的目标是一半的两倍——

But because it was half of what you set-

对。

Correct

……

...

我觉得自己真的很差劲。

I feel like I'm really bad.

没错。

That's right.

而且从某种程度上说，这也有点好处。如果你找对了人，他们心里会有一团火，觉得自己没达到预期。

And in some ways, there's a little bit of benefit to that where if you get the right person, they've got a fire lit under them, and they feel like they're not meeting expectations.

会有一些健康的焦虑，但这取决于你招的是什么类型的人。

There's some healthy angst, but it depends on the archetype that you bring in.

好，先停一下。

Well, so just pause.

所以我们是100%的OTE。

So we're 100% OTE.

那什么时候会变，我们怎么才能开始讨论修正那个计划呢？

When does that change, and how do we then instigate a different discussion around correcting that plan?

数据。

Data.

通常这要看你们针对的是哪些细分市场，但如果销售周期少于六个月，系统里应该有足够的数据来判断，比如这个人已经上岗两个月了。

Like typically this would take, it depends on what segments you're going after, but if you have cycle times that are less than six months, you should have enough data in the system to figure out, okay, this person has been in seat for two months.

他们头90天在适应期。

They've ramped for the first 90 days.

我们看到阶段进展不错。

We're seeing stage progression here.

我们有理由相信管道会是X。让我们根据手头的数据制定一个既有挑战性又合理的配额。

We have reason to believe that pipeline's going to be X. Let's make a quota that is both ambitious and somewhat reasonable based on the data that we have.

而且你永远不应该一次只招一个销售或一个SDR。

And you should never hire one seller or one SDR at a time.

因为问题是，你怎么衡量他们的表现呢？

Because the problem is, how are you going to benchmark their performance?

你怎么知道他们好不好？

How do you know if they're good?

你要拿自己作为创始人来给他们做基准吗？

Are you going to benchmark them against yourself as the founder?

我觉得那不太合理。

I don't think that's reasonable.

而且作为创始人，如果你要花时间带新人，那很费劲，也很花钱。

Also, as a founder, if you're going to be spending time onboarding a seller, that's laborious, that's expensive.

要成对地招。

Do it in pairs.

这样既有竞争，也有合作。

And there's competition, there's collaboration.

他们也不会觉得孤单。

They're not lonely.

我强烈建议不要一个一个地招。

I strongly advise against one at a time.

我们总是会淘汰一个，还是有时候两个都留着？

Do we always shed one, or do we sometimes keep them both?

你是什么意思？

How do you mean?

比如有人表现不好？

Like if someone isn't performing well?

因为有两个，其中一个总会比另一个差。

By nature of having two, one will always perform worse than the first.

你们是经常两个都留，还是淘汰一个？

How often do you keep them both versus get rid of one?

看情况。

It depends.

如果有人完全是个异类，把另一个卖家搞垮了，那确实可能需要淘汰那个人。

If someone is just complete outlier, destroying the other seller, yeah, you probably need to shed that person.

如果差距只有10%到20%，那就要深入分析一下。

If it's a 10% to 20% delta, you have to go deeper and unpack it.

比如为什么这个人赢的更多？

Like why is this person winning more?

他们可能有什么结构性优势？

Like what structural advantage might they have?

是不是我给的销售线索？

Is it pipeline that I gave them?

是不是来自我们股东名单的销售线索？

Is it pipeline that came from our cap table?

还是其他原因？

Is it something else?

是不是他们对产品更了解？

Do they know the product better?

是不是他们更有动力？

Are they more motivated?

是不是一个很上心，而另一个根本不在乎？

Do they give a shit, and the other person doesn't?

这得靠创始人自己去弄清楚。

Like this is on the founder to go ascertain.

所以对于100%的OTE，抱歉，回到那个话题，那是针对SDR的。

So for the 100% OTE, sorry, going back to that, that's for SDRs.

当我们为AE设计薪酬时，这个会变吗？

Does that change when we're doing comp design for AEs?

不，这是统一的，适用于——

No, it's unilateral across-

统一的

Unilateral

……早期的市场拓展团队。

... early go-to-market teams.

哇。

Wow.

你觉得创始人在设计薪酬时最容易犯的大错误是什么？

What are the big mistakes you think founders make when they're doing comp design?

因为再说一次，我们有很多复杂的细节。

Because again, we have challenging nuances.

比如当你有新产品时，你想更多地激励他们。

Like when you have new products, you want to incentivize them more.

你想鼓励他们多卖这些产品来获得奖金。

You want to encourage bonuses for selling more of those.

但我不想看到一堆人全去卖新产品，而核心产品没人卖。

But I don't want to then have a load of people sell all of that and none of the core.

你怎么看待这个问题？

How do you think about that?

我对此有很多想法。

I have so many thoughts on this.

这取决于公司所处的阶段。

Depends on stage.

首先，如果你是早期阶段的创始人，你可能还在努力把一款产品推向市场，你想专注于那款产品。

First, if you're an early-stage founder, you're probably still trying to take one product to market, and you want to focus on that.

你真的需要了解你的理想客户画像。

You really need to understand your ICP.

换句话说，与其用半吊子的方式为六个客户提供多种产品但让他们不太满意，不如让二十个客户对单一产品赞不绝口、兴奋不已，这样价值要大得多。

Said another way, it's so much more valuable to have 20 customers that are raving and thrilled about one single product offering than you, in a half-ass way, serving six customers on multiple products that aren't as thrilled.

你需要积累案例研究、客户推荐和积极势头，让业务形成正向循环。

You need to get the tailwind going of case studies, references, and positive momentum across your business.

不过到了后期阶段，比如像Ramp现在这样，激励设计就变得极其重要，而且我认为过度激励新产品来启动市场是生死攸关的。

Later stage, though, like where Ramp is today, incentive design is incredibly important, and I think it's existential to over-incentivize new products to get off the ground.

所以，要考虑新产品的配额按2倍到3倍计算。

And so thinking through 2X to 3X quota retirement for new products.

再说一次，你必须推动势头，这样才能赢得更多多产品客户、更多案例研究和更多动力。

Again, you have to get the momentum going such that you earn your way into more multi-product customers, more case studies, more momentum.

Max，当你招错人的时候，有哪些你本应该看到却没有看到的问题？

When you get a hire wrong, Max, what do you not see that you should see?

比如对我来说，有时候我表现得相当直接和激进。

So like for me, sometimes I'm quite overtly aggressive.

这对我来说是天性，我很有冲劲，我会拼了命去干掉竞争对手，我会对此垂涎欲滴，而且我很乐意谈论这些。

It's very innate, and I'm intense, and I'm going to fucking kill competition, and I'm going to salivate over it, and I'm happy to talk about that.

但那些不声不响的杀手，有时候我觉得没那么容易发现。

The quiet killers I don't find as easy sometimes to uncover.

那类人才我容易错过，我会尽量去纠正这一点。

That would be the talent that I miss, and I try and correct for that.

当你招人犯错时，你会漏掉什么本该看到的东西？

When you make a mistake on hiring, what do you miss that you should see?

做销售的人，尤其是做领导的，天生就擅长面试。

People in sales, especially leadership, naturally tend to interview well.

他们本身就是靠销售吃饭的。

They are sellers by trade.

他们知道该说什么话。

They know how to say the right things.

他们知道在面试过程中如何快速反应，来表现出自己很紧迫、能穷追不舍地跟进。

They know how to respond extremely quickly in the interview process to show that they are urgent and can follow up ruthlessly.

我觉得我们犯过的唯一错误就是太看重出身，太看重那些大牌公司背景，而没有真正搞清楚两件事。

I think the only mistakes that we've made are over-indexing on pedigree and coming from the big-name brands and not truly understanding two things.

第一，他们有没有自主能力，有没有那种自己想办法解决问题的特质，不需要依赖那么多内部资源。

One, do they have the agency, and do they possess the figure-it-out X factor where they do not need to be dependent and reliant on so many different internal resources?

第二，也是相关的，他们会不会全力以赴？

And then two, which is related, are they going to go all in?

他们会不会对在Ramp工作有深深的执着？

Are they going to have a deep obsession with working at Ramp?

就是说，这得成为他们的身份认同。

Like it has to become their identity.

如果这两点在面试过程中没有清晰地确认，那可能就会出问题，有时候就会招错人。

And if both of those things aren't ascertained crisply in the interview process, it could come out, and it's sometimes the wrong hire.

Chad Pete在节目里说过，他是传奇的销售领袖，他说年轻人就是不想工作，他们对为什么想在家工作有不同的理解，他们想要工作生活平衡，想要使命感，他们容易倦怠，他们想要康普茶。

Chad Pete said on the show, legendary sales leader, he said that young people just don't want to work And that there is a different appreciation for why they want to work from home, they want work-life balance, they want mission, they get burnt out, they want kombucha.

他说得对吗？

Is he right?

我很喜欢Chad。

I love Chad.

他真是个猛人。

He's a beast.

我也很喜欢《Degnan》那期节目。

I loved "Degnan," too.

那期节目很有意思。

That was a fun show.

我觉得他说得对。

I think he's right.

这话有点挑衅，但确实有很多年轻专业人士愿意全力以赴，你得找到他们。

It's a bit provocative, but there are plenty of young professionals that do want to go all in, and you have to find them.

而且你有责任在公司内部打造一种文化，让大家每天都愿意来办公室。

And it's on you to build the culture internally to make sure people want to come into the office every single day.

我们有一些刚入行的年轻销售，周末都会刷卡进公司。

We have younger sellers in their career that badge in on Saturdays and Sundays.

没人要求他们这么做。

Nobody's asking them to do that.

但如果你营造出那种文化，它就会非常有感染力。

But if you create that culture, it's super infectious.

这种文化的好处在于，它能自动筛掉那些进来却不想遵守这种文化的人。

And the beauty of that culture is it sniffs out people that do come in that don't want to adhere to that.

听着，如果你想远程工作，每天打四个小时电话，那公司里的其他员工是不会让这种风气蔓延到我们整个组织里的。

Look, if you want to work remote and you want to make calls for four hours a day, other ICs in the business are just not going to let that permeate throughout our org.

帮我理解一下。

Help me understand.

我很高兴接受你的提议。

I'm delighted to accept your offer.

非常感谢你，Max。

Thank you so much, Max.

在如何有效培训新员工方面，你最大的心得是什么？

What have been your biggest lessons on how to onboard new reps effectively?

所以早期阶段，你们都被关在一个房间里，对吧？

So early stage, you're all locked into a room, okay?

你们要经历四个非常关键的环节。

You're going through four very key components.

第一个是你们销售的产品和技术。

The first of which is the product and the technology that you're selling.

第二个是你们要面对的买家画像。

The second, the buyer personas that you're selling into.

第三个是竞争格局。

The third is the competitive landscape.

第四个就是内部运营的混乱情况，也就是你们的系统怎么运作，以及作为销售你需要知道什么。

And the fourth is just the internal operating chaos of how your systems run and what you need to know as a seller.

所以关于第一点，在人工智能时代，尤其是当新一代买家坐下来看的时候，他们拥有我所说的“防忽悠雷达”。

And so on point one, in the age of AI, and especially as the next generation of buyers sit and see, they have what I would describe as bullshit repellent.

他们非常直接。

They are direct.

他们能很快得到答案。

They could get answers quickly.

所以，如果他们在跟销售员交谈，他们也希望对方能快速给出答案。

And so the expectation is if they're talking to a seller, they need answers quickly, too.

所以，如果你对自己卖的产品和技术不够精通，那作为销售员，你基本上没什么用。

And so if you're not technically proficient in your product offering, you're fairly useless as a seller.

第二点，就是你要面对的买家画像。

The second is the buyer personas that you're selling into.

这一点非常重要。

This is really important.

你得知道他们的优先事项是什么。

You need to know what their priorities are.

你得理解他们面临的挑战。

You need to understand their challenges.

而且这些因人而异。

And it differs.

如果你是在跟一家风投支持的软件公司的首席财务官谈话，那对话内容和跟一家建筑公司的高级会计谈话会大不相同。

If you're talking to a CFO of a venture-backed software company, that conversation's going to be a hell of a lot different than if you're talking to the senior accountant of a construction business.

这一点你也需要了解。

And you need to know that, too.

一个会非常高层。

One is going to be super high level.

他们追求的是推动积极的业务成果。

They are trying to drive positive business outcomes.

而会计可能需要一个跟月末结账相关的工作流程，这个流程给他们带来了很多繁琐的麻烦，你需要具备这种切换场景的能力。

The accountant might need one workflow that is tied to the month-end close that is creating a lot of laborious chaos for them, and you need to have that context-switching capability.

第三点，竞争格局。

The third, the competitive landscape.

我们显然身处一个竞争极其激烈的市场。

We obviously play in an incredibly saturated market.

很多竞争对手都声称能做很多类似的事情。

A lot of players claim to do many of the same things.

你需要研究这些公司，了解它们的弱点，并以一种得体的方式揭露这些弱点，同时把你的产品定位成对买家来说尽可能完美。

You need to study these businesses, you need to understand their weaknesses, and you need to expose them in a diplomatic way where you're positioning your product to be as perfect as possible for the buyer in question.

你们有没有一个训练营，专门带你过这些阶段？

Do you have a boot camp where you go through these stages?

有的。

We do.

能给我讲讲吗？

Can you walk me through that?

多长时间？

How long is it?

谁负责带？

Who leads it?

有什么教材？

What materials are there?

具体到训练营，根据不同的细分市场，一般是60到90天。

In the boot camp specifically, depending on the segment, it's going to be 60 to 90 days.

前四个星期非常严格，有很多里程碑需要你达成。

First four weeks is fairly rigorous with many milestones that you need to hit.

其中一些是高强度的实操练习，另一些是我们赋能团队针对所有这些不同主题制作的自主学习技能。

Some of this is intense hands-on-keyboard, some of it is self-guided skills that our enablement team has created across all of these different topics.

然后就是里程碑，这里面有很多严格的要求。

And then the milestones, there's a lot of rigor that goes into this.

你需要完成一个发现认证，而且必须表现得非常出色。

You need to complete a disco certification, and you need to be excellent.

你需要完成一个演示认证，而且必须表现得非常出色。

You need to complete a demo certification, and you need to be excellent.

我喜欢定期去抽查这些。

I like to pop into these periodically.

如果你没有完成，你就不会被分配到客户。

And if you don't complete them, you don't get turned on in the router.

你拿不到你的账户。

You don't get your accounts.

所以表现好是至关重要的，否则你上手的速度和成为成功销售的能力就会受限。

And so it's existential that you perform well, otherwise, your ability to ramp and become a successful seller is contained.

我要多久才能开始独立跟客户或顾客交谈？

How long before I start speaking to clients or customers on my own?

两到四周，取决于你所在的部门。

Two to four weeks, depending on your segment.

哇，好的。

Wow, okay.

我们会尽量加快这个过程。

We try and make it as quick as possible.

在那之前，我会听很多成交电话，真正去了解节奏、用语和话术。

And I'm going to be listening to a load of gong calls before that to really try and understand the cadence, the language, the patter.

当然。

Absolutely.

你会去听那些成交电话的。

You're going to be listening to gong calls.

你会参加实时通话。

You're going to be joining live calls.

你会参加团队会议，听管道审查和预测电话，以及所有相关的内容。

You're going to be in team meetings, listening to pipeline reviews and forecasting calls, and everything in between.

然后你猜怎么着？

And then guess what?

在你第一次通话后，你的领导负责全程陪同，确保从头到尾支持你。

After your first call, your leader is responsible for riding shotgun and making sure they're supporting you from start to finish.

如果你管理一个大的销售团队，只依赖培训，那你会失败的。

If you're running a big sales team and you're just dependent on enablement, you're going to die.

你需要你的前线领导积极介入，并且尽可能深入地参与新员工的入职过程。

You need your frontline leaders to lean in aggressively and also be as deep in the weeds as possible with new hires onboarding.

这听起来很明显，但作为领导，要深入细节确实很难，我不是说得很糟糕，但有点像风险投资基金的实习生批次，你会觉得——

It's one of those ones which sounds obvious but is hard when you are a leader to delve down into the, I didn't mean it awfully, but it's kind of like intern batches in venture funds where you're like-

完全同意。

100%

当然每个人都想帮助年轻人，但我得搞定那笔大得吓人的交易。

... of course everyone wants to help young people, but I got to close the big fucking whale of a deal.

完全正确。

100%.

但你必须两者兼顾。

But you have to do both.

是的，当然。

Yeah, of course.

你有一个要负责的数字，所以如果有一笔大交易，而你是一线领导，那你肯定要全力以赴。

You have a number that you're responsible for, and so yeah, if there's a big swing deal and you're a frontline leader, yeah, you're all hands on deck.

同时，你猜怎么着？

At the same time, guess what?

随着这些新销售逐渐上手，你的目标会逐月、逐季度地往上加。

Your number's going to keep going up sequentially month over month, quarter over quarter as these new sellers ramp up.

所以你有直接动力去确保他们一进来就能成为顶尖销售，否则作为领导，你就有麻烦了。

And so you're directly incentivized to make sure that they're coming into the system to be killers, otherwise, you're going to be in trouble as a leader.

你觉得第一次通话中，有多少比例让你印象深刻，多少比例让你失望？

What percent of first calls do you think you're impressed by versus disappointed by?

七三开。

70/30.

七成让我印象深刻，三成达不到我们的标准。

70 in the camp of I'm impressed, 30 in the camp of this is just not to our standard.

那这三成的情况是怎么处理的？

And so what happens in the 30%?

我其实挺深入参与这块的，我会去审查和观看很多通话录音，特别是针对新员工的。

I'm actually fairly in the weeds on this, where I'm reviewing and watching a lot of gong calls, specifically with new hires.

说实话，甚至包括更多资深员工。

Candidly, even more of our tenured reps.

如果不符合我们的标准，我会把他们和我们的领导一起叫过来，然后我们讨论一下。

And if it's not to our standard, I'm pulling them in and our leader and we're going to talk about it.

这确实挺难的。

It's tough.

确实很难，但这是对的。

It's tough, but it's right.

如果你加入的销售团队，你的领导或高级副总裁不深入细节、不让你承担责任，那可能是个不好的信号。

If you join a sales team that doesn't have your leader or your SVP that into the weeds holding you accountable, that's probably a bad sign.

说说怎么让你承担责任吧。

Talk about holding you to account.

假设我过了这90天。

Let's say I come out of these 90 days.

好吗？

Okay?

我准备好了。

I'm ready.

我就像被放归野外一样自由了。

I'm unleashed in the wild.

Carlos，Eleven Labs的销售主管，说他们能达到20倍配额。

Carlos, who was the head of sales at Eleven Labs, said that they get 20 X quota.

那个视频当时还挺火的。

Now, it was a slightly popular clip.

你怎么看这件事？

How do you feel about that?

对你来说什么算好？你会给正在创业的听众什么建议？

What is good to you, and how would you advise founders listening?

我比较认同Degnan的看法，如果你效率那么高，可能反而是在浪费机会，你需要更多的销售代表。

I sort of lean in the camp of Degnan on this one, where if you're that efficient, you're probably leaving money on the table and you need more reps.

以前老派的观点，像Snowflake和MongoDB他们通常是一比四或一比五的比例。

Now, I think the old school thought, that the Snowflakes and the Mongos used to run of four to one or five to one.

那个太低了。

That's too low.

我觉得在Ramp，根据不同的业务板块，大概在七到十二之间。

I think depending on our segments at Ramp, it's anywhere from seven to 12.

我觉得这个比例挺健康的。

I think that's pretty healthy.

那确实挺多的。

It's a lot.

哥们，如果我是十二比一，我得让你多付我钱。

I'd want you to pay me more if I was doing 12 to one, dude.

我知道。

I know.

我们可能得把这段剪掉。

We might have to cut that out.

多付我双倍工资，那就变成六比一了。

Pay me double and then it'll be six to one.

怎么样？

How about that?

哦，不。我觉得我们可能得把这段剪掉。

Oh, no. I think we might have to cut that part out.

我不知道我们的内部销售代表是否知道，他们有些人实际上是十四比一。

I don't know if our inside sales reps actually know that some of them are like 14 to one.

他们百分之百是——我觉得这样挺好的。

They are 100%-- I think it's good.

你想要的是那种竞争激烈的饥饿游戏。

You want the Hunger Games of competition.

好的。

Okay.

不过对我来说，作为一家早期公司，我现在大概在六到十的范围，这差不多是我需要达到的水平，才能算是一个业绩型销售团队。

So for me as an early-stage company, though, I'm in the six to 10 range now is where I kind of need to be heading to be in a, you are a performance sales team.

我觉得没错。

I think that's right.

还有，关于上手时间，训练营结束后你打算给我多长时间来适应？

And like ramp time, how long do you give me to ramp post-boot camp?

因为显然，训练营只是让我先站稳脚跟。

Because obviously boot camp, kind of getting my feet on the ground.

我有多长时间来逐步上手？

How long do I get to ramp?

还是得看具体领域。

Again, it depends on the segment.

我们低端市场的销售，也就是内部销售代表，是60天。

Our downmarket sellers, inside sales reps, 60 days.

商业客户代表是90天。

Commercial reps, 90 days.

中端市场是四个月。

Mid-market, four months.

企业客户是五个月。

Enterprise, five months.

而战略企业客户则是六个月的适应期。

And our strategic enterprise is a six-month ramping schedule.

之所以这样安排，主要是因为销售周期的长短不同。

The reason why those ramping schedules exist in that way is just due to cycle length timing.

你多久能看出一个人不太行？

How quickly do you know if someone's not very good?

我觉得要判断一个人行不行，其实挺简单的。

I think it's actually fairly simple to get a pulse check on if someone is going to be good or not.

我觉得在入职培训期间，那些让人头疼的销售和让人省心的销售，两者之间是有直接关联的。

I think there's a direct correlation in onboarding with sellers that are annoying and sellers that are not.

我说的让人头疼的销售，就是那种一天到晚不停问问题的人。

And when I say sellers that are annoying, they are constantly asking questions 24/7.

他们考虑得很周全。

They're very thoughtful.

他们会讨论客户策略。

They're talking about account strategy.

他们想跟你请教销售管道的问题，还想让你替他们发邮件。

They want to pick your brain about pipeline and getting you to send emails on their behalf.

他们会不停地问你产品相关的问题，没完没了。

They want to ask you product questions, and it's never-ending.

这种人往往表现非常出色。

There is a direct correlation with that person being incredible.

反过来不一定成立，但我觉得那些很安静、不问问题，或者问的问题随便一个AI机器人或Notion机器人就能回答的人，通常是个不太好的信号。

The inverse is not always true, but I think the folks that are quiet, not asking any questions, or asking questions that any AI bot or Notion bot can answer, usually that's going to be weak signal.

我完全同意。

I totally agree.

我一直说，其实一个创始人的水平是很明显的。

I always say, actually, the quality of a founder is very obvious.

创始人跟VC面试或开会时，最后问的问题的质量就能看出来。

The quality of the questions a founder asks at the end of an interview with a VC or a meeting with a VC.

百分之百。

100%.

所以我在面试时故意留至少十分钟让他们随便问我。

That's why I intentionally leave at least 10 minutes in an interview for them to fire away at me.

因为这能说明问题。

Because it tells you.

人们觉得，我的合伙人经常说：“我们为什么要花这么多时间回答他们的问题？”

People think, my partners will often say, "Why are we spending so much time answering their question?"

对。

Yes.

因为你不懂。

Because you don't get it.

我其实是在考察他们。

I'm actually measuring them.

他们会问：“告诉我，

They go, "Tell me.

你们有四个合伙人。

You've got four partners.

在投资委员会里是平等投票吗？”

Is it an equal vote in the IC?"

或者，“你们是怎么考虑投资决策的？”

Or, "How do you guys think about investment decision-making?"

这挺有——

That's quite a-

没错。

Exactly

……问创始人的问题确实很聪明。

... smart question to ask your founder.

我也是这么想的。

I think about it the same way.

我觉得面试的时候，我故意要留至少十到十五分钟让他们尽情提问，就像他们试图向我推销一样。

I think about an interview where I intentionally need to give them at least 10 to 15 minutes to fire away, as if they're trying to sell into me.

所以有些销售会说：“嘿，Max，我跟你们企业团队的Scott聊过。

And so I get some sellers who will say, "Hey, Max, I spoke with Scott on your enterprise team.

我知道他现在是第一名。

I know he's number one right now.

我觉得他做得好的原因是他跟我讲了他的流程。

The reason why I think he's doing really well is he walked me through his process.

这是我怎么看待销售的，而且这跟Scott的做法特别像。”

Here's how I think about sales and why it's uniquely very similar to what it is that Scott's doing.

这让我非常适合这个职位。

That makes me a really good fit for this role."

就像你打入企业客户一样。

In the same way that you're breaking into an enterprise account.

如果我是销售，我给财务总监打电话，"嘿，财务总监先生，我跟你的财务主管聊过。

If I'm a seller and I get on the phone with a CFO, "Hey, Mr. CFO, I spoke with your controller.

这些是痛点。

These are the pain points.

这些是挑战。

These are the challenges.

这是我认为Ramp能独特解决其中一些挑战的方法。"

Here's how I think Ramp can uniquely solve some of these said challenges."

这也是我想要确认的。

It's the same thing that I'm trying to ascertain.

我能问你一下吗？你提到了Degnan好几次。

Can I ask you, you've mentioned Degnan quite a few times.

德南总是跟我说：“我觉得客户成功就是扯淡。”

Degnan always says to me, "I think customer success is bullshit.

“它应该是付费的专业服务。”

It should be paid-for professional services."

然后我就想，我不确定他说得对不对。

And I'm like, I'm not sure if he's right.

你觉得客户成功是扯淡，应该直接收费吗？

Do you think CS is bullshit and it should just be paid for?

我对此有一点不同的看法。

I have a slight spin on that.

但你看，我非常相信客户成功是一种结果。

But look, I believe enormously in customer success as an outcome.

因此，我们决定把客户成功作为我们业务中的一个组织架构，而且他们非常专业。

And as a result, we've decided to make customer success an organizational construct in our business, and they're highly technical.

其中一些人本身就是注册会计师。

Some of them are CPAs by trade.

他们精通ERP和会计系统。

They're proficient in ERP and accounting systems.

所以这几乎就像是客户会计职能的延伸，我觉得这是专业服务公司无法复制的。

And so it's almost an extension of the customer's accounting function in ways that I don't think you can replicate with a professional services business.

而且我们产品的经济模式让我们能够补贴很多这样的工作。

And the economics of our product work such that we can subsidize a lot of that work.

所以你看，我觉得那个团队为我们带来了很多价值。

And so, look, I think there's a lot of value that that team drives for us.

虽然这对Snowflake可能有效，但我认为对Ramp来说这不是正确的决定。

And while that might work for Snowflake, I don't think it's the right decision for us at Ramp.

你得把客户成功看作是一个经济引擎，它会在未来推动你客户组合的净收入留存率。

You kind of have to think of customer success as the economic engine that is going to drive NDR for your portfolio of customers over time.

所以我们想要亲自上手操作。

And so we want to be hands-on-keyboard.

我们想要掌控结果，因为在初次交易时，部署是极其重要的。

We want to own the outcome because at the time of the initial transaction, that deployment is so incredibly important.

因为如果我们把这件事做好，并且做得出色，能带来价值，你猜怎么着？

Because if we knock it out and we do well and we deliver value, guess what?

我们就赢得了机会，随着时间的推移，可以卖出越来越多的产品。

We earn the right to, over time, sell more and more products.

在现在的Ramp，新产品从来不缺。

In Ramp today, there's no shortage of new products.

我们得好好想想，怎么才能有策略地进行交叉销售、追加销售和扩展，最终目标都是为客户带来财务影响和运营效率。

We have to think through how can we thoughtfully cross-sell, upsell and expand, all with the goal in mind of driving financial impact and operational efficiency for our customers.

但你猜怎么着？

But guess what?

如果一开始没做到完美，那以后想靠这个赢得更多产品的销售机会，就会越来越难。

If you don't do that perfectly at the onset, it's going to be increasingly difficult to earn your way into selling more products over time.

我觉得，扩展业务最难的地方在于预测。

The hard thing about, I find, expansion is forecasting.

预测扩展本身就很难，这是第一点。

It's difficult to forecast expansion, number one.

但我觉得预测阶段简直难到离谱。

But I find forecasting stages like freaking impossible.

我们生态系统里的波动性太大了。

The volatility inherent within our ecosystem is so high.

增长率我们永远没法——作为领导者，你现在怎么看预测这件事？

Growth rates we can never-- How do you think about forecasting today as a leader?

你对创始人和领导者，特别是销售负责人，在2026年怎么做预测有什么建议？

And what's your advice to founders and leaders, sales leaders, on how to forecast in 2026?

我很幸运，有一个非常出色的财务搭档。

I'm the beneficiary of having an unbelievable counterpart in finance.

他叫Asher，他建了一套非常厉害的预测系统和模型，整个业务的预测误差一直控制在5%以内。

His name's Asher, who has built pretty ridiculous systems and models around forecasting, such that they are consistently within a 5% delta across the entire business.

所以——

And so-

你遇到的最大偏差是什么，它没预测到什么？

When you've been biggest delta, what did it not see?

没有，因为我们现在已经达到了大数定律的阶段。

Nothing, because we're at the law of large numbers at this point.

几年前，在我们收入运营部门还没有建立起纪律之前，很多预测都是销售自己做的，所以存在偏差。

Years ago, before we've had the discipline in our revenue operations function, a lot of this was self-done by sales, and there was discrepancy.

我觉得我能给的建议，以及我们为了让预测更一致而采取的关键措施，你猜是什么？

I think the advice that I'd give and the lever we pulled to make it far more consistent is, guess what?

销售们，你们的预测准确性和纪律不会直接决定你们的薪酬或报价。

Sellers, you're not going to be compensated or quoted on your forecasting accuracy and discipline.

但它是你们绩效评估的一部分。

But it's part of your performance review.

它会在你们的一对一会议中被提及。

It's coming up in one-on-ones.

它也会在你们的季度业务回顾中被提及。

It's coming up in your QBRs.

所以，销售从一开始就要重视预测准确性，你猜怎么着？

And so forecasting accuracy at the onset of the seller, guess what?

他们自然就会上心了。

They're incentivized to care.

一线主管也是一样。

The same thing with frontline leaders.

部门负责人也一样。

The same thing with segment leaders.

如果你不把它纳入绩效文化，我觉得会很难，因为很多销售会凭感觉来。

If you don't make it part of your performance culture, I think it's going to be hard because a lot of sellers are going to use emotion.

“哦，他们说我们是首选供应商。”

"Oh, they told us we're vendor of choice."

可你想啊？

Well, guess what?

他们连法务或信息安全部门都还没启动呢。

They haven't even kicked off legal or InfoSec.

这个季度就剩三天了。

We've got three days left in the quarter.

所以我觉得，真正让每个人都负起责任来，这就是我的描述方式。

So I think really holding everybody accountable in that way is how I describe it.

麦克斯，你多久做一次管道审查？

How often do you do pipe review, Max?

天哪，我们每周做一次管道审查。不过好的是，我已经取消了预测电话会议。

Gosh, we do pipeline reviews once a week What's great though is I've gotten rid of forecasting calls.

为什么？

Why?

因为那太系统化了，而且有很多重复重叠的地方。

Because it's so system-driven, and there was too much duplicative overlap.

那只是表演性的工作剧场，我们不需要那个。

It's just performative work theater, and we don't need that.

每一小时都很重要，作为领导者，我需要尽可能多地给团队留出时间。

Every hour matters, and as a leader, I need to give as much capacity as humanly possible.

否则，那就是个昂贵的问题。

Otherwise, it's an expensive problem.

那管道评审，谁来参加？

So with pipe reviews, who comes?

谁收到邀请？

Who gets the invite?

由各板块负责人主持。

So they are led by segment leaders.

所有一线负责人都会参加，然后是一些核心员工轮流汇报他们最大的交易。

All frontline leaders are on, and then it's a rotation of certain ICs that go through their biggest deals.

我们重点关注的不是那些进展顺利的交易。

And what we try to focus on, we don't really care that much about deals that are in a beautiful spot.

而是那些有流失风险的交易，以及我们作为一个团队要如何降低风险、推动进展。

It's like, what are the deals that are at risk of losing, and what are we going to do as a unit to de-risk and try and advance?

我觉得了解我们丢掉了哪些交易也很重要。

I think it's also important to understand what are the deals that we've lost?

怎么才能止损？

How do we stop the losses?

是不是我们本来可以控制的事情？

Is it something that we could've controlled?

是产品有差距吗？

Is it a product gap?

是价格问题吗？

Is it pricing?

还是其他原因？

Is it something else?

输的时候，你们有没有想过为什么会输？

When you lose, why do you lose?

我觉得大部分时候，我们输给了现状，这责任在我们自己。

I would say the majority of the time we're losing to the status quo, which is on us.

这不是产品差距的问题。

That's not a product gap.

而是我们需要好好反省自己。

That's a "We need to look ourselves in the mirror.

我们没有制造出足够的紧迫感。

We did not create enough urgency."

作为销售，你可以制造紧迫感。

And you can manufacture urgency as a seller.

你得抓住一个大的业务问题。

You got to latch onto a big business problem.

你得在公司内部找到合适的人，这个人要有足够的动力去推动变革，因为这会影响他们的职业生涯。

You got to find the right person internally that's motivated enough to actually make a change because it's going to impact their career.

他们能从中获得政治资本。

They could yield political capital from it.

如果对方级别低，你可能得不到这种支持。

You might not get that with somebody low level.

如果对方是CFO，你也可能得不到。

You might not get that with a CFO.

所以你必须适当地多线并行。

So you have to be appropriately multi-threaded.

哥们，我们看到像Ramp这样的大品牌在品牌营销上的投入前所未有。

Dude, we're seeing brand marketing spend like never before from big brands like Ramp.

你们销售团队感受到这种影响了吗？

Are you seeing the effect of that as a sales team?

你们有没有看到销售周期因此缩短？

Do you see the compression of that in sales cycles?

你有没有遇到买家热情地说‘哦，我在地铁上看到你们了’或者‘哦，我在……’我不知道，‘波士顿红袜队的球衣上’或者你们美国人看体育时看到的那些东西？

Do you see the warmth of buyers going, "Oh, I saw you on the subway" or "Oh, I saw you on," I don't know, "Boston Red Sox shirt" or whatever you Americans watch sports.

是的，这确实有帮助。

Yeah, it certainly helps.

听着，我们有很多炒作和热度。

Look, we have a lot of hype and buzz.

很难在数据中真正归因于这一点，但这对我们的外呼SDR团队来说是一种全方位的声音，尤其是在某些市场和地区。

It's hard to truly attribute this in the data, but it's a surround sound for our outbound SDR team, especially if we're in certain markets, certain geos.

这是一种方式，让销售人员和客户，以及同样重要的，漏斗中的潜在客户，邀请人们参加体育赛事，邀请人们参加我们的Bill Pay音乐剧，邀请人们参加定制晚宴等等。

It's a way for sellers with customers, and just as critically, prospects in funnel to invite folks to a sporting event, invite folks to our Bill Pay musical, invite people to bespoke dinners, and things of that sort.

这确实体现在销售周期上，也体现在客户愿意扩大使用Ramp的程度上。

And it's definitely showing up in cycle times, in customer willingness to expand their usage of Ramp.

这是直接相关的。

It's directly correlated.

你目前最想改变内部销售流程中的哪一点，但还没改或改不了的？

What would you most like to change about your internal sales process today that you haven't changed yet or can't change?

哦。

Ooh.

我们一直在不断迭代优化销售流程。

We've made so many iterations to optimize our sales process over time.

随着模型越来越好，这其实从去年底、今年初就开始了。

As the models have gotten better, really predates to end of last year, early this year.

我们为销售团队做了很多，释放了大量产能，我来举几个例子。

We've done so much for our sellers to unlock a lot of capacity, and I'll give examples of this.

销售就像一条流水线。

Sales is very much a conveyor belt.

你是一名销售。

You're a seller.

你和一家企业有初次会面。

You have an initial meeting with a business.

在会面之前，你需要做一些准备工作。

There's work you have to do prior to that meeting.

你得自己去进行独立调研。

You have to go perform your independent research.

那是什么意思呢？

What does that mean?

你得去上领英。

You got to go into LinkedIn.

你得去他们的网站看看。

You got to go on their website.

你得去查PitchBook。

You got to go into PitchBook.