20VC：Anthropic百亿美元融资：他们是否已超越Cursor | a16z的150亿美元融资：当今风投界中间层已消亡？ | OpenAI如何可能归零与11 Labs的110亿美元估值：买还是不买？

就是这样。

That's the thing.

这可不是Workday在减少一点开支，以确保Windows 98集成正常运行。

This isn't work Workday spending a little bit less on on making sure that the the the Windows 98 integration works properly.

如果没有资金，你就完了。

You die if you don't have the capital.

但我想你说得对，杰斯，但我否定了你最初的评论，我不认为这个用户群体会在大约一百天内大量流失。

But I'm but but I suppose I you're right, Jess, but I I rejected your first comment, which I don't believe that this is the kind of user base that churns at, you know, a hundred days notice.

我认为，消费者行为的粘性正在变得越来越强。

I think that there is a large degree an increasingly large degree of consumer behavior and stickiness.

所以，是的，你能描述一个情景吗？

So, yeah, can you paint a scenario

不行。

No.

就是不行。

Like No.

等一下。

Hold on.

就一秒。

Just one second.

想象一下好吗。

Just just imagine okay.

OpenAI 在未来两到三年内需要一千亿美元。

OpenAI needs a $100,000,000,000 in the next two to three years.

这比它迄今为止的支出还要多。

That is more than it has spent to date.

明白吗？

Okay?

它的支出正在加速。

Its spend is accelerating.

我们假设它无法筹集到这笔资金，然后陷入停滞。

Would you let's imagine it it can't raise that and it's frozen in time.

今天，ChatGPT本质上是停滞不前的。

ChatGPT is essentially frozen in time today.

你会使用一年前的ChatGPT吗？

Would you use ChatGPT from a year ago?

你会使用一年前的Claude吗？

Would you use Claude from a year ago?

绝对不可能，你不会使用一年前的这些产品。

NFW, you would use these products from a year ago.

你绝不会用它们来写代码或在Cursor中使用。

There's no way you would use them in Cursor or for coding.

绝对不可能。

There's no way.

开发者使用一年前模型的可能性百万分之一都没有。

There's not a one in a million chance any developer would use a

我明白，一年前的模型。

year old model I understand.

公司会逐渐衰退。

Company would deteriorate.

所以就会像底特律一样。

So it would be like Detroit.

也就是说，它仍然会存在。

Like, it would still exist.

对吧？

Right?

或者就像AOL和拨号上网一样。

Or it'd be like AOL and dial up.

你还是会听到那种尖叫声，因为有些人，比如奶奶，根本不懂。

You'd still hear the the shrieking because some people don't grandma doesn't know.

奶奶用一年前的ChatGPT没问题，因为它能帮她在厨房里找食谱，但世界上其他人都已经转向宽带了。

Grandma's fine with chat GBT from a year ago because it helps her with recipes in the kitchen, but the rest of the world's moved on to broadband.

有两个评论。

Two comments.

第一点是，顺便说一句，真令人惊讶，居然还有人交易AOL，而它居然还有现金流。

One is, yes, by the way, is astonishing that someone just traded AOL and it still has cashflow.

这绝对是今年最有趣的一个事实。

That was the funnest fact of the year.

就在去年，还有人说，哇，这东西二十年后居然还值十亿美元。

Literally last year, someone was like, wow, that thing's worth a billion bucks still twenty years on.

我不认同你说的观点。

I don't agree with what you're saying.

我理解你的意思，但你说的像是在画一个二维矩阵，一边是宏观环境好，另一边是宏观环境差。

I understand the point, but what you're saying, there's imagine a two by two, which is macro conditions good, macro conditions bad.

而矩阵的另一维度是扩展定律是否仍在发挥作用，即进步是否关键，还是扩展定律已经放缓。

And then the other side of the two by two is scaling laws still working, so improvement is vital versus scaling laws slow down.

你说得对。

You're right.

在扩展定律仍然强力发挥作用、下一个模型远超上一个模型，而宏观环境糟糕、无法获得资本的那个极端情况下，你说得没错。

In a world where scaling laws are still massively working, so the next model is infinitely better than the last model, and where macro is shit, so they can't access the capital, then in that corner case scenario, then you're right.

你可以设想这种情景，因为你总能描绘出一个糟糕的场景。

You can play that scenario because you can always paint a bad scenario.

这就是你学到的东西。

That's what you learn.

我觉得这只是更低的

I think it's just the lower

让我再补充一点，我不希望在这里占用太多时间。

Let the me just add one more point, and I don't want to take too much time here.

你是老板。

You're the boss.

我觉得我们回到了某个时间节点。

I think we have returned to a moment in time.

这感觉像是2020年底或2021年，或者，罗里，你能不能想起我们职业生涯中其他一些时候，那时我们给经济衰退的概率赋予了低于零的可能。

It feels like late twenty twenty, 2021, or maybe, Rory, you could pick some other times in our careers where we have ascribed the odds of a downturn to less than zero.

在风投领域，我们一直在募资、部署资本，上一轮融资刚结束几周就又进行新一轮融资。

In venture and everything, are deploying, we are raising funds, we are deploying capital, we are doing up rounds weeks after the last one.

而这一赌注背后的基本假设是，事情不会出错的概率为0%。

And underlying that bet essentially is a 0% chance of things not.

我们在数据中心的使用上看到了这一点。

We see it in data center use.

我们在电力使用、水资源使用和增长上也看到了这一点。

We see it in power use and water use and ramp.

但我们确实在这样做，这没问题。

But we are and that's fine.

我们并不是为了在风险投资初创企业中降低下行风险而获得报酬的。

We're not paid to mitigate downside in venture startups.

但我认为OpenAI存在生存风险。

But I think OpenAI has existential risk.

这是一种赌注，认为最好的时光至少会持续十年。

It is a bet that the best of times last at least a decade.

我认为你可以跟我讲讲经济衰退的历史。

And I think you can tell me the history of of downturns.

它们通常比我们想象的要短，但十年周期在历史上会是一个很长的周期。

They're usually shorter than we think, but we don't ten year cycle will be a long one historically.

对吧？

Right?

十年都没有衰退。

Ten year with no downturn.

我也得说，我认为在用户留存这一点上，你错了，罗里。

Do also have to say, I do think on the consumer retention element, I I think you're wrong, Rory.

我觉得人们的忠诚度远没有我们想象的那么高。

I think people are a lot more promiscuous than we give credit.

你别替我说话。

Speak for yourself.

而且我

And I

我觉得自从

think since

不好意思。

excuse me.

自从最新的Gemini模型推出以来，我确实如此。

Since the latest Gemini models I I I definitely am.

我对新模型简直欲罢不能。

I'm a total slut for a new model.

是的。

Yeah.

但自从新的Gemini模型发布以来，你那边ChatGPT的使用量下降了22%。

But since the new Gemini models came out, you've had a 22% drop in chat GPT usage.

我儿子不用了。

My son dropped it.

对。

Yeah.

他付费使用Cursor，同时免费使用谷歌的产品。

He pays for Cursor, and he uses and Google's free for him.

因为谷歌是免费的。

Google because Google's free.

他不想每月花20美元买ChatGPT。

He doesn't wanna pay $20 a month for ChatGPT.

他自掏腰包购买Cursor。

He pays for Cursor out of his own pocket.

他自掏腰包购买Cursor，但再也不为ChatGPT付费了。

Out of his own pocket, he pays for Cursor, but he doesn't pay for ChatGPT anymore.

记住，投资你孩子所做的事情。

And remember, invest in whatever your kids do.

这就是你如何抓住Snap和这些热门机会的方式。

This is how you get into Snap and all these hot deals.

如果我儿子不用ChatGPT了，Rory，我们就得做空。

You just do So if my son's out of ChatGPT, Rory, we gotta short.

我们上Calci，赶紧做空这个吧。

Let's get on Calci and just short this baby.

来吧。

Come on.

这正是哈里的观点。

It's to Harry's point.

下一代是善变的。

It that the next generation is fickle.

如果你曾经读过像空中起重机坠毁之类事件的事故分析，你会发现任何事故总是多重因素造成的。

If you ever read failures analysis of things like air crane crashes or anything like that, what you always discover is any crash is always multifactorial.

总是有不止一个原因。

There's always more than one cause.

我认为你所说的是正确的。

And I think what you're saying is correct.

如果宏观环境在某个时刻恶化，而他们又没有太多资本，同时在那时该产品在消费者层面的市场依然极度不稳定，那么如果所有这些情况同时发生，就会出问题。

If macro goes to shit at a point in time when they don't have a ton of capital, and at that time, the market for this product is still incredibly fluid at the consumer level, then if all those things happen at the same time, you have trouble.

我只是在说，认为这种情况可能发生并不是一个愚蠢的观点。

I just argued that it it's it so it's not a stupid comment to say it can happen.

这只是我认为概率相当低的多重事件叠加。

It's just, you know, concatenated probabilities that I think are fairly low.

我认为更可能的是，你需要调整自己的抱负，专注于消费领域，切实执行并打造一家世界级的企业。

I think the much more likely is is that you you have to moderate your ambitions and just execute on the consumer space and make it happen and build a world class business on that.

说到调整抱负，有一家公司根本没有降低自己的野心。

I mean, speaking of moderating ambitions, there's one firm that is not moderating their ambition.

我们亲爱的安德里森·霍罗威茨基金，新基金规模达150亿美元。

Our dear friends at Andreessen Horowitz, $15,000,000,000 for the new funds.

我相信，2025年风险投资领域筹集的所有资金中，有22%流向了他们这笔基金。

I believe it was 22% of all of the dollars raised from Venture in 2025 going to them with this fundraise.

这规模太大了。

It's enormous.

我们对此有何反应？

How did we react to it?

还有一个更深层的问题：在2026年，你要么必须成为超级大型平台，要么就做小型精品机构，才能参与这场游戏吗？

And a subsequent really underlying question, do you have to go mega big platform or tiny boutique to play the game in 2026?

听我说，一方面，那又怎样？

Listen, on the one hand, so what?

自从这个播客开始以来，我们一直在讨论这个问题。

We've been talking about this since this pod started.

对吧？

Right?

我们一直在谈论巨额资金，你只要看看Databricks和Anthropic的融资轮次，就能很容易理解为什么你会想采用这种模式。

We've been talking about massive funds, and and it it's just all you have to do is just look at the Databricks and Anthropic Rounds, and it's pretty easy to see why you'd wanna do that playbook.

我觉得挺有意思的是，Andreessen不仅筹集了最多的资金，而且在创始人品牌方面，我认为也是最强的。

I would say pretty interesting that Andreessen not only raised the most capital, but on a 2x2, I think, as the strongest founder brand.

同时做到这两点很难。

That's hard to do both.

同时做到这两点很难。

It's hard to do both.

它已经发展演变了。

And it has evolved.

而Andreessen，我从业时间足够长，依稀记得它起步的时候，从第一天起就很酷。

And Andreessen, I've been around long enough to remember vaguely when it started, and it was cool from day one.

它从一开始就很酷，虽然和今天的规模不可同日而语。

It was cool from and that wasn't what it was today.

但我记得有个转租客——Marc Andreessen，来我们办公室洽谈投资事宜，那一刻简直是天启时刻。

But I remember I had a I had a subtenant, Marc Andreessen, came into our office to meet with them to fund them, and it, you know, it was a God moment.

天啊。

Oh my god.

安德森是马克吗？马克·安德森在办公室吗？

Is Andreess is Marc that Mark Andreessen in the office?

我的意思是，确实看起来像是马克·安德森。

I mean, sure it looks like Mark Andreessen.

而且他们在品牌建设的多个层面都进行了投资。

And they have invested in that in many levels on the brand.

而且在某些方面，我不知道他们是怎么做到的。

And I don't know how they've done it in some ways.

而且它的表现起起落落。

And and it's gone a little bit up and down.

我记得有一位创始人很火，但他很沮丧，因为他拿到了安德里森的条款书，而不是红杉的，但这种情况今天不会再发生了。

I remember I had one founder that was pretty hot who was bummed that, you know, he he he got a term sheet from Andreessen and not Sequoia, but that don't happen today.

那是2008年、2009年时期的安德里森。

That was the 'eight, 'nine version of Andreessen.

那只是短暂的一刻。

That was a brief moment.

而且你获得了回报。

And you have returns.

这些回报是公开的。

The returns are published.

这些回报属于前10%。

The returns are top decile.

所以你拥有最大的基金，前10%的回报率，或者说是前四分之一，不管怎么说，都是顶级的，而这在过去曾是个缺点。

So you have the biggest fund, the top decile returns or quartile, whatever, top tier, which used to be a knock.

创始人非常喜欢这个品牌。

And founders love this brand.

无论是谈论基金还是公司或平台，要在大规模上做到这些都很困难。

Whoever was talking about fund versus firm or platform, it's hard to do all of those at scale.

创始人非常喜欢它。

Founders love it.

这是有护城河的。

It's defensible.

所以你还不如拿走51%的资本，然后直接让竞争对手关门。

So you might as well hoover up 51% of the capital and then just shut down your competitors.

同意。

Agreed.

关于你提出的问题，我思考过很多，我需要讲的内容很多，先提醒你一下。

I've thought about this a lot in terms of the question you asked, and I have a lot to cover on this, just heads up.

我会给你一个总结。

And I'll give you the summary.

他们已经赢了，而且赢得非常出色，目前可能影响他们的唯一因素是内部执行失误。

They've won, and they've won really well, and the only thing that might impact them at this point is mis execution internally.

但现在让我们来拆解一下这个问题。

But now let's unpick this.

因为你在笔记中提到的第一个问题是：他们能否在150亿美元上实现3倍或5倍的回报？

Because the first question in your little notes you said is, can they make a three x or a five x on $15,000,000,000?

这就是你提出的问题。

So that's the question you asked.

对吧？

Right?

每个人总是从这个问题开始。

And everyone always starts with that question.

他们说，根本就没有足够的退出案例来证明这一点。

Oh, there's just not enough exits to justify that is what they say.

但这种思维方式是错误的，因为我认为你需要拆解它，问塞思：首先，这个行业现在是否已经发展到足以让如此庞大的资本实现整体回报的阶段？

And it's the wrong way to think about it because I think you have to break it apart and say, Seth, first of all, is the industry at a stage now whereby that amount of capital can earn a return in total?

换句话说，就是投入的总资本。

In other words, the total capital going in.

因为请记住，如果投入的总资本整体上能获得不错的回报，那么从行业角度来看，这1000亿美元的资本是全部交给一家公司并由其全部投资，还是分散给100家不同的公司、每家投资10亿美元，其实并不重要？

Because remember, if the total capital going in can overall earn a decent return, it it doesn't matter from the industry's perspective if that 100,000,000,000 of invested capital goes all to one firm and they invest it all, or it all goes to a 100 different firms and each invest a billion dollars?

第一个宏观问题是，整体市场是否处于均衡状态，从而能在这里获得不错的回报？

The first the macro question is, is the overall market in equilibrium such that you can get a decent return here?

第二个问题是，既然你知道——再回顾一下——如果市场确实处于均衡状态，那么这些公司能拿走多少总资金并实现盈利性配置？

And then the second question is given that you know, like, again, going back, if if it is an equilibrium, can these guide, how much of that total money can they take and profitably deploy?

换句话说，是否存在规模经济或规模不经济？他们能否有效执行？

In other words, are there diseconomies or economies of scale, and can they execute it well?

简单来说，我对这个问题的两点看法是：第一，我认为这个行业大致处于均衡状态，因此他们能做到。

And kind of fast forward to my two comments on this is, a, I think the industry is roughly in equilibrium so they can do it.

而且事实上，数据正在向他们有利的方向发展。

And in fact, the numbers are moving in their favor.

第二个观点是，关于规模化运用资本的论点，我认为他们是能做到的。

And then second comment is, so the argument on employing it at scale, I think it can make it.

那我们先看第一个。

So let's do the first.

他们筹集了150亿美元，但占了总量的20%。

They raised 15,000,000,000, but they do 20% of the total.

这意味着整个行业总共筹集了750亿美元，所有人都说：‘这么多资金，退出渠道不够啊。’

So it means the industry as a whole raise 75,000,000,000 and everyone goes, Oh, there's not enough exits for that.

好吧，粗略算一下，今年的退出估值大约是3000亿美元，虽然今年退出情况并不算好，包括医疗健康领域在内。

Well, rough and tough, 3X, the value of exits this year, which wasn't an amazing year for exits, including healthcare by the way, was around 300,000,000,000.

所以并不完美。

So not perfect.

这些退出价值并非全由风投持有，但大致上差不多。

That's not all owned by venture, but you're kind of roughly there.

假设明年如果今年是3000亿美元退出，而Entropic一家公司就上市了，那么明年退出总额将达到5000亿美元。

Presumably next year, if it's 300,000,000,000 this year and Entropic alone goes public, next year is 500,000,000,000 of exits.

所以这个行业筹集的资金不到1000亿美元。

So the industry raised under a 100,000,000,000.

这相当于七百五十亿，我的意思是，如果他们真的筹集了150亿，并且确实占了总量的20%，那就意味着风险投资总共筹集了7500亿美元。

This is seven I mean, if if they really raised 15 and they really are 20% of the total, that implies 75,000,000,000 of venture raised.

在我看来，这个数字是可以被消化并实现整体三倍回报的。

It seems to me that's a kind of number that can be digested and yield a three x return overall.

所以，这笔资金的规模并不愚蠢。

So it's not it's not like it's stupid, the amount of money.

而且实际情况正在好转，因为在过去几年里，风险投资每年投入了数百亿美元，但每年只筹集了大约700亿到800亿美元。

And it's actually getting better because in the last couple of years, Venture has deployed a couple of 100,000,000,000 a year and only raised about 70 to $80,000,000,000 a year.

现在，其中一部分是因为所投入的资本中包含了一些非传统风投，但新基金越来越难筹集到资金。

Now, some of that is because some of that capital being deployed is non traditional venture, but it's getting harder for newer funds to raise money.

那么，我们来看第二个问题：他们能否成功地部署占风投总额20%的资金？

So if you move on to the second question, can they deploy 20% of venture successfully?

宏观趋势正对他们有利，因为他们正在其他机构筹资减少的时候筹集更多资金。

The macro trends are moving in their favor because they're raising more money at a point in time when other people are raising less.

所以，只要他们能成功部署这些资金，他们就处于一个相当有利的位置。

So they're getting in a relative they're in a nice position provided they can deploy it.

所以我认为整个行业正在走向均衡。

So I think overall the industry is getting into equilibrium.

那么第二个问题是，我该怎么表述呢？

Then the second question is how can I put it out?

去年有20%的资金，对吧？

And there was 20% of the money last year, right?

但你需要从两年的时间跨度来看。

But you've got to think of over two years.

如果每两年有一次融资，比如24年没融资，25年融资，但我们就假设每两年一次，这意味着在持续基础上，它占资金的10%。

That's roughly, if there is every second year, no interest made a raise in '24 and then '25, but let's just say every two years, that implies it's 10% of the money on a sustaining basis.

同意吗？

Agreed?

这就像是你释放了10%的资本。

It's like you're putting out 10% of the capital.

所以基本上，他们需要获得10%的退出回报。

So basically they've got to get 10% of the exits.

他们必须拿到10%的A轮投资，等等。

They got to get 10% of the series A's, etcetera, etcetera.

有趣的是，去年我们提到的那位DST合伙人所做的研究显示，在过去十年中，安德里森资本投资的A轮项目中，约有10%最终成长为价值50亿美元的公司。

Now, interestingly, that work that we talked about way back last year that the partner from DST did showed over the last decade, Andreessen did roughly 10% of all series As that became $5,000,000,000 outcomes.

所以这可以说是他们的市场份额。

So it's kind of their market share.

他们必须拿到所有项目的10%。

They gotta get 10% of everything.

他们必须拿到10%优秀的A轮项目。

They gotta get 10% of the great series As.

他们必须拿到10%优秀的B轮项目。

They gotta get 10% of the great series Bs.

只要他们能从头到尾成功执行这一策略，就能实现目标。

And provided they could execute that all the way up the stack, they make it happen.

这个总结太棒了。

That's a great way to summarize it.

当我这么做的时候，我意识到，蔡斯，我之所以这么做，纯粹是因为我正在为非现场会议做准备。

And what I realized when I did that, Chase, it was like, I just literally did it this one because I'm getting ready for off-site.

我正在查看一些退出数据。

I'm looking at kind of exit data.

我的意思是，有两个风险，我们稍后会讨论，但你一看就会觉得这并不离谱。

Mean, are two risks and we'll talk about them in a second, but you look at it and you go, it's not crazy.

如果，正如你所说，部分原因在于——你提到他们已经在结构上做到了这一点。

If, and then as you say, it's in part because, I mean, you said it is that they've done it in the makeup.

我读了帕基·麦科马克的文章和相关内容。

And I read the Paki McCormack article and all that.

我认为我们很多人进入这个行业时都是作为投资者。

I think a lot of us come into this business as investors.

我认为他们是作为工程师和公司建设者进入这个领域的，并且出色地解决了这个系统问题。

I think they came into it as engineers and as company builders and they did a great job of solving the system.

但在这个过程中，存在大量信息流失。

And there's a lot of leakage along the way.

意思是，那篇文章中有趣的一点是，你一路上会遇到很多负面的NOx，但只要整体模型有效，这就不重要。

Mean, one of the things that was interesting in that article is you deal with a lot of negative NOx along the way, but it doesn't matter provided the model works overall.

而且我再重复一遍，他们必须拿到所有项目的10%。

And again, I repeat, they got to get 10% of everything.

现在可能有两到三件事会出错，三个。

Now there's two, maybe two or three things that go wrong, three.

首先是，当你规模变大时，如果你必须参与所有A轮融资的10%，就会变成大量交易，这意味着需要大量人员，那么边际投资者真的还靠谱吗？

The first is, when you get bigger, if you have to do 10% of all series A's, it just becomes a lot of deals, which means a lot of people, which means is the marginal investor any good?

当你有20个人在签支票，而不是10个人时，你还能保持优秀吗？

Can you stay good when you have 20 people writing checks versus 10?

这真的很困难。

It's just hard.

这是一个管理问题，但他们确实是优秀的管理者。

That's a management problem, they're good managers.

第二点是，有趣的是，你说你必须拿到所有退出项目的10%，对吧？

The second thing is, the funny thing is you say you've got to get 10% of all exits, right?

目前所有私营公司的总退出价值约为3.6万亿美元。有趣的是，如果你按投资资本的3倍计算，十年内就是1.2万亿美元，这意味着每年创造约1000亿美元的价值，每年产生3000亿美元的价值。

And the total exits, the total value of all private companies right now is about 3,600,000,000,000.0, which pleasingly by the way, if you say 3X on invested capital, that's 1,200,000,000,000.0 over ten years, that kind of says it's got 100,000,000,000 a year, creating 300,000,000,000 a year of value.

如果你只剔除前三笔交易，总价值就会大幅下降到远低于一万亿美元的水平。

If you chop off just the top three deals, you're down well north of a trillion bucks.

你会降到2.6万亿美元。

You go down to 2,600,000,000,000.0.

因此，基金规模越大，募集的资金越多，数学计算上看似成立，但高度依赖少数几笔顶级交易。

So the bigger the firm, the more capital you raise, the math all works, but it's very top dependent.

我可以让我的数学计算成立，却一个前十名退出项目都抓不到。

I can make my math work and not get any top 10 exits.

如果没有拿到那些顶级退出项目，你根本不可能让这种数学模型成立。

You simply can't make this kind of math work without getting those top exits.

你并不需要在A轮就入场。

And you don't have to get in at the a.

你知道，你不需要投资SpaceX的A轮，但你最好在他们达到全面估值前就出现在股东名单上，因为那是一万亿美元的价值，你必须分到一杯羹。

You know, you don't have to do the a of SpaceX, but you better show up on the cap table before they hit total because that's a trillion dollars of value that you gotta get.

这是他们的使命。

That's the mission for them.

而且，他们在这么做。

And, you know, they're doing it.

这就是为什么。

And that's why

但在我看来，这部分是最容易的，罗里。

But that part, to me, seems the easiest part, Rory.

你以一种非常简洁的方式概括了：他们每年只需要投资10%的有影响力的关键A轮融资。

Did the you simply simplified in a great way, which is they need to do 10% of series A's that matter each year.

如果你拥有前两大品牌，我认为这是可行的，而且你只需要确保能见到每一个创业者。

That's doable if you have a top two brand, I think, and you have the You right just meet with every jobs to meet.

我不认为你需要参与10%的种子轮项目。

I don't think you do 10% of every pre seed deal.

我认为即使YC也做不到——那是另一个问题了。

I think even YC can't like that's a different question.

这是可以做到的。

It's doable.

如果你是顶级三大品牌之一，并且团队足够大，我在Insight工作时，从Teddy那里学到了这一点：如果我们没看过每一个项目，就会被解雇。

And then if you have one of the top three brands and you have a large enough team I mean, at Insight, I learned this from Teddy back in the day, like, you get fired if we don't see every deal.

这问题是，我们是否能赢得这些项目。

It's a different question of whether we win it.

如果我们没看过每一个项目，就会被解雇。

We get fired if we don't see every deal.

如果Insight能做到，Vista也能做到，那为什么Andreessen不能看到每一个项目呢？因为他们和每一个重要的投资经理都有关系。

If Insight can do that and Vista can do that, why can't Andreessen see every single like, because they have relationships with every seat manager that matters.

他们无处不在。

They're out everywhere.

他们和Gary Tan以及其他人都关系密切。

They're close to Gary Tan and the rest of the world.

那你为什么看不到每一个项目呢？当然，总会有一些意外的项目，对吧？

Why shouldn't you see every I mean, there'll be some from left field, right?

我

I

同意。

agree.

当然。

Of course.

但如果你的品牌足够强大，为什么你不该去接触他们呢？

But why shouldn't you see if your brand's strong enough, you should still see them?

然后有趣的问题是，为什么不能这样？几年前我记得Klaviyo的Andrew Bilecki说过：为什么不能占据90%的市场份额？

And then the interesting question is why can't this this was the the question years a couple of years ago that I remember Andrew Bilecki from Klaviyo said well, why not 90% market share?

为什么Andreessen不能拥有40%、50%呢？

Why can't Andreessen have 40%, 50%?

我的意思是，当然存在利益冲突。

I mean, there's conflicts, of course.

不过，我们先搁置这些冲突。

Let's put conflicts aside, though.

为什么你的数学模型不能扩展到50%呢？

Why can't your math scale to 50%?

这其实是个有趣的问题，Jade，因为如果你想想我当初的起点，你说得对。

It's actually an interesting question, Jade, because if you think about where I started, you're right.

举个例子，为什么我会说，你其实能感觉到，他们内心深处是相信的——即使另一家风投公司有一百亿，你也会想，为什么我们要让它们拥有这些？

I mean, one of the examples of why I'm say, you can tell deep in their heart they believe even if one other venture firm has a billion dollars, you're like, why are we letting them have that?

对吧？

Right?

我们其实更希望全部都归我们自己。

We'd really just prefer it to be all us.

对吧？

Right?

回到刚才关于总体均衡的评论，如果每年科技行业和创业者都给风投机构机会，让他们把一千亿美元变成三千亿美元，从宏观层面来看，创业者根本不在乎这是由一家公司全做，还是由两家公司各做一半，或者一百家不同公司共同完成。

And going back to the total equilibrium comment provided if every year, the technology industry, entrepreneurs gives the money, the venture guys, the chance to turn a 100,000,000,000 into 300,000,000,000, the entrepreneurs at some macro level don't care if that's done by one firm doing all of it or half of it versus a 100 different firms doing it all.

这在学术上并没有明显的原因。

There's no obvious academic reason.

尤其是当没有任何负面后果时。

Especially if there's no downside to end reason.

如果我唯一得到的是好处，我卖公司时不会遇到任何麻烦，不会被推出来当替罪羊，他们会好好对待我，最坏的情况也不过是被善待。

If all I get is upside, I don't get any drama if I sell my company, I don't get thrown under the bus, they do my pro radas, the worst case is I'm treated well.

而且我还能参加这些酷炫的活动。

And I get to go to these cool events.

那已经是最坏的情况了。

That's the worst case.

我为什么不拿他们的钱呢？

Why would I not take their money?

所以你说得对。

So you're right.

完全正确。

Exactly right.

因为这是一个有趣的问题。

Because it's an interesting question.

如果他们能做10%，为什么不能做20呢？

If they can do 10%, why can't they do 20?

50。

50.

是的，没错。

Yeah, exactly.

所以我认为可能有三件事会出错。

So I think there's really three things that could go wrong.

这很有趣，但预期错了。

It's interesting expect.

第一，正如我所说，当你在A轮看到所有好项目时，你应该假设自己同时也看到了所有坏项目。

One is, as I say, I think you should assume that when you have that, you see all the good deals at the series A, but remember, you also see all the bad deals.

所以，你需要筛选的项目越多，要做的交易就越多，要让所有筛选都精准就越困难。

So the more pickers you have to have to do more of the deal, the harder it gets to have all those pickers be good.

你的错误率会上升，但如果你做的A轮交易足够多，就能弥补这一点，对吧？

You just, your mistake rate goes up, but you can cover for that if you do enough of the A, right?

所以这是第一点。

So that's the first thing.

然后第二点是，随着进展，你必须专注于赢家，对吧？

Then the second thing is as you get later, you just have to concentrate in the winners, right?

你可以在A轮时极度分散投资，但回到刚才的说法，如果总私人价值是3.6万亿美元，而目前前四家公司中，如果SpaceX真的值一万亿美元，那么你可以认为前三家公司现在就占了1.8万亿。

You can be diversified as shit at the A, but going back to the comment is if it's 3,600,000,000,000.0 of total private value and the top four companies now if if SpaceX really was worth a trillion, you could argue with the top three companies are now 1.8.

你必须确保聚焦在这些公司上。

You just gotta make sure you concentrate down on those.

如果你错过了，执行起来就会变得更困难。

And if you slip on missing, it just gets harder to execute.

比如，这就是第二个重大风险。

Like, you can so that's that's the second big risk.

你没有聚焦

You don't concentrate

在每两年或每年一次上。

on the every two years or every year.

我认为你的工作是学会专注？

You can I think your job is to get good at concentrate?

比如，你拥有第五名，我认为安德里森应该瞄准本和马克，但他们实际上并没有在WhatsApp上联系我。

Like, you own fifth I think Andreessen should target Ben and Mark actually did not WhatsApp me on this.

但我觉得你的数学逻辑，罗里，对我而言非常有说服力。

But I think your math, Rory, is so powerful to me.

A轮的10%。

10% of series As.

把这一点和安德鲁·贝莱基结合起来——如果你作为创始人没有占据80%的市场，你就失败了；作为Klaviyo的CEO，你拥有51%的风险投资份额。

Combine that with Andrew Bailecki, own eight 80% of your market or you're a failure as a founder from CEO of Klaviyo, own 51% of venture.

我相信，对创始人来说，利益冲突是一个完全可以解决的问题。

I believe conflicts are a super solvable problem for founders.

就像律师事务所那样，他们能处理好。

Like law firms figure it out.

你只需要把它隔离出来。

Like you just isolate it.

我们有三个团队，安德森被视为行业黄金标准。

We have three teams and Andreessen becomes known as the gold standard.

没有任何冲突。

There are no conflicts.

你可以有直接竞争对手安德森，但他们已经解决了这个问题。

Like you can have direct competitors Andreessen and they have solved this.

没有任何信息泄露。

Like there is no leakage.

他们已经解决了这个问题。

They have solved this problem.

这是一家传统风投公司。

This is a traditional VC.

就连红杉也存在这个问题。

Even Sequoia has the issue.

我们不搞利益冲突。

We don't do conflicts.

对吧？

Right?

我记得在早期我们见面时，我们推荐了一些公司，你们却说：不，HubSpot才是我们的首选。

I remember in the early days when we met, we referred some stuff and you guys were like, no, HubSpot's our winner.

我们不能有任何利益冲突。

We can't have any conflicts.

但我认为这是一个可以解决的问题。

But I think it's a solvable issue.

然后你就获得了51%的市场份额。

Then you get 51% market share.

而红杉资本和那些通用催化剂公司只能分到残羹冷炙。

And then Sequoia and those general catalyst guys get the scraps.

如果你想打造一家公司，而不仅仅是一个基金，这就是我给朋友们的挑战。

If you want to build a firm and not a fund, this is what I challenge my friends to do.

51%。

51%.

因为你的数学逻辑告诉我，你可以解决所有其他问题。

Because your math just I think you can solve all the other issues.

我真的认为你可以解决这些问题。

I genuinely think you can solve them.

安德里森从未有过回报低于4倍的基金。

And Andreessen hasn't had a fund below 4x.

太夸张了。

Gross.

从未有过回报低于3倍的基金。

Hasn't had a fund below 3x.

杰森，我之所以喜欢为你做这件事，是因为我原本以为需要提出一套意见，结果却完全站在了对立面。

What I like about doing this for you, Jason, is how incredibly I can go in expecting to have to make one set of comments and end up on the total opposite side.

因为我原本以为他们根本无法在10%的份额下让数学模型成立。

Because I was expecting to have the, oh, they can't make the math work at 10%.

但显然，我说服了你，他们是可以的。

And clearly, I convince you they can.

所以你现在就想，管他呢。

So now you're like, fuck it.

如果你能做到10，为什么不能做到50？

If you can do 10, why not do 50?

为什么不呢？

Why not?

如果你能拿到资金却不尝试，那你就是个懦夫。

You're a wimp not to try it if you can access the capital.

嗯，这其实是个有趣的前提。

Well, that's actually an interesting caveat.

所以我想说的是。

So I think that look.

我认为有两三个风险。

I think there's two or three risks.

一个是如果你在做A轮融资，做的越多，你就需要越多的人。

One is if you're doing series As, the more you do, the more people you have to have.

而且在某个时间点，情况会变成这样：因为你部署的资金越多，你能做的动作就只有一两个。

And at some point it becomes because the more capital you're deploying, you only have one or two moves.

你要么做更多小额交易，要么做更少的大额交易。

You either do more small deals or fewer big deals.

如果你每年不做20个A轮投资，而是做60个A轮投资，就需要X数量的普通合伙人。

If you're doing instead of 20 series a's a year, you're doing 60 series a's a year, need x number of GPs.

我认为规模扩大会导致质量下降。

I I think quality goes down at scale.

让我给你证明这一点。

Let me give you proof on that.

安德森的市场份额在这方面比基准更高，我希望DST的罗特曼也能做到。

Andreessen's market share is higher than benchmarks in terms of that worked, and I wish Rotman, the guy from DST did.

在优质A轮融资方面，它的市场份额占比更高，对吧，但命中率却低得多。

It's higher in terms of the great series a's, right, as a percent market share, but the hit rate is much lower.

随着规模扩大，你完成得更多，但质量率却下降了。

As you get bigger, you get more done, but the quality rate goes down.

在某个时候，不仅你的命中率下降了，而且你很可能因此有了更多失败的案例。

And at some point, not only did your hit rate go down, you probably, but therefore you have a lot more fails.

所以如果你的市场份额从5%增长到10%，你的命中率会下降几个百分点。

So if you scale from 5% market share to 10%, your hit rate goes down by a couple of points.

如果你从10%增长到20%，接下来的10%将由水平较差的投资者来主导，完成交易的压力也会增加。

If you go from 10 to 20, now you have the next 10% being written by less good investors, the pressure to do deals goes up.

我猜测，随着时间推移，你的命中率会持续下降。

My guess is your hit rate goes down over time.

这就是在A轮阶段发生的情况。

So that's the way it happens at the series A side.

我认为这背后存在一个自然的极限，因为如果你看看公开市场投资，指数投资是规模驱动的业务，而选股则不是。

So I think there was a natural limit to this because I mean, if you look at public investing, index investing is a scale business, stock picking is not.

现在我们可以讨论一下，在公开市场中，指数投资是否是正确的选择，这就是为什么所有大型公开市场资产管理者都采用指数策略的原因。

Now we can talk about is in the public markets, is indexing the right answer, which is why all the big money managers in the public markets are indexes.

但总的来说，选股在超过五到七个人的团队中会变得很难做好。

But stock picking in general, it gets hard to be smart in a room with more than five or seven people in it.

所以我认为存在固有的限制。

So I think there are inherent limits.

如果你将红杉资本作为指数对象，那么指数化会降低他们所募集的基金规模，大约是十五亿美元左右。

If you are indexing Sequoia, index index reduced the fund size that they went out and raised a billion and a half circa.

红杉资本实际上的基金规模相当有限。

Sequoia actually have quite constrained fund sizes.

我认为他们的种子基金大约在两亿美元左右，并且每个基金并没有达到数十亿美元的规模。

I think the, you know, seed fund is two around 200,000,000, and they don't have billions and billions per vehicle.

他们是否必须拥抱规模，然后说：管他呢。

Do they have to embrace scale and say, fuck it.

安德鲁·伊森已经树立了先例。

Andrew Eason have set a precedent.

这是一场资金规模的游戏。

This is a money wall game.

毫无疑问，你可以用大约五亿美元左右的资金规模，实施一个非常出色的种子轮和A轮策略。

There's no doubt that you can pursue a really great seed in series a strategy with plus or minus 500,000,000, plus or minus five yeah.

可能是五亿到十亿。

Maybe 500 to a billion.

这一点毫无疑问。

There's no doubt about it.

对吧？

Right?

尼克的团队也能做到。

And Nick's can do it.

红杉也能做到。

Sequoia can do it.

任何机构都能做到。

Everything can do it.

数学逻辑很清楚。

The math is clear.

你可以有五位合伙人来做投资。

You can have five partners doing deals.

所以，也许另一种提问方式是：要在A轮融资中取得成功，你是否还必须增加这个附加产品——即大量的资金用于增长阶段，用这些资金做两件事。

So So maybe another way you ask, to ask the question another way is to be successful in the series A, do you also have to add this adjunct product called a shit ton of money for your growth stage, where you use that money to do two things.

一是帮助你赢得A轮交易，因为你可以对人说，我不仅会投你的A轮，而且后面还有一大笔资金等着，对吧？

One is to help you win series A deals, because you can say to people, not only would I do your series A, but I have a wall of money for later, right?

这就是隐含的意思。

That's the implied thing.

它给你的另一个优势是让你显得更强大，从而在各方面都能获得更多。

And the other advantage it gives you is just you seem bigger, so you get more of everything.

这就是问题所在。

That's the question.

而Benchmark已经证明你不需要这样做，最近的事实也证明了这种方式可以非常成功。

And Benchmark have proven you don't, and recent have proven that it can be great.

我认为真正的实情是，你知道，参与A轮融资游戏有多种方式。

And I think the real truth is, you know, there's multiple ways to play that series A game.

其中一种方式在十五到二十年前完全不存在，但现在显然可行的是：将大型后期基金与你的A轮基金捆绑运作——只要你在这两方面都执行得当，就能提升你的知名度，大幅增加对创始人的价值，并极大提升个人净资产。只要你不搞砸后期业务部分，这就是一种可行方式，但并非唯一方式。

And one of the ways that wasn't true at all fifteen, twenty years ago, but now is clearly true is co attaching a big late stage fund to your series A firm fund, provided you execute on both of them well, is a way to increase your profile, it's increased your value to founders, it increases your personal net worth enormously, And provided you don't shank the late stage part of the business, it's one way to play it, but it's not the only way.

我不相信，无论风险投资家在向创始人宣讲和推介时怎么说，创始人都不会特别看重风险投资家能够资助他们度过每一个阶段这一事实。

I don't believe, no matter what VCs tell founders in their spiels and pitches, I don't believe founders highly value the fact that VCs can fund you through every stage.

每个大型基金都会这样告诉你。

Every big fund tells you that.

每个指数基金、每个红点资本，所有人都会说：好消息是，如果我们认为你值得投资，当我们相信你是我们最好的公司之一时，我们可以源源不断地给你注资。

Every index, every red point, everyone comes in and says, The good news is, if we deem you worth it, we can shovel cash into you if we believe you're one of our best companies.

我不认为创始人们在听到这些话后，会从南公园或沙丘路兴奋地蹦跳着离开——这对我来说不是问题，我需要的是现在能得到帮助，以及获得足够金额和合理条款的资金。

I don't think founders go skipping down the street from South Park or Sandhill when they hear that that's not my problem, Getting help now and giving me the capital on amount and terms.

所以，我只是不认为这一点比赢得所有A轮投资更具竞争力。

So I just don't think that is as defensible as winning all the As.

这仅仅是综合了优先认购权和赢得超出优先认购权资格的结果。

That is just an output of a combination of pro radas and winning the right to do beyond your pro rata.

我对此持否定意见，Jason，因为我认为它确实有两点帮助。

Put me down for a no on that, because I think there's two ways it helps, Jason.

我觉得这并不能完全决定创始人的选择，但我认为它在边际上有所帮助，原因有几点。

Hear I don't think it's dispositive for the founder, but I think it helps at the margin because it'll for a couple of reasons.

第一，它能帮你给创始人讲一个故事。

One, it helps you tell the founder a story.

看看过去两年的情况。

Oh, look at the last two years.

比如，Lightspeed 就做得非常好。

Like, Lightspeed do a really good job of that.

看看那个在车里的时候吗？

Look at was it in the van?

或者看看我们在退出时持有了多少股份，因为我们全程都在。

Or oh, look how much we owned at the exit because we were there the whole way through.

还有，用 Databricks 的例子来讲这个好故事。

And and reason tell that good story with Databricks.

看啊。

Oh, look.

我们全程都在。

We're there the whole way through.

我认为在边际上这确实有帮助。

And I think at the margin that helps.

对吧？

Right?

更多的钱总比少的好。

More money's better than less.

我不觉得

I don't

我认为一个普通的A轮创始人选择你，并不是因为你把Nivon创始人的股权稀释到了5%。

think an average Series A founder is picking you because you diluted the founders of Nivon to 5%.

我觉得这并不是我在创始人路演中听过的最有说服力的故事。

I don't think that's the most compelling story I've heard at a founder pitch.

哦，这可真够严厉的。

Oh, that's harsh.

他们选择我，是因为他们相信马克、本和团队能帮助我打造一家价值十万亿美元的公司。

They're picking me because I believe Mark and Ben and team are going to help me build $100,000,000,000,000 company.

是的。

Yeah.

第二个论点，因为我认为第三个论点最重要，我先给你这个。

The second argument, because I think the third argument's the important I'll give you this.

第二个论点是，你可以用所有成长阶段的费用来资助整个平台业务，至于你对此相信多少，可以自行决定。

The second argument is one, you can use all the growth stage fees to fund all the platform stuff, and you can decide how much or how little you believe on that.

我认为第三个论点才是真正有说服力的。

I think the third argument is the really compelling one.

看好了。

Watch this.

当我有一个后期基金时，我可以决定自己没聪明到像Benchmark那样只挑选优秀的项目。

It's when I have a late stage fund, I can decide I'm not clever enough to be like Benchmark and pick just the good ones.

管他呢。

Fuck it.

我会多投一些项目，总会有个特别出色的。

I'll just do more of them and someone will be great.

即使我在A轮犯了错误，我也能从赢家身上赚到足够多的钱来弥补我的失误。

And even if I make errors at the A, I will be able to get so much money in my winners that I can cover for my mistakes.

我并不是说这些公司都在这么做，但数学逻辑很清楚。

And I'm not saying that's what any of these firms are doing, but it's clear on the math.

你规模越大，犯的错误就越多。

The more scale you do, the more errors you make.

因此，你唯一能犯更多错误的方式，就是拥有从错误中恢复的能力。

And therefore the only way you can make more errors is if you have a way to come back from it.

而最容易的恢复方式就是：如果我能抓住一个优秀的A轮项目，我愿意在其他三四个A轮项目上犯错，因为在那个优秀的A轮项目里，我会继续投B轮、C轮、D轮和E轮，其他项目就淹没在噪音里了。

And the easiest way to come back from it is just to know if I to get one good series A, I'm willing to get three or four of them wrong because in that good series A, I'll do the B, C, D, and E, and the other stuff gets lost in the noise.

这实际上是后期基金真正的优势。

That's actually the real power of the late stage fund.

Aisle 5的清理工作。

It's clean up on Aisle 5.

是的，我们犯了一些错误，错过了一些项目，但我们可以轻松补救，对吧？

Yeah, we made some whoopsies, we made some misses, but we'll just clean it up, right?

我们另外三个失败的A轮项目，就当是业务成本，你损失了6000万，每个项目2000万，但你在那个成功的项目上投了2000万，然后投入10亿资金让它翻倍，你就回本了。

We'll go the other three series A's that went bust, cost of doing business, you're down 60,000,000, 20 on each, you have 20,000,000 in the good one, you put a billion in and you just 2X it, you've covered your nut.

这才是真正的优势所在。

That's the real strength.

只要你有足够的后期项目来弥补损失，你在A轮投资上就可以更加大胆。

You can be promiscuous at the A if you have enough late stage stuff to cover it up.

这就是核心论点。

That's the argument.

这又回到了核心问题，我认为那里面已经包含了这一点。

And it gets back to the core thing, I think it was inside that.

想想如果你以投资者的心态来经营业务，我认为基准非常棒，就像你只是，我在努力挑选最好的。

Think if you approach your business as an investor, and I think benchmarks are superb, like you just, I'm trying to pick the best.

而我自然会被那种方式吸引。

And I naturally gravitate to that.

让我试着聪明一点，挑选最好的。

Let me try and be smart and pick the best.

我认为，当你以工程师的视角来看待这个问题时，那些人会问：如何设计一个整体系统，使其能够正常运行？

I think when you approach it as an engineer, I think those guys said, how do you engineer an overall system such that it works?

他说，只要整体系统能够弥补，我这里承受一点损失率是可以接受的，这仅仅是一种方法。

And he said, I can take a little loss rate here provided the overall system can cover for it, and it's just an approach.

对我来说，事实是你的增长型资产不断膨胀，这意味着你早期资产的价格弹性也在持续上升。

Well, for me, the truth is the ballooning of your growth assets means you have ever increasing price elasticity on your early assets.

因此，对于我们这些玩早期游戏的人来说，他们可以直接进来出价300万，而我们只能出价150万美元。

And so for for us playing the early game, they can just come in and bid 300 when we're bidding $1.50.

这根本无关紧要，因为大卫·乔治会在估值30亿或40亿美元时投下3亿美元。

Doesn't freaking matter because David George is gonna put in a 300,000,000 check at 3 or 4,000,000,000.

所以你在这里拥有的越多，这里的弹性就越大。

And so the more you have here, the more elasticity you have here.

而这正是你从这种模式中获得的真实超额收益。

And that's the real alpha that you get from this.

这正是我的观点，亚历克斯·兰佩尔在周一发布的节目中非常直白地提到：中间地带已经消亡。

And that was my point, which Alex Rampell said on the show that we released on Monday, very simply, the middle is dead.

其他所有成熟的资产类别，你都会看到精品专家和大型平台玩家，而中间层则被掏空。

Every other asset class that matures, you see a boutique specialist, and you see a very large platform play, and the middle hollows out.

罗里，我这么说完全是出于善意和最真诚的喜爱，因为我认为你才华横溢。

I mean this in the nicest and most loving way, Rory, because I think you're utterly brilliant.

你不就是中间层吗？你会如何回应这一点？

Are you not the middle, and how would you respond to that?

首先，我认为，在那个背景下，你确实是中间层。

I think, first of all, yeah, in that context, you are the middle.

但我认为如果你粗略地按资产管理规模（AUM）来看，确实存在压力，当有公司能筹集到150亿美元时，这无疑会带来额外压力，不承认这一点就是愚蠢的。

But I think if you're gonna do crudely on AUM, I do think there is pressure when you have firms that can raise $15,000,000,000, And that definitely creates additional pressure, and you'd be a fool not to say it.

我认为你必须专注，因为我认为'精品'这个词不仅仅意味着规模小。

I think you have to focus because I think the word boutique doesn't just mean small.

鉴于我们投资的阶段，每个基金我们只能做20到30笔交易。

Given the stage we invest at, we can only do 20 to 30 deals per fund.

我们只能专注于企业软件领域。

We can only focus on enterprise software.

我们不做消费领域。

We don't do consumer.

我们不做加密货币。

We don't do crypto.

你必须在某件事上做得出色。

You have to be good at something.

在我们投资的阶段，我们不可能成为一家2500亿美元的所谓精品公司，因为你需要投A轮和B轮，就得开出2000万到3000万美元的支票，还要预留50%的储备金。

At the stage we invest at, we couldn't be a $250,000,000,000 quote unquote boutique because you have series a and series b, you're gonna have to writing 20 to $30,000,000 checks with 50% reserves.

所以，你至少必须专注于某一特定领域，并成为该领域的最佳。

So what you have to do at a minimum is focus on a specific set of areas and be the best at that.

是的，让我们来看看安德里森·霍罗威茨的做法。

So yes, let's examine what Andreessen does.

消费、金融科技、加密货币、国防，等等。

Consumer, fintech, crypto, defense, blah.

如果我们试图覆盖所有这些领域，那我们注定会失败。

If we were trying to cover all those grounds, we'd be doomed.

今天很有趣，亚历克斯·奥珀坎说到了这一点。

It's interesting today, Alex O'Perkam, he says that.

但另一方面，很明显他们把基金分成了四个大约和我们规模相当的基金，直接投给你。

But on the other hand, it's very noticeable that they split the fund up into four funds roughly our size to put right at you.

美国动力基金大约是10亿美元，金融科技和人工智能应用大约是10亿零1美元的一半，婴儿基金十五亿美元，这显然是个绝妙的策略。

American Dynamis is roughly of 1,000,000,000, FinTech and AI and apps about 1,000,000,001 half, Infant a billion and a half, because implicitly, and by way, think it was a brilliant strategy.

这非常像阿尔弗雷德·斯隆在创办通用汽车时的做法。

Very Alfred Sloan, if you read the founding of GM.

他们所做的，是承认你不可能把这一切当作一个整体来运营，因为我认为你看到了投资质量的下滑。

What they're doing is saying, they're recognizing you couldn't run this as a single thing because I think you see deterioration of investment quality.

他们给了马丁自己的试验田，给了大卫·约洛维奇自己的试验田，给了亚历克斯自己的试验田，每个基金都是一个十亿美元规模的精品基金，就像我们一样。

And what they've done is they've given Martin his sandbox, they've given David Iolovich his sandbox, they've given Alex his sandbox, and each of those funds is a fricking boutique fund at a billion dollars, just like us.

所以，我不认同这种说法。

So no, I don't buy that.

一个专注的十亿美元基金。

A focused billion dollar fund.

他们拥有150亿美元的资金，而你作为一只9000亿美元的基金，在与他们15亿美元的AI应用基金同处一个市场时，优势在于品牌带来的掩护，以及50亿美元的后期基金可以弥补他们的失误。

What they do have with the 15,000,000,000 that you don't have as a $900,000,000,000 fund in the same market as their 1 and a half billion dollar AI apps fund is they have the air cover of the brand and they have the cleanup of the $5,000,000,000 late stage fund to cover for their misses.

所以，是的，这就是他们的优势。

So, yeah, so that's the advantage they have.

但简单地认为其他人都会消失，这不仅不对，而且很有趣。

But I think to just simplistically say everyone else goes away is not just it's it's it's interesting.

这有个评论，但他们的业务结构恰恰反驳了这一点，因为这就是他们所做的。

Has a comment, but it's belied by the way they've structured their business because that's what they've done.

但你必须非常出色，因为你每天早上都要面对这样的现实：你是在和那些能接触到几乎所有资源、可以全力投入自己想做的事情的人竞争，因为他们拥有品牌和后期资金。

But you have to be damn good because you have to get up every morning and say, you're competing against someone who will see almost everything, who can really lean into what they want because they have it, and they have this the brand and the late stage money.

所以你必须更早进入市场。

So you have to be you have to get there earlier.

如果你等到共识形成或接近共识时再行动，你很可能已经输了。

If you wait till it's consensus or anything close to consensus, you're probably gonna lose.

这其实就是彼得·蒂尔的问题，因为我一直认为，如果我们回顾过去三十年里两个最重要的新进入者——自1995年Benchmark以来，真正由工程师出身的创始人所创立并系统化运作的公司。

I mean, it's the Peter Thiel question because I always think if if we look at the two biggest entrants in the last thirty years that are really since benchmark in '95, and Jason Howard signed figured it out as founders who were engineers, and they systematized it.

我认为，尽管名为创始人基金，但创始人基金的创始人作为卓越的投资者，从投资角度找到了突破口。

And I think Founders Fund, even though the name is Founders, figured it out as founders who were incredible investors and figured it out from an investor perspective.

所以他们的视角是认为自己已经深思熟虑，但实际上，这是通过精心设计和管理实现的。

So the lens is thinking they thought it through, whereas in truth, it's engineered and managed it through.

他们显然投资了两个成功的规模化新进入者。

And they bought obviously the two successful scale entrants.

我认为关于彼得·蒂尔的评论是：你知道些什么是别人不知道的？

I think the comment on the Peter Thiel comment is what do you know that no one else knows?

如果你是一家所谓的精品型或专注型基金，你就必须掌握某些别人没有的独特见解，否则你就会被淘汰。

If you're doing as a quote unquote boutique or a focused firm, you have to know something and have an area that the more general funds don't have, otherwise you're toast.

没错。

Exactly.

你必须更早地看到趋势。

You have to see things earlier.

这很难。

It's hard.

结果发现赚钱很难。

It turns out to be hard to make money.

你听到那个剧透了吗？

Did you hear that spoiler?

那是罗里说的，下一个基金即将推出15亿美元。

That was Rory saying the next fund is gonna be a billion 5 coming soon.

绝对不是。

Absolutely not.

我的意思是，这

I mean, it's

都是真的。

all true.

对吧？

Right?

显然，从安德里森到YC，会淘汰很多参与者。

Obviously, Andreessen down to YC is will squeeze out a lot of players.

你没法反驳这一点。

Like, you can't argue with that.

更深层的问题是，你还能找到橡果吗？

The meta question is, can you still find acorns?

你还能找到埋没的钻石吗？

Can you still find diamonds in the rough?

有没有哪些优秀的初创公司没有通过 YC？

Are there any good startups that don't go through YC?

有没有哪些公司是 Andreessen 根本不会看到 A 轮的？

Are there any that Andreessen won't see the A?

Anthropic 现在势头正猛，但它的联合创始人之一曾说，他们第一次融资时，23 家风投中有 22 家拒绝了。

Anthropic is on fire, but one of the co founders said in the very first time they tried to raise money, 22 out of 23 VCs said no.

但几乎就在那之后，所有人都争着投资。

Now almost instantly later, everyone put money in.

你能找到那个关键的时间点吗？

Can you find that moment in time?

如果风险投资市场如此高效，从底层的YC、南公园社区、HFO到Project Europe，如果这些机构在项目发掘上已经如此高效，以至于剩下的唯一机会就是早期孵化。

If the markets are so efficient in venture, from the bottom end, from YC to South Park Commons to HFO to Project Europe, if those have become so efficient in discovery that the only thing left is inception.

有很多长期从事风险投资的VC认为，唯一剩下的机会就是孵化阶段投资，因为你无法与YC、Project Europe、HFO和南公园社区竞争。

And there are a lot of VCs that have been doing this a long time that think the only thing left is inception investing because you can't compete with YC and Project Europe and HFO and South Park.

它们已经垄断了整个市场。

They've all locked up the market.

早期孵化阶段，也许会出现一个新的基金，在EF之前就锁定早期孵化前的市场。

Inception's And maybe there'll be a new fund pre EF that locks up the pre inception market.

就像我们会去中学或者小学阶段寻找机会。

Like, we'll go to middle school or grammar school.

所以这种说法是有道理的。

So there is truth to that.

这是我看待风险投资的方式。

And here's my way to think about venture.

这是因为这是唯一可行的方式。

This is because this is the only thing.

否则，我会辞职。

Otherwise, I would quit.

我会退休。

I would retire.

你还能在这个系统之外找到价值一百亿美元的宝藏吗？

Can you still find a $10,000,000,000 gem outside of the boundaries of this system or not?

这是个元问题。

This is the meta question.

如果你找不到价值一百亿美元的宝藏，那么这一切都只是游戏、费用或行业下行的表面文章。

If you cannot find a $10,000,000,000 gem, then this is all a game or fees or writing the downturn of industry.

如果这仍然是可能的，并且你的基金或公司——基金与公司之间的差异和理由——依然能在系统之外找到这样的宝藏，那么你就能赚取巨额财富。

If it is still possible and your fund or firm, that differentiation and reason between fund and firm, can actually still find one of those outside of the boundaries of the system, then you can make an insane amount of money.

但如果不能，这一切都只是表演。

But if not, it's all performative.

都只是些小支票。

It's all little checks.

全都是给热门YC公司开出25张支票，然后在推特上玩生活方式的笑话。

It's all 25 checks into hot YC companies, and it's all a lifestyle joke on Twitter.

这就是问题所在。

That's the question.

随着市场成熟——天哪，过去几年它确实成熟了很多——它会无情地为所有资产类别从诞生之初就创造发现机会吗？

Will this market as it matures and it is, goodness gracious, matured a lot in the last couple of years will it ruthlessly create discovery for all asset classes to inception?

它肯定正朝着这个方向发展，对吧？

It's certainly all down the path to doing that, right?

这是向Gary Tan和他的朋友们提出的问题。

Here's the question to Gary Tan and friends.

你能找到一个不会经过YC及其朋友圈的优秀初创公司吗？

Can you find a great start up that won't go through YC and Friends?

你现在还能找到这样的公司吗？

Can you even find one anymore?

但我认为只是假设一下

But I think just to posit

从两个方面来看。

it in two ways.

有两类创始人。

There's two there's two founders.

一类是年轻且想要YC支持的，另一类是连续创业者，他们想要资金、好估值以及不干涉的投资者——比如Andreessen、Navin Rao、Databricks，在上市前多轮融资都被红杉和Andreessen包揽了。

There's the ones who are young and want YC, and then there's the serial entrepreneurs who want money and a good price and people who won't get in your way, which is Andreessen, Navin Rao, Databricks, multiple rounds before anything came public, all swallowed by Sequoia and Andreessen.

所以补充你的问题就是：你能找到任何创始人既不通过YC，也不通过红杉和Andreessen这些幕后有大资金早期支持的内部网络吗？

So the question just to add your addition is, can you find any founders that don't go through either YC or Sequoia and Andreessen with big money very early behind the scenes because they're in those insider networks?

我不知道。

I don't know.

我上周惹了麻烦，因为我发推说，现在最糟糕的投资阶段是A轮。

I got in trouble last week because I tweeted, the worst place to be investing is series a.

如今要想赚钱，要么投种子轮前，要么投上市前。

You either need to be pre seed or pre IPO today to make money.

我认为风投领域总有一个细分市场会一直存在。

There is one segment that will always exist in venture, I think.