20VC：Anthropic 月收入60亿美元 | OpenAI 停止Sora并实现广告年经常性收入1亿美元 | Oura上市与Whoop以100亿美元估值融资 | Manus创始人被困中国及亿万富翁税：加州还有人留下吗？

这就像是我拿我们1亿美元的风险投资、9亿美元的风投基金，借入18亿美元，全部投进去。

It would be like me taking our $100,000,000 venture, $900,000,000 venture fund, borrowing 1,800,000,000.0 and investing it all.

如果成功了，我的回报就会大幅提升。

And if it works, I really juice my return.

但如果下跌30%，我就完蛋了。

But if it goes wrong by 30%, I'm done.

对吧？

Right?

这实在是太激进了。

And it's it's it's super aggressive.

我的意思是，我想他的经验是，孙正义在2002年挺过来了——我提醒大家，当时纳斯达克指数下跌了85%。

I mean, I suppose his lesson is Masa survived 2002 when I remind everyone the Nasdaq went down 85%.

没经历过指数下跌85%，你就不算真正活过。

You haven't lived till you've seen an 85% decline in an index.

显然，如果发生过类似的情况，你早就深陷亏损了。

And obviously, if that happened or anything like it, you'd just be way underwater.

对于一只投资基金来说，这种杠杆水平可以说是相当高的。

It's a fairly high amount of leverage for an investment fund, to say the least.

是的。

Yeah.

当然，这非常激进。

For sure, it's dramatic.

话虽如此，房地产投资基金的设计本就是尽可能利用最高杠杆。

Having said that, real estate investment funds get the maximum leverage they can by design.

对吧？

Right?

这正是它们的运作方式。

That is how they work.

我猜想，如果风险投资能获得更多债务融资，我们都会大量使用。

I would imagine if venture had access to more debt, we'd all load up on it.

如果我们都能参与你最热门公司的成长轮融资，也许我们确实会这么做，从而获得全部的收益分成。

If we all could do the growth rounds in your hottest company, maybe we would and we could get all the carry from it.

最糟糕的是，我们把七号基金的钥匙留在了桌上。

And the worst thing is we leave the keys to fund seven on the table.

我们也许也会加杠杆。

We might we might load up too.

我不确定。

I'm not sure.

但毫无疑问，房地产基金都会尽可能多地加杠杆。

But certainly real estate funds load up as much as they can.

但我再反驳一下，因为房地产基金加杠杆是因为现金流可预测。

But just pushing back again because real estate funds load up because the cash flows are predictable.

但它们确实可以。

But they can.

由于现金流可预测，它们才能加杠杆。

Because the cash flows are predictable, they can load up.

很好。

Great.

对吧？

Right?

我们做不到，只是我的小基金很难去硅谷银行借2亿美元来抵押。

We don't we it's just harder for my little fund to go to Silicon Valley Bank and borrow 200,000,000 against the

在风险连续体中，我认为软银的投资组合——不是子公司层面的电信公司——而是软银的投资组合，更像杰森的基金，而不是房地产基金。

In the continuum of risk, I would argue the SoftBank portfolio, not the telecom company at the subsidiary level, but I would argue the SoftBank portfolio is more like Jason's fund than it is a real estate fund.

所以我认为这是高风险。

So I think it's a high level of risk.

那么，普莱西，他在WeWork上亏了多少？

Well, Plessy, what did he lose on WeWork?

120亿美元？

12,000,000,000?

他懂这种感觉。

He knows what it's like.

据我回忆，两个主要资产显然是OpenAI的持仓和ARM的持仓，我认为ARM仍在控股公司里，都是了不起的公司，世界级的企业，即使股价下跌30%，也完全值得收购。

Look, the two big assets from memory are obviously the OpenAI position and I think the ARM position, which I still think is in the in the holding company, amazing companies, world class companies, easily imaginable upbought them with a decline 30%.

这种生活方式真是够呛。

It's a hell of a way to live.

说到下跌30%和陷入亏损，我们之前提到过，显然Mythos、Bleak重创了网络安全股。

Speaking of declining 30% and being in the hole, we touched on it earlier, but, obviously, Mythos, Bleak, hammered Cyber stocks.

CrowdStrike、Palo Alto、Zscaler全都下跌了6%。

CrowdStrike, Palo Alto, Zscaler, all down 6%.

Ogden、Netskope下跌了7%。

Ogden, Netskope, down 7%.

Hannibal下跌了9%。

Hannibal, down 9%.

这是合理的回调，还是对Anthropic新闻的过度反应？

Was this a justified dip, or is this an unjust reaction to Anthropic news?

我认为这不是合理的回调。

I'm gonna say it's not a justified dip.

我刚才在听这些名字，安全领域有不同的方面。

And I was listening to names, and there's different aspects of security.

其中一些我可以说，是的，可能确实有重叠。

And some of them I can say, yeah, maybe that overlaps.

然后有些公司我觉得完全是另一回事。

And then someone I go, that's just a different thing.

当你听到所有被提到的名字时，你会觉得这是把孩子和洗澡水一起倒掉了。

When you listen to all the names that been thrown out, you say, that's just baby with the bathwater.

因为退一步说，Anthropic 是如何提升安全性的呢？

Because step back, how does Anthropic make security better?

在代码开发阶段，它们可以分析代码并发现安全漏洞。

At the code development stage, they can look at code and find security flaws.

所以有一些公司从一开始就做类似的事情，也就是应用安全公司，你可以说这是一种不同的实现方式。

So there are companies that upfront do something like that and, you know, application security companies, and you could argue that this is a different way of doing that.

也许这些公司中的一些会受到影响。

Maybe some of those guys will be impacted.

但它们并没有做的是实时边界防御。

What they're not doing, for example, is real time perimeter defense.

他们不是实时地像防火墙那样阻止用户。

They're not in a real time basis, you know, blocking people like a firewall.

他们也没有像Okta那样做单点登录和身份验证。

Nor are they doing what's, for example, Okta does, right, which is single sign on and authentication.

那根本不是他们做的事。

That's simply not what they do.

这是完全不同的事情。

It's a different thing.

那些类似股票的下跌表明，这仅仅是一种本能反应，而不是经过深思熟虑的结果。

And the fact that those kind of stocks sold off says it's just a kind of knee jerk reaction rather than anything thought through.

这会产生影响。

It will have an impact.

如果你从事应用安全或代码安全审查，你可能需要将这种方式融入你的分析中，否则就会变得冗余，就像GitHub不得不整合完整模型并思考如何采用它一样。

If you were doing application security or security code review, you're probably going to have to either incorporate how this works in your analysis, you'll be redundant, just as GitHub had to roll in complete models and figure out how to adopt this.

所以对其中一些公司来说，这真的很重要。

So for some of them, this is really going to matter.

而对于其他人来说，这完全是另一回事。

And then for others, it's just a different thing.

退一步说，我认为我们现在正处于恐慌阶段。

Stepping back, I think we're in the panicky stage.

我认为，由于这些公司表现如此出色，又都是私营企业，没人能看到它们的数据，再加上人工智能如此吸引人且潜力巨大，我们现在正处于任何事情都可能引发恐慌的阶段。

I think we're in the stage of because these companies are doing so well, because they're private, no one sees the numbers, because AI is so sexy and so potentially amazing, we're at the stage now where everything anything can cause a panic.

Robinhood的股价下跌了大约10%，因为埃隆没有向他们提供要约收购，而是直接通过Etrade进行交易。

Robinhood was down, like, 10% because Elon didn't potentially give them the tender and was going straight through Etrades.

光是这一点就对他们造成了巨大打击。

And that alone was like a massive hit for them.

显然，市场上现在一片恐慌。

Obviously, there's a panic in the market.

问题是，这种恐慌有道理吗？

And the question is, is the panic justified?

对吧？

Right?

恐慌在于这些收入不具备可持续性。

The panic is that this revenue is not durable.

对吧？

Right?

这才是真正的恐慌。

That's the panic.

网络安全这个话题特别有趣。

The cybersecurity one's really interesting.

依我的经验和看法，这完全是本末倒置、南辕北辙。

In my experience and opinion, this is one where it's just backassed, barqwards.

如果你身处智能代理的世界，这正是安全领域的黄金时代。

If you're in the agentic world, this is the golden age of security.

安全威胁和问题的数量正在呈数量级增长。

The number of security threats and issues is going up orders of magnitude.

Claude泄露源代码，这其实无关紧要。

Claude leaking its source code, it doesn't matter.

应用程序的数量激增。

The number of of apps exploded.

比如，现在有这么多移动应用，上架审核要一个月，而不是以前的一周。

Like, there's so many mobile apps that App Store is like it's like a month to get your app reviewed versus a week.

一切都正在爆炸式增长。

It is everything is exploding.

这些应用都是由智能代理构建的。

These apps are being built by agents.

它们是以不可预测的方式被开发出来的。

They're being built in unpredictable ways.

没人去查看代码。

Folks aren't looking at the code.

功能和产品的发布速度越来越快，各种捷径都被走遍了。

The pace of features being shipped, products being shipped, corners being cut.

这是将任何成熟领域推向新高度的黄金时代，对我们来说，好消息是威胁更多了。

This is a golden age of taking any mature category and acknowledging good news for us, there's more threats.

我不在乎这是应用层还是边界问题。

I don't care whether it's application level, perimeter.

好消息是威胁正在激增。

The good news is threats are exploding.

我这一生的整个模式一直都是：你得不断购买新产品，因为新的威胁不断涌现。

The whole shtick in my whole lifetime has been you've got constantly buy new products because new threats keep emerging.

这就像网络安全领域的一只金鹅，让新进入者得以涌入这个保守的行业。

Like, this is there's been a golden goose of cybersecurity that has allowed new entrants to come into a conservative category.

像Wiz这样的公司会出现，说：嘿，我们懂怎么在网页上做这件事，而人们对新威胁如此恐惧，以至于愿意来开会。

Someone like Wiz will show up and say, guys, we know how to do this on the web, And people are so terrified of new threats, they'll take the meeting.

对吧？

Right?

这应该是新老投资者的黄金时代，因为威胁令人恐惧，而你无法阻止那些由Vibe编写的、访问了你数据的 rogue 工程师。

This should be the golden age for new and existing investors because the threats are terrifying, and you can't stop the rogue engineers that Vibe Coded something that accessed your data.

这应该对所有人都有利。

This should benefit everybody.

每个人都应该像火箭一样飞速发展。

Like, everyone should be a rocket ship.

每个人都在利用GPU赚钱，这都是火箭级的增长。

Like, everybody monetizing GPUs is a rocket ship.

市场却看不到这一点，这说明在我看来，我们正处在真正的恐慌中，而这种恐慌的底部很难预测。

And the fact that the market doesn't see it shows we're in a in my opinion, we're in a true panic, which is hard to predict a bottom.

这很难搞。

It's hard.

但我就是不明白。

But I don't get it.

当应用开发出现爆炸式增长和范式转变时，每个人都应该受益。

Everyone should be benefiting when you see an explosion in application production and a change in the paradigm.

这种范式的转变对每个人都有利，除了1996年的Windows Defender。

The change in the paradigm is good for everybody except, you know, Windows Defender from 1996.

它可能对那个产品或者他们现有的任何东西都没什么帮助，但所有拥有工程师的公司都应该受益。

It probably doesn't help that product or whatever the hell they have, but everyone with engineers should benefit.

我总体上同意杰森的观点。

I broadly agree with Jason.

我的意思是，除了2006年的Windows Defender，可能还有其他受影响的东西。

I mean, there might there are more than Windows Defender 2,006 that might be impacted.

正如我所说，一些应用安全代码审查相关的部分也可能受到影响。

As I say, some of the application security code review stuff could be.

但从宏观角度看，杰森是对的。

But big picture, Jason's right.

现在不再是人们试图突破你的防火墙，而是每个人都下载了一个代理，给予它对电脑的完全root权限，并让它去尝试。

Instead of having people trying to get into your firewall, everyone is now downloading an agent, giving it full root access to their computer, and telling it to have a go.

正如杰森刚刚指出的，这些工作都是通宵进行的。

And as Jason just pointed out, work overnight.

有趣的是，我的同事ARR，他主要做安全方面的工作，我们一直在研究这些公司。

It's funny, my colleague, ARR, who does a lot in the security side, we've been looking at a lot of these companies.

目前还没有人知道我们究竟该如何应对组织内部运行的代理。

No one yet knows the exact approach that we're going to have to take to defend against agents running within the organization.

但每个人都完全明白，由于采用速度与解决方案威力的叠加，这正成为一个新兴的超级威胁。

But everyone 100% understands that this is an emerging megathreat because of the velocity of adoption times the power of the solution.

所以我同意Jason的观点。

So I agree with Jason.

可能受益于这一点的并不是传统巨头。

It might not be the old guard that takes advantage of it.

我欣赏像CrowdStrike、Palo Alto Networks这样的安全公司的一点是，它们非常清楚，当一个新的威胁出现，随之而来新的解决方案，而早期的赢家浮现时，你必须立即投入三亿、五亿美元，迅速收购这个赢家并将其整合进你的产品。

One of the things I admire about the security companies is the CrowdStrike, the Palo Alto Networks of this world is they know damn fine that when a new thread emerges and a new solution emerges for that thread, when an earlier winner comes out, you better spend your $300,000,000, your $500,000,000, and just swoop up the winner and add it to your product.

因此，我认为随着代理安全解决方案的出现，将会有大量快速收购发生。

So I think there'll be a ton of fast acquisitions as agent security solutions emerge.

如果够聪明的话，人们会提前进行收购——我认为这两家公司极其聪明，他们会赶在事情‘板上钉钉’之前就行动，因为届时CIO们会来找你谈。

And people will be doing, if they're smart, and I think those two companies are extraordinarily smart, they'll be doing acquisitions long before it's quote certain because you're gonna have CIOs come and talking to you.

关于这一点，值得一提的是，有人泄露了Anthropic的内部信息，这很有趣。

One thing worth mentioning on that is it was interesting, again, and somebody leaked information from Anthropic.

他们非常擅长贩卖恐惧。

They are masters at selling fear.

他们正在做的一件事是，首先向公司内的首席信息安全官（CISO）发布Mythos模型。

One of the things they're doing is they're releasing the Mythos model first to CISOs within companies.

这有点像是，哦，太吓人了。

It's kind of like, oh, it's so scary.

我们会给你这个模型，并给你时间去弄清楚如何使用它。

We're going to give you this model and give you time to figure out how to use it.

当然，这段时间的一部分会涉及向Anthropic支付一百万美元。

Of course, part of that time will involve giving a million bucks to Anthropic.

所以这纯粹是出色的营销。

So it's just great marketing.

因此，他们实际上在积极推动这一点，对CISO们说：你们必须自己搞清楚这个问题。

So they're actually leaning into that and saying to the CISOs, you're going to have to figure this out.

这是我们发明的全新恐怖武器。

This is the new terrifying weapon we've invented.

请给我们一百万美元，我们也会让你用它来保护自己。

Please give us a million dollars, and we'll let you defend yourself with it also.

绝佳的营销。

Great marketing.

但这反映出，鉴于企业中智能代理AI的快速采用，每位安全CISO都应感到如此正确的恐惧。

But it speaks to how correctly afraid every security CISO should be given the pace of Agentsic AI adoption of the enterprise.

在网络安全的黄金时代。

In the golden age of cyber.

确实应该如此。

It should be.

约个会有多难？

How hard is it to get a meeting?

无论你是谁，只要你有已建立的品牌，我们都有新的智能代理产品。

Whoever you are, if you have any established brand, we've got a new Agentsic product.

我们将帮助你防范这一点。

We're gonna help protect you from this.

你当天下午就能约到会。

You're gonna get a meeting that afternoon.

真希望我当初买了Figma。

Wish I bought them over Figma.

我正在看的这张图表真让人沮丧。

That's a depressing chart that I'm looking at.

你得放手了，哈里。

You need to let go, Harry.

你得让我失望了。

You need to let I'm down

一个月内跌了30%，罗里。

30% in a month, Rory.

一个月内跌了30%后，很难放手。

It's hard to let it go after 30% in a month.

好的。

Okay.

赌场里不许哭。

No crying in the casino.

继续前进。

Move on.

我想讨论一下收入的某些可疑之处。

I do want to discuss revenue kind of questionability.

Anthropic 的收入确认方式与 OpenAI 非常不同，而 Emergent Labs 的收入也存在疑问；如果 ARR 的会计处理方式有些模糊，这可以接受吗？

We've got Anthropic recognizing revenue in a very different way to OpenAI, and then you also have questionability around emergent labs is, And is it okay if ARR is kind of questionable in sorts of how it's accounted for?

我们该如何看待这个问题？

How do we think about that?

你可以选择你想要跟进的那一个。

You can choose which one you wanna take.

让我先说一下，也许 Rory 可以深入探讨，但我可以告诉你，我投资过一家 ARR 超过一亿美元的初创公司。

Let me just can I just maybe Rory can dig into it, but I'll I'll tell you this one startup I invested in that's over a 100,000,000 ARR?

我持有的股份刚好够收到投资者更新信息。

I own just enough to get the investor updates.

我不在董事会里。

I'm not on the board.

每个月我都会收到三个数字。

And I get three numbers every month.

三个收入数字。

Three revenue numbers.

我不知道它们到底是什么，但都超过一亿美元，其中最小的那个是ARR。

I don't know what the hell they are, over 100,000,000, but the smallest one is ARR.

我投资的是种子轮。

Now I invested in seed.

我其实并不在意。

I don't really care.

我已经回本了。

I'm in the money.

我别无选择，但我就是搞不懂。

I don't I don't have a choice, but I I can't understand.

这家公司表现很棒，但我就是想不明白这三个数字。

This company is doing great, but I can't under I for the life of me, I cannot understand these three numbers.

而且还有星号和脚注，上面有各种图表，但数据一直向右上方攀升，我觉得这正是我们下次可以讨论的新兴现象，我想一些投资者也说过，谁在乎呢？

And there's asterisks and daggers, and there's charts that go over it, but they keep going up into the right, which I think was this emergent thing we could talk about our next I think that's what some the investors said, who cares?

但我根本搞不懂2026年的ARR到底有什么区别。

But I can't tell the hell the difference what a what an ARR is in 2026.

我总是搞懂的是像管道这样的东西，完全是胡扯。

What what I always get is, like, pipe, which is complete bullshit.

对。

Yeah.

有已签约的，然后还有实际生效的。

Contracted, and then there's live.

是的。

Yeah.

首先，公平地说，Anthropic和OpenAI对ARR的定义非常清晰合理。

So first of all, stepping back, to be fair to both Anthropic and OpenAI, they have a very clear and sensible way they define ARR.

他们采用过去四周的平均值，平滑波动后按13周计算，因为一年有13个四周周期，这比按月计算更合理，因为每个月的天数都不一样。

What they take is they take the last the average of the last four weeks to smooth out times to 13 because there are thirteen four week periods in a year, which is more sensible than monthly because you have these varying months.

所以他们说的是，过去四周的实收收入取平均值，再乘以30——这显然不对，既然是平均值，就应该乘以52，但本质上这就是实际的GAAP收入。

So what they're saying is realized revenue for the last four weeks averaged, the average of last four weeks times 30, that's obviously if it's the average, it's times 52, but basically it's actual GAAP revenue.

我们过去四周的账单金额是多少？他们用过去四周的平均值来计算，这就是他们的年化增长率，对吧？

What did we bill for the last four the average calculated across the last four weeks to take into account how this that's their run rate, right?

实际上这相当合理，公平地说，他们并没有陷入那些高大上的废话。

It's actually pretty it's not commit to be fair to them, it's not committed to any of the bullshit kind of higher level stuff.

这是真正流入系统的资金。

It's actual money flowing through the system.

根据这种过去四周的滚动指标，Anthropic的大致收入是190亿美元，而OpenAI则在250亿美元左右。

Anthropic is roughly at $19,000,000,000 based on that kind of trailing four week metric, and OpenAI is around 25.

但现在我们来谈谈你的观点。

But now let's talk about your thing.

之前有个梗，说OpenAI报告的是净收入，而Anthropic报告的是毛收入。

There was this kind of whole meme of OpenAI reports net on their partner revenue and Anthropic reports gross.

他们意思是，如果OpenAI通过微软销售，微软从中抽成，那么OpenAI只报告扣除后的净额。

And what they're saying there is if OpenAI sells through Microsoft and Microsoft takes some money off the top, OpenAI only reports the net amount.

如果 Anthropic 通过 AWS 销售，产生了 1 亿美元的收入，他们会报告全额收入，然后将 2000 万美元作为销售成本返还给亚马逊。

If Anthropic sells through AWS and they sell $100 worth of revenue, they report the gross amount and then they give $20 back to Amazon as a cost of sales.

所以，对于看似相同的收入结构和收入模式，却有两种不同的处理方法。

So there's two different methods for what look like the same revenue of mix, same revenue approach.

我以为你会进一步展开这一点。

I thought you were going to extend that.

我以为你接下来要讲的是迈克尔·坎农·布鲁克斯在节目中提到的观点，即由于收入确认方式的问题，很多收入被重复计算了，甚至三重计算。

I thought part of where you're going was to Michael Cannon Brookes point on the show was that a lot of this revenue is getting double or triple counted because of how it's being recognized.

不仅如此，Cursor 还在再次销售并确认这部分收入，对吧？

And not only does this happen, Cursor is selling it again and recognizing the revenue, right?

同样的人不断反复转售这些代币，并将其计入自己的 ARR。

The same people keep reselling these tokens again and again and recognizing them as their own ARR.

我们到底还能反复转售这些可怜的小代币多少次？

How many times do we get to resell these poor little tokens?

我觉得这个观点非常好，杰森。

I think that's actually a great point, Jason.

我还没说到这点，但你说得完全对。

I hadn't got to, but you're exactly right.

不，每个人都声称自己有惊人的收入增长，因为同一个微小的代币在不断流转，我简直能想象到这个小代币。

No, it's like everyone's got amazing revenue growth because it's the same little token going, I just can picture this little token.

我的意思是，如果我们大家都同意保持近乎0%的毛利率，那我们就能无限次地互相转售代币，对吧？

I mean, if we all agree to have essentially 0% gross margins, an infinite number of us can keep reselling tokens to each other, can't we?

这就是我们的新20家VC规模的创业展示日。

This is our new 20 VC Scale Saster demo day.

我们在第一周就互相转售了一百万个代币。

We all resell a million tokens to each other on the first week.

所以，第一期的所有创业公司第一周都有百万级别的年经常性收入，因为我们只是互相转售了代币。

So everyone in batch o o o one has a million ARR its first week because we just resold our tokens to each other.

风险投资机构并不在意。

The VCs don't mind.

你说得完全对。

You're exactly right.

你顺口加的那句话才是关键。

And the sentence that you added in passing is the key one.

在我们所有人都必须实现盈利之前，这一切都可以继续下去。

Until we all have to get profitable, all this, you know, can continue.

然后在某个时刻，这就是为什么我说，我觉得你已经开始看到了。

And then at some point, that's why I said, I think you're starting to see it.

某个人终将要问：如果我们希望有净现值和现金流，这里到底发生了什么？

Someone's going to have to say, assuming we want to have a net present value and a cash flow, what's going on here?

然后这一切就会变得更加清晰。

And then all this becomes more clear.

我并没有评论Emergent Labs如何最快达到一亿美元。

I didn't comment on the Emergent Labs fastest to a 100,000,000.

杰森，你其实试过了，对吧？

Jason, you you actually tried it, didn't you?

你觉得这不错。

You thought it was good.

我确实试过了。

I did.

我觉得，听我说。

I thought I mean, listen.

要我评价这些批评，真的很难。

It's hard for me to know the criticism.

对吧？

Right?

我知道，有些媒体人士在印度B2B领域试图把这件事炒成丑闻。

I I you know, the the some folks in the press in the India b to b environment tried to make this some sort of scandal.

对吧？

Right?

而且，从某种角度来说，这也说得通。

Because and in a sense, fair enough.

如果你去了解Emergent Labs，它算是印度的一个竞争对手，而Replen和Lovable——我稍后给你展示我学到了什么。

If you go to Emergent Labs and Emergent Labs is sort of an Indian competitor, Replen and Lovable, which I'll show you what I learned in a minute.

对吧？

Right?

如果你现在去他们的主页，上面写着从零到一亿，我觉得是八个月。

And if you go right now to the homepage, they say zero to 100,000,000, I think, eight months.

就明明白白地写着呢。

It's right there.

那是最大的横幅。

It's the biggest banner.

所以公平地说，如果你把自己放在聚光灯下，不只是发一条推文，而是把这数字直接放在官网首页上，人们自然会期待这个数字的准确率达到70%到80%，最好是更高。

So in all fairness, if you're going to put yourself out there, not just as a tweet, but if it's going to be right there on your website, one would expect 70 to 80% accuracy in that number, ideally higher.

对吧？

Right?

所以如果实际数字低于这个水平，我觉得有人提出质疑也是合理的。

So if it's lower than that, I think it's fair that some daggers came out.

但我其实并不知道具体发生了什么。

But I don't actually know what happened.

这是重复计算吗？

Is it triple counting?

我可以告诉你我学到的一件事，我不喜欢这一点，很多AI初创公司都这么做。

I can tell you one thing that I learned, which I don't love, and a lot of AI startups do this.

所以这并不是Emergent独有的问题。

So this is not unique to Emergent.

它们不是让你使用免费版本，而是立即引导你进行免费试用，声称首月免费，之后每月20美元。

Instead of getting to use the free version, they try to get you to immediately do a free trial instantly that says it's $0 and $20 a month thereafter.

现在有太多公司都这么做。

Now so many folks do this.

这并不是它们独有的做法。

It is not unique to them.

这在大多数加速器中可能是最佳实践。

It's probably best practice in most accelerators.

但我很确定，这意味着当用户首月支付零美元时，它们却确认了240美元的年经常性收入。

But I'm pretty sure that means they recognize $240 in ARR that first month when you're paying zero.

他们骗了你，因为即使你确实需要点击Stripe链接，但你几乎会觉得你只是在使用免费产品。

And they trick you because you even yeah, you do have to click on the Stripe link, but you almost think you're just using the free product.

所以，如果我推出一个每月0美元的产品，作为营销成本打折，三十天后就流失了，这算不算240美元的年经常性收入？

So is that if I do a $0 a month product that's discounted as a marketing cost and I churn after thirty days, does that count as $240 of ARR?

我认为对很多初创公司来说，确实算。

I think for a lot of startups, it does.

所以这是一个合理的批评。

So that's a fair criticism.

我并不是说这种情况一定会发生，但很多初创公司会立即把这算作240美元的年经常性收入，这就是他们快速提升业绩的方式。

I'm not saying this would emerge in it, but a lot of startups will instantly recognize that as two forty dollars in ARR, which is how they rock it.

否则，你不可能这么快达到这个数字。

Otherwise, you can't get there that quickly.

对吧？

Right?

所以他们明显就是这么做的。

So so they clearly did that.

我要说，有趣的是，总体来看，我认为这些批评可能没有根据，因为我觉得这个产品相当不错，比Make好得多，简直比Make这个灾难好了一个数量级。

I will say what was interesting is overall, I think the criticism is probably unfounded because I thought the product was pretty good, much better than Make, like an order of magnitude better than the disaster of Make.

因为我做的是五步测试、六步测试。

Because I do a five part test, a six part test.

第一步是认知测试。

The first part is awareness test.

所以我让它重新设计saster.ai的主页。

So I ask it to redo the saster.ai homepage.

实际上，在所有平台中，它表现得最好。

Actually, of all the platforms, it did the best job.

它击败了所有其他竞争对手，所有领先者，因为我最近重新做了一遍。

It beat all of them, all of the leaders, because I redid this recently.

我重新做了一遍。

I redid it.

它们都做得不错，Replit、Lovable、v0。

They're all good at it, replet, lovable, v0.

它们都擅长这个。

They're all good at it.

它们都通过了测试。

They all passed the test.

但事实上，它可能是最好的，并且通过了其他许多测试。

But it actually was probably the best, and it passed a bunch of the other tests.

所以我不打算转向Emergent Labs，但我会说它在Vibe Coding应用中排在前10%。

So I'm not going to switch to emergent labs, but I would say it's in the top 10% of Vibe Coding apps.

这已经很不错了。

That's pretty good.

这告诉我它是一个真正的商业项目。

So that tells me it's a legit business.

它们确实做了该做的事。

Like they did the work.

说实话，你试过很多这类工具，即使是一些领军产品，Make也不是唯一一个糟糕的，对吧？

The truth is, you play with a lot of these, even from leaders, Make's not the only one that's crappy, okay?

因为他们基本上依赖于Claude代码为你完成90%的工作，对吧？

Because they're basically relying on the fact that Claude code does 90% of the work for you, right?

他们只是给这个东西加了个最简单的包装。

They're just putting the simplest wrap around this.

所以他们做得不错，但我真的很不喜欢他们的计费方式，不过我们可能得淘汰一半做PLGAI的被投公司，因为我觉得这种做法可疑。

And so they did a good job, but I really didn't like the way they do the billing, but we'd probably have to shoot half our portfolio companies that that do PLGAI because I think it's a sus practice.

我不喜欢用第一个月0美元来误导你，让你以为你在使用免费试用。

I just don't like tricking you with this $0 for the first month when you think you're using a free trial.

这才是可疑的部分。

That's the sus part.

我不太喜欢这种灰色地带的做法，但产品确实不错。

I don't love that kinda gray art, but the product's pretty good.

说到让人困惑的地方，你最讨厌的是什么？

You know what I don't like when it comes to confusing?

我本来在想，要不要在这期节目里好好吐槽一番，但后来我想了想，管他呢。

I was wondering whether to go off on one in this show, and then I thought, fuck it.

我们来聊聊这个吧。

Let's go off on one.

今天真是漫长的一天。

It's been a long day.

我对这种分阶段融资感到非常恼火。

I'm pissed off by these tranched rounds.

我简直天天都能看到这种操作。

I see them all the freaking time.

有太多Sequoia的融资案例，比如某公司从Square以50亿美元的估值融资。

The amount of Sequoia rounds where it's like, oh, x raises money from Square at 5,000,000,000.

相信我，Sequoia当初进入时的估值才1美元，但他们把所有轮次的钱凑在一起，然后公布总额和最新估值。

Trust me, Sequoia got in at one, but they just club it together and then announce the sum and then the latest valuation.

这完全具有误导性。

And it's just very misleading.

顶级投资机构总是能早早入场。

The tier ones get in early.

二三梯队一进来就立刻按同样方式标价

A tier two, tier three instantly marks it up same

加密货币，这么多年都是这样，对吧？

crypto, isn't it, for years?

有什么区别？

What's the difference?

我们给安德里森·霍罗威茨的加密基金，基本上给代币打八折。

We'll give the Andreessen Crypto Fund, you know, essentially 80% off the the token.

这不就是一回事吗？

What's the it's the same thing, isn't it?

你付的钱其实是为这种信号买单。

You're paying for the paying for the signal.

我认为如果拆解来看，首先，为了让大家都达成共识，因为有趣的是，Claude 和 GPT 都不了解什么是分轮融资，它们还拿出了过去那种基于业绩里程碑的传统风投分轮模式——就是我们当年真正经营企业时那些老掉牙的废话，对吧？

I think if you break it down, first of all, just so everyone's on the same page, because interestingly, neither Claude nor GPT was on the same page and didn't know what a tranche round was, and they gave the old conventional venture tranche round based on performance milestones, you know, BS from back in the day when we actually ran businesses, right?

所以我对这个根本一无所知。

So I didn't have a clue about this.

所以我们来明确一下这里的做法。

So let's be clear on the practice here.

这里的做法是，当一家热门公司融资时，每股实际上存在两种不同的价格。

The practice here is when a company, a hot company, raises a round where there are effectively two different prices per share.

我们称之为首次关闭和二次关闭，即使两者时间相近或几乎同时，首次可能以250万美元估值进行，第二次则以10亿美元估值进行，但对外宣传总是说以10亿美元估值。

Let's call it a first close and a second close, even if they're at or near contemporaneous, where the first one might be at $2.50 pre and the second one is at a billion pre, and the headline is they always at a billion pre.

这会产生两个影响。

There's two impacts of this.

首先，我们来看简单的情况：这一轮融资中只有一个参与者。

First, let's do the simple one, where there's just a single participant in the round.

也就是说，如果你是新投资者，你希望以600万美元的价格投资。

That's where, you know, if I'm the new investor, I want to pay 600.

公司希望对外宣传的估值是10亿美元，为了促成交易，有人就说：好吧。

The company wants a headline of a billion, And to win the deal, someone says, okay.

让我以250万美元估值投一部分，再以10亿美元估值投一部分。

Let me put some money in at $2.50, some money in at a billion.

我会算账，因为我作为投资者，就是靠算账拿工资的。

I can do math because I'm paid to do math because I'm an investor.

所以我知道我的整体成本是六亿美元。

So I know my overall basis is 600,000,000.

所以我得到了我想要的，公司也得到了它想要的——那就是十亿美元的 headline 数字。

So I'm getting what I want, and the company's getting what it's want, which is a headline number of a billion.

这很荒谬，但这种情况就只是这么回事。

It's silly, but that's all that's happening in that case.

这就是单一参与者的分批交易。

That's the single participant tranche deal.

如果公司想要一个 headline 数字，他们就能得到。

If a company wants a headline, that's what they get.

通常，这类做法最终会反噬你，因为从定义上讲，如果你是公司方，就像投资者会算账一样，你显然也会算账；如果你接受了这种组合交易，就等于默认承认：我知道我实际只值六亿，但我想要十亿的表面光鲜。

Generally, those things come back to bite you, because by definition, if you're the company, just as the investor can do math, presumably you can do math, if you accept that combined deal, you're implicitly saying, I know I'm only worth 600, but I'd like the optics of a billion.

你必须非常确定，下一轮融资时你的估值能到十五亿美元。

You better be damn sure that your next round, you're at 1 and a half billion.

否则，你就会面临估值下调的表象。

Otherwise, you'll have the optics of a down round.

如果你相信表象，那这可能比估值上涨更糟糕。

And if you're an optics believer, that's probably worse than the uptick.

所以，这就是单一参与者的版本。

So that's kind of the single participant version.

更让人烦扰的版本，哈里显然对此非常不满，那就是当结构相同，但只有领投方参与了本轮前的2.5亿美元投资，而只承担了10亿美元轮次的一半，其他新投资者则直接参与了10亿美元的轮次。

The much more annoying version that Harry clearly was getting on his high horse about is when you have the same structure, but access to those rounds where the lead investor maybe does all of the $250 pre round and only half of the billion round, and then some new investors just get to do the billion round.

换句话说，在同一时间，领投方以600亿美元的估值投资，而跟随方——名气较小的投资者——却以10亿美元的估值投资同一个资产。

So literally at the same time, the lead investor is investing at 600,000,000,000 and the follower investor, less marquee investor, is investing in the same asset at a billion.

我不认为在金钱面前有对错之分，金钱就是金钱。

And I don't believe there's right or wrong in money, there's just money.

至少，作为其他投资者，你必须直面自己，说：哇，这就是成为‘酷’的代价。

That's where, at the minimum, you have to look yourself in the mirror as the other investor and saying, Wow, that's the price of being cool.

这就是获得准入资格的代价。

That's the price of access.

我多付了50%的价钱，因为我根本无法参与这个交易。

I'm paying 50% more because I just can't access that deal.

这感觉非常不公平，我的意思是，再回到刚才的说法，如果你试着避开道德判断，只说‘这感觉太糟糕了’。

And that feels like a pretty invidious thing to I mean, again, going back to the comment, if you think about it again, trying to avoid morality and saying, Oh, because it would feel shitty.

如果你这么做，真的会觉得自己是个失败者。

You really would feel like a loser if you did that.

但让我们把这种情况推演下去。

But let's play it out.

这是一种情况：领投方，比如说红杉，因为所有优质强势的机构都该是红杉——他们承认，平均而言，这家公司只值6亿美元，而他们只是在进行一场虚假交易。

This is a situation where the lead investor let's say it's Sequoia because everything good and strong should be Sequoia They are admitting it's only worth $600 on average, and they're just doing this faky transaction.

公司也承认，平均而言它只值6亿美元，因为他们是以6亿美元的综合成本接受资金的。所以，你以10亿美元的价格进入，要么是说你资本成本更低，愿意接受比别人更低的回报；要么你唯一能给出的正面解释是：公司认为它值6亿，红杉也认为它值6亿，但你足够聪明、足够机智，即使没有准入资格，你也清楚它实际上值10亿，所以你愿意以10亿的价格入场，尽管你拿不到6亿的定价。

The company is admitting it's only worth $600 on average because they're taking the money at a blended cost of $600 So what you're saying doing at a billion is you're either saying, either I have a lower cost of capital and I'm willing to take a lower return than everyone else, or the only positive spin you can come up with is the company thinks it's worth 600, Sequoia thinks it's worth 600, but I am smart enough even though I don't have access, I am smart enough and clever enough to know that it's really worth a billion, and I should do it at a billion even though I can't get to 600.

我愿意忍受 upfront 的税负和这种愚蠢行为，因为六个月或十二个月后，大家都会明显看出，我买在了极佳的价格，也许我看起来像个天才。

And I'm willing to put up with the upfront tax and foolishness look because six, twelve months from now, it'll be obvious that I bought at a great price and maybe I look like a genius.

是的。

Yeah.

但我们已经进入了一个时代，许多创始人对 headline prices（ headline 价格）着了迷。

But we've we've entered an era, though, where so many founders are obsessed about headline prices.

着了迷。

Obsessed.

他们从演示日出来后就着了迷。

They're obsessed coming out of demo day.

着了迷。

They're obsessed.

一旦估值突破十亿，我认为这本该是一个停下来思考的时刻，因为此时有并购选项，但他们却执着于把估值推到110亿、90亿，不断压过竞争对手。

Once they cross a billion, which I think should be a moment to take a pause because of the m and a options, they're obsessed about driving to 11,000,000,000 and 9,000,000,000 and one upping their competition.

他们从未认真考虑过自己所接受的估值会带来什么后果。

And they don't think through the any of the ramifications of the valuation they're hiring.

他们根本不在乎。

They don't care.

我甚至不是说这不好。

And I'm not even saying that's bad.

我的意思是，我认为烧掉桥梁是实现巨大成果的好方法，但这件事在很多层面已经完全游戏化了。

I mean, I think burning the bridges is a good way to have a big outcome, but it's become utterly gamified on many levels.

对吧？

Right?

它已经完全变成了一场游戏。

It's just become gamified.

所以这个11轮分期融资之类的做法，只是游戏化的一部分。

And so this 11 team tranches and around is just part of gamifying it.

自从我开始投资以来，YC就一直是这样。

It's been true of YC since I started investing.

在演示日之前，如果你足够热门，价格会更低；在演示日当天价格会更高；演示日之后又会上涨20%或30%。

There there was always a cheaper price before demo day if you're reasonably hot, a higher price at demo day, and then a 20% or 30% after demo day.

这种模式已经制度化了，如果创始人想要这样，那就随他们吧。

So that version has just become institutionalized, and so be it if it's what the founders want.

如果他们想把它变成一场游戏，那就随他们吧。

If they wanna gamify it, so be it.

对吧？

Right?

我只是觉得，当你只有八千万或一亿美元的可疑ARR时，估值却达到五十亿或八百亿，这并不是世界上最令人兴奋的成就。

I just don't think raising at 5 or 8,000,000,000 when you're at 80,000,000 or a 100,000,000 of suspect ARR is the most exciting accomplishment in the world.

我会在邮件里发几个点赞表情，但也就这样了。

I'm gonna send a few thumb emojis on the email, but that's about it.

不过，这又回到了你关于Emergent Labs和图表显示八个月达到一亿美元的观点。

It goes back to your point, though, on emergent labs and the graph doing the eight months to a 100,000,000.

对于这种追求一亿美元估值的竞赛游戏化，我不会选择Emergent Labs。

The gamification of, like, the race to a 100,000,000, I'm not choosing Emergent Labs.

听我说。

Listen.

我觉得他们做了一个不错的产品。

I think they built a good product.

我相信他们确实被过度批评了。

I think I'm sure they've been overly lambasted.

因为不管是1亿、8000万还是6000万，我都无所谓。

Because whether it's a 100 or 80 or 60, I don't care.

这已经相当不错了。

It's pretty damn good.

对吧？

Right?

不管怎样吧。

Whatever it is.

但如果你这么做，当它没达到100%时，你就活该被抨击。

But if you're gonna do that, you deserve the the daggers to come out when it's not a 100%.

对吧？

Right?

我同意。

I agree.

我觉得特别令人兴奋的是，我总是喜欢看到有公司即将上市或很快上市。

One that I thought was fantastically exciting, I always like to see a potential IPO or to IPO shortly.

我觉得这非常有趣。

I thought this was fascinating.

实际上，从斯堪的纳维亚的这些创始人建立这家公司开始，这段旅程就令人难以置信。

It's been an incredible journey actually from, like, you know, Scandinavia, these founders building this business.

这家公司已经换了几次首席执行官。

It's had a couple of CEO changes.

这家公司的状况实际上非常好。

The business is actually in incredible shape.

事实上，Whoop今天宣布他们融资了5亿美元，估值达到100亿美元。

Both, actually, and Whoop announced today that they raised, I think it was 500,000,000 at 10,000,000,000.

健身和健康数据，你知道吗，Rory？

Fitness and health data do you know what, actually, Rory?

杰森又说对了，真是烦人。

Jason's annoyingly right again.

我不知道你是否还记得他的预测，但如果不记错的话，他预测2027年将是人类健康数据和长寿的元年。

I don't know if you remember his predictions, but he predicted, if I'm not wrong, that 2027 would be the year for, like, human health care data and longevity.

是的。

Yes.

而且看起来可能甚至是2026年。

And it looks like it might even be 2026.

而且，你知道，这两个故事的精彩之处在于，约翰尼，我有一个非常站得住脚的立场，这并不是一个对AI的嫉妒故事。

And and, you know, the great thing about both stories is, Johnny, I have a side, very defendable from and this is not an AI envy story.

我的意思是，他们确实在业务中使用了AI，但这些产品本质上是独立的，拥有清晰的消费者价值主张。

This is I mean, they use AI in what they do, but these are fundamentally stand alone products with a clear consumer value proposition.

它们不会在周五变成Claude Coded。

They're not going to be Claude Coded on Friday.

我完全明白。

I totally see it.

而且它们在收入方面显然已经达到了临界规模。

And they clearly have had critical mass in terms of revenues.

我觉得太棒了。

Think it's awesome.

我认为问题在于，这些产品的有趣之处在于，回到ARR这个话题，它们都是经常性收入产品，对吧？

I think the question Listen, the interesting thing for these products, going back to the topic of ARR, these are recurring revenue products, right?

在很大程度上，对吧？

For the most part, right?

是相当昂贵的订阅服务。

Fairly expensive subscriptions.

它们很令人兴奋，直到像Peloton那样不再如此的时候。

And they're exciting until like Peloton when they aren't.

目前，这里并没有2000美元的成本。

Right now, there's not a $2,000 cost here.

我并不是在批评。

And I'm not being critical.

我认为它们很令人兴奋。

I think that they're exciting.

但同时也存在一种潮流效应，用户可能会随时切换。

But there's also a faddishness ism people can switch.

那么，这些公司值得什么样的估值倍数？

So what multiples do these companies deserve?

到底是多少呢？

What it is?

我还不够聪明，说不清楚，但这种加速确实是势不可挡的。

I I'm not smart enough to know, but the but the acceleration is a force of nature.

对吧？

Right?

我真希望能成为早期投资者。

I'd love I'd love to be a seed investor.

别误会我的意思。

Don't get me wrong.

你

Do you

你觉得这里也存在类似的跟风现象吗？

think there's a fartishness in the same way?

我觉得我们是

I think we are

我觉得你可以从健身手环转向健身领域。

I think you can switch from vent Harry, you're into fitness.

我不太算，但我连续十年每天跑五英里，一年跑360天。

I'm not so much, but I run 360 days a year, five miles a day for ten years.

所以如果有更好的跑步机、更好的设备、更好的东西，我就会换，不管是什么。

So if they're a better treadmill, a better device, a better thing, would switch and whatever.

你挺健康的，哈里。

You're fairly fit, Harry.

如果你本来就喜欢，而且你觉得Whoop更好、你在乎，那你就会换。

Like if you are or and you love it, but Whoop is better and you care, you're going to switch.

所以这并不是现在的ARR服务，对吧？

So it's not service now ARR, right?

不是。

It's not.

你很忠诚，但确实有些颠覆性变化。

You're loyal, but there's just some disruption.

看看Peloton吧。

Like, look at Peloton.

当Peloton爆红时，但随着世界变化，即使人们热爱Peloton，对吧？

When Peloton blew up, but actually as the world changed, even though people love Peloton, right?

净推荐值超高。

Super high NPS.

还记得2020年在Zoom上沉迷Peloton的那些人吗？

Remember the Peloton addicts of 2020 on Zoom?

他们确实很喜欢，但当世界变化后，他们对Peloton的简单反应就是：换掉了。

They they loved it, but when the world changed, they just the simple answer to Peloton is they just switched.

Whoop和Aura不同，可能会出现Whoop、Whoop Whoop Whoop Aura，也许其中一个戴在脚踝上，里面还有乔尼·艾维设计的AI芯片，到时候我们就换了。

And Whoop is different than Aura, and there could be a Whoop or Whoop Whoop Whoop Aura, and, maybe one is your ankle and it has your AI rock from Johnny Ive in it, and we'll switch.

关于这个，我有两个评论。

Two comments on this.

有一点需要说明，我们很幸运地通过收购我们旗下的一家公司进行了一笔小额投资。

One disclosure, we are lucky enough to have a small investment or through the acquisition of one of our companies.

所以我掌握的信息不多，也不会泄露任何机密信息，但出于谨慎，我不会评论任何具体数字。

So I don't have a ton of information, so I'm not going to breach any confidentialities, but just an abundance of caution, I'm not going to comment on numbers at all.

产品很棒，对吧？

Great products, right?

但说到重点，杰森，这可不是像ServiceNow那样的年经常性收入，直说吧，别纠结了。

But to your point, Jason, it's not ARR like ServiceNow, let me be direct, get the fuck over it.

不是世界上每个企业都设计了五年规划。

Not every business on the planet has five year designed in.

如果你在街角开一家酒吧，每天晚上我都可以去不同的酒吧喝酒。

If you're running a bar down the street, every night I can go drink at a different bar.

如果你卖可口可乐，每天我都可以换成百事可乐。

If you're selling Coca Cola, every day I can switch to Pepsi.

如果你经营亚马逊的消费业务，每天我都可以去搜索并转向沃尔玛。

If you're running Amazon, consumer, every day I can go and search and go on Walmart.

并不是每一家企业都能拥有持久的长期用户粘性，当然你更希望有粘性，但有很多企业已经存在了五十年，每天都要重新赢得消费者的选择。

Not every business is going to have enduring kind of long term lock in, and that's obviously you prefer to have lock in, but there are lots of businesses that have been around for fifty years where every day they have to earn the right for the consumer to go to them.

我毫不怀疑，任何消费类硬件与软件结合的产品，都会从订阅中获得一些剩余资产，但随后，是的，每一款新设备都必须非常出色。

There's no doubt in my mind that any kind of consumer hardware software combination product has some residual asset from the subscription, But then, yeah, every new device has to be awesome.

你正在与其他出色的产品竞争。

You're in competition with other awesome products.

事实证明，资本主义是艰难的。

It turns out capitalism is hard.

如果你想创造一百亿美元的价值，就必须为消费者提供价值。

If you want to make $10,000,000,000 in value, you've to deliver value for your consumers.

我认为Peloton的价值究竟如何，我实际上觉得真正发生在他们身上的事，有点像Zoom的故事，那就是本应非常旺盛的需求。

And I think what it's worth on Peloton, I actually think what really happened to them, it's a little like the Zoom story, is demand that should would have been wonderful.

如果这种需求能分散在五到六年里，每年以20%的速度增长，那它将成为有史以来最棒的股票。

It would have been the greatest stock ever had that demand been spread out over five or six years, increasing at 20% a year.

我们会谈论Peloton这个复利机器。

We'd be talking about the Peloton compounding machine.

相反，所有人都在同一时间买了这该死的东西。

Instead, everyone bought the damn thing at the same time.

他们增加了人员配置以应对这一需求。

They staffed up to kind of meet that demand.

市场严重饱和，随后股价下跌，叙事崩塌。

The market was wildly saturated, then the stock went down and broke narrative.

所以，我确实同意。

So I I do agree.

你无法让市场变得比它本来更大，但我认为他们因为新冠疫情带来的需求激增和随后的急剧下滑而遭受了剧烈震荡。

There's nothing you can do to make a market bigger than what it is, but I I think they got whiplash by virtue of the COVID demand spike followed by demand fall off.

对于风投来说，Meta的问题是，你知道的，经典的彼得·蒂尔从零到一。

The Meta question for Venture is, you know, the classic Peter Thiel zero to one.

蒂尔博士说，竞争是失败者的游戏。

Competition's for losers is what doctor Thiel said.

竞争是失败者的游戏。

Competition's for losers.

竞争会摧毁利润。

Competition destroys profits.

垄断推动创新。

Monopolies drive innovation.

你应该投资垄断型企业。

You want to invest in monopolies.

我的宏观焦虑在于，如果这些市场无法形成垄断，它们是否还适合风险投资？

That's just my meta anxiety is if these are unmonopolizable markets, are they good ones for venture or not?

当然，这个问题有两面性，但我更愿意投资那些能成为垄断的企业。

And obviously, there's two sides to it, but I would feel more comfortable investing in things that become monopolies.

我的意思是，比起投资酒吧，这显然是个更好的落脚点。

I mean, it's a it's a better landing place than investing in bars.

你无法赋予同样的持久性

And you can't ascribe the same durability

收入稳定性，就像你对某一天能做的那样？

of revenue to this as you can what day?

就像那么多

Like, as much

但另一方面，你不能赋予它极高的增长潜力，也不能赋予它巨大的总潜在市场。

But as I on the other hand, you can't ascribe super high growth, and you can't ascribe big TAM.

你可能只是看起来如此。

You might just it look.

如果有足够的垄断企业，每年能出现一个优秀的垄断企业，我就参与。

If there were enough monopolies to do even one good monopoly a year, I'd be in.

而且，说到创始人，他们即将获得终身大奖，因为他们投资了太空垄断领域，二十年后，他们将套现离场。

And, you know, speaking of the the founders are about to get the all time prize because they invested in the space monopoly, and twenty years later, they're gonna cash in their chips.

对吧？

Right?

垄断企业比竞争性市场是更好的商业模式。

Monopolies are better businesses than competitive markets.

但我确实认为，你仍然可以从一款优秀的消费产品中创造数十亿美元的价值。

But I do think you can still build many billions of dollars of value from a high good consumer product.

而且之前有很多这样的例子。

And there are lots of prior examples of that.

但我们所有人都明白其中的动态——说实话，我认为如果你看看像GoPro这样迅速衰落的消费产品，问题远没有那么大，我这是即兴说的，但这更多不是竞争问题。

Yet we all understand the dynamics of I mean, actually, for what it's worth, I think if you look at consumer products that flame out like the GoPro, it's much less and I'm doing this on the fly, but it's much less a competition issue.

GoPro的 demise 并不是因为出现了竞争对手。

It's not like GoPro died because the competitor to GoPro emerged.

对吧？

Right?

真正的问题在于市场饱和，这和任何其他因素一样严重。

It's that saturation is as big a problem as anything else.

嗯，DGI可能会不同意你的看法。

Well, DGI might disagree with you.

整个行业发生了一次巨大跃升，而他们却被甩在了后面。

There was a whole step function in the industry that they got left behind.

你更愿意拥有20亿美元的消费硬件收入，还是像Palantir那样价值20亿美元的五年期合同？

Would you prefer $2,000,000,000 in consumer hardware revenue, 2,000,000,000 worth of five year contracts like Palantir.

是的，我选那些毛利率90%、五年锁定期的合同，谢谢。

Yeah, I'll take the contracts with the 90% gross margin and the five year lock in, please.

你先来，十号位。

You're a starter for 10.

我认为，罗里，你提出的这个问题可能更有趣，因为变化实在太大了，这是我们第50期节目，变化真的太大了，对吧？

I think maybe the more interesting question, Rory, that you brought up, because so much has changed, this is our fiftieth show, so much has changed, right?

当我们刚做这个节目时，即使收入增长放缓，持久的上市公司收入仍是黄金标准。

When we started the show, durable public company revenue despite slowdown in the top line was the gold standard.

对吧？

Right?

那是当时最好的收入模式。

It was the best revenue out there.

再看今天。

Fast forward to today.

我们还在乎ARR是什么类型吗？

Do we give a crap what type of ARR it is?

因为那些稳定的软件公司股价现在低于标普500指数。

Because the durable software stuff is trading lower than the S and P 500.

也许我更愿意要Ring的收入，即使它的客户生命周期价值有点可疑，因为软件本身的价值太低了。

Maybe I'd rather have Ring revenue with a somewhat suspect customer lifetime value because the software value is so low.

也许我不在乎我的ARR来自哪里。

Maybe I don't care where my ARR comes from.

托尼。

Tony.

对吧？

Right?

以前这很重要。

It used to matter.

以前这很重要。

It used to matter.

对吧？

Right?

我们曾经参加过董事会会议，那时会逼迫公司增加经常性收入（ARR），减少可变收入。

We'd be in board meetings where you would torture companies so that they would have more ARR and that they would have less variable revenue.

我的意思是，这在今天看来似乎已经过时了。

I mean, that seems like archaic today.

是的。

Yeah.

我记得我以前也这么做过。

And I remember doing that.

我记得我曾告诉人们不要这么做，因为我坚信你应该按照客户想要的购买方式来销售产品。

I remember telling people not to do that because I'm a big believer is you should sell your product the way the customer wants to buy it.

我同意，风险投资中我最讨厌的一点就是，人们总说：‘把所有收入都变成经常性收入。’

And I agree, one of things I hated about venture was when people would say, oh, make it all recurring revenue.

还有一个特别有趣、现在其实非常相关的情况是，你记得以前大家总说：‘这虽然是个硬件产品，但价值都在软件里，所以我们本质上是一家软件公司。’

And then the fun one that's actually really relevant right now is you remember everyone would say, Oh, it's a hardware product, but all the values in the software, so we're really like a software company.

而现在，荒谬的是，大家都说：‘谢天谢地我有硬件，因为硬件才是可防御的，软件不是。’

And now hilariously, everyone's going, Oh, thank God I've got hardware because hardware is defensible, not software.

从宏观角度看，你应该围绕你的客户和商业模式来构建公司，而不是围绕你的风投。

A big picture comment is you should conform your company around your customers and your model, not your VCs.

我同意你的观点，这种假装是ARR，但明年又讨厌ARR的做法，对创业者来说完全是浪费时间。

Because I agree with you, this kind of pretend it's ARR, but then next year we hate ARR, it's just a total waste of time for entrepreneurs.

事物就是事物本身，如果你能坦诚面对现实，并以此为准则去经营，你就会在商业上表现得最好。

Things are what they are, and you do best in business if you actually say what they are and just live and die by that.

大多数消费品都伴随着较高的波动性。

Most consumer products have high volatility associated with them.

你最好拥有一个出色的研发团队，并持续打造优秀的产品。

You better have a damn good R and D function and continue to build great products.

关于Oura上市，我有一个问题，今天这周我们看了相关信息，他们还提到，我觉得Allbirds好像是以不到三千万的价格被收购了，是吧。

The one question I would have about an Oura IPO, just thinking about it, we looked today this week, they also talked about how I think Allbirds was it acquired for less than thirty Yeah.

是被收购了，是的。

Was acquired yeah.

我正准备提这件事呢，杰森。

I was literally about to bring this up, Jason.

它被Oura以3900万美元收购。

It was acquired by Oura for $39,000,000.

所以我的问题是，如果像Oura这样的公司上市后，某个季度表现疲软，你应该像对待Allbirds那样立即抛售，还是应该像对待Salesforce或ServiceNow那样对些许疲软给予宽容？

So my question is, if a company like Oura goes public and you see weakness in a quarter, should you dump this thing instantly like Allbirds versus forgive a little bit of weakness in a in a Salesforce or ServiceNow?

我会避免提及任何具体细节，这里只是真诚地发表一点看法，因为这样并不合适。

I I I'm gonna avoid any specifics, genuine comment here, right, because it's not appropriate.

但我想说，与其他两位不同，我三十年前经营过一家纺织制造公司。

But I would say something, unlike the other two guys, I've run a textile manufacturing company thirty years ago.

制造Allbirds鞋子所需的技术，与制造能戴在人类手指上测量血液的电子模块设备所需的技术是不同的。

The technology required to make an all birds our shoe is not the same as the technology required to make a module electronic device that sits on the human finger and measures blood.

这些消费电子产品中的任何一种，都不像英伟达那样具有垄断性，但能够做到这一点的公司数量非常稀少。

Either of these kind of consumer electronic products, they're not a monopoly in the same way NVIDIA is, but it's a pretty rare number of companies that can do that.

往下说吧，杰森。

Go down, put it this way, Jason.

我先说一个可穿戴设备，你再说一个可穿戴设备；然后我再说一双运动鞋，你再说一双运动鞋。

I'll name a wearable, you'll name a wearable, and then I'll name a sneaker and you'll name a sneaker.

我们在完成运动鞋之前就会先完成可穿戴设备，因为有太多不同的运动鞋公司。

We'll be done with wearables long before we're done with sneakers because there's a lot of different sneaker companies.

而且确实，运动鞋比可穿戴设备更容易制造，而可穿戴设备又比英伟达的GPU芯片更容易制造。

And yeah, turns out sneakers are easier to make than wearables, which are easier to make than NVIDIA GPU chips.

说到这个，我们真的在意吗？

Speaking of, like, do we care?

我们到底在乎什么？

What do we actually care about?

我不知道你们知不知道，但我有一群很棒的合伙人，其中一位比我聪明得多，罗里，你肯定会拿这个开个玩笑。

I don't know if you guys know this, but I have wonderful partners, and one of my partners is much more intelligent than me, which, Rory, you're gonna make some form of gag about.

但他也帮我一起安排一些日程。

But he helps me put together some of the schedules too.

他当时说：哇哦。

And he was like, woah.

我根本不知道还有这回事。

I had no idea about this.

他当时说：‘哇。’

He was like, woah.

Epic Games 裁员了 25%。

Epic Games laid off 25%.

我根本没听说这件事。

I didn't even hear about that.

是的。

Yeah.

然后我在你上一期播客里请了马克·安德森，他当时笑着谈到我们所有人在 2021 年都过度招聘了。

And then I then I had Marc Andreessen on your last pod sort of laughing about how we all overhired in 2021.

马克·安德森说得非常清楚。

Marc Andreessen was was very clear.

他认为我们都在拿人工智能当借口。

He thought that we were all using AI as an excuse.

我们所有人都多雇了至少 50% 到 75% 的人。

We were all overstaffed by 50 or at least 75%.