20VC：Benchmark新晋普通合伙人Ev Randle谈为何AI领域利润率重要性降低 | 为何大型基金难以取得良好回报 | OpenAI与Anthropic之争：谁将胜出编程领域 | 从Peter Thiel和Mamoon Hamid身上学到的投资经验

所以我认为最大的例子就是合同规模可以大得多，即使毛利率较低。

So I think that's the biggest biggest example is that the the the contract sizes can be much larger even if the gross margins are lower.

但我认为还有其他几个方面，比如训练自己的模型，因此会产生训练成本和其他各种变化。

But I think there's several others in terms of, you know, train their own models, and so there's, you know, training costs and other various changes as well.

那我们是不是不该...帮我理清一下思路。

So should we not play help me out.

我们是不是不该如此强调利润率？

Should we not place such emphasis on margins?

我认为目前我们不应该过分强调利润率。

I think we should not be placing that much emphasis on margins today.

我认为我们应该做的工作是试图理解这些业务的最终毛利率结构会是什么样子，以及这些公司在每个类别中能代表的绝对毛利金额是多少？

I think the work that we should be doing is trying to understand what does the terminal gross margin structure look like for these businesses, and then also what is the absolute gross profit dollars in in each of these categories that these companies can can represent?

因为就像Andreessen Horowitz的团队所做的出色工作所表明的：如果你作为AI应用公司现在拥有很高的毛利率，很可能意味着你的成本结构中几乎没有AI推理支出，这意味着实际上没人使用你的AI功能。

Because it's just again, like, I think the folks over at Andreessen Horowitz have done a lot of good work in terms of evangelizing this idea that, like, if you have grow high gross margins as an AI app company right now, probably it means that you have very little inference expense AI inference expense in your cogs, which means no one's actually using your AI features.

要理解这些AI应用公司在五到七年后的毛利率状况会是什么样子，并不是件容易的事。

It's not the easiest thing to understand, like, what are these AI app gross margin profiles going to look like in five to seven years.

但我认为，至少尝试从第一性原理出发，推理这些公司在五到七年内每位客户的毛利金额和毛利率会是什么样子，这样做要有价值得多。

But I think that, like, at least trying to go from first principles and reason about what the like, the gross profit dollar per customer and the gross margins of these companies in five to seven years look like, that is so much more worth doing.

而且比起试图将其与SaaS相比，这是一个更好的智力锻炼，因为SaaS是截然不同的业务，其定价和商业模式在未来十年内我认为都不会那么相关。

And it's such a better intellectual exercise than trying to compare it to SaaS, which is just a very, very different business, and it has a very different pricing and business model that that isn't going to be as relevant, I think, over the next ten years.

这太有趣了。

It's so interesting.

Scale的罗里·奥德里斯科尔，他基本上就像是我的养父，虽然他不知道这事。

Rory O'Driscoll from Scale, who's basically, like, my adopted father, he doesn't know that.

所以，干得漂亮。

So, like, well done.

你刚刚多了个儿子。

You've just gained a son.

但他总是告诉我，从根本上说，我们能否从AI中赚钱，将取决于我们是否能见证从人力劳动预算向AI软件支出的转变。

But he always tells me that, like, fundamentally, whether we make money from AI or not will be predicated on whether we see the movement from human labor budgets to AI software spend.

而且我认为，正如你刚才所说，对于那些试图从绝对美元利润角度理解问题的人来说，你的利润率可以更低。

And I think exactly to your point there for everyone who kind of is trying to understand absolute dollars in terms of profit, your margin can be lower.

但由于支出是五倍，按每位客户计算，你的绝对利润要高得多。

But because the spend is five x, your absolute profit is significantly higher on a per customer basis.

对吗？

Correct?

正是如此。

Exactly.

那么让我们以AWS为例来思考一下。

So let let's think about AWS, for example.

比如AWS，其实我不知道他们具体的毛利率是多少，但肯定没那么高。

Like, AWS, I actually don't know their exact gross margins, but they're not as high.

达不到80%。

They're not 80%.

假设大概是50%或60%吧。

Let's say they're, like, 50 or 60%.

据我所知他们的运营利润率大概在30%左右。

I know that their operating margins, I think, are at about 30%.

关于AWS的关键在于，对于任何大型软件企业来说，它都是最大的支出项目，远超其他任何付费服务。

The thing about AWS is it is the largest line item for essentially any large software business versus anything else that they pay for.

比如，企业在AWS上的支出远超Salesforce、Workday或其他任何SaaS公司，差距极其悬殊。

Like, you're paying more for AWS than you're paying for Salesforce, Workday, any other SaaS company by a wide, wide margin.

在2010年代初期，有些公司年收入达到1亿到1.5亿美元时，人们开始质疑：为什么账面上会有3000万美元的AWS服务成本？

In the, you know, the early twenty tens, you had, you know, companies doing, like, a $100,150,000,000 dollars of of revenue, and people started to be like, what is this $30,000,000 cogs line to Amazon Web Services?

这到底是怎么回事？

Like, what in the hell is this?

我认为这是个绝佳的例子——AWS的毛利率确实比Adobe低吗？

And I think that's, like, an amazing example of, yeah, do they does does AWS have lower gross margins than, you know, Adobe?

当然是的。

Of course, it does.

但每个AWS的核心客户在AWS上的支出都是Adobe的几倍，这就是为什么它能成为如此庞大的业务。如果从亚马逊拆分出来，很可能是个万亿美元级别的业务。

But everyone that uses AWS and is a core customer of AWS spends multiples on AWS than they do on Adobe, which is why it's such an unbelievably large business, probably a trillion dollar business if it was spun out of Amazon.

所以我们需要明白的是：并非每家公司都能做到这样。

So, like, that that is the idea that I think we need to all get in our heads is, like, it's not gonna be every company.

并非所有市场都会如此。

It's not gonna be every market.

但对于正确市场中合适的AI公司来说，其单客户收入规模将远超SaaS，即便毛利率较低，这些公司也将变得极具价值。

But for the right AI companies in the right markets, the size of their revenue per customer is going to be so much larger than SaaS that even if they have lower gross margins, it's going to be a much, much more valuable companies.

说到这个，AWS到底是什么？

Going to that as well, what is AWS?

它是一种大宗商品。

It's a commodity.

这正是我觉得最有趣的地方。

And that's what I find so interesting.

我当时想，模型不会赚钱，因为它们只是大宗商品业务。

I I was like, oh, you know, models won't make money because they're just commodity businesses.

但当你看到谷歌云、Azure和AWS时，你会惊叹不已。

And then you look at Google Cloud, you look at Azure, and you look at AWS, and you're going, wow.

也许正如你所说，世界上最好的生意恰恰是大宗商品业务。

Maybe the best business in the world is a commodities business to your point.

是啊。

Yeah.

过去两年里我改变看法的一件事，就是这些AI推理云业务。

One of the things I've changed my mind on over the last two years, you know, there's these AI inference cloud businesses.

就像是，谁将成为AI时代的AWS、GCP、Azure呢？

So it's like, who's gonna who's gonna be the AWS GCP Azure of of the AI era?

当CoreWeave最初在私募市场融资时，我就想，天啊。

And when they were when CoreWeave was was first raising in private markets, was like, oh my god.

他们这是在转售大宗商品。

This is they're reselling a commodity.

你知道，他们就是个中间商。

You know, they're a middleman.

他们是计算资源的经纪人。

They're a broker of compute.

这将是低利润的，诸如此类。

It's gonna be low margin, yada yada yada.

我错得有多离谱？

How wrong was I?

市场略有下滑。

The market's down a little bit.

但上次我查看时，它已是一家市值600亿美元的上市公司。

But last time I checked, it was a $60,000,000,000 public company.

Nebius是一家市值300亿美元的上市公司。

Nebius is a $30,000,000,000 public company.

公开市场总市值已超过1000亿美元，同时还有几家私营企业在AI推理云领域以惊人速度增长。

There there's over a $100,000,000 of public market cap, and there's several private players that are growing astronomically as well in this AI inference cloud.

所以我认为有时候我们会过度纠结于——当需求如此旺盛时，就像最初超大规模云服务那样，业务质量是否真的重要？

So I think sometimes we can twist our mind in knots over, like, oh, is the business quality okay when you have demand like this, like you had for the initial g c like, the initial hyperscaler clouds?

而且我认为我们看到AI推理领域出现了更强劲的群体需求曲线。

And I think we're seeing an even greater cohorted demand curve for for AI inference.

有时候你只需要停止过度思考，顺势投资。

Sometimes you just gotta shut your mind up and invest with the momentum.

但这让我想到另一个前所未有的不同因素。

But it brings me to the other element, which is different than ever before.

你刚才提到从关注利润率转向关注每位客户的绝对毛收入。

You mentioned now the change from margin to focus on absolute gross dollars per customer.

不同的是增长率。

The thing that's different is growth rates.

我纠结的是可持续与不可持续的问题，但同时又被高速增长和漂亮数字所吸引。

I think the thing that I'm struggling with is sustainable versus unsustainable, but also being a sucker for momentum and high high numbers.

你如何看待增长率优化与可持续性之间的重要性权衡？

How do you think about the importance of growth rate optimizing for it versus sustainability?

我们是否也需要围绕增长率建立新的分类标准？

And do we need a new taxonomy around growth rate as well?

再次强调，我认为当我们思考这个问题时需要牢记：有些公司能在不到一年内从零做到百亿规模。

Again, I I I think the things that we need to hold into our head when we're thinking about, man, you know, we have companies going zero to a 100 in less than a year.

这是前所未有的现象。

We've never seen that.

但与此同时，这是否来得容易去得也快？

But at the same time, is it easy come, easy go?

你知道，我们早期就有过这样的例子。

You know, we had we had early examples of this.

我现在可以坦然地说这件事，因为这家公司已经反弹，据我所知发展得非常好。

I'm comfortable saying this because now the company has rebounded and, to my knowledge, is doing really well.

但我记得人们谈论Jasper时的情景。

But I remember when people were talking about Jasper.

掀起这波浪潮的两项AI投资是Stability AI和Jasper AI。

Like, the two AI investments that started the wave were Stability AI and Jasper AI.

至于Stability，那又是另一回事了。

And, well, Stability, different story.

但Jasper，我认为它确实从零迅速飙升至巅峰，但随后实际上开始萎缩。

But, Jasper, you know, I think it went zero to a 100 very, very quickly, but then actually started shrinking.

这是因为其收入模式属于来得快去得也快，他们没有搭建足够的支撑架构，也没有创造足够的实际价值来真正维持客户关系和增长速率。

And it was because it was sort of easy come, easy go with the revenue, and they hadn't built enough scaffolding, and they hadn't built enough, like, actual true value in order to, like, really sustain the customer relationships they had and sustain their growth rates.

因此我实际上一直在思考这个问题，特别是考虑到我认为另一个方面是：对于许多这些Appler公司来说风险是什么，它们面临谁的威胁？

So the way I've actually been thinking about this, especially as it relates to because I think the other aspect of this is that what is the risk for a lot of these Appler companies, and who are at they at danger against?

是那些实验室。

It's the labs.

比如，实验室正在开发应用程序。

Like, the labs are creating apps.

他们通过模型创造更多价值，并直接提供给用户。

They're creating more value via the models, and they're giving them directly to users.

作为一个应用程序公司，你通常需要提供比每月20美元的ChatGPT所能提供的更好的服务。

And oftentimes as an app company, you need to be doing better than what $20 a month can get you from ChatGPT.

因此我认为，对于许多这类产品来说，实验室设定了客户体验的基准线。

And so I think the the way to think about it is that for a lot of these categories, the labs set the baseline in terms of customer experience.

它们是你基础层的竞争对手。

They're your competition at at your base layer.

因此无论你能从ChatGPT获得什么，或是直接从实验室应用本身获得什么，你都必须与之形成足够差异，因为它们很乐意每月向每个用户收取2.2美元或200美元的费用。

And so whatever you can get from ChatGPT or whatever you can get from from anything directly from the labs apps themselves, you need to be sufficiently differentiated from that because they're happy to, you know, charge $2.20 or $200 per month per user.

许多这类AI公司希望收取远高于此的费用，以实现可持续的商业模式，并能够真正开展企业级分销业务。

And a lot of these AI companies wanna charge a lot more than that in order to have a sustainable business equation and be able to, like, actually do b to b distribution.

所以我认为，以Jasper最初的情况为例，他们遇到的问题在于：当GPT-4发布时，人们开始意识到——

So I think when you think about, like, Jasper at first, the issue that they ran into, people when g p t four came out, they started being like, wow.

从Jasper获得的内容输出，与每月20美元从OpenAI获得的效果差不多。

Like, the outputs I'm getting from Jasper are kind of the same that I'm getting for 20 a month from OpenAI.

既然如此，就没必要为Jasper支付更高的溢价了。

Like, I'm not I'm not gonna pay, you know, however much more for Jasper.

我直接用ChatGPT就好了。

I'm just gonna use ChatGPT.

但我认为他们现在做的是构建了足够差异化的工作流软件，并能够将LLM技术贯穿用户工作生命周期的各个环节，这种方式既实现了充分差异化，又为他们构筑了更深的护城河。

But I think what they've done now is build sufficiently differentiated workflow software and been able to, like, tie in LLMs through the life cycle of how their users work and operate in a way that is diff sufficiently differentiated and gives them more of a moat.

我不认为从SaaS到AI时代，护城河的来源本质上发生了改变。

Like, I don't think the sources of moats have changed from SaaS to AI, necessarily.

七大竞争优势依然是那七大竞争优势。

Like, the seven powers are still the seven powers.

所有构建差异化的方法依然存在。

All of the same ways to build differentiation are there.

只是赌注更高了，因为增长率大幅提升，而且实验室进步神速，特别是在应用交付方面。

The stakes are just much higher because the growth rates are much higher, and the labs are just getting so much better so quickly, especially at delivering applications.

对于那些认为护城河已经改变的人，你怎么看？

How do you feel about people who say the moats have changed?

过去以技术为核心的护城河，现在本质上变成了面向客户的渠道和数据获取能力，重心已从技术转向这两者。

The moat that was technology is now fundamentally distribution in terms of access to customers and data and access to data, and it shifted from technology to those two.

你不同意这种观点吗？还是说你认同？

Do you disagree with that, or do you agree with that?

我...我完全不同意这种说法。

I I definitely disagree with that.

我认为护城河本质上仍在于技术，而非渠道。

I think the moat is still fundamentally in technology, not in in distribution.

当然，渠道优势能为你打造差异化技术提供条件。

I think distribution obviously gives you the right to build differentiated technology.

但作为行业一员，我们获得的一大教训就是：打造优秀的人工智能产品实在太难了。

But I think one of the huge learnings that we've had, as an industry is how damn hard it is to build good AI products.

比如，一个好的AI产品与一个好的SaaS产品的构建方式大不相同。

Like, a good AI product is so much different to build than a good SaaS product.

需要不同的人才。

Like, you need different people.

构建优质流程涉及诸多不同环节，比如在哪些环节引入大语言模型？

There's so many different parts of, like, a like, a good pipeline in terms of, like, where do you bring in LLMs?

如何优化它们？

How do you improve them?

就像它如何适应整体工作流程？

Like, how does it fit within a general workflow?

不仅仅是接入OpenAI的API，然后在文本框里使用那么简单。

It's not just bringing in the OpenAI API and, like, using it within the text box or something.

要打造一款卓越的AI产品，一个能超越实验室应用本身的产品，实际上需要极其细致和复杂的考量。

It's actually extremely nuanced and complex to build an exceptional AI product and one that's gonna outshine the labs applications themselves.

所以我仍然认为这是技术问题。

So I still think it's technology.

可能只是表现形式不同，比如或许不是传统意义上的技术模式，即拥有一个独特数据库，前所未有地为特定应用场景优化。

It might just be different in terms of, like, maybe it's not not a tech mode in terms of having, like, you know, a unique database that no one's ever built before that's more efficient for x, y, and z use cases.

但这本质上是一种人才稀缺和技术模式的问题，真正懂得如何构建这些产品并智能优雅地运用这些模型的人才太少了，这就是为什么你会看到AI研究者能签下数十亿美元的合同，拿到像勒布朗那样的天价薪酬。

But it's really a talent scarcity and, like, a talent tech mode where there's just not that many people that know how to build these products and build off of these models in a super intelligent, tasteful way, which is why you're also seeing, you know, people go for for billion dollar contracts and make LeBron money as an AI researcher.

你如何衡量这个问题？

How do you benchmark think about that?

我...我也为此感到困扰。

I I I struggle with it with this one too.

说真的，我的基金规模是4亿美元。

Mean, my fund is 400,000,000.

据我所知，基准应该在5到6亿之间。

Benchmark, I believe, is 500 to 600.

我的意思是，情况总是这样...嗯。

I mean, it's always kind of Mhmm.

你们从不真正像大多数人那样公布基金规模，因为现阶段可能主要就是你们自己的资金。

You guys never really announce funds in the way that most people do because it's probably mostly just your money at this stage.

我想问的是，当你看到——无意针对他们——比如Miramarati或Periodic Labs这些优秀且才华横溢的团队时。

My question to you is, like, when you see, like, I I don't mean to pick on them, but, a Miramarati or a Periodic Labs, great and very talented people.

但这些可是3亿美元、20亿美元的融资轮次。

But these are 300,000,000 rounds, $2,000,000,000 rounds.

你是否直接接受那不是你们参与的领域？

Do you just accept that is not a world that you play in?

这某种程度上触及了某些人心中的疑问。

It's kind of gets to the question that I think some people have have.

我认为你从没这么想过，Harry。

I don't think you've had it, Harry.

你对我们一直很友善。

You've been very kind to us.

但我觉得有些人确实在质疑：Benchmark是否错过了人工智能的浪潮？

But I think some people have asked the question, did Benchmark miss AI?

Benchmark是否因为不在那些实验室里，没有参与Mirror或Thinking Machines这类投资，而错过了AI浪潮？

Did Benchmark, you know, not get in on the AI wave because they're, you know, not in one of the labs or they weren't in mirrors, they weren't thinking machines or or any of these investments?

我非常信奉康威定律。

I'm a big believer in Conway's Law.

康威定律是一个编程概念，用我们这些外行人能理解的话来说，哈里，就是你最终交付的是你的组织结构。

And Conway's Law is this programming concept that when it's super dumbed down for people like us, Harry, says you ship your org yeah.

你交付的产品会反映出你的组织结构。

You ship your org chart, or the product you ship looks like your organizational structure.

我坚信这条定律同样适用于风险投资公司。

I'm a huge believer in that for venture capital firms as well.

我认为你们最终会按照基金规模和团队结构进行投资。

I think you ship your fund size or you invest your fund size and your team structure.

如果你管理着70亿美元的基金，拥有50人的团队，那你们绝对需要参与这些巨额轮次。

If you have a $7,000,000,000 fund and you have 50 people, you definitively need to get in on these mega rounds.

这是你一次性有效配置数十亿美元资本的唯一途径。

It is the only way that you can put, you know, a billion dollars of capital at work productively in a single shot.

如果你不这样做而项目最终成功了，你就会落后于那些参与大型投资的同行们，他们获得了那些回报。

And if you don't and it ends up being successful, you are now left in the dust where all of your mega your megafund brethren got those returns.

现在你因为错过了其中某个机会，在与他们的比较中表现不佳。

And now you're benchmarked poorly against them because you missed one of those things.

对于像Benchmark这样的公司来说，投资一个50亿美元的实验室融资可能完全没有意义，尽管这些都是好投资，因为我们的基金结构和精简规模。

For a firm like Benchmark, it might not make any sense at all to invest in a, you know, $5,000,000,000 financing in a in a lab even though those are good investments, because of our fund structure and because of our lean size.

但我们精简的规模和小型基金也让我们能够做其他我们认为可能带来更好回报的事情。

But our lean size and our smaller fund size also allows us to do other things that we think could even generate better returns.

在我们上一只基金中，按最后一轮价格(LRP)计算，表现最好的五个投资回报率约为60倍。

Out of our last fund, our five best investments in that last fund today held at LRP last round price are about a 60 x.

我们有两个30倍回报的项目，还有两个20倍回报的项目。

We have two thirty x's, and we have two twenty x's.

自从ChatGPT发布以来，没有一轮OpenAI的投资能达到这样的回报倍数和资金乘数。

Since ChatGeeBT was released, there isn't an OpenAI round that touches that return multiple and that money on money multiple.

而我们拥有五个这样的项目。

And we have five of them.

我认为它们每一个，即使从今天来看，仍有相当的上涨空间，甚至可能还有很大的上涨潜力。

And each of them, I think, have a fair amount of upside even from here today or maybe a lot of upside even from from today.

我觉得你必须选择你要参与的游戏，这取决于你的基金规模有多大，以及你的投资团队有多少人。

I think you have to kind of choose the game that you're going to play, and it's based on how big your fund is and how many people you're you have on your investment team.

但我认为我们有多种不同的方式来参与游戏，甚至可能比投资实验室的人获得更好的资金回报率，尽管我确实认为实验室投资显然是非常成功的。

But I think there's so many different ways that we can play the game and generate maybe even better money on money returns than folks that are investing in the labs, even though I do think the labs have obviously been amazing investments.

你的基金规模决定了你要解决的问题。

Your fund size dictates the problem that you're solving for.

我想当你提到错过了30倍回报的OpenAI时，坦白说，我当时想的是那大概相当于今天的15倍粗略回报率。

And I think when you said there about missing the OpenAI at 30, transparently, what I thought was that's what, like a 15 x on a blunt multiple to where it is today.

算上稀释的话是12倍。

With dilution 12 x.

但实际考虑稀释后，你看到的大约是6到8倍的回报，别误会，这已经很棒了。

But with actual dilution, you're looking more at like a six to eight x, which don't get me wrong, it's fantastic.

但当你将其与你的Lagoras、Langchains、Sierras、Macours和Firework等项目比较时，我们更关注的是现金对现金的回报。

But when you do a comparison to your Lagoras, to your Langchains, to your Sierras, to your Macours, to your Firework, we're focused on cash on cash.

100%同意。

100%.

实验室投资同样令人惊叹，但如果我们想保持小规模，唯一能打动有限合伙人的方式就是实现惊人的现金回报率。

The lab investments are amazing as well, but I think if we're gonna stay small, the only way we're going to impress LPs is by having incredible cash on cash returns.

你是否担心需要它们来保持相关性？

Do you worry you need them to stay relevant?

在有限合伙人方面我同意你的观点。

I agree with you on LPs.

在现金回报方面我也同意。

I agree on cash on cash.

但就与创始人和社区的相关性而言，你是否担心需要它们来保持影响力？

But just relevancy with founders and with community, do you worry that you need them stay relevant?

我认为这是个需要我们不断自省的问题。

I think it's a it's a question that we need to constantly be asking ourselves.

我认为如果我们发现自己的网络资源、亲密关系或能接触到的人脉正在流失，或者无法接触到关键人物和核心网络节点时，就需要始终保持警惕并重新审视这个问题。

And I think if we ever find that our network access, the close relationships we have, and the people we have access to is slipping or we're not getting access to the right people or the right network nodes, I think it's something that we always need to be sharp on in revisiting.

但我想，如果你思考当今AI时代的文化标杆型创始人，除了布雷特·泰勒，还有谁能更好地代表这波AI应用浪潮呢？

But I think if you if you think about kind of, like, the cultural touchstone founders of today's AI era, like, is there anyone more than Bret Taylor who represents this wave of AI applications?

他就像是当前AI应用领域的教父级人物。

He's like the he's like the godfather of AI apps right now.

当你想到这些AI领域真正出色的年轻团队时，人们最仰望的莫过于Merkor的布伦丹，以及他们在AI基础设施方面的成就。

And when you think about these, like, really cracked young teams in AI, you know, who do people look up up to more than than Brendan at Merkor and if what what they've done on the AI infrastructure side.

至少到目前为止，即便采用我们的策略，即便存在那些让我们能参与每一轮优质投资的权衡取舍，我们依然成功吸引并合作了这波AI浪潮中许多备受瞩目的创始人，并建立了极佳的关系。

At least thus far, even with our strategy, even with the trade offs that mean that we can invest in every single good round, we've still been able to attract and partner with and, I think, build really great relationships with a lot of the founders that people look up to in this AI wave.

我认为迄今为止我们的网络资源一直非常出色。

And I think our network thus far has been has been exceptional.

但这确实是个持续存在的问题——如果未来只剩下通过数十亿美元融资才能与这些人建立关系，那这将成为长期挑战。

But I do think it's a it's an ongoing question because if if all there is left is is these billion dollar raises in order to, like, build relationships with these people, then that's that's an ongoing question.

如果真发展到那一步，我们所有人要么为朝鲜军队工作，要么为安德森·霍洛维茨基金效力，二选一。

If that happens, then all of us will either work for the North Korean army or for Andreessen Horowitz, one of the other.

所以，你知道的，

So, you know,

这可真是够烦人的。

that's rather a pain.

对我来说他们就是一回事，哈利。

They're one and the same to me, Harry.

他们就是一

They're one and the

样的我。

same me.

马克和本，是他说的。

Mark and Ben, he said it.

是他说的。

He said it.

不是我说的。

It wasn't me.

你说了'口误'这个词，然后又提到了麦考尔。

You said the word slip, and then you said about McCour.

现在我比你们晚一点进入McCour，真遗憾。

Now I'm in McCour a little bit after you guys, sadly.

但我确实看到了那篇文章，提到Benchmark在McCore的持股比例明显低于传统水平，我记得大约是10%左右。

But I did see the article which said about the ownership that Benchmark had in McCore being obviously much less than the traditional, and I think it was about 10% give or take.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我不是在询问公司的具体细节。

I'm not asking specifics about company.

我只是很好奇。

I'm just intrigued.

在这个所有权趋势普遍下降的新AI时代，你如何看待关于所有权的纪律问题？

How do you think about discipline around ownership in a new AI world where everyone's is trending down?

是啊。

Yeah.

当我思考Benchmark的北极星指标时，也就是我们投资战略中真正关心的要素——这关系到我们在投资中获得的股权，或是其他人在他们的投资中获得的股权——实际上我们有两个北极星指标需要考虑。

When I think about Benchmark's north stars, what we really care about in our investment strategy, and this relates to the ownership that we get in our investments or everyone else gets in their investments, we have two north stars, really, that we think about.

我们希望成为创始人最高投资回报率且最亲密的合作伙伴。

We want to be the highest ROI and closest partner to the founders that we partner with.

从合作伊始直至公司不复存在，我们都希望成为他们最有意义的风险投资方和合作伙伴。

We wanna be their most meaningful VC and partner that they have from the moment that we partner with them until the company no longer exists.

无论是公司上市还是持续经营直至终止，我们都希望为有限合伙人创造其风险投资组合中最高的资金回报率。

Like, it can go public or still be on the board in until the company no longer is a is a going concern, and we wanna generate the highest money on money returns that any of our LPs have in their venture portfolio.

但基本上就是这样。

But that's basically it.

随着资产类别的发展，我们可以在不必每次都获得20%所有权的情况下，依然能真正服务于这两个北极星目标。

As the asset class evolves, there are ways to really serve those two north stars without having to necessarily get 20% ownership every single time.

我们都是信徒。

We're all believers.

我想你也是信徒。

I think you're a believer.

我们坚信，当今技术领域的成果规模比起十年前、十五年前要大得多得多。

We're certainly a believer that the outcomes are much, much, much larger in today's technology landscape than they were ten years ago, fifteen years ago.

现在有更多机会投资潜在市值千亿甚至万亿美元的公司。

There's more bites at at, you know, potential $100,000,000,000 or trillion dollar companies.

在如何成为创始人真正重要的合作伙伴，同时创造极其卓越的回报方面，存在着大量机会。

There's just so many bites at the apple in terms of how you can both be a really meaningful partner to the founders and to generate really, really exceptional returns.

所以在Merkor这个案例中，是的，我们确实没有获得15%或20%的股权。

So in the Merkor case, yes, we we didn't get, you know, high teens or 20% ownership.

但如果你和Merkor团队聊聊他们最有影响力的风投合作伙伴是谁，我想他们会说是Benchmark。

But I think if you talk to the Merkor folks and who their most impactful VC partner's been, I think they would say benchmark.

我认为这将为有限合伙人带来难以置信的回报，你可以根据我们目前的持股比例计算已实现的投资回报倍数。

And I think that's gonna generate unbelievable returns for LPs, and it's one of those ones that's you know, you can do the math on on what the money on money return has been thus far from our ownership stake.

所以我觉得有时候人们会混淆Benchmark的投入与产出标准，比如认为必须持有20%股权，或只愿意以100估值投资等等。

And so I I I think sometimes people confuse the inputs for the outputs at benchmark where it's like, oh, like, they have to have 20% ownership, they only wanna invest at a 100 post and all these things.

我认为这种看法与事实相去甚远。

And I think that's that couldn't be further from the truth.

我们真正坚守的是那两大北极星原则。

We really have those two north stars.

无论资产类别允许我们建立何种关系，以及我们如何能为有限合伙人和创始人提供最佳服务，这才是我们所追求的，而不是拘泥于某个固定的持股比例。

And whatever the asset class allows for in terms of the relationships that we build and how we can deliver the best for LPs and our founders, that is what we're serving to and that's what we're optimizing for, not some vanilla percentage ownership number.

讽刺的是，如果你询问我们的任何一位创始人是否后悔给予基准投资公司的持股比例，

Ironically, I think if you polled any of our founders and said, you know, do you regret the amount the the percentage ownership that you gave the benchmark?

我认为你不会听到任何一个人说不。

I don't think you'd get a single one of them to say, no.

我们给基准投资公司的太多了。

We gave benchmark too much.

我认为这是关于合伙历史中真正特别的一点。

I think that's one of the really special things about the history of the partnership.

这是我加入的第三周，显然我对此还毫无贡献。

It's my third week, so, obviously, I've contributed nothing nothing to that.

我只是在讲述我们现任和历任普通合伙人为这个平台所做的卓越工作。

I'm just speaking to the amazing work that all of our current and historical GPs have done for the platform.

但我确实认为，即使我们经常能获得很高的股权份额，我不认为有哪位创始人会后悔这种合作关系。

But I I also do think that the the even when we get and and we still often do get really high ownership stakes, don't I think a single founder regrets that regrets that partnership.

伊娃，看来尽管你在风投行业多年，还是需要我来给你上一课——无论你做了什么，之前的辉煌成就都归功于你。

Eva, it seems despite many years in venture, you still need a lesson from from me, which is regardless of what you did, it was all credit to you for the brilliance that happened before.

正是如此。

Exactly.

明白吗？

Okay?

那其实是我。

It was it was me.

对。

Yeah.

没错。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

嗯。

Yeah.

妮可，我记得早年做过eBay。

Nicole, I remember doing eBay back in the day.

我和皮埃尔，我们经常一起混。

Me and Pierre, we were hanging.

我们基本上是一起共同创立了这个生意。

We basically cofounded the business together.

所以

So

不错。

good.

是啊。

Yeah.

我需要，对。

I need yeah.

我确实需要

I do need

要在这方面努力。

to work on that.

你说过我们可以把这个去掉，如果你想的话。

You said about we can take this out if you want to.

我来撬开，你可以取出。

I pry, and you can take out.

你的老搭档之一，Delian，对Benchmark颇有微词。

One of your old partners, Delian, is quite vocal about Benchmark.

我是说，这有点像那个爆米花动图。

I mean, it's kind of the popcorn GIF.

你知道吗？

You know?

确实如此。

It is.

你还提到要成为最佳搭档。

And you say about being best partner.

我认为如果你能回答这个问题会很有帮助，因为你的Delian并没有起到作用，他说你们就是不断解雇创始人。

I I think if you can answer it, it's helpful because your Delians doesn't help where he says, well, you just fire founders continuously.

作为一家既解雇创始人又自称最佳合伙人的公司，这难道不有点自相矛盾吗？

Is that not slightly incongruous being the firm that fires founders and also your best partner?

我先从Delian的媒体策略说起。

I'll I'll I'll start with Delian's media strategy.

Delian，你知道的，我很喜欢Delian。

Delian and, you know, love Delian.

他是我的好兄弟，所以我想他不会介意我这么说，因为他平时可没少调侃我。

He's a close buddy of mine, so I don't think he'll mind me saying this because he he certainly busts my balls more than more than enough.

Delian总能找到绝妙的媒体和推特策略，就是去找那些，你知道的，有稳固品牌的人，或者操场上最显眼的那个，然后直接上去打脸。

Delian has has always found an amazing kind of media and Twitter strategy, which is go find, you you know, someone with with, like, you know, a stalwart brand or, like, go find the the biggest person on the playground and go punch him in the face.

人们就吃这套，能收获大量点赞和点击。

People love it, and it gets a lot of likes, and it gets a lot of clicks.

这有助于提升你的形象，几乎能让你达到他们的地位。

And it helps raise your your kind of profile, and it it almost, like, elevates you to to their positioning.

他给红杉资本发了大量这类内容。

He's sent it to Sequoia an immense amount.

多年来他也给安德森霍洛维茨发过，我们也没能幸免于那些点击诱饵式的达利安推文。

He's sent it to Andreessen over the years, and we have not been spared the clickbait, you know, Dalian tweets either.

没有。

No.

我认为显然每个故事都有极其复杂的细节。

I think I mean, obviously, every every story has an immense amount of nuance.

董事会、创始人和管理团队之间发生的事情，每个决策背后都蕴含着极其复杂的考量。

And what happens between a board and a founder and a management team, that there's just an immense amount that goes into every single one of those decision decisions.

我觉得时代也完全变了。

I think, you know, times also completely change.

比如在九十年代和千禧年初，如果你读到或听说谷歌的投资，凯鹏华盈和红杉投资谷歌后立即开始物色职业CEO。

Like, in the nineties and early aughts, like, if you read about or hear about the Google investments, you know, Kleiner and Sequoia do the Google investment and immediately start searching for a professional CEO.

所以过去这完全是常态，甚至不是'我们要赶走创始人'这种程度。

So, like, it used to be like, it used to be the absolute norm that it's like it's not even like, oh, we're gonna push the founders out.

不是这样的。

It's like, no.

你投资后，大家会一起去找个CEO。

You invest, and then you altogether go look to recruit a CEO.

2025年与2000年截然不同。

2025 is immensely different than 2000.

与2010年也大不相同。

It's immensely different than 2010.

甚至与2015年相比也有巨大差异。

It's even immensely different than 2015.

董事会与创始人之间的关系已经改变。

And just the relationship between boards and founders have changed.

风投公司与管理团队及公司之间的关系也发生了很大变化。

The relationships between venture firms and management teams and companies have changed a lot.

我认为这些变化是往好的方向发展。

I think it's for the better.

显然，我职业生涯中相当长一段时间是在创始人基金度过的。

Obviously, I spent a fair amount of time of my career at Founders Fund.

我非常认同永不解雇创始人的理念，让他们从合作之初到IPO乃至之后一直领导自己的公司。

I love the idea of never firing founders and, know, having them lead their companies from the moment you partner until the IPO and beyond.

但归根结底，我也相信基本的公司治理原则。

But at the end of the day, they're also like, I also am a believer in, like, basic governance.

比如，如果你最终投资了违法或逾越道德底线的人，作为董事会成员，你有责任代表所有股东、员工和公司采取补救措施。

Like, I'm also a believer in like, if if you do end up investing in someone who breaks the law or someone that's, you know, crossed ethical lines, it is your responsibility as a board member to also potentially take remediations and and action on behalf of all of the shareholders, all of the employees, and the company.

就像我们担任董事席位并参与治理时，最终至少要承担基本的道德责任。

Like, if you take a board seat like we do and you do have governance, you ultimately do have at least basic ethical and moral responsibilities.

我认为德莱昂和创始人基金的某些人通过声称'这不关我们的事'来推卸责任和压力，实际上是一种便利之举。

And I think it's actually a convenience for Deleon and some of the Founders Fund folks to absolve themselves of that weight and that responsibility just by being like, oh, it's not part of our it's not part of our thing.

但我觉得，他们这种对创始人的态度有时更多是出于懒惰而非责任感。

But I think, you know, it's it's almost out of out of laziness sometimes more than it is duty that they that they find to founders.

你知道的，你说过会给我些猛料的。

You know, you said you'd give me some bangers.

我也给自己出过些难题，但我觉得我们在另一方面又过于仁慈，以至于现在不愿履行受托责任，只因太害怕失去NPS（净推荐值）。

I also, you know, give myself spicy ones, but I think we're actually too kind on the flip side where we now do not adhere to our fiduciary responsibility because we do not want to lose NPS so much.

我现在投资的一家公司里，董事会为了保全创始人的NPS评分，刻意模糊他们的受托责任，以防出现负面评价。

I'm on a company now I'm invested in where the board is deliberately obfuscating their fiduciary responsibility just to preserve founder NPS in case they say something bad.

他们不去关注股权结构表，仅仅因为不想惹恼CEO。

They are not looking after the cap table just because they do not want to piss the CEO off.

这是对你保护股东利益和为其谋取最佳权益责任的刻意逃避。

That is a deliberate obfuscation from your responsibilities of protecting shareholders and doing what's best for them.

100%同意。

100%.

我完全赞同。

I I completely agree.

而且我认为最优秀的创始人，他们也不希望董事会里全是阿谀奉承之辈。

And I also think the best founders, they they don't want sycophants in the boardroom.

就像他们不需要一个只会说他们完美无缺、从不犯错的GPT-4O待在董事会里。

Like, they don't want g p t four o in the boardroom telling them that everything that they do, they walk on water and that they do nothing wrong.

就像，他们其实希望会议室里有其他成年人来推动他们、与他们切磋，让公司变得更好。

Like, they actually want other adults in the room that are going to push them, that are going to spar with them, and that are gonna make the company better.

我能问问你关于多次尝试机会的看法吗？

Can I ask you, have you said about kind of multiple bites at the apple?

当我们回顾Benchmark这些年的投资，Phantom参与了Airtable的C轮融资。

When we look at Benchmark over the years, you know, Phantom did Airtable series c.

我记得Nadeko也是C轮。

I think Nadeko was series c.

Langchain是种子轮。

Langchain was a seed.

你们现在会在多大程度上推动合伙关系，扩展我们所说的A轮定义，让Benchmark能更广泛地尝试不同阶段的投资机会？

To what extent will you push the partnership now to expand the boundaries of what we call an a and what Benchmark does to do more broad bites at the cherry or apple?

从历史上看，再次回到我们讨论的那些北极星指标，当你思考Benchmark的投资策略时，将我们谈到的每个投资都必须为LP带来潜在天文数字回报的北极星，与我们希望成为创始人最有意义的合作伙伴这一目标结合起来，是很有帮助的。

Historically, again, going back to those north stars that we talk about, when you think about the benchmark investment strategy, it's helpful to marry the north stars that we talked about in terms of every investment needs to be potentially absolutely astronomical money on money returns for LPs, and we wanna be the most meaningful partner to our founders.

实现这个目标有很多不同的方式。

There's a lot of different ways to do that.

因此你需要将这些北极星原则与每位普通合伙人的个人投资风格相结合。

And so you marry those north stars with the personal investing style of each of the GPs.

比如，我们每个人各占基准资本的25%。

Like, each of us is 25% of benchmark.

我们合作非常默契，是一个极其紧密的团队，但每个人都有自己独特的风格。

And we work really well together, and we're a super tight knit team, but each of us has our own styles.

所以即使埃里克喜欢在企业创立初期就介入，成为首轮投资者，真正深入初创企业的萌芽阶段，这并不意味着我、切坦或彼得总是会完全遵循同样的投资阶段。

And so even if Eric tends to love getting in right at inception and be the first check-in and be, you know, really, really in the primordial soup phase of of a startup, it doesn't mean that myself or Chetan or Peter are always gonna operate exactly at that stage.

我们都有各自特定的偏好。

We all have our particular preferences.

彼得在追随他对创始人的信念方面做得非常出色。

Peter does an amazing job following his founder conviction.

他并不考虑投资阶段。

He doesn't think about stages.

当他找到霍伊、找到布雷特或任何这类创始人时，这些就是他行动的指南。

Like, when he finds a Howie, when he finds a Brett, when he finds any of these founders, that is what he lets him that's what guides him.

他会想，我要找到方法成为这位创始人最重要的合作伙伴，并找到让投资为我们的有限合伙人创造丰厚回报的途径。

And he's like, I'm gonna find a way to become the most meaningful partner to this founder, and I'm gonna find a way for the investment to make them a lot of money for our LPs.

这是我们所有人共有的思维方式。

That is the mindset that we all have.

从历史上看，我更多参与成长期投资。

And historically, I've done more growth.

比如，我更多关注B轮及之后的阶段，而非早期投资。

Like, I focus more on series b and beyond than I focus on early stage.

所以我是否会比初创期种子投资更早涉足A轮或B轮之类的投资？

So will I do more kind of series a b or whatever we call it these days than inception seed investing, especially at first?

很可能。

Probably.

但重申一次，我们以那些北极星原则为指导，寻找真正能产生共鸣的创始人。

But, again, we're we're guided by those north stars and finding founders that we really resonate with.

通常我们都能在后期找到解决方案，让投资产生卓越回报，实现所有这些目标。

And then, typically, we're able to find ways to make it work on the back end and for our investments to generate exceptional returns and all those things.

所以不同于那些大型基金，他们可能有专门负责A轮、B轮、C轮的投资人，还有分管金融科技、医疗保健等不同领域的团队。

So unlike, you know, a huge mega fund that is like, we have our series a partners, we have our series b partners, we have our series c partners, they do fintech, they do health care, they do blah blah blah.

我们根本不会考虑这些条条框框。

Like, we don't think about those things at all.

我们真正关注的只有核心投资理念——越来越清晰地认识到，实现10倍、20倍甚至30倍回报的路径其实多种多样。

We really just think about our north stars realizing more and more that there's just so many different ways that you can have 10 x, 20 x, 30 x returns.

我和你的一位前同事聊过，他们说'Av是位卓越的成长期投资者，但他始终专注于成长期投资'。

I spoke to one of your former colleagues, and they said, Av is a phenomenal growth investor, but he's a growth investor.

当我思考不同阶段的关键要素时，早期投资看团队，而后期更关注市场潜力——规模、深度以及发展空间。

And when I think about what matters at different stages you know, for me in the early stages, it's people, And in the later stages, it's market actually, sizing, depth, and just how big something can be.

最近Air Walletx以40亿估值完成后期融资。

Recently did Air Walletx late at 4,000,000,000.

太惊人了。

Incredible.

为什么能做到？

Why?

太不可思议了。

Incredible.

但为什么呢？

But why?

因为老兄，B2B支付这玩意儿市场潜力巨大啊。

Because like, dude, fucking b two b payments, It's a big market.

我们还有很大的发展空间。

We got a lot more room to run.

你如何看待早期的这种转变？

How do you think about that shift earlier?

你对此感到紧张吗？

Are you nervous about making it?

在你看来，哪些方面发生了变化？哪些因素最重要？

And what changes and what matters in your mind?

是的。

Yeah.

哈里，我想对你坦诚相告，当时我正在和团队里的埃里克·维斯特里亚共进晚餐时谈到了这件事。

I'll be vulnerable with you, Harry, and say that this was when I was talking, this was this was a dinner I was having with Eric, Vistria on our team.

那时我正对担任Benchmark普通合伙人的角色感到不安，在和他交谈时我说，嘿，

And I was having a moment of insecurity when I was talking to him about the role of of being a a GP at Benchmark and saying, like, hey.

你知道，我主要做的是增长投资。

You know, like, I I've mostly done growth.

他却说，老兄，比尔·格利在加入Benchmark之前可是做公开市场分析的。

And he was like, dude, Bill Gurley was a public markets analyst before before he came to Benchmark.

你肯定不会成为Benchmark有史以来最出格的聘用决定。

Like, you certainly are not gonna be the most, you know, the most off the wall hire that Benchmark has made.

这其实更符合Benchmark的一贯作风。

That's actually more par for the course for Benchmark.

而且我认为，当你看看当今那些杰出的投资人时，你会发现他们都不局限于某个投资阶段。

And I think also when when you look at, like, who do you think are the amazing investors today, I think they transcend stage.

比如帕特·格雷迪，他会自认为是增长型投资人吗？还是说他认为自己就是位杰出的投资人？

Like, you look at Pat Grady, does Pat Grady think of himself as a growth investor, or does Pat Grady think of himself as just an amazing investor?

也许他太谦虚了。

Maybe he's too humble.

他是个相当谦虚的人，所以可能根本不认为自己是个了不起的投资者。

He's a pretty humble guy, so maybe he doesn't think about him himself as an amazing investor at all.

但我看到帕特的所作所为时，我觉得他总能发现那些潜力巨大的创始人和投资项目，并与之合作。

But I look at what Pat does, and I'm like, he finds incredible founders and investments that he thinks have an immense amount of upside, and he goes and partners with those founders.

所以我不会说自己已经是个出色的投资者了。

And so I wouldn't say that I'm an amazing investor yet.

我还没有足够的业绩来证明这点，但这就是我的北极星，是我的目标。

I don't have the track record yet to say that that I am, but, like, that is that is my North Star, and that is my goal.

我会拼命工作来实现这个目标——我觉得自己已经能磨练出直觉判断力了。

And I'm gonna work my ass off to do that where I'm just going to find I think I've I've been able to tune my intuition.

尽管我过去主要用这种直觉做成长阶段投资，但你会发现很多所谓的成长阶段投资者现在也在投早期项目，同时涉足多个阶段。

And even though I've used it to execute on growth stage investing, I think if you look at a lot of even the the people that we think are growth stage investor, they're doing earlier stage companies now and doing a lot of different stages at the same time.

我还以为帕特只是接手他妻子谈成的项目呢。

I thought Pat just did the deals his wife did.

我只是在开玩笑。

I'm just kidding.

哈维是

Harvey was

不。

No.

是他说的，不是我说的，帕特。

He said it he said it, not me, Pat.

是他说的。

He said it.

老兄，我认识他十年了。

Dude, I've known him for ten years.

我早就说过这种话。

I've said this shit.

你可以

You can

离它远点。

get away from it.

我这么说已经好几年了，这就是为什么我觉得他就像，我从未见过哈利。

I've said it for years, and this is why I think he's just like, I've never met Harry.

毫无头绪。

No idea.

显然，确实会变化的是价格，这在不同的阶段确实很重要。

A thing that does change, obviously, is price, and it does matter at different stages.

你如何看待自己与价格的关系？

How do you think about your own relationship to price?

我认为，以成长型投资者的身份开始我的职业生涯，实际上对我帮助很大。

I think almost by starting my career as a growth investor, it actually really helps me.

2022年我回到凯鹏华盈后做的第一笔投资是以150亿美元估值投的SpaceX。

The first investment that I did at Kleiner Perkins when when I came back in 2022 was SpaceX at a $150,000,000,000.

当时的感觉就是，天啊。

And at the time, it's like, oh my god.

1500亿美元的入场价格。

Like, 150 ball billion dollar entry price.

这些绝对数字，我们真的能从中获得良好回报吗？

Like, the the absolute numbers, can we really make a good return on this investment?

不得不经历这个过程，说，嘿。

And having to go through the process of saying, hey.

我们不要只关注一些庞大的绝对数字。

Let's not focus on just some large absolute figure.

比如，看看他们的总可寻址市场(TAM)。

Like, let's look at the TAM.

看看他们在市场中的竞争地位。

Let's look at their competitive position in their market.

看看如果成功会怎样，评估成功的概率，以及谁可能取代他们的位置导致失败。

Let's look at what happens if this goes right, and let's look at the probability of it going right and who could potentially knock them off their perch to make it not go right.

当你真正退后一步审视时，说，嘿。

And when you actually zoomed back and said, hey.

让我们在每个数字后面去掉几个零，无论是市场规模、估值、收入还是其他所有数字。

Let's just, like, take a few zeros off of every single number, the TAM, the valuation, the revenue, everything.

如果你把它看作一个普通的公司，把每个数字都缩小两个数量级，你会觉得这绝对是个稳赚不赔的投资，有10倍回报潜力。

If you were to, like, look at it as a vanilla widget co and just reduce, like, know, two tours of magnitude off of every number, you'd be like, this is an absolute no brainer investment with a 10 x upside case.

进行后期投资实际上能帮助你思考早期阶段的价格，因为它能让你真正考虑清楚。

Doing later stage investing can actually really help you think about price even at the earlier stage because it really makes you think about, okay.

我会忽略那些看起来相对于市场而言过高的入场价格。

Like, I'm gonna ignore what feels like a large entry price relative to market.

如果你所处的市场里人人都说A轮估值1亿美元是标准。

Like, if you're in a market where everyone's like, oh, the series a market's a 100 post.

而如果你以2亿美元估值投资，别人会觉得你疯了，因为贵了两倍——这样你就会错过Rippling在2.5亿美元估值的投资机会。

And, like, if you do something at 200 post, you're an idiot because that's, like, two x more expensive, then you miss rippling at 250.

你知道Mahmoud那个著名的A轮投资吗？当时所有人都觉得他疯了。

You know, the the famous series a that Mahmoud did where everyone's like, this guy's out of his mind.

他给一个几乎没有收入的A轮公司开出了2.5亿美元的估值。

He just paid $2.50 for a series a company that barely has any revenue.

而且，显然，你会错过帕克的卓越之处。

And, obviously, you miss Parker's excellence.

你会错过他瞄准的市场总容量。

You miss the TAM that he's going after.

你会错过产品规划、他将建立的差异化优势，以及他组建的杰出团队。

You miss the product sequencing, the differentiation that he's going to build, and you miss the exceptional team that he had built.

所以我认为，如果你总能试着去独立分析，就像，嘿。

And so I think if you can always try to isolate, like, hey.

我不会在意市场上发生了什么。

I'm not gonna care about what's going on in the market.

我只关心对投资真正重要的因素，以及我认为在理想状态下能有多大的上涨空间。

I'm going to care about what matters for an investment and how much upside I think there is in a vacuum.

我认为这一点重要得多，而且如果你从成长型投资开始职业生涯，实际上是可以领悟到这一点的。

I think that matters a lot more, and it's something that you can actually get if you start your career in growth.

你还记得安德鲁·里德投资Figma的时候吗？

Do you remember when Andrew Reed did Figma?

当时他们大概有4400万美元的误差，而他在400倍时出手了。

And they were, like, $44,000,000 in error, and he did it at 400.

所有人都觉得这家伙能赚100倍。

And everyone was like, this guy is a 100 x.

什么？

What?

疯了。

Nuts.

现在我就像是

Now I'm like One of

SaaS领域首批实现百倍回报的交易之一。

the first 100 x deals, I think, in SaaS.

当时人们都在问，百倍的年度经常性收入？

And people were like, a 100 x ARR?

这怎么可能？

What the hell?

显然，最终结果是30.40倍。

Obviously, it ended up being $30.40 x.

难以置信的投资。

Unbelievable investment.

不过，你们会做结果情景规划吗？

Do you outcome scenario plan, though?

因为你刚才提到市场分析，以及尝试自上而下与自下而上的方法。

Because you said there about market analysis and trying to do top down versus bottoms up.

你对此是怎么考虑的？

How do you think about that?

你难道不担心这可能会误导你走向错误方向吗？

And do you not worry that it can mislead you in the wrong direction?

这个教训主要是我从玛丽那里学到的。

This is a lesson I think I learned from Mary mostly.

这是我最重要的框架之一。

It's one of my most important frameworks.

你应该了解公司的基本情况，或者说基准未来前景是怎样的。

You should understand what the the, like, base case or, like, the base rate future of the company looks like.

假设你是一名股票分析师，这是你研究的第100家公司，你只是简单做了个预测模型，没太花心思，就随便应付说'好吧'。

So if you are, like, an equity analyst and this was your hundredth company that you were doing, like, a little forward model for and you weren't paying that much attention, And you're just like, okay.

就简单粗暴地翻三倍，所以它会翻倍、翻倍、再翻倍，或者诸如此类的。

Just triple tripled, so it's gonna double, double, double, or, like, whatever.

然后你就随便写了个'嘿'。

And you just did like, hey.

这就是市场认为这家公司应该达到的基本水平。

This is what the market thinks is sort of, like, the baseline of what this company should do.

把这些全部列出来并可视化实际上非常有帮助。

It's actually extremely helpful to lay that all out and visualize that.

所以我不会说'哦，这是乐观情况'。

So I don't say, oh, this is the bull case.

这是基本情况，而这是悲观情况。

This is the base case, and this is the bear case.

但我列出了人们正在评估的内容

But I lay out, like, what are people underwriting to?

因为你知道，在成长阶段，人们评估的是大约3到5倍的回报

Because, you know, let's say at the growth stage, people are underwriting to, like, a three to five x.

这在纸面上看起来是怎样的？

What does that look like on paper?

然后这又如何与我心目中这家公司对其客户、市场乃至在某些情况下对美国经济的重要性的框架相吻合

And then how does that jive with my mental framing of how important this company is going to be for its customers, for its market, for The US economy in some cases.

当你对一家正处于转折点、即将爆发式增长的公司有着极其强烈的直觉时，你会审视人们为达成三到五倍增长而设定的数字，然后断言这家公司绝对会远超这些预期。

When you have a really, really strong intuition about a company in the middle of an inflection that's about to absolutely explode, you look at the numbers that people are underwriting to to get to their three to five x, and you say, this company is gonna absolutely smoke these projections.

这种情况极为罕见，但感觉非常美妙，因为它能让你在审视时获得十足的把握，心想：所有人都会低估这件事。

Happens very rarely, but it's really, really nice because it it really gives you the amount of conviction when you look and say, oh, this is just like everyone's gonna underestimate this thing.

我认为模型除了这种简单框架外无用的另一个原因是，每个成功的投资都会让你觉得——如果你试图为Figma的增长建模，所有人都会嘲笑你。

And I think the other reason why models are are not useful beyond that simple framing is that every successful investment, you just feel like, if you were to model Figma's growth, you know, everyone would make fun of you.

你会说，老兄，别闹了。

You'd be like, dude, come on.

就是，你只是想把这笔交易搞定。

Like, you're just trying to get this deal done.

你知道，为什么要建模它增长得这么快这么久，还这么赚钱？

You know, why would you model it growing for this fast for this long, this profitably?

就像，这在SaaS领域从未发生过。

Like, it's never happened in SaaS.

就像，你疯了，或者你就是在对投资委员会不负责任。

Like, you're crazy, or you're just, like, doing the IC a disservice.

所以我认为除了作为检验你信念的标尺外，模型并没有那么有用。

And so I think beyond being, like, a yardstick to test your conviction, models aren't that useful.

但就这一点而言，它们真的非常非常好。

But for that, they're really, really good.

我一直记得Carvana的Ernie上来就说，有多少投资者会说，最大的汽车展厅市值也就3亿美元左右。

I always remember Ernie from Carvana coming on and being like, the amount of investors that would be like, the biggest car showroom is, like, $300,000,000 market cap.

所以，这生意不好。

So, like, this is a bad business.

我一直认为，在投资时围绕市场可比公司打转是件非常危险的事。

And I always think, like, market comps is such a dangerous one to rotate your mind around when investing.

100%同意。

100%.

或者想想Figma与设计师的关系。

Or, you know, Figma with designers.

我记得David George可能在这个节目或其他地方讲过，他当初如何低估了Figma的市场规模——他回去跟团队说'看看全球有多少设计师'。

And I think David George, maybe he was on this show or another, you know, talked about how he, you know, under under misunderstood and understated the TAM of Figma because he was you know, he he went back to the team and said, well, look at how many designers there are in the world.

如果你只是简单计算价格乘以设计师数量，根本得不出这么大的商业潜力。

If you just do the p times q, the price time, the quantity of designers, you don't get that that big of a business.

显然Figma后来渗透到了企业内远不止设计师的更多岗位。

And, obviously, Figma then ended up penetrating a lot more different roles within a company beyond designers.

人员、产品、市场。

People, product, market.

按优先级从高到低排序这三项。

Rank one through three in order of priority for you.

你刚才说的方式，老实说，就是人、产品和市场。

The way you said it, honestly, people, product, and market.

人决定其他一切。

The people define everything else.

他们是推动一切运转的上游引擎。

They are the upstream engine that makes everything go.

他们是最重要的部分。

They're the most important piece.

第二，我认为人们打造的产品也能充分说明人的特质。

Two, I think the product that the people build just tell you so much about also the people.

就像，他们构建的产品是衡量人才质量的最佳证明。

Like, it's it's the greatest evidence of the quality of the people is the product that they build.

然后市场排在第三，显然我相信所在市场最终决定规模，而创始人则决定你能在退出时获取该市场的多少份额。

And then market third, obviously, I am a believer that, like, the market you're in ends up defining the size, and then the founder, you know, determines how how like, what percent of that size you can you can get in your exit.

但我认为这是最具可替代性的因素。

But I just think it's the most fungible.

我认为你无法将一个平庸之人转变为非凡之人。

Like, I don't think you can turn a non exceptional person into an exceptional person.

我不认为你能让一个无法打造好产品的团队突然变得能够打造好产品，但你可以改变市场方向——尤其是在公司早期阶段。

I don't think you can take a team that can't build a good product and make them a a team that can build a good product, but you can change markets, especially early on in a company's life.

大多数卓越企业和成功退出案例都经历过转型，无论是Slack还是其他公司都是如此。

Like, most of the amazing companies and exit stories had some pivot along the road, whether you're talking about Slack or or any of these others.

因此我确实认为，正因市场最具可替代性，它在这三要素中是最不重要的。

So I I I truly think that because it's the most fungible, market is the least important of those three things.

你提到了市场转变。

You said they're the change of markets.

Doug Leone曾在这个节目中说，风险投资已从高利润的精品行业转变为低利润的同质化产业。

It was on this show where Doug Leone said venture capital has transitioned from a high margin boutique community to a low margin commoditized industry.

你认同他这个观点吗？

Do you agree with him in that statement?

我觉得Doug可能是从我这里得到这个想法的。

I think Doug might have gotten that idea from me.

我半开玩笑地说，但我早在2021年就写过这篇文章。

I'm half kidding, but I wrote this piece back in 2021.

我想这就是我们最初私信交流的原因。

I think it's the reason why we first DMed.

文章名为《玩不同的游戏》。

It was called Playing Different Games.

表面上，这篇文章是关于老虎基金的崛起。

Ostensibly, the the piece was about the rise of Tiger.

但文章真正探讨的是围绕提升投资速度作为核心战略的公司级策略的兴起。

But what the piece was really about was the rise of a firm level strategy that surrounded itself around increasing investment velocity as the core strategy.

这个理念认为，即使单笔投资的预期回报率降低，只要每年投入更多资金，公司和普通合伙人就能赚更多钱。

And so the idea being that you could make more money as a firm and as a GP if you invested a lot more money per year even if you thought the forward returns were gonna be lower on average per investment.

就像老虎基金是第一个真正贯彻这个理念并大获成功的机构，他们在2021年募集了150亿美元之类的巨额资金。

And the idea was, like, Tiger was really the first one to take this idea and really, really run with it and make it you know, they raised $15,000,000,000 or whatever they did in 2021.

约翰·柯蒂斯基本上在那18个月里就把这些资金全部部署完毕了。

John Curtis basically deployed it all over the that eighteen month period.

最讽刺的是这篇文章最底部的部分。

And at the very bottom, this is the ironic part of that piece.

在最底部，我曾说过风险投资将会两极分化。

At the very bottom, I said venture capital is going to bifurcate.

一端是老虎基金模式——高资本周转率、每年大量资金投入、低接触、优厚报价，给创始人非常好的条件。

And on one end, you're going to have the tiger model, which is high capital velocity, lot of money out the door every single year, low touch, good prices, like giving giving founders really good prices.

而另一端我列举了谁呢？

And on the other end, who did I have?

讽刺的是，我列举了基准资本。

I had benchmark, ironically.

那将成为高接触的精品模式。

And, like, that is going to be, like, the craft that is going to be high touch.

对创业者而言，那将是最佳信号——他们会深度参与其中。

It's gonna be the best signal that you can get if you're a founder, they're and gonna be very, very involved.

而中间地带，我当时说就像杰西潘尼百货基金那样的死亡区域。

And then in the middle, I was like, we have the JCPenney funds, which is like the dead zone.

我觉得最疯狂的是，过去四年发生了什么，哈里？

And I think, like, the crazy thing to me is, like, what what's happened over the last four years, Harry?

有多少公司转向了老虎基金那一端？

How many firms have moved towards the tie Tiger side of the spectrum?

老虎基金消亡了，而我们在过去四年里又冒出了六七个类似的基金。

Like, Tiger died, and we got six or seven more tigers out of, like, in the last four years.

当然，很多基金采取不同策略，比如Thrive和Founders Fund专注于对极高质量公司进行高度集中的投资。

And, obviously, a lot of these firms are are running different strategies, you know, Thrive and Founders Fund doing extremely concentrated investments in really high quality companies.

还有像Lightspeed和GC这样的巨型基金在按自己的方式运作。

You have the mega funds like Lightspeed and GC doing their thing.

虽然资本流动速度作为北极星有很多不同表现形式，但现在有六到八家基金以资本流动速度、投资速度作为他们的北极星。

It's a lot of different, you know, flavors of capital velocity as a north star, but there are six to eight firms now doing capital velocity, investment velocity as their north star.

这也是为什么我对高信念投资和加入Benchmark非常有信心的原因之一。

And that was one of the reasons why I was really confident in high conviction and joining Benchmark.

因为看看有多少一线品牌向Benchmark那端靠拢——基本上没有。

Because if you look how many of those tier one brands have moved more towards the Benchmark side of the scale, there's basically none.

我能追问一下吗？

Can I just push you?

你认为他们是以资本周转率为北极星指标吗？

Do you think they are doing Capital Velocity as their North Star?

我认为Josh会强烈反对这种说法，尤其是来自Thrive的立场。

I think Josh would ardently push back on that from Thrive.

我甚至觉得这说法套用在Lightspeed和GC身上都不合适。

And I I don't even think you could apply it to Lightspeed and GC.

我认为他们追求的是大额支票投资，这就是为什么他们必须押注这些巨型公司——有时需要部署5亿美元资金。

I think they're solving for large checks, which is why they have to be in these mega companies because they need to deploy 500,000,000 in some cases.

但我不认为他们追求速度的方式与Tiger相同。

But I don't feel like they're solving for velocity in the same way that Tiger were.

我要反驳这个观点。

I would push back.

这里有两层含义。

Well, there's two things.

所以我认为，显然现在这里面有不同的细分领域。

So I think, obviously, there's there's different, like, subsegments of this now.

让我们以实际的大型基金为例，我认为这是最遵循这一策略的人群。

Let's take the actual mega fund, the people that I think are most following this this strategy.

如果你要问，像GC。或Lightspeed这样的顶级基金，是否将投资速度作为北极星战略？

If you were to say, well, are GC or Lightspeed or some of these mega funds, is the strategy investment velocity as a north star?

要回答这个问题，我会建议你去和这些公司的初级合伙人、中层合伙人以及普通员工聊聊。

To answer that question, I would have you go talk to the principals, the junior partners, and the associates at those firms.

如果你采访10个这样的人，然后告诉我资本速度不是这些公司的北极星。

You interview 10 of those people, and you tell me that capital velocity is not the north star of those firms.

我会向你认输，Harry。

I will cede victory to you, Harry.

我认为当你真正观察基层的运作情况时，Ravi或Hermann说什么并不重要。

I think when you actually look at what's going on at the ground floor, it doesn't matter what Ravi or Hermann are saying.

当你真正观察实际情况时， 那些真正在做这些投资的人，他们深有体会。

When you actually look at what's going on, the people actually going and doing these investments, they feel it.

他们觉得必须把钱投出去，这是他们在那些机构获得晋升的唯一途径。

They feel that they need to get money out that door, and that's the only way that they're getting promoted up those organizations.

所以我认为这非常、非常真实。

So I think it's very, very real.

在Thrive这边，我同意你的观点。

On the Thrive side, I agree with you.

我觉得乔什会反感这种描述，可能这种描述太过直白了。

I I think that that Josh would resent that characterization, and it was probably too blunt of a characterization.

但话说回来，我认为潜意识里这仍然是家（遵循该策略的）机构。

But, again, I I I think subconsciously still is a firm.

很难去关心那些不是你主要业务的东西。

It's hard to care about something that's not your main product.

当你开出十亿美元支票时，那就是你的主营业务。

And when you're writing billion dollar checks, that is your main product.

这才是能让你赚大钱的东西。

Like, it's that's what's gonna make you all the money.

如果你向OpenAI投资30亿美元，它会变成120亿美元，无论是有意还是无意，潜意识里都极难再去想着'我们同时也要成为最优秀的A轮投资机构，并且同样重视A轮投资'。

If you put $3,000,000,000 in OpenAI and it's gonna turn into $12,000,000,000, it it just subconsciously, whether it's conscious or not, it is unbelievably hard to then go and be like, we're also going to be the best series a firm, and we care just as much about series a.

因为何必呢？

Because why would you?

因为95%的利润和你口袋里的钱，都将来自你投给Databricks的10亿美元，或是投给OpenAI的30亿美元，或是那些已成为你主营业务的投资项目。

Because 99 or not not like, 95% of the profit that you're going to make and the money in your pocket is going to come from the billion dollars you put in Databricks or the $3,000,000,000 you put in OpenAI or any of those things that have ended up being your main product.

你不可能面面俱到并全力以赴。

You just can't focus on everything and give it your all.

所以我认为，尽管对Founderscore和Thrive这类机构来说不那么明显，但潜意识里这已成为他们的主营业务和关注焦点。

And I think so even though it's less conscious for those firms like Founderscore and Thrive, it has become their main product and their main focus subconsciously.

如果我们接受这点，人们往往会转向——而且他们会做得更差。

If we accept that, people then often move to the and they're gonna do worse.

我们接受较低的回报率，因为他们有挪威树养老金基金。

We accept a lower rate of return because they have the Norwegian tree pension fund.

年化4%，这就是他们的目标。

One's 4% a year, and so that's what they're going for.