20VC：从仅限OpenAI到坚定支持Anthropic：OpenAI在企业市场的衰落 | Harvey与Legora：法律AI是赢家通吃 | Max Junestrand，Legora首席执行官，单日实现700万美元年经常性收入，三轮融资共筹集2亿美元，无需商业计划书

所以，克莱尔·戈特利布，你知道的，那种白鞋华尔街律所，还有古德温和普罗克特，是全球顶尖的风投律所之一。

So Cleary Gottlieb, you know, White Shoe, Wall Street firm, Goodwin and Procter, one of the best VC firms in in the world.

我认为这两家都是美国排名前20的律所。

And I think both are in the top 20 law firms in The US.

我们能够与这两家合作，并让他们相信，我们能比其他任何公司更好地支持他们。

We were able to work with both of them and give them confidence that we could support them better than anybody else.

这给了我信心，让我前往美国并组建一支团队。

That gave me the confidence to go to The US and hire a team.

在美国组建团队的绝佳之处在于，员工离职只需要两周时间。

And the awesome thing about building a team in The US is it takes two weeks for people to leave.

我们可以聊聊美国和欧洲的一些差异，但我认为，美国与瑞典等地相比，解雇周期短，实际上是美国设立大型办公室的一个结构性优势。

We can talk about some of the differences between, you know, US, Europe, but I think the the termination period in The US versus in, let's say, Sweden is actually one of the structural benefits of having a big office in The US.

那具体是怎么比较的？

So how does it compare?

在美国，离职只需要两周。

Two weeks to leave in The US.

每个人都有三个月的试用期。

Three months on like, everybody has three months.

对你作为创始人来说，这在团队搭建速度上简直是天壤之别。

And for you as a founder, that is a night and day difference in terms of ramp.

我们每个季度规模都翻倍。

We've doubled in size every quarter.

只要我知道需要某个人，如果等一个季度，我们公司就已经不一样了。

And the minute I know that I need somebody, if they wait a quarter, we're a different company.

对吧？

Right?

太疯狂了。

It's wild.

所以你得好好规划，首先，我在欧洲比在美国更得仔细预测我们的人员编制，因为在欧洲，事情就像啪啪一样慢。

So you just need to well, for one, I need to try and predict our headcount plan much more diligently in Europe than I do in The US because there it's like pa pa.

但真正优秀的人才，两周内就能到位。

But really awesome people can just turn up in two weeks.

所以，你给那些在美国扩张但不想投入大量资源的创始人的最大建议，就是可以通过免费增值模式从欧洲进行测试？

So your biggest advice to founders on scaling in The US without committing large resources would be that you can do a freemium and test it from Europe?

是的。

Yes.

当然。

For sure.

我觉得我们能做到，那你为什么不能呢？

Well, I think we we could, so why can't you?

而且我们非常侧重企业市场，所以情况可能不同。

And we're very enterprise, so that might be different.

我们在美国并没有在营销或B2C内容上投入大量资金。

We did not need to invest a ton in marketing or, like, b to c content in The US.

我只需要参加一些演示，飞几次，展示产品，运行几个试点项目，总是竞争性的试点。

I could just get on demos and get on a few flights, demo the product, run a few pilots, you know, always competitive pilots.

然后，在合作伙伴层面，展示我们愿意配合这些公司的高远目标。

And then, again, on the partnership level, show that we were willing to work with these firms on their ambition level because it's very high.

我们合作的公司并不把人工智能当作一项应付差事。

The firms that we work with are not treating AI as a check the box exercise.

他们不是说，哦，买个东西，推下去，就完事了。

It's not, oh, let's buy, you know, this thing, let's roll it out, and we're done.

他们的目标是成为凭借对人工智能和技术的深刻理解而主导市场的公司。

It's we wanna be the firm that dominates our market because we understand AI and technology better than any other firm.

再回到美国市场和扩张的问题上，你后悔等了这么久吗？

Just going back to The US and the expansion there, do you regret waiting as long as

你等了这么久，后悔吗？

you did?

没有。

No.

我跟你说过吗？我曾决定六个月不销售产品。

Did I tell you that I took a decision to not sell the product for six months?

没有。

No.

所以，为了给你一些背景，我们的第一次董事会会议是在YC期间举行的，当时我们从Benchmark融资了1000万美元，一个月后又从Redpoint融资了2500万美元，那时我们团队只有12个人。

So our first board meeting so to give you some context, we were at YC, we raised $10,000,000 from Benchmark, a month later we raised another 25,000,000 from Redpoint, and we had our first board meeting, and we were like 12 people at the time.

第一次董事会会议，参与者包括Benchmark、Redpoint和三位创始人。

First board meeting, it's Benchmark, Redpoint, and three founders.

我们坐下来，我告诉他们，接下来的六个月我们不会出售任何产品。

And we sit down, and I tell them that we are not going to sell at all for the next six months.

Redpoint的人看着我，我想他们有点紧张，因为他们在只和我见面了一个小时四十五分钟后，就给了我们一个很高的估值。

Redpoint sort of looked at me, and they were, I think, a little nervous that they had met me for basically an hour and forty five minutes and given me Paid a walk walk off off price.

我出现时说：我们不会出售。

And I was showing up, and I said, we're not gonna sell.

Redpoint这轮融资的估值是多少？

What price was the Redpoint round?

1.50美元。

$1.50.

这很有趣。

That's interesting.

你后悔做了这一轮融资吗？我不是说红点资本，而是做了这一轮。

Do you regret taking I'm not saying RevPoint, but doing that round.

不后悔。

No.

因为这会导致很大的股权稀释。

Because that's a lot of dilution.

是的。

Yeah.

在刚完成Benchmark融资两个月后，你并不需要钱，却以1.5美元的价格融了2500万美元。

25 at $1.50 when you didn't need the money two months after a benchmark.

对。

Yeah.

但你当时不可能知道你不需要这笔钱。

But you you couldn't know that you didn't need the money.

如果我没记错的话，我们的一个竞争对手在之后很快也完成了另一轮融资。

And if I remember correctly, one of our competitors did another round quite quickly after.

所以我认为这很好地证明了市场对Leguora股票的兴趣。

So I think it was good to solidify that there's interest in Leguora stock.

现在我只是在归档邮件，因为收到的咨询太多了。

And now I just get, like you know, at this point, I'm just archiving emails because because I'm getting too much inbound.

但回到之前，哪

But back Which

这就是我发WhatsApp的原因。

is why I send WhatsApps.

是的。

Yeah.

但那时候这是一件好事。

But back then that's a good thing.

这是一件好事。

That's a good thing.

那时候，他们，你知道的，我转过身来说，嘿。

Back then, they were you know, I I turned around and said, hey.

我们不会出售。

We're not gonna sell.

我们需要尽快达成目标，因为我们只有一次机会。

We need to get to the point because we only have one shot.

我们只有一次机会与这些律师打交道，因为他们非常没有耐心。

We only have one shot with these lawyers because they are very impatient.

如果这次不成功，他们就不会再回来了。

If it doesn't work, they're not gonna come back.

这就是为什么在产品中，激活和实现价值的时间如此重要。

And that's why activation and getting that, like, the time to value is so important in the product.

但回到过去，我们花了六个月时间计算了时间，决定不卖。

But to go back, we took six months, calculate the time, and said we're not going to sell.

我们必须解决我们的基础设施、可靠性以及产品的可扩展性，我们需要重建和重构大量代码，因为它们只是仓促搭建起来的。

We have to solve our infrastructure, our reliability, the scalability of the product, and we're gonna need to rebuild and refactor a lot of it because it has just been quickly put together.

我们告诉所有客户，我们很幸运，因为当时是夏天，我们可以说：哦，欧洲正在放暑假，所以我们不工作。

And what we told all the clients were we were lucky, you know, it was summer because we could say, oh, it's, you know, summer in Europe, so we're not working.

我们打算等夏天过后再为您办理入驻。

And we're gonna wait to onboard you after summer.

需求量太大了，我们不得不等到十月，因为九月已经完全排满了。

And there's so much demand that we're gonna have to do it in October because September is, like, completely full.

我们无法再接纳更多客户。

We can't onboard more clients.

但在2024年10月1日，我们已经能够轻松地每天为一千名律师办理产品入驻。

But 10/01/2024, we were ready to onboard a thousand lawyers a day comfortably on the product.

我们达到了这个阶段，然后就开始了重组。

And we got to that point, and then we started to do RIP.

我很自豪自己有勇气告诉投资者，这是正确的计划。

And I'm very proud that I had the guts to tell the investors that that was the right plan.

因为我认为，如果我们继续强行推进，只会把一切都搞砸。

Because I think if we had continued to push, we would have just churned everything.

所以当你回顾美国扩张的时机时，你不觉得你们本可以更早行动，而不至于让出这么多地盘吗？

So when you look back at the timing of The US expansion, do you not think you could have gone sooner and not ceded so much ground?

不过说真的，我不认为我们让出了很多地盘，如果这么说的话，我们正在赢回很多地盘。

Well, for what it's worth, I don't I don't think we conceded a lot of ground, and we are winning back a lot of ground, if you put it that way.

所以客户没有忠诚度吗？

So customers aren't loyal?

没有。

No.

我认为每个人都仍将这视为一个长期的试点项目和对人工智能的一种选择。

I think everybody is still treating this as an extended pilot and an option on AI.

就像一个看涨期权。

It's like a call option.

他们不会签五年合同。

They're not doing five year contracts.

他们签的是一到三年的合同。

They're doing one to three year contracts.

在律所的时间尺度上，这简直转瞬即逝。

And in law firm time, that's just, you know, that's a blink.

这些公司中的许多已经存在了两百年。

Many of these firms have been around for two hundred years.

所以两年可能相当于我们半辈子，但对他们来说，这只是很短的时间。

So two years might be half of our lifetime, but for them, it's it's a short time.

所以当我们看数据时，Harvey的客户保留率是98%的品牌保留率，净收入留存率为178%。

So when we look at the numbers, the retention for Harvey's is 98% logo retention, a 178 net revenue retention.

你们也有这么好的数据吗？

Do you have as good numbers?

对于这两个数字，是的。

So for both those numbers, yes.

但在净收入留存率方面，我认为我不太适合评论，因为我们的增长大部分并非来自2024年合同的续约。

But on NRR, I don't think that's a fair number for me to comment on because so much of our growth is not about renewing contracts from 2024.

在2025年12月的单日，我们在24小时内新增了700万美元的年度经常性收入。

In a single day in 2025 in December, we added 7,000,000 of ARR one day in twenty four hours.

这一数字超过了我们在2023年和2024年两年的总和。

And that was more than what we did in 2023 and 2024 combined.

因此，NRR和客户保留率，到2026年才能确定这些真实数据会是多少。

And so NRR and logo retention, you know, it's up to 2026 to determine where those, you know, real numbers will be.

我认为，就这一点而言，这些产品能够广泛适用的能力将非常有趣，因为某种程度上，我们最初针对的是AI可以解决的一些使用场景。

And I think for for what it's worth, the ability of these products to go quite broad will be very interesting because, you know, to some extent, there's initial use cases that you can solve with AI that we target.

随着我们与客户相处的时间越来越长，我们看到的问题和机会也越来越多。

And then the more time we spend with our clients, the more problems and opportunities we see.

因此，产品本身正在迅速扩展。

And so what's happening to the product is they're growing quite a lot.

所以我认为，这将演变成一个类似套件、类似平台的模式，逐渐成为他们开展工作的核心系统。

And so what I think will happen is that this will be like a suite, like a platform kind of play that just becomes more and more of the central system where they do their work.

那么从NRR的角度来看，你们是按席位收费，还是按任务收费，还是按

So on an NRR standpoint, do you charge on a per seat basis or on a per task basis or on

按任务量收费？

a volume per task basis?

我们是按席位收费的。

We charge on a per seat basis.

这最理想吗？

Is that optimal?

我认为这对买家来说是最理想的。

I think that's optimal for the buyer.

我不觉得这对我们来说最理想。

I don't think that's optimal for us.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我会，而且是

So I'll And is

这不像是在解决一个历史常态，而是面向未来。

that not like solving for a historical norm, not a future Yes.

确实是。

It is.

实际上，我认为这种定价方式并不合适。

I actually don't think it's the right pricing Yeah.

我认为这应该是基于消耗的。

I think it should be consumption based.

是的。

Yeah.

因为个别用户可能会产生极高的大语言模型成本，导致按用户计算变得根本不可持续。

Because you can have individual users racking up such big LLM costs that it it basically becomes unsustainable on on a per user basis.

我们之所以这样设计，是因为需要让买家使用起来更简单。

The reason why we have that is you need to make it easy for the buyer.

如果他们不知道如何管理基于消耗的定价模式，那就不能采用。

If they don't know how to manage a consumption based pricing model, you can't have it.

我认为这会有所转变。

And I think that will pivot.

我不太确定具体的时间点。

And I'm unsure exactly what the timing is.

我认为时机更多取决于客户是否准备好了，而不是我们是否准备好了。

I think the timing is more around when the clients are ready versus when we are ready.

因此，任务扩展对用户留存非常有用，但对收入优化帮助不大。

And so task expansion is incredibly useful for retention, not for revenue optimization.

换句话说，用户使用得越多，留存的可能性就越大，但这并不会真正增加你的收入。

In other words, the more they do, it's more likely they are to retain, but it doesn't actually help your dollars.

对。

Right.

不对。

No.

实际上成本更高。

It actually costs more.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，用户使用产品越多，反而是件坏事。

I mean, so it's it's a bad thing the more they use the product.

但是

But

你们的利润率高吗？

Do you have good margins?

我们的利润率还行。

We have okay margins.

我欣赏你这个回答的坦诚。

I respect the honesty of that answer.

是的。

Yeah.

这并不是销售利润率，而且我认为需要一些时间才能达到。

It's it's it's not sales margins, And I think it will take time to get there.

你认为能实现吗？

Will it get there, you think?

或者说是的。

Or is Yes.

我觉得会达到的。

I think it will get there.

我不但认为它会达到目标，而且我认为你们在定价上相对于传统法律文书产品将具有惊人的优势。

Not only do I think it will get there, but I think your ability to price versus traditional sauce products will be insanely high.

因为你们过去常常使用这些产品来完成非常狭窄的工作环节，而且它们彼此都是孤立的。

Because you used to use a lot of these products to do very narrow parts of the work, and they were all disconnected.

为了让你了解律师的日常工作，就像你们有一个产品用来比较两份合同。

To give you an insight into the life of a lawyer, it's like you have this product over here that you use to compare two contracts.

你们还有一个产品用来从合同中提取相关信息。

You have this product over here that you use to extract relevant data from contracts.

你们还有另一个产品用来查询法律法规。

You have this other product over here where you go and look up legislation.

你们还有一个产品用来查询判例法。

You have this other product over here where you go and look up case law.

对吧？

Right?

所有这些不同的工具。

All these all these different things.

所以作为人类，你不得不坐在那里，逐一浏览所有这些不同的系统，自己去整合这些信息。

So you as the human had to sit there, comb through all these different systems, like, aggregate the stuff yourself.

但现在，类似于OPUS 4.5，你只需要把任务交给Liguora，任务可以是任意的，然后让它自己去处理。

But now, similar to OPUS 4.5, you're just gonna send the task to Liguora, and it can be pretty arbitrary, then you let it figure it out.

它会去完成所有工作，或者至少完成大部分工作，而且速度更快、质量更高。

And it just goes and does all the work, or at least a big portion of the work, in a much, much, much, much shorter time at a very high quality level.

当你这么做时，你不再是和其它SaaS产品进行价格对比。

And when you do that, you are not being priced against the other SaaS products.

你是在和‘我请一位律师去实际完成这项工作要花多少钱’进行对比。

You're being priced against, you know, what would I pay a lawyer to go out and actually do this work.

那么三年后，你们还会采用按席位收费的模式吗？

So in three years time, will you still have seat based pricing?

绝对不会再用了。

Absolutely not.

那这种变化什么时候发生？

When does that change?

当我们的客户准备好按使用量付费时。

When our clients are ready to buy on consumption.

你为什么这么有信心这会在

Why do you sound so confident that will

三年内实现呢？

be within three years respectfully?

因为，你知道，Cursor 是按使用量计费的，许多其他企业工具也是按使用量设计的。

Because, you know, cursor is consumption, a lot of other enterprise tools are for consumption.

我只是觉得法律领域需要多一点时间。

I just think legal takes a little bit more time.

但三年内呢？

But within three years?

嗯，你要明白我的立场。

Well, look, like, you gotta understand my vantage point.

三年时间比我担任 Leguora 首席执行官的时间还要长。

Three years is longer than I've been CEO at Leguora for.

所以对我来说，三年在未来是一段非常长的时间。

So three years for me is is a very long time going forward.

在边际优化方面，这有点像，当然，我们投资了Lovable，他们能够根据任务进行模型选择，并因此优化边际收益。

On the margin optimization side, is it a little bit like, know, obviously, we're investors in Lovable, where they're able to do model selection dependent on task and optimize margin because of that.

当然，你可以这么做，我们也在一定程度上这样做。

You can do that, of course, which we do to some extent.

但我觉得我们还不到进行边际优化的时候。

But it's also I don't think we're in the margin optimization time yet.

你现在正处于抢占市场的阶段。

You're in the land grab time.

是的。

Yes.

这样表达才对。

That's the right way to phrase it.

在抢占市场的阶段，你面临的最大挑战是什么？

In the land grab time, what is the biggest challenge that you face?

我们目前面临的最大挑战是从30人增长到300人，然后在接下来两个季度内从300人再翻倍到600人，同时还要保持那份让我们走到今天的雄心、诚信、团队合作和纯粹的坚韧精神。

Biggest challenge that we have right now is growing from 30 to 300, and then doubling again in the next two quarters from 300 to 600 and maintaining the ambition, integrity, teamwork, and just, like, raw grit that got us here when you double the team.

我想我们刚在美国聘了两位新员工，他们对大家工作到这么晚感到非常惊讶。

I think we we just hired two two new people in The US, and they were really surprised by how late everybody was working.

他们说：‘我之前待的另一家法律科技公司，大家六点就下班了。’

They were like, oh, at the at the other place I was at, which was a, you know, another another legal tech provider, everybody left at six.

而我们却要在办公室里八点才吃晚饭。

We And have dinner in the office at eight.

所以当你们全球的整个团队都以这种水平和节奏，带着明确的目标在运转时，这真是太棒了。

And so when your entire team globally operates at that level and at that pace with that, you know, goal in mind, that's awesome.

但我非常在意保持这种状态。

But I care a lot about maintaining that.

要怎么维持这么多东西呢？

There's so many maintain that?

嗯，我仍然亲自面试每一个人。

Well, I still interview everyone.

所以我经常会问一些很尖锐的问题：为什么选择这份艰苦的工作？你本可以去别处上班。

So I ask quite brutal questions about why take a hard job, you could go work somewhere else.

我努力培养的是传教士，而不是雇佣兵。

I try to create missionaries, not mercenaries.

我认为我们在这方面做得非常成功。

And I think we've successfully done that.

我也觉得，你会被这种氛围吸引进去。

I also think that you you get pulled in.

当你看到别人都在这样做的时候，你就会想：好吧。

Like, when you see everybody else doing it, you're just like, okay.

当然，我也要这么做。

Of course, I'm gonna do it.

势头会催生更多的势头。

And momentum breeds momentum.

比如，我们在除夕夜还在签合同。

Like, we were signing deals on New Year's Eve.

我们在喝格鲁格酒——或者那玩意儿叫什么来着的时候，吃了顿丰盛的圣诞晚餐。

We had a big Christmas dinner whilst we were having glug or what's it called?

骡子酒？

Mule wine?

是的。

Yeah.

你们瑞典也有这个。

You have that in Sweden.

我们在晚餐前就喝了酒，当时还把大型销售仪表盘摆在酒席旁边。

We were having the wine before the before the dinner, and we had the big sales dashboard, like, at the wine thing.

每个人都不断往那儿看，因为大家都想要势头。

And everybody kept looking at it because, like, everybody wants momentum.

每个人都想赢。

Everybody wants to win.

当你加入一家公司并感觉自己是个赢家时，我觉得你会在做那些让你感觉不到胜利的工作时感到精疲力尽。

And when you join a company and you feel like a winner, I think you get burned out doing work that you know, where where you don't feel like you're winning.

你认为竞争有助于营造这种氛围吗？

Do you think competition is helpful in creating that vibe?

绝对如此。

A 100%.

当然。

Of course.

你会不会点起火苗，这么说吧，来助长这种势头？

Do you light the Tinder, so to speak, and fuel the fire?

哦，是的。

Oh, yes.

实际上，我觉得我在这方面很擅长。

I think I'm very good at it, actually.

竞争可以在宏观层面进行，比如我们对抗他们，但也可以在微观层面进行，比如我们的市场团队想成为最出色的市场团队，或者我们的工程师想比其他团队更快地完成文档上传。

And competition can be played at a macro level, where you think us versus them, but you can also do it at a lower level, which is our marketing team wants to be that marketing team, or our engineers want to build a faster document upload time than that other team.

因此，你在这些微观层面上展开竞争，并疯狂地庆祝每一次胜利。

So you compete on all these micro levels, and you celebrate them like crazy.

今年我学到的一点是，我以前其实很不擅长庆祝。

What I've learned this year, I actually used to be quite bad at celebrating.

我记得上商学院的时候，我梦想的工作是去麦肯锡，因为我觉得那里聚集了所有优秀的人。

I remember when I was in in business school, my my dream job was to go to McKinsey because I thought that that's where that's where all the amazing people went.

后来我发现，也许情况并非如此。

I found out maybe that that was not the case.

但当我接到电话、拿到这份工作时，我正在超市，于是买了一包花生来庆祝。

But when I when I got the call and I got the job, I was in the in the grocery store, and I celebrated by buying a bag of peanuts.

哇。

Wow.

是的。

Yeah.

那有点疯狂。

That was a bit crazy.

所以我以前真的很不擅长庆祝，特别不擅长。

So I was really bad at celebrating, like really bad.

这解释了你为什么这么瘦，但是但是

Explains why you're so thin, but but

今年，我们学会了庆祝，这太棒了。

this year, we've learned to celebrate, and it's amazing.

你越是拼命庆祝胜利，就越能深刻感受到失败。

You celebrate the wins really hard because then you also really feel the losses.

因为我认为，当你有势头、有成功的时候，很容易被突如其来的状况打个措手不及。

Because I think it's it's easy to get to be blindsided if you have momentum and you have success.

你需要

You need

看清世界的本来面目。

to see the world for what it is.

我听你的某些投资者说，Harvey内部的人称你为他们的CPO，说到团队对比的话。

I heard from some of your investors that internals at Harvey call you their CPO, speaking of comparisons of teams.

嗯，我觉得你会有

Well, I I think you'll have

去问他们。

to ask them.

这很有趣。

That's funny.

我打算问你。

I am gonna ask you.

他们抄袭过你的产品吗？

Have they ripped your product?

嗯，我认为我们在尽可能快且高质量地开发产品方面感到非常自豪。

Well, I think we take a lot of pride in developing our product as fast and as well as we can.

我认为我们的产品开发主要有两个方面。

And I think there's two main parts to to our product development.

一个是改进我们现有的部分，另一个是做出新的合理判断。

One of them is improving the parts that we have, and the other one is making new qualified bets.

我认为我们过去一直有做出大胆且正确的判断。

I think we have had a history of making bold and correct bets.

我认为有很多法律科技产品，表面上看起来非常相似。

I think there's many legal tech products that on the surface looks pretty similar.

甚至还有另一个产品，直接抄了我们的名字，就是我们的表格评审功能。

There's even another product where they ripped our name and it's it's, you know, our tabular review.

他们的产品就直接叫‘表格评审’，这完全没问题。

It's just called tabular review in their product, which is totally fine.

但当你进入这些竞争性试点时，用户开始深入拆解这些产品，这时你就会发现，一个产品像劳斯莱斯，或者可能是沃尔沃，而另一个产品则像是廉价版本。

But what happens when you then go into these competitive pilots and the user starts to kind of rip them apart, that's where you see that one product is a Rolls Royce and or maybe a Volvo, and the other product is maybe a cheaper version.

在产品决策中，有哪些事情在 hindsight 看来是错误的？

What product decision did you make that with the benefit of hindsight was a mistake?

你从中学会了什么？

And what did you learn?

2023 年推出的 Legora 产品第一版，完全走错了方向。

The first version of the Legora product back in 2023, that was completely the wrong direction.

我们围绕几个核心使用场景构建了它，但没有一个能够执行这些任务的智能代理或聊天功能。

We built it centered around a couple of core use cases, and we did not have an agent or a chat that could operate over those tasks.

那只是一个点击和指向的使用场景，明显走错了方向。

It was like a click and point use case, clearly the wrong direction.

在我们入选iCombinator后，我们删除了所有那部分代码。

So after we got accepted into iCombinator, we deleted all of that code.

我认为我们通过早期采用做出了不错的决策——当时LangChain太差了，所以我们自己构建了代理架构。

I think we made some good product decisions by very early adopting basically, LangChain was too bad at the time, so we built our own agent architecture.

我们很早就做了这件事，我对此非常自豪。

And we did that very early, which I'm very proud of.

那确实是应该继续走下去的正确方向。

And that was, like, the right direction to continue on.

那你们现在还有吗？

Now You still have that today?

没有。

No.

它已经被彻底重构了很多次。

I I it's been completely rebuilt many times.

我最后一次提交代码是在2020年10月。

I last committed code in October 2020.

但我很好奇，你们如何看待越来越多的公司，比如Deal或Revolut，选择构建自己的完整垂直软件？

But I'm just intrigued as to how you think about that we're seeing more and more companies, a la Deal or a la Revolut Yeah.

构建自己的完整垂直软件？

Build their own complete vertical software?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得我们还没达到Revolut或Deal那样的规模，所以对我们来说，这么做可能并不划算。

I think we're not the size of Revolut or Deal, and so it probably doesn't make sense for us to do that.

而且LangChain以及其周边的许多工具已经进步了很多。

And Langchain and a lot of their surrounding tools have gotten a lot better.

所以我认为我们现在的工作，以及我们的工程团队，是挑选最好的第三方工具。

And so I think we're in the job of, and our engineering team is in the picking the best third party things.

对。

Yeah.

我们做的另一个正确的（或错误的）产品决策是，我们同时做了太多事情。

The other right product decision we made or wrong was that we were doing too many things.

所以在2024年，我们有12名工程师，却试图同时开发六七个不同的产品。

So in 2024, we were 12 engineers, and we were trying to build six or seven different things at the same time.

这造成了很多混乱，因为当时我深度参与了产品决策，但主要精力却放在了市场推广上。

And that was creating a lot of confusion because I was very involved in the product decisions at the time, and I was basically just out doing go to market.

因此，很多产品决策没有让我参与，结果产品看起来就像一个拼凑起来的弗兰肯斯坦怪物。

And so we'd make a lot of product decisions without me in the loop, and then it kinda looked like a Frankenstein monster.

实际上，2024年10月或11月有一份很有趣的文档，名叫《莉亚产品宣言》。

There's actually a pretty funny doc from October or November 2024 that was called the Leia product manifesto.

天啊。

Gosh.

我记得。

I remember.

是的。

Yeah.

我们当时叫Leia。

We were Leia.

到了2025年，我们仍然叫Leia。

In 2025, we were still called Leia.

是的。

Yeah.

我记得。

I remember.

这份文件大致说明了我们要做三件事，但我们要把这三件事做到极致，让我们的产品套件成为花钱能买到的最棒组合。

And it basically outlined that we were gonna do three things, but we were gonna do those three things so well that our suite was the best basket money could buy.

我们的产品包括智能代理、助手、表格审查功能和Word插件。

And it was our agent, our assistant, our tabular review, and our word add in.

当时我们是在和本地的这些产品竞争。

And we were competing with local products for these different things.

对吧？

Right?

比如，我们的文字添加功能要和许多只专注于文字添加功能的法律科技公司竞争。

Like the word add in was competing with a bunch of other legal tech companies that were only focused on the word add in.

我们的表格审查功能当时要和Hebia等公司竞争，它们只专注于表格审查，或者他们称之为矩阵的功能。

Our tabular review was competing with, at the time, Hebia, companies who were only focused on, like, tabular review as or the matrix, I think they call it.

然后我们还有我们的智能代理。

And then we had our our agent.

但我们说，如果我们把这三项功能以非常用户友好的方式整合在一起，这个套件就会比分别购买这三项功能更好。

But we said, if we have all of these three things and we combine them in a very user friendly way, that suite is gonna be better than buying all of these three things separately.

这就是所谓的平台策略或套件策略。

And that's kind of the platform play or the suite play.

这完全是正确的决定。

That was totally the right move.

所以我们取消了正在开发的五六个其他功能，直接删除了代码，然后全身心投入这三项功能。

So we removed five or six other things that we were building, just deleted the code, and then we hard committed on these things.

当你审视整个行业格局，思考这种捆绑与解绑的策略时，回顾今天的局面，你认为三到五年后的行业格局会是什么样子？

When you look at the landscape, when you think about kind of that bundling versus unbundling, how you thought about that, when you look at the landscape today, how does that landscape look in three to five years?

如果我们 okay，这是个赢者通吃的局面吗？

Is this a win and take if we okay.

其实，更好的问法是，这是像 Uber 和 Lyft 这样的模式，

Actually, a much better way to ask that is, is this an Uber and a Lyft,

还是像 Google Cloud、AWS、Azure 这样的模式？

or is this a Google Cloud, AWS, Azure?

我不认为这是 Uber 和 Lyft 的原因在于，Uber 和 Lyft 之间没有任何产品差异。

The reason why I don't think it's a Uber and Lyft is because in Uber and Lyft, there was no product differentiation.

它们的产品几乎一模一样。

The products were pretty much the same.

它是

It was

战略差异主要体现在全球垂直领域。

strategy differentiation very on global vertical.

是的。

Yeah.

但它

But it

很难打造出不同的东西。

was very hard to build something different.

就Uber而言，说实话，如今它的产品看起来基本还是一样的，只是增加了一些花里胡哨的功能，但核心本质没变。

Uber, for what it's worth, I mean, the product looks the same today, basically, right, with the addition of, you know, bells and whistles, but it's the same fundamental thing.

但与我们的故事不同的是，产品差异化真的至关重要，你能构建的东西种类极其丰富。

But the difference to our story is that the product differentiation really matters, and the amount of things that you can go and build is so vast.

这就像一个从未被开发过的法律科技宇宙。

It's like this universe of legal technology that just has never been built.

因为我的一个理论是，在生成式AI出现之前，法律科技领域可能并没有太多令人兴奋的可构建方向，而且很难把一家好公司做大。

Because one of my theories is that maybe in legal tech before generative AI, there weren't that many exciting things to build, and it was really hard to scale a good company.

一旦你做到几百万美元的年收入，就会收到收购要约——这对创始人来说是改变人生的钱，但却无法成就独角兽公司。

And as soon as you got to, like, single digit million revenue, you would get an acquisition offer, which would be life changing money for the founders, but no unicorn outcomes.

因此，产品战略将极大影响我们这个垂直领域内所有企业的走向。

So the product strategy will impact the trajectory of all of the businesses in our in our vertical tremendously.

我认为这完全是赢家通吃。

I think it's totally a winner takes all.

全部靠优势。

All sauce.

我的意思是，你明白的。

I mean, you know this.

第一名会拿下90%，第二名到第十名分享剩下的10%。

Number one will grab 90%, and number two to number 10 will share the remaining 10%.

所以我认为这对我们的意义是必须拼命奔跑。

And so I think what that means for us is gotta run like hell.

你必须赢。

You gotta win.

没有第二名。

There's no number two.

只有成为第一名。

There is only being number one.

只有赢。

There's only winning.

其他一切都是输。

Everything else is losing.

有这种想法的人，正是那些在核心团队工作的人。

The type of people who think like that are the people who work at the core.

我感兴趣的一个领域，或者两个领域，就是垂直化。

One segment that I do find interesting or two segments that the verticalization.

就像我们是Solve的投资者。

It's like we're investors in Solve.

是的。

Yeah.

为专利律师提供人工智能。

AI for patent lawyers.

喜欢他们。

Love them.

他们做了令人惊叹的工作。

They've done amazing work.

你在这种意义上实现了垂直整合，同时你还有另一种垂直整合，就是我们要掌控整个垂直领域，像克罗斯比那样做。

You have verticalization in that sort of way, and then you also have verticalization in the we're gonna own the whole vertical and do like a Crosby.

我们要成为你的律师事务所，对吧。

We're gonna be your law firm Right.

然后使用我们的。

And use ours.

是的。

Yep.

你对这两种方式怎么看？

How do you feel about those two?

我认为掌控整个服务层和软件层并不是一种成功的策略，本质上是在打造一家原生AI律师事务所。

I don't think that owning the entire service layer and software layer is a winning strategy, basically building an AI native law firm.

原因是，我认为有非常多才华横溢的律师非常擅长使用软件，我不愿意与他们竞争。

The reason is I think there are so many talented lawyers that are very good at utilising software, and I would not want to compete for them.

我认为进入这个领域并尝试解决低复杂度的任务很容易。

I think it's easy to get into that space and try and solve lower complexity tasks.

我的意思是，你一开始会从保密协议、主服务协议这类事情入手。

I mean, you're starting out with kind of nondisclosure agreements, master service agreements.

你可以很快达到这个阶段，但这个领域本身就会变得非常拥挤。

You can get there pretty quickly, but then that will be a very crowded space in and of itself.

我更愿意做那个向全世界才华横溢的律师卖铲子的人，他们希望把自己的律所转变为软件驱动的实体。

I would much rather be the shovel seller to all the world's amazingly talented lawyers who want to turn their firms into software powered entities.

我不认为低复杂度的工作会有太多利润空间。

I don't think that there will be a ton of margins slash profit in the low complexity work.

因为我认为，只要AI能完成某项任务，它就会立即接手。

Because I think as soon as AI can do a task, it will do that task.

唯一的问题是，这些任务究竟在哪里发生交易？

The only question is kinda where does it get transacted?

大型律所已经免费为客户提供保密协议，因为他们必须赢得利润丰厚的私募股权业务。

And the big law firms, they already do NDAs for free for their clients because they gotta win the expensive private equity work.

所以问题是，你会以Crosby或其他人的身份出现，说：‘嘿，每份NDA付我50美元？’

And so it's like, are you gonna show up as Crosby or somebody else and go, hey, pay me $50 a NDA?

我不确定。

I'm not sure.

好的。

Okay.

所以我们认为这不是一个好策略。

So we think that's not a good strategy.

那垂直化呢？

What about the verticalization?

是的。

Yeah.

我认为在垂直化方面，你能更快地实现大量价值。

I think you can quicker get to a lot of value in verticalizing.

我不确定这些垂直领域内的总潜在市场规模是什么样子。

I'm not sure what the TAM looks like within each of those verticals.

如果你看一下专利，这是一个价值4850亿美元的市场。

If you look at patents, it's a $485,000,000,000 market.

是的。

Yeah.

所以这是一个巨大的市场。

So it's a huge market.

所以也许你可以赢得专利，这很棒。

So maybe you go win patents, and that's amazing.

或者专利成为更广泛事物的一部分。

Or patents becomes part of a broader thing.

还不清楚。

Unclear.

我认为生态系统中不同层次将会出现许多赢家。

I think there will be many winners in different layers of the ecosystem.

我也认为有一部分是中心枢纽，比如说，有人去Lagor想申请专利，那我们为什么不直接联系Solve Intelligence呢？

And I also think that there's one part which is kind of the central hub that will you know, let's say somebody goes to Lagor and they wanna write a patent, then why don't we just ping Solve Intelligence?

是的。

Yeah.

然后说，嘿，Solve Intelligence。

And say, hey, Solve Intelligence.

来帮我们写这个专利。

Come write us this patent.

是的。

Yeah.

然后它回来完成这件事。

And then it comes back and does it.

或者这正是Copilot想做的。

Or maybe that's what Copilot wants to do.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得有很多重叠的部分，有很多交集。

I think there's there's a lot of Venn diagrams and a lot of overlap.

现在，我认为这更多取决于执行，而不是对市场本身的聪明判断。

Right now, I think it's more down to execution than it is to, like, underlying market, being smart about the markets.

你现在已经在美国雇了150人？50还是150？

You have hired now a 150 people in The US, 50 or a 150?

没那么多，就50人左右。

Nowhere, like, 50.

现在在美国有50人。

50 in The US now.

好的。

Okay.

我觉得我们将会达到150人。

I think we'll be a 150

在夏天之前。

before summer.

这是很多人，

It's a lot of people,

所以，是的。

so Yeah.

当你想到这一点时，你是否认为普遍的看法是，美国人工作更努力，更有进取心，更注重交易且看涨，经常加班，而我们在欧洲只是想放松一下？

When you think about that, do you think the canonical wisdom thought that The US works harder, they are harder driving, they are more transactional but bullish, and they are in the office late, and we in Europe just like to chill the fuck out?

你雇了50个人，这公平吗？

Do you know it's fair having hired 50?

我不觉得这公平。

I don't think that's fair.

我认为我们在美国很好地播下了Legora文化的种子，我们一些来自欧洲的顶尖人才去了美国，并在那里投入了大量时间。

I think we were very good at seeding the legora culture in The US, and a couple of our best people from Europe went to The US and have spent a lot of time there.

所以实际上，我们都这么拼命。

So actually, like, the, hey, we're all such hustlers.

我们在美国真的很棒。

We're so good in The US.

是的。

Yeah.

有点

It's a bit

胡说八道。

of bullshit.

我觉得这有点胡说八道。

I think it's a little bullshit.

但说真的，我们美国办公室现在的文化让我几乎想花更多时间待在美国，因为那里充满活力。

But for what it's worth, the culture that we have in our US office now is I almost wanna spend more time in The US just to be there because it's electric.

我的意思是，纽约正在燃烧。

It's I mean, York is on fire.

我很难在纽约待很久之后再回到斯德哥尔摩，因为纽约总是充满活力。

And I have a hard time spending a lot of time in New York and then coming back to Stockholm because New York is always up.

它总是醒着的。

It's always awake.

这正是我的节奏。

It's my tempo.

而斯德哥尔摩不一样，你一走出门，或者在办公室里，都感觉有点昏昏欲睡。

Whereas Stockholm is when you walk out on the street, when you're in the office, it's a little sleep.

你为什么不住在纽约或者美国呢？

Why are you not living in New York or living in The US?

我实际上每天都住在飞机上。

I'm de facto living on a plane.

去年我总共出差了两百天。

I had two hundred travel days last year in total.

去年，我花了不少时间在产品上，而我们的所有工程团队都在斯德哥尔摩。

Last year, I spent a meaningful amount of time on product, and we have all engineering in Stockholm.

我们的工程、产品和设计团队中有10%是YC创始人。

We're 10% YC founders in our engineering product and design team.

哇哦。

Wow.

我觉得这个比例已经很高了。

Which I think is a high number.

我们的两批伙伴实际上已经加入了公司。

Two of our batchmates have actually joined the company.

他们和普通的个体贡献者工程师有什么不同？

How are they different than normal IC engineers?

我觉得有趣的是，我们的结构方式让我管理风格非常注重授权，而不是微观管理。

I think what's cool about it is we're we're structured in a way where I think my management style is very it's not it's a lot of delegating.

不是事无巨细地干预，而是说清楚目标，然后放手让他们去做。

It's not very micromanaging, and it's very, here's the thing, go wrong with it.

我觉得创始人在这种模式下表现得特别好。

I think founders do very well with that.

我也认为这基本上将我们平台的各个不同组件分成了独立的小组。

I also think it basically gives all the different components of our platform, which is separated into pods.

比如，有一个团队负责产品这一部分，另一个团队负责另一部分，每个部分都由一位YC创始人带领，然后他们就全速推进自己的领域。

Like, we have one team working on this piece of the product, one team working on this piece of the product, and there's like a YC founder running part of the product, and then they just run like hell on their thing.

他们还会竞争，希望自己的部分比其他部分更出色，或者至少比其他产品的同类部分更优秀。

And they're competitive about their part being better than all the other parts, or rather their equivalents in other products.

我也认为YC有一种吸引非常有抱负、渴望成功的人的方式。

I also think YC has a way of attracting very ambitious people who wanna win.

在我们讨论律师事务所的未来并进行快速问答之前，我得问你一下。

Before we do discuss kind

关于律师事务所的未来，然后进行一轮快速问答，我得问你一下。

of future of law firms and then do a quick fire, I have to ask you.

我待会儿要邀请哈维上节目，对吧？你知道的，太好了。

I'm gonna ask Harvey on the show, right, which you know Great.

关于他们的收入。

About their revenues.

我也得问问你们的收入情况。

I have to ask you for yours.

你们现在做到什么程度了？

Where are you guys at?

好吧，我稍后在季度末再告诉你。

Well, I'll tell you a little bit later in the quarter.

但在十二月，我们一天内增加了七百万，过去六个季度基本上每个季度都翻了一番。

But in December, we added 7,000,000 in a day, and we've basically doubled every single quarter for the last six

到年底你们会达到200吗？

Will you be at 200 by the end of the year?

当然会。

Definitely.

否则我就回来了。

Otherwise, I'll come back

那你的远大目标是什么？

and What's the stretch goal?

你可以羞辱我。

You can you can shame me.

远大目标是什么？

What's the stretch goal?

你得去问我们的首席营收官帕特里克。

You'll have to ask Patrick, our CRO.

如果你是

If you were

达到300，你会满意吗？

at 300, would you be happy?

嗯，我不会孤立地看待这个数字。

Well, I don't view the number in isolation.

如果我们在年底前兑现了对客户的所有承诺，即使不需要这些竞争性试点项目，我也会感到满意。

I'll be happy by the end of the year if we deliver on all the promises we made to clients, and and we don't even need these competitive pilots.

如果你是一名律师，从事严肃的法律工作，那你就在使用Legora。

If you're a lawyer and you do serious legal work, you're on Legora.

就像Figma一样。

It's like Figma.

如果你是一名赚钱的设计师，那你就在使用Figma。

If you're a designer that makes money, you're on Figma.

我希望这能成为现实。

I want that to be the truth.

如果我们做到了，我相信300这个数字甚至还会更多。

And if we do that, I'm sure 300 is the number or even more.

对吧？

Right?

好的。

Okay.

从律师事务所的结构来看，他们感谢你们接手了原本需要他们完成的工作。

In terms of the structure of law firms, they thank you for the work that they now no longer have to do because you do it.

但你们需要的实习生会少得多。

But you will need far fewer trainees.

你们需要的初级律师也会少得多。

You will need far few fewer juniors.

你同意你们需要的初级律师会少得多吗？

Do you agree you will need far fewer juniors?

那律师事务所的结构是怎样的

And what is the structure of a law

未来的律师事务所结构会是怎样的？

firm in the future?

我认为律师事务所将会经历一个相当显著的整合期，因为到目前为止，整合律师事务所的动机并不多。

So I think law firms will go through a quite significant consolidation period because so far, there hasn't been a lot of incentives to consolidate law firms.

但现在，私募股权确实想介入，希望资助那些希望实现人工智能化的律师事务所。

But now, actually private equity wants to get in on the action, want to fund different law firms who want to become AI powered.

再次回到这个观点：你是想拥有整个技术栈，还是只想使用服务层？

Again, coming back to the idea of do you wanna own the whole stack or do you just wanna work with the service layer?

所以你是说一种整合收购的策略，将多家律所整合在一起？

And so you're saying a roll up play where you integrate

人工智能，没错。

AI Absolutely.

为它们注入活力

Juice up the

看看这些晋升机会。

promotions Look.

我认为不会出现AMLOT 200。

Don't think there's gonna be an AMLOT 200.

我觉得会是AMLOT 20，或者可能是AMLOT 12。

Think it's gonna be an AMLOT 20 or maybe AMLOT 12.

我认为不会成为四大，因为监管原因，而且这需要时间。

I don't think it'll be a big four because of regulation, and it just takes time.

但肯定会发生整合。

But it will definitely consolidate.

归根结底，利瓜拉和我关心的是与这个领域中的赢家合作，因为技术杠杆将成为与其它律所竞争时最重要，如果不是最重要的杠杆。

At the end of the day, Liguora and I care about working with the winners of that space because the technology lever will be one of the, if not the most important lever, to utilise in competing against other firms.

不同业务领域和不同层级的情况会有所不同，但我们就以最常见的并购交易为例。

It it looks different for different practice areas and in different calibers, but let's take a bread and butter m and a transaction.

在最常见的并购交易中，律所所做的法律工作基本上没有差别。

In a bread and butter m and a transaction, the legal work that the law firms do is pretty much undifferentiated.

不管你选择哪家律所，得到的东西都差不多。

You get pretty much the same thing depending on which firm you go to.

如果你只是看一下尽职调查和相关工作的话。

If you just look at the, you know, DD and the work.

这基本上是一种价格达到的平衡状态。

It's kind of an equilibrium where the price gets offered at.

比如说，报价是1亿英镑。

Let's say it's $100,100,000 pounds.

一旦这个领域中的某家律所能够以更低的价格提供相同质量的服务，或者更快的速度，或者其他一些吸引人的交易执行优势，

The minute that one of the firms that are playing in this game are able to offer that at a lower price, but same quality or maybe higher speed or something like that, some attractive aspect of running that deal.

比如说他们报价8000万英镑。

Let's say they're offering at 80 k.

你就打破了这种平衡。

You kind of break the equilibrium.

所有人都不得不转向这个新的平衡点。

Everybody has to move to that equilibrium.

所以这本质上是一场市场份额的竞争。

So it's kind of a market share game.

这就像谁能最快地运用技术，以及运营律师事务所所需的其他各方面，谁能赢得最多的市场份额并维持住。

It's like who can run the fastest on technology and all the others, the other aspects of what it takes to run a law firm, and who can win most of the market and then hold that market.

因为这样一来，你就能提供超出那些极其竞争性服务之外的更多服务。

Because then I think you're able to deliver additional services that go outside of what the very, very, very competitive things are.

我们会减少初级律师和实习生吗？

Will we have fewer junior lawyers and trainees?

律师事务所会变小吗？

Will law firms be smaller?

我反而认为律师事务所会变大，因为它们会合并。

I actually think law firms will be bigger, right, because they will consolidate.

但我认为，完成一笔交易所需的律师人数不会像现在这么多。

But I don't think that you will need the same number of lawyers running a transaction as you have today.

对吧？

Right?

如果你有一个实体数据室，之所以叫数据室，就是因为你要派人过去，打开所有文件箱，阅读所有内容，并做全部的批注。

If you have a physical data room, that's why it's called a data room, you just have to send people there, and they would open up all the boxes, read everything, make all the commentary.

对吧？

Right?

然后就变成了虚拟数据室。

And then it became a virtual data room.

但你得假设未来会有更多的交易，是的。

But you have to assume that there's gonna be more transactions Yes.

在未来。

In the future.

是的。

Yeah.

所以交易会更多，但执行这些交易的人可能会更少，而每个人由于技术的帮助可以处理更多的交易。

So more transactions, probably fewer people running those transactions, but every person can run more transactions because of technology.

交易更多是因为所以

More transactions because So of

为了明确一下，你不认为会

just to really be clear, you do not think there will

会更少的实习生和初级律师吗？

be less trainees and junior lawyers?

我认为初级律师和实习生确实会减少，因为我觉得公司执行工作所需的人手不会像以前那么多。

I do think that there will probably be less junior lawyers and trainees, because I think that you just won't need as many people to execute the work that the firm has.

而且，大多数律师事务所都是合伙制，对吧？

Also, most law firms are partnerships, correct?

没错。

Right.

所以合伙制会积累利润。

So partnerships accrue profits.

是的。

Yes.

所以如果我能减少

So if I can take out

但我已经看到一些模式了，我们合作的律所中，有人离职时……

But but I'm already seeing patterns of this, where firms that we work with will have, you know, somebody leaving.

他们不会填补这个空缺，但他们的收入却比去年更高，因此利润也更高。

They will not fill the vacancy, but they're doing more revenue than they did last year, and so it's a higher profit.

我认为这可能也为大型律所创造了一个机会，因为它们拥有众多护城河、强大的品牌和大量数据。

I think it might also create an opportunity for big law will do really well, because they have a lot of moats and a lot of brand and a lot of data.

小型律所也能表现得很好，因为它们仍然建立在非常个人化的基础上。

Small law can do really well, because that's still operating on a very, very personal basis.

我认为可能会遇到困难的是中型律所，因为竞争非常激烈，你们在价格上激烈角逐，再引入人工智能，只会让竞争更加激烈。

I think where it might get difficult is mid law, where it's very competitive, you're competing hard on price, you throw AI into the mix, and it will make it even more competitive.

但在工程领域，让我举另一个例子。

But in engineering, let me like, let let's just take another example.

我们正在招聘更多的工程师，尽管他们编写的代码更多了。

We're hiring more engineers, although they're writing more code.

对吧？

Right?

因为要做的事情变多了。

Because there's, like, more stuff to do.

所以对于律师事务所来说，他们需要扩大整个蛋糕的规模。

So the thing for the law firms is they need to increase the size of the pie.

所以你认为两年后我们会拥有更多的工程师吗？

So you think we'll have more engineers in two years' time?

实际上，我是这么认为的。

I think so, actually.

因为我觉得那时你能做的事情会更多。

Because I think that there'll be you can just do more stuff.

两年后，写代码和做事情、启动新项目的人会比今天多得多。

You'll have more people writing code and doing things or starting new things and and projects and and things in two years than you have today.

我觉得你有点过于乐观了，这真的很不错。

I think you're being quite optimistic, which is really nice.

是的。

Yeah.

但我认为我们会看到比人们预期更多的劳动力被取代，我觉得这种现象会在未来十二到二十四个月内出现。

But I think we're gonna see more labor displacement than I think people expect, and I think we're gonna see that in the next twelve to twenty four months.

杰森·兰普金，又一位朋友，说今年我们将看到人工智能取代大量知识型工作。

Jason Lampkin, again a friend, said this is the year that we're gonna see AI displace large amounts of knowledge work.

是的。

Yeah.

这将在就业数据中体现出来。

And that's gonna show up in labor figures.

你觉得这会不会太早了？

Do you think that's too soon?

我认为，在这个时间范围内，人工智能将在我们的垂直领域内非常熟练地完成端到端的任务。

Well, I think it's within that time frame that AI gets pretty good at completing end to end tasks very deterministically within our vertical.

所以，除非他们能找到除了在公司内部做这件事或扩大市场规模之外的其他事情可做，否则确实如此。

So unless they can find something else to do than, you know, that thing within the firm or growing the pie, then, yeah.

但这里有个有趣的地方。

But here's the cool thing.

对吧？

Right?