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我们回来了。
We are back.
欢迎收听20VC，我是哈里·斯蒂宾斯。
Welcome to 20 VC with me, Harry Stebbings.
今天这期节目可太精彩了。
And what a show we have for you today.
今天坐在热椅上的这位，
In the hot seat, one of
是市场上最顶尖的资金投放者之一，管理着超过三千亿美元的资本承诺，投资了四百多家公司。
the biggest capital deployers in the market with over 30,000,000,000 in capital commitments and over 400 portfolio companies.
在过去二十五年里，他们是最具影响力的创投机构之一。
They are one of the leading investing franchises in the last twenty five years.
因此，我很高兴邀请到Insight Partners的董事总经理德文·帕雷克。德文本人已参与了90多项投资，包括推特、阿里巴巴、京东、Chargebee、Vinted，还有WordPress的开发商Automattic，这只是其中一部分。
And so with that, I'm thrilled to welcome Deven Parekh, managing director at Insight Partners, where Deven himself has made more than 90 investments, including in the likes of, check this out, Twitter, Alibaba, jd.com, Chargebee, Vinted, and Automattic, the makers of WordPress, to name a few.
德文还担任多家公司的董事，比如Checkout——上个月我们刚请过吉勒姆做客；还有Calm、Saks.com、Optimizely和First Dibs，这只是几个例子。
Deven also sits on the boards of Checkout, where we had Guillaume on the show just last month, Calm, saks.com, Optimizely, and First Dibs, again, to name a few.
更别说，德文还担任卡内基和平基金会董事会成员，以及蒂施纽约多发性硬化症研究中心的董事——这个机构对我意义特别重大，因为我妈妈一直饱受肝硬化之苦。
And if that wasn't enough, Deven also sits on the boards of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and one that's very close to my heart in the board of the Tisch New York MS Research Center with my mom obviously having multiple cirrhosis.
这对我来说真的非常特别。
Really meaningful one for me then.
由于投资上的卓越成就，德文五次入选《福布斯》米达斯榜单。
As a result of his investing success, Deven's also been named on the Forbes Midas List no less than five times.
我要特别感谢 Checkout 的吉约姆、杰夫·利伯曼，还有 VintDibs 的托马斯，今天提供了许多精彩的提问建议。
I do wanna say huge thank you to Guillaume at Checkout, Jeff Lieberman, and Thomas at VintDibs for some amazing question suggestions today.
这些提议真的让节目增色不少。
Really did make such a difference.
但在正式开始之前，你知道吗？美国上市公司股票中，超过80%的股份掌握在仅10%的美国人手中。
But before we dive into the show state, did you know that more than 80% of US public stock is owned by just 10% of Americans?
而在私募市场，这种差距甚至更大。
This divide is even greater in the private market.
Carter 让你给员工发放股权，就像发工资一样简单。
Carter makes it as easy to issue equity to your employees as it is to issue payroll.
对员工来说，接受起来也很简单。
And for employees, it's easy to accept it too.
已经有超过一万六千家公司通过Carter向员工发放股权。
More than 16,000 companies issue equity to their employees through Carter.
无论你是刚起步，还是准备上市，Carter的团队都能帮你搞定。
Whether you're just getting started or getting ready to go public, the team at Carter can help.
更多详情请访问 carter.com。
Check them out at carter.com.
接下来我要介绍的另一个很棒的产品是Secure Frame。
And then another incredible product you have to introduce is Secure Frame.
Secure Frame能帮助企业快速达到企业级标准，简化SOC 2和ISO 27001的合规流程。
Secure Frame helps companies get enterprise ready by streamlining SOC two and ISO 27,001 compliance.
使用Secure Frame，企业几周内就能完成合规，不用再像现在这样耗上好几个月。
Secure Frame allows companies to get compliant within weeks rather than the painful months that is today.
像Stream、Hasura、Benepos这样的公司都在用Secure Frame，你也来试试，轻松提升销售机会。
Join companies like Stream, Hasura, Benepos, and unlock more sales with Secure Frame.
还有，前20位听播客的朋友在 secureframe.com/twentyvc 可以享受九折优惠。
And 20 VC listeners get 10% off at secureframe.com forward slash two zero VC.
最后，我一直特别喜欢历史，所以我想聊聊Cooley这家以初创企业和风险投资为核心的全球律所。
And finally, I've always been a big history fan, and so I wanna talk about Cooley, the global law firm built around startups and venture capital.
自从在硅谷设立了第一个风险投资基金以来，Cooley所参与设立的风险投资基金数量比世界上任何其他律所都多，已经为风投行业服务了五十多年。
Since forming the very first venture fund in Silicon Valley, Cooley's formed more venture capital funds than any other law firm in the world with fifty plus years working with VCs.
他们帮助风投机构设立和管理基金、进行投资，并处理基金生命周期中出现的各种复杂问题。
They help VCs form and manage funds, make investments, and handle the myriad of issues that arise throughout a fund's lifetime.
想了解更多关于全球最活跃的、为风险投资支持的上市公司提供法律服务的律所？请访问 cooley.com，也别忘了看看 cooleygo.com。
So to learn more about the number one most active law firm representing VC backed companies going public, head over to cooley.com and also check out cooleygo.com.
不过，我的话就说到这儿。
But enough of me.
接下来，我很高兴邀请 Insight Partners 的管理合伙人德文·帕雷克登场。
So now I'm thrilled to welcome Deven Parekh, managing director at Insight Partners.
三、二、
Three, two,
您已到达目的地。
have now arrived at your destination.
德文，能和你聊这真是太开心了。
Deven, this is such a joy to do.
上次我们见面还是在伦敦。
The last time we met, we were in London.
真遗憾不能面对面交流，但还是很感谢你。
I'm sad we can't be in person, but thank you
非常感谢你今天抽出时间参加。
so much for joining me today.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我记得你当时在喝一杯浓缩马提尼，不知道对不对。
I think you were drinking an espresso martini, if I remember correctly.
希望你现在还在享受这种饮品。
So I hope you're still enjoying those.
你记性真好。
You have a great memory.
没错，说实话，我现在更多喝美式咖啡了，不过你记性确实不错。
And, yeah, I mean, sadly, I'm more on espressos these days, but, totally good memory.
我想先聊聊，你加入Insight已经二十一年了。
But I do wanna start, you know, you joined Insight over twenty one years ago.
能说说你是怎么进入风险投资这个领域的吗？当初是怎么加入Insight的？
Talk to me, how did you make your way into the world of kind of venture and finance, and how did you come to be at Insight first?
咱们先从背景说起。
Let's start with some context.
嗯，是啊。
Well, yeah.
不是。
No.
这真不是我当初想象会待的地方。
This is not where I expected to be.
我高中时是个科学迷，还参加过国际科学展览会，后来上了宾大，主修生物化学。
I mean, I was a science geek in high school, went to the International Science Fair, went to Penn, was studying biochemistry.
就像常有的事一样，机缘巧合发生了。
And like what happens a lot, serendipity happens.
我有几个室友是经济学专业的，他们说：‘要不你也选一门经济学课吧？’ 那时我正在宾大的医学院做研究，顺便选了门经济课。
And I had a bunch of roommates that were economics majors and said, well, I guess I should take a class in economics just so was doing research at the medical school at Penn while I was taking a class in econ.
我特别喜欢那门经济学课。
I really enjoyed the econ class.
所以我虽然还是把生物化学当主修，但在大一结束后就去华尔街找了份工作，真的很喜欢。
And so while I stuck with biochemistry as my major, I got a job on Wall Street after my freshman year and really liked that.
大二那年我回到学校，又重新投入科学领域。
And I came back my sophomore year and went back to science.
我来回折腾了好一阵子，最后不得不做个决定，于是决定两样都干。
And I kept kind of going back and forth, and then I had to make a decision, and I decided I was gonna do both.
我要同时学经济学和生物化学。
I was gonna study economics and biochemistry.
后来我修了七门课，想同时满足两个专业的学分要求，结果发现这主意其实不太靠谱。
And then after, I think, a semester where I took seven classes to try to meet the requirements for both, I decided that probably wasn't such a great idea.
所以我必须做个决定。
And I had to make a decision.
别人就问我，你是怎么选经济学的？
And people said, well, how'd you decide to do economics?
这正是我最终的选择。
Which is what I decided to do.
说实话，主要是我等不及了——我没法想象自己要花那么多年读书才能当上医生。
And I think, honestly, it was impatience, which is I didn't see myself in school for how long it was going to take to be a doctor.
四年本科，四年医学院，再加住院医师培训，我想，要是走商业这条路，能更快起步。
Four years of college, four years of medical school, residency, and I figured, well, if I go into business, I can start quickly.
我真希望能给出个更体面的理由，但说实话，就是因为我性子急，才最终选了经济学。
And I wish I could give a better answer, but I really do believe it was my impatience that led me to end up majoring in economics.
大学毕业后我去了黑石，之后有机会加入了一家精品投行，当时叫巴伦斯与曼内尔公司，创始人是美林投行前联席主管。
And I went to Blackstone out of college, and then I had an opportunity to join a merchant banking boutique, what was then called at the time, Barons and Manel and Company, which was founded by the former co heads of merchant banking in Merrill Lynch.
几年后，他们决定要进军科技领域。
A few years in, they decided that they wanna do something in tech.
他们招了几个人，我们的角色就是帮他们筹措一笔基金，然后投资科技公司。
They brought a few people on, and effectively what our role was gonna be was to help them raise a fund, and we're gonna invest in technology.
那个人其实就是杰夫·沃林和杰里·默多克，他们后来成了英赛特的创始人。
That person really was Jeff Waring and Jerry Murdock, who ended up being the founders of Insight.
杰夫和杰里很快发现，巴林顿马尼拉在科技基金里帮不上什么大忙，于是决定单干。
Jeff and Jerry quickly figured out that Barrington Manila wasn't really gonna add a lot of value in a tech fund, and they decided to go off on their own.
我和他们关系不错，也一起做过几个项目，他们就问我：你为什么不跟我们一块儿干？
I built a good relationship with them and had worked on a few deals with them, and they said, don't you join us?
我当时觉得自己是个了不起的副总裁，才25岁，而他们俩连基金都没筹到，这事儿怎么看都不像明智之选。
I thinking I was a hotshot vice president, you know, at the age of 25, and they were two people without a fund, didn't seem like a really good decision.
所以我拒绝了。
So I decided, no.
我觉得我还是留在这儿吧，你们去干吧——他们后来真去了。
I think I'm gonna stay, but you guys should go do this, which they did.
幸运的是，我们一直保持联系，1999年的时候，杰夫和我一起吃了顿午饭。
And, thankfully, we stayed in touch, and Jeff and I had lunch at the nineteen ninety nine.
他说：我们马上就要筹措第一支机构基金了。
He was like, well, we're about to raise our first institutional fund.
你现在也许该加入我们了。
Maybe you should join us now.
就是那时候，我加入了。
And that's when I joined.
我就是这样来到Insight的。
That's how I got to Insight.
我是真的特别喜欢这里。
I mean, I absolutely love it.
到现在已经二十一年了。
And more than twenty one years it has been.
不过我想问一下，因为我从来没经历过宏观层面的崩溃。
I do wanna ask, though, because, you know, I've never seen a macro crash.
过去这些年，我们经历了最棒的一轮牛市。
We've had the most wonderful bull market for the last however many years.
你肯定亲眼见过两次明显的崩盘，一次是你刚加入Insight的时候，另一次就是2008年。
You know, you've seen two very prominently, you know, one very close after you're joining Insight, and then obviously in 2008.
你觉得亲眼目睹这些崩盘，对你的投资心态产生了什么影响？
How did seeing those crashes impact your investing mentality stage, you think?
是的。
Yeah.
有趣的是，我们最近还亲身经历了一次——新冠疫情，虽然股市没明显反映，但经济确实受到了冲击。
And interestingly, there's been a third that we all just lived through, which is COVID, which was an economic effect even if we didn't see it in the stock market.
如果仔细看这三次，我觉得它们的性质完全不同。
If you look at those three, I think they were very, very different.
1999年的时候，股市估值很高，但很多所谓的公司根本算不上真正的公司。
Back in 1999, you had high stock market valuations, but you had a lot of companies that weren't really companies.
2000年那次虽然跌幅巨大，但很多企业根本就没有可行的商业模式。
You know, 2000, while you had a massive contraction, a lot of the contraction was businesses didn't really have a model.
潮水退去的时候，才发现它们根本没像样的商业模式。
And when the tide came in, it was clear they didn't have a model.
所以很多这样的公司最终都没撑下去。
And so you saw a lot of those companies never make it.
2008年那次，经济出现了严重收缩，但那些公司都是实实在在的正经企业。
2008, you saw a very significant economic contraction, but you had companies that were real companies.
虽然它们不得不做出剧烈调整，削减开支，做各种应对，但总的来说，软件行业还是挺抗压的，后来也慢慢恢复了。
And while they had to make radical changes in their business and cut expenses and do all those things, generally, you find is software were still pretty resilient, and it kinda came back.
而最后一次，也就是新冠疫情，某种程度上最让人意外，我和很多人当时都看错了——我们当时都去见了有限合伙人。
And then the last one, which was in some ways the most interesting one, which we all got certainly, I and others got pretty wrong was COVID where we all met with our LPs.
我们说，估计这段时间没法投什么新项目了。
We said, you know, we're probably not gonna deploy any capital.
估值肯定会大幅下跌。
Valuations are gonna go down dramatically.
准备好迎接我们多年以来最差的一次业绩表现吧。
Get ready for probably our worst performance in a really long time.
但这些全都没发生。
And, of course, none of that came true.
我觉得我们从这段经历中学到的一点是，虽然我们本来就坚信软件模式，但事实证明它比我们想象的还要强大，韧性也远超预期。
And I think that one of the things that many of us learned through that is software, even though we're obviously big believers in the software model, it turns out that's even better than we thought it was, that it was even more resilient than we thought it was.
新冠疫情显然加速了那些已经持续了很长时间的数字化转型趋势。
And that COVID accelerated, obviously, the digital transformation trends that have been going on for a really, really long time.
所以综合这三次经济动荡来看，我的结论是：只要公司是真正有根基的——就像我说的，1999年和2000年的时候，真正有根基的公司少得多——软件模式就极其坚韧。
So I kinda come out of this, and the big picture that I take out of those three different economic dislocations is that when you have real companies, which as I said, 1999, 2000, you had less real companies, the software model is incredibly resilient.
经历了这三次波动之后，我对这一点的信心比以前更强了。
I feel better about that having been through those three periods than I probably did before.
我完全同意你的看法，尤其是在软件模式的韧性这一点上。
I totally agree with you in those respects and especially in terms of resiliency of the software model.
我觉得问题在于，现在从大型宏观基金到混合型基金，所有人都看到了这一点，风险投资圈在过去一年里已经发生了翻天覆地的变化。
I think, you know, the challenge is everyone is now seeing it from big macro funds to crossover funds, and the venture world has changed so much in the last year alone.
你瞧，老虎基金三个月就投了50亿美元，这简直让人难以置信。
You know, we've seen Tiger deploy 5,000,000,000 in three months, which is I mean, blind me.
这比二十分钟的风投访谈还快。
It's faster than a twenty minute VC episode.
所以我想问你，从你Insight的角度来看，面对当前市场这种狂热，你是怎么分析的？
And so my my question to you is, like, when you look at the current landscape, how do you, with your Insight hat on, how do you analyze the current kind of mania that we see in the market?
有几点要说。
Well, a couple of things.
首先，我们不妨从宏观层面来看。
One, let's step back to the highest level and think about the macro.
我觉得很多人和我看法一致，就是软件模式的韧性非常强。
And I think a lot of people are of the same view that that I think I just shared, which is that the software model is incredibly resilient.
尽管过去十年、二十年我们经历了这么大的增长，但举个例子，目前只有20%的计算负载在云端。
Even with the amount of growth we've had over the last ten or twenty years, you know, only 20% of the loads, as an example, are in the cloud.
对吧？
Right?
所以还有很长的路要走。
So there's still a long way to go.
而且大家觉得还有十到二十年的增长空间。
And I think people see another ten to twenty years of growth.
第二，我觉得增长其实加速了。
Two, I think growth has actually accelerated.
如果你看看我们旗下基金的中位增长率，五号、六号、七号、八号基金，每新推出一档基金，中位增长率都更高，而且基金规模还越来越大。
If you look at our kind of median growth rate in our funds, you know, fund five, fund six, fund seven, fund eight, as you get the each successive fund, the median growth rate is higher, and that's with bigger funds.
所以大家看到的是，增长的加速势头正在加快。
And so I think people are seeing the rate of acceleration increase.
他们认为数字化转型的趋势来得更快，创新的速度也明显提升了。
They're saying the digital transformation trends are happening even faster, and the rate of innovation is really faster.
所以总的来说，你这个问题归根结底是在问估值的问题。
So I think generally when it comes to because really your question when it comes down to is really a question about the valuation world.
我们内部有一条原则：从不付过高的价格。
We have a line that we use internally is that we never overpay.
公司业绩没达标的情况时有发生。
Companies miss their numbers.
如果我们对增长预期的判断没错，那价格根本不是问题，因为复利的力量实在太惊人了。
What it really is saying, if we're right on our growth underwriting, price is not really the problem because it's amazing the power of compounding.
我举个简单的例子，如果一家公司每年增长10%，持续十五年，它的价值就会涨到六倍。
If you take, and I'm gonna use low numbers, but if you take a 10% growth rate over fifteen years, the company's six x's.
如果年增长率提高到15%，同样的十五年里，它的价值就能涨到十六倍。
If you take a 15% growth a year over the same period of time, the company's 16 x's.
而在我们关注的领域，很多公司每年的增长率都在50%、60%甚至70%。
And generally, in our spaces, we're talking about companies that are growing at fifty, sixty, 70%.
过去三四年里，我们看到大多数公司都能达到甚至超过我们当初预测的增长水平。
So I think that what we've seen over the last three or four years is that companies have generally been able to meet or exceed our growth expectations.
只要它们能持续这样增长，即使估值已经上涨了，也依然有道理支撑。
And if they can continue to do that, valuations, while they've gone up, you can still justify them.
这些年确实一直如此。
They have over the years.
我的问题是，现在这种情况前所未见——我经常看到年收入五百万到一千万美元的公司，估值已经到了十五亿美元。
I guess my question is we're seeing it now like never before where I'm quite often seeing five to 10,000,000 ARR companies be a billion 5 in valuation.
我真是想不明白，我不想太悲观，
And I'm just scratching my head going, I I feasibly I'm I don't want to be pessimistic.
我想看到其中的潜力，但实在看不出它能以所需的速度增长到那个估值水平，
I want to see the brilliance, but I can't see this growing into the valuation at the rate it needs to.
你觉得未来几年会出现这种脱节吗？还是说它们真能成长到匹配这个估值？
Do you think we are gonna see this kind of dislocation in the next few years, or do you think actually they will grow into it?
你看，
Look.
顺便说一句，这周我们内部刚聊过一家公司，正在考虑投资，他们的年经常性收入有四百万美元，
I think by the way, think there was a company we were just talking about internally this week that we're looking at that I think has 4,000,000 of ARR.
结果估值直接给到了十五亿美元，还是知名基金投的，
They went for 1 and a half billion dollar valuation with a well known fund.
你看，
Look.
你觉得每笔这样的投资都能成功吗？
I think that are every one of those deals gonna work?
不会。
No.
但反过来也一样成立。
But the converse is also true.
当我们分析那些成功的交易和失败的交易时，经常发现，那些我们认为价格便宜的项目，结果也往往表现不佳。
Like, when we do our analysis of the deals that worked and the deals that didn't work, we often find is when we did something that we thought was cheap, those didn't work particularly well either.
我觉得我们过去错过的项目，更多是因为我们觉得估值太高而拒绝了，结果那家公司却执行得特别出色。
And I think that where we've generally had misses, they've been more because we said no on valuation and the company actually executed incredibly well.
他们面对的是一个非常大的市场。
They had a very, very large market.
我不会在这里跟你说，每个融资估值达到15亿美元、年经常性收入400万美元的公司都能成功，但肯定有一部分会做得非常好。
So I'm not gonna sit here and tell you that every company that raises money at a 1 and a half billion dollar valuation or 4,000,000 of ARR is gonna work, but you're gonna have a subset that are definitely gonna work.
我们的任务是确保投进的是对的那些公司，确保我们愿意出高价的项目，其长期增长预期是靠谱的。
Our job is to make sure that we're getting in the right ones and that the ones that we're paying up for are the ones where our long term growth underwriting is correct.
当然，我们不可能每次都对，但至少得对得足够多。
And we won't always be correct, obviously, but we need to be correct enough.
我能问个问题吗？
Can I ask?
这问题真有意思。
Really interesting one.
我昨天跟全球顶尖的基金之一聊了聊，他们说判断是否成功的标准，是自己投资组合里占了多少家独角兽公司的份额。
I had a chat yesterday with one of the best funds in the world, and they said the way that they determine ultimate success is how much market share of unicorn companies do they have.
也就是说，在所有独角兽公司这个大市场里，他们希望自己的投资能覆盖四分之一以上。
So of the total available market of unicorn companies, they wanna have north of 25% in their portfolios.
那你们怎么最终定义Insight的成功呢？
How do you ultimately define, like, Insight and your success?
这算不算那种指导方向的终极问题？
Is that one of those kind of meta questions, which is the guiding north star?
听好了。
Look.
归根结底，我们当然以有限合伙人的标准来衡量自己，也就是看回报好不好——幸运的是，我们在这方面一直做得不错。
Ultimately, obviously, we measure ourselves by what our LPs measure us by, which is by having good returns, which we've been fortunate enough to have had.
但你昨天聊的那个人说的，其实和我们说的意思是一回事。
But what the person you spoke to yesterday said is another way of saying the same thing.
也就是说，如果你真的在独角兽公司里占了很大份额——顺便说一句，我觉得我们还没做到。
Meaning, if you actually have a high market share in kinda unicorn companies, which by the way, I don't think we do.
正因如此，我觉得我们的市场空间还很大，因为我们目前在独角兽公司里的占比，离我觉得可能达到的水平还差得远。
And that's why I think our market opportunities is so large, which is that our market share in unicorn companies isn't that high relative to what I think it could be.
很多我们看过但没投的公司，这说明我们整个团队还得提升，得学会更安心地做这类投资。
In many cases, companies that we looked at and decided not to pursue, which means we have to get better as a firm on how we get comfortable with deals like that.
但我认为这些事情其实是有关联的。
But I think those things are related.
对吧？
Right?
那在这个领域，怎样才能获得最好的回报呢？
So how do you get the best returns in this space?
就是投到最好的公司。
It's by being in the best companies.
当你投资的是顶尖公司时，价格其实没那么重要。
And when you're in the best companies, price generally didn't end up really mattering that much.
当然，谁都希望买得便宜点，但市场上总有个合理价格。
Of course, you'd always rather own something cheaper, but generally, there's a clearing price.
关键不在于你是否想以更低的价格成交。
And the decision point isn't whether you'd like to do the deal at a lower price.
当然谁都希望价格更低，但现在的市场根本不可能压价。
Of course, you'd rather do the deal at a lower price, but we're not in a market where that's possible.
说实话，哈利，今天更大的挑战其实不在价格上。
I think the bigger challenge today, to be honest with you, Harry, is less around price.
而在于决策必须多快做出。
It's more on how quickly decisions are having to get made.
我觉得这可能会带来负面影响，不只是对投资者，对创始人也是，因为这些投资就像婚姻。
And I think that, I think, might have, you know, negative implications, not just for investors, but also for founders because these deals are marriages.
你得和这些人长期共事。
You're in these companies with people for a long period of time.
我更担心的不是非得付这个价，而是得做这个决定。
I'm more troubled by having to not necessarily pay a price.
我更担心的是，得在周末或者三天内做出决定，却没花上足够的时间去了解。
I'm more troubled by having to make that decision over a weekend or in three days without having spent a meaningful amount of time.
就算不是面对面，很多时候，这些决定都是在半小时或一小时的Zoom会议后就定了。
And even if that time's not in person, oftentimes, you're seeing these decisions get made after a half hour, an hour Zoom.
这让我更不安，因为我觉得每个阶段的人都有这种感受。
That concerns me more because I think we all feel it at every stage.
不管你是在种子轮还是Pre-IPO轮，情况都一样。
I don't think that matters whether you're at seed or you're at pre IPO round.
这些决定现在都变得太快太快了。
Those decisions are getting made really, really quickly.
我觉得在早期阶段，花时间尤其重要，因为你押注的是人。
And I think in some ways, at an earlier stage, it's even more important to spend that time because you're really betting on the person.
你不是在押注一串财务数据，那种东西在后期公司里还能衡量。
You're not betting on a set of financial metrics, which we can do on a later stage company.
我想问一下，当你考虑这种时间上的压缩，并且把它应用到整个投资组合时，我以前一直被教导说，作为风投领域的学习者，时间上的分散很重要，而且它带来的好处是显而易见的。
Can I ask, you know, when you think about that kind of compression in terms of time frame and applied across the portfolio, I was always told that I'm a student of venture, temporal diversification is important and the benefits of it?
但现在看来，这些观念好像已经被彻底抛弃了。
It seems like that's kind of been thrown out the window.
你怎么看待时间分散？它的价值还在吗？相比几年前，它现在还那么重要吗？
How do you think about temporal diversification, the benefits of it, and whether it's still such an important factor state than it was years ago?
听我说。
Look.
说实话，这很难反驳。
Mean, I think it's hard to argue.
对。
Yeah.
我记得我还在黑石当分析师的时候。
I remember when I was at Black I was an analyst.
我们做过一项分析，研究是什么因素最直接影响了我们的回报。
We had done an analysis of what were the biggest drivers of our returns.
这不是我做的。
It wasn't done by me.
这是公司层面的统一分析，我只是参与其中。
It was just done as a firm wide exercise, and I was just part of it.
但看到其中最重要的因素之一居然是交易发生的年份，确实挺有意思，因为周期长短真的有影响。
But it was just interesting to see that one of the most important drivers was the year you did the deal because cycle time mattered.
对吧？
Right?
如果你在价格低的时候买入，又在价格高的时候卖出。
If you bought at a time when prices were low and you sold at a time when prices were higher.
所以时间点确实很关键。
So there's no doubt timing matters.
不过话说回来，这挺有意思的。
That being said, it's interesting.
对吧？
Right?
你之前提到过1999年，还有2008年和2007年。
If you go back to you talked about 1999, you talked about 2008, 2007.
在那个时候，是的，我们投资得比较谨慎。
At that point in time, yeah, we were investing slowly.
投资者当时就说，嘿，各位。
And investors said, hey, guys.
你们现在投资速度变快了。
You're investing fast now.
那段时间你们投资怎么变慢了？
How come you invested slow during that period?
实际情况是大家都放慢了脚步。
The reality is people slowed down.
公司们因为看到估值收缩，就减少了融资。
The companies slowed down raising capital because they saw the valuations contract.
而且当时也没那么多交易可做。
And it wasn't like there were so many deals to go do.
当然，谁都希望做时间上的分散投资，理想情况下，当价格低迷时，你能投入最多的资金。
And so while, of course, you'd like to do temporal diversification, and, of course, ideally, your temporal diversification would be such that when prices are low, you're deploying the most amount of capital.
但那些时候，公司通常不会去融资，或者不会融大额资金。
But those aren't the times when companies go raise capital or not significant amounts of capital.
所以我觉得，你看到的普遍情况是——我们大概在两年半内把资金投完。
And so I think what you are seeing generally, I mean, we probably deploy funds in about two and a half years.
五年前或七年前，我们因为两年半就投完，被觉得快得离谱。
Five or seven years ago, we were perceived as being extremely fast because we deployed in two and a half years.
当时的有限合伙人还说：你们怎么回来得这么快？
And LPs were like, you guys come back too quickly.
现在我们两年半投完，其实已经算平均水平了，还有很多机构回来得比我们还快。
And I think we're probably now average in two and a half years, and there's certainly a lot of firms that are coming back even sooner.
问题是，随着投资节奏加快，如果你还想把时间分散定在三四年，基金规模就得比现在大得多，这也会让有限合伙人说：等等。
The challenge is as deployment paces have gone up, if you try to get temporal diversification defined as three or four years, fund sizes would be even dramatically larger than they are now, which also LPs would say, hey.
谁也不想让你搞一个三百亿美元的基金，就为了实现四年的分散投资。
Like, I don't really want you to have a, you know, $30,000,000,000 fund to have four years of temporal diversification.
对吧？
Right?
所以我觉得，对有限合伙人来说，如果在这样的投资节奏下还要搞四年分散投资，管理费的负担会变得相当高。
So I think that the economics for LPs, if they end up with four year diversification at these types of deployment cases, the fee drag gets pretty high as well.
我觉得现在市场的情况就是，时间分散通常会被定义为两年半，有些基金甚至更短。
So I think we're just in a market where temporal diversification is probably gonna get defined as two and a half years and some funds a lot lower.
但总体来看，市场上的主流还是两年到两年半之间。
But, you know, in the market overall, it's probably more like two to two and half years.
我的意思是，现在市场就是这个样子。
I mean, that's kind of where the market is right now.
我们已经多次提到价格了，我之前还和杰夫聊过。
We've mentioned price quite a few times, and I spoke to Jeff before the show.
他说德文最厉害的地方，就是特别擅长谈判。
He said one of the most brilliant skills that Deven has is his ability to negotiate.
我觉得这确实挺有意思的。
And so I thought that's such an interesting thing.
他说这是你最突出的优势。
He said it's like your single biggest strength.
那你觉得是什么让你这么擅长谈判？
So what do you think makes you such a good negotiator?
当你思考谈判这门艺术时，你觉得它的核心是什么？
And when you think about, like, the art of negotiation, what do you think its core essence is?
我觉得很多人把谈判当成一种博弈，但我不觉得这是游戏。
Well, I think that people, unfortunately, they view negotiating as a game, and I I don't really think it's a game.
对我而言，真正的谈判是建立在相互信任的基础上，双方都相信对方说的是实话，也相信自己说的话对方能理解。
I think negotiation that works to me is one where you actually build the trust based relationship with somebody, that they believe that what you're saying is true, that you believe what they're saying is true.
你们各自都有需要满足的利益相关方。
You both have certain needs to satisfy your constituency.
就我来说，可能是我的投资委员会。
In my case, it can be my investment committee.
而对他们来说，可能是他们的联合创始人、公司，或者其他相关方。
In their case, it can be their cofounders or their company or whatever it might be.
他们有些重要的事，我们也有我们看重的东西。
There's things that are important to them, and there are things that are important to us.
我觉得好的谈判，既要清楚自己需要什么，也要真正理解对方的需求。
And I think in a good negotiation, you're actually sensitive to what you need, but you're also very sensitive to what they need.
你要想办法弥合这些差距，而且要以诚实的方式去做。
You try to bridge that gap, and you try to bridge it in a way that's honest.
很多人觉得，谈判就得耍花招、玩套路。
And I think people feel like, oh, in order to negotiate, you have to have the springsmanship style.
但说实话，那种方式根本行不通。
Actually, honestly, don't think that works.
我经手过好多笔交易，最后就靠一个握手就定了。
And I think that, you know, I've done multiple deals on a handshake.
你不是刚跟Checkout的盖伊聊过吗？
I mean, you've talked to Guy at Checkout.
我们那笔交易，就是靠握手敲定的。
I mean, we did that deal on a handshake.
我们从来都没签过条款清单。
We never signed a term sheet.
我知道他看重什么。
I knew what was important to him.
他也清楚我们在意什么。
He knew what was important to us.
我们握了手。
We shook hands.
我的想法是这样的，我要直说。
And, you know, my kind of my view was and I'm gonna say this.
人人都会说，用手shake搞定条款清单就行。
Everybody's gonna say, let's do term sheets by a handshake.
但如果连握手都不够可靠，那我可能根本不想投资。
But if a handshake's not good enough, maybe I don't wanna invest.
所以我觉得，谈判的关键在于让双方真正理解对方的诉求，每个人都该觉得有所收获。
And so I think the key in a negotiation is making sure both sides really understand what's important to the other party, and everybody should walk away feeling like they got something.
我觉得，如果一方觉得占尽便宜，另一方却什么都没得到，这种谈判通常都搞不下去。
I think negotiations where one party feels like they got everything and the other side got nothing, those just generally don't work.
最后一点，要诚实。
And then the last one is be honest.
我见过太多次了，有顾问或者投行的人说，‘我们最低也要x，一分都不能少。’
I mean, how many times I've been in a situation where there's an adviser or there's a banker and they say, oh, we're not gonna do a deal for a penny less than, you know, x.
你只能回应，哦，这样啊。
And you're like, okay.
那既然这样，我就不参与了。
Well, you know, then I'm out.
结果两周后，你听说这笔交易以低得多的估值完成了。
And then you hear the deal get done at a substantially lower valuation two weeks later.
这其实对谁都没好处。
Well, that didn't serve anybody that well.
其实，我们本来是可以按那个价格谈成的。
Like, we might have done the deal at that price.
这家公司可能其实很希望我们成为他们的投资人。
The company might have wanted us as an investor.
所以我觉得，只要你坦诚、真实，并且真正努力去理解对方想要什么，这才是做好一场谈判的关键。
So I think if you're transparent, honest, and you really try hard to understand what the other person wants, I mean, I think that actually ends up being how a good negotiation gets done.
你提到要了解双方各自的需求，这点特别有意思。
It's really interesting you say about kind of knowing what each party wants.
前几天我请了Box Group的戴维·蒂施来做节目。
I had David Tisch on the show from Box Group the other day.
我听了那期节目。
I listened to it.
那场访谈真的很棒。
It's a great interview.
非常感谢。
Thank you so much.
他在节目中说，创业者其实不需要知道我的持股要求。
And he said in the episode, the entrepreneur doesn't need to know my ownership requirements.
他们根本不需要知道这个。
They don't need to know that.
而且，在最顶尖的公司里，这其实根本不重要。
And actually, if you're in the best companies, it doesn't matter.
所以这跟他们完全没关系，我想把这个从他们的考量中剔除掉。
And so that's nothing to do with them, and I wanna remove that from their place.
我对所有权这个点很感兴趣，因为对你和Box来说，现在所处的阶段很不一样。
I'm intrigued on that element of ownership because it's a very different stage also for you versus Box.
是的。
Yeah.
你觉得现在所有权有多重要？
How do you think about the importance of ownership today?
很多人说，现在市场大了十倍，所以我们没必要像以前那样追求所有权了。
A lot of people are going, well, markets are 10 x bigger, so we don't need the ownership that we did before.
德文，你今天投资时，怎么看待所有权的核心地位？
How do you think about the centrality of ownership when you're investing today, Deven?
一旦我们决定看好某个项目，就希望能尽可能多地持股。
Once we've decided we like something, we like to own as much as we can.
不过，这也有个门槛。
That being said, threshold.
我们并没有规定必须持有最低百分比。
We don't have a minimum percentage we have to own.
有些公司我们只占4%的股份，也有公司我们持股超过90%。
You know, we have companies where we own as little as 4%, and we have companies where we own north of 90%.
我们和别人不一样的一点是，你知道，我们还有并购业务，会通过杠杆收购实现完全控股。
And one of the things that's different about us is that we're willing to as you know, we also have, like, a buyout business where we do kind of full control transactions where we use leverage.
但不太为人所知的是，我们也会投资那些本质上属于风险投资类型的公司，只是现有股东因为各种原因想套现退出。
But I think what's less known is that we also do control deals where we're buying control of companies that you would define as a venture company, where a set of existing investors, for whatever set of reasons, wants to get liquidity.
我们看重的是公司未来的增长潜力。
And we're excited about the growth profile of the company.
它们不一定需要盈利。
They don't need to be profitable.
我们以控制权为导向。
We'll go by control.
我们持有的公司中，有70%到80%的公司，如果你只看利润表，会觉得这根本就是家初创企业。
So we own 7080% of companies that if I just showed you the income statement, you'd say, well, that looks like a venture company.
这看起来不像收购交易，你说得对。
That doesn't look like a buyout, and you'd be right.
我们也不会用任何杠杆。
And we wouldn't be using any leverage.
我们会全用股权来交易。
We would do an all kind of equity deal.
所以我们的思路是，一旦我们对某个项目有了信心，就尽可能多拿股份。
So we come at it as once we build conviction on something, we wanna own as much as we can.
但话说回来，如果你手里的资产每年增长100%，作为卖家，你可能会觉得卖80%不合算，因为价值涨得太快了。
That being said, if you've got an asset that's growing a 100% a year as a seller, you might decide that selling 80% of that doesn't make sense because the value is going up too quickly.
所以我们的态度是：只要能上股东名单就行。
So our view is, look, we'll get on the cap table.
如果你任何时候有兴趣出售更多股份，我们随时都在，也愿意继续增持，无论是二级市场交易，还是为公司注入新资本，甚至支持未来的并购交易。
And if at any time you're interested in selling more, we're here, and we're open to buy more, whether that be for secondary or whether that be for capital in the company or to potentially finance additional m and a.
我问个尖锐的问题啊，我之前接触过一些创始人，他们收到了Insight的报价，虽然很兴奋，但也担心一个信号风险——考虑到你们能跨阶段投资。
Can I ask a tough one, which is like, you know, I've spoken to founders before who have offers from Insight, and they say, one amazing, obviously, and very excited, but one concern is the signaling risk, given your ability to invest across stage?
万一你们不跟投下一轮，外界会怎么解读？
It's what if they don't invest next round, and how is that perceived?
你们是怎么正面回应这个问题的？
How do you advise and answer that question with the Insight head on?
实际情况是，市场已经说明了这一点，大卫在他的访谈里也提过。
The reality is the markets I think David talked about this in his interview.
对吧？
Right?
市场已经证明，这种信号风险其实没那么大。
I mean, the market has shown that the signaling risk is not that significant of a risk.
我们完全可能在早期投资一家公司，之后不参与下一轮，但这家公司依然能成功融到资。
That is entirely possible for us to invest in something earlier for us to not pursue the next round and for the company still to be able to raise capital.
就我们实际情况来看，这种情况很少发生。
As a practical matter in our case, it hasn't happened very often.
我们自己并不把自己当成早期基金。
We don't think of ourselves in early stage funds.
所以如果我们决定参与一个早期项目，那一定是很有信心的。
So if we're going into something on the earlier phase, we have pretty strong conviction.
通常当公司准备下一轮融资时，很少会出现那种情况：六个月前我还挺看好，现在却完全不看好了。
And generally, when the company is raising that next round, it's very rare that there's a sufficient amount of data where you're ready to say, oh, I liked it six months ago.
我之前喜欢，但现在真不看好。
I really don't like it now.
一般情况下，公司还是有进展的，只是还没到足以让我们决定不再支持的地步。
Generally, there's been progress, but there hasn't been enough progress for you or not progress for you to make the decision to not continue to support the company.
所以从理论上来讲，我来回答这个问题。
So I'll answer the question in a theoretical sense.
在更广泛的市场中，这其实并不是个大问题。
It hasn't proven to be a big issue in the market more broadly.
在我们的投资组合里，这根本不是什么大问题，因为我们很少会停止支持一家公司。
Certainly hasn't been that big an issue in our portfolio because it's not been very common for us to not continue to support the company.
说到支持公司，我们之前提过设备借用的事。
I mean, in terms of supporting the company, we mentioned gear checkout.
我还跟Vintage的托马斯聊过。
I also spoke to Thomas at Vintage.
在支持公司方面，你们在董事会里的作用显然非常关键。
One area where, obviously, you're very instrumental in supporting the companies is on boards.
你们现在已经担任过无数家公司的董事了。
You you've sat on countless boards now.
我很想听听你的看法。
I'd love your thoughts on me.
你如何看待自己在董事会中的风格？这些年有什么变化吗，德文？
How do you think about your style of board membership, and how has that changed over the years, Deven?
我还记得2002年左右我第一次加入董事会时的情景。
I still remember one of my first boards back in 2002 maybe.
我当时和我妻子在一起。
I was with my wife.
我们在为儿子看幼儿园，当然在纽约，这跟申请哈佛差不多紧张。
We're visiting schools for my son for pre kindergarten, which, of course, in New York is like you're applying to Harvard.
规矩是，面试时不能看手机。
And the rule is when you're going on your school interview, you can't look at your phone.
什么也不能做。
You can't do anything.
这时我接到那家我担任董事的公司CEO的电话，说CIO可能要辞职了。
And I got a call from the CEO of this company I was on the board of saying, I think CIO was quitting.
我记得清清楚楚。
I remember.
那种感觉我到现在都记得，毕竟那是我最早担任董事的公司之一。
I still remember the feeling I had because it's one of my first boards.
我当时觉得这下全完了。
I just thought it was a total disaster.
我当时整个人都崩溃了。
I was, like, emotionally just wrecked by this.
我老婆瞪着我，让我把手机收起来，我就照做了。
My wife was glaring at me saying to put my phone away, which I did.
幸运的是，我儿子被录取了。
Thankfully, my son got in.
你慢慢会明白，公司总有起起落落，不能被一时的波动牵着走。
And one of the things you realize is that companies have lots of ups and downs, and you can't get that affected by individual ups and downs.
早年我可能对负面消息反应过度，对好消息也一样反应过激。
So early on, I think I probably overreacted to the negative and probably overreacted to the positive.
所以这些年下来，我慢慢学会了对好坏消息都保持平和的心态。
So I think the biggest thing for all those years is you kinda get a little bit more even keeled about both bad news and good news.
你也会意识到，每家公司，哪怕最成功的，都会遇到坎坷。
And you realize every company, even the most successful company, is gonna have bumps.
通常你都能挺过去，而且对团队有信心。
You generally work through them, and you have confidence in your team.
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所以这是第一点。
So that's one.
第二点，刚开始的时候，你有时会忘记自己是董事会成员，而不是管理者。
Number two, I think when you're early on, you sometimes forget that you're a board member, you're not an operator.
你不是去管公司日常运营的。
You're not there to run the company.
你的角色是提供帮助。
You're there to help.
你的角色是提出不同意见。
You're there to be a devil's advocate.
你的角色是挑战现有的想法。
You're there to challenge thinking.
但归根结底，你是去支持管理团队的。
But at the end of the day, you're there to support the management team.
我觉得刚开始的时候，你太关注这笔交易能不能成，压力太大，不知不觉就插手运营了，因为你总觉得这事儿必须成功。
And I think early on, you're so focused on that deal working that you feel the pressure of that deal working that sometimes you go into the operating side unintentionally because you feel like this has to work.
而且随着做久了，你会明白这根本不是你的职责。
And I think as you do this longer, you realize that's really not your role.
顺便说一句，我只能代表我自己说。
By the way, you're probably not I'll speak for myself.
我没法通过告诉公司怎么运营来创造价值，但我能帮上忙，因为我见过太多类似的情况，能以挑刺的角度提醒他们：
I'm not gonna add value telling a company how to operate, but I think I can add value because a lot of pattern recognition of being a devil's advocate saying, hey.
这事儿在别的地方曾经成功过。
This has worked somewhere else.
也许你可以跟那家公司聊聊，或者该冒点更大的风险，又或者该收敛一点。
Maybe you wanna talk to this company, or maybe you should take a little bit more risk, or maybe you should take a little less risk.
所以我觉得，真正称职的董事会成员，就是在战略层面这样发挥作用。
And so I think kind of playing at that strategic level is really what I think a good board member does.
最后一点是，尽量聚焦在你真正能带来价值的地方。
And then the last thing is, you know, try to lean into the things where you can really add value.
刚开始时，大家总觉得自己必须对每件事都有看法。
I think there's a tendency early on to feel like you have to have an opinion on everything.
再说一遍，我只谈我自己的情况。
Again, I'll speak for myself.
那曾经是我的短板。
That was a weakness.
以前我觉得自己必须对每件事都有看法，但现在我不这么想了。
I felt like I had have an opinion on everything, and I don't feel that way anymore.
我知道自己能在哪些方面提供价值，就会主动去推动那些事。
I know the areas that I think I can add value, I push on those.
至于我帮不上忙的地方，还有其他董事和专家能比我能提供更大的价值。
And where I can't, there's other board members and other people who are gonna add more value than me.
我反过来想问一下，既然谈的是董事的角度，那作为创始人，你过去十年接触过不少顶尖的创始人，他们是怎么组织董事会会议的？
Can I ask on the flip side of that, if that's like the board member side, on the founder side, you've worked with some of the best founders over the last decade?
那些最出色的创始人，是怎么开好董事会的？
How do the very best founders run their board meetings?
从你的角度看，他们是怎么最大限度地利用好董事会的？
And I guess, what do they do to extract the most value from them from your perspective?
这真是
That's a
个好问题，因为我现在还参与很多董事会和董事会会议。
great question because I'm still on many boards and board meetings.
确实有些董事会会议是我很期待的。
There's still definitely board meetings I look forward to.
我现在就不点名具体公司了。
I won't name companies now.
也有一些董事会会议是我特别不想参加的。
And board meetings I really don't look forward to.
对我来说，那些我不愿参加的董事会会议，通常有个固定模式——我跟别人说，我喜欢闲暇时读历史，但我不喜欢听别人念历史。
And to me, the board meetings I don't look forward to, I talk about a profile of a board meeting, is kind of a recitation of What I say to people is I like to read history for fun, but I don't like people reading the history.
所以，在那些我能施加影响的董事会里，我已经把一次董事会拆成了两次独立的会议。
So the board meetings I enjoy the most, where I have enough influence to be able to do this, I've broken up the board meeting into two separate board meetings.
其中一次是45分钟的财务汇报，由CFO直接通报财务表现。
So one's a forty five minute financial overview of performance where the CFO just presents the financial performance.
大家有什么问题都可以提出来。
People have any questions they can ask.
然后是正式的董事会，财务表现只用一张幻灯片带过，剩下的时间主要讨论亮点和问题——哪些做得好，哪些没做好，通常会请一两个职能部门来汇报，让大家更深入了解管理团队的其他成员。
And then the main board meeting where there's one slide on financial performance, but then the rest of the meeting is really about highlights and lowlights, what's working, what's not working, generally having one or two functional areas come in and present so that you get better exposure to the rest of the management team.
接着就是CEO目前最关注的关键战略问题。
And then kinda what are the key strategic issues that the CEO is kinda focused on?
这些才是我最喜欢的董事会形式。
And those are my favorite board meetings.
我觉得董事会时间太长，容易变成念数据；而时间紧凑的会议，反而更能聚焦在真正重要的事情上。
I also think that long board meetings tend to lead to recitation of facts, and tighter board meetings tend to focus the conversation on the things that matter.
我经常在想，当你发现核心问题或担忧，尤其是涉及CEO或创始人的领导力时，很难判断是该在五位其他董事面前直接提出来，让CEO当众回应，还是该会后单独找他谈，比如‘德文，我注意到这个情况，我们得好好想想’。
One thing that I often think about is when you identify a core weakness or a core concern, especially related to the CEO or the founder's leadership, I'm never sure whether it's the right environment to air it openly in front of five other board members and really put the CEO on the spot or to take them aside at the end and say, hey, Deven, I noticed this, and we should think about this.
你觉得什么时候才是提出这些核心问题的合适时机？
How do you think about when's the right time to add those core concerns?
毕竟，你也希望借助在场每个人的智慧。
Because you do also wanna get the benefit of the wisdom of the people in the room.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得这还得看具体情况。
And I think it depends a little bit on kinda what it is.
对吧？
Right?
比如说，我觉得我们的营销策略在这儿根本行不通。
I mean, I think if it's something around I don't feel like our marketing strategy is really working here.
我只是举个例子。
I'm just using an example.
是的。
Yeah.
这种情况下，我们能听到更多不同角度的反馈，公开讨论往往更有价值。
That's something we're getting broader kind of feedback where somebody else might have a different view and really airing it out probably has value.
但更敏感的是，当你觉得高管团队里有人没做好本职工作，或者对CEO处理某件事的方式有疑虑的时候。
I think where it gets more sensitive is when you think there's a member of the senior management team that maybe is not working as a direct report of the CEO, or you have a challenge with the way the CEO might be handling something.
我觉得这类对话更适合一对一进行。
I think those conversations are better had one on one.
人们往往只从自己的角度去想问题。
I think people tend to just think about ourselves.
当着五个人的面被批评，我们容易变得防御性很强；但要是单独聊，我们通常就没那么抵触了——至少我是这样。
We tend to be defensive when people critique us in front of five people, and we tend to be less defensive when people talk to us kind of one on one, at least I do.
所以我发现，一对一的交流更容易带来建设性的结果，大家也更愿意敞开心扉。
And so I find that those conversations are much more kind of constructive, and people are more open in a kind of one on one type conversation.
说到董事会的时间安排，我想聊聊在投资组合中如何分配时间。按传统观念，你肯定会把所有精力都放在表现好的项目上，毕竟这才是回报的来源，而表现差的公司，为了优化基金业绩，干脆少花时间。
Speaking of the time on the board there, I do wanna touch on time allocation across the portfolio because like traditional thinking would suggest, hey, you spend all your time with the winners, that's what drives the returns, and bluntly, you minimize time on underperforming companies just in terms of how you're gonna optimize fund performance.
你是怎么看待在投资组合中分配时间的？
How do you think about time allocation across portfolio?
这二十一年来，有没有什么特别重要的经验教训？
Have there been any big lessons for you from the twenty one years now?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，你忽略了其中一个类别，就是那些明显的赢家。
I mean, you missed the category, which is that you've got clear winners.
还有中间那一部分，对基金表现很重要，再就是那些可能只回本甚至亏钱的项目。
You've got the middle, which are meaningful for the fund performance, and then you've got the ones that are gonna return capital or potentially lose money.
那人们该怎么分配时间呢？
How should people allocate?
如果你说，我是个机器人，我要完全以最大化基金回报的方式来分配时间。
If you said, I'm a robot, and I'm gonna allocate my time in a way that totally optimizes fund returns.
实际上，你几乎不用花时间在赢家身上。
Actually, you spend almost no time with the winners.
市场表现很好。
The market's great.
管理层也很出色。
The management's great.
你只需要当个啦啦队就行了。
You're a cheerleader.
你觉得自己在创造价值，其实没你想象的那么多。
You're not adding as much value as you think you are.
至于中间那部分，你其实是有能力影响结果的。
The middle, you actually probably can influence the outcome.
可能需要调整一下策略。
Maybe it requires making some changes in the strategy.
也许得换掉管理层，但总归是有办法影响这个结果的。
Maybe it requires upgrading management team, but there are probably ways that you can influence that outcome.
所以，花点真正有意义的时间在中间这部分，是合理的。
So spending some meaningful time in the middle actually makes sense.
至于那些能回本的或者亏钱的项目，几乎不用花时间。
And then spending almost no time on the capital returners or the losers.
这才是一个高效机器该分配时间的方式。
That's how an optimized machine would spend their time.
我没见过真有人这么做事，我自己也做不到。
I don't know of anybody who's actually spends their time that way, and I certainly don't.
为什么？
Why?
一方面，花时间陪伴成功的公司，比做心理咨询便宜多了。
Well, one, spending time with winners is a lot cheaper than therapy.
我们花很多时间去寻找公司。
We spend a lot of time looking for companies.
即使你没带来多少实际价值，和表现优秀的公司在一起也让人感觉很好，我认识的投资者没有一个不愿意多陪陪自己的赢家，哪怕他们没做什么贡献。
It feels good to be around companies that are doing great even if you're not adding a lot of value, and I don't know a single investor who doesn't wanna spend time with their winners even if they're not adding value.
我们可能没花足够的时间在中间层的公司上，反而花了太多时间在最差的那些公司上。
We probably don't spend enough time with the middle, and we end up spending a lot of time with the bottom.
虽然从理论或假设的角度看，这种时间分配并不合理，但我也不确定自己会不会彻底改变这种做法。
So while that's not theoretically or hypothetically the right allocation of time, I'm not sure I would radically change it.
所以，就第二个描述而言，这大概就是我的真实状态。
So that's probably where I am in the second description.
我会强迫自己多花点时间在中间层——也就是大多数公司身上。
I do force myself to spend more time, call it, in the middle, which is the bulk of the companies.
但那些处于底部的公司，我觉得创业者为了筹到这笔资金、打入这个市场，已经拼尽全力了。
But the bottom, I feel like entrepreneurs have killed themselves to raise this capital, to go after this market.
一方面，可能是个人自尊心作祟，不想认输；另一方面，就是实在不忍心丢下他们不管。
And partially, it's probably personal ego of not wanting to lose, but also, like, just feeling like you can't really abandon somebody.
如果你从长远来看，我不是说大家应该把 disproportionate 的时间花在那里，但我想，当你希望被长期记住时，你更希望别人说，遇到困难时，你没有袖手旁观。
I think if you think about this from a long term perspective and I'm not saying people should spend a disproportionate time there, But I think, you know, when you wanna be referenced long term, I think you wanna be referenced as somebody who, when there was a problem, you didn't advantage yet.
当然，你完全可以合理安排时间，不至于在那些公司身上耗太多精力。
I think there's a way to manage your time, obviously, and not spend a crazy amount of time there.
但我觉得自己永远都不会走到那一步，觉得‘这明显是个没戏的项目’，就彻底不管了。
But I don't think I'll ever get to the point where I'm like, oh, well, that's clearly not a deal that's working.
我不会完全不搭理的。
I'm not gonna spend any time.
我想问一下，那些表现没那么好的公司，你怎么看？
Can I ask the speaking of those companies that maybe don't perform as well?
我得问一下，希望这问题不会太私人。
I do have to ask this, and I hope it's not too personal.
但你知道的，二十一年了，取得了巨大的成功。
But, you know, twenty one years, huge successes.
你几乎什么场面都见过了。
There's very little that you haven't seen.
当你想想，比如，你自己的
When you think about, like, your
内心深处的不安全感和自我怀疑，我觉得有个词能形容。
own insecurities and self doubts today I think there's a term.
对吧？
Right?
不安全感驱动的高成就者。
Insecure overachiever.
我 definitely 属于这一类。
I definitely go into that bucket.
我的意思是，说实话，我总在担心，我还能不能再找到那些表现特别出色的公司？
I mean, look, I think that I constantly am worried about am I gonna be able to still find companies that are gonna perform really, really well?
你想提高网球水平，就得跟比你强的人打。
And look, when you wanna learn how to get better at tennis, you play with people who are better than you.
我觉得Insight的一大优势就是，我的所有合伙人都是顶尖的投资人。
And I think one of the great things about Insight, all my partners are amazing investors.
这里有很多人一直在做超棒的交易，我总觉得自己得拼命跟上他们的步伐。
And it's a firm where there's so many people who are doing amazing deals, and I constantly feel the pressure to keep up with them.
我觉得这其实是件好事。
I think that's a healthy thing.
真的挺好的。
It's a good thing.
但说实话，这确实让我不敢松懈，因为我会想，好吧。
But I think that it definitely keeps me on my toes because I feel like, okay.
杰夫·沃伦刚把一家公司推上市，估值高得吓人，杰夫·利伯曼又刚卖掉一个项目，我得赶紧找一个不输他们的才行。
Well, Jeff Warren just took that one public at this massive valuation, and Jeff Lieberman just sold this thing, and, like, I gotta find something just as good.
我跟其他基金里一些特别有名的人聊过，虽然不方便点名，但确实聊过。
And I think that I've talked I won't name people, but I've talked to people at other funds who are really well known names.
我的意思是，有很多比我有名得多的人，也都在担心自己能不能跟得上。
I mean, way better known names than me who have the same concern about can they keep up?
他们能不能持续找到好项目？
Can they continue to find great deals?
这真不是件容易的事。
It's not easy to do.
对吧？
Right?
所以我们大家都得拼命干。
So we all have to work hard.
我看看。
I look.
虽然这种压力并不舒服，但我觉得，也正因如此，才让人有动力，一直往前冲。
I think that being said, while it's not a great feeling to have that feeling, I also think it is the thing that keeps you going and keeps you motivated and keeps you working hard.
完全对。
Totally.
确实能让人保持动力。
It does keep you going.
你提到杰夫把公司送上股市，还有你和你们公司那些了不起的成功案例，我们都清楚。
You mentioned that, you know, Jeff taking companies public and, you know, as we mentioned, some of the amazing successes you and the firm have had.
我一直以来特别想知道的是，你们怎么避免过去的成功或失败影响未来的决策？
One big question I always have is, like, how do you prevent past successes or failures impacting your future decision making?
而且你们投过这么多IPO，某个行业或领域自然会显得更有吸引力，毕竟你们亲眼见过它能有多出色。
And I guess with the many IPOs that you've had, a certain space or vertical can inherently seem more attractive than others because you've seen how good it can be.
你们怎么确保过去的经验不会左右未来的判断？
How do you prevent past impacting future decision making?
举个例子，如果你参加了我们合伙人的会议，或者这周早些时候我们第一次在户外吃了一顿投资委员会的午餐，你绝对不会有‘这些人真会庆祝’这种感觉。
Well, for one, if you sat in on our partners meetings or we had a first in person outdoor lunch, I guess, of our investment committee earlier this week, you would not come out of lunch feeling like, boy, these guys know how to celebrate.
我们花在自我反思上的时间，远多于庆祝。我们总在想：那些错过的项目，为什么没早点关注那个领域？为什么不够激进？为什么看到机会却没出手？
We spend way more of our time beating ourselves up on the things that we missed and why didn't we look at that area or are we not being aggressive enough in that area or why didn't we do that deal when we saw it.
所以我觉得最重要的是，永远要把注意力放在还能改进的地方，而不是沉溺于过去的成就。
So I think the first thing is you constantly have to focus on the things you can do better rather than celebrating the successes.
我可以告诉你，这完全是我们文化的体现。
I can tell you that's very much of our culture.
每当一笔交易公布，邮件里都会讨论，我们有没有认真看这个项目？
And there's emails that go around when a deal gets announced, and and we talk about, do we look at it?
我们有没有花足够的时间去研究？
Do we spend enough time on it?
谁对这个项目感兴趣？
Who want it?
他们看到了什么，是我们没注意到的？
What did they see that we didn't see?
我们经常这么做。
We do a lot of that.
所以我觉得，这背后反映的是我们的文化是什么。
And so I think that part of it is what's the culture?
每个人都热爱自己的工作，也都非常渴望成功。
Everybody loves what they do, and everybody really wants to win.
如果你去问任何一位竞技运动员，他们会怎么做？
If you talk to anyone who's a competitive athlete, what do they do?
他们会反复观看对手的比赛录像。
They watch videos of their competition.
观察对手在做什么。
They see what the competition's doing.
从中学习对方的技巧和策略。
They try to learn from what they're doing.
他们该怎么应对这样的对手？
How are they gonna compete against that?
我们也是这么做的。
That's what we do.
我们当然不会看录像，但花大量时间研究别人在做什么，从中汲取经验。
We don't watch videos, obviously, but we spend a lot of time studying what others are doing and where we can learn from it.
当公司规模扩大时，即使你本意是让想法本身说了算，等级结构也会自然形成，不同人的意见也会有轻重之分。
When firms scale, inherently, even if you want by a meritocracy of ideas, hierarchies are created and people have different weights of words.
我觉得，你说的话分量真的很重。
I think, you know, the weight of your words are very impactful.
你怎么确保每个人都能感到安全，哪怕是个分析师，也能直接说，德文，我觉得你这次搞错了，我们漏掉了什么。
How do you ensure that everyone feels a safe space where even an analyst can say, hey, Deven, I think you're wrong on this one and we've missed out.
你怎么看待营造这种安全的氛围，避免某些人的话显得太有压倒性？
How do you think about creating that environment of safety and preventing words being too heavy from certain people?
你看啊。
Look.
公司越大，这事儿就越难办。
It gets harder and harder as the firm gets kind of bigger and bigger.
但我可以告诉你我怎么做。
But I'll tell you what I do.
当我处理一个项目时，通常会有一支团队一起参与，包括我们现场的同事。
And so when I'm working on a deal, we have a team generally of people who are working on it, people from our on-site team.
很多人可能不太了解，我们公司的工作方式其实非常注重团队协作。
I think people don't always understand that, like, our firm, the way it works is really a team based approach.
当我们评估一项新投资时，投资团队的成员都会参与进来。
So when we're looking at a new investment, there's members of the investment team.
我们还有现场团队，也就是我们的咨询和运营团队，大家一起共同完成尽职调查。
We have our on-site team, which is kind of our consulting slash operations team, and we all do that diligence process together.
在决定是否推进之前，我们通常会开个会，讨论尽职调查的结果。
We generally have a meeting before we decide whether we're gonna do something where we kinda talk about the diligence findings.
我的做法是，让资历最浅的人先发言，然后依次往上，而不是从最资深的人开始。
And my approach on those is always to start with the most junior person and go to the most senior person as opposed to start with the most senior person and go the other way.
也就是说，让新人先开口。
I mean, you have the most junior person speak first.
他们不太愿意第一个发言，因为不清楚其他人会怎么想。
Now they don't like to be the first person to speak because they don't know where the rest of the room is.
但我觉得这特别重要，因为如果我或者别的资深同事一上来就说‘这项目太棒了’，他们可能会觉得自己的顾虑没人听，或者发现了什么潜在问题不敢说。
But I think it's really important because if I or another senior person says, love this deal or this deal is great, they might think they hate the deal or there's something they found in diligence that they're concerned about.
所以得让新人先说，确保他们能畅所欲言，而且很多时候，这些客户访谈都是他们做的。
So you kinda need to let the junior folks speak first so that you make sure that they're able to and oftentimes, they might have done the customer calls.
他们可能还做了背景调查。
They might have done the references.
他们可能做了些非常关键的基础工作，你得确保能听到这些意见。
They might have done some really, really important fundamental work, and you wanna make sure that you kinda hear that.
我们刚才在谈节奏的时候也提到过这个。
We were talking about this earlier with respect to pace.
在决策方面，节奏变得越来越快了。
You know, with the decision making, pace has gotten so quick.
要建立流程来确保获取这些信息并融入决策，越来越难了。
It's harder and harder to create processes to make sure that you get that data and you kind of incorporate it into your decision.
听我说。
Listen.
我很赞同让他们先发言的做法。
I love that in terms of them speaking first.
这让我想起安妮·杜克在节目里提到的《思考的边界》。
It reminds me of Annie Duke on the show who wrote Thinking in Back.
她建议所有独立贡献者都提前写下自己的想法。
She suggested that all ICs are done where you essentially actually document your thoughts beforehand.
前一天晚上，把你的所有观点写下来，然后提交上去。
So the night before, you write out all your opinions, and then you submit them.
这样就不会被外界观点影响，能进行最纯粹的讨论，我觉得这个方法特别好。
And then no one is impacted by external perspectives, and you have the most pure conversations, which I really liked as a method.
不过我想转到我最喜欢的环节了，德文，就是快问快答。
I do wanna move into my favorite though, Deven, which is the quick fire round.
我会说一句简短的话，你马上说出你的第一反应。
So I say a short statement, and you give me your immediate thoughts.
这样可以吗？
Does that sound okay?
可以。
Sounds
太好了。
great.
好的。
Okay.
那你最喜欢的书是哪一本？为什么？
So what's the favorite book and why?
我读得特别广。
I read really, really, really widely.
你看，我们正坐在我这儿的书堆里。
You can we're sitting in my kinda library here.
所以没有哪一本是我最喜欢的。
So I don't have a favorite.
举个例子吧，让你看看我平时读的东西有多杂，我最近读完的三本书。
Just as an example, just to show you the randomness of what I read, the last three books I read.
一本是凯里·艾曼纽尔写的《我们对气候变化的了解》，他是麻省理工的教授，因为我总觉得这方面的知识我懂得太少。
One is what we know about climate change by Kerry Emanuel, who's like a professor at MIT, because I don't feel like it's a topic I know enough about.
这本书有点科学背景，但特别棒，只有五十页，谁都花不了多久就能读完，能把这个话题讲得特别清楚。
It's got a little bit of a scientific tilt, but it's great because it's 50 pages, so anybody can read it really quickly, and it's a great summary of the topic.
在那之前，我读过一本叫《鳗鱼之书》的书。
Before that, I read a book called the book of eels.
对。
Yes.
鳗鱼，就是那种鱼。
Eels as in the fish.
顺便说一下，这本书是畅销书，讲的是鳗鱼的历史，特别有意思，还涉及作者和他父亲的关系。
By the way, it's a bestseller, and it's a book about the history of eels, which is fascinating, by the way, as well as the relationship with the author and his father.
我现在正在读的是一本叫《写作的过程》的书，作者是约翰·麦卡菲，他为《纽约客》写了三十年，书里谈的是他自己怎么写作。
And then the one I'm reading right now is a book called On the Writing Process by John McAfee, who's been a thirty year writer at The New Yorker, and he's just talking about his process of how he writes.
我觉得写作是一项被严重低估的技能，我一直在努力提升自己的写作能力。
And I think writing is such an underrated skill, constantly trying to improve how I write.
这本书真的很吸引人。
And so it's a fascinating book.
这三本就是我最近读的书。
Those are the last three books.
所以我读的书挺广的，题材也特别多样。
So I read pretty widely, and I read on pretty eclectic topics.
听我说。
Listen.
那本关于气候变化的书我没读过，这倒挺好。
I have not read the climate change book, so I think that's great.
卖出了五十页。
50 pages sold.
那本关于写作的书我真想读一读。
Book of writing, totally wanna read that.
你居然读一本关于鳗鱼的书，我都想让你来伦敦，跟我喝杯浓缩马提尼了。
The fact that you're reading a book on eels makes me think you should come to London and have an espresso martini with me.
这事咱们以后再定，德文。
We'll resolve that in time, Deven.
说真的，从外表上看，你拥有了人人都想要的一切。
Tell me, you know, on appearance, you achieve, you know, everything that one would want to.
Deven，今天是什么让你有动力呢？
What motivates you today, Deven?
我就特别喜欢学习新东西。
I just love to learn.
我的意思是，这又回到第一个话题了。
Mean, that goes back to topic one.
我们俩所在的这个行业最棒的地方，就是总会有新的东西等着你去了解。
The beauty of this business that we're both in is there's always a new thing to learn about.
总会有新的主题冒出来，不管你干了多久，完全不重要。
There's always a new topic to learn about, and how long you've been doing it is totally irrelevant.
Insight里最懂加密货币的人，才二十五岁。
The smartest person about cryptocurrency at Insight, twenty five.
如果我想搞懂它，就得从最基础的开始，像自己才二十五岁那样重新学一遍。
And if I wanna learn about it, I have to go back to first principles and learn it as if I'm 25 too.
我就特别喜欢这样。
And I love that.
这正是让我有动力的原因。
That's what motivates me.
你最常想起的座右铭或名言是什么？
What motto or quote do you most frequently revert back to?
这个很简单。
It's an easy one.
凡是值得拥有的东西，都不会轻易得到。
It's nothing worth having comes easy.
我有两个孩子，一个18岁，一个21岁，我经常跟他们这么说。
And, you know, I've got kids, 18 and 21, and I tell them that.
我觉得这对创业者来说也是一样。
I think it's true for founders.
我觉得对我自己也是如此。
I think it's true for myself.
我们现在所处的世界，人人都觉得事情发生得特别快。
I think we're in this world right now where everybody feels like things happen really quickly.
我觉得我听过你的一期节目，可能是你第一次谈障碍，说那是一段长达十年的艰辛历程。
I think I listened to your one of your episodes, maybe his first round talking about roadblocks and how that was a ten year fast journey.
但大家都只看到结果。
And everybody sees the end.
人们总说，Insight，你们真成功啊。
And, people say, oh, Insight, you're so successful.
他们忘了杰夫·沃伦和杰里·默多克，当年开着房车到处奔波，只为筹到三千万美元。
You know, they forget Jeff Warren and Jerry Murdock, like, in a station wagon running around trying to raise $30,000,000.
如果没有那段经历，今天就不会有现在的Insight。
And without that, it wouldn't be what it is today.
所以我觉得，只要值得拥有，就得拼命去争取，不可能轻而易举。
So I think if it's worth having, you gotta work at it, and it's not gonna come easy.
现在这个时代，人们总以为事情会顺顺利利，但其实往往不是这样。
And I think there's a tendency in today's world to think that things are gonna come easily, but they generally don't.
完全正确。
Absolutely.
克里斯管这叫慢火炖煮。
Chris called it the slow bake.
但跟我说说，现在对Insight来说，最大的挑战是什么？
But tell me, what's the biggest challenge for you today with Insight?
我觉得是不断的自我重塑。
I think it's a constant reinvention.
你刚才提到像泰格现在在做的事。
You talked earlier about, like, say, what Tiger's doing.
五年后，可能就是别人、别的东西，或者市场出现了新的变化。
And, you know, five years from now, it'll be somebody else or something else or a different market shift.
我觉得关键是要持续调整我们的业务，去适应市场的机会。
And I think it's continuing to evolve our business to the market opportunity.
到目前为止，我们在这方面做得还算不错，但市场变化得越来越快，我们必须跟上节奏，同时——这一点特别重要——要保持我们原有的创业文化。
And I think we've done a reasonable job on that so far, but the markets are changing faster and faster and making sure that we continue to change as fast and while maintaining, and this is really important, the entrepreneurial culture that we have.
我觉得这可能是最大的挑战。
And I think that's probably the biggest challenge.
你现在明白了哪些事，是希望刚入行时就能知道的？
What do you know now that you wish you'd known at the start of your career and venture?
你永远不可能得到确切的答案。
That you're never gonna know the answer.
我总觉得只要足够努力，就能做到百分之百确定。
I mean, I think there's a tendency to feel like with diligence, you can get to a 100%.
根本不存在百分之百这回事。
There is no 100%.
我们刚才还聊到，要听取别人的意见。
And we were talking earlier about getting people's opinions.
我跟团队成员谈项目时，最喜欢问的一句话是：你现在会把钱打出去吗？
One of my favorite things I do when I'm talking to people on my team and we're looking at a deal is I say, well, would you wire the money today?
他们就会说：还没做客户调研呢。
And they're like, well, we haven't really done the customer calls yet.
我说：对，就是这样。
I'm like, right.
我不是说我们今天就要打款。
I'm not we're not gonna wire the money today.
我只是想知道，你今天会打款吗？
I just wanna know, would you wire the money today?
如果再多一些信息，你会怎么做？
With additional information, what would you do?
很多人都讨厌这个问题，但我最喜欢问这个，因为它逼着你去想：好吧。
And people hate that question, and it's my favorite question because it forces you to think of, okay.
我们手头的信息够不够做决定？
Do we have enough information to make the decision?
因为我们永远不可能掌握全部信息，总可以再做五个客户访谈。
Because we're never gonna have we could always do another five customer calls.
总可以再找五名员工聊聊，但到了某个点，回报就开始递减了。
We could always talk to five more employees, but at some point, you get to diminishing returns.
这算80%了吗？
Is that 80%?
是70%吗？
Is it 70%?
是60%吗？
Is it 60%?
我不确定。
I don't know.
但教会人们在信息不完整的情况下，根据现有信息做决策——包括我自己在内——我觉得这特别重要。
But training people to think about making decisions with the information that you have when the information is not complete, including myself, by the way, is, I think, really important.
我得问一下这个。
I have to ask this one.
你刚才说的太多了。
You just gave me too much there.
你怎么能在数据不完整的情况下，安心做出快速决策？
How do you get comfortable with making fast decisions with imperfect data?
你怎么才能对这件事感到安心？
How do you get comfortable with that?
第二个问题是，人们有多少次会毫不犹豫地说：‘今天就投了！’
And the second one is like, how often do people go, hell yeah, I'd wire today?
还不够多。
Not often enough.
其实，要习惯快速做决定，关键在于不断回顾那些曾经成功的案例，看看它们有哪些共同点，然后判断当前这个项目是否也具备足够多的这些共同点，值得下注。
And the reality is that how do you get comfortable with quick decisions is I think you just start thinking more and more about the history of what were the common themes about things that have worked, and are enough of those common themes in this deal to take the bet.
你还要靠投资规模来自然控制风险。
You also have built in risk mitigation, which is investment size.
比如Insight的一个优势是，虽然我们的基金规模扩大了十倍，但中位数单笔投资金额只增长了40%左右。
Like, one of the beauties of Insight is even though we have this really large fund, while our fund has gone up whatever it is 10 times, our median deal size has gone up, like, 40%.
所以我们能通过减少单笔投资金额，自然地降低风险。
And so we have the natural ability to risk mitigate by just writing a smaller check.
所以我觉得最重要的是聚焦在核心逻辑上，搞清楚支撑这个逻辑到底需要哪些关键事实。
And so I think that it's really, really trying to focus on what's the core thesis and what are the real facts that we need to know the core thesis.
问题是，你总能找到更多数据。
The problem is there's there's always a way to get more information.
顺便说一句，如果你是在问我们是不是已经做到完美了，那肯定还没。
And by the way, I don't think we're if you're asking whether or not we've perfected it, we definitely haven't.
顺便提一下，我觉得老虎基金在这方面确实值得肯定。
By the way, this is something I think the Tigers credit.
我觉得他们做得不错。
I think they do well.
我觉得他们更倾向于从宏观层面押注某个市场。
I mean, I think they take more of a kind of a macro bet on a market.
他们做很多自外向内的分析，先判断宏观趋势是否看好，再看这家公司的市场地位，然后才下注。
They do a lot of outside in work, and they decide that they like the macro and they like what that company's market position in as they take the bet.
是的。
Yeah.
我覺得誰都挑不出他們在決策速度上的毛病。
I don't think anyone could fault them for speed of decision making.
沒錯。
Correct.
好的。
Okay.
我们当时毫不犹豫地答应了，让资金留下来。
We said the the hell yeah to the would you mind the money stay.
你最近一次拍板决定投资的是哪家公司？为什么你当时觉得非做不可？
What was the most recent hell yeah that you made and then obviously subsequently made the investment on, and why did you feel the hell yeah?
我最近投的一家是叫TetraScience的公司。
The most recent one that I've done is a company called TetraScience.
如果说Veeva之于Snowflake是这样，那TetraScience之于Snowflake也是类似的关系。
TetraScience, if you think about Veeva is to snowflake, TetraScience would be to snowflake.
它专注在生命科学领域的垂直化数据服务。
So it's kind of verticalized data around the life sciences category.
我觉得未来十年到二十年，生命科学、生物技术和制药行业会经历类似的高速增长，甚至可能比科技行业更明显。
If you think about a category that I think is gonna have the same type of growth over the next ten to twenty years and has had the same type, if not more Moore's Law effects, it's life sciences, biotech, pharma.
想想我们多快就研发出了新冠疫苗。
Mean, think about how quickly we got a vaccine.
十几年前根本没法想象会这样。
Couldn't imagine that ten or fifteen years ago.
所以我觉得这个行业将迎来前所未有的创新。
And so I think that industry is going to see just an incredible amount of innovation.
我觉得TetraScience是这个领域里最令人兴奋的软件投资之一。
And I think TetraScience is one of the more exciting software bets around that category.
作为一家公司，我们大概在制药和生命科学行业的不同软件应用和不同环节上做了七八个投资。
But as a firm, we've probably made seven or eight different bets around different software applications, different layers of the pharma life sciences industry.
德文，今天和你聊得太开心了，真的非常感谢你抽出时间。
Deven, been so much fun doing this, and I just can't thank you enough for giving up your time today.
谢谢。
Thank you.
我特别喜欢刚才的讨论。
I just love that discussion.
非常感谢你，德文，对我的那些天马行空的问题这么坦诚回应。
Wanna say huge thank you, Deven, for being so open with my very wayward questions.
如果你想更多了解我们的幕后内容，可以去20minutevc.com看看。
If you'd like to see more from us behind the scenes, you can, of course, on the 20minutevc.com.
我总是特别期待在那儿见到你。
I always love to see you there.
但在我们结束之前
But before we leave
今天
you today,
你知道吗？美国上市公司超过80%的股票，其实只掌握在10%的美国人手里。
did you know that more than 80% of US public stock is owned by just 10 of Americans?
在私募市场，这种差距甚至更大。
This divide is even greater in the private markets.
Carter让给员工发放股权变得和发工资一样简单。
Carter makes it as easy to issue equity to your employees as it is to issue payroll.
对员工来说，接受股权也同样方便。
And for employees, as easy to accept it too.
超过一万六千家公司通过Carter向员工发放股权，无论你是刚刚起步，还是准备上市，Carter的团队都能帮你搞定。
More than 16,000 companies issue equity to their employees through Whether you're just getting started or getting ready to go public, the team at can help.
访问.com了解更多信息。
Check them out at .com.
接下来我要介绍的另一个绝佳产品是Secure Frame。
And then another incredible product you have to introduce is Secure Frame.
Secure Frame帮助公司快速达到企业级标准，简化SOC 2和ISO 27001的合规流程。
Secure Frame helps companies get enterprise ready by streamlining SOC two and ISO 27,001 compliance.
使用Secure Frame，公司几周内就能完成合规，而不用再经历漫长而痛苦的几个月。
Secure Frame allows companies to get compliant within weeks rather than the painful months that is today.
像Stream、Hasura、Benepass这样的公司都在用Secure Frame，你也来试试，轻松提升销售机会。
Join companies like Stream, Hasura, Benepass, and unlock more sales with Secure Frame.
20 VC的听众在secureframe.com/20VC使用专属码，还能享受九折优惠。
And 20 VC listeners get 10% off at secureframe.com forward slash 20 VC.
最后，我一直对历史特别感兴趣，所以想聊聊Cooley这家专注于初创企业和风险投资的全球律所。
And finally, I've always been a big history fan, so I wanna talk about Cooley, the global law firm built around startups and venture capital.
自创立硅谷首个风险投资基金以来，Cooley所管理的风险投资基金数量已超过全球任何其他律所，服务创投行业超过五十年。
Since forming the very first venture fund in Silicon Valley, Cooley's formed more venture capital funds than any other law firm in the world with fifty plus years working with VCs.
他们帮助风投机构设立和管理基金、进行投资，并处理基金生命周期中出现的各类复杂问题。
They help VCs form and manage funds, make investments, and handle the myriad of issues that arise throughout a fund's lifetime.
想了解更多关于全球最活跃的、为风投支持的上市公司提供法律服务的律所？请访问 cooley.com，也别忘了看看 cooleygo.com。
So to learn more about the number one most active law firm representing VC backed companies going public, head over to cooley.com and also check out cooleygo.com.
一如既往，非常感谢你们的支持，我已迫不及待要为你们带来下一周的精彩节目了。
As always, I so appreciate all your support, and I can't wait to bring you a fantastic set of episodes next week.
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